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R
E S E A R C H
Kyle Beardsley
Department of Political Science, Emory University
Abstract
This article examines the effect of UN actions on the duration of international crises. Four different types of action
assurance, diplomatic engagement, military involvement, and intimidation and three different outcomes
compromise, victory, and stalemate are considered. After building on the existing literature to develop expectations of how a third party like the UN shapes crisis trajectories, hypotheses are tested using the International Crisis
Behavior (ICB) data and a new events dataset on UN activity. Results from competing-risks models reveal that UN
military involvement does well to decrease the risk of one side achieving victory, and diplomatic engagement
increases the ability of the belligerents to reach a compromise in the long run. Moreover, diplomatic engagement
accompanied by military involvement substantially hastens the pace of stalemate outcomes. Both tactics, however,
have some trade-offs. Military involvement can decrease the sense of urgency for compromise; diplomatic engagement can be used for insincere motives and increase the risk of one-sided victory over time. UN actions of assurance and simple intimidation have considerable shortcomings as crisis management vehicles.
Keywords
conflict resolution, event history, International Crisis Behavior, matching, United Nations
Introduction
The literature on the relationship between the UN and
conflict predominantly has focused on its role as peacekeeper. While much is known quantitatively about the
effects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Collier,
Chauvet & Hegre, 2008; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000,
2006; Greig & Diehl, 2005; Fortna, 2003, 2004a,b; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2006), less is known about how the
UN performs as a conflict manager or peacemaker.1 This
article explores the UNs impact on the duration of crises
and posits that different types of UN action have disparate effects on the timing of crisis abatement.
The existing literature presents competing expectations of what types of third-party tactics are most effective in conflict management and resolution. While
some work expects only heavy-handed tactics to have the
1
See Favretto (2009) and Svensson (2007) for studies that consider
the different benefits of lighter and heavy-handed mediation.
336
Beardsley
337
Operational deployment
Yes
No
UN intervention
Types of involvement
To form expectations about what effect the UN can have
on crisis duration, we must first get a sense of what types
of action the UN might take. The UN has a number of
means available for managing conflict. For the purpose
of limiting the scope of activities, this article focuses on
those activities that involve Security Council or General
Assembly resolutions or substantive action by the
Secretary-General. I consider two dimensions of UN
involvement, which produce four distinct types of UN
actions. The first dimension relates to the intended
mechanism of that action as defined by whether the
UN is trying to facilitate a negotiated bargain within the
existing set of possible agreements that are mutually preferable to conflict or to increase the costs of conflict and
thereby expand the set of possible agreements. When a
third party attempts to expand the set of existing settlements through such actions as threatening punishments,
shaming or militarily enforcing its will, we can say that the
No
Yes
Assurance
Diplomatic engagement
Military involvement
Intimidate
338
expectations that then emerges is that impartial diplomatic engagement, such as that by the Secretary General or a special envoy, can have the potential to
effectively manage conflict toward compromise. A
number of empirical studies have also shown that diplomatic engagement in the form of mediation can
improve the ability for the actors to either reach a new
arrangement or to back down from military hostilities.
Beardsley (2008, 2011), Beardsley et al. (2006), Regan
& Stam (2000), Wilkenfeld et al. (2005), and Walter
(2002) have shown that mediation can improve the
ability for disputants to reach a negotiated settlement.
Rauchhaus (2006) shows that third parties who use
light mediation can improve the ability of actors to
de-escalate, and coercive intervention has no significant
effect. The first hypothesis that we can test is that diplomatic engagement will tend to hasten the path
toward compromise.
Efficacious bargaining hypothesis: The time until compromise will be shorter after the UN has become involved
in diplomatic engagement.
Beardsley
339
Other scholarship has pointed to more direct downsides to third-party diplomatic engagement. One line
6
These studies, however, focus on how the military involvement and
assurance roles played by third parties can increase the durability of
peace after conflict and not whether they improve the ease and
pace of settlement.
340
Also see earlier work by Snyder (1984), who considers how thirdparty commitments can prove precarious in affecting the incentives
of the combatants.
Beardsley
341
10
342
Beardsley
343
16
344
Table II. Multinomial logit models of crisis outcomes after coarsened exact matching
Victory
0.221 (0.365)
25.09** (5.046)
24.98** (4.945)
2.056** (0.528)
7.564* (3.928)
9.903** (4.101)
0.493 (0.720)
7.639 (7.502)
10.99 (7.125)
0.0810 (0.109)
4.369 (4.843)
4.680 (4.933)
3.108 (3.743)
9.201 (9.903)
6.235 (6.916)
0.504* (0.264)
0.0625 (0.395)
0.927* (0.494)
0.0173** (0.00687)
0.289 (0.300)
0.396** (0.0938)
0.685** (0.253)
0.0107 (0.325)
0.0131** (0.00375)
2.00e-05** (8.05e-06)
9.34e-09** (4.70e-09)
4.573** (0.695)
73,211
1.347* (0.716)
24.09* (12.79)
24.89** (12.45)
0.657 (1.098)
13.29** (5.664)
13.83** (6.053)
0.708 (0.501)
9.169 (10.83)
14.49 (11.93)
0.0790 (0.236)
17.10** (7.469)
16.75** (7.264)
0.917 (4.419)
7.357 (15.16)
5.708 (11.26)
1.277** (0.634)
0.507 (0.608)
0.0577 (0.568)
0.0114* (0.00605)
0.0705 (0.513)
0.671* (0.346)
0.0414 (0.553)
0.689 (0.557)
0.00702 (0.00620)
7.37e-06 (8.81e-06)
2.78e-09 (3.09e-09)
6.469** (1.140)
73,211
Stalemate
0.943 (3.445)
5.744 (35.33)
6.803 (30.67)
1.973 (2.862)
1.796 (4.755)
0.968 (4.872)
0.0949 (0.843)
13.90 (19.16)
15.57 (19.40)
0.274 (0.586)
5.495 (12.87)
6.211 (12.03)
6.492* (3.811)
20.04 (12.39)
13.60 (9.669)
0.655 (0.445)
1.090** (0.460)
1.707** (0.403)
0.0184** (0.00611)
1.206** (0.514)
0.388 (0.238)
0.148 (0.403)
1.041** (0.385)
0.00273 (0.00281)
1.91e-06 (2.44e-06)
5.01e-10 (3.94e-10)
4.997** (0.789)
73,211
Beardsley
345
Table III. Multinomial logit models of crisis outcomes after coarsened exact matching
Model 2: Interaction of types
Compromise
Count of diplomatic engagement
after military inv.
Duration of diplomatic engagement
after military inv.
(Duration of diplomatic engagement
after military inv.)^2
Count of other UN involvement
Duration of other UN involvement
(Duration of other UN involvement)^2
Any UN involvement
Haste of UN involvement
(Haste of UN involvement)^2
Contiguity
Protracted conflict
Violent trigger
Maximum response time
Ethnic conflict
Number of crisis actors
P-5 crisis actor
Regional organization
Elapsed time
(Elapsed time)^2
(Elapsed time)^3
Constant
N
Victory
Stalemate
0.907** (0.309)
0.290 (0.437)
1.506** (0.408)
2.931 (7.133)
15.24* (8.136)
39.22** (9.010)
4.056 (7.498)
17.77** (8.387)
42.82** (9.575)
0.124 (0.0929)
4.005 (3.726)
3.369 (3.839)
2.155 (4.527)
8.430 (12.37)
6.086 (8.404)
0.545** (0.253)
0.0706 (0.381)
0.971* (0.504)
0.0159** (0.00666)
0.365 (0.311)
0.378** (0.0953)
0.618** (0.240)
0.0374 (0.333)
0.0127** (0.00371)
1.79e-05** (6.91e-06)
7.68e-09** (3.71e-09)
4.482** (0.667)
73,211
0.157 (0.107)
10.37 (7.492)
10.39 (7.565)
2.657 (5.304)
5.556 (18.85)
2.789 (14.02)
1.067 (0.678)
0.456 (0.559)
0.0231 (0.499)
0.00472** (0.00179)
0.246 (0.474)
0.675** (0.232)
0.115 (0.480)
0.760 (0.538)
0.00713 (0.00514)
6.52e-06 (5.87e-06)
1.66e-09 (1.66e-09)
6.327** (0.994)
73,211
0.574** (0.250)
32.36** (13.54)
32.37** (13.71)
4.364 (4.174)
5.830 (14.40)
2.873 (10.36)
0.675 (0.440)
1.168** (0.467)
1.660** (0.385)
0.0196** (0.00655)
1.165** (0.448)
0.402* (0.228)
0.122 (0.402)
1.076** (0.367)
0.00250 (0.00260)
1.57e-06 (2.03e-06)
5.22e-10 (3.58e-10)
4.971** (0.794)
73,211
Another way to see these effects is through counterfactual predictions. The 2002 Kaluchak crisis between
India and Pakistan did not include any of the UN involvement considered here and ended in stalemate after 186
days. If we set the control variables to the same values as
this crisis, we can then ask how the trajectory of the crisis
might have been different had the UN become involved
in various capacities at, say, six days into the crisis. To
form such expectations, I use the Clarify software (King,
Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000) and generate the predicted
probabilities of each type of outcome at six days, 36 days,
and 186 days.
Starting with the impact of military involvement, the
decline in daily risk of victory is quite pronounced as it
falls from 0.18% to 0.003% immediately after deployment and from 0.14% to 0.004% 30 days later. The
decline in ability to compromise is also quite substantial
during UN military involvement, as it falls from 0.49%
to 0.04% immediately after involvement and from
0.33% to 0.04% 30 days later. Turning to diplomatic
engagement, the likelihood of compromise increases substantially after 180 days when the UN becomes involved
346
A
Relative risks
Relative risks
6
4
3
2
1
6
5
4
3
2
1
1
0
7 30 60 90 180 0
Compromise
7 30 60 90 180 0
7 30 60 90 180
Victory
7 30 60 90 180 0
Compromise
Stalemate
C
8
7
Relative risks
Relative risks
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
7 30 60 90 180 0
Compromise
7 30 60 90 180 0
7 30 60 90 180
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
7 30 60 90 180 0
Compromise
Stalemate
Victory
Relative risks
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
Victory
7 30 60 90 180
Stalemate
7 30 60 90 180 0
7 30 60 90 180 0
Victory
7 30 60 90 180
Stalemate
7 30 60 90 180 0
7 30 60 90 180 0
Compromise
Victory
7 30 60 90 180
Stalemate
could have been prudent in this case although not necessarily practical because of Indias general resistance to
outside interference. The predicted probability of one
side achieving a substantial victory after diplomatic
engagement was still rather small this is true in a
hypothetical sense from the probabilities recovered in
this exercise and it is more importantly true in a practical
Beardsley
347
Replication data
The dataset and do-files for the empirical analysis in this
article can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to Holger Schmidt, Victor Asal, Birger
Heldt, and the participants of the Folke Bernadotte
348
Funding
Funding for the coding of the UNIEvents data was provided by the Folke Bernadotte Academy.
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