Professional Documents
Culture Documents
89-3607-16
INTRODUCTION
1 Original Petitioner is Vicki G. Flores (hereinafter the “Petitioner”); Respondent is James Lee
“Plaintiff”). There is one non-party, (Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, by and through
agents in his employ) that continually attempts to unlawfully enter the jurisdiction of the court by
fraud.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY IN MEMORIA
2 It is a well-established practice and policy of the 16TH District Court and the Denton Courts
to discriminate and act with specific bias and prejudice and malice aforethought against
3 It is also common knowledge throughout North Texas, and well documented by numerous
complaints filed with the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, record of the court, and
the press, that judges presiding over 16TH Judicial District Court of Texas in Denton County, as
well as the Denton County Courts have regularly engaged in conduct that violates civil and
criminal statutes, the rules of court and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
4 It is also well-established that the 16TH Judicial District court has used or induced the
improper use of authority and power, or criminal acts of the court’s coordinator Kelly Smith and
district attorney Bruce Isaacks in order to aid in the concealment of proceedings in which:
4.1 the presiding judge has predetermined the outcomes of cases prior to hearing or trial,
determinations,
4.3 or the presiding judge predisposed a case to political favor in order to conceal fraud and
other crimes committed by parties and/or by their lawyers.
5 On or about October 28, 2003, the court coordinator, KELLY SMITH, despatched a notice
with her signature affixed thereto, through the United States Postal Service, dated Thursday,
October 28, 2003 on the letterhead of Carmen Rivera-Worley, District Judge. The notice advised
the Plaintiff Lance Flores of a setting of a “NON-JURY TRIAL” to hear the merits on the court’s
motion for dismissal for want of prosecution. The original Petitioner, Vicki G. Flores was not
made for the acquisition of evidence for review by the Texas State Commission on Judicial
Conduct and the Travis County District Attorney by an independent observer (hereinafter “the
Observer).1 During the inquiry the Observer records, from a statement made by Court
Coordinator, Kelly Smith, that Katrina W. English,2 urged SMITH to set a hearing to dismiss the
7 On January 30, 2002, Katrina W. English, inscribed her name to and filed a “Motion to
Clarify and Reduce Unpaid Child Support to Judgment in behalf of John Cornyn, then Attorney
General of Texas (hereinafter, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, the “OAG”), to
unlawfully and illegally cause the taking of funds from the Petitioner Vicki G. Flores without
standing to do so. At the hest of James Lee Kitchen,3 Howard G. Baldwin Jr., Brian R. Burton,
Joseph Sarpong, Marissa L. Balus, and Katrina W. English initiated a continuous course of
8 On December 12, 2003, the Petitioner Vicki G. Flores moved the Court on a plea of privilege
1 See, Observer’s bystander affidavit; also, another similarly filed with the House Committee on Judicial Affairs, and the
to transfer venue showing also:
8.1 that the Court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over actions of the OAG in the 16TH
District Court (a conjunct group of uncontroverted verified motions4 were concurrently filed
on June 21, 2002 by the Plaintiff, a period in excess of seventeen (17) months having elapsed at
prosecution was malicious with clear and obvious design to conceal numerous felony and
misdemeanor crimes, crimes of moral turpitude, where their acts were clearly and in violation of,
inter alia, the Texas Penal Code, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Texas Civil Practices and
committed numerous crimes and torts in violations of the Texas Penal Code, Texas civil statutes,
and federal crimes. (See Plaintiff’s verified pleadings of December 11, 2003)5
9 On December 11, 2004 Kelly SMITH, the court coordinator, without leave of, nor notice to
2 Katerina W. English is an assistant attorney general, who originally appeared in the lower court (Title IV court Denton
the Petitioner, Vicki G. Flores, executed the Fiat in the stead of the presiding judge setting a
hearing for January 8, 2004. SMITH also scheduled Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Testimony,
Motion to Quash & Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, and Motion for Sanctions for hearing
without his knowledge and for which he submitted no Fiat to set hearing.
County) for Greg Abbot, Attorney General of Texas. English, a person in her personal capacity and under color of law, who had
10 On January 6, 2004 Plaintiff dispatched an electronic communique to Kelly Smith,
informing her and all parties that he just became aware that a hearing was set for January 8, 2004
and that there were other parties that may not be aware that she had set a hearing date.
January 8, 2004 Hearing on Respondent’s Motion for Transfer and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike
no standing, fraudulently invoked the jurisdiction of the inferior court under the above-styled and -numbered cause. After the
Testimony, Motion to Quash & Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, and Motion for Sanctions
11 On January 8, 2004, appeared the Plaintiff and Brian R. Burton, Assistant Attorney General
OAG; Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley presiding; the court called the instant cause from the docket,
and before hearing argument and presentation of fact regarding the motions sub judice, the
original plea to the jurisdiction, motion to show authority, and answer & counter claims, were filed on May 22, 2002, the lower
following objections and motion for judicial notice were asserted as follows:
WHEREAS:
court relinquished jurisdiction and referred the matter back to the original trial court for disposition on the matters which were the
12 The Court heard objection (raised by the Plaintiff invoking the issue of his verified and
uncontroverted First Amended Motion to Show Authority collaterally attacking the void
judgment of December 6, 1991) to the appearance and participation before the bar of Howard G.
Baldwin Jr., Brian R. Burton, Joseph Sarpong, Marissa L. Balus, and Katrina W. English
wherein:
subject of the Plaintiff-Intervenor’s cross-complaint and motions.
12.1.1 the motion affirmatively plead the lack of grounds, standing and
authority of the OAG, (the Office of the Attorney General neither answering by verified
pleading nor answering under oath nor even challenging the objection in open court)
12.1.2 the manifest fact was presented as a matter of record of the court by
12.1.3 the supporting civil statute (Texas Government Code § 74.053) was
presented showing that the order upon which the OAG advance grounds and standing
was void,7
12.1.4 the supporting criminal statutes (Tex. Penal C. §§ 32.46 and 38.12) of
the criminal actions in which, inter alios, the attorneys (Assistants Attorney General) for
the OAG had engaged,8
12.1.5 the prevailing precedent set forth per curiam by the Supreme Court of
Texas in Flores v. Banner9 showing specific congruency between the instant cause and
Flores that the order upon which the attorneys for the OAG assert grounds for their
12.2.1 by acting intentionally with gross indifference the her duties required of
Petitioner’s children, Amanda Dawn Kitchen and Lindsey Diane Kitchen. Mr. Kitchen secreted his and their whereabouts until
her to
12.2.1.1 upon the showing in open court that the OAG had no standing nor the
Court subject-matter jurisdiction, strike the pleadings and dismiss the actions of the
authority, and
12.2.1.4 to strike the OAG pleading because the failed to show authority.10
12.2.2 Judge Worley callous disregard of the law is error, and violates Tex.
Const. Art.V § 1-a(6)A, and the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct which the continued
for the period he had possession of the children resulting from the kidnaping.
thenceforth.
12.3 Judge Rivera-Worley, knowing that her actions were in violation of the canons of
judicial conduct, criminal law and civil statutes, did wilfully refuse to comply with the those
canons and law, and instead engaged in a course of judicial misconduct from the bench after
4 06/21/2002 First Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Verified)
presented with and having knowledge of:
12.3.2 statutory law that left but one course of non-discretional action; and
12.3.4 misconduct by the lawyer for the Respondent and the lawyers for the
Attorney General of Texas, in that they had committed numerous and continuous
other respects;
12.4 By her failure to act on the Plaintiff’s oral Objection and Judicial Notice and Motion
to Show Authority, judge Rivera-Worley, wilfully abused her authority and power.12 (“willful”
relating to a judge’s conduct, has been clearly defined by our Supreme Court relating to judicial
misconduct,
06/21/2002 First Amended Answer to Motion to Clarify and Reduce Unpaid Child Support to Judgment, Intervenor's
see In re James L. “Jim” Barr, Judge;13 and also, In re Lowery14 ). By her willful and flagrant
disregard of State and federal law and rule, and her engagement in the concealment of criminal
acts of others she breached the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct by violating the following
12.11 Canon 3 D. (2) A judge who receives information clearly establishing that a lawyer
has committed a violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct should take
appropriate action. A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the Office
of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas or take other appropriate action.
Judicial Notice
WHEREAS:
13 On motion in open court by the Plaintiff to take judicial notice, the Court took notice of
Plaintiff’s uncontroverted verified pleadings:
14 First Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction & Collateral Attack wherein
it irrefutably establishes:
06/21/2002 First Amended Motion to Show Authority (Verified)
14.1 that on 10/18/1991 the Plaintiff, timely filed a PLEA IN INTERVENTION15 prior to
a judgment being rendered in the above-styled cause pursuant to the TRCP Rule 60, with service
had pursuant to TRCP 21 and 21a, pleading a justiciable interest in the on-going suit;16
assignment of visiting judge Barbara Culver Clack18 precluding her from taking any
action other than the function of disqualifying herself from the case;
14.1.2 that on 12/02/1991, the day of the hearing, prior to docket call, prior to
the visiting judge being seated, and prior to the calling the case, the Objection, was
5 12/11/2003 Motion to Strike Testimony, Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, Motion for Sanctions,
presented in hand to Barbara Culver Clack; and
14.1.3 that the instruments presented were verified copies from the records of
the Court and that the Plea in Intervention and Objection to Assignment of Judge were a
14.1.4 that a verified exhibit was enclosed presenting the court with the
and Collateral Attack on Void Judgment (Uncontroverted / Verified)
prevailing precedent set forth per curiam by the Supreme Court of Texas (Flores,
supra)19 with specific congruency between the instant cause and Flores.
WHEREFORE:
14.2 Upon collateral attack on void order and showing that the OAG had no standing nor
the Court subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court erred, through the direction of judge Carmen
Rivera-Worley who allowed the continuation of the proceedings without subject-matter
14.2.1 by acting intentionally with gross indifference the her duties required of
her to
6 See First Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction § II. FACTS, A-D, pp 3,4
14.2.1.1 upon the showing in open court that the OAG had no standing nor the
Court subject-matter jurisdiction, strike the pleadings and dismiss the actions of the
14.2.1.3 not permit the OAG attorneys to appear in the cause with out showing
7 Id. at § III. Argument and Authorities, A-C.1, pp 4-7
authority, and
14.2.1.4 to strike the OAG pleading because the failed to show authority.20
14.2.2 Judge Worley callous disregard of the law is error, and violates Tex.
Const. Art.V § 1-a(6)A, and the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct which the continued
thenceforth.
8 Id. at § III.C.2-3, p 7
14.3 By her failure to act on the Plaintiff’s oral objection by judicial notice of his
and rule, and her engagement in the concealment of criminal acts of others Carmen Rivera-
Worley breached the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct by violating Canon 1 {¶ 11.5 at 9}, Canon
2 {¶11.6 at 9}, Canon 3 B.(2) {¶11.7 at 9}, Canon 3 B.(4){¶ 11.8 at 9} , Canon 3 B.(8) {¶11.9 at
WHEREAS:
15 The Plaintiff made a second assertion of TRCP Rule 12, lack of authority of Brian Burton,
for the Office of the Attorney General, to appear in the instant cause was made by moving the
file a motion to show authority. TEX. R. CIV. P. 12. The challenged attorney has the burden of proof to show sufficient authority
court to judicial notice of his uncontested verified Motion to Show Authority & Collateral
Attack. Said motion indisputably showed by manifest fact, and clear and unambiguous law and
ruling, that Howard G. Baldwin Jr., Brian R. Burton, Joseph Sarpong, Marissa L. Balus, Katrina
W. English, attorneys for the OAG, and the Attorney General of Texas, have fraudulently
invoked the Court’s jurisdiction. Further, that the same individuals have intentionally and
to represent the client. Id. If sufficient authority is not shown, the attorney is not permitted to appear in the cause. Id.
willfully continued the prosecution of an action in which they have no grounds for standing and
have fraudulently invoked jurisdiction, committing, inter alia, the crime of barratry.
WHEREFORE:
15.1 Upon the court’s judicial notice of Plaintiff’s 1ST Amended Motion to Show
Authority, showing that the OAG had no standing nor the Court subject-matter jurisdiction, the
Further, if no authorized person appears, the court shall strike the pleadings on file.”
Court again erred by the direction of Judge Rivera-Worley, who allowed the OAG to proceed
without standing and the Court without subject-matter jurisdiction. Carmen Rivera-Worley,
presiding judge, continued a pattern of judicial misconduct by her wrongful use of the power of
her office;
Court subject-matter jurisdiction, strike the pleadings and dismiss the actions of the
15.1.1.3 not permit the OAG attorneys to appear in the cause with out showing
authority, and
15.1.1.4 to strike the OAG pleading because the failed to show authority.
15.1.2 Judge Worley callous disregard of the law is error, and violates Tex.
Const. Art.V § 1-a(6)A, and the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct which the continued
thenceforth.
15.2 By her failure to act on the Plaintiff’s oral motion and the court’s judicial notice on
Plaintiff’s answer, Judge Rivera-Worley, again, wilfully abused her authority and power. By her
willful and flagrant disregard of State and federal law and rule, and her engagement in the
concealment of criminal acts of others Carmen Rivera-Worley, breached the Texas Code of
Application of Law to Facts - “Rule 12 provides that the motion may be heard at any time before the parties have announced
Judicial Conduct by violating Canon 1, Canon 2, Canon 3, Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon
16 Plaintiff raised on judicial notice in open court, his uncontested verified First Amended
Answer to Motion to Clarify and Reduce Unpaid Child Support to Judgment, Intervenor's
Counterclaims and Collateral Attack on Void Judgment wherein it presented the court with
16.2 collaterally attacks the void order upon which Howard G. Baldwin Jr., Brian R.
ready for trial. Id. … The purpose behind enactment of the rule also weighs in favor of allowing Rule 12 challenges as soon as
Burton, Joseph Sarpong, Marissa L. Balus, Katrina W. English, attorneys for the OAG, and the
Attorney General of Texas, advanced grounds upon which they falsely asserted standing and
16.3 irrefutably establishes that Howard G. Baldwin Jr., Brian R. Burton, Joseph Sarpong,
Marissa L. Balus, Katrina W. English, attorneys for the OAG, and the Attorney General of Texas,
practicable after new or different counsel attempts to appear in a case. ‘The rule's purpose is to discourage and cause dismissal
have fraudulently invoked the Court’s jurisdiction and that same have intentionally and willfully
continued the prosecution of an action in which they have no grounds for standing and have
WHEREFORE:
16.4 Upon judicial notice taken on Plaintiff’s 1ST Amended Answer &c. showing that the
of suits brought without authority …’ Sloan, 693 S.W.2d at 784; see also Mobile Homes of Am., Inc. v. Easy Living, Inc., 527
OAG had no standing nor the Court subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court again erred on the
direction of Carmen Rivera-Worley, who allowed the OAG to proceed without standing and the
16.5 By her failure to act on the Plaintiff’s oral motion to take judicial notice and the
Court’s notice of his uncontested and verified 1ST Amended Anwer judge Rivera-Worley,
S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1975, no writ).”
wilfully abused her authority and power. Carmen Rivera-Worley, the presiding judge, thus
continued a pattern of judicial misconduct by her wrongful use of the power of her office;
16.5.1 by acting intentionally with gross indifference the her duties required of
her to
16.5.1.1 upon the showing in open court that the OAG had no standing nor the
Court subject-matter jurisdiction, strike the pleadings and dismiss the actions of the
16.5.1.3 not permit the OAG attorneys to appear in the cause with out showing
authority, and
11 Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Brigham, 184 S.W.2d 849 (These allegations were not denied by appellant by
16.5.1.4 to strike the OAG pleading because the failed to show authority.
16.5.2 Judge Worley callous disregard of the law is error, and violates Tex.
Const. Art.V § 1-a(6)A, and the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct which the continued
thenceforth.
16.6 By her willful and flagrant disregard of State and federal law and rule, and her
verified pleadings, and therefore under the specific provisions of Rule 93, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, must be presumed to
engagement in the concealment of criminal acts of others she breached the Texas Code of
Judicial Conduct by violating Canon 1, Canon 2, Canon 3, Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon
Judicial Notice on Motion to Strike Testimony, Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter
be true.)
Agreement Motion for Sanctions and Collateral Attack on Void Judgment
WHEREAS:
17 Plaintiff raised on judicial notice in open court, his uncontested verified Motion to Strike
Testimony, Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, Motion for Sanctions,
and Collateral Attack on Void Judgment wherein it presented the court with uncontroverted
evidence which showed:
17.1 that on, 06/28/2002, G. David Heiman the attorney for the Respondent Kitchen,
James Lee Kitchen and Beverly Kitchen initiated fraud against two different district courts
concurrently further establishing a willingness to engage in violations of civil and civil statutes
12 In re Whitfield, 115 S.W.3d 753 (Evidence regarding uncontroverted matters, including the existence of the
which include but not limited to pattern of barratry,23 et seq.
17.1.1 Heiman, and the Kitchens in a continued pattern of using the well-
known practice of the 16TH Judicial District Court to conceal criminal activity, attorney
17.1.2 the record of the 16TH Dist. Ct., shows, however, that G. David Heiman
arbitration agreements, was before the court in the form of verified pleadings, judicial admissions, an affidavit, and
attempted to extend the dead hand of the 16TH District Court of Texas beyond Denton
County in order to illegally and unlawfully circumvent the lawful jurisdiction of the
101ST Judicial District Court,24 in Dallas County. G. David Heiman, James Lee Kitchen
and Beverly Kitchen not only attempted to secure an unlawful order by deception, which
is a crime, but attempted to do so covertly; thætis, without giving notice to any of the
authenticated documentary evidence. The trial court abused its discretion in finding that Whitfield did not establish the
parties concerning a hearing on the protective order.
which no lawful notice26 had been given, attorney John B. Hawley, attorney G. David Heiman,
pursuant to TRCP Rule 196 which would have included of documents such as the Mary
Carter Agreement and witness lists in his original answer and counter claim and again in
his amended answer and counter claim; the purpose for which, was to prevent a trial by
ambush. Neither documents or witness were ever produced to the Plaintiff. Further, the
only way in which this hearing could have occurred is if Hawley and Heiman had
conspired with the Court in an ex parte meeting to hold the unannounced trial by
ambush.
13 In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525, The term "willful," as applied in Tex. Const. art. V, § 1-a(6)A, is the improper or wrongful
17.2.2 How could a hearing be had otherwise? If a hearing was not scheduled
on the docket, and there was no motion, and no notice, how could be heard anything?
How was the Court moved to hear what Rivera-Worley subscribes happened in the
hearing for the Agreed Take Nothing Judgment and Severance of Intervenor. There was
no motion for hearing on an Agreed Take Nothing Judgment and there certainly was no
use of the power of his office by a judge acting intentionally, or with gross indifference to his conduct.
motion for a hearing on Severance of Intervenor. The Records of the Court show no such
motions. The only way to have arranged the surprise hearing that day was for an ex
parte meeting to have occurred between the judge, G. David Heiman and John B.
Hawley in which they had a meeting of the minds and planned a trial by anbush in
which they would secret from the Plaintiff an agreement made between the OAG,
Heiman and Hawley. The Plaintiff later discovered a hand written construction of the
secreted agreement in the possession of the court reporter, never appearing in the record
of the court until the Plaintiff filed his motion to strike testimony and strike the Mary
Carter Agreement. The final version or rather the result of the Mary Carter Agreement,
the Agreed Take Nothing Judgement &c. which was secreted from the Plaintiff, and at
sometime thereafter, was entered into the record as an exhibit.28
17.3 that again, the Plaintiff raised a plea to the jurisdiction,29
17.4 that John B. Hawley, G. David Heiman, and George Michael Barnes, conspired to
use threats of continued (unlawful) prosecution by the strong arm of the State against Petitioner
Vicki Flores,
17.5 that Hawley, Heiman, Burton, Sarpong, Balius, English, Barnes, the Attorney
General of Texas and the KITCHENS, crafted a passive self-serving extortion or
tort actions, and criminal liability for intentionally misleading the16TH and 101ST District
Courts.30
17.6 that Hawley’s, coerced his client by intimidation an threats, to capitulate to the
Mary Carter agreement, effectively withdrawing her actions, and fulfilling his
consideration in the unlawful agreement he had reached with the judge, Heiman, the
Kitchens, and the attorneys for the Office of the Attorney General.31
17.7 that John Hawley’s intent and motives to extort the silence of Vicki Flores to
cover up his malpractice, fraud on the court, torts, and malice extends further in order to
prevent his client from disclosing his sexual advancements and torts of Offensive Physical
Contact and sexual advancements were the sole purpose for his contrivance to secretly
Thoma, 873 S.W.2d at 489-90. As noted in Thoma, willfulness involves more than an error of judgment or a mere lack of
Disciplinary Rules and cause for his public reprimand33 for
and
diligence. By way of further exposition, the Thoma Review Tribunal additionally noted that "willfulness" necessarily
17.8.3 action with intention to intimidate his female client in order to stop
encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, corruption, misuse of office, or bad faith generally, whatever the
ENGLISH, BARNES, THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS34 and the
KITCHENS35 included entering the court with unclean hands by their egregious and outrageous
acts and under extraordinary circumstances, that include but not limited to acts and conduct of:36
have known was beyond the legitimate exercise of his authority may in and of itself constitute bad faith. … A judge acts
17.9.11 official misconduct43
17.9.12 and other serious crimes44 including but not limited to the Texas Penal
Code (Tex P C) Under:
15 1ST Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction &c. at § II.B., pg. 3
Plaintiff-Intervenor maliciously;49
17.10.5 making a claim or defense for which there was no good faith argument
that the action taken is consistent with existing law, rules or is supported by a good faith
argument;50
17.10.6 a claim or defense that contains a knowingly false statement of fact;51
17.10.7 taking positions that unreasonably increases the costs or burdens the
case and delays litigation;52
17.10.8 using or relying upon false evidence and referring to that evidence;53
16 1ST Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction &c. Exhibit “1” PLEA IN INTERVENTION
17.10.9 failing to avoid assisting criminal and fraudulent acts;54
17.10.10 violation of prohibitions against improper influence of witnesses,
and obstructive tactics in general;55
17.10.11 falsifying evidence or counseling or assisting a witness to testify
falsely;56 and
17.10.12 habitually violating the Texas rules of civil procedure and
evidence.57
17 Ibid. at § II.E., pg 4
WHEREFORE:
17.11 Upon judicial notice taken on Plaintiff’s 12/11/2003 Motion to Strike Testimony,
Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, Motion for Sanctions, and Collateral
Attack on Void Judgment and presenting uncontroverted, verified, and affirmatively plead fact
17.11.2 that the attorneys for the Office of the Attorney General, G. David
Heiman, and James Lee Kitchen fraudulently invoked the jurisdiction of the court, and
17.12 AND, by failing to act on the uncontroverted evidence and clear unambiguous well-
established law the Court again erred on the direction of Carmen Rivera-Worley, who allowed
the Office of the Attorney General to proceed without standing and the Court without subject-
matter jurisdiction in light of the crimes committed and other violation of law.
20 Air Park-Dallas Zoning Comm. v. Crow-Billingsley Airpark, Ltd., 109 S.W.3d 900 (Applicable Law … “Any party may
17.13 By her failure to act on the Plaintiff’s oral motion to take judicial notice and the
Court’s notice of his uncontested and verified motions judge Rivera-Worley, wilfully abused her
authority and power. Carmen Rivera-Worley, the presiding judge, thus continued a pattern of
17.13.1 by acting intentionally with gross indifference the her duties required of
file a motion to show authority. TEX. R. CIV. P. 12. The challenged attorney has the burden of proof to show sufficient authority
her to
17.13.1.1 upon the showing in open court that the OAG had no standing nor
the Court subject-matter jurisdiction, strike the pleadings and dismiss the actions of the
showing authority,
17.13.1.4 to strike the OAG pleading because the failed to show authority,
Tex. Const. Art.V § 1-a(6)A, and the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct which the
continued thenceforth.
17.14 By her willful and flagrant disregard of State and federal law and rule, and her
engagement in the concealment of criminal acts of others she has brought bad light and disgrace
upon the Texas judiciary breaching the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct by violating Canon 1,
Canon 2, Canon 3, Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon 3 B.(8), Canon 3 C. (2), Canon 3 D.
(2).
Judge Rivera-Worley, LexisNexis™ annotated citations of Flores v Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500,
1996 Tex59 and WestLaw™ annotated citation of Morris v. National Cash Register Co., 44
S.W.2d 433 Tex.Civ.App. 1931,60 in support of his argument at bar. The aforementioned citations
presented clear and well-determined law about which there is no confusion or question as to its
interpretation where Plaintiff’s complained-of legal error is egregious that is a part of a pattern or
19 Judge Rivera-Worley’s continual and intentional refusal to abide by the law is not only error
21 Barr, Lowery, Thoma ,supra
by the court, but a clear abuse of power not mere indiscretion. Furthermore, her intentional
violation of Constitutional prohibitions of procedural and substantive due process are clearly
20 That Judge Rivera-Worley might argue that she is unfamiliar with laws or rule which require
her to follow specific procedural processes or prohibitions on denial of due process is wholly
unacceptable as legal argument of unintended error when it is clearly intended to violate federal
criminal statute.62 This has been particularly true in light of the U.S. Supreme Courts long-held
position in Screws.63 This is especially true in her own case, where she had previously held a
position in the Denton County District Attorney’s Office. She should have been, given even the
most limited competency needed to preform those duties, intimately familiar with constitutional
22 Whitfield, supra
prohibitions.
following bill of exceptions to the January 12, 2004, Hearing on Respondent’s Motion for
Transfer and Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Testimony, Motion to Quash & Dissolve Mary Carter
Agreement, and Motion for Sanctions:
23 See, Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Motion to Strike Testimony, Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement &c. §II,
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS
21 On the afternoon of January12TH, 2004, hearings set on the court’s own direction on January
8TH, 2004 where called from the docket on motions made by the original Petitioner and Plaintiff-
Intervenor.
22 Three observers attended the hearing to record the events of the proceedings as bystanders.
23 Prior to argument of the motions Plaintiff attorney and Petitioner attorney were ordered by
judge Rivera-Worley to be sworn before initiating presentation of their motions. The court did
not require the same of attorney G. David Heiman and attorney Brian Burton, for the OAG. The
court thus ordered the two parties with motions before the court to be held to higher standards to
argue and present evidence while not requiring the parties who had been shown earlier not to
have standing on numerous occasions in the OAG/Kitchen64 action.
24 At the time which the Plaintiff began his motion argument G. David Heiman raised an issue
concerning his possession of an Agreed Take Nothing Judgement and Severance of Intervenor,65
(Judgment on the Mary Carter Agreement) along with a copy of the envelope in which it was
delivered. Plaintiff, still at the bench, then presented the Court with the original documents,
including the envelope, to examine and verify the authenticity of the copies being entered into
the record. While before the bench, Plaintiff moved the court to note for the record the following,
and the same was entered:
25.1 that the same said instrument alleges that it resulted from the hearing on July 1,
2002. (The day the illegal Mary Carter agreement was constructed by G. David Heiman, John B.
Hawley and George Michael Barnes.)67
25.2 that the instrument was signed by Carmen Rivera-Worley on December 22, 2002
(six months, after a Mary Carter Agreement was created without knowledge or agreement of all
of the parties)
25.3 that the Judgment on the Mary Carter Agreement shows a Denton County District
25 See, Motion to Strike Testimony, Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement &c, §II, ¶¶ W thru W.5.
Clerk file stamp recording that the 16TH Judicial District Court (Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley
presiding) secreted the unlawful agreement and did not enter the Judgment on the Mary Carter
25.4 that the postmark on the envelope (in which Judgment on the Mary Carter
Agreement was delivered) bearing the return address of “The Law Firm of G. David Heiman”
26 Pursuant to TRCP Rule 21, 21a.
showed that it was mailed on Thursday, January 8, 2004.
26 Following, the Court’s receipt of the aforementioned Judgment documents into evidence,
refused to hear objections preserving errors of the court. By a mandate from the bench, Judge
Rivera-Worley issued notice that she would not hear “any more objections at [that] time”; a
period that persisted after numerous violations of procedural and substantive due process were
conjoined by Heiman, Burton and Rivera-Worley in an effort to estop probative evidence from
27 The Texas Supreme Court severing from the rest of the agreement and holding that null and void, in Elbaor v. Smith, 845
being brought before the court and entered into the record.
28 The court refusal to allow objections was initiated when Heiman and Burton interrupted the
Plaintiff’s proceeding alleging improper notice of the hearing. However, neither Heiman nor
prosecute their motions under oath, and that Heiman and Burton were not required to do the
same.
28.2 It was at this time Plaintiff raised again, an objection (under oath, resulting from
Judge Rivera-Worley’s order) to show authority and again to raise a plea to the jurisdiction.
However, before the Plaintiff could complete his objection, Judge Rivera-Worley refused to hear
the objection stating that she would hear no more objections “at this time,” thereafter
immediately proceeded,
preventing his objection to the obvious evidentiary error. Rivera-Worley, announced to the Court
that the Plaintiff’s motion was improperly before the court and she was going to dismiss the
Plaintiff’s motions.
28.4 The Plaintiff attempted again to object noting that a reference made by Heiman was
an apparent typographical error, but Rivera-Worley responded, “that’s not good enough,”then
again refused to allow Plaintiff to complete his objection and offer evidence. et seq:
28.4.1 Be it remembered that the Plaintiff’s motions were initially set by Kelly
Smith, court coordinator, for the court, not set by the Plaintiff, on December 11, 2003
without notice to the Plaintiff, then reset by the Judge Rivera-Worley in open court on
“The case before us reveals yet another jury trial and verdict distorted by a Mary Carter agreement. The trial judge, who
January 8, 2004 to be heard on January 12, 2004.
receiving telephonic facsimile equipment upon the transmitted document shows the
fully grasped the detrimental effect these agreements could have on the outcome, attempted to monitor the lawsuit by assiduously
transmission/receipt time to be “1/12/2004 9:48 PM FROM: DLPost2143811295
TO: 940-349-2311".
28.4.3.1 The transmission date code on the document Heiman and Burton were
alleging shows Heiman was not given proper notice, also shows it didn’t exist in the
known Universe at a the time they were alleging error based on a document that would
applying the guidelines suggested in the Smithwick concurrence. The conduct of this trial, however, confirms the apprehension
not even exist for at least another seven hours.
28.4.3.2 Yet, there, at bar, stood G. David Heiman, appearing before the court,
arguing improper notice, from a document he alleged was in possession, that showed, he
would not receive that document until 9:50 PM, later that night.
28.4.3.3 What did appear on the document, of more rational consequence, was a
expressed by Justice Spears in Smithwick : that these remedial measures would only mitigate and not eliminate the unjust
certificate of service showing Mr. Heiman was notified of the January 12 TH hearing, on
the same day that Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley set that hearing in open court on
29 Following Judge Rivera-Worley’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s motions which she had set
for hearing, the original Petitioner, Vicki Flores, presented her case, (Be it remembered, the
disclosing the true alignment of the parties, and revealing the agreement's substance cannot overcome collusion between the
Petitioner was ordered to be placed under oath to argue and present her motion) stating the
following in oratory:
29.1 “On April 10, 1991, Jim Kitchen filed a "Motion to Modify" with the court.
29.2 “On October 18, 1991, Lance Flores filed a "Plea in Intervention" under the
authority of the Texas Rules of civil Procedure Rule 60 and under the service authority of Texas
plaintiff and settling defendants who retain a financial interest in the plaintiff's success. In fact, Mary Carter agreements may
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 21 and 21a
29.3 “Under the rules, a plea in intervention cannot be stricken without a motion to
strike, and cannot be stricken if the intervenor could have brought the same action or any part
thereof of his own right if the intervention would not complicate the cause by excessive
multiplication of issues, or if the intervention was almost essential to effectively protect the
force attorneys into questionable ethical situations under Rule 3.05 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
intervener's interest.
29.4 “The court has already received two cases in which this [issue] is upheld – 793
SW2d 652, Guaranty Federal and 857 SW2d 580 – Tony's Tortilla [ Tony's Tortilla Factory, Inc.
29.5 “At the time of the plea in intervention, the opposing party was asking for a
Conduct, which is titled "Maintaining the Impartiality of the Tribunal." Comment 2 to that rule notes, regarding alternate
psychological evaluation of Lance [Lance Flores, Plaintiff-Intervenor].
29.6 “On December 2, 1991 at approximately 8:47 am, Lance filed an ‘Objection to the
assignment of Judge’ against Judge Clack, prior to the docket call, Prior to the judge being
29.7 “On the same day, Judge Clack refused to step down, and proceeded to conduct a
trial.
29.8 “Now – under the Texas Government Code 74.053 – when a party files a timely
objection to an assigned judge under 74.053, the assigned judge's disqualification is mandatory.
An objection is timely filed if the party files before the first hearing or trial over which the
methods of dispute resolution (like Mary Carter agreements), that "a lawyer should avoid any conduct that is or could
29.9 “If the assigned judge overrules a timely section 74.053 objection, then the judge's
subsequent orders are void. It is our contention that the order issued by Judge Clack is
therefore void, that the last valid order is the final decree of divorce, and that the attorney
29.10 “Objections under 74.053 were cited in the case Flores v. Banner 932 SW2d 500
reasonably be construed as being intended to corrupt or to unfairly influence the decision maker." See SUPREME COURT
previously presented to the court.72
29.11 “In that case, specifically under 74.053 b & d, it states – it allows a party to make
one objection to an assigned judge and unlimited objections to an assigned former judge who
was not a retired judge, which applies to Clack. 74.053 (d) states that a former judge or justice
who was not a retired judge may not sit in a case if either party objects to the judge or justice.
OF TEXAS, TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT art. X, § 9 (1990) [emphasis added]; cf.
29.12 “Therefore, because the order issued by Judge Clack is void, and the motion for
trial was never reset by Kitchen, this action should be dismissed for want of prosecution. The
motion to modify has never been legitimately prosecuted and is now moot.
29.13 “This means that the Attorney General's office has never had the authority to bring
an action against me and does not have the authority now. The AG has never filed any
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-20 (1979)(attorneys responsible for upholding adversarial
answers to any motions filed in this case, and under Morris v. National Cash register, 44 SW2d
433, all facts alleged in a motion sworn and not contested should be accepted as true. Under
the provisions of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 93N (6) allegations not denied by a party
system). The dissent acknowledges that Mary Carter agreements skew the trial process. This effect reasonably could be construed
v. Brigham73
29.14 “Because of the void order, I am still managing conservator. Now, when the
subject to collateral attack and may be attacked at any time or place by injunction or otherwise,
29.16 “Under the Texas Family Code 1106(b) - on the timely motion of any party and on
showing venue is proper in another county, the court shall transfer proceeding to the county
where venue is proper. Therefore, this court should transfer this case to Dallas County …
29.17 [testimony/argument was then interrupted by the Court] ”
complaint was made by G. David Heiman and Brian R. Burton, advancing his same heard story74
of the purloined notice described in ¶¶ 27 through 27.4.3.3. Again Rivera-Worley heard unsworn
testimony from the bar without submission of any evidence.
(¶¶4 thru 19 are incorporated by reference hereto) – The court erred through Judge Carmen
“As a matter of public policy, this Court favors settlements, but we do not favor partial settlements that promote rather than
Rivera-Worley’s failure to apply the law pursuant to TRCP Rule 12. Rivera-Worley had prior
knowledge that Brian R. Burton for the OAG had after nineteen (19) months not shown
authority.75 The had been made aware after objection was made by Plaintiff’s invoking and
securing judicial notice then moving on Plaintiff’s motion to show authority in the hearing on
January 8, 2004. Her refusal to act according to the Rule and allow the OAG attorneys to
discourage further litigation. And we do not favor settlement arrangements that skew the trial process, mislead the jury,
continue their appearance without showing authority establishes willful intent to deprive
Plaintiff’s of due process and violate the Rules of Procedure with malice aforethought. The
challenged attorneys had the burden of proof to show sufficient authority to represent the Office
of the Attorney General by affirmative defense made under oath.76 Rivera-Worley’s refusal to
require the OAG attorney to show sufficient authority, not to permit the OAG to appear in the
promote unethical collusion among nominal adversaries, and create the likelihood that a less culpable defendant will be
cause, and failing to strike the pleadings of the OAG on file (See Air Park-Dallas Zoning
FN
Comm., surpa, 10, at 7). Such constitutes:
32.1 POINT 1: Violation of TRCP Rule 12. Judge Rivera-Worley may not arbitrarily
overlook requirements of rules of procedure that brace the foundation of due process rights at her
hit with the full judgment. The bottom line is that our public policy favoring fair trials outweighs our public policy favoring
whim;77 rules of procedure must be applied ipso jure.78
32.2 POINT 2: Violation of Tex. Const. art 1, §19, Bill of Rights Due Course of Law
32.4 POINT 4: Violation of Tex. Const. art. 5, §1-a(6),81
32.5 POINT 5: Violation of the Texas Code of Judicial conduct Canon 1, Canon 2,
Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon 3 B.(8), Canon 3 C. (2), and Canon 3 D. (2).82
(¶¶4 thru 19 are incorporated by reference hereto) – The Court erred through Judge Carmen
Rivera-Worley’s specific intent to use the powers of her judicial office to accomplish a purpose
which she knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate exercise of her authority to
callously disregard of the law. At the calling of the hearing Judge Rivera-Worley had prior
knowledge acquired on or before the January 8TH hearing that the OAG had no standing and the
dismiss the action brought by the Office of the Attorney General on the behest of James Lee
Kitchen. Rivera-Worley’s refusal to enforce that which was required by law is a commission of
egregious legal error, a commission of a continuing pattern of legal error, and the commission of
33.1 POINT 1: Violation of Tex. Const. art 1, §19, Bill of Rights Due Course of Law
provision,
33.2 POINT 2: Violation of U.S. Const. Amendments V and XIV, Due Process
33.3 POINT 3: Violation of Tex. Const. art. 5, §1-a(6),
33.4 POINT 4: Violation of the Texas Code of Judicial conduct Canon 1, Canon 2,
Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon 3 B.(8), Canon 3 C. (2), and Canon 3 D. (2).84
34 ERROR 3 Denial of Due Process, Judicial Bias, Right to Fair Hearing – Pathology –
“Mary Carter agreements frequently make litigation inevitable, because they grant the settling defendant veto power over
Failure to Act on Prior Knowledge Crimes, Concealment of Crimes, Fraudulent
16.13.2 are incorporated by reference hereto) – The Court erred through Judge Carmen Rivera-
Worley’s prior knowledge and specific intent to use the powers of her judicial office to
accomplish a purpose which she knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate exercise
any proposed settlement between the plaintiff and any remaining defendant. See Bass v. Phoenix Seadrill/78 Ltd., 749 F.2d 1154,
of her authority. It was error of the court for Rivera-Worley to callously disregard the law and act
in concert to conceal and further state and federal crimes. It was error of the court for Rivera-
Worley to willfully and intentionally engage in the concealment of criminal acts where, inter alia,
those crimes include numerous counts of mail and wire fraud, and where such include sufficient
predicated acts or other criminal acts set forth in 18 U.S.C. §1961(1) which would invoke the
1156 (5th Cir. 1985)(Mary Carter agreement gave settling defendant veto power). Thus, "only a mechanical jurisprudence could
breadth and force of the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act. The court errs by
Rivera-Worley’s prima facie attempt to conceal her involvement in the criminal acts 85 of the
OAG attorneys, G. David Heiman, John B. Hawley, and James Lee Kitchen.86 The court errs by
Rivera-Worley’s use of the force of the State to retaliate against the Plaintiff and Petitioner
through the threat of continued unlawful prosecution of the case by the 16TH Judicial District
characterize Mary Carter arrangements as promoting compromise and discouraging litigation--they plainly do just the opposite."
Court, the Attorney General of Texas and others, and the denial to a fair and impartial hearing
which constitutes:
34.1 POINT 1: Violation of Tex. Const. art 1, §19, Bill of Rights Due Course of Law
provision,
34.2 POINT 2: Violation of U.S. Const. Amendments V and XIV, Due Process Clause of
Stein v. American Residential Mgmt., 781 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 1989), writ denied per curiam, 793
the Fourteenth Amendment - Right to a Fair Hearing.
34.4 POINT 4: Violation of the Texas Code of Judicial conduct Canon 1, Canon 2,
Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon 3 B.(8), Canon 3 C. (2), and Canon 3 D. (2).87
35 ERROR 4 Denial of Due Process, Judicial Bias, Right to Fair Hearing – Pathology –
unlawful Judgment created out of a Mary Carter Agreement designed to conceal wrongdoing and
skew the trial process, mislead the jury, promote unethical collusion among nominal adversaries.
It was error of the court for Rivera-Worley to callously disregard the law by her open bias and
hostility toward the Plaintiff when it was revealed that she had kept secret a document she
falsified by signing a the Agreed Take Nothing Judgment And Severance of Intervenor. The fact
that it was discovered in open court that Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley had been involved in
unlawful execution of that document does not give her leave to further deny due process by
purposely hindering the Plaintiff’s right to a fair hearing by extending her hostility to overt bias.88
35.1 POINT 1: Violation of Tex. Const. art 1, §19, Bill of Rights Due Course of Law
provision,
35.2 POINT 2: Violation of U.S. Const. Amendments V and XIV, Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment - Right to a Fair Hearing.
35.4 POINT 4: Violation of the Texas Code of Judicial conduct Canon 1, Canon 2,
Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon 3 B.(8), Canon 3 C. (2), and Canon 3 D. (2).89
“In his concurring opinion in Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. 1986) (on motion for rehearing), Justice
36 ERROR 5 Denial of Due Process, Judicial Bias, Right to Fair Hearing – Pathology –
"Willful" conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, corruption, misuse of office, and
bad faith where clear and uncontroverted evidence and well-settled law were presented to
the Court requiring but a specific course of action where that mandate by law was callously
Spears pointed out that "Mary Carter agreements should be prohibited because they are inimical to the adversary system, and
disregarded. (¶¶28 thru 28.17 are incorporated by reference hereto)90 During the Petitioner’s
recitation on her Motion to Transfer Venue, and Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution &c.
the Court erred by failing to dismiss the action of the Office of the Attorney General of Texas for
its lack of standing, and failure to show authority; further, because the Petitioner showed that the
they do not promote settlement – their primary justification." The truth of this statement has been recognized by commentators
36.1 Be it remembered that Rivera-Worley forced Plaintiff and Petitioner to present their
motions under oath. Judge Rivera-Worley’s obvious intent to require a higher pleading standard
of the Plaintiff and Petitioner on argument, an act in itself a violation of due process equal
protection and equal access. It is inescapable that Rivera-Worley’s acts were constructed by
and Petitioner from raising objection to preserve error, her attempt to bind their hands by
consequences for her. The Petitioner’s argument by the legal nature of a sworn oath, despoiled
and has been proven by the subsequent history regarding the use of Mary Carter agreements.…”
the effect of Rivera-Worley’s calculation. Instead of impeding Petitioner’s argument, Rivera-
manifest fact from the Court’s own record, positive law, and well-established and binding
36.2.1 that the order upon which the attorneys for the Office of the Attorney
General of Texas advance grounds for their standing was void;
36.2.2 that without grounds, the Office of the Attorney General had no
36.2.3 that without standing, the OAG continued pursuit of the case after
attempted to acquire jurisdiction by continuing to file motions and appearing before the
court in the instant matter, securing the unlawful Mary Carter Agreement and the
28 Plaintiff became aware that the Mary Carter Agreement had been made after later examining the court reporter’s records
Balus, George Michael Barnes and Katrina W. English willfully engaged in the crimes
and attempts to conceal those crimes identified throughout this instrument with John B.
Balus, George Michael Barnes, Katrina W. English, John B. Hawley, James Lee Kitchen
36.2.6.1 “ON the 1ST day of July, 2002 came on for hearing …” (however, the
record of the court shows there was no hearing, which is because there is no record of a
hearing being set and no motion setting a hearing on the alleged Agreed Take Nothing
document showing that any notice was given to any party of the alleged hearing – the
29 Motion to Strike Testimony/Motion to Quash and Dissolve Mary Carter Agreement, at §II ¶ A-Q, pp. 4-11
through its counsel George Barnes …” The Court was aware that the OAG had no
standing;
36.2.6.3 “… upon evidence offered and adduced, upon the arguments of counsel,
exhibit entered and other things and matters appearing before the court including the
express agreement of the Parties appearing …” Plaintiff-Intervenor had raised the issues
Such is error and constitutes the 1) commission of egregious legal error, 2) the commission of a
continuing pattern of legal error, and 3) the commission of legal error which is founded on bad
31 Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley’s collusion in the activities of Hawley, Heiman, and the OAG would not become apparent
faith and is:
36.3 POINT 1: Violation of Tex. Const. art 1, §19, Bill of Rights Due Course of Law
provision,
36.4 POINT 2: Violation of U.S. Const. Amendments V and XIV, Due Process Clause of
in the January 8TH hearing – It became evident four days later at the continuation of the hearing on Plaintiff’s motions to strike
36.5 POINT 3: Violation of Tex. Const. art. 5, §1-a(6),
36.6 POINT 4: Violation of the Texas Code of Judicial conduct91 Canon 1, Canon 2,
Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon 3 B.(8), Canon 3 C. (2), and Canon 3 D. (2).92
testimony and quash & dissolve the Mary Carter agreement. See Bill of Exception ¶¶ thru at and ERROR 4 at , infra.
The Second Heiman Tall Tale
37 ERROR 6 Denial of Due Process, Judicial Bias, Right to Fair Hearing – Pathology –
(¶29 is incorporated by reference hereto) – The Court erred by dismissing the Motion to Transfer
32 It would be later revealed that John Hawley had other motivation behind his actions which was to silence his client from
Venue and Motion to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution where it was shown and evident by G.
David Heiman’s appearance that he had been properly notified of the hearing. It cannot be
argued that the sufficient notice was not given. It was Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley that set
the Monday, January 12, 2004 hearing during the January 8TH hearing.
37.1 The Petitioner was not at the January 8, 2004 hearing because Kelly Smith the court
reporting his sexual advancements and assault to his client’s husband. This became apparent at hearing before the Texas Bar for
coordinator has signed the Petitioner’s Fiat submission without informing the Petitioner that she
had set the original January 8TH hearing. If Heiman wanted to complain of insufficient notice his
complaint should have been directed at Judge Rivera-Worley for setting a time in which such
37.2 Why would Rivera-Worley dismiss the Petitoner’s motion for being improperly
those and other allegations where Hawley, when questioned, plead his right not to testify against himself pursuant to 5TH
before the court for lack of sufficient notice when it was the Court that had set the hearing
37.3 There is only one conclusion that can be drawn. It is evident that the entire hearing
was a charade designed and contrived by G. David Heiman and Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley.
The certificate of service on facsimile notice sent to Heiman shows he was sent notice on
Amendment protection throughout the hearing. This is a known pattern of behavior by Hawley – it is evident by his previous
January 8, 2004. The telephonic facsimile was transmitted to his office at 9:48 PM which was
only about seven hours after the hearing was recessed and only five hours after the Plaintiff had
returned to his office in Dallas. Neither the Court nor Heiman could complain that the Plaintiff
had not been diligent in providing notice to Heiman. It was Carmen Rivera-Worley that had
reprimand where he previously assaulted a female client. See, The District 6 Grievance Committee of The State Bar of Texas v.
37.4 It would be absurd to even consider the ridiculous presumption of FAX
Date/Time/CSID/TSID with the 1/12/2004 – 9:49 PM date code related by Heiman and Rivera-
Worley in ¶27.4.3. It would indeed be absurd to consider except that if we recall, Judge Rivera-
facsimile service which proved he had not received notice because it showed he wouldn’t
John B. Hawley, 193rd Dist.Ct. Tex, Dallas Co. June 29,1983, Cause No 79-4174.
become aware of the hearing until he receive the FAX later that night. Inconceivable as it may
appear that an attorney could present such argument in a court of law and be expected not be
committed to a psychiatric institution for mental examination, it even more unimaginable is that
a Texas judge would receive such absurd unsworn testimony instead as the Petition advanced to
the Court that is was an obvious typographical error by the facsimile machine; recall, Judge
Carmen Rivera-Worley response to Plaintiff’s explanation at ¶27.4: “… that’s not good enough.”
37.5 A more rational mind would reason the facts be explained, that by the time Judge
Rivera-Worley realized the impact of her mistaken effort to corrupt what would otherwise be the
inevitable legal outcome of the motions, her abrupt termination of the Petitioner’s argument was
37.6 Even if notice had been improper, which has been shown it was not, it was far too
late to raise objection on Plaintiff’s motions because of irrelevancy, and error, even if such
existed was damnum absque injuria. That is, as it pertained to the action by the assistant
attorneys general for the Office of the Attorney General of Texas. By the sworn testimony and
the OAG claimed as grounds for their standing was void on its face and the Court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction.
37.7 It was at this moment in the hearing that it became inescapable that all the attempts
to conceal the federal kidnaping and related crimes of the KITCHEN’S, all the attempts to
35 for which it would be later evident that CARMEN RIVERA-WORLEY would join, infra. at
conceal the state and federal felonies, other crimes, torts, misconduct, malfeasance, acts of
37.8 Judge Carmen Rivera-Worley at that same moment was caught between Scylla and
Charybdis through her own arrogance; a monster at one end if she did that which was required of
her by judicial duty and law; the other awaited her if she chose to make one last effort on her part
to allay determination of her pattern of corruption and dishonesty. It was predictable which
37 “The elements of an abuse-of-process action are as follows: (1) the defendant made an illegal or improper use of
course she would steer. Judge Rivera-Worley, resolved not to lawfully act upon the motions
before the Court, and again engaged HEIMAN and BURTON to feign the same bombastic
argument they had concocted for the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s and the Petitioner’s motions. The
Court erred in dismissing the Petitioner’s and the Plaintiff’s motions, thus, denying due process
of the right to a fair hearing and extending her hostility to overt bias and misconduct that
constitutes:
37.9 POINT 1: Violation of Tex. Const. art 1, §19, Bill of Rights Due Course of Law
provision,
37.10 POINT 2: Violation of U.S. Const. Amendments V and XIV, Due Process Clause of
process, (2) acting from an ulterior motive, (3) resulting in injury to the plaintiff. See Bossin v. Towber, 894 S.W.2d 25, 33 (Tex.
37.11 POINT 3: Violation of Tex. Const. art. 5, §1-a(6),
37.12 POINT 4: Violation of the Texas Code of Judicial conduct Canon 1, Canon 2,
Canon 3 B.(2), Canon 3 B.(4), Canon 3 B.(8), Canon 3 C. (2), and Canon 3 D. (2).94
CONCLUSION
38 Given the overwhelming evidence by manifest fact, positive law, prevailing and compelling
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton, S.A., 766 S.W.2d 377, 378 (Tex. App.-
precedent, and affirmatively plead fact and argument presented there can only be one conclusion
drawn; that the entire judicial process is corrupt relating to the instant cause of action; that the
Office of the Office of the Attorney General of Texas never had standing nor the Court subject-
matter jurisdiction over the claims of the OAG; that the pleadings of the OAG should be
stricken, that the dismissal order of the Petitioner’s and Plaintiff’s motions presented to the court
by the OAG, if such have been executed, be withdrawn and stricken; and because the time has
tolled for the Respondent James Lee Kitchen to answer by affidavit and it is a matter of law that
the Court is now without jurisdiction of the above-styled and -numbered cause, the court must
transfer the case and order the records of the court transferred to Dallas County.
Texarkana 1989, no writ). The ulterior motive required by the second element does not supplant, supersede, or substitute for the
Respectfully submitted,
By:
Lance Flores
3314 Pleasant Drive
Dallas, Texas 71227-5419
Tel. (214) 418-6852
Fax. (214) 3811295
illegal or improper use of process required by the first element; both elements must be established along with the third. See RRR
VERIFICATION
STATE OF TEXAS §
§
COUNTY OF DALLAS§
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared R Lance Flores, a person
whose identity is known to me. After I administered an oath to him, upon his oath, said he read
Farms, Ltd. v. American Horse Prot. Ass'n, Inc., 957 S.W.2d 121, 134 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied);
the foregoing instrument “FORMAL BILL OF EXCEPTION” and that the facts stated in it are
within his personal knowledge and are true and correct. Affiant further attesting to the
authenticity of the attached exhibits and certifying same, said that they are true and correct
copies or facsimiles of the original documents.
SIGNED AND SWORN to under oath which witness my hand and seal of office, on this, the
Baubles & Beads, 766 S.W.2d at 378-79; Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd
______ day of ______________, 2004.
________________________________
Notary Public, in and for
the State of Texas
Seal
n.r.e.).” McCall v. Tana Oil and Gas Corp., No. 03-00-00347-CV (Tex.App. Dist.3 07/26/2001)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I personally delivered a copy of the foregoing instrument to Petitoner, Vicki G.
Flores, in hand at her office, on February 20, 2004.
I certify that I have sent a copy of the foregoing instrument to G. David Heiman, counsel for
the Respondent James Lee Kitchen, by telephonic facsimile transmission whose address is Suite
38 In Tidelands Auto. Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. App.-- Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the Beaumont Court
604, 1702 South Highway 121, Lewisville, Texas, (972) 436-0827, and whose fax number is
(971) 436-0210 on February 20, 2004.
Lance Flores,
Attorney for the Plaintiff-
Intervenor
of Appeals recognized a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Tidelands, an automobile club member
filed a claim for death benefits arising out of an automobile accident that killed his wife. The claim was denied because the auto
club claimed the wife was intoxicated. The husband became severely emotionally distressed because his wife did not drink
alcoholic beverages. He later discovered a lab report that indicated his wife was not intoxicated, and he later discovered evidence
that proved the auto club knew the wife was not intoxicated. The husband asserted a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress against the auto club and recovered $50,000 in damages. The Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed the award
and recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The elements of the tort as recognized in Tidelands are: (1)
the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, (2) the conduct was "extreme and outrageous," (3) the actions of the defendant
caused the plaintiff emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe. Chiles v. Chiles, 779
S.W.2d 127 (CA 15 Hou. 1989)
39 To establish fraud, a plaintiff ordinarily must prove, among other things, that the defendant has made a false
representation. See, e.g., Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977).
Fraud has been described as deception intended to "induce another to part with property or to surrender some legal right,
which accomplishes the end desired." First State Bank of Miami, 847 S.W.2d at 395.
The mere fact that the Plaintiff-Intervenor may now or in the future, seek damages more often associated with personal
injury claims, i.e., emotional and mental anguish, is not determinative of limitations of sanctions or awards for damages. In fact,
several courts have already awarded mental anguish damages or allowed claims for such damages in fraud cases. See Fidelity &
Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Saenz, 865 S.W.2d 103, 113 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 925
S.W.2d 607, 614 (1996) (concluding that evidence was insufficient to support award of mental anguish damages); Dillard's Dept.
Stores, Inc. v. Strom, 869 S.W.2d 654, 658- 60 (Tex. App.- El Paso 1994, writ dism'd by agr.) (allowing recovery of mental
anguish damages for fraud).
40 The barratry statute, Art. 430, P.C., which in part provides that: "Whoever shall, for his own profit or with the intent to
distress or harass the defendant therein, wilfully instigate, maintain, excite, prosecute or encourage the bringing, in any court of
this State, of a suit at law or equity in which he has no interest; … or shall willfully instigate, maintain, excite, prosecute or
encourage the bringing or prosecution of any claim in which he has no interest, for his own profit or with the intent to distress or
harass the person against whom such claim is brought or prosecuted; or shall seek to obtain employment in any claim to
prosecute, defend or collect the same by means of personal solicitation of such employment, or by procuring another to solicit for
him employment in such claim; … shall be fined not to exceed five hundred dollars, and may in addition thereto be imprisoned in
jail not exceeding three months. The penalties herein prescribed shall apply not only to attorneys at law, but to any other person
who may be guilty of any of the things set forth in this article …"
41 "Malfeasance" is defined as "wrongdoing or misconduct by a public official." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 968 (7 th
ed. 1999).
P.C. as revised in 1983, § 39.01 now states the penal offense of "official misconduct" in simpler terms, viz:
"(a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm another, he intentionally or
knowingly:
(1) violates a law relating to his office or employment; …”
42 Conclusion that a particular crime involves moral turpitude is one of law. See In re Thacker, 881 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.
1994); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex. 1980).
In the context of attorney discipline, we have consistently held that crimes of moral turpitude must involve dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or deliberate violence, or must reflect adversely on an attorney's honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as an attorney. See Birdwell, 20 S.W.3d at 688; Duncan, 898 S.W.2d at 761; Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d at 408.
43 “Twice in recent years we have had occasion to discuss the meaning of the phrase, "official misconduct," as used in
Article 4.05. In Robinson v. State, 470 S.W.2d 697, 699 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971), we held that official misconduct, for the purposes of
that article, was defined in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 5973.*fn5 Article 5973, still in effect at the time of appellee's trial in 1985,
defined "official misconduct" as any unlawful behavior in relation to the duties of his office, willful in its character, of any
officer entrusted in any manner with the administration of justice, or the execution of the law; and includes any wilful*fn6 or
corrupt failure, refusal or neglect of an officer to perform any duty enjoined on him by law…
(Footnote and emphasis added.) Although this statutory definition includes the term, "willful neglect," we do not construe
that term to include negligence. Rather, "willful neglect" refers to "the intentional disregard of a plain or manifest duty." Black's
Law Dictionary 1600 (6th ed. 1991).” Talamantez v. State, 829 S.W.2d 174 (CCA 1992)
44 As a matter of law the acts are qualified as a "serious crime" as that term is defined by rule 1.06(U). Under the
disciplinary rules, "serious crime" means: barratry; any felony involving moral turpitude; any misdemeanor involving theft,
embezzlement, or fraudulent or reckless misappropriation of money or other property; or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation
of another to commit any of the foregoing crimes. Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 1.06(U).
45 Section 1 of Act June 25, 1948, c. 645, 62 Stat. 683; as codified in part "Title 18 of the United States Code; see Title 18
U.S.C.A.
46 TDRPC (Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct) Rule 1.02(c)
47 TDRPC Rule 1.02(d)
48 TDRPC Rule 1.02(e)
49 TDRPC Rule 3.01
50 Ibid.
51 Id.
52 TDRPC Rule 3.02
53 TDRPC 3.03(a)(3)
54 TDRPC 3.03(a)(2)
55 TDRPC 3.04
56 TDRPC 3.04(b), Penal Code §§37.09(a)(2), 37.10(a)(1)-(2)
57 TDRPC 3.04
58 by and through BURTON, SARPONG, BALIUS, ENGLISH, BARNES
59 in particular, the Supreme Court of Texas per curiam: “We agree with Flores.
“When a party files a timely objection to an assigned judge under section 74.053 of [**3] the Texas Government Code, the
assigned judge's disqualification is mandatory. See Tex. Gov't Code § 74.053(a)-(c); Starnes v. Chapman, 793 S.W.2d 104, 107
(Tex. App.--Dallas 1990, orig. proceeding).
“The objection is timely if the party files it before the first hearing or trial over which the assigned judge is to preside. See Mercer
v. Driver, 923 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding); Starnes, 793 S.W.2d at 107.
“Subsections 74.053(b) and (d) n1 allow a party to make one objection to an assigned judge, and unlimited objections to an
assigned former judge who was not a retired judge. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 74.053(b) and (d); Garcia v. Employers Ins. of
Wausau, 856 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). If the assigned judge overrules a timely section
74.053 objection, that judge's subsequent orders are void …”
60 Head note [5] Appeal and Error
1175(5) Uncontested affidavit showing denial of motion to vacate judgment was error, appellate court must reverse and
render judgment vacating judgment below. Referring to:
“We are, however, confronted with a different question; the motion in question was supported alone by the affidavit of
defendant, and, so far as disclosed by the record, was neither contested nor was evidence heard thereon in open court,
hence as no evidence was heard, other than the sworn allegations of the motion, there were no facts to bring up in a
statement, and none was required. It is only in instances where motions for new trials are based on grounds specified in article
2234, R. C. S. 1925, such as misconduct of the jury or of the officer in charge, that evidence as to the truth of the grounds alleged,
is required to be heard in open court, and cannot be proven by affidavit, as is permitted in all other cases. Dallas, etc., v. Kelley
(Tex. Civ. App.) 142 S. W. 1005; San Antonio, etc., Co. v. Wells (Tex. Civ. App.) 146 S. W. 645; Texas, etc., Co. v. Tucker (Tex.
Civ. App.) 183 S. W. 1188; Hines v. Parry (Tex. Civ. App.) 227 S. W. 339; Southern, etc., Co. v. Wilson (Tex. Civ. App.) 241 S.
W. 636; Robinson v. Shockley (Tex. Civ. App.) 266 S. W. 420, 422, and authorities cited …
“As the facts alleged in defendant's motion were sworn to by him and not contested, they should have been accepted
as true. Durham v. Flannagan, 2 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 22; Thomason v. Mason (Tex. Civ. App.) 141 S. W. 1075, 1076;
Green v. Cammack (Tex. Civ. App.) 248 S. W. 741. We think the court erred in refusing to vacate the judgment on the showing
made by defendant; it therefore becomes our duty to reverse this holding and render such judgment as should have been rendered,
that is, vacating the judgment below, and it is so ordered.”
61 “While mere legal error should best be left to the appellate courts rather than to the disciplinary process, that
does not mean that legal error can never constitute judicial misconduct. Generally, there are three circumstances in which
legal error may be found violative of one or more of the Canons of Tex. Code Jud. Conduct. These circumstances are: 1)
commission of egregious legal error; 2) the commission of a continuing pattern of legal error; or, 3) the commission of
legal error which is founded on bad faith. …
“A member of the Texas judiciary may be found to have violated Tex. Const. art. V, § 1-a(6)A, by a legal ruling or
action made contrary to clear and determined law about which there is no confusion or question as to its interpretation
and where the complained-of legal error is egregious, made as part of a pattern or practice of legal error, or made in bad
faith. So long as judicial rulings are made in good faith, and in an effort to follow the law as the judge understands it, the usual
safeguard against error or judicial overreaching lies in appropriate appellate review. With respect to judicial disciplinary
proceedings, a specific intent to use the powers of the judicial office to accomplish a purpose which the judge knew or
should have known was beyond the legitimate exercise of judicial authority constitutes "bad faith" as a matter of law.” In
re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525
62 18 USC § 3 Accessory after the fact, it is a criminal offense if a person knowing that an offense against the United
States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial
or punishment; 18 USC § 241 Conspiracy Against Rights of Citizens it is a federal criminal offense if two or more persons
conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any inhabitant of any state, territory, or district in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so
exercised such right or privilege, such persons may be fined and/or imprisoned; 18 USC § 242 Deprivation of Rights Color of
Law it is a criminal offense if under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom a person wilfully deprives an
inhabitant of any State of his rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and punishable by fine or imprisonment for no more than one year.; 18 USC §§ 1961-1963 Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act it is a criminal offence punishable by fine or imprisonment of not greater than twenty years for any
acts or threat involving extortion which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or
any act under certain provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code including but not limited to § 1341 (relating to mail fraud),
§ 1343 (relating to wire fraud), § 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), § 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal
investigations), § 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), § 1513 (relating to retaliating against a
witness, victim, or an informant), § 1951 (relating to interference with commerce)
63 “The constitutional requirement that a criminal statute be definite serves a high function. It gives a person acting
with reference to the statute fair warning that his conduct is within its prohibition. This requirement is met when a statute
prohibits only "willful" acts in a certain sense. One who does act with such specific intent is aware that what he does is
precisely that which the statute forbids. He is under no necessity of guessing whether the statute applies to him for he
either knows or acts in reckless disregard of its prohibition of the deprivation of a defined constitutional or other federal
right. Nor is such an act beyond the understanding and comprehension of juries summoned to pass on them. § 20 of the Criminal
Code, 18 U.S.C.S. § 52, would then not become a trap for law enforcement agencies acting in good faith. A mind intent upon
willful evasion is inconsistent with surprised innocence. … Willful violators of constitutional requirements, which have been
defined, certainly are in no position to say that they had no adequate advance notice that they would be visited with punishment.
When they act willfully in the sense in which the Supreme Court of the United States uses the word, they act in open defiance or
in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been made specific and definite. When they are convicted for so
acting, they are not punished for violating an unknowable something.” Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
64 i.e., Office of the Attorney General’s Motion to Clarify &c.
65 hereinafter the “Judgment on the Mary Carter Agreement”
66 Plaintiff had received the same instrument by U.S. Postal Service standard mail delivery at about the time of his
departure for the hearing.
67 ¶ , supra
68 The Plaintiff was not informed of the filing of the order incorporating a Mary Carter Agreement until twenty-seven (27)
days after his verified motion to strike and dissolve the Mary Carter agreement and sanctions motion was filed.
69 An electronic facsimile notice of hearing sent to the law office of G. David Heiman.
70 Ibid.
71 FN
, p.
72 FN
, p.
73 Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Brigham, 184 S.W.2d 849
74 See, ¶
75 The original verified motion to show authority was filed on March 22, 2002; the first amended verified Rule 12 motion
was filed on June 21, 2002.
76 … because the Rule challenge was verified
77 The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have the same force and effect as statutes. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Cross,
501 S.W.2d 868 (Tex 1973). Freeman v. Freeman, 160 Tex 148, 327 S.W.2d 428 (1959).
78 "Generally, it may be said that the Bench and Bar may not lightly treat these Rules as 'merely procedural matters or
technicalities' as contradistinguished from statutory laws or well settled principles of equity. These rules have the dignity of
statutory provisions and must be observed as such. Like statutes, they must be carefully interpreted and applied. It is not
optional with trial or appellate courts to disregard them because they do not meet the approval of such courts. They are
designed to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of
substantive law. Little less can be said of any wholesome law."Pearl Assur. Co. v. Williams, 167 S.W.2d 808 (CA 1943).
79 “Tex. Const. art. 1, § 19. Due process of law applies to the method of making a judicial decision as well as to
protection of procedural and substantive rights. See State ex rel. Merriman v. Ball, 116 Tex. 527, 296 S.W. 1085 (1927).
Indeed, the protections granted by rule 681 are mere recitations and "tale-telling" without a proper judicial examination of every
issue in accordance with the law. Without a hearing, that examination cannot be had. Judicial curtailment of a constitutional right
or freedom cannot be justified in the name of efficiency or by the erroneous notion that the resultant benefit will be judicial
economy. Moreover, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge be patient and courteous to the litigants and
lawyers, and "accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, . . . full right to be heard according to law.
. . ." Texas Supreme Court, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 3A(3), (4) (1980).
In the instant case, the trial court terminated the hearing before Lyons rested his case and before Kramer presented its defense.
Counsel for Kramer objected, but was rebuked by a trial judge who refused to hear any further evidence.
The trial court clearly abused its discretion in the abrupt, capricious manner in which it disposed of this case. Kramer's first
point of error is sustained. In view of our disposition of point of error one, we need not address the remaining points.
80 Our Supreme Court has long held that … "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age
and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of the general public good, which regards
and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law." Hurtado v. People of the State of
California, 110 U.S. 516, (1884) …
and commanded the enforcement of fundamental constitutional rights against the state's encroachment by the same
standards applied against federal encroachment. Justice John Marshall Harlan in Taylor:
"When the Fourteenth Amendment forbade any State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, I had supposed that the intention of the people of the United States was to prevent the deprivation of any legal
right in violation of the fundamental guarantees inhering in due process of law." Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 599, 20 S. Ct.
890, 1014, (1899).
81 Provides in relevant part, that any Justice or Judge of the courts established by the Constitution or created by the
Legislature may be removed from office, disciplined, or censured for “incompetence in performing the duties of office, willful
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, or willful or persistent conduct that is clearly inconsistent with the proper performance
of duties or casts public discredit upon the judiciary on the administration of justice;”
82 Elaborated at ¶ at thru ¶ at .
83 Standing is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court's power to
decide a case. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54, 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 125 (Tex. 2000); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v.
Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 607 (Tex. 1993).
84 Elaborated at ¶ at thru ¶ at .
85 Chief Justice William Rehnquist for the Court in Bracy: “In the District Court, petitioner contended that he was
"deprived of his right to a fair trial" because "there is cause to believe that Judge Maloney's discretionary rulings in this case may
have been influenced by a desire on his part to allay suspicion of his pattern of corruption and dishonesty." … In support, he
submitted a copy of Maloney's 1991 indictment, App. 16-35, and a newspaper article describing testimony from Maloney's trial,
in which attorney William Swano described an additional, uncharged incident where he bribed [Judge] Maloney to fix a murder
case.” Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899
86 Id. “For example, Lucius Robinson and Robert McGee, who were involved in Maloney's corruption as a lawyer, later
facilitated his bribe-taking when he became a judge. United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 650-652 (CA7 1995), cert. denied,
519 U.S. (1996); App. 22-24; 54-55. As the government alleged in its proffer, "Maloney was closely tied to the [sic] La Cosa
Nostra prior to his appointment to the bench and . . . major organized crime figures looked forward to [his] appointment as an
opportunity to have a 'good friend' on the bench . . . [and] after his elevation to the bench, Maloney continued his close First
Ward/organized crime connections, fixing the results of several murder cases of import to organized crime."
87 Elaborated at ¶ at thru ¶ at .
88 “Were it possible to indulge this presumption here, we might well agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner's
submission and his compensatory-bias theory are too speculative to warrant discovery. But, unfortunately, the presumption has
been soundly rebutted: Maloney was shown to be thoroughly steeped in corruption through his public trial and conviction. We
emphasize, though, that petitioner supports his discovery request by pointing not only to Maloney's conviction for bribe-taking in
other cases, but also to additional evidence, discussed above, that lends support to his claim that Maloney was actually biased in
petitioner's own case. That is, he presents "specific allegations" that his trial attorney, a former associate of Maloney's in a law
practice that was familiar and comfortable with corruption, may have agreed to take this capital case to trial quickly so that
petitioner's conviction would deflect any suspicion the rigged Rosario and Chow cases might attract. It may well be, as the Court
of Appeals predicted, that petitioner will be unable to obtain evidence sufficient to support a finding of actual judicial bias in the
trial of his case, but we hold that he has made a sufficient showing …” Bracy, supra.
89 Elaborated at ¶ at thru ¶ at .
90 Ibid. “Legal error and judicial misconduct are not mutually exclusive; a judge is not immune from discipline merely
because the judge's conduct also constitutes legal error. From earliest times it has been recognized that "errors" are subject to
discipline when the conduct shows an intentional disregard of the law. No sound argument can be made that a judge should be
immune from discipline for conduct demonstrating lack of fitness solely because the conduct also happens to constitute legal
error. Judicial independence encompasses making mistakes and committing error, but was not intended to afford protection to
judges who ignore the law or otherwise pose a threat to the administration of justice.”
91 "Willful" as applied in Tex. Const. art. V, § 1-a(6)A is the improper or wrongful use of the power of his office by a judge
acting intentionally, or with gross indifference to his conduct. "Willful" is more than an error of judgment or a lack of diligence
and encompasses conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, corruption, misuse of office, or bad faith. In re Lowery, 999
S.W.2d 639
92 Elaborated at ¶ at thru ¶ at .
93 by and through BURTON, SARPONG, BALIUS, ENGLISH, BARNES
94 Elaborated at ¶ at thru ¶ at .