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MIT Press
Logic of Charity: Poor Relief in Preindustrial Europe
Author(s): Marco H. D. van Leeuwen
Source: The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring, 1994), pp. 589-613
Published by: MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/205627
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Europe
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590
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idem, "Policing,"
Peter Mathias, "Adam's Burden: Diagnoses of Poverty in Post-Medieval Europe and the
Third World Now," Tijdschriftvoor Geschiedenis,LXLIX (1976), quotation, 154.
5 See, e.g., Nicolle Haesenne Peremans, La pauvretedans la regionLiegeoised l'aubede la
revolution industrielle (Liege, 1981), 378-382.
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595
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j 597
io Schama, Patriots and Liberators,49. See also Joop de Jong, Een deftig bestaan:Het
dagelijksleven van Regentenin de 17deen 18deeeuw (Utrecht, 1987), 46; Kathryn Norberg,
Rich and Poor in Grenoble, 1600-1814 (Berkeley, 1985), 303; Robert M. Kingdon, "Social
Welfare in Calvin's Geneva," AmericanHistoricalReview, LXXVI (I971), 59; Derek Fraser,
"The Poor Law as a Political Institution," in idem(ed.), The New PoorLaw in the Nineteenth
Hendrik Flap, "Patronage: An Institution in its Own
Century (London, 1976), III-127;
Right," in Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler (eds), Social Institutions: Their Emergence,Maintenance,and Effects(New York, I990), 225-243.
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598
I46-I8I.
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villages. For any particular town, it was tempting not to care for
the needy, provided some other region helped them. De Swaan
showed that villages acting from pure self-interest created a collective outcome that was inferior to what would have resulted if
they had cooperated.13 He argued that the geographical dilemma
of charity-how
any one region can be sure that other regions
will contribute to a collective arrangement-was
not solved once
and for all, but rather many times and gradually. En route from
local care at the village level to national frameworks for social
welfare, this dilemma had to be solved more than once, in the
course of which the results covered increasingly larger geographical units.
The notion that poor relief was a control strategy used by
elites assumes that elites could exert a strong influence on poor
relief either directly-for
indiexample, as administrators-or
as
benefactors.
few
studies
have
rectly,
Surprisingly, however,
been done of the social origins of poor relief administrators. We
do know that in sixteenth-century Geneva these administrators
belonged overwhelmingly to the "power elite," the "small group
of families who controlled the city." In Aix-en-Provence in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they were drawn from the
ruling classes of French society, noblemen, lawyers, and prominent merchants, selected in part on the basis of their social status
and wealth. In Grenoble the nobility supplied administrators in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; in the following century
these were drawn from the professional classes-judges,
busiin
and
doctors.
Guardians
of
the
the
Dutch
town
nessmen,
poor
of Leiden in the eighteenth century were part of the top stratum
of Leiden's bourgeoisie and, as a rule, were men of property.
They were not, however, among the political elite. In Rotterdam
during the first half of the nineteenth century Reformed, or Calvinist, deacons were typically young businessmen who did not
belong to the social elite of the patrician families. Boyer cited
Digby, who wrote that large farmers in Norfolk were "exploiting
their position as poor law administrators" to ensure a labor reserve.14 In conclusion, it is clear that in some, but not all, instances
13 De Swaan, In Care, 13-51.
14 Kingdon, "Social Welfare," 50-69; Fairchilds, Poverty,38-43; Norberg, Rich andPoor,
296-297; G. Peter M. Pot, "Tussen medelijden en spaarzaamheid: De regenten van het
Leidse Huiszittenhuis," Holland, XX (1988), 73, 74, 79; Petrus A. C. Douwes, Armenkerk:
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600
guardians of the poor were selected from the upper classes of society, who were thus able to use charity to further their interests.
The way that preindustrial European charity was financed
remains largely obscure. In England under the Old Poor Law a
pauper tax was levied per city or village; all persons of sufficient
means thereby contributed to assisting the needy. In other countries, like France or the Netherlands, benevolent societies were
financed, wholly or in part, through donations of individual benefactors, from interest on assets, or by selling capital goods. The
composition of total income according to source is seldom
known. The funding of charity remains an essential but neglected
component of social welfare in the past.
Another area that is little studied by historians relates to the
advantages and disadvantages of poor relief to elites compared
with other means of social control. It is almost impossible to say
much about this comparison at present since studies of relief from
the point of view of purposefully acting elites, faced with a choice
of alternative strategies, are few. Boyer presented a systematic,
nonfunctionalist discussion of the alternatives to poor relief available to large farmers in England wishing to obtain sufficient labor.
In addition, various studies by Lis and Soly have given some
indications. Raising wages, temporary employment schemes, or
handing out food stamps formed economic alternatives to poor
relief allowances; repression was a political alternative, as was the
confinement of paupers to workhouses. The range of alternatives
was rich, however, the comparative advantages and disadvantages
of each remain unclear.
A large proportion
of the popula-
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How-
605
2I
86.
I983); Trebble,
136-137;
Gutton,
La societe, 61-62;
B. Seebohm
Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life (London, 1922), 88; Jones, OutcastLondon, 8788.
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606
23
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clients could discriminate and shape demands to what was available. Applying for relief was an active, negotiated process between administrators and the poor."24London paupers regularly
applied for assistance when ill or unemployed, at the birth of a
child, or when faced with the costs of a funeral. They believed
that they had a right to choose the type of relief most suitable:
medical help when ill, financial aid when out of work, a small
pension for their elderly parents so that they would not have to
be their parents' keepers, or even incarceration of burdensome
family members in workhouses, hospitals, or lunatic asylums.
Poor relief was not only an economic survival strategy; it
also provided paupers with certain facilities-education for their
children, medical help, and free Bible classes. The poor might try
to exploit these facilities to their own advantage, regardless of the
intentions of those providing them. For example, pauper schools
could be used as day-care centers, without the poor attaching too
much significance to the moral lessons that were taught. Some
workers "out of their own free will . . . turned to the authorities
to discipline members of their group-a rational way to act,
because the survival margins were small indeed." In Antwerp, at
the close of the ancien regime, one in thirty-nine households asked
the authorities to lock up a troublesome relative-mostly husbands or sons who failed to contribute to the family budget and
spent their days idle.25
MUTUAL
INTERDEPENDENCE
Institutionalized
bargaining took
quotation,
47-48,
61-62.
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same level
of power?!
608
of the poor was their poverty; the problem of the rich was the
poor. A "perpetual commerce of charity" connected rich and
poor.26
Outdoor poor relief was not the only way for elites to realize
their interests. There were alternatives, such as regulating bread
prices, establishing employment projects, using police force or
the Grand Enfermement. In turn, the poor could choose survival
strategies other than charity if conditions for its provision were
too demanding or the amount that was given was too low. The
choices that the poor made were important to the elite. If a labor
reserve of assisted workers were to disappear, employers would
suffer. Shameless paupers or persistent beggars were a nuisance
to elites. Looting was a threat to privileged positions; it was not
just a form of anger and frustration, it was also a technique to
pressure elites, a "collective bargaining by riot." A child not
vaccinated against smallpox was a risk to the health of elites. A
pauper refusing assistance posed a threat to the eternal salvation
of charitable donors. Elites had to take the wishes of the poor
into account. In making a decision, they had to anticipate the
reaction of the armies of the poor, exemplifying what Friedrich
has termed the "rule of anticipated action."27
This dependency between rich and poor over the centuries
may have led to a system of rights and duties. Several authors
contend that in preindustrial Europe the poor thought that they
had a right to relief and, conversely, the rich felt themselves
obliged to give aid. On the surface, it seems odd to include a
system of rights and obligations in a theoretical perspective based
on rational actors, but only if historical actors act contrary to
their perceived interests because of a current norm. If a norm
were simply a reflection of an actual situation, the paradox would
be resolved. A norm may act as a precept, a "focal point," solving
a complex problem involving the weighing of unlike pros and
cons, both with regard to conflicts between elites and the poor
26 On bargaining, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategyof Conflict(New York, I963),
esp. 58-77; Amartya K. Sen, "Gender and Cooperative Conflicts," in Irene Tinker (ed.),
PersistentInequalities: Womenand WorldDevelopment (New York, 1990), 123-149; idem,
CollectiveChoiceand Social Welfare(San Francisco, 1970), II8-125; De Swaan, In Care, 14;
Fairchilds, Poverty, quotation, 17.
27 Eric J. Hobsbawm, LabouringMen: Studies in the History of Labour(London, I964),
quotation, 7; Carl Joachim Friedrich, Man and his Government:An Empirical Theory of
Politics (New York, 1963), I99-215. See also De Swaan, In Care, 189.
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609
EFFECTS
28 On focal points, see Schelling, Strategy,57-59, 91, III-II5; De Swaan, In Care, 14;
Sen, "Gender," 126.
29 Edward P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth
Century," Past & Present, 50 (I971), 76-136; cf. Louise A. Tilly, "The Food Riot as a
Form of Political Conflict in France," Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, II (1971), 23-57.
On poor relief as a right of the poor, see William Apfel and Peter Dunkley, "English
Rural Society and the New Poor Law: Bedfordshire, 1834-47," Social History, X (I985),
54-56; Himmelfarb, Idea, 4I; Woolf, Poor, 39; cf. Thompson, "Moral Economy," 136;
Lees, "Survival." On best bargains, see Sen, "Gender," 126; idem, Collective Choice, 26,
121.
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610
that poor relief was ample and freely given, enabling workers to
live idly at the expense of a parish. The influential I834 Report
of the Poor Law Commission in England argued that poor relief
fostered voluntary unemployment on a massive scale. Even historians of the labor movement, such as the Hammonds and the
Webbs in the first decades of the twentieth century, accepted that
poor relief had unintended negative effects.30 Polanyi was of the
same opinion, but he also drew attention to what was to become
a main feature of revisionist literature, namely the economic rationality of poor relief. This revision began in earnest, however,
with an article written by Blaug in I963. Many objections have
since been raised to the traditional interpretation of the effects of
poor relief. The average value of assistance was so low that it
could hardly have been a major disincentive to work. Further,
the monitoring of poor relief institutions was so effective that
"labor evasion" on a large scale was unlikely. Finally, only specific
groups were given relief and in specific economic contexts. In the
absence of assistance, wage levels would not have declined nor
would the labor supply have increased. On the contrary, part of
the labor surplus would have migrated or starved. In order to
prevent this migration, higher wages would have had to be paid.
yes ?
Charity did not lead to widespread unemployment, rather, wideof
kind
a
created
charity.
particular
spread unemployment
Poor relief could have had at least two other major social
consequences. First, it could have stabilized (as it was meant to
do) or destabilized the social and political order. Second, it could
have helped the poor to survive (if assistance was sufficient),
forced them to migrate or starve (if too meager), or even attracted
numerous immigrants (if too generous). Thus charity could have multiples
effets
increased the number of the poor. In addition, medical aid could
have helped paupers, especially children, to survive, thus swelling
the ranks of the poor.31 Poor relief also had consequences for the
education and spiritual well-being of the poor, and their attitude
toward family life, sexual relations, and hygiene.
30 See Boyer, EconomicHistory, 65-83; Daniel A. Baugh, "The Cost of Poor Relief in
South-East England, 1790-1834," EconomicHistory Review, XXVIII (1975), 50-68; Mark
Blaug, "The Myth of the Old Poor Law and the Making of the New," Journal of Economic
History, XXIII (1963), 151-184; idem, "The Poor Law Report Reexamined," Journal of
EconomicHistory, XXIV (1964), 229-245; Anne Digby, "The Labour Market and the
Continuity of Social Policy after 1834," EconomicHistory Review, XXVIII (1973), 69-83.
31
I50-I72.
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6II
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INTERACTION
Poor:
increasing wages
employment projects
food subsidies
police action
dispensing poor relief
pawning
migration
begging
prostitution
crime
revolt
accepting poor relief
mutual societies
1
EFFECTS OF POOR RELIEF
- increasing or decreasing the number of poor
- (de)regulating the labor market
- (de)stabilizing social order
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