UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.

FRANCISCO
JIMENEZ RECIO and ADRIAN LOPEZ-MEZA
No. 011184
[January 21, 3003]

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In this case the lower courts applied the Cruz rule to similar facts: On November 18,
1997, police stopped a truck in Nevada. They found, and seized, a large stash of illegal drugs.
With the help of the trucks two drivers, they set up a sting. The Government took the truck to
the drivers destination, a mall in Idaho. The drivers paged a contact and described the trucks
location. The contact said that he would call someone to get the truck. And three hours later,
the two defendants, Francisco Jimenez Recio and Adrian Lopez-Meza, appeared in a car.
Jimenez Recio drove away in the truck; Lopez-Meza drove the car away in a similar direction.
Police stopped both vehicles and arrested both men.
A federal grand jury indicted Jimenez Recio, Lopez-Meza, and the two

original truck

drivers, charging them with having conspired, together and with others, to possess and to
distribute unlawful drugs. A jury convicted all four. But the trial judge then decided that the
jury instructions had been erroneous in respect to Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza. The judge
noted that the Ninth Circuit, in Cruz, had held that the Government could not prosecute drug
conspiracy defendants unless they had joined the conspiracy before the Government seized the
drugs. The judge ordered a new trial where the jury would be instructed to that effect. The new
jury convicted the two men once again. Thereafter, Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza appealed.
They pointed out that, given Cruz, the jury had to find that they had joined the conspiracy
before the Nevada stop, and they claimed that the evidence was insufficient at both trials to
warrant any such jury finding. The Ninth Circuit panel, by a vote of 2 to 1, agreed. All three
panel members accepted Cruz as binding law. The Government sought certiorari. It noted that
the Ninth Circuits holding in this case was premised upon the legal rule enunciated in Cruz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conspiracy was terminated when the government seized the drugs?
HELD/RULING OF THE COURT:
In Cruz, the Ninth Circuit held that a conspiracy continues until there is affirmative
evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. The
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critical portion of this statement is the last segment, that a conspiracy ends once there has
been defeat of [its] object. The Circuits holdings make clear that the phrase means that the
conspiracy ends through defeat when the Government intervenes, making the conspiracys
goals impossible to achieve, even if the conspirators do not know that the Government has
intervened and are totally unaware that the conspiracy is bound to fail. In our view, this
statement of the law is incorrect. A conspiracy does not automatically terminate simply because
the Government, unbeknownst to some of the conspirators, has defeat[ed] the conspiracys
object.
We conclude that the Ninth Circuits conspiracy-termination law holding set forth
in Cruz is erroneous in the manner discussed. We reverse the present judgment insofar as it
relies upon that holding. Because Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza have raised other arguments
not here considered, we remand the case, specifying that the Court of Appeals may consider
those arguments, if they were properly raised.
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
NGO YAO TIT, ET AL., and CHUA ENG CHENG vs. THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA
G.R. Nos. L-9619 and L-9620
March 28, 1914
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Herein petitioners were charged for violation of Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 152. The Section
3 of said ordinance reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Visiting places where opium is smoked or dealt in prohibited. No
person shall visit or present at or in any place where opium, or any of its
derivatives or compounds, is smoked or otherwise used in or upon the
human body, or unlawfully sold, given away, or otherwise disposed of.
Upon a final judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting them on a new
trial, following an appeal from the municipal court of said city, of a violation of section 3 of
Ordinance No. 152, the petitioners herein are detained under a commitment issued and
sentencing each one of them to pay P100 fine, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
nonpayment.
In support of their Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, petitioners contend that, the
Supreme Court having already held in the case of United States vs. Ten Yu (24 Phil., Rep., 1),
that, before a conviction can be had under section 3 of Ordinance No. 152, "the defendants may
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prove, if the fact exists, that they visited the place described in the complaint lawfully and not
in violation of the provisions or the spirit of said ordinance," and that, in effect, it must be
shown, to sustain a conviction under said ordinance that the house visited was one generally
used for the smoking of opium, and it appearing by an affirmative statements in the decision of
the Court of First Instance that the house in question was a Chinese Club and was not
destined or generally used for the smoking of opium, and there being no finding that the
accused were unlawfully there, the judgment of conviction has nothing to sustain it and is,
therefore, absolutely void. That such being the case, a writ of habeas corpus will lie, it is
contended, as imprisonment under a judgment absolutely void is an illegal imprisonment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy to be availed of
by the committed petitioners herein?
HELD/RULING OF THE COURT:

While the authorities cited sustain the propositions advanced, neither the one nor the
other applies, in our judgment, to the case before us. It is admitted that the court had
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and that it had jurisdiction to try a person
accused of violating section 3 of Ordinance No. 152. There was, therefore, jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter. It is equally undoubted that, if the acts of the petitioners
constituted the crime defined in that ordinance, they were properly convicted. It having been
demonstrated by the evidence, as stated in the decision of the trial court, that the petitioners
were found in the club house in question and that opium was being smoked therein, it became
the duty of the court to determine, by he exercise of its judicial functions, whether such acts
constituted the crime defined by the ordinance. This was a judicial determination admittedly
within the jurisdiction and authority of the court to make. That being so, the exercise of that
jurisdiction would not result in void judgment, provided the court kept within the limits thereof.
In the determination of the case before it, it is clear that the court kept fully within the limits of
its jurisdiction and, exercising the authority which it had a right to exercise within that
jurisdiction, determined the question whether the acts developed by the evidence fell within the
prohibition of the ordinance. This same question is one which is passed upon by a court every
time it tries a criminal cause. That is one of the necessary adjudications. If it is to be held that
a wrong determination of that question deprives the court of jurisdiction, then the correctness
of a judgment of conviction in a criminal case will nearly always be determined by a writ
of habeas corpus. ( Ex parteCoy, 127 U.S., 731.) This, of course, is not the function of that writ,
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and makers of legislation and constitutions which preserve the writ never intended that it
should be used in that manner and for that purpose.
It is urged that, in view of the decisions of this court in the case of the City of Manila vs.
Rizal (p. 50, ante), the action should have been in the name of the United States and not the
city of Manila; and that, the action having been wrongly entitled, the court acquired no
jurisdiction of the person or the subject matter of the action and that its judgment of conviction
was absolutely void. This being the case, it is argued, habeas corpus will lie as the
imprisonment is illegal.
We cannot agree with this contention. The bringing of the action in the name of the city
of Manila instead of the United States is an error merely and not a jurisdictional defect. It is not
similar to the case where, as claimed by petitioners, an information is filed by a person who is
not authorized in law to file it. The fact that the city of Manila was the plaintiff in the action
does not signify that said city was the person who signed and filed the information. The
accused where prosecuted by the same officials, before the same court, and in the same
manner as they would have been if the action had been brought in the name of the United
States, and they received the benefits of the same rights and the same privileges which they
would have received if the action had been properly entitled. They have been in no sense injured
or prejudiced.
The defect is one which could have been cured at any stage of the trial by an amendment
on the motion of the court itself or upon the motion of any person interested in the prosecution.
Defects of that character which are not taken advantage of in the court below in the manner
prescribed by law cannot be raised for the first time here, and especially in a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus was not intended and cannot be used to correct mere errors or
defects in proceedings, and accordingly does not lie in the present application.
The writ is denied.

JESUS T. TANCHANCO
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 141675-96
November 25, 2005

and

ROMEO

R.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

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LACSON

versus

THE

HONORABLE

Tanchanco served as NFA Administrator from 1972 to 1986, during the presidency of
Ferdinand Marcos. His co-petitioner Romeo Lacson (Lacson) was the Deputy Administrator of
the NFA when he was the Administrator.
On 6 May 1988, Tanchanco and the PCGG entered into a Cooperation
Agreement, occasioned by the desire of Tanchanco to cooperate with the Philippine government
in connection with the latters efforts in the location and pursuit of government properties
purloined by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, their agents and others who hold property on their
behalf. In the Cooperation Agreement, the parties stipulated as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants contained herein
and intending to be legally bound hereby, the parties agree as follows:
1.

Tanchanco

shall

cooperate

with

any

and

all

Philippine

Government investigations or prosecutions pursuant to Executive Order No. 1;

2.

Cooperation means that Tanchanco shall provide complete, candid

and absolutely truthful disclosures, in response to any and all questions and
inquiries that may be put to him/her in connection with the Philippines
investigations, civil actions, criminal prosecutions, or any other proceedings whether
in the Philippines, the United States or elsewhere. Further, upon the request of the
Philippines, Tanchanco will offer such cooperation in investigations and proceedings
brought by other governments, including but not limited to the United States and
Switzerland;
Cooperation also means a disgorgement of assets, if any, acquired in violation of
Philippine laws, rules and regulations. Cooperation further means a full disclosure of
assets and liabilities, beneficially owned by Tanchanco. Any assets not therein listed
as Tanchancos personal property, and thereafter discovered to be in Tanchancos name
or under his/her legal or beneficial control, directly or indirectly, as of the date of this
Agreement, shall become the property of the PCGG.
3.

Should any of Tanchancos statements or testimonies be false,

misleading or materially incomplete, or should Tanchanco knowingly fail to act with

total honesty and candor in any such matters, the Philippines shall no longer be
bound by any of its representations contained herein. Immunities and other
considerations granted in reliance thereof, shall be null and void.
In return for the above, the Philippines hereby represents and agrees as follows:

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(1)

At a time to be mutually agreed upon between

Tanchanco and the Philippines, the Philippines shall move to

dismiss all actions that are presently pending against Tanchanco
before the Sandiganbayan and any such other courts;
(2)

The Philippines shall lift any sequestration orders

against Tanchancos properties, if any, and rescind hold orders it may

have issued against his/her actions;
(3)

The Philippines shall not bring any additional civil

or criminal charges against Tanchanco, arising from:

(A)

Service

in

or

for

the

Marcos

government;
(B)

Any

other

actions

revealed

by

Tanchanco pursuant to his/her cooperation as defined in

this Agreement.
Significantly, Tanchanco was called upon as one of the witnesses for the prosecution in
the case filed against Imelda Marcos in New York for violation of the so-called RICO Act. It
appears that his testimony was elicited concerning the transfer of P10,000,000.00 rebate
obtained by the NFA from the Philippine National Lines to the Security Bank, as well as the
matter of the use of discretionary and/or intelligence funds by the Marcos administration
involving the funds of the NFA during Tanchancos administration.
Nonetheless, a criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 16950, was filed in 1991
against Tanchanco with the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds in the amount
of P10,000,000.00 from the Philippine National Bank. Tanchanco filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation, wherein he argued that the case should be dismissed as he had been granted
immunity from the said suit by the PCGG. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan First Division agreed
with Tanchanco and in a Resolution dated 27 October 2000, the case was ordered dismissed.
However, Criminal Case No. 16950 proved to be only just one of several attempts of the
government to prosecute Tanchanco. In 1997, a total of 22 Informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Tanchanco. He was charged with 21 counts of Malversation of Public
Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and one count of Failure of Accountable
Officer to Render Accounts under Article 218 of the same Code. Lacson was charged as a codefendant in four of the informations for Malversation of Public Funds. These cases were
consolidated and raffled to the Sandiganbayan Second Division. On 2 September 1997,
Tanchanco and Lacson pleaded not guilty to all of the charges.

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On 26 November 1997, Tanchanco and Lacson filed a Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss all
22 cases, citing as basis the Cooperation Agreement which was said to have granted immunity
to Tanchanco from criminal prosecution.
Still, the motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan examined
Section 5 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 14, which empowered the PCGG to grant immunity from
criminal prosecution, and ruled that the grant of immunity by the PCGG pertained only to
offenses which may arise from the act of a person testifying or giving information in connection
with the recovery of supposed ill-gotten wealth. The Sandiganbayan likewise concluded that
even assuming the immunity granted by the Cooperation Agreement covered the offenses
charged against Tanchanco, the same could not benefit Lacson, as he was not a party to the
immunity agreement.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Tanchanco and Lacson, however, the same was
denied.
Hence, this Petition by the Petitioners arguing that the grant of immunity under
the Cooperation Agreement encompassed the subject charges.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jesus T. Tanchanco and Romeo R. Lacson can be granted immunity
under the Cooperation Agreement?
RULLING:
Tanchanco is entitled to immunity.
We hold that Cooperation Agreement, validly undertaken between the PCGG and
Tanchanco as it was, precludes the prosecution of Tanchanco under the subject changes.
The Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the charges
despite its lack of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case against Tanchanco. The present
petition, in so far as it relates to Tanchanco, must be granted. It goes without saying though
that this ruling does not shield all grantees under section 5 of E.O No.14-A from all kinds of
criminal prosecution. The extent of immunity available to each particular grantee depends
on their respective immunity agreements with the PCGG and the surrounding facts.
Lacson Not Entitled to Immunity.
It may seem unsettling to some that Lacson will have to endure criminal prosecution
while Tanchanco would be discharged, or that Tanchanco will need not answer for whatever
culpable acts of his during his service in the Marcos government. Yet the Court is not the
guarantor of karmic warrants, but only of legal ones. The Cooperation Agreement, entered into
in the judgment of the State that it would serve a higher end of justice, is a valid document,
enforceable as to Tanchanco before this Court and other courts of the land.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Court hereby orders the
DISMISSAL of the SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES INSOFAR AS PETITIONER JESUS TANCHANCO
IS CONCERNED. No pronouncement as to costs.

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