The Chinese Communist State System Under the Constitution of 1954

Author(s): Yu-Nan Chang

Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Aug., 1956), pp. 520-546
Published by: University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2127261
Accessed: 16-11-2015 02:07 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Chicago Press and Southern Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve
and extend access to The Journal of Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE CHINESE COMMUNISTSTATE SYSTEM

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1954
YU-NAN CHANG
I.

COMMUNIST IDEOLOGYAND THE CONSTITUTION

OI

ALL THE EVENTS that have taken place in China in the past
six years, the promulgation of the Chinese Communist Constitution is perhaps the most significant phenomenon. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China was adopted on September
20, 1954, by the first National People's Congress (NPC) of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) at its first session.' Its adoption
marks a logical break in the course of the nation's strife for power.
The Constitution, while embarking upon a new stage toward socialism, provides the nation with a state form and system that is meant
to ensure the political monopolization of power by the Communist
Party of China (CPC), thereby placing China closer to the camp
of Communism. The meaning of this political development can best
be apprehended by a proper appreciation of the state form and system and by the understanding of what the Chinese Communists
themselves think.
In the first place, the Chinese Constitution is governed by the
Communist ideology which regards a constitution as a fundamental
law and an instrument of force. In the second place, the pronouncement of the state form of the regime as a democratic and unified
multi-national state implies the monopolization of political power
by the CPC. It means the demotion of the minor parties in Chinese
policies and the strengthening of the Communist rule over the
national minorities. And in the third place, the Communistic claim
to a one-power state system that is led by the NPC and rests upon
the four types of state organs -the
organs of legislative author'The Chinese text is in Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo hsien-fa [The
Constitution of the People's Republic of China] (Peking, 1954). The English
text is in Liu Shao-chi, Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's
Republic of China and Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Peking,
1954). Comments on the Constitution in the Englizh language are found in
H. Arthur Steiner's article, "ConstitutionaL-sm in Communist China," The
American Political Science Review, XLIX, No. 1 (March, 1955), 1-21, and
in Franklin W. Houn, "Communist China's New Constitution," The Western
Political Quarterly, VIII, No. 2 (June, 1955), 199-233.
4 520 ]

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956]

THE CHINESECONSTITUTION

521

ity, the executive organs of state, the people's courts, and the organs
of the people's procuratorates- is a fallacy. This is evidenced by
the concentration of actual power in the Chairman of the PRC and
in 'the executive organ - the State Council - and by the subordination of the People's Courts and the People's Procuratoratesto the
State Council.
As a fundamental law of China, the Constitution purports to
enjoy full legal force and is the source of law sanctioned by the
state.2 In contrast to the Western idea of a constitution, the Chinese
Constitution does not intend to limit the power of the government;
rather, it aims to guarantee the unrestricted rule of the government
and to augment the arbitrary use of power for the benefit of the
ruling party. This can be explained by the fact that the Constitution is totally governed by the Communist ideology which entertains the idea that both state (an organ of class domination) and
law (the expression of the will of the dominating class) are instruments of force. Precisely, the Chinese Constitution is conceived as
a weapon of the state.
The Constitution is viewed by the Communist writers as a superstructure above a definite social-economic structure of a society.3
It is a product of and an instrument to serve the structure. The
Constitution thus serves as a legal document formally confirming
the past victory of the dominating class and legally fixing a new
political and social system under the Constitution. Through the
adoption of the Constitution, the draft of which was prepared by the
Central Committee of the CPC, a state system is instituted, pyramidal in structure and extreme in its centralization of power. The
state system is regarded by the Communists4 as an integrated system resting upon four types of state organs. Each is a centralized
'This view is shared by many Chinese writers: Mao Tse-tung, Hsin min-chu
hsien-cheng [New Democratic Constitution] (Peking, 1952); Yu Kwang-yfian,
"The Conclusion of a Victory," Hsiieh Hsi, [Study] 7, (July 2, 1954), 14;
Editorial, Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily, JMJP] (September 21, 1954), p. 1.
'This view is similar to that of the Soviet writers. For the Soviet view,
see Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, The Law of the Soviet State (The Macmillan
Company, 1948), p. 13. The Chinese view is expressed in Ch'in Chuan,
"Effects of the Constitution in the Life of the State," Hsiieh Hsi (July 2, 1954),
15-17, and Chang Hung, "Some Understanding of the Content of the Draft
Constitution," ibid., pp. 17-22.
'Hsiung Hsi-yUan, "Principles of Organization and Operation of Our State
System," JMJP (November 18, 1954), p. 3. Yang Hua-nan, "State Organs
in Our Draft Constitution," Hsiieh Hsi, p. 8, (August 2, 1954), 6-9.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

522

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

[ Vol. 18

unit and is under the sole leadership of the highest organ of state
power, which is the NPC. These organs form a powerful weapon to
uphold the Constitution, to enforce the laws, and to carry out the
struggle toward the building up of a socialist state.
The assimilation of the Communist ideology in the Constitution
also leads to the inevitable transformation of the Chinese society
into a socialist society. Such a transformation is the goal and the
spirit of the Constitution. To pave the way for this "arduous struggle," Chinese people of all nationalities are called upon for unity
and are required to "uphold discipline at work" and to "respect
social ethics."5 These are perhaps the most decisive obligations
imposed upon the people. These so-called "social ethics" imply
absolute obedience to the Communist ideology by the people and
subjugation of all the people's rights, as guaranteed by the Constitution, to Communist ethics. By limiting the rights of the people,
governmental power is unlimited and individual freedom is destroyed.
Indeed, the Communist concept of constitution is reproduced in
the Chinese version. In commenting on the Soviet constitutions,
Andrei Y. Vyshinsky stated, "Soviet constitutions represent the sum
total of the historic path along which the Soviet state has traveled.
At the same time, they are the legislative basis of the subsequent
development of state life."6 The Chinese Communist writers echo
this interpretation in stating that the Chinese Constitution blazes a
path for China, recording what has been won in China and what is
yet to be conquered. This reminds us of the nature of the Chinese
revolution, which, according to Mao-Tse-tung, is clearly divided into
two stages - the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution
leading toward the establishment of a communist society in China.
The establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, marked the
conclusion of the first stage of the revolution,7 namely the New
Democratic Revolution. Imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic
-

'Article 100 of the Constitution should be read together with Article 19,
which indicates the determination of the state to suppress all treasonable
and counter-revolutionary activities and to punish all traitors and "counterrevolutionaries."
'Vyshinsky, op. cit., p. 87.
'For the Chinese interpretation of the revolutionary stages, see Wang
Hui-te, "Concerning the Two Stages of Chinese Revolution," Hsfieh Hsi,
(January 2, 1954), 3-5, and Wang Po-ming, "Studying the Programmatic
Documents of the New Democracy," Hsin Chien She [New Construction] 7,
(July, 1953), 1-6.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956 ]

THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION

523

capitalism were largely destroyed; the Chinese society was to be

converted from one of semi-colonial and semi-feudal society to one
of New Democratic Society. The Common Program of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC),8 adopted on
September 29, 1949, spoke of what was to be acquired in the future,
although it functioned as a constitution having the force of a fundamental law. Not only did it promise to continue "the people's war
of liberation to the very end," and "to ensure the people's rights to
elect and be elected"; it also prescribed the organic and functional
principles of the government. However, the spirit of the Common
Program was to launch the country into a stage of revolution preparatory to the systematic socialist transformation of the state.
The entry of the country into a period of planned economic consruction, beginning in 1953, apparently marked the conclusion
of the preparatory period and the start of the systematic socialist
transformation. It is stated9 that the elections up to 1953 of
13,637,000 people's representatives to the All-Circle Representative Conferences at all levels, with approximately 75 per cent
of the representatives from the worker and peasant classes, marked
the consolidation of the political leadership of the proletariat. The
rapid establishment of more than 40,000 producers' co-operatives
in the rural communities at the end of 1953 and the gradual expansion of state-ownership in the industrial and business sectors of the
economy indicated the development of social factors.10 Specifically,
8The English text of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) is in The Important Documents of the

First Session of the ChinesePeople'sPolitical ConsultativeConference(Peking,

1949). The Constitution is regarded as being "based on the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference of 1949, and is an
advance on it." (Preamble). This legal relationship is seen in a law passed
by the NPC declaring that laws and decrees enacted under the Common
Program are valid unless they contravene the Consitiution. Kuang-min jihpao [Enlightenment Daily, KMJP] (September 27, 1954), p. 1. Other aspects
of their relationship are discussed by HsU P'an-ch'iu, "The Relation between
the Constitution and the Common Program," Hsueh-hsi hsien-fa ts'an-k'ao
tzu-liao (Canton, 1954), pp. 15-19.
9Huan Hsiang, "The Superior Characters of the Electoral Law of the
People's Congresses," Hsin Chien She, 4, (April 3, 1953), 37-41.
"0Conditions in China before the promulgation were explained in Chou
En-lai's report of September 27, 1954, Cheng-fu kung-tso pao-kao [Report
on Government Work] (Peking, 1954). English translation in Current Background (CB) 296 (November 28, 1954).

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

524

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

[Vol. 18

the development of social factors is part of the second stage of revolution. Mao Tse-tung explained this by saying:11
The entire result of the ChineseRevolution is on the one hand, the
development of capitalist factors, whilst on the other, the development of Socialist factors. What are these Socialist factors? They are
the proportionalgrowth of the proletariatand the CommunistParty
in China's politics, and the possible or the actual recognitionof the
leadershipof the proletariatand the CommunistParty by the peasantry, intelligentsia and petty-bourgeoisie. All these are the Socialist
factors.

After the basic socialist factors are realized and after the necessary conditions are met, the foundation is then laid for the undertaking of a systematic transformation toward the completion of the
second revolution. Thus, the Constitution serves in the main as a
legal document outlining the fundamental tasks of the state in the
transition period before the building up of a socialist society. In
the Preamble, the Constitution sets forth the fundamental tasks of
the state:
. . .step by step, to bring about the socialist industrializationof the
country and, step by step, to accomplishthe socialist transformation
of agriculture,handicraft and capitalist industry and commerce.

Article 4 to Article 16 outline the basic economic policies during this

period. However, the Chinese Communists repeatedly urge that
their goals be realized over -a reasonably long period. The Chinese
people are not to hope for an overnight transformation,but to "proceed step by step in the light of the experience and political consciousness of the masses and in accordance with what is possible in
the actual situation." Perhaps the adoption of such a flexible and
patient attitude is necessary because of the unfavorable economic
conditions in China, which limit a rapid industrialization, and of
the popular resistance against drastic actions. Nevertheless, the
Chinese Communists are determined to employ force and violence
for the realization of their goals; for as observed by Liu Shao-chih,
in his expanatory report on the Draft Constitution, "the idea that
there is no struggle in China is completely wrong."
39.3.

Mao Tse-tung, ChineseRevolution and the CommunistParty of China,

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956]

THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION

II.

525

THE UNITED FRONT AND NATIONALITY POLICIES

Politically, the Constitution not only endorses the state machinery as a powerful weapon but solidifies the ever-increasingdominating position of the CPC. This is accomplished through the gradual
elimination of minor parties and the further consolidation of Communist power over national minorities.
Article 1 of the Constitution declares the PRC to be a democratic
state led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers
and peasants. The Constitution also calls for the continued functioning of the people's democratic united front led by the working
class and composed of various democratic classes, parties, groups,
and people's organizations. However, these democratic elements in
China, particularly the minor parties, are rapidly losing their identity and are sinking into obscurity.
With the promulgation of the Constitution, the CPPCC continues to be the organization of the Chinese people's democratic
united front but ceases to be a constitutional organization. Reorganized in December, 1954, it exercises only assigned duties
and its functions are merely administrative.12 Its previous constutional functions are transferred to the newly elected NPC.
However, due to the centralized nature of the NPC and to the
greater arbitrary power possessed by the Chairman of its Standing
Committee, the importance of the members of the minor parties in
the NPC is greatly limited. Furthermore, the joint selection of candidates through consultation between the CPC and other democratic
parties and organizations for the election of people's representatives
to the NPC further reduces the chance for free participation of
minor parties in political matters. The fact that people's representatives are accountable to the people and not to their parties further
lessens the political influence of the minor parties.
During the systematic transitory stage of revolution under the
Constitution, there is still need for the continued existence of minor
parties to organize and to persuade all segments of the societythe industrialists, the intellectuals, and businessmen- to participate
in the revolutionary process. The minor parties are to function
12The Chinese text of the Regulations of the CPPCC is in JMJP (December
26, 1954), p. 2. For a report see Ch'en Shu-t'ung's in JMJP (December 22,
1954), p. 22. Also Ma Hsii-lun, "Historical Mission of the Democratic Parties,"
Hsin-hua yfieh-pao, 2, (February 28, 1955), 35-36.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

526

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

[ Vol. 18

as any other mass organization for uniting and arousing popular

support and participation in political activities directed by the CPC.
Eventually, they will no longer exist as political parties in the ordinary sense, because their political influence will be reduced to little,
if any, significance.
The CPC's effort to infiltrate the minor parties and to restrict
their activities will persist. It is worth noting that while the
CPC has been willing to encourage the minor parties to expand, it
is also suggested as early as May, 1951, that Communist Party
members be included in the minor parties up to ten or twenty
per cent of the total membership for the purpose of assisting them
in organizational matters.13 This facilitates the CPC's control over
the minor parties and will bring about their gradual extinction. Furthermore, the original restriction on the activities of the
minor parties will continue to apply. This restriction is twofold:
the establishment of minor parties is allowed only at national, provincial, and municipal levels; and direct relationship between the
national committee and the local committees is not permitted. National and local committees are independent organizations without
direct jurisdiction of one over the other. Furthermore, with the
retirement of their aging members and the complete absence of new
and vigorous young members, the fate of the minor parties' existence is doubtless clear. The way is thus established for eventual
proletarian dictatorship and the termination of the people's democratic united front.
Article 3 of the Constitution affirms the People's Republic of
China as a unified, multi-national state. This multi-national state
is characterizedby the promise of equality among all nationalities,
the freedom to preserve and foster their culture, and the grant of
regional autonomy in areas entirely or largely inhabited by national
minorities. Unlike the Soviet Union, where the ethnic groups are
many in number and form the backbone of the Soviet federation,
the sixty-four Chinese ethnic groups constitute only six per cent of
the whole population, with only a few groups exceeding four to five
millions in population.14 Historically, due to their geographical
13Chang Chih-i's article in Ch'ang-chiang jih-pao [ Yangtze Daily, CCJP]
(May 10, 1951), p. 1.
"Official reports are compiled in Min-tsu cheng-ts'e wen-hsien hui-pien
(Peking, 1953). Discussions on the subject are in "National Minorities of
Our Country," HsAeh Hsi, 7, (October 1, 1952), 34-35.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956]

THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION

527

distribution,15 the ethnic groups seldom create problems of great

political importance. The Communist nationality policies give the
impression that the design for the national minorities is not so
much a cultural matter as a political and economic concern.
First, the national minorities, though small in number, occupy
fifty per cent of the Chinese territory. This very fact may illustrate the importance of the nationality problem in China. Politically, to have an effective nationality policy is to extend the political
power to over half the territory of China. Although the past Chinese dynasties saw this necessity, they maintained no long-range
policies. By pursuing a policy either of physical suppression or of
peaceful domination, the dynasties exercised certain political controls over the nationality groups. Economically, the vast area
occupied by minorities is very attractive. It is a region rich in raw
materials and productive in agriculture. Both Inner Mongolia and
Northwest China are known to be areas of abundant economic
potentialities, and their economic development has been greatly
publicized throughout China in recent years. While Inner Mongolia
is a source of lumber, salt, and rare metals, Sinkiang offers one of
the most hopeful oil supplies in China. The reported discovery
of uranium and other rare metals in Sinkiang is a well-known
fact. From Sinkiang in Southwest China come asbestos, mica,
and other metals important to industrial development. Undeveloped
raw materials are no less significant. This economic fact cannot
be ignored when China is engaged in large-scale industrialization.
The fact that the remote areas also contain land for grazing and
agricultural production adds to their importance to the Chinese
economy. Their contribution to the country's industrialization is
made more meaningful by the fact that China's main exports are
agricultural products in exchange for industrial goods.
Secondly, the geographical distribution of the nationality groups
holds political and military significance. For example, along the
three thousand kilometer boundary in southwestern China, adjoining Burma and Thailand, reside a number of nationality groups.16
"5Anexcellent article reporting recent developments of the national minorities
and showing their geographical distribution was written by Wu Wen-tsao,
"Facts on National Minorities," China Reconstructs, IV, No. 3 (March, 1955),
9-12.
"6For example, a Thai regional autonomous government was established in
June, 1953. It is an administrative area of 9,652 square miles with 200,000
population of which 70 per cent are Thai people. They are closely related
to the people of Thailand and to the Shans and the Karens in Burma. Chen
Han-seng, "Thai People of Yunnan," China Reconstructs, 5, (SeptemberOctober, 1953), 38-42.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

528

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

[ Vol. 18

Since these national minorities mingle with peoples of neighboring

nations, and since these autonomous areas are permitted under the
Constitution to organize their own security forces, they can play a
significant part in the Communist strategy toward the Southeast Asia
countries. Likewise, from the Chinese Communist point of view,
these autonomous areas are of considerable importance in national
defense.
Finally, due to the comparatively undeveloped conditions, these
remote regions have been in the past a source of domestic insurgence and resistance. The several revolts in Sinkiang province
instigated by the Soviet Union in the past decade and those in the
Inner Mongolia area by the Japanese in the thirties were long a
concern of the central government of China. Even the less politically important areas were used in the past by armed bandits and dissenters as bases for resistance. The Chinese Communists announced
at the end of 1950 that, in Southwest China alone, over one million
"counter-revolutionary" elements were using these areas as their
base of operation. It goes without saying that the establishment of
Communist power in these remote areas has a very significant
meaning in both national defense and public security.
The development of the Communist nationality policy was long
and deliberate. After the founding of the Communist Government
in 1949, the policy was immediately included in the Common Program. The Constitution reiterates the policy in a more complete
form. The most concrete concession to the national minorities is
the grant of autonomous status to the nationality groups. This is
guaranteed by the establishment of organs of self-government in
the areas, the only instance in the Constitution where the term
"self-government" is used. These nationality areas can be set up
according to ethnic and historical conditions of the locality. As prescribed by law,17 the national autonomous areas may be established
under three types of conditions. Where a single nationality group
is predominant, an autonomous status may be sanctioned. An autonomous region is also permitted where one nationality group
is predominant yet other ethnic groups of a smaller number are
'7"Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo min-tsu ch'i-yU tzu-chih shih-shih
kang-yao" ["Basic Principles on the Practice of Self-Government in National
Minorities Areas"] was approved by the Government Council of the People's
Republic of China on August 8, 1952, in Min-tsu cheng-ts'e wen-hsien huipien, pp. 164-170. Other documents regarding political participation of national
minorities in ibid., pp. 183-192.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956 ]

THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION

529

included in its composition. The third type is composed of two

or more equally dominant national groups.
In addition to the establishment of national autonomous areas,
at least two methods have been devised through which the national
minorities can participate in the administration of their own affairs:
(1) the representation of the national minorities in both local
people's congresses and people's councils where Han peoples constitute an absolute majority; and (2) the participation of the
national minorities in the organization of the Nationalities Affairs
Committee at all levels of government.
Furthermore, the self-governing organs of the autonomous areas
exercise certain powers which are non-existent in other local organs.
They not only perform the general functions and powers of ordinary
local organs of state, but they also administer their own local
finances (Article 69). They can organize local public security forces
in accordance with the military system of the country and draw up
regulations governing the exercise of autonomy and other special
regulations to suit their political, economic, and cultural characteristics (Article 70). Furthermore, their national culture and languages are promoted and are used in the performance of their political duties and in the people's courts. The higher organs of state
are required to safeguard the rights of local organs of all autonomous regions, autonomous ckou, and autonomous counties; to exercise the autonomy and to assist the various national minorities in
their political, economic, and cultural development (Article 72).
Such a liberal grant of self-governing powers to the autonomous nationalities is, however, not in the least unlimited by the
CPC and by the central administrative organs. In the first place,
all the nationality self-governing units are integrated into the centralized political system. They all obey and follow the central and
provincial governments, whatever the case may be. They are completely subjected to the operations of other centrally controlled
organs, the procuratorates, the public security offices, the military
forces, and most important, the party apparatus. In this connection, the CPC has long been engaged in recruiting party members
and cadres from the nationality groups. The Nationality Institute,
established in the thirties at Yenan, has already supplied a large
number of party members for the postwar work in the nationality
areas, particularly in Inner Mongolia. The 'CPC's recruitment

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

530

THE JOURNAL

OF POLITICS

[Vol. 18

among the nationality groups and its expansion in these areas are
both aggressive and encompassing. As of 1954, in Inner Mongolia
alone, Communist party branches have been established in 88.5
per cent of farm villages, 18 per cent higher than the national average.18 There is no doubt that with the complete control by the
CPC of both economic and political affairs in the autonomous areas,
Communist political and economic strength will be maintained.
III.

THE

NPC,

ITS STANDING

CHAIRMAN

COMMITTEE,

OF THE

AND THE

PRC

Chinese Communist writers have proudly asserted that the Chinese political system is one of people's congresses and is monolithic
and truly democratic.
It is democratic in the sense that the people's representation is fully guaranteed by the Constitution. It is
monolithic in that the state power is one and inseparable and is
given to only one institution, the National People's Congress- the
highest organ of state authority. Communists ridicule the theory
of separation of powers. Article 2 of the Constitution specifies
that the NPC, the local congresses, and other organs of state - the
executive, the local people's councils, the judicial organs and the
people's procuratorates- without exception practice democratic
centralism. Thus, the state system is both pryamidal in structure
and centralized in operation.
Article 21 and Article 22 grant the state power to the NPC.
While Article 21 recognizes the NPC as the highest organ of state
authority, Article 22 affirms the NPC as the organ exercising the
legislative authority of the state. Since all power in the PRC belongs to the people, and since the NPC and the local people's congresses are the organs through which the people exercise power, the
state power is placed in the hands of the people's representatives.In
other words, other powers and authorities-executive,
judicialflow from the state highest organ. Theoretically, the NPC is the
only organ to legislate. Since law is regarded as the expression of
the will of the dominating class sanctioned by the state, it follows
that whatever law is passed under the name of the NPC requires
'8JMJP (July 7, 1954), P. 3.
19Liu's Report, pp. 34-43. Other discussions in Chao K'o-ching, "The Significance of Our People's Congresses System," Hsin Chien She, 2, (February
2, 1953), 1-3; Hsiung Hsi yuan, op. cit.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956]

THE CHINESECONSTITUTION

531

absolute obedience by the people. It is precisely for this reason

that the NPC becomes a mere instrument of the CPC.
It is true that both the NPC and its Standing Committee are
vested with enormous powers including sovereign power, legislative,
executive, and judicial powers of the state. However, the NPC and
its Standing Committee are restricted in their performance either
by the lack of means to exercise the power or by the fact that the
power is shared with other organs. These inconsistencies are not
mentioned in the Communist writings, but they are determining
factors in evaluating the true nature of the Chinese Communist
political system. Prerogatives and functions assigned to the NPC
and its Standing Committee are mainly of two types: those independently enjoyed by them and those jointly shared with other
organs.
Among the thirteen functions assigned to the NPC, only seven
are independently exercised, and the other six are powers only "to
decide"; namely, to make a choice of other organs' decisions. The
power to decide on general amnesties and on questions of war and
peace is jointly shared with the Chairman of the PRC. The office
of the Chairman of the PRC is a unique one and will be discussed
later. The power of appointment and the power of removal, although they appear great, are powers shared with the Chairman of
the PRC, and final authority rests not in the NPC but in the
office of the Chairman. While Article 27 (5) and (6) grant to the
NPC the power, upon recommendation of the Chairman of the
PRC, to choose the Premier of the State Council, the component
members of the State Council and the Vice-Chairman and members of the Council of National Defense, the power to initiate the
appointment does not lie with the NPC. The power of removal
under Article 28 follows the same pattern.
Under the Constitution, the power to enact laws is granted to
the NPC as its principal function. However, law is very narrowly
defined; hence, laws are few and are prepared in advance by other
organs of the state, leaving little legislative authority to the NPC.
The first session of the NPC produced only five organic laws, and
the election of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the PRC
who were nominated prior to the session by the deputies of the
NPC from organized groups. The election of the Chairman of the
Standing Committee, the President of the Supreme People's Court,

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

532

THE JOURNAL oi POLITICS

[ Vol. 18

and the Supreme People's Procuratorate at the first session of the

NPC was such a haphazard process that it in effect prevented
membersof the NPC from exercising sound judgment on the matter.
With regard to the power to amend the Constitution and to supervise the enforcement of the Constitution, the NPC is again dominated by the CPC. Since the draft of the Constitution itself was
prepared by the Central Committee of the CPC, any amendment
to it would follow the same procedure as its adoption. In other
words, the CPC is the only organ to initiate a constitutional amendment.20 Furthermore, the NPC meets only once a year and for a
very short period. Its actual legislative function is a formality.
Other powers which are granted to the NPC are those of deciding on a national economic plan and examining and approving the
state budget and financial report. These are also purely formal.
It is unthinkable that the CPC-controlled NPC would reject its own
drafted economic plan, the state budget, and the financial report.
(The draft of the first Five-Year Plan was passed by the National
Conference of the Communist Party in March, 1955, and by the
NPC in July, 1955.)
Article 30 of the Constitution designates the Standing Committee of the NPC as the permanent body of the NPC. This implies
that the Standing Committee may exercise some of the legislative
authority of the NPC. However, powers and functions granted to
the Standing Committee fall into the same category as that of the
NPC, namely, powers jointly shared with other organs and powers
independently exercised by the Standing Committee. The jointly
exercised powers are primarily shared with the Chairman of the
PRC. They are the functions of the Chief of State dealing with
foreign affairs, and of the Chief Executive in domestic affairs.
In matters of foreign affairs, Article 41 provides that the Chairman of the PRC represents the country in its relations with foreign
states, receives foreign envoys and, in accordance with the decisions
of the Standing Committee, appoints or recalls plenipotentiary envoys to foreign states and ratifies treaties concluded with foreign
states. Article 31 (11), however, concedes to the Standing Committee the power of confirmation. Another example of inconsistencies is seen in Article 31 (12), which permits the Standing Com20Constitutionalamendmentsrequire a two-thirds majority vote. (Article
29). However, the procedureof initiating amendmentsis not provided for.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956]

THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION

533

mittee to decide on the ratification and abrogation of treaties concluded with foreign states; but here again, the Chairman of the
PRC has the power to ratify and to abrogate treaties (Article 41),
leaving only the Standing Committee to endorse action. Among the
seven jointly shared powers listed under Article 31 are powers belonging to the Chief Executive in domestic affairs, such as, "to decide on the granting of pardons; to decide, when the NPC is not
in session, on the proclamation of a state of war in the event of
armed attack on the country or in fulfilment of international treaty
obligations concerning common defense against aggression; to decide
on general or partial mobilization; to decide on the enforcement of
martial law throughout the country or in certain areas; and to exercise such other functions and powers as are vested in it by the
National People's Congress."
Powers that belong independently to the Standing Committee
are in actual practice restricted to a mere formality. This is caused
by the nature of the organ itself and by the lack of means of legislating. While the NPC is the sole organ exercising the legislative
power, the Standing Committee is the only organ charged with the
duty of interpreting the Constitution and law and of adopting decrees. However, these powers are handicapped by two factors. One
is the wide use of decrees, decisions, and orders issued by the administrative organs. The other is the lack of means of legislating.
The Chinese apparently regard law as a judicial force higher than
that of other state acts. Law is the highest judicial form in which
state authority is manifested. Hence it is the highest act of state
authority and is reserved for the NPC only. However, this narrow
use of law is compensated for by the wide use of decrees. Since a decree is considered as an act of a higher administration based on
law, it deals with regulations and details of statements of principles
laid out by the law. By means of decrees, a law is extended to all
cases embraced by its meaning and content. Under this concept,
the highest administrative organ, the State Council, would make
liberal use of decrees once they are adopted by the Standing Committee.
Article 34 provides that the NPC establish a Nationalities Committee, a Bills Committee, a Budget Committee, a Credentials Committee, and other necessary committees. But only the Nationalities
Committee and the Bills Committee are functional committees

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

534

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

[ Vol. 18

under the direction of the Standing Committee when the NPC is

not in session. In other words, the Standing Committee has only
two committees for legislation,21 plus investigation committees
which may be constituted to inquire into specific questions when
the NPC or its Standing Committee deems it necessary. Since the
Standing Committee is deprived of means of functioning properly,
bills submitted by the State Council cannot be thoroughly examined. This in turn increases the issuance of decisions and orders
by the State Council. Such decisions and orders, unless they are
contrary to the 'Constitution, laws, or decrees, are fully effective
and enjoy the sanction of the state. This means in effect that the
exercise of the executive powers is arbitrary and is not checked by
the legislative power. The only possibility of legislative check upon
the executive organ is through supervision of the work of the State
Council and the annulling of decisions and orders of the State Council where decisions and orders of the State Council contravene the
Constitution, laws, or decrees. Since the Standing Committee does
not have the means of supervising the State Council and other
administrative organs, this provision is meaningless.22 The annulment of decisions and orders of the State Council could occur only
when an obvious violation of the Constitution, laws, or decrees is
committed by the State Council and when serious friction is created
between the two organs. Such a development is most unlikely in
a system where the Party controls all these organs.
The Standing Committee also has the power independently to
conduct the election of deputies of the NPC, to interpret the laws,
"Judging by the smaller composition of these two Committees (85 for
Nationality Committee and 33 for Bills Committee out of 1226 representatives)
and their minor political standing in the regime, their inadequate legislative
functions are justifiably doubtful. A comparison with the United States Congress will show the inadequacy of this arrangement. While the United States
Senate has a total of 14 standing committees, the House has 19 for legislative purposes, plus more than 7 joint committees and several selected and
special committees in both Houses.
22The NPC recently dispatched several inspection teams (Shih Ch'a T'uan)
organized by the representatives of the NPC to different regions to examine
the work of the country. The meaning of this action is not clear, and its
result is uncertain. However, it can be stated that the reports of these supervisory groups are not binding to the State Council and that since these trips
were arranged prior to the opening of the second session of the NPC, it may
prove to envisage a propaganda effect on the representatives, a means to arouse
renewed enthusiasm for a national program.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956]

THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION

535

to adopt the decrees, to institute military, diplomatic, and other

special titles and ranks, and to institute and decide on the award
of state orders, medals, and titles of honor. Except for the legislative nature of the adoption of decrees, all functions are merely
administrative acts which are part of the power of the collective
head of state.
An examination of the organization and functions of the Standing Committee provided for in the Organic Law of the NPC23 further strengthens the conviction that the Standing Committee is not
meant to be an organization for legislation. The Organic Law supplies no detailed regulations governing the organization and functions of the Standing Committee. It is particularly silent on procedural matters relative to legislative process and to the conduct of
meetings. Article 18 of the Organic Law assigns to the Chairman
the duty of presiding over meeting of the Standing Committee and
the functional committees. Article 19 vests in him the power of
nominating component members and the Secretary-General of the
Standing Committee, the position now held by P'eng Chen, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC and mayor of Peking.
These provisions enable the Chairman of the Standing Committee
to exercise arbitrary power over the Committee's affairs.
The Organic Law gives no impression as to the assignment of
duties to the members of the Standing Committee. Except that
their assignments are determined by the Presidium of the NPC,24
their legislative duties are not given. One wonders whether the
members are there for legislation, as the Constitution calls for; or
whether they represent the people in name only, without real authority. It is true that the Standing Committee is endowed with
certain prerogatives which make competition with the State Council possible. Experienced observers would discard this possibility
simply because the Communist Party maintains the unity of all
state organs. On the other hand, both the NPC and its Standing
Committee serve as a symbol of popular unity and as a legal instrument of the Party.
23Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo ch'iian-kuo jen-min tai-piao ta-hui tsuchih fa [Organic Law of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China] (Peking, 1954). English text in CB, 302 (November 5, 1954).
24Members of the presidium are elected at each session of the NPC and
perform their duties during the session.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

536

THE JOURNAL 0F POLITICS

[ Vol. 18

The office of the Chairman of the PRC exercises the power derived, in theory, from the NPC. It is here that all powers are
brought together. The Chairman of the PRC is a part of the collective head of state representing the state in its relations with
foreign states and acting as the Chief Executive in promulgating
laws and decrees in accordancewith the decisions of the NPC or its
Standing Committee. He is also empowered to proclaim general
amnesties, martial law, a state of war, to order mobilization, and
to grant pardons. The Chairman of the PRC commands the armed
forces of the country and is the Chairman of the Council of National Defense, which is the organ actually in command of the
armed forces. Through the power of appointment and removal
over the Vice-Chairman and members of the Council of National
Defense, he retains a close control over that body.
By far the most important aspect of his strength lies in his
power to convene a Supreme State Conference whenever necessary
and to act as its Chairman (Article 43). The organization and the
power of the Supreme State Conference are not provided for in the
Constitution. It is simply stipulated that the Supreme State Council
is to be attended by the Chairman of the Standing Committee of
the NPC, the Premier of the State Council, and other persons concerned. The Chairman of the PRC is to submit the views of the
Supreme State Conference on important affairs of state to the NPC,
its Standing Committee, the State Council, or other bodies concerned for their consideration and decision. This short article perhaps sums up the basic spirit of the Chinese state system, which in
all its features is a truly monolithic and totalitarian state. It is
worth noting that the Supreme State Conference is attended by the
chiefs representing the executive and legislative organs, plus the
most influential figures in the Chinese Communist hierarchy. It follows that the concentration of the decision-making power is further
reduced from one organ to that of one man. One who knows the
Communist documents well cannot help conceding that the least
described office is also the most powerful.
The office of the Vice-Chairman may be briefly mentioned at
this point. The provision having the greatest political importance
is contained in Article 46, which grants to the Vice-Chairman the
constitutional right to succeed to the office of the Chairman of the
PRC, should it fall vacant.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956]

THE CHINESECONSTITUTION

537

COURTS,
THE PEOPLE'S
IV. THE STATECOUNCIL,
PROCURATORATE
ANDTHEPEOPLE'S
Article 2 provides that the principle of democratic centralism,
as the basic principle of all political organs, governs the relationship
and operations of all organs, the NPC, the local people's congresses,
and other organs of state. This principle, stated by Mr. Liu Shaochi, "is explained by the fact that the exercise of state power is
unified and concentrated in the system of people's congresses." Specifically, it means two things: that the state power is based on people's representation and that the political system rests on a unified
and centralized system. The accent apparently rests on the word
"centralization."
Democratic centralism applicable to the state administration is
said to contain the following principles:25
(1) Deputies of all people's congresses are elected by the people,
supervisedby them, and can be recalledby the people at any time
in accordancewith law.
(2) The appointment of the Premier of the State Council and its
component members is decided by the NPC. Members of the
People's Councils are elected by the local people's congresses.
The NPC and all the local people'scongressesreservethe right to
recall the elected officers.
(3) Initiative and aggressivenessboth in the central and local governments are encouraged. However, the lower echelon of command
obeys the upper, the local organs obey the central organs. In
other words, laws enacted by the NPC require unconditional
observanceby all state organs, government workers, and all its
citizens. Local people's councils are accountable to the local
people's congresses,and the administrativeorgans are to make
reports of their work to the people's congresses. This principle
endorses a political system, under which all the administrative
organs, local and central, are included in a unitary and integral
system. This system also enables the participationof all peoples
in the administrationof national affairs.

It is true that China has always been a unitary state and that
the degree of centralization depends on the strength of the central
government. However, the nature of the centralized system under
the new Constitution is revolutionary, and its scope is undoubtedly
wide. The centralization of executive power is visible in the State
Council, which is the executive organ of the highest state authorit)
2"Chu Lo-ping, "Concerning Democratic Centralism in Our State Structure,",
JMJP (September 21, 1954), p. 3, and Yang Hua-nan, op. cit., p. 8.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

538

THE

JOURNAL

OF POLITICS

[ Vol. 18

and the highest administrative organ of state. The State Council

under the Constitution has much more authority than its predecessor, the Government Administration Council of the Central People's
Government of 1949. The present State Council is in itself the
Central People's Government, whereas under the Common Program, the Government Administration Council was only an organ
subordinate to the Central People's Government.
The great expansion of governmental control over all walks of
life has placed under the State Council the complete direction and
administration of government activities. An examination of the
growth in the size of the Government Administration Council since
its establishment in October, 1949, may also illustrate the rapid
expansion of government activities. The Council in 1949 was composed of twenty ministries, three commissions, and six other organs.26 They were grouped under the direction of four Committees
- Political and Legal Affairs, Financial and Economic Affairs, 'Cultural and Educational Affairs, and People's Supervision. With the
increasing tendency toward centralization, the Council was expanded
in 1952 at the outset of the First Five-Year Plan to a total of twenty-eight ministries, five commissions, and four other organs.27
Under the present State Council, there are thirty-four ministries
and five commissions.28 Article 6 of the Organic Law of the State
Council29 also permits the establishment of administrative offices
under the Council, without the confirmation of the Standing Committee, to assist the Premier in the direction of the work of the
State Council. There are already eight administrative offices with
duties ranging from the co-ordination and direction of public security, foreign trade, heavy and light industry, to cultural and educational affairs, embracing all the functions of the State Council
except foreign affairs and national defense. Article 7 of the Organic
"Newspaper Reader's Manual, (Hankow, 1950), pp. 75-104.
"7Organizational changes were summarized in Ta-kung Pao (Hongkong,
December 1, 1952), p. 7; CB, 263 (October 1, 1953).
28A list of the ministries numbered 31 plus 4 commissions as reported in
Jen-min shou-ts'e (Tientsin, 1955) and also in CB, 316 (March 7, 1955). Five
additional ministries have been added to the original 31 since 1954. The Third
Ministry of Machine Building was established in April, 1955, Wen-hui Pao,
(Hongkong, April 19, 1955), p. 1; the ministries of Coal Industry, of Electric
Power, of Petroleum Industry, of Agricultural Products Procurement were
established in June, 1955. The Ministry of Fuel Industry was abolished;
see KMJP (June 24, 1955), p. 1.
29Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo kuo-wu-yiian tsu-chih fa [Organic Law
of the State Council] (Peking, 1954).

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956]

THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION

539

Law of the State Council further sanctions the establishment of subordinate organs directly under the State Council to administer specific affairs. However, their activities and resolutions are subject
to the approval of the Standing Committee of the NPC. The directly subordinate organs number twenty-three, ranging from the
Bureau of State Statistics, and the People's Bank, to the Personnel
Bureau of the State Council, and the Foreign Exports Work Bureau.
This expansion of the State Council both in organization and in
operation no doubt enhances the power of the Council. The outstanding expansion of government activities is evidenced in the
planning and administration of economic affairs. Out of the thirtyfour ministries and five commissions, there are twenty-four ministries
and two commissions engaged in the administration of economic
affairs. Even the State Planning Committee which was established
in November, 1952, for economic planning was placed directly under
the State Council.
The abolition of the committee system, which under the previous
Government Administration Council was an intermediate organ of
control between the Premier and the ministries strengthens the authority of the Premier. The newly established administrative offices
cannot correspond to the previous committees under the Premier.
The previous committees were few in number, and their functions
were to direct the work of the several ministries, with a considerable
degree of independencefrom the Premier. Furthermore,the seniority,
in Party standing, of the previous committee chairmen contributed
to their power to direct the work of the ministries. Quite to the contrary, the present heads of the administrative offices are mostly senior ministers of the State Council, who may act as co-ordinators and
as channels through which the work of the ministries can be better
unified under the Premier.
The Premier's power of appointment and removal is now considerably greater. Not only can the Premier recommend the appointment of the Vice-Premiers, ministers, and other key persons in
the administration, subject to the decision of the NPC, but he also
exercises complete power over the appointment and removal of the
Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council, deputy ministers,
assistant ministers, and other personnel of the State Council, department heads under the provincial government, heads of a district,
consular officers, and other diplomatic officers. In brief, the Premier

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

540

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

[Vol. 18

of the State Council is the single head of the growing bureaucracy

and is the administrator of a centralized organ which exercises immeasurable executive power without legislative check. However, he
is responsible, as any other heads of the state organs, to the Chairman of the PRC and to the Chairman of the Central Committee
and the Political Bureau of the CPC, and, theoretically, to the NPC
and its Standing Committee.
The constitutional provisions governing the relationship between
the central and provincial and local governments are actually contained in all sections in Chapter II - the State Structure- with the
exception of Section 2: the Chairman of the PRC. This relationship is a centralized one with no powers left to the local governments
at all. Article 49 (1), (4), (6), (7), (9), (10), (12), (15) and
(16) of the Constitution will suffice to explain this point. This must
be read with the Organic Law of the State Council and the Organic
Law of the People's Congresses and the People's Councils.30 However, the centralized character of Chinese institutions can be specifically illustrated by a random selection of some provisions from
the above-named Organic Laws:
(1) The State Council leads, while the local governments obey. Article 49 (4) of the Constitution, Article 66 and Article 24 of the
Organic Law of the People's Congresses and the People's Councils.

(2) The higher organs enjoy the right to revise or annul inappropriate decisions and orders of the next lower level. Articles 31 (7),
49 (6), 60, 65 of the Constitution, and Article 6 (9), (10) of the
Organic Law of the People's Congresses and the People's Councils.
(3) The higher organs possess certain power of appointment and removal. Articles 49 (16), 65 of the Constitution. Article 9 of the
Organic Law of the State Council makes note of the appointment
of provincial department heads and other local officials by the
State Council.

Under the principle of democratic centralism, local organs are

encouraged to develop aggressiveness and initiative in administering
local affairs.3' This is provided for in Article 58 of the Constitu80Chung-huajen-min kung-ho-kuo ti-fang ko-chi jen-min tai-piao ta-hui
ho ti-fang ko-chi jen-min wei-yfian-hui tsu-chih fa [Organic Law of Local
People's Congressesand Local People's Councils]. English text in CB, 302
(November 5, 1954).
"1Thisis one of the principal elements of the Chinese administrative system.
"Developing the Aggressiveness and Initiatives of the State Organs," Editorial,
JMJP (October 8, 1954), p. 5.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956]

THE CHINESECONSTITUTION

541

tion, which permits the local congresses at every level to draw up

plans for local economic and cultural development and for public
works, to examine and approve local budgets and financial reports,
to protect public property, to maintain public order, and to safeguard
the rights of citizens and the equal rights of national minorities.
However, since local people's councils are the executive organs of
the local people's congresses (Article 62), which are not provided
with committees for legislation, the exercise of the above-listed authorities remains with the local people's councils. Yet the administration of local affairs is greatly limited by the fact that many
ministries of the State Council maintain bureaus at provincial and
municipal levels. These bureaus enjoy independent authority and
are responsible only to the central government. The rapid establishment of supply and marketing co-operatives all over China and the
direct management of most enterprises and industries by the nine
ministries of the State Council further restrict local people's councils' administration of their own affairs.
The launching of the First Five-Year Plan in 1953 was accompanied by changes in the political division of the country as a whole.
The abolition of the Administrative Committee scheme in the region
and the adjustment of boundaries between several provinces before
the promulgation of the Constitution may in part explain this impact. The establishment of the regional Military and Political Committee was an accomplished fact in 1949-50 after the Communist
military victories on the mainland of China. The dispositions of the
Communist forces were such that the regional division of command
was accomplished. Hence, the regional political division followed
largely the pattern of the military field commands, and the field
army commanders,except one, were placed in positions of chairmen
of the regional people's governments. It is equally true that immediately after the seizure of power by the Communists, a highly centralized government was not a possibility. The regional committees
were thus instituted both as a representative of the central government and as the highest local state authority. The regional government structure followed that of the Government Administration
Council, and the regional government exercised independent powers
in political, economic, and cultural matters.
The rapid conclusion of economic reconstruction, coupled with
many other reasons, rendered the regional political division of China
no longer practical. At the meeting of the GovernmentAdministra-

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

542

THE JOURNALOF POLITICS

[ Vol. 18

tion Council on November 15, 1952, a decision was made to change

this regional organization and gradually to abolish it altogether before the promulgation of the Constitution.32 The decision changed
not merely the name from Military and Political Committee to
that of Administrative Committee but basically set forth the move
toward the ultimate abolition of the regional set-up. While the Administrative Committee was to function continuously as the representative of the central government, it no longer functioned as the
highest organ of government authority. The jurisdiction of the four
committees under each regional Administrative Committee was reduced to a much smaller scope. Departments under the Committee
were reduced to bureaus, and many bureaus on economic affairs were
placed under the direct control of the ministries of the Government Administration Council. This transfer of regional jurisdiction from the Administrative Committee to the Government Administration Council greatly fostered the power of the latter, particularly
in the field of domestic trade and industrial development.
Along with the decision to make basic changes in the regional
structure, a State Planning Committee, a Ministry of Higher Education, and a Commissionon Abolishing Illiteracy were also established
as accompaniments of the announcement of the First Five-Year
Plan in January, 1953, and the preparation for national elections in
1953-54. The decision of November 15, 1952, was followed by a
series of orders transferring regional administrative personnel to the
central government and by a reshufflingof personnel at the provincial level.33 Such were the major government actions taken at the
end of 1952 towards eliminating the regional governments and
achieving the formation of the highly centralized State Council under the Constitution. The decision of June 19, 1954, finally abolished the regional Administrative Committee and prepared the way
for the integration of the central and provincial administrative sys32For the full text see KMJP (November 17, 1952), p. 1.
3"The establishment of the State Planning Committee transferred in effect
all the chairmen of the regional Administrative Committees to the Central
Government. Other key personnel involved in this shuffling were many. For
example, Sun Chih-yuan, former secretary-general of the Southwest China
Administrative Committee, Teng Tzu-hui, vice-chairman of the Central-South
China Administrative Committee, and many others were affected by this major
transfer of personnel. For details, see KMJP (November 17, 18, 19, 24, 1952),
pp. 1-2. Another major shuffling of personnel occurred in June, 1954, in
connection with this administrative adjustment. JMJP (June 25, 1954), p. 1.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956]

THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION

543

tems. The regional administrative system, however, had achieved

at least two things. It assisted in the rapid consolidation of political power of the Chinese Communist regime over China and prepared during this period a large number of trained administrative
personnel. These well-trained high officials were transferred to the
central government for the direction of this integrated administrative system after the abolition of the regional Administrative Committee. The semi-retirementof the older Communist Party members
and the rise of many promising young administrators and party
members no doubt added to the vitality of the regime.
Two other integrated systems under the Constitution should be
mentioned at this point, the people's courts and the people's procuratorates. While the Supreme People's Court, Local People's
Courts, and Special People's Courts are judicial organs exercising
the judiciary authority of China (Article 1 of the Organic Law of
the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China),34 the Supreme People's Procuratorate and local organs of the People's Procuratorates extend their power down to the cities and counties and
below. The judicial system is not meant to be independent. First
of all, people's courts are not set up mainly to protect the rights
and legitimate interests of the individual but are regarded as instruments of the state. Their tasks consist of adjudicating criminal and
civil cases and, through this, punishing all types of criminals and
settling civil disputes, thereby defending the people's democratic
system, maintaining public order, protecting public properties, and
ensuring the smooth carrying out of socialist construction and the
socialist transformation of the country (Article 3 of the Organic
Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China).
Secondly, judges are indirectly elected by the people's congresses
and are inclined to be strongly political. Finally, Article 17 of the
Organic Law of the People's Courts grants to the basic level people's
courts the right to set up a certain number of people's tribunals.
This provision further facilitates the employment of judicial organs
as a means of violence. Memories of the people's tribunals during
the land reform period and the "three-anti" and "five-anti" movements are still fresh in the minds of the people. Their arbitrary use
of power and wide use of violence are terrifying and sometimes in34Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo jen-min fa-yuan tsu-chih fa J[Organic
Law of People's Courts]. English text in CB, 303 (November 5, 1954).

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

544

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS

[Vol. 18

human. The Constitution, nevertheless, sanctions their use and

thus goes far to reduce the judicial system to an instrument of mere
force rather than of justice.
Article 81 of the Constitution grants to the Supreme People's
Procuratorate the authority "over all departments of the State
Council, all local organs of state, persons working in organs of state,
and citizens, to ensure observance of the law." Likewise, local
organs of the people's procuratoratesexercise approximately the same
power over local state organs, officials, and citizens. Local organs
of the people's procuratoratesand the special people's procuratorates,
however, are required to work under the leadership of the people's
procuratorates at the higher levels, and all work under the unified
leadership of the Supreme People's Procuratorate (Article 81).
Furthermore, in the exercise of their power, they are independent
and not subject to any interference by local organs of the state.
This unique structure of centralization resembles to some degree
that of the public security organs. However, the people's procuratorate organs are to exercise a check over the judicial organs, the
local state organs, and the public security organs relative to their
illegal interference with the rights of citizens (Article 4 of the Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates). To revoke an improper
decision of a people's court, the people's procuratoratesmay submit
protests and institute proceedings before the people's court. The
people's procuratorates may also supervise the administration of
reform camps to ensure their conformity with law. Article 19 of
the Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates35 further provides
that people's procuratorates organs in their proceedings may send
men to attend meetings of the relevant organs and to gain access
to the decisions, orders, files, and other documents of the related
organs, enterprises, co-operatives, and social bodies- The relevant
organs, bodies, and personnel are obligated to supply the necessary
information and explanations to the people's procuratorates. Unlike
the judges of the people's courts who are elected and accountable
to the people's congresses, the Chief and department chiefs of the
people's procuratorates below the provincial levels are appointed or
removed directly by the Supreme People's Procuratorates (Articles
35Chung-huajen-min kung-ho-kuo jen-min chien-ch'a-yuiantsu-chih fa
[Organic Law of Peoples's Procuratorates]. English text in CB, 303 (November
5, 1954).

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1956]

THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION

545

20 and 21 of the Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates).

Hence, the people's procuratorates are by all appearances a highly
centralized and effective weapon of control.
V.

CONCLUSION

The complete assimilation of the Communist ideology in the

Chinese Constitution is of greater importance than is realized. Such
a fact not only marks the rededication of the Chinese Communist
regime to the Marxism-Lenism ideology; it also illustrates how
closely Communist China patterns herself along the Communist
line.36 The Chinese Constitution as governed by this Communist
ideology makes possible a further explanation of the nature of the
Communist state system. The final elimination of democratic elements and the effective control over the national minorities are two
of many political means envisaged by the Communists for the final
establishment of proletarian dictatorship over the entire Chinese
territory. The scheme for the gradual transformation of the Chinese society into a socialist society has become a constitutional fact.
The Chinese Communist state system which rests upon the four
integrated systems is theoretically under the leadership of the NPC.
However, by granting joint power to the NPC and its Standing
Committee, and by depriving them of the means to carry out their
legislative functions and the power to supervise the other three organs, the highest state organ is reduced to an agency without real authority, whose power is easily exploited by the State Council. The
State Council, by virtue of its broad executive and administrative
functions and of its control over a growing bureaucracy, is without
question the most influential organ of the state. While the people's
courts serve as organs safeguarding state interests, the people's procuratorates act as instruments of control, providing the state with
extra supervisory power over the state organs, the people's courts,
the public security organs, and the citizens. All these four systems
are subject in reality to the CPC which, as the core of leadership
"6Substantial
differencesexist between the Soviet Constitution of 1936 and
the Chinese Constitution of 1954. Chinese Cummunistwriters have brought
out the notion that the two Constitutions representtwo dissimilar stages of
social developmentand that there are differencesin the organizationalset-ups
provided by the two documents.

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

546

THE

JOURNAL

OF POLITICS

[Vol. 18

of the state, exercises the real power of the state. The leadership of
the Party in state affairs is demonstrated by the following facts:37
(1) The CPC issues precise directions to the executive organs of state as to the nature and the method of work.
(2) Through the executive organs of state and their working departments,the CPC executes its policies and supervises the activities of the state organs.
(3) The CPC selects and promotes faithful and competent
persons (members and non-membersalike) for service in
the executive organs of state.
With the establishment of complete controls over the three other
organs, the CPC reserves for itself the exercise of the one state
power. In other words, the 1CPCis the custodian of that sole power
and exercises it under the name of the people. The newly established office of the Chairman of the PRC under the Constitution in
effect facilitates the further centralization of legislative and executive authorities of state in a single office. Such an institution may,
on the one hand, envisage the rule of a one-man dictatorship under
a strong Chairman, while permitting, on the other hand, the possibility of a collective leadership of state under which the heads of the
highest executive organ - the State Council, the highest legislative
organ - the Standing Committee, and the Chairman of the CPC
may be brought together on equal footing, preventing a competitive
struggle for power.
"7Hsiung,Hsi-yilan, loc. cit., (see note 4).

This content downloaded from 163.152.3.23 on Mon, 16 Nov 2015 02:07:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions