LEGAL TECHNIQUE MIDTERMS

1. Pascor vs. NLRC &Rances; GR 76595; May 6, 1988

Re: Authentication
Facts: Due to a POEA decision rendering Rances (employee of Pascor) as being liable for inciting
another officer to insubordination etc., Rances sought to enforce an award allegedly granted him by a
Dubai Court against Pascors foreign principal. Rances presented as evidence what purports to be an
original copy of the decision of the Dubai court written in Arabic script and language, with a copy of an
English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal letter signed by one Mohd
Bin Saleh Honorary Consul for Philippines.
Issue: WON the Dubai decision can be enforced against Pascor.
Held: NEGATIVE.
Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the
original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy
of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular
Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for
Philippines does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 nor the
authentication envisaged by Section 25.
The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document which purports to be an English translation of that
decision, but that translation is legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires that documents written in a non-official language (like Arabic) shall not be admitted as
evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish or Filipino.
There is no showing of who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which respondent
Rances submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made by an
official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government. Neither the Identity
of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and English languages has been shown. The
English translation submitted by the respondent is not sworn to as an accurate translation of the
original decision in Arabic. Neither has that translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and
faithful one.
2. SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. AUTOCORP GROUP AND PAUL Y. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Seaoil Petroleum Corporation purchased one unit of ROBEX 200 LC Excavator, Model
1994 from respondent Autocorp Group. The sales agreement was embodied in the Vehicle Sales Invoice
No. A-0209 and Vehicle Sales Confirmation No. 258. Seaoil issued 12 checks as payment therefor;
however 10 checks were not honored by the bank since Seaoil requested that payment be stopped.
Autocorp filed a complaint for recovery of personal property with damages and replevin in the Regional
Trial Court. Seaoil claims that Seaoil and Autocorp were only utilized as conduits to settle the obligation
of one foreign entity named Uniline Asia, in favor of another foreign entity, Focus Point International,
Incorporated. The real transaction is that Uniline, through Rodriguez, owed money to Focus. In lieu of
payment, Uniline instead agreed to convey the excavator to Focus. This was to be paid by checks issued
by Seaoil but which in turn were to be funded by checks issued by Uniline. Petitioner Seaoil in sum
alleges that the written agreement failed to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, thus
parol evidence is admissible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not parol evidence rule is applicable in this case.
HELD:
No. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. Evidence of a prior or
contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid contract. The Vehicle Sales Invoice is the best evidence of the transaction. The
terms of the
subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC Excavator
paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera.
3. PEOPLE v. SANTITO
G.R. No. 91628, 22 August 1991, 201 SCRA 87
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. Upon arraignment, accused,
assisted by counsel, entered pleas of not guilty. After trial on the merits, the court rendered judgment
finding them guilty. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether the identification of an entry in the police blotter is equivalent to an offer of evidence ..

Ruling: Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. They
are not conclusive. The entry in the police blotter was never presented by the defense during the
proceedings. Even assuming that the same had been identified in court, it would have no evidentiary
value. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it
will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party. The party may, or may not, decide to
formally offer it after all. In any case, since the defense did not identify or formally offer the said entry in
the blotter, the court still would not consider the same, identification and marking as an exhibit being
necessary for a formal offer. Under Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, no evidence shall be
considered without first having been formally offered. Annexes attached to pleadings, if not offered
formally, are mere scraps of paper and should not be considered by the court,15 unless the truth of
their contents has been judicially admitted.
4. PEOPLE'v. TANDOY
C.R. No. 80505, 4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 28
Accused was convicted of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. He appealed to the Supreme Court,
contending that the trial court erred, in violation of the Best Evidence Rule, in admitting a xerox copy of
the bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
Issue: Whether the xerox copy of the marked bill is admissible in evidence.
Ruling: The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of
inquiry. Where the issue is only: as to whether or not such document was actually expected, or exists, or
in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible. Since the photocopy of the marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other
substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy, is therefore admissible without accounting for the original.
5. People v. Encinada
G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA 72
FACTS: Appeal from a decision of the RTC convicting appellant Roel Encinada of Illegal Transpotation of
prohibited drugs from Surigao City to Cebu, under Sec. 4 of R.A. 6425 as amended by BP 179.
SPO4 Bolonia received a tip from an informant (4:00pm) that the appellant Encinada would be arriving
in the morning of May 21, 1992 on board the M/V Sweet Pearl bringing with him marijuana. They were
not able to secure warrant of arrest because the office was already closed. However, they still decided
to pursue the apprehension of the appellant.
Morning of May 21,1992, when M/V Sweet Pearl docked SPO4 Bolonia with his team followed the
appellant carrying two small colored plastic chairs and boarded a tricycle. The appellant was chased
and ordered the driver to stop, they inspect the plastic chairs and discovered that a package was place
between; tearing the package they were convinced that it is marijuana because of the smell. They
apprehended the appellant brought him to the police station and in the presence of a member of the
local media, they opened the package and saw that indeed it contains dried leaves of marijuana.
ISSUE: a) WON the evidence sufficiently shows the possession of marijuana by appellant.
b) WON the search on the person and belongings of the appellant valid.
HOLDING: SC ruled that proof of ownership of the marijuana is not necessary in the prosecution of
Illegal drug case; it is sufficient that such drug is found in appellants possession.
The court ruled acquitting the appellant, it reiterates the constitutional proscription that evidence seized
without a valid search warrant is inadmissible in any proceeding. A guild of incriminating evidence will
not legitimize an illegal search. Indeed, the end never justifies the means.
In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the policemen. Moreover, the
Lawmen did not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed an offense. The search cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Raw
intelligence information is not sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest.
6. People vs Guamos; GR 109662; Feb. 21, 95
Re: Testing the accuracy/credibility of witness
Facts: Guamos was found guilty of raping Michele (then 8 years old). On appeal of the decision of the
trial court, Guamos sought to discredit and exclude the testimony of the rape victim upon the ground
that she had not answered the questions posed to her at cross-examination during trial (which were
complicated to be answered for adults more so for a 9 year old).
Issue: WON the testimony of Michele should be discredited.
Held: NEGATIVE.

It is the right of every party to cross-examine a witness with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
[or her] accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all
important facts bearing upon the issue. It is also the duty of the witness to answer questions put to
him or her, subject to certain exceptions.In the instant case, defense counsel did not ask the Court to
enforce his right and to compel the witness (Michelle) to perform her duty. As noted, the trial judge had
instructed defense counsel to simplify his questions. Defense counsel, for his part, neither complained
about this directive nor complied with it.
Counsel for appellant seeks to make much of the fact that Michelle Dolorical did not answer some of the
questions of defense counsel on cross-examination. This failure does not detract from the admissibility
or credibility of Michelles testimony. Firstly, this appears to the Court to be a case of failure of Michelle
to answer some questions rather than an obstinate refusal to do so. In formulating those questions on
cross-examination, defense counsel obviously did not take into account that he was cross-examining a
child of tender age (Michelle was approximately nine [9] years of age at the time she gave her
testimony in open court) susceptible to confusion and probably easily intimidated.
It is clear, that defense counsel exercised no substantial effort to present intelligible questions to
complaining witness Michelle Dolorical designed to elicit straightforward
answers. The Court considered that she, in all probability, simply failed to grasp some of the questions
put to her on cross-examinations. The defense had made it very difficult if not practically impossible for
her to answer those questions intelligently and truthfully.

7. Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales

GR No. L-55960; November 24, 1988
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the Philippines.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration alleging that
they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al
alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China. The trial court
rendered decision in favor of the opposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,
modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in
accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both parties moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme
Court granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine laws.
HELD: Well established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the validity of
marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.
For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and consequently of the marriage, the marriage between
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.
8.PEOPLE vs. ELIZAGA
GR. No. 78794 No, 21, 1988
FACTS: While driving his jeep on Taquiqui Bridge in Gattaran, Cagayan, Tomas Foster saw Wilson Stacy,
a policeman, lying along a canal with a gunshot wound in his stomach. With the help of one Romulo
Tolentino, Stacy was carried into the jeep of Foster. They proceeded to the clinic of Dr. Pulmano in
Centro, Gattaran. On the way to the clinic, another man named Pedro Tapuro stopped the jeep to ride
with them. Tapuro, who was wounded in the arm, explained to Foster that he was the pilot of the canoe
which Stacy rode when the latter was shot.
When they arrived at the clinic, while Stacy was being treated, another policeman named Rodrigo Sales
took his statement for the police report. When asked as to what happened to him, Stacy answered, "I
was shot by Marcos Elizaga, Iping Elizaga, and Pabling Molina."
However, despite medical attendance, Stacy died. On March 5, 1976, an Information was filed with the
CFI against accuses Felipe Elizaga and Marcos Elizaga of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code. After due trial, Felipe Elizaga was convicted since Marcos
Elizaga already passed away.
ISSUES:
1. WON the dying declaration of Stacy is valid and admissible.
2. WON the dying declaration of Stacy is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
HELD:
1. Yes, In order that a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, the following requisites must
concur:

(a) That the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death;
(b) That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an
impending death;
(c) That the declarant is competent as a witness; and
(d) That the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is the victim.
As it has been shown that all the above-mentioned requisites are present, the dying declaration of Stacy
is clearly admissible.
2. No, It is true that the dying declaration of Stacy is valid and admissible. However, this does not mean
that it will automatically convict the appellant of the crime of murder. For an accused to be convicted of
murder, it is necessary that it be proved that he killed the victim or acted in conspiracy with the one
who killed him. This must certainly apply to appellant Elizaga.
There is no factual basis for the finding of conspiracy by the lower court. There is no showing of
planning and concerted action on the part of the alleged co-conspirators. No evidence was presented of
the conduct of the supposed assailants before, during, and after the crime from which it can be inferred
that they were in conspiracy with each other. Indeed, there is no concrete proof that appellant acted in
any manner in conspiracy with the two other assailants.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it (Art. 8, par. 2, RPC), the proof necessary to show conspiracy requires a
showing:
1. That two or more persons came to an agreement;
2. That the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and
3. That the execution of the felony be decided upon.
Conspiracy, like any other ingredient of the offense, must be established by clear and convincing
evidence, not by mere conjectures. It is also a well-entrenched rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt
is required to establish a finding of criminal conspiracy. Therefore the appellant is acquitted.
9. SIGNATURE OF DECEASED SHOWN; PRIMA FACIE PRESUMED TO BE A PARTY TO A CHECK
FOR VALUE
FELICITO SANSON, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127745. April 22, 2003
Facts: Felicito Sanson filed a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Juan See. Sanson
claimed that the deceased was indebted to him in the amount of Php 603, 000.00 and to his sister
Caledonia Sanson-Saquin in the amount of Php 320,000.00. also petitioner Eduardo Montinola and his
mother filed separate claims against the estate alleging that the deceased owed them Php50,000 and
Php 150, 000, respectively. During the trial, Caledonia and Felicito Sanson testified that they had
transaction with the deceased evidenced by six checks issued by the deceased before he died and that
after his death, Felicito and Caledonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were
dishonored due to the closure of the account. The same transaction happened to Eduardo and Angeles
Montionola but when they presented the check to the bank, it was dishonored. Demand letters were
sent to the heirs of the deceased but the checks remained unsettled.
Issue: Whether or not presumption of consideration may be rebutted even if the heirs did not present
any evidence to controvert it.
Held: When the fact was established by a witness that it was the deceased who signed the checks and
in fact who entered into the transaction, the genuineness of the deceased signature having been
shown, the latter is prima facie presumed to have been a party to the check for value, following Section
24 of NIL which provides that every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued
for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a
party thereto for value.
Since the prima facie presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the heirs, it has become
conclusive.
10. People vs. Plazo January 29, 2001
Facts: Murder. One Leonor Fabula witnessed the killing her son, Romeo Fabula by herein Appellant
Edison Plazo with the use of Gatab.
Issue: W/N Human Behavioral Response of a witness considering blood relationship be given credence
in convicting the accused for the crime charged.
Ruling: Having had the opportunity to personally observe the witness demeanor and manner of
testifying, the trial judge is in better position to pass judgment on their credibility. As observed, Leonor

Fabula testified in straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, which is necessary for single witness
to be found worthy of credence to support conviction. Witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that
elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for which no clear-cut standard form of human
behavior response can be drawn when one is confronted with a strange, startling, or frightful
experience. Blood relationship between a witness and a victim does not, by itself, impair the credibility
of a witness. On the contrary, relationship strengthens credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved
relative to falsely to accuse someone other than the actual culprit. The earnest desire to seek justice for
a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence and blame one who
is innocent of the crime.

11. FULE v. COURT OF APPEALS

GR. No. L-79094, 22 June 1988, 162 SCRA 446
Petitioner was convicted of a violation of B.P. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law, on the basis of an unsigned
stipulation of facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during pre-trial. On appeal the
respondent appellate court upheld the stipulation of facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Issue: Whether the conviction, based solely on a stipulation of facts which was not signed by either the
petitioner or his counsel, was proper.
Ruling: The omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the
Rules, renders the stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused,
in his memorandum, confirmed the stipulation of facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118
requires the signature of both the accused and his counsel. What the prosecution should have done,
upon discovering the lack of the required signatures, was to submit evidence to establish the elements
of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused. Without said evidence
independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond
reasonable doubt.