Republic Vs.

Lacap
Facts
The District Engineer of Pampanga, issued and duly published an invitation to bid, where Lacap was
awarded as the lowest bidder. Accordingly, the latter undertook the works, made advances for the
purchase of materials and payment for labor costs.
On October 29, 1992 the office of the DE issued Certification of Final Inspection and Acceptance for
100% completion of project in accordance with specifications.
The respondent sought to collect payment but Department of Public Works and Highways withheld
payment after the District Auditor of Commission on Audit disapproved final release of funds on the
ground that contractors license had expired.
Opinion of the DPWH Legal Department was sought by the District Engineer. The former then responded
that RA No. 4566 does not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void and
that there is no law which expressly prohibits such a contract void. Furthermore, Cesar D. Mejia, Director
III of the Legal Department in a First Indorsement, recommended the payment should be made to Carwin
Construction. However, no payment was made.
On July 3, 1995, respondent filed the complaint through Office of the Solicitor General for Specific
Performance and Damages against petitioner before the RTC. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on September 14, 1995 on the grounds that complaint states no cause of action and RTC had no
jurisdiction since respondent did not appeal to COA. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss.
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was likewise denied by RTC, in its order on May 23,
1996. On August 5, 1996, the OSG filed its Answer invoking defense of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies and doctrine of non-suability of the State.
Following the trial, the RTC rendered on February 19, 1997 its decision ordering the DPWH to pay the
contract price plus interest at 12% from demand until fully paid and the costs of the suit.
Issue: Whether or not a contractor with an expired license at the time of execution of its contract is
entitled to be paid for completed projects?
Held:
Yes. The petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the completed project
and enjoyed the benefits thereof. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost would
undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjust
enrichment is not allowed by law.

MHP GARMENTS, INC., and LARRY C. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AGNES VILLA CRUZ, MIRASOL LUGATIMAN,
and GERTRUDES GONZALES, respondents.

FACTS: On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges,
and insignias. In their Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the authority to
"undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and
other scouting supplies." Sometime in October 1983, MHP received information that respondents were
selling Boy Scout items and paraphernalia. Larry De Guzman, employee of MHP, was then tasked to
undertake the necessary surveillance and to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary.
On October 25, 1983, at about 10:30 A.M., petitioner and constabulary men of the Reaction Force
Battalion went to the stores of respondents and seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses and suits on
display at respondents stalls without any warrant. The seizure caused a commotion and embarrassed
private respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items were then turned over by
Captain Peafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping.
A criminal complaint for unfair competition was then filed against private respondents. During its
pendency, petitioner de Guzman exacted from private respondent Lugatiman P3,100.00 in order to be
dropped from the complaint. On December 6, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed the
complaint. On February 6, 1984, he also ordered the return of the seized items. The seized items were not
immediately returned despite demands. 3 Private respondents had to go personally to petitioners' place of
business to recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized items were returned. The other items
returned were of inferior quality.
A civil case for sums of money and damages was filed by the private respondents against the petitioners.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent which was later affirmed by CA.
Issue:
Did CA err in imputing liability for damages to petitioners?
Held:
No. The petitioners did not apply for a warrant despite the sufficiency of time. They seized the goods of
private respondents and in doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be
proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
The raid was conducted with the active participation of petitioners employee. De Guzman did not lift a
finger to stop the seizure. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the same
extent as the officers themselves. The nature of Article 32 is that the wrong maybe civil or criminal. It is
not necessary that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main
purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights.

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE

LAROYA, respondent
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Roberto
Capitulo and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan, figured in accident. Two cases were filed, with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property. Casupanan and Capitulo also filed a civil case against Laroya
for quasi delict.
The respondent, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case filed by the petitioners on the ground of forumshopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. Motion to dismiss was granted by MTC.
Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a motion for reconsideration. They insisted that the civil case is a separate
civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a petition for certiorari still it was denied for lack of merit.
They filed a Motion for Reconsideration but RTC denied the same.
Issue:
W/N the accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
indepently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
Held:
Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint,
unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent
on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice and is not appealable. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states
that where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on
the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively. Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and
Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two
actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is
based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa
aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or
prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is
that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June19, 1991. He died while the
appeal was pending. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal but
required the Solicitor-General to comment with regard to Bayotas civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor-General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. On the other hand, the
counsel of the accused argued that the death of the accused while judgment of the conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both criminal and civil penalties.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability.
Held:
Yes, the death if the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely on the criminal act committed. The claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicted as one source of obligation
other than delict, such as law, contract, quasi-contract or quasi-delict.