G.R. No.

L-409

January 30, 1947

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,

vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa,
etc., the Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed
by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and
comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized
by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1)
that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of
Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon
the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
ISSUE: WON Laurel can be prosecuted for the crime of
treason.
HELD: YES. Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution which provides that pending
the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the
United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe
allegiance to the United States", was one of the few
limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained
by the United States, but these limitations do not away or
are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way

that the people of each State of the Union preserves its own
sovereignty although limited by that of the United States
conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to
reason may be committed against the Federal as well as
against the State Government, in the same way treason
may have been committed during the Japanese occupation
against the sovereignty of the United States as well as
against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth;
and that the change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution
of those charged with the crime of treason committed during
the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the
same government and the same sovereign people, for
Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that "The
government established by this constitution shall be known
as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States
and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be
known as the Republic of the Philippines";
G.R. No. 17958

February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch

possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of
the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the
other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise
subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived
between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies. There the boat was surrounded by sixvintas manned
by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for
food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of
the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated
two of the women by methods too horrible to the described.
All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of
the two young women, were again placed on it and holes
were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although
as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of
hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the
Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of
the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to
escape. There they were arrested and were charged in the
Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing
with the crime of piracy are still in force.
HELD:

YES. It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish

Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the
Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation
to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy,
would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not
only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations
is the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has
never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal
Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere
and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily
be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration
in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion. It is evident that the provisions
of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to
piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions
in force in the United States.
[G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN,

VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accusedappellants.
s of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87.
was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second
Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an
aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accusedappellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,

Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew
and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear
portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was
then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was
forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the
ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to
the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the
Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9,
1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to
await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to
the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it
remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18
nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored
beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to
the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi
Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the
area, was completed on March 30,1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer
of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained
at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern
warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days or until
April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed.

ISSUE:
(3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No.
7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accusedappellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the
acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?
HELD:

We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part
to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there
are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear
unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a
common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused- appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off
Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the
members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them
to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare
and food provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accusedappellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accusedappellants.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he

can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters
as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a],
respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because
Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994) which
amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has
impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He
reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been
rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in
Philippine waters.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended

the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No.
532. There is no contradiction between the two laws.
There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no
need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential
decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in
keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as
neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations.
As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of
all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article
122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree
No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant
Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine
waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on
and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee"
by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded,
transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under
accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although

Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and

seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in
Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the
vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of
piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in
Philippine waters.
G.R. No. L-456

March 29, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CUCUFATE ADLAWAN, defendant-appellant.
in this case to review the sentence of death and a fine of
P20,000 imposed by the People's Court upon the appellants
who was charged with treason but convicted of what the
said court terms "complex crime of crime of treason with
murder robbery and rape."
The convicted is based on defendants plea of guilty to a
complaint which as amended contains the following counts:
1. That on or about and during the period comprised
between March 1943 and May 3, 1945 in the city of
Cebu. Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of this
court the accused Cucufate Adlawan adhering to the
enemy the Empire of Japan and its Imperial Japanese
forces with treasonable intent to give as he did give aid
and comfort to said enemy did then and there wilfully

unlawfully feloniously and treasonably join and become

a member of the so-called Philippines Constabulary, an
enemy-sponsored military organization knowing fully
well that the aims and purposes of said organization
are among other to extend every aid and cooperation
with said enemy in the prosecution of her war efforts
against the United States of America and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and during the period
aforesaid as a member of said enemy-sponsored
Philippines Constabulary the said accused further
adhering to the enemy with treasonable intent to give
as he did give aid and comfort to them did go out on
numerous patrol in company with Japanese soldier in
search of guerrilla and other elements and other
elements resisting said enemy in the Philippines.

ISSUE:
WON the aggravating circumstance of In considering, as aggravating
circumstances, treachery, abuse of superiority and unnecessary cruelty;
4. In holding that the crime committed by then accused is a complex crime of treason with murder,
rape and robbery;

HELD:
There is, however, merit in the contention that the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength should not have been considered. These
circumstances are "by their nature, inherent in the offense of

treason and may not be taken to aggravate the penalty."

(People vs. Racaza, 82 Phil., 623) But the facts alleged in
the information show that appellant in committing the crime
of treason, deliberately augmented the wrong by being
unnecessarily cruel to captured guerrilla suspects,
subjecting them to barbarous forms of torture and finally
putting them to death, and as appears in count No. 18, he
also chose to add ignominy to his treasonous act in
arresting and maltreating a guerrilla suspect by stripping his
wife of her clothes and then abusing her together with other
Filipino girls. Clearly shown as they are by the allegations of
the complaint and deemed admitted by appellant's plea of
guilty, these two aggravating circumstances of unnecessary
cruelty and ignominy may be appreciated against him.
G.R. No. L-820

April 11, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AURELIO ALVERO (alias RELI), defendant-appellant.
urelio Sevilla Alvero alias Reli was charged with treason on
twenty-two(22) counts (Annex A) before the People's Court.
After trial, said Court in a 45-page decision penned by
Judge Jose S. Bautista, Associate Judge of said Court,
concurred in by Associate Judges Dizon and Tancinco, and
found the defendant guilty on all counts except the 10th
relative to his interview with Leonardo Garcia, and the 18th
which refers to his alleged ordering, helping in and causing

the burning of the buildings west of Taft Avenue and south of

Libertad Street in Pasay
ISSUE:
WON he People'sCourt erred in considering adherence as
constituting by itself treason and of treating it as an
independent charge
HELD:
No. Regarding this same adherence, had appellant confined
himself within the realm of mere adherence disloyal state
of mind and treasonous thoughts, intentions, and
sympathies, however great may have been the
disappointment, disapproval, and even hatred of his
countrymen for such disloyalty to them and to their country,
the law and prosecuting officials could not have taken action
against him. Adherence alone is not indictable. In a free and
democratic country like the Philippines, there is freedom of
thought and free and unhampered discussion and
expression of sentiment. But when he translated such
treasonous sympathies and intentions into overt acts of
treason such as joining the Makapili, establishing his military
organization Bisig Bakal Ng Tagala and offering its services
to take charge of the maintenance of peace and order,
which included the suppression of the guerrillas, so that the
Japanese could concentrate their forces in defending the
City of Manila by fighting against the American and guerrilla

forces trying to enter and liberate it, then he (appellant)

breached as it were the walls of allegiance and loyalty which
the treason law has erected to surround and protect the
security and integrity of the nation, and he may then be held
criminally liable.
In several cases already decided by this Court we have
convicted persons of treason for mere membership in the
Makapili organization, on the theory that one joining such
military body organized to actively help the Japanese Armed
Forces was "placing himself at the enemy's call to fight side
by side with him when the opportune time came altho an
opportunity never presented itself, because such
membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and
comfort." (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 43005 People
vs. Alitagtag, 45 Off. Gaz., 715 6. Here, the appellant not
only joined the Makapili as a member but greatly helped
organize and later inaugurate it. He was assigned the high
and important post of colonel in it. Later, in a radio speech
he hailed as heroes to be emulated the Makapilis who, side
by side with the Japanese, were fighting the American
landing forces in Lingayen. That appellant Alvero is guilty of
the charge of treason, is clear.