31. G.R. No.

L-62306

January 21, 1985

KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PINAGYAKAP (KMP), ISAGANI

GUTIERREZ, FLORENCIA CARREON, JOSE FLORES, DENNIS ALINEA,
ELADIO DE LUNA and CRISANTO DE VILLA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CRESENCIANO TRAJANO, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS, CATALINO SILVESTRE, and CESAR ALFARO,
respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the Regional Office for the expulsion of the union
officers on the ground that they committed gross violation of the Labor Code as
based on the revelations of Union Account Examiner of the Minister of Labor and
Employment after their wriiten request for accounts examination of the financial
status of the Kapisanan ng Manggagawang Pinagyakap (KMP) Labor Union.
In their Answer, the union officers denied the imputation and argued that the
disallowed expenditures were made in good faith; that the same conduced to the
benefit of the members; and, that they are willing to reimburse the same from
their own personal funds.
On April 28, 1982, Med-Arbiter Antonio D. Cabibihan ordered the holding of a
referendum, to be conducted under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, to decide on the issue of whether to expel or suspend the union
officers from their respective positions.
Petitioners appealed the said order of Med-Arbiter Cabibihan to herein public
respondent Director Trajano of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor,
Manila, claiming that the same is not in accordance with the facts contained in
the records and is contrary to law.
Private respondents, on the other hand, claimed that the Med-Arbiter erred in
calling a referendum to decide the issue. They reiterated that the appropriate
action should be the expulsion of the herein union officers.
Both appeals are dismissed by Trajano and affirmed in toto the order the MedArbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether a call for referendum to decide the issue is applicable in this case.
RULING:

No. If herein union officers (also petitioners) were guilty of the alleged acts
imputed against them, said public respondent pursuant to Article 242 of the New
Labor Code and in the light of Our ruling in Duyag vs. Inciong, 98 SCRA 522,
should have meted out the appropriate penalty on them, i.e., to expel them from
the Union, as prayed for, and not call for a referendum to decide the issue.
The holding of the referendum in question has become moot and academic. This
is in line with Our ruling in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil.
471, which We quote:
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that
they disregarded or forgave Ms faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically
overrule the will of the people.
32. G.R. Nos. 81852-53 March 5, 1993
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), petitioner, vs.NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER MANUEL P. ASUNCION,
ABUNDIO IBASCO, ANTONIO MAGSIPOC, CARLOS VILLARANTE and
BIENVENIDO RAMIREZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch, National Capital
Region, National Labor Relations Commission for illegal and exorbitant deduction
and illegal expulsion from the union.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of NLRC.
Labor Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss. In 1987 the NLRC issued a resolution
affirming the decision of respondent Labor Arbiter and dismissing the appeal.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the NLRC has jusrisdiction in this case.
RULING:
No. Clearly this is an intra-union dispute a dispute between a labor union and
its members. "Internal Union Dispute" includes all disputes or grievances arising
from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and
by-laws of a union, including any violation of the rights and conditions of union
membership provided for in the Code (Book V, Rule I, Section l(a), Omnibus Rules
Implementing The Labor Code).
2

Article 226 of the Labor Code of the Philippines vests on the Bureau of Labor
Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions jurisdiction to act on all inter-union or
intra-union conflicts. Said Article thus provides:
Art. 226.
Bureau of Labor Relations The Bureau of Labor Relations and the
Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall
have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon
request of either or both parties, on all
inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems
arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all work places whether
agricultural or non-agricultural, except those arising from the implementation or
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be subject of
grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The subject of which is an intra-union dispute, fall under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and respondent Labor
Arbiter and NLRC have no jurisdiction over said cases.
33. G.R. No. L-77282 May 5, 1989
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) petitioner, vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, as Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment; PHILIPPINE SOCIAL
SECURITY LABOR UNION (PSSLU); SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION
OF LABOR (SPFL) and GAW TRADING, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
GAW Trading, Inc. recognized ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for
the majority of itsemployees. A CBA was executed.In the meantime, Southern
Philippines Federationo f Labor (SPFL) together with Nagkaisang Mamumuosa
GAW (NAMGAW) undertook a Strike after it failed toget GAW Trading Inc. to sit for
a conference respecting its demands in an effort to pressure GAW Trading Inc.to
make a turnabout of its standing recognition of ALUas the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of its employees
GAW Trading Inc. filed a TRO. Labor Arbiter held the strike as illegal. GAW Lumad
Labor Union (GALLU-PSSLU)Federation filed a Certification Election petition. MedArbiter ruled for the holding of a certificationelection in all branches of GAW
Trading Inc. BLR granted ALUs appeal (MR) and reversed the Med-Arbiter on the
ground that the CBA has been effective and valid and the contract bar rule is
applicable.SPFL filed a MR to the BLR. BLR reversed its previous decision and
ordered theholding of a certification election among the rank-and-fileworkers of
GAW Trading, Inc. and ruled that the contract-bar rule does not apply in this
case because the CBA involved is defective as it was not duly submitted in
accordance with the Implementing Rules. xxx There is no proof tending to show
that the CBA has been postedin at least 2 conspicuous places in the

establishment atleast 5 days before its ratification and that it has beenratified by
the majority of the employees in thebargaining unit.
Issue:
Whether the contract-bar rule is applicable in this case?
RULING:
No. The collective bargaining agreement in question is indeed defective hence
unproductive of the legal effects attributed to it by the former director in his
decision which was subsequently and properly reversed.
The mechanics of collective bargaining are set in motion only when the following
jurisdictional preconditions are present, namely, (1) possession of the status of
majority representation by the employees' representative in accordance with any
of the means of selection and/or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2)
proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251,
paragraph (a), of the New Labor Code. In the present case, the standing of
petitioner as an exclusive bargaining representative is dubious, to say the least.
It may be recalled that respondent company, in a letter dated May 12, 1986 and
addressed to petitioner, merely indicated that it was "not against the desire of
(its) workers" and required petitioner to present proof that it was supported by
the majority thereof in a meeting to be held on the same date. The only express
recognition of petitioner as said employees' bargaining representative that We
see in the records is in the collective bargaining agreement entered into two
days thereafter. Evidently, there was precipitate haste on the part of respondent
company in recognizing petitioner union, which recognition appears to have been
based on the self-serving claim of the latter that it had the support of the
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. Furthermore, at the time of the
supposed recognition, the employer was obviously aware that there were other
unions existing in the unit. As earlier stated, respondent company's letter is
dated May 12, 1986 while the two other unions, Southern Philippine Federation of
Labor (hereafter, SPFL and Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU, for
short), went on strike earlier on May 9, 1986. The unusual promptitude in the
recognition of petitioner union by respondent company as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the workers in GAW Trading, Inc. under the fluid and
amorphous circumstances then obtaining, was decidedly unwarranted and
improvident.
An additional infirmity of the collective bargaining agreement involved was the
failure to post the same in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the
establishment at least five days before its ratification.
Another potent reason for annulling the disputed collective bargaining is the
finding of respondent director that one hundred eighty-one( 181) of the two
hundred eighty-one (281) workers who "ratified" the same now " strongly and
vehemently deny and/or repudiate the alleged negotiations and ratification of
the CBA.
... Basic to the contract bar rule is the proposition that the delay of the right to
select represen tatives can be justified only where stability is deemed
paramount. Excepted from the contract which do not foster industrial stability,
4

such as contracts where the identity of the representative is in doubt. Any

stability derived from such contracts must be subordinated to the employees'
freedom of choice because it does nto establish the type of industrial peace
contemplated by the law.
Technical rules of procedure do not strictly apply in the adjudication of labor
disputes. 12 Consequently, its objection that the evidence with respect to the
aforesaid repudiiation of the supposed collective bargaining agreement cannot
be considered for the first time on appeal on the Bureau of Labor Relations
should be disregarded, especially considering the weighty significance thereof.
Additionally, the inapplicability of the contract bar rule is further underscored by
the fact that when the disputed agreement was filed before the Labor Regional
Office on May 27, 1986, a petition for certification election had already been filed
on May 19, 1986. Although the petition was not supported by the signatures of
thirty percent (30%) of the workers in the bargaining unit, the same was enough
to initiate said certification election.

34. BUKLOD NG SAULOG TRANSIT vs. MARCIANO CASALLA, ET ALS.,

G.R. No. L-8049, May 9, 1956
FACTS:
Saulog Transit, Inc. is engaged in the transportation business in Manila and
surrounding cities and employs 583 workers including supervisory
personnel; that there exists in the company two unions, namely, the Buklod g
Saulog Transit, the intervenor in this case, and the Saulog Employees
Union (PFL); that the petitioners numbering 65 are all employees of the
company; that there exists a collective bargaining contract dated July 15,
1953, between the Saulog Transit, Inc. and the Buklod g Saulog Transit with a
supplementary agreement (Exhibit 10-1) entered into on January 10,
1954, a month after the petition for certification election was filed and
already being investigated by this Court.
ISSUE 1:
Whether the CIR has jurisdiction over the petition for certification of election filed
by 65 employees of the company.
RULING 1:
Yes. The petition filed by 65 laborers or employees of the Saulog Transit, Inc., was
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Industrial Relations, for their
number was more than 10 percent of the laborers and employees of the
Saulog Transit, Inc.
ISSUE 2:
Whether the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into between Buklod and
the Saulog Transit, Inc. is a bar to certification of election.
RULING 2:
5

No. The collective bargaining agreement entered into on 15 July 1953 is no bar to
a certification election at the instance of at least 10 per cent of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit, pursuant to Section
12, Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), Republic Act No. 875.
The collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between the Saulog
Transit, Inc. and the Buklod g Saulog Transit on 15 July 1953 does not touch
in substantial terms the rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other conditions of employment of all the employees in the company but
seeks to establish merely a grievance procedure for drivers, conductors and
inspectors who are members of the Buklod g Saulog. And even in the
supplementary agreement , there is no clear-cut stipulation as to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions or employment.
The trial court took, however, into consideration both agreements and
found that the first agreement being incomplete does not bar a certification
election; and as to the supplementary agreement the Court held that it having
been entered into after the filing of the petition for a certification election the
same cannot and does not bar a certification election.

35. G.R. No. L-48367 January 16, 1979

ASSOCIATED TRADE UNIONS-ATU (ATU-KILUSAN), petitioner, vs.
HON. CARMELO C. NORIEL, in his capacity as Director of THE BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS (SYNTHETIC MARKETING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
CHAPTER), AND SYNTHETIC MARKETING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
FACTS:
The old CBA of petitioner ATU-KILUSAN with respondent Synthetic Marketing and
Industrial Corporation was to expire on October 31, 1977. However, 5 months
and 21 days before its expiry date, or on May 10, 1977, ATU-KILUSAN renewed
the same with the consent and collaboration of management. The renewed CBA
was then submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations for certification on July 8,
1977, or approximately 3 months prior to the expiration of the outgoing CBA.
In the meantime, on September 13, 1977 (48 days before the expiration of the
old CBA on October 31, 1977), a petition for certification election was filed by
respondent union, the Federation of Free Workers. Meanwhile, the renewed CBA
between petitioner ATU-KILUSAN and respondent company was certified on
October 3, 1977 or twenty-eight days before their old CBA was to expire.
ISSUE:
6

Whether the renewed CBA forged between the respondent company and
petitioner union constitutes a bar to the holding of a certification election.
RULING:
No. The renewed CBA cannot substitute a bar to the instant petition for
certification election.
In the first place, the said CBA was certified after the instant petition for
certification had been filed by herein respondent union, and its certification was
conditioned upon the fact that there was no pending petition for certification
election with the Bureau of Labor Relations * * *.
In the second place, the new CBA which was to expire on October 31, 1977.
Hence, said new CBA was not yet in existence when the instant petition for
certification election was filed on September 13, 1977. Said new CBA was to
become effective on November 1, 1977 after the old CBA expires on October 31,
1977, and this, if no representation issue had arisen in the meantime, which is
not the case. Clearly, therefore, the contract-bar rule does not apply to the case
at bar.
Finally it is undubitably clear from the facts heretofore unfolded that
management and petitioner herein proceeded with such indecent haste in
renewing their CBA way ahead of the 'sixty-day freedom period' in their obvious
desire to frustrate the will of the rank-and-file employees in selecting their
collective bargaining representative. To countenance the actuation of the
company and the petitioner herein would be violative of the employees'
constitutional right to self-organization.
36. G.R. No. L-45513-14
January 6, 1978
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR DIRECT CERTIFICATION OR
CERTIFICATION ELECTION. FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
EMPLOYEES' UNION (FEU), petitioner, vs.THE HON. FRANCISCO L.
ESTRELLA, as Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES and
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), respondents.
FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION, represented
by Romulo Ramos as President, petitioner, vs.THE HON. FRANCISCO L.
ESTRELLA, as Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), respondents.
FACTS:
The petition alleges that on June 21, 1973, the National Labor Relations
Commission certified a three-year collective bargaining agreement between
7

respondents Associated Labor Union (ALU) and Firestone Tire & Rubber Company
of the Philippines. Said collective bargaining agreement was to be effective from
February 1, 1973 to January 31, 1976.
On February 1, 1974, the aforementioned respondents entered into a
"Supplemental Agreement" extending the life of the collective bargaining
agreement for one year, making it effective up to January 31, 1977. The
extension was not ratified by the covered employees nor submitted to the
Department of Labor for classification.
Within the sixty-day period prior to the original expiry date of the agreement,
some 233 out of about 400 rank-and-file employees of respondent Company
resigned from respondent ALU. Subsequently, the number of these employees
who resigned from the union was increased to 276 and, by way of letter to the
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, they requested for the issuance of a
certificate of registration in favor of petitioner Firestone Tire & Rubber Company
Employees' Union (FEU).
On February 20, 1976, respondent ALU filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a
petition for the cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner FEU, 2
alleging that at the time of FEU's registration, respondent ALU was the
recognized and certified collective bargaining agent in the unit, and that FEU had
not submitted the required sworn statement that there is no recognized or
certified collective bargaining agent therein.
Respondent ALU prayed for the dismissal of R04-MED-143-76.
ISSUE:
Whether the pending petition for the cancellation of FEU's registration certificate
and that there is an existing collective bargaining agreement, due to expire on
January 31, 1977, which constitutes a valid bar to the holding of a certification
election.

RULIING:
No. A contract does not operate as a bar to representation proceedings, where it
is shown that because of a schism in the union the contract can no longer serve
to promote industrial stability, and the direction of the election is in the interest
of industrial stability as well as in the interest of the employees' right in the
selection of their bargaining representatives. Basic to the contract bar rule is
the proposition that the delay of the right to select representatives can be
justified only where stability is deemed paramount. Excepted from the contract
bar rule are certain types of contracts which do not foster industrial stability,
such as contracts where the Identity of the representative is in doubt. Any
stability derived from such contracts must be subordinated to the employees'
8

freedom of choice because it does not establish the type of industrial peace
contemplated by the law
In the case at bar, it is doubtful if any contract that may have been entered into
between respondent ALU and respondent Company will foster stability in the
bargaining unit, in view of the fact that a substantial number of the employees
therein have resigned from ALU and joined petitioner FEU. At any rate, this is a
matter that must be finally determined by means of a certification election.
A certification election for the collective bargaining process is one of the fairest
and most effective way of determining which labor organization can truly
represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the
majority, if given in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to
make their choice, is controlling. No better device can assure the institution of
industrial democracy with the two parties to a business enterprise, management
and labor, establishing a regime of self-rule.
Once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, a
certification election is the most expeditious way of determining which labor
organization is to be the exclusive bargaining representative.
It appearing that the extension of the life of the collective bargaining agreement
for a period of one year was not certified by the Bureau of Labor Relations, it
cannot, therefore, also bar the certification election. Only a certified collective
bargaining agreement would serve as a bar to such election
Corollarily, therefore, petitioner's application for registration was not premature,
as it need not have waited for the expiration of the one-year extension, the
agreement having expired on January 31, 1976.
37. G.R. No. 96425
February 4, 1992
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PDC), petitioner, vs.THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
MED-ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG
PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)-TUCP, respondents.
FACTS:
On June 19, 1990, respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP
(hereinafter referred to as Kilusan) filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file
employees of the petitioner alleging that it is a legitimate labor federation and its
local chapter, Progressive Development Employees Union, was issued charter
certificate No. 90-6-1-153. Kilusan claimed that there was no existing collective
bargaining agreement and that no other legitimate labor organization existed in
the bargaining unit.
Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss dated July 11, 1990 contending that the
local union failed to comply with Rule II Section 3, Book V of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the submission of: (a)
the constitution and by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or
members; and (c) books of accounts.
9

Med Arbiter dela Cruz held that there was substantial compliance with the
requirements for the formation of the chapter. He further stated that mere
issuance of the charter certificate by the federation was sufficient compliance
with the rules. Considering that the establishment was unorganized, he
maintained that a certification election should be conducted to resolve the
question of representation. The Secretary of Labor and Employment denied
PDCs appeal and motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners petitioner for certiorari thus filed.The petitioner maintains that the
documentary requirements prescribed in Section 3(c), namely: the constitution
and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts, must follow the requirements
of law. Petitioner PDC calls for the similar application of the requirement for
registration in Article 235 that all requisite documents and papers be certified
under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization and attested to
by the president.
ISSUE:
In the case at bar, the constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted in
the BLR, while attested to by the chapter's president, were not certified under
oath by the secretary. Does such defect warrant the withholding of the status of
legitimacy to the local or chapter?
RULING:
Yes. A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only
upon submission of the following to the BLR:
1)
A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor
federation or national union, and
2)
The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the
books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its
president.
Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does
not become a legitimate labor organization.
In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the
required documents under oath is fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate status.
The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against
the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection to
unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-bynight unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for
dubious ends.
The mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of an
agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free to
serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints
imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the association. Thus, where as in
this case the petition for certification election was filed by the federation which is
merely an agent, the petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter, the principal,
which must be a legitimate labor organization. The chapter cannot merely rely on
the legitimate status of the mother union.
10

The local union must first comply with the statutory requirements in order to
exercise this right. Big federations and national unions of workers should take the
lead in requiring their locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and
the rules instead of merely snapping union after union into their folds in a furious
bid with rival federations to get the most number of members.
38. G.R. No. L-41955 December 29, 1977
ELISCO-ELIROL LABOR UNION (NAFLU) and its OFFICERS AND MEMBERS
OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, petitioners vs.CARMELO NORIEL, in his
capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, ELIZALDE STEEL
CONSOLIDATED, INC. and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS
(NAFLU), respondents.
FACTS:
On February, 1974 the members of the petitioner union who were then yet
affiliated with the National Association of Free Labor Union negotiated and
executed with the respondent company a collective bargaining agreement with
expiry date in November, 1976.
On May 28, 1975, after the same members, by valid resolution of the Board of
directors and approved by the general membership, have formed themselves
into an i t organization and applied for registration as a union, a certificate of
registration was issued by the Department of Labor. And on June 10, 1975 again
by a valid resolution the same members disaffiliated with the NAFLU.
Respondent company without any justifiable reason refused and continues to
refuse to recognize petitioner as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative
of its employees, and, now actually dismissed the petitioner union's officers and
board members. In this connection, a complaint for unfair labor practice was
filed by petitioners against respondents for the latter's refusal to bargain
collectively with petitioner.
Petitioners filed a petition before the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of
Labor against respondents Elizalde Steel Consolidated, Inc. and the National
Federation of Labor Unions be ordered to stop from presenting itself as the
collective bargaining agent and pursuant thereto, a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued.
Med Arbiter dismissed the petition. Respondent Director of BLR affirmed the
dismissal.
ISSUE:
Which of the two unions should be recognized as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees and ultimately recognized to

11

administer and supervise the enforcement of the collective bargaining

agreement.

RULING:
Petitioner local union is declared to be the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees of respondent corporation entitled to administer
and enforce any subsisting collective bargaining agreement with said employer
corporation.
The local union did not form a new union but merely registered the local union as
was their right. Petitioner Elisco-Elirol Labor Union-NAFLU, consisting of
employees and members of the local union was the principal party to the
agreement. NAFLU as the "mother union" in participation in the execution of the
bargaining agreement with respondent company acted merely as agent of the
local union, which remained the basic unit of the association existing principally
and freely to serve the common interest of all its members, including the
freedom to disaffiliated when the circumstances so warranted as in the present
case.
The locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and
maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer and their
employee-members in the economic struggle for the fruits of the joint productive
effort of labor and capital; and the association of the locals into the national
union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the same end. These associations are
consensual entities capable of entering into such legal relations with their
members. The essential purpose was the affirmation of the local unions into a
common enterprise to increase by collective action the common bargaining
power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the
basic units of association, free to serve their own and the common interest of all,
subject to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the
Association, and free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare upon the
terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into existence.
Corollarily, the "substitutionary" doctrine likewise fully supports petitioner's
stand. Petitioner union to whom the employees owe their allegiance has from the
beginning expressly avowed that it "does not intend to change and/or amend the
provisions of the present collective bargaining agreement but only to be given
the chance to enforce the same since there is a shift of allegiance in the majority
of the employees at respondent company." As was stressed by the Court in
Benguet Consolidated Inc. vs. BCI Employees & W Union-PAFLU5
... This principle, formulated by the NLRB as its initial compromise solution to the
problem facing it when there occurs a shift in employees' union allegiance after
the execution of a bargaining contract with their employer, merely states that
12

even during the effectivity of a collective bargaining agreement executed

between employer and employees thru their agent, the employees can change
said agent but the contract continues to bind then up to its expiration date. They
may bargain however for the shortening of said expiration date.
In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only consideration involved as
the employees' interest in the existing bargaining agreement. The agent's
interest never entered the picture. In fact, the justification for said doctrine was:
... that the majority of the employees, as an entity under the statute, is the true
party in interest to the contract, holding rights through the agency of the union
representative. Thus, any exclusive interest claimed by the agent is defeasible at
the will of the principal.
The actuation of NAFLU of dismissing 13 individual compainants conclusively
constitute discrimination. Since the suspension of the complainants was effected
at the instance of NAFLU, it should be held liable to the payment of back wages.
W)hat is paramount, as it is expressly and explicitly emphasize in an exacting
language under the New Constitution, is the security of tenure of the workers,
not the security of the union.
39. G.R. No. L-46509 November 16, 1978
CHRYSLER PHILIPPINES LABOR UNION (CPLU), petitioner, vs.HON.
FRANCISCO ESTRELLA, Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION (ALU), and CHRYSLER PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION (CPC), respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner CPLU has been duly registered as a Labor organization as early as
1965 with an independent certificate of registration No. 4664-IP.It retained the
same registration number when it affiliated with ALU sometime in 1974 and had
its name changed accordingly to CPLU-ALU.
On January 17, 1977, petitioner filed a "Petition for Direct Certification with
Preliminary Injunction" 9 with Regional Office No. 4, Bureau of Labor Relations,
Department of Labor. It alleged that "there is another union claiming to represent
the workers as the bargaining unit proposed and this is the Associated Labor
Union,** but it represents the minority." It prayed, therefore, that the Bureau,
after proper proceedings, "directly certify the Chrysler Philippines Labor Union,
(i.e. petitioner) as the exclusive bargaining agent of the workers on hourly basis
employed by the Chrysler Phil. Corporation." Attached to the aforesaid petition
was a general membership resolution 10 signed by three hundred fifty (350) out
of the alleged total of "five hundred and fifty (550) more or less' employees in
the bargaining unit. In said resolution, the signatories alleged-

13

1.
That we have no knowledge and have not authorized the Associated Labor
Union to amend and change the name of our local union with another
registration certificate which was issued on the 23rd (should be 13th) day of
March, 1974. We do hereby resolve and petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to
restore the original name in the registration issued on August 20, 1965.
2.
That we the undersigned members of the Chrysler (Phil.), Labor Union do
hereby maintain the said labor union as an independent labor organization and
we hereby disaffiliate from the Associated Labor Union (ALU) and maintain our
membership with Chrysler (Phil.) Labor Union.
Med-Arbiter dismissed CPLUs petition. BLU affirmed the dismissal .

ISSUE 1:
Whether CPLU has the legal personality to file a petition for certification election,
notwithstanding its disaffiliation from ALU.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner has legal personality to file a petition for certification election,
notwithstanding its disaffiliation from ALU. First, there is nothing in the Labor
Code nor in the implementing rules which provides that a duly registered local
union which affiliates with a national union or federation loses its legal
personality, much less is there any provision which requires that upon the
disaffiliation of said local union, it should register anew to be entitled to all the
rights and privileges of a duly registered labor union. On the contrary, the Labor
Code expressly allows disaffiliation for the purpose of operating as an
independent labor organization (Art. 241). The change of name from CPLU to
CPLU-ALU was only a matter of form which did not affect in the least the legal
personality of both affiliating unions. And it follows that if, upon its disaffiliation,
petitioner was required to secure a registration certificate in its original name
(without the suffix ALU), the same was only for record purposes and nothing
more. Second, the only way by which a duly registered labor (union) can be
disenfranchised is upon an order of cancellation issued by the Bureau of Labor
Relations and only after due hearing in a proceeding instituted for said purpose.
Thus, Article 239 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 239. Cancellation of registration; appeal. The certificate of registration of any
legitimate labor organization, whether national, or local, shall be cancelled by
the Bureau if it has reason to believe, after due hearing, that the said labor
organization no longer meets one or more of the requirements herein prescribed.
ISSUE 2:

14

Whether there is merit in CPLU-ALU's allegation that the petition for certification
election has become moot and academic because of the ratification by a
majority of the hourly-paid employees of CPC of the new CBA effective during the
period November 1, 1977 to October 31, 1980.
RULING 2:
No.There is no merit in CPLU-ALU's allegation that the petition for certification
election has become moot and academic because of the ratification by a
majority of the hourly-paid employees of CPC of the new CBA effective during the
period November 1, 1977 to October 31, 1980.
It was not sought for the purpose of choosing the exclusive bargaining
representative of the hourly-paid employees. Although the ratification slips
provide that "the ratification shall constitute a bar to any petition for certification
election that has been or may be filed by any party or union, " the same cannot
and should not be given force and effect, because it will defeat petitioner CPLU's
claim of majority representation.
It should be added that the execution of a new Collective Bargaining Agreement
does not necessarily foreclose the issue of representation. It is only when the
Collective Bargaining Agreement is certified that no petition for certification
election shall be entertained, except within the so-called freedom period of sixty
(60) days prior to its expiration.
In this case, the new Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be certified
precisely because of the restraining order issued to the public respondent Acting
Director enjoining him from certifying any Collective Bargaining Agreement
which may be concluded by and between private respondents CPC and CPLUALU. The Collective Bargaining Agreement not being certified, there is no legal
obstacle against the holding of a certification election.
both contending unions claim majority representation, there is no better way
than the holding of a certification election to ascertain which union really
commands the allegiance of the hourly- paid employees at CPC. Thus We held
that . . . "(T)he important factor is the true choice of the employees, and the
most expeditious and effective manner of determining this is by means of the
certification election, as it is for this very reason that such procedure has been
incorporated in the law.
The Bureau of Labor Relations is directed to call a certification election so that
the question of representation of the hourly-paid employees at Chrysler
Philippines Corporation be resolved. The TRO is lifted.
40.

15

41.
G.R. No. 70067 September 15, 1986
CARLOS P. GALVADORES, ET AL., petitioners, vs.CRESENCIANO B.
TRAJANO, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, MANGGAGAWA NG
KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS (FIWU), PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
COMPANY (PLDT), and JOSE C. ESPINAS, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner employees of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
and members of respondent Free Telephone Workers Union, now the
Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (simply referred to hereinafter as the
Union), question the legality of the check-off for attorney's fees amounting to
P1M, more or less, of respondent Atty. Jose C. Espinas (hereinafter referred to as
"Respondent Counsel") from the monetary benefits awarded to PLDT employees
in a deadlocked collective bargaining agreement negotiations between the PLDT
and the Union.
ISSUE:
Whether required individual authorizations in this case are wanting.
RULING:
YES. Article 222(b) of the Labor Code provides:Article 222. Appearance and Fees.
xxx xxx xxx(b)No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any
kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the
collective bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of
the contracting union; Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be charged
16

against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any

contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and
void.
While Article 242 of the same Code reads:
Art. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. The
following are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization:
xxx xxx xxx
(o)
Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special
assessment, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees
may be checked off "from any amount due an employee without individual
written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should
specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code also provide that deductions
from wages of the employees may only be made by the employer in cases
authorized by law, including deductions for insurance premiums advanced by the
employer on behalf of the employees as well as union dues where the right to
check-off is authorized in writing by the individual employee himself. 3
The provisions are clear. No check-offs from any amounts due employees may be
effected without individual written authorizations duly signed by the employee
specifically stating the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. The
required individual authorizations in this case are wanting. In fact, petitioner
employees are vigorously objecting. The question asked in the plebiscite, besides
not being explicit, assumed that there was no dispute relative to attorney's fees.
Contrary to respondent Union's and Counsel's stand, the benefits awarded to
PLDT employees still formed part of the collective bargaining negotiations
although placed already under compulsory arbitration. This is not the
"mandatory activity" under the Code which dispenses with individual written
authorizations for check-offs, notwithstanding its "compulsory" nature. It is a
judicial process of settling disputes laid down by law. Besides, Article 222(b) does
not except a CBA, later placed under compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of
its prohibition. The cardinal principle should be borne in mind that employees are
protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish their compensation
without their knowledge and consent.
42. G.R. No. 77951
September 26, 1988
COOPERATIVE RURAL BANK OF DAVAO CITY, INC., petitioner, vs.PURA
FERRER-CALLEJA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, MOLE,
MANILA; FELIZARDO T. SERAPIO, MED-ARBITER DESIGNATE, REGIONAL
OFFICE NO. XI, MOLE, DAVAO CITY; and FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS,
respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. is a cooperative banking
corporation operating in Davao City. It is owned in part by the Government and
17

its employees are members and co-owners of the same. The petitioner has
around 16 rank-and-file employees. As of August, 1986, there was no existing
collective bargaining agreement between the said employees and the
establishment. On the other hand, the herein private respondent Federation of
Free Workers is a labor organization registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment. It is interested in representing the said employees for purposes of
collective bargaining.
On August 27, 1986, the private respondent filed with the Davao City Regional
Office of the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a verified Petition for
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.
Respondent granted the petition for certification of election.
Petitioner filed an Appeal Memorandum and sought a reversal of the Order of the
Med-Arbiter. Petitioner insists that its employees are disqualified from forming
labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. BLU affirmed MedArbiters decision.Petition for Reconsideration was denied. Petition for Certiorari
was filed.
ISSUE:
Whether the employees of a cooperative can organize themselves for purposes
of collective bargaining.
RULING:
No. An employee of a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot
invoke the right to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain
with himself or his co-owners.Employees of cooperatives who are themselves
members of the cooperative have no right to form or join labor organizations for
purposes of collective bargaining for being themselves co-owners of the
cooperative.
Under Section 2 of P.D. No. 175, a cooperative is defined to mean "organizations
composed primarily of small producers and of consumers who voluntarily join
together to form business enterprises which they themselves own, control, and
patronize." Its creation and growth were declared as a policy of the State as a
means of increasing the income and purchasing power of the low-income sector
of the population in order to attain a more equitable distribution of income and
wealth.
A cooperative, therefore, is by its nature different from an ordinary business
concern, being run either by persons, partnerships, or corporations. Its owners
and/or members are the ones who run and operate the business while the others
are its employees. As above stated, irrespective of the number of shares owned
by each member they are entitled to cast one vote each in deciding upon the
affairs of the cooperative. Their share capital earn limited interests. They enjoy
special privileges as exemption from income tax and sales taxes, preferential
right to supply their products to State agencies and even exemption from the
minimum wages laws.
43.G.R. No. 84433

June 2, 1992

18

ALEXANDER REYES, ALBERTO M. NERA, EDGARDO M. GECA, and 138

others, petitioners, vs.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, as Officer-in-Charge, Bureau of Labor
Relations, Med. Arbiter PATERNO ADAP, and TRI-UNION EMPLOYEES
UNION, et al., respondent.
FACTS:
The officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations (Hon. Cresenciano Trajano)
sustained the denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred fortyone (141) members of the "Iglesia ni Kristo" (INK), all employed in the same
company, at a certification election at which two (2) labor organizations were
contesting the right to be the exclusive representative of the employees in the
bargaining unit. That denial is assailed as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion in the special civil action of certiorari at bar, commenced by the INK
members adversely affected thereby.
The certification election was authorized to be conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Relations among the employees of Tri-Union Industries Corporation on October
20, 1987. The competing unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized
Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade
Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially
deemed to be qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the election,
conducted under the provision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Among the 240
employees who cast their votes were 141 members of the INK.
The ballots provided for three (3) choices. They provided for votes to be cast, of
course, for either of the two (2) contending labor organizations, (a) TUPAS and
(b) TUEU-OLALIA; and, conformably with established rule and practice, 1 for (c) a
third choice: "NO UNION."
The final tally of the votes showed the following results:TUPAS
1;TUEU-OLALIA
95;NO UNION-1;SPOILED-1;CHALLENGED-141.The challenged votes were
those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated and excluded from
the final count in virtue of an agreement between the competing unions, reached
at the pre-election conference, that the INK members should not be allowed to
vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in
the previous certification elections.

ISSUE :
Whether the members of the INC should not be allowed to vote because they
refused to participate in the previous certification elections.
RULING :
19

No. The plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote to
all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a
labor organization or not.No law, administrative rule or precedent prescribes
forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past
certification elections.
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a
labor union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join,
and to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective
bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid
and protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights
and interests.
Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to
disaffiliate or resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join,
affiliate with, or assist any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right
to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or
refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be
denied the exercise of a right granted by law, so also, no one should be
compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has opted to
acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting
to renounce such membership.
The right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join or assist
labor organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to form, join or
assist any labor union.
That the INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true
sense of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond
question, as well as the fact that when they voted that the employees in their
bargaining unit should be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply
exercising that right of self-organization, albeit in its negative aspect.
44. G.R. No. 91902
May 20, 1991
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs.THE HON. SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, STAFF AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION OF MERALCO, and FIRST LINE ASSOCIATION OF MERALCO
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES, respondents.
FACTS:
The Staff and Technical Employees Association of MERALCO (hereafter "STEAMPCWF") a labor organization of staff and technical employees of MERALCO, filed a
petition for certification election, seeking to represent regular employees of
MERALCO who are: (a) non-managerial employees with Pay Grades VII and
above; (b) non-managerial employees in the Patrol Division, Treasury Security
Services Section, Secretaries who are automatically removed from the bargaining
unit; and (c) employees within the rank and file unit who are automatically
disqualified from becoming union members of any organization within the same
bargaining unit.

20

Meralco moved the dismissal of the petition. Med-Arbter ordered the certification
of election. MERALCO appealed but the Secretary of Labor affirmed the MedArbiters decision with modification.
Petitioner seeks to review the Resolution of respondent Secretary of Labor and
Employment Franklin M. Drilon dated November 3, 1989 which affirmed an Order
of Med-Arbiter Renato P. Parungo (Case No. NCR-O-D-M-1-70), directing the
holding of a certification election among certain employees of petitioner Manila
Electric Company (hereafter "MERALCO") as well as the Order dated January 16,
1990 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of MERALCO.
ISSUE 1:
Whether employees from pay grades VII and above are rank-and-file employees.
RULING 1:
No. MERALCO has admitted that the employees belonging to Pay Grades VII and
up are supervisory.
It must be emphasized that private respondent First Line Association of Meralco
Supervisory Employees seeks to represent only the Supervisory Employees with
Pay Grades VII to XIV.
The Secretary of Labor's Resolution was obviously premised on the provisions of
Art. 212, then par. (k), of the 1988 Labor Code defining "managerial" and "rank
and file" employees, the law then in force when the complaint was filed. At the
time, only two groups of employees were recognized, the managerial and rank
and file. This explains the absence of evidence on job descriptions on who would
be classified managerial employees. It is perhaps also for this reason why the
Secretary of Labor limited his classification of the Meralco employees belonging
to Pay Grades VII and up, to only two groups, the managerial and rank and file.
However, pursuant to the Department of Labor's goal of strenghthening the
constitutional right of workers to self-organization, RA 6715 was subsequently
passed which reorganized the employee-ranks by including a third group, or the
supervisory employees, and laying down the distinction between supervisory
employees and those of managerial ranks in Art. 212, renumbered par. [m],
depending on whether the employee concerned has the power to lay down and
execute management policies, in the case of managerial employees, or merely to
recommend them, in case of supervisory employees.
Anent the instant petition therefore, STEAM-PCWF, and FLAMES would therefore
represent supervisory employees only. In this regard, the authority given by the
Secretary of Labor for the establishment of two labor organizations for the rank
and file will have to be disregarded since We hereby uphold certification
elections only for supervisory employees from Pay Grade VII and up, with STEAMPCWF and FLAMES as choices.
ISSUE 2:
Whether it is legal for security guards to join either the rank and file or the
supervisory union.
RULING 2:
21

No. On December 24, 1986, Pres. Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 111 which
eliminated the provision on the disqualification of security guards as provided
under the old rules Art. 245 of the Labor Code. What was retained was the
disqualification of managerial employees, renumbered as Art. 245 (previously
Art. 246), as follows:
Art. 245.
Ineligibility of managerial employees to joint any labor organization.
Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization.
With the elimination, security guards were thus free to join a rank and file
organization.
On March 2, 1989, the present Congress passed RA 6715. 2 Section 18 thereof
amended Art. 245, to read as follows:
Art. 245.
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization;
right of supervisory employees.Managerial employees are not eligible to join,
assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible
for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may
join, assist, or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor organization
of the rank and file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization
of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank. By
accommodating supervisory employees, the Secretary of Labor must likewise
apply the provisions of RA 6715 to security guards by favorably allowing them
free access to a labor organization, whether rank and file or supervisory, in
recognition of their constitutional right to self-organization.
45. G.R. No. 110399
August 15, 1997
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION AND
ERNESTO L. PONCE, President, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO
E. LAGUESMA IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HONORABLE DANILO L. REYNANTE IN HIS CAPACITY AS
MED-ARBITER AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner union filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
Petition for Direct Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors
and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao,
San Fernando and Otis.
Med-Arbiter granted the petition. Respondent San Miguel Corporation filed a
Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, pointing out, among others, the
Med-Arbiter's error in grouping together all three (3) separate plants, Otis,
Cabuyao and San Fernando, into one bargaining unit, and in including
supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature.
Undersecretary granted the companys appeal but later on granted the
reconsideration and directed the conduct of separate certification elections
among the supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the
exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and
Otis.
22

The company filed a motion to suspend a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to suspend proceedings which was granted by the Undersecretary. A Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction was filed.
ISSUE 1:
Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the
company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a
union.
RULING 1:
The Court rules that said employees do not fall within the term "confidential
employees" who may be prohibited from joining a union.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity,
(2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in
the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be
met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor,
and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor
relations.
The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the normal course of
their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is
a principal objective sought to be accomplished by the ''confidential employee
rule." The broad rationale behind this rule is that employees should not be
placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests.
An employee of a labor union, or of a management association, must have
access to confidential labor relations information with respect to his employer,
the union, or the association, to be regarded a confidential employee, and
knowledge of labor relations information pertaining to the companies with which
the union deals, or which the association represents, will not cause an employee
to be excluded from the bargaining unit representing employees of the union or
association." "Access to information which is regarded by the employer to be
confidential from the business standpoint, such as financial information 18 or
technical trade secrets, will not render an employee a confidential employee.
In the case at bar, supervisors 3 and above may not be considered confidential
employees merely because they handle "confidential data" as such must first be
strictly classified as pertaining to labor relations for them to fall under said
restrictions. The information they handle are properly classifiable as technical
and internal business operations data which, to our mind, has no relevance to
negotiations and settlement of grievances wherein the interests of a union and
the management are invariably adversarial. Since the employees are not
classifiable under the confidential type, this Court rules that they may
appropriately form a bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Furthermore, even assuming that they are confidential employees, jurisprudence
has established that there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees
who are not performing managerial functions to form and join a union.
ISSUE 2:
23

If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants
constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit.
RULING 2:
The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely, in
Cabuyao, Laguna, in Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando,
Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical location can be completely disregarded if
the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed.
The distance among the three plants is not productive of insurmountable
difficulties in the administration of union affairs. Neither are there regional
differences that are likely to impede the operations of a single bargaining
representative.
Bargaining unit may be defined as "a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the
collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer,
indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions of thelaw.
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have
substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other
subjects of collective bargaining.
Although they belong to three different plants, they perform work of the same
nature, receive the same wages and compensation, and most importantly, share
a common stake in concerted activities.

24