Regalado P. Samartino, petitioner, vs. Leonor B. Raon, Agustin G.

Crisostomo, The
Municipal Trial Court of Noveleta, Cavite, Hon. Manuel A. Mayo, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Cavite City, Hon. Rolando D. Diaz, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cavite
City, Sheriff Danilo G. Lapuz, Cavite City and The Hon. Court of Appeals,
respondents.

Facts:

Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving

sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who
passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her
one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under the name of
co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo. On January 25, 1996,
respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for
ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased her
share in the property to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that
the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused
to vacate the property despite demands therefor. Summons was served on Roberto
Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service of summons at petitioners
house, he was not at home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of
Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since
January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug
dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared
before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply
with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period,
inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program
and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.

Issue:

Whether or not the right of petitioner to due process is violated.

Ruling:

Yes. The trial courts failure to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file his
answer violated his right to due process. There being no valid substituted service of
summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. It
should be emphasized that the service of summons is not only required to give the
court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an
opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the
rules regarding the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of
jurisdiction. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is
elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first be
informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.
OEL P. LIBUIT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 154363. September 13, 2005

Facts: Joel Libuit was charged with the crime of estafa. Sometime in May 1993,
Domingo del Mundo delivered and brought his car (Chevy 2dr. HT: Plate No. EDD725) valued at P60,000.00, to the motor shop owned and/or operated by Joel Libuit
and Julius Libuit for repair, it was received by Jose Bautista, mechanic, but accused
Joel, once in possession of the said car, misappropriated, converted and/or
misapplied the said car to his own personal use and benefit and despite repeated
demands to return the said car to the owner, accused refused.

It appears from the prosecution evidence that sometime in May 1993, del Mundo,
brought his car for repair at the Paeng Motorworks operated by the Joel. The car
was received by Jose Bautista, a mechanic, in the presence of the Joel who assured
the del Mundo that it would be safe in his motor shop.

When del Mundo returned to the motor shop in January 1994, he saw his car by the
roadside while the engine was inside the shop. Bautista explained that the engine
was pulled out because it also needed repairs. Joel and Bautista assured him that

they would finish the repair work and deliver the car to del Mundos house after two
weeks. However, Joel failed to deliver the car. Del Mundo gave him another two
weeks. Thereafter, del Mundo returned to the motor shop and found that his car was
already missing. He reported the matter to the police, who discovered that Joel had
sold the cars differential and cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be
found.

Joel testified on direct examination. However, his defense counsel, Atty. Glenn P.
Mendoza withdrew from the case after his initial cross-examination. The
continuation of his cross-examination was reset to give him time to engage the
services of another counsel. Joel eventually secured the services of Atty. Jose
Dimayuga.

At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga failed to appear despite notices. On

motion of the prosecution, court issued an order striking from the records Joel's
direct testimony and declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence already on record.

Court found herein petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.

On appeal, CA affirmed in toto the decision of trial court. CA held that the trial court
never deprived Joel of his right to counsel as he was represented by a counsel de
parte, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza. When said counsel withdrew, the trial court allowed
the resetting of Joel's cross-examination to give him time to engage the services of
another counsel. It ordered the striking of his testimony from the records only after
his new counsel failed to appear at the subsequent hearings.

Issue: Was petitioner deprived of his right to counsel?

Held: Joel contends that the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio
when his counsel consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination.

The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no
counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at

the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to
arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice. When the time for the
presentation of evidence for the defense arrived, and Joel appeared by himself
alone, the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.

Since Joel was represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the
trial court could not be deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the
continuation of his cross-examination. Indeed, after his initial cross-examination,
the trial court granted the motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage
the services of another counsel.

The failure of Atty. Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to appear at the subsequent
hearings without reason was sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the
striking from the records of his direct testimony, and thereafter render judgment
upon the evidence already presented. In fact, the repeated failure to appear of
Joel's counsel may even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the courts
proceedings.

The appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation like the present case would be
discretionary with the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the
absence of grave abuse. This Court is convinced that the trial court had been liberal
in granting postponements asked by the petitioner himself. We think that such
liberality removes any doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Petition is denied.