Case Title: MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B.

DAWAY, in his
capacity
as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents. (G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21,
2004)
Facts:
The petitioner, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng
Corporation,
allegedly sold or offers the sale of garment product using the trademark
Caterpillar to the
prejudice of Caterpillar, Inc., private respondent in this case. The respondent filed
the case with
the RTC. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense
charged
contending that the case should be filed with the MTC because violation of unfair
competition is
penalized with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years under RA 7691.
Issue:
Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual
property
rights?
Ruling of the Court:
The SC held that under Section 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition shall
be brought
before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The law
contemplated
in Section 163 of IPC is RA 166 otherwise known as the Trademark Law. Section 27
of the
Trademark Law provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered
marks, unfair
competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is
lodged with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). Since RA 7691 is a general law and
IPC in
relation to Trademark Law is a special law, the latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair
competition
therefore should be filed with the RTC.

Esteban vs. Alhambra

G.R. No. 135012
Ponente: Sandoval-GutierrezFACTS:1.
The case came to the SC as a petition for certiorari filed by Anita Esteban, sister in law of theaccused, to
reverse the two petitions for the annulment of cash bail of Gerardo Estebanamounting to P20,000
each.2.
Anita, originally posted the bail for Gerardo, however, he committed another crime while out onbail; she
got "fed up", and moved for the cancellation of the posted money to the court andsurrendered the
accused to the City Jail Warden. However this was denied, so was her motionfor reconsideration.3.
Anita now pleas that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of
jurisdiction, and that the issue is one of "first impression". She cites that under Sec 19,now Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the bail may be cancelled uponsurrender of the
accused.ISSUE: WON Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction when it refused to cancel the bail upon petition of AnitaHELD: No1.
Anita misapplies the provision; the cash bail cannot be cancelled because Gerardo was notsurrendered for
the four criminal cases he was originally charged with, he was acquiredbecause of the subsequent
case filed against him
2.
The court also cites section 14 which states:
Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail.
The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest
collector of internal revenue or provincial, cityor municipal treasurer the amount of
bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed
the case. Upon submission of a proper certificateof deposit and a written
undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of Section 2 of this Rule, the
accused shall be discharged from custody. The moneydeposited shall be considered

as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs,while the excess, if any, shall
be returned to the accused or to whoever made thedeposit
. (Underscoring supplied)
A cash bond is treated as the money of the accused (even if it was supplied by
another person in his behalf). The money of the accused shall than applied as
payment for anyfine or cost imposed by the court. It is treated in the nature of a
lien. In the cited caseof Esler vs. Ledesma, between the accused and the third party
(the one who posted

Hambon vs CA
G.R. No. 122150
March 17, 2003
FACTS:
Herein respondent filed a complaint for damages against respondent for the injuries and expenses he
sustained when the latters truck bumped him that night of December 9, 1985.
However, the criminal case (Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence) filed previously against
the respondent was dismissed by the court for petitioners lack of interest.
Respondent alleges that the dismissal of criminal case includes that of the civil action.
Trial Court rendered decision in favor of petitioner,
Court of Appeals reversed the decision, on the grounds that the Hambon failed to file the civil case.
Hence, it is impliedly instituted with the Criminal case. The dismissal of the criminal case also includes the
dismissal of the civil case.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY DISMISSED
FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A CRIMINAL CASE
FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED PURSUANT TO RULE 111,
SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION BEING DUE TO
THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE
NOTICE
HELD:

1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the
recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case.... In
other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether
arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved
otherwise they will de deemed instituted with the criminal action.
Contrary to private respondent's contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be
brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their
exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that
matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly
liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned
the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought separately.
While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the rule
explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.
x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be
instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal
action.
. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of
the Court in "Caos v. Peralta":
. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear
congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least
expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.
Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for
damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages
subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein
was likewise dismissed.chan robles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUBERT

JEFFREY P. WEBB
Posted on March 28, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard
[G.R. No. 132577. August 17, 1999.]
FACTS: Webb, an accused in the crime of Rape with Homicide, filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition,
to take the testimonies of some vital witnesses residing in the U.S., before the proper Philippine consular authorities
since the Philippine court had no jurisdiction over them and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify.
Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose
testimonies are allegedly material and indispensable to establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned
by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court. The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion
averring that Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court has no application in criminal cases. The trial court denied the
motion but was thereafter reversed by the COA on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed reversible error in reversing the trial courts ruling.
HELD: YES. It need not be overemphasized that the factual circumstances only serves to underscore the immutable
fact that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely corroborative or
cumulative in nature and in denying respondents motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment
on what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to
the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record.
It is pointed out that the defense has already presented at least fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four
(464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as those to be produced or testified to by the proposed
foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, We sustain the proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse

of discretion if she decides that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the United States could not possibly
add anything substantial to the defense evidence involved.