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take cognizance of and to decide the instant petitions on their merits is beyond challenge.

"In this connection, however, it must be borne in mind that in the form of government envisaged by
the farmers of the Constitution and adopted by our people, the Courts indisputable and plenary
authority to decide does not necessarily impose upon it the duty to interpose its fiat as the only means
of setting the conflicting claims of the parties before it. It is ingrained in the distribution of powers in
the fundamental law that hand in hand with the vesting of the judicial power upon the Court, the
Constitution has coevally conferred upon it the discretion to determine, in consideration of the
constitutional prerogatives granted to the other Departments, when to refrain from imposing judicial
solutions and instead defer to the judgment of the latter. It is in the very nature of republican
governments that certain matters are left in the residual power of the people themselves to resolve,
either directly at the polls or thru their elected representatives in the political Departments of the
government. And these reserved matters are easily distinguishable by their very nature, when one
studiously considers the basic functions and responsibilities entrusted by the charter to each of the
great Departments of the government. To cite an obvious example, the protection, defense and
preservation of the state against internal or external aggression threatening its very existence is far
from being within the ambit of judicial responsibility. The distinct role then of the Supreme Court of
being the final arbiter in the determination of constitutional controversies does not have to be asserted
in such contemplated situations, thereby to give way to the ultimate prerogative of the people
articulated thru suffrage or thru the acts of their political representatives they have elected for the
purpose.
Indeed, these fundamental considerations are the ones that lie at the base of what is known in
American constitutional law as the political question doctrine, which in that jurisdiction is
unquestionably deemed to be part and purse of the rule of law, exactly like its apparently more
attractive or popular opposite, judicial activism, which is the fullest exertion of judicial power, upon the
theory that unless the courts intervene injustice might prevail. It has been invoked and applied by this
Court in varied forms and modes of projection in several momentous instances in the past, (Barcelon v.
Baker, 5 Phil. 87; Severino v. Governor-General, 16 Phil. 366; Abueva v. Wood, 45 Phil. 612; Alejandrino
v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 85; Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Cabili v.
Francisco, 88 Phil. 654; Montenegro v. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882; Santos v. Yatco, 55 O.G. 8641 [Minute
Resolution of Nov. 6, 1959]; Osmea v. Pendatun, Oct. 28, 1960.) and it is the main support of the
stand of the Solicitor General on the issue of jurisdiction in the cases at bar. It is also referred to as the
doctrine of judicial self-restraint or abstention. But as the nomenclatures themselves imply, activism
and self-restraint are both subjective attitudes, not inherent imperatives. The choice of alternatives in
any particular eventuality is naturally dictated by what in the Courts considered opinion is what the
Constitution envisions should be done in order to accomplish the objectives of government and of
nationhood. And perhaps it may be added here to avoid confusion of concepts, that We are not losing
sight of the traditional approach based on the doctrine of separation of powers. In truth, We perceive
that even under such mode of rationalization, the existence of power is secondary, respect for the acts
of a co-ordinate, co-equal and co-independent Department being the general rule, particularly when
the issue is not encroachment of delimited areas of functions but alleged abuse of a Departments own
basic prerogatives. (59 SCRA, pp. 379-383.)
Applying the foregoing considerations to the cases at bar, I hold that the Court has jurisdiction to pass
on the merits of the various claims of petitioners. At the same time, however, I maintain that the basic
nature of the issues herein raised requires that the Court should exercise its constitutionally endowed
prerogative to refrain from exerting its judicial authority in the premises.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Stripped of incidental aspects, the constitutional problem that confronts Us stems from the absence of
any clear and definite express provision in the Charter applicable to the factual milieu herein involved.
The primary issue is, to whom, under the circumstances, does the authority to propose amendments to
the Constitution property belong? To say, in the light of Section 15 of Article XVII of the Charter, that
faculty lies in the interim National Assembly is to beg the main question. Indeed, there could be no
occasion for doubt or debate, if it could only be assumed that the interim National Assembly envisaged
in Sections 1 and 2 of the same Article XVII may be convoked. But precisely, the fundamental issue We
are called upon to decide is whether or not it is still constitutionally possible to convene that body. And

relative to that question, the inquiry centers on whether or not the political developments since the
ratification of the Constitution indicate that the people have in effect enjoined the convening of the
interim National Assembly altogether. On this score, it is my assessment that the results of the
referenda of January 10-15, 1973, July 27-28, 1973 and February 27, 1975 clearly show that the great
majority of our people, for reasons plainly obvious to anyone who would consider the composition of
that Assembly, what with its more than 400 members automatically voted into it by the Constitutional
Convention together with its own members, are against its being convoked at all.
Whether or not such a manifest determination of the sentiments of the people should be given effect
without a formal amendment of the Constitution is something that constitutional scholars may
endlessly debate on. What cannot be disputed, however, is that the government and the nation have
acquiesced to it and have actually operated on the basis thereof. Proclamation 1103 which, on the
predicate that the overwhelming majority of the people desire that the interim Assembly be not
convened, has ordained the suspension of its convocation, has not been assailed either judicially or
otherwise since the date of its promulgation on January 17, 1973.
In these premises, it is consequently the task of the Court to determine what, under these
circumstances, is the constitutional relevance of the interim National Assembly to any proposal to
amend the Constitution at this time. It is my considered opinion that in resolving that question, the
Court must have to grapple with the problem of what to do with the will of the people, which although
manifested in a manner not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, was nevertheless official, and
reliable, and what is more important clear and unmistakable, despite the known existence of wellmeaning, if insufficiently substantial dissent. Such being the situation, I hold that it is not proper for the
Court to interpose its judicial authority against the evident decision of the people and should leave it to
the political department of the government to devise the ways and means of resolving the resulting
problem of how to amend the Constitution, so long as in choosing the same, the ultimate constituent
power is left to be exercised by the people themselves in a well-ordered plebiscite as required by the
fundamental law.
-2Assuming We have to inquire into the merits of the issue relative to the constitutional authority behind
the projected amendment of the Charter in the manner provided in Presidential Decree 1033, I hold
that in the peculiar situation in which the government is today, it is not incompatible with the
Constitution for the President to propose the subject amendments for ratification by the people in a
formal plebiscite under the supervision of the Commission on Elections. On the contrary,

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