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Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the editors of The Journal of

Interdisciplinary History
MIT Press
Logic of Charity: Poor Relief in Preindustrial Europe
Author(s): Marco H. D. van Leeuwen
Source: The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Spring, 1994), pp. 589-613
Published by: MIT Press
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Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XXIv:4 (Spring 1994), 589-613.

Marco H. D. van Leeuwen

Logic of Charity: Poor Relief in Preindustrial


To suggest that the social history of Europe is unan understanding of poor relief is only a slight
without
intelligible
exaggeration. The problem of poverty has recurred throughout
the centuries, and was, in different ways, a problem for rich and
poor alike. The central concern of the poor was how to survive;
the problem of the elites was the poor. Thousands of charitable
institutions existed in various forms, influencing the lives of most
of the population in preindustrial Europe. Assistance for the poor
was closely related to the involvement of economic pressure
groups, the position of the various social groups in society, the
distribution of political power, and the role of those who held
that power. This article is a discussion of the function of charity
in preindustrial Europe and provides answers to three questions:
which groups provided poor relief and why, which groups received poor relief and why, and what were the effects of poor
relief on society?
Historians, social scientists, and welfare economists have produced a large literature on poor relief that has been surveyed using
three approaches. The first suggests that charity in various regions
and at different periods in preindustrial Europe displayed general
characteristics. The poor tried to survive in ways enormously
ingenious but comparable. The involvement of the European elites
in charity also displayed striking similarities. The merits of this
first approach are simplicity and insightfulness. A drawback is
that local and temporal particulars become invisible.

Europe

Marco H. D. van Leeuwen is a Research Fellow, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts


and Sciences, Department of Sociology, University of Utrecht. He is the author of Bijstand
in Amsterdam,ca. 1800-1850: Armenzorgals beheersings-en overlevingsstrategie
(Zwolle, 1992).
The author thanks the Center for Studies of Social Change at the New School for
Social Research where he held a fellowship from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). For their valuable comments, he also thanks Wim Blockmans,
Joop Faber, Henk Flap, Chris Gordon, Henk van Leeuwen, Joyce van Leeuwen-de Witt,
Cle Lesger, Ann McCants, Leo Noordegraaf, Carine van Oosteren, Werner Raub, Andy
Schlewitz, Tom Snijders, Theo van Tijn, Charles Tilly, Wout Ultee, Jan de Vries, Jeroen
Weesie, Reinhard Wippler, and an anonymous reviewer of this journal.
? 1994 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the editors of The Journal of
Interdisciplinary
History.

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590

MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

The second approach assumes that societies were composed


of purposefully acting men and women who had ordered preferences and, individually or in groups, tried to obtain their goals
as best they could with the means at their disposal. This appealingly simple assumption should not be taken literally. Nobody
will assert that all men and women acted purposefully all of the
time. Rather, it should be taken to mean that most people in most
situations based their actions on perceived interests. Naturally,
this leaves open the possibility that some actions have unintended
consequences, or that mortals may err when choosing the most
rewarding strategy. Furthermore, historical actors were constrained in their options, and these constraints differed according
to society, period, and social group. The historical situation restricted the set of alternative actions and determined which strategies were most rewarding. A weakness of this approach is that
forms of "pure altruism" are not taken into account. They undoubtedly played some part in charity, but they cannot be modeled fruitfully.
In the third approach, two groups of actors are distinguished.
This categorization also simplifies the historical reality of populations that contained different kinds of elite, various sorts of
poor, and, in addition, a multitude of middling classes. Initially,
however, it will be advantageous to lose sight of certain distinctions in order to understand the general outlines better, especially
because little is known about those distinctions. This approach
argues that elites invested in poor relief because they had an
interest in doing so. Poor relief was a control strategy, influencing
the behavior of the poor in ways that were advantageous to elites.
Conversely, the poor accepted poor relief because it was profitable
to do so. It was a survival strategy, a means of increasing their
chances to survive. This argument implies the existence of some,
if limited, measure of choice. The elites could realize their interests
in ways other than providing assistance, just as the poor could
draw on survival strategies other than charity. Preindustrial poor
relief functioned as a "bargaining process." The elites provided
money, food, and services, but only under certain conditions and
as a "package deal." These conditions had to be in the interests
of the elites, but also attractive to the poor. If the elites did not
use poor relief as a control strategy, the poor could not use it as
a survival strategy, and vice versa.

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POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

59I

The approaches mentioned above have been derived from


studies in the fields of history, sociology, and welfare economics.
A few are mentioned here, but their approaches often differ in
many ways. The general idea of analyzing societies in terms of
the purposeful actions of persons who are developing strategies
to realize perceived interests in a given social context, is taken
from Boudon. Olson formulated an innovative theory relating to
conditions favoring or barring the creation of collective goods by
individuals. De Swaan has provided an original analysis of the
development of social welfare in Europe and the United States,
in part based on Olson's work. Studies by de Swaan, Gutton,
Lis, Soly, and van Damme have demonstrated the manifold similarities in the functioning of poor relief in preindustrial Europe.
Boyer has shed much light on why, and how, English rural elites
made use of charity. The strategic behavior of the poor has been
stressed particularly in studies by Popkin on Vietnamese peasant
communities, Murray on the poor in the United States, and Portes
on the inhabitants of Latin-American slums. A multitude of survival strategies for the preindustrial poor in Europe has been
documented by Hufton and Lis, and Lees has described the pragmatic use of the poor law by the English poor.l

I Raymond Boudon, The Logic of Social Action: An Introductionto SociologicalAnalysis


(London, I98I); idem, "Subjective Rationality and the Explanation of Social Behaviour,"
Rationalityand Society, I (1989), 173-196; George R. Boyer, An EconomicHistory of the
English Poor Law, 1750-1850 (Cambridge, I990); Abram de Swaan, In Care of the State:
Health Care, Education,and Welfarein Europeand the USA in the ModernEra (New York,
1988); Jean-Pierre Gutton, La societeet les pauvres en Europe (XVIe-XVIIIe siecles) (Paris,
1974); Olwen H. Hufton, The Poor of Eighteenth-CenturyFrance, 1750--1789(Paris, 1974);
Lynn Hollen Lees, "The Survival of the Unfit: Welfare Policies and Family Maintenance
in Nineteenth-Century London," in Peter Mandler (ed.), The Uses of Charity: The Poor on
Relief in the Nineteenth-CenturyMetropolis(Philadelphia, I990), 68-9I; Catharina Lis, Social
Change and the LabouringPoor, Antwerp 1770-1860 (New Haven, 1986); idem and Hugo
Soly, "Policing the Early Modern Proletariat 1450-I850," in David Levine (ed.), Proletarianizationand Family History (Orlando, I984), I63-228; Lis and Soly, "'Total Institutions'
and the Survival Strategies of the Laboring Poor in Antwerp, I770-I860," in Mandler
(ed.), Uses of Charity, 38-67; Lis, Soly, and Dirk van Damme, Op vrije voeten? Sociale
politiek in West-Europa1450-1914 (Leuven, I985); Charles Murray, Losing Ground:American
Social Policy, 1950-1980 (New York, 1984); Mancur Olson, The Logic of CollectiveAction:
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, 1965); Samuel Popkin, The Rational
Peasant:The PoliticalEconomyof RuralSocietyin Vietnam(Berkeley, 1979); Alejandro Portes,
"Rationality in the Slum: An Essay on Interpretative Sociology," ComparativeStudies in
Societyand History, XIV (1972), 268-286.

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592

MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

How important was poor relief for


elites
and
to
what
extent could they influence it? Three
European
issues are relevant: the collective interests of elites, the "free-rider
problem" and mechanisms to counter it, and the degree to which
elites were in a position to influence charity. Five collective interests are discussed: the labor market, the social order, the public
order, the risk of infection, and moral behavior.
The labor-reserve theory argues that members of the labor
force were given relief if their presence was of interest to local
elites. Assistance was provided to those essential segments of the
labor force who could not live from their work alone and who,
in the absence of charity, would have had to migrate, resort to
illegal activities, or face starvation. Often, the groups that were
helped were those that were vulnerable because of the imperfections characteristic of preindustrial labor markets. These markets
were characterized by sharp seasonal and cyclical fluctuations,
resulting in a strong increase in the demand for labor in summer
and during an economic upturn, and a sizable decrease in winter
and during economic decline. In slack periods it might be rational
for employers to assist workers, ensuring their availability at times
when demand for labor was high. In the case of England, 1750I85o, Boyer has demonstrated that to dispense relief to rural
laborers was economically rational for large farmers, under two
conditions.2 To begin with, seasonal fluctuations in labor demand
had to be high in two periods of the year. In addition, laborhiring farmers had to be able to have other taxpayers (family
farmers, shopkeepers, and artisans) pay for part of the cost of this
outdoor relief. If both conditions were met, alternative ways to
cope with seasonal fluctuations in labor demand would be less
cost-effective. Migrant labor, for example, was generally not
available in spring and, in any case, a farmer could never be sure
when and how many migrants would arrive. Paying higher wages
in summer or providing rural laborers with small pieces of land
were also less efficient alternatives.
ELITES AND POOR RELIEF

Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the RelationshipbetweenClasses in


VictorianSociety (New York, I976); James H. Trebble, UrbanPoverty in Britain, 1830-1914
(London, 1983). On segmented labor market theory, see Michael J. Piore, Birdsof Passage:
MigrantLabor and IndustrialSocieties (Cambridge, I979); Ad Knotter, "De Amsterdamse
bouwnijverheid in de 9geeeuw tot ca. 1870," TijdschriftvoorSocialeGeschiedenis,X (I984),
I23-I54. On the relation between poor relief and the labor market, see, e.g., Lis, Social
Change;Lis, Soly, and van Damme, Op vrije voeten?;Boyer, EconomicHistory.
2

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POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

593

Poor relief was so finely tuned that, in combination with


other sources of income, it enabled a labor reserve to exist and
discouraged the migration of rural laborers to cities. Boyer's analysis explained the timing and geographical pattern of outdoor
relief for agricultural workers. This system was only cost-effective
in grain-growing regions of England, where the demand for labor
during the sowing and harvest seasons was much higher than
during the winter. The introduction of the allowance system
coincided with the decline of rural industry and with rising land
prices; thus an alternative source of income for rural laborers
declined and another option-supplying
them with small pieces
of land-became
less attractive.
Socially, European elites endeavored to stabilize the existing
social order by means of poor relief. To the poor, the social order
was presented as God-given, and therefore legitimate and changeless. This conception was based on a degree of reciprocity: the
well-to-do were under an obligation to assist the poor, and the
latter had a duty to accept the world as it was. By accepting
money and goods, the poor were made to accept the legitimacy
of the existing social order. The children of the poor were obliged
to go to pauper schools, receiving education that stressed the
justice and invariability of the social order. The attempts by elites
to minimize upward social mobility are situated within this framework. Assistance was also given to impoverished persons of good
families in order to mitigate sharp downward mobility. These
Shame-Faced Poor, Pauvres Honteux, or VerschdmteArmen received
greater assistance than the ordinary poor and under less stringent
conditions.3
Politically, poor relief was intended to safeguard public order.
Destitution for the many might easily lead to discontent. Fear of
the poor was widespread, especially during times of high food
prices: "classes laborieuses, classes dangereuses." Poor relief was
advantageous if its costs were less than those of other means to
3 Gutton, La societe, I35, 156; Lis, Social Change, 133; Stuart J. Woolf, The Poor in
WesternEurope in the Eighteenthand Nineteenth Centuries(London, 1986), 20, 27, 40. On
the shame-faced poor, see, e.g., Hufton, Poor, 2I5; Jeffry Kaplow, The Names of Kings:
The ParisianLabouringPoor in the EighteenthCentury (New York, 1972), 96; A. Spicciani,
"The 'Poveri Vergognosi'," in Thomas Riis (ed.), Aspectsof Povertyin Early ModernEurope
(Alphen a.d Rijn, 1981), II9-I82; Richard C. Trexler, "Charity and the Defense of Urban
Elites in the Italian Communes," in Frederic C. Jaher (ed.), The Rich, the Well Born, and
the Powerful:Elites and Upper Classes in History (New York, 1973), 64-I09.

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594

MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

maintain public order and protect property and lives. Assistance


to the needy would check their hunger and, to some extent, shield
the rich from the undesirable behavior of the hungry poor: "poor
relief was the ransom paid by the rich to keep their windows, as
well as their consciences intact."4
Medically, poor relief could reduce the danger of infection.
The same diseases that decimated the poor could kill the rich. It
therefore made sense to ensure that paupers, willingly or not,
received medical help, in the form of smallpox inoculations for
instance, as a condition of poor relief.5
Morally, elites tried to "civilize" or "discipline" the poor, to
curb undesirable behavior by teaching the poor new values and
norms. This initiative may seem strange-why
not leave the poor
"uncivilized"?-but
poverty was thought of as a moral problem,
a consequence of a seamy way of life. To give assistance without
attaching moral conditions would only reproduce squalor. Because a lack of discipline and a preference for leisure were considered major causes of unemployment, poor relief had to stimulate
paupers to work. Another complaint was related to the family
life of the poor. The reproduction of poverty as a result of
ill-advised marriages and extramarital sex had to be checked.
Malthus advised the poor to pay heed to "moral constraints"
before deciding to marry. In various German regions in the first
half of the nineteenth century, the right to marry was restricted
by law. Local authorities were determined that paupers unable to
support a family remain single. Once married, a decent family
life shielded a family from poverty; a "bad" family life, in contrast, lay at the root of all evil. Relief could be tied to instruction
in family ethics, and be deprived to those unwilling to listen.
Lack of education was, allegedly, another cause of poverty. The
ranks of the poor included numerous unskilled, uneducated la4

Lis and Soly, Poverty and Capitalismin PreindustrialEurope(Atlantic Highlands, 1979);

idem, "Policing,"

163-228; Lis, Social Change, I34-I39;

Louis Chevalier, Classes laborieuses

et classesdangereusesd Paris pendant la premieremoitie du XIX siecle (Paris, 1969); Harvey


Chisick, The Limits of Reform in the Enlightenment:Attitudes towardsthe Educationof the
Lower Classes in Eighteenth-CenturyFrance (Princeton, I981), 249-251; Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age (New York, 1983), 371-400;

Peter Mathias, "Adam's Burden: Diagnoses of Poverty in Post-Medieval Europe and the
Third World Now," Tijdschriftvoor Geschiedenis,LXLIX (1976), quotation, 154.
5 See, e.g., Nicolle Haesenne Peremans, La pauvretedans la regionLiegeoised l'aubede la
revolution industrielle (Liege, 1981), 378-382.

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POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

595

borers. The education of the poor became an important issue


from the late eighteenth century onward. Education seemed to
be a solution to the problem of poverty; the children of the needy
could be instructed in vocational skills and in basic reading, writnot much more since the elite's attitude
ing, and arithmetic-but
was that education ought to remain appropriate to one's class.6
Poor relief has been regarded as a many-sided instrument
that could be used by elites to realize collective interests. The fact
that a group of people has an interest in a collective good is,
however, no guarantee that it will either be made or maintained.
Olson's theory makes this clear. A good is a collective good, in
Olson's definition, if all members of a group have access to it and
no one can be excluded from its use.7 Olson demonstrated that
collective goods can be problematic because of the free-rider problem. The nonexcludibility of a good implies that a member of a
group profits, even if he or she makes no contribution to it. It is
rational for a group member to want to enjoy the benefits of an
arrangement without paying the costs. This desire can lead to the
paradoxical situation that a collective good does not come into
being, or works suboptimally, although its proper functioning is
beneficial to all members of a group. The free-rider problem may
hinder collective arrangements such as hospitals, charitable provisions, new roads, or sewerage; it operates in all but small
groups. Fortunately, this problem can be solved, under certain
conditions. The state, as a third party involved, may administer
a collective good and force people to pay for it. Present-day
European welfare states are prime examples: states levy social
security contributions and other taxes, fine fraudulent or reluctant
contributors, and control the system of social security.
In many preindustrial regions, however, charity was not
solely administered at a national level by the state but at a local
6 See Jacques Donzelot, La police desfamilies (Paris, I977), who labels poor relief "police
des morals." His work has been influenced by Foucault. See also Isaac Joseph, Philippe
Fritsch, and Alain Battegay, Disciplinesd domicile:L'dification de lafamille (Fontenay-SousBois, 1977); Bernard Kruithof, "De deugdzame natie: Het burgerlijk beschavingsoffensief
van de Maatschappij tot Nut van 't Algemeen tussen 1784 en i860," Symposion,II (1980),
22-37; Gutton, La societe, 133-135, I68; Lis and Soly, "Policing," I98-I99; Treble, Urban
Poverty, IIO-I20; John Knodel, "Malthus Amiss: Marriage Restrictions in NineteenthCentury Germany," Social Science, XLVII (1972), 4-45; Chisick, Limits of Reform, 38-44,
76-182, 274, 278-290.
7 Olson, Logic of Collective Action, 2, 14-15, 5I.

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MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

or regional level by means of voluntary financial donations or


personal participation in charitable bodies. Thus, state intervention as a solution to the free-rider problem is not a sufficient
explanation for the functioning of preindustrial charity. An alternative solution to the free-rider problem is to give some members
of a group selective incentives to contribute to a collective good.
These selective incentives can be positive, rewarding individuals
who contribute to the collective good, or negative, punishing
those who do not. Selective incentives may operate in the form
of praise for cooperative members and shame for free-riders (thus
establishing or harming their reputation). They may also operate
through the existence of positive side effects of cooperation: joining an occupational association, for example, may further a common cause and, at the same time, extend entitlements, such as
sickness benefits, to an individual.8
Which selective incentives operated in the area of preindustrial charity? It was often prestigious to be a guardian of the poor.
Guardians and liberal donators gained social status. Their charitable duties were, so to speak, signs of reliability. Participation in
poor relief legitimized the privileged position that members of
the establishment held, or, in the case of the nouveaux riches, to
which they aspired. Poor relief thus became a Legitimierung des
Gliickes: those fortunate enough to belong to the high ranks of
society were obliged to legitimize their luck. Poor relief was a
many-sided litmus test: vis-a-vis one's peers, apropos subordinate
members of society, and, in fact, toward God and one's own
conscience. In another respect too, charity could be useful; the
nouveaux riches, economically successful but socially inferior,
could exchange money or time for social capital.9
8 Olson's work has been the source of a considerable body of literature demonstrating
that the free-rider problem can be mitigated. Actors may have knowledge of each other's
previous behavior which can be used to predict future behavior. Further, actors are
sometimes engaged in more than one interaction over time; they may know that noncooperation at one moment will be penalized at the next, which should make them more
cooperative. It is also true that collective action may begin in small groups, where the
free-rider problem is relatively small, and spread to other members of the collectivity over
time. In real life, Olson's view may be the worst case scenario.
9 See Cissie C. Fairchilds, Poverty and Charity in Aix-en-Provence,1640-1789 (Baltimore,
1976), 40-41; Van Damme, Armenzorgen de staat(Leuven, I990), I94. A free interpretation
of Legitimierungdes Gliickes from Max Weber, Wirtschaftund Gesellschafi:Grundrissder
verstehendenSoziologie (Tibingen, 1972), 299. Simon Schama, Patriotsand Liberators:Revolution in the Netherlands,1780-1813 (New York, 1977), 49. On social capital, see Pierre

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POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

j 597

Charity also presented opportunities to further one's political


career and to dispense patronage. Being a guardian of a poorrelief institution provided young members of the elite with the
chance to develop administrative abilities and a social network.
Schama noted that in the Dutch Republic "those offices most
closely connected with the superintendence of the needy were
. . . often rewarded to cadet recruits, who in their turn regarded
them as staging posts to grander styles and grosser pickings." To
oversee the poor was an investment in future wealth and power.
It could also increase present power. In Calvin's Geneva, care of
the Hopital fell to Procureurs, who also had considerable political
influence. Kingdon remarked that "their control of every government ration of food to every poor family in the city must also
have given them considerable political leverage." In nineteenthcentury England, suffrage was based on the amount of poor law
tax paid, and those administering poor relief had the opportunity
to manipulate electoral registers. Patronage-a
common feature
in
of preindustrial societies-also
a
role
played
charity. Guardians
of the poor were able to favor their clients with assistance or jobs.
Charitable institutions provided employment to persons in clerical
or supervisory positions, to contractors, bookkeepers, stockbrokers, artisans, and laborers. This provision of jobs could be beneficial to the guardians too, as it was in Calvin's Geneva.10
Assisting the needy was also a religious obligation. Until the
twentieth century, a major part of poor relief in Western Europe
was administered by church bodies. In countries with various
religions, poor relief could be used as a means to preserve fellow
believers or even to win new ones. Religious motives did not
function as selective incentives solving the free-rider problem of
collective goods, but they did shift the free-rider problem from
Bourdieu, "Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction," in Richard Brown (ed.),
Knowledge,Education,and CulturalChange (London, 1973), 71-112; Bourdieu, "The Forms
of Capital," in John G. Richardson (ed.), Handbookof Theoryand Researchfor the Sociology
of Education (New York, I986), 241-258.

io Schama, Patriots and Liberators,49. See also Joop de Jong, Een deftig bestaan:Het
dagelijksleven van Regentenin de 17deen 18deeeuw (Utrecht, 1987), 46; Kathryn Norberg,
Rich and Poor in Grenoble, 1600-1814 (Berkeley, 1985), 303; Robert M. Kingdon, "Social
Welfare in Calvin's Geneva," AmericanHistoricalReview, LXXVI (I971), 59; Derek Fraser,
"The Poor Law as a Political Institution," in idem(ed.), The New PoorLaw in the Nineteenth
Hendrik Flap, "Patronage: An Institution in its Own
Century (London, 1976), III-127;
Right," in Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler (eds), Social Institutions: Their Emergence,Maintenance,and Effects(New York, I990), 225-243.

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598

MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

elites as a whole to those of particular denominations. This shift


from a large group to many smaller ones diminished the problem.
Sincere compassion with poor people from one's own village,
town, or region, for the most part in combination with biblical
commandments, also induced the upper classes to give. To some
extent this giving was pure altruism: a laudatory phenomenon
which cannot be incorporated into a model of goal-oriented ac- demostration?
tion. Another, complementary, vision nonetheless exists of poor
relief as the sine qua non of spiritual welfare: "le pauvre est un
etre social utile . . . il permet au rich de se sauver en faissant
l'aumone," and "charity then was a way for rich man to buy

salvation." Schama, elaborating on the "embarrassment of riches"


in the Dutch republic, observed "that if the poor and derelict
plainly needed the charity of the rich, it is no less true . . . that
the rich needed the poor for the quiet of their souls." Norberg
wrote that the Catholic faith acted as a selective incentive in
Grenoble: "Catholicism encouraged charitable giving . . . It successfully attached personal benefit to the common good by promising benefactors distinct rewards-Eternal Salvation-and misers
distinct penalties-Eternal
Damnation."1
A distinction between collective and private interests is useful
for analytical purposes but in real life, distinctions were often
blurred. They were not always and everywhere equally important. Lis and Soly argued that in England regulation of the labor
market was the chief challenge for the upper classes and thus the
prime reason for helping the needy; in France maintenance of
public order was more important. They also drew attention to
the fact that elites in Western Europe could fissure, creating different groups with both similar and rival claims.12 A labor market
ideally suited to employers, a tranquil society with low welfare
expenditure favored by politicians, and instruction in the teachnot always
ings of the church-a
clergyman's priority-were
compatible.
The free-rider problem faced by a single town or a village
could also obstruct collective arrangements between towns or

II Gutton, La societe, 143; Fairchilds, Poverty, 27; Schama, The Embarrassment


of Riches:
An Interpretationof Dutch Culture in the Golden Age (London, 1987), 124, 334, 576-577,
579; Norberg, Rich and Poor, 301.
12 Lis and Soly, "Policing," 47, 210-2II;
Lis, Soly, and Van Damme, Op vrije voeten?,
81-119,

I46-I8I.

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POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

599

villages. For any particular town, it was tempting not to care for
the needy, provided some other region helped them. De Swaan
showed that villages acting from pure self-interest created a collective outcome that was inferior to what would have resulted if
they had cooperated.13 He argued that the geographical dilemma
of charity-how
any one region can be sure that other regions
will contribute to a collective arrangement-was
not solved once
and for all, but rather many times and gradually. En route from
local care at the village level to national frameworks for social
welfare, this dilemma had to be solved more than once, in the
course of which the results covered increasingly larger geographical units.
The notion that poor relief was a control strategy used by
elites assumes that elites could exert a strong influence on poor
relief either directly-for
indiexample, as administrators-or
as
benefactors.
few
studies
have
rectly,
Surprisingly, however,
been done of the social origins of poor relief administrators. We
do know that in sixteenth-century Geneva these administrators
belonged overwhelmingly to the "power elite," the "small group
of families who controlled the city." In Aix-en-Provence in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they were drawn from the
ruling classes of French society, noblemen, lawyers, and prominent merchants, selected in part on the basis of their social status
and wealth. In Grenoble the nobility supplied administrators in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; in the following century
these were drawn from the professional classes-judges,
busiin
and
doctors.
Guardians
of
the
the
Dutch
town
nessmen,
poor
of Leiden in the eighteenth century were part of the top stratum
of Leiden's bourgeoisie and, as a rule, were men of property.
They were not, however, among the political elite. In Rotterdam
during the first half of the nineteenth century Reformed, or Calvinist, deacons were typically young businessmen who did not
belong to the social elite of the patrician families. Boyer cited
Digby, who wrote that large farmers in Norfolk were "exploiting
their position as poor law administrators" to ensure a labor reserve.14 In conclusion, it is clear that in some, but not all, instances
13 De Swaan, In Care, 13-51.
14 Kingdon, "Social Welfare," 50-69; Fairchilds, Poverty,38-43; Norberg, Rich andPoor,
296-297; G. Peter M. Pot, "Tussen medelijden en spaarzaamheid: De regenten van het
Leidse Huiszittenhuis," Holland, XX (1988), 73, 74, 79; Petrus A. C. Douwes, Armenkerk:

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600

MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

guardians of the poor were selected from the upper classes of society, who were thus able to use charity to further their interests.
The way that preindustrial European charity was financed
remains largely obscure. In England under the Old Poor Law a
pauper tax was levied per city or village; all persons of sufficient
means thereby contributed to assisting the needy. In other countries, like France or the Netherlands, benevolent societies were
financed, wholly or in part, through donations of individual benefactors, from interest on assets, or by selling capital goods. The
composition of total income according to source is seldom
known. The funding of charity remains an essential but neglected
component of social welfare in the past.
Another area that is little studied by historians relates to the
advantages and disadvantages of poor relief to elites compared
with other means of social control. It is almost impossible to say
much about this comparison at present since studies of relief from
the point of view of purposefully acting elites, faced with a choice
of alternative strategies, are few. Boyer presented a systematic,
nonfunctionalist discussion of the alternatives to poor relief available to large farmers in England wishing to obtain sufficient labor.
In addition, various studies by Lis and Soly have given some
indications. Raising wages, temporary employment schemes, or
handing out food stamps formed economic alternatives to poor
relief allowances; repression was a political alternative, as was the
confinement of paupers to workhouses. The range of alternatives
was rich, however, the comparative advantages and disadvantages
of each remain unclear.

THE POOR AND POOR RELIEF

A large proportion

of the popula-

tion in preindustrial Europe was poor. Structural changes in the


European economy brought destitution during certain periods or
in some regions. High grain prices and severe winters caused
problems in some years. The adaptive family economy acted as
a shield against poverty, and if one did not belong to it trouble
lay ahead. Even under the lee of the family, however, certain
phases of the family life cycle caused distress. Destitution not only
hit particular groups in certain regions, it might have struck
De hervormdediaconiete Rotterdamin de i9e eeuw (Rotterdam, I977), 92-96; Boyer, Economic
History, 8I, I4I.

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POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

601

almost every European at one time or another. Some groups were


especially prone to destitution: the sick and infirm, the elderly,
widows with children, workers with large families, and casual
laborers. Why did the poor accept relief? The most obvious
reason was economic, but there were alternative economic survival strategies, and relief had its drawbacks. In some circumstances these alternatives could be more attractive, since assistance
could well mean social control. The poor lived in an "economy
of makeshifts," using a "combination of ad-hoc expedients."15
Surviving meant having to resort to a combination of survival
strategies.
Women's labor, as a way of supplementing the inadequate
income of husbands but also as a source of income for single
women, was widespread in both preindustrial and industrial Europe. Women more often than not ended up in unskilled, lowwage jobs. In times of adversity they might be forced to trade a
legal and "honorable" occupation for an illegal and "dishonorable"
activity, such as prostitution: "partout la misere est le meilleur
recruteur de la prostitution." Some English and French female
textile workers switched to prostitution during periods of mass
unemployment: "morals fluctuate with trade."'6
Not only poor men and women worked; children did too.
Some helped their parents at work, and others made a living on
the streets-delivering
messages, carrying parcels, or shining
shoes. Children-small,
excellent
quick, and endearing-made
beggars. Hufton calls begging "a kind of patrimony for poor
children." Adults begged too. It was "une ressource ordinaire
dans le menu peuple," according to Gutton. The variety of beggars was staggering. Tramps, vagabonds, and rogues, alone or in
bands, roamed from village to village, from town to town, and
prowled around the countryside. Every town had professional
and occasional beggars. Some hung on to an arbitrary pedestrian
for dear life; others had a fixed spot, near a church entrance for
I5 Hufton, Poor; Treble, UrbanPoverty, 79.
I6 Louise A. Tilly and Joan W. Scott, Women,Work,and Family (New York, 1978), 196;
Olwen Hufton, "Women without Men: Widows and Spinsters in Britain and France in
the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century," Journal of Family History, IX (1984), 355-376;
Treble, UrbanPoverty, 23, 34, 80, I20-130, quotation, 80; Sally Alexander, Women'sWork
in Nineteenth-CenturyLondon:A Study of the Years1820-50 (London, I983); Kaplow, Names,
55-65, 149; Gutton, La societ, 74; see also Hufton, Poor, 306-317; idem, "Women," 363.

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602

I MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

example; still others made weekly rounds, on a certain day and


at a fixed hour, to a philanthropist known to them, asking for a
chunk of bread, a piece of sausage, or alms. Some asked in a
more friendly fashion than others. Children, adults, and the elderly begged in the streets of Europe, asking, appealing, demanding, or threatening. Begging, too, was a survival strategy.
Van Holthoon found that during periods of great distress in the
Dutch province of Groningen more ordinary workers resorted to
begging than in normal years. Poverty forced them. They were
not the only ones. Faced with high unemployment, silk weavers
in Lyon took to begging.17 Some occupational groups combined
their occupation with requests for alms. For hawkers this strategy
was almost inevitable. A modest stroke of bad luck meant that
they could not purchase their stock, inexpensive as it was, and
they were forced to ask for small donations.
Poor people robbed and cheated, but they also rendered mutual support. Old women and young girls took care of babies for
a small fee or for free. A kind neighbor would run errands for an
ill pauper; if a poor person had no food during a holiday, a
neighbor might provide some. Mutual assistance by neighbors,
family, people from the same region, by those sharing a common
religion or occupation was a consequence of mutual poverty, and
not just in the preindustrial era. A study of London's poor at the
end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century
noted that: "few families were so secure that they knew they
would never need help, and so mutual assistance seemed not only
the right way to live but the sensible way also." The poor helped
each other in finding work, too. Casual workers relied on leads
and a good reference to find a job, which tied them to their place
of residence. The costs of building networks of informants were
high, which explains why, despite their destitution, casual laborers in cities like Glasgow, Liverpool, London, and Manchester
were so immobile. Yet, extreme poverty could force men and
women to leave their native region. In order to minimize migration costs, migrants often used familiar routes and relied on ex17 Hufton, Poor, I07-I27, 194-216, 219-244, quotation, I09; Fairchilds, Poverty, IIo114; Gutton La socidte,2I-40, 80-84, 153; Kaplow, Names, 127-134, I46; Angelika Kopeqny, Fahrendeund Vagabunden(Berlin, 1980), Frits L. van Holthoon, "Beggary and Social
Control: Government Policy and Beggary in the Province of Groningen between 1823
and I870," Economischen Sociaal HistorischJaarboeck,LXIII (1980), I54-I93.

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POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

603

isting social networks. Auvergnats usually headed for Paris, Lyon,


Chartres, and Orleans and became water or wood carriers; those
from Limousin became construction workers. On arrival, migrants from the same region often lived in the same parts of the
city and helped each other. Migrants from Auvergne even managed to monopolize the water-carrying trade: outsiders were
beaten up. The dishonest poor, tramps, rogues, and criminals on
the road also used these social networks.18
The assistance that the poor rendered each other was based
on an intuitive knowledge of the value of what sociologists and
anthropologists call social capital. Men and women can further
their life chances by using their resources-economic,
political,
their knowledge of social norms and cultural codes, and formal
those of their friends, family, and acquainqualifications-and
tances. "Investments" in social capital are partly determined, as is
the case with financial capital, by the expected "rate of return."
The rate of return for investing in social contacts is particularly
high for the poor. They lack alternative channels in which to
invest; they cannot accumulate political or cultural capital. Common sense tells them that whoever renders a friend a service may
expect one back in times of need. Such times would always come.
The virtual certainty that an investment would pay off in the
future naturally increased the willingness to invest. Mutual assistance was not solely a form of spreading risks over time. Help
from people of the same region meant that the poor had access
to resources otherwise inaccessible, and they may have obtained
information otherwise foregone. This phenomenon has been
termed "the strength of weak ties." Finding employment was
I8 David Thomson, "'I am not my Father's Keeper': Families and the Elderly in Nineteenth-Century England," Law andHistoryReview, II (1984), 265-286, holds a view similar
to that of Lis, Social Change, 158, who also argues that assistance from the family was
slight. Woolf, Poor, 14-16, draws attention to the small size of families in preindustrial
Europe, which reduced the possibility of family help; Peter Laslett, "Family, Kinship, and
Collectivity as Systems of Support in Preindustrial Europe," Continuityand Change, III
(I988), I53-I75, argues that help from friends and charities was more important than that
from relatives. See also Richard Wall, "Relations between the Generations in British
Families Past and Present," in Catherine Marsh and Sara Arber (eds.), Familiesand Households(London, 1992), 63-85. Jerry White, RothschildBuildings:Life in an East End Tenement
Block 1887-1920 (London, 1980), quotation, 96. See also Ellen Ross, "Survival Networks:
Women's Neighbourhood Sharing in London before World War One," History Workshop,
XV (1983), 4-27; Treble, Urban Poverty, 55-56. See also Hufton, Poor, 69-I06, 257;
Kaplow, Names, 67-71; Kopecny, Fahrende.

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604

MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

often achieved through weak ties-through


acquaintances or peofrom
the
same
to
ple
region-as opposed
family. Weak ties opened
another
of
contacts
series
social
to
up
supplement one's immediate
contacts. 19
crime is
Crime was also a means to survive. In Germany and France the same
in the nineteenth century a remarkable correlation existed between to steal ?
or rob ?
grain prices and crime. Men and women who normally made an
honest living were forced to steal during hard times. But what is
theft? What a property owner considers theft may be regarded by
the thief as an exertion of an almost legitimate privilege. In the
Black Country in England during the first half of the nineteenth
century, miners and others made a subtle distinction between
illegitimate stealing and legitimate taking. Poor women felt that
they had a right to take coal from the waste heaps: "the 'black
gleaning' of coal tips was seen as analogous to agricultural gleaning-a traditional right of the poor to the inferior leavings." There
was the "right" to remove pieces of metal or tools from the
workplace. This practice also existed in other parts of England in
the eighteenth century. Coal dockers on the Thames felt that they
were entitled to small amounts of coal. Workers emptying a ship's
hold might take some sugar, grain, or the contents of torn sacks
(and sacks with a desirable content might be prone to tear).
Foucault termed these "illegalisms." Every social class embraced
evasions of the law during the ancien regime. The rich were
fortunate enough to have privileges granting exemptions from
the law. The poor had none, but they
benefitted, within the margins of what was imposed on them by
law and custom, from a space of tolerance, gained by force or
obstinacy; and this space was for them so indispensable a condition
of existence that they were often ready to rise up to defend it; the
attempts that were made periodically to reduce it ... provoked
popular disturbances, just as attempts to reduce certain privileges
disturbed the nobility, the clergy and the bourgeoisie.20
19 See Flap, "Patronage"; Bourdieu, "Le capital social: Notes provisoires," Actes de la
Rechercheen SciencesSociales, XXXI (1980), 2-3; James S. Coleman, Foundationsof Social
Theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 300-32I. A simple game theoretical illustration is
provided by Robert Axelrod, The Evolutionof Cooperation(New York, 1984), I2-I6, 5569; Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," AmericanJournal of Sociology,
LXXVIII (1978), 1360-1380.
20 Fairchilds, Poverty, 115-126; Hufton, Poor, 245-305; Kaplow, Names, I44-152;

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How-

POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

605

In the struggle for survival, pawning was helpful, as was the


ability to build up rent arrearsor to buy on credit. These practices
often had a fixed place in the daily life of the needy. Sunday
clothes were redeemed on payday (Friday or Saturday), only to
be hocked again the following Monday. Most landlords were
inclined to give tenants some leeway at difficult times, if only
because most tenants faced problems in paying rent every now
and then. Local shops were forced to give credit as a form of
customer relations. Often this meant that customers had to buy
inferior goods, at higher prices than elsewhere, or pay high rates
of interest. Destitute customers might consider this unjust, but
the shopkeeper, eking out a meager living, could equally well
justify it as compensation for bad debts. It did imply, however,
that the poor had to pay more: poverty gave birth to poverty. To
live on credit was not only an expensive means to survive, it also
immobilized shopkeepers and their poor customers. The poor
could leave without notice, but then they lost their "right" to
credit, acquired over a long time.21
Guilds or friendly societies protected some members of the
gremio
labor force, that is, those who could afford to make contributions,
and only when these mutual societies had sufficient funds available
to help poor members. Nevertheless, sometimes a significant
proportion of the labor force received a sizable amount, especially for an illness or for covering funeral costs. Charity was also
a way to survive. In preindustrial Europe many charitable bodies
assisted the institutionalized poor, or gave outdoor relief in the
form of an allowance. Outdoor relief took the form of money,
bread and other nourishment, peat, and clothes, as well as medical
help, education, and Bible classes. It is not known exactly what
proportion of Europe's population received charity; it was presumably large. Hufton believed, for example, that approximately
ard Zehr, Crimeand the Developmentof ModernSociety:Patternsof Criminalityin NineteenthCenturyGermanyand France(London, 1976), 43-57; David Phillips, Crimeand Authorityin
VictorianEngland: The Black Country, 1835-1860 (London, 1977), 184; cf. Peter King,
"Gleaners, Farmers, and the Failure of Legal Sanctions in England, I750-I850," Past &
Present,125 (1989), I45-146; Michel Foucault, Disciplineand Punish: The Birth of the Prison
(New York, 1977), 82-83,

2I

86.

Melanie Tebbutt, Making Ends Meet: Pawn Brokingand Working-ClassCredit(London,

I983); Trebble,

Urban Poverty, 92-93,

136-137;

Gutton,

La societe, 61-62;

B. Seebohm

Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life (London, 1922), 88; Jones, OutcastLondon, 8788.

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606

MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

one-third of the population of France was assisted in the second


half of the eighteenth century, and the majority of Antwerp's
workers in the period 1770-1860 received aid.22 The poor chose
the assortment of survival strategies that offered them the most
benefits at the least cost. Depending on costs, benefits, and alternatives, charity could be included in this assortment; it was a
potential alternative to prostitution, theft, begging, and the like.
What was the value of poor relief for the poor? Woolf was
positive: "charity could become an important or even regular
source of income for the poor." Hufton, however, wrote about
the "total inadequacy of formal relief." She stated that for large
segments of the poor "formal institutional relief was not a factor
in their struggle for survival."23 The divergence of opinion here
may reflect differences between localities and periods. Even so, it
is possible to make a few general remarks. For one, relief was
likely to have been of importance to many of the poor. Even a
small amount of help could mean the difference between a tolerable existence and fathomless misery. Poor relief offered a relatively certain source of income in an otherwise uncertain world,
and it could be combined with other survival strategies.
What disadvantages were associated with accepting poor relief? Accepting charity meant abstaining from illegal survival
strategies and accepting forms of social control. To deserve help,
one had to behave deferentially and "decently," could not migrate,
nor openly resort to begging, prostitution, crime, or looting. To
the extent that poor relief was free of obligation and the value of
charity was high at a time when the authorities punished begging,
theft, and migration, poor relief was attractive. It could be given
in cash, in kind or a combination of both. Whether relief took
the form of outright dole, at the one extreme, or incarceration,
at the other, was not decided by the poor, but it was important
to them. Indoor relief had a higher monetary value than outdoor
relief, but it also entailed a higher degree of social control. In
addition, the workhouse was ill-suited to those in need of social
contacts-the
underemployed trying to find work, for example.
In nineteenth-century London, the type of assistance was not
fixed, but it was partially dependent on the strategic behavior of
the poor: "Since poor law aid came in several forms, potential
22

23

Hufton, Poor, 126; Lis, Social Change, 127.


Woolf, Poor, 39; Hufton, Poor, 174, 176.

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POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

607

clients could discriminate and shape demands to what was available. Applying for relief was an active, negotiated process between administrators and the poor."24London paupers regularly
applied for assistance when ill or unemployed, at the birth of a
child, or when faced with the costs of a funeral. They believed
that they had a right to choose the type of relief most suitable:
medical help when ill, financial aid when out of work, a small
pension for their elderly parents so that they would not have to
be their parents' keepers, or even incarceration of burdensome
family members in workhouses, hospitals, or lunatic asylums.
Poor relief was not only an economic survival strategy; it
also provided paupers with certain facilities-education for their
children, medical help, and free Bible classes. The poor might try
to exploit these facilities to their own advantage, regardless of the
intentions of those providing them. For example, pauper schools
could be used as day-care centers, without the poor attaching too
much significance to the moral lessons that were taught. Some
workers "out of their own free will . . . turned to the authorities
to discipline members of their group-a rational way to act,
because the survival margins were small indeed." In Antwerp, at
the close of the ancien regime, one in thirty-nine households asked
the authorities to lock up a troublesome relative-mostly husbands or sons who failed to contribute to the family budget and
spent their days idle.25
MUTUAL

INTERDEPENDENCE

Institutionalized

bargaining took

place between elites and poor through charitable bodies. Charity


functioned at the same time as a control strategy for the elites and
a survival strategy for the poor. Donors and recipients of relief
were dependent on each other in the sense that both preferred
some kind of cooperation to none at all. But, next to mutual
accommodation the precise nature of that cooperation was the
outcome of conflicting interests. Charity became the object of,
mostly tacit, bargaining. Mutual interdependence did not mean
equal power or equal benefits, and, in the process of bargaining,
the needy, locked in a struggle for life, held the weakest cards.
The poor were not entirely without power, however: the problem
24 Lees, "Survival," 69.
25 Cf. Lis and Soly, "Policing," 124; Lis, Soly, and Van Damme, Op vrije voeten?, 3437, I20-I27,

quotation,

127; Lis and Soly, "'Total Institutions',"

47-48,

61-62.

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same level
of power?!

608

MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

of the poor was their poverty; the problem of the rich was the
poor. A "perpetual commerce of charity" connected rich and
poor.26

Outdoor poor relief was not the only way for elites to realize
their interests. There were alternatives, such as regulating bread
prices, establishing employment projects, using police force or
the Grand Enfermement. In turn, the poor could choose survival
strategies other than charity if conditions for its provision were
too demanding or the amount that was given was too low. The
choices that the poor made were important to the elite. If a labor
reserve of assisted workers were to disappear, employers would
suffer. Shameless paupers or persistent beggars were a nuisance
to elites. Looting was a threat to privileged positions; it was not
just a form of anger and frustration, it was also a technique to
pressure elites, a "collective bargaining by riot." A child not
vaccinated against smallpox was a risk to the health of elites. A
pauper refusing assistance posed a threat to the eternal salvation
of charitable donors. Elites had to take the wishes of the poor
into account. In making a decision, they had to anticipate the
reaction of the armies of the poor, exemplifying what Friedrich
has termed the "rule of anticipated action."27
This dependency between rich and poor over the centuries
may have led to a system of rights and duties. Several authors
contend that in preindustrial Europe the poor thought that they
had a right to relief and, conversely, the rich felt themselves
obliged to give aid. On the surface, it seems odd to include a
system of rights and obligations in a theoretical perspective based
on rational actors, but only if historical actors act contrary to
their perceived interests because of a current norm. If a norm
were simply a reflection of an actual situation, the paradox would
be resolved. A norm may act as a precept, a "focal point," solving
a complex problem involving the weighing of unlike pros and
cons, both with regard to conflicts between elites and the poor
26 On bargaining, see Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategyof Conflict(New York, I963),
esp. 58-77; Amartya K. Sen, "Gender and Cooperative Conflicts," in Irene Tinker (ed.),
PersistentInequalities: Womenand WorldDevelopment (New York, 1990), 123-149; idem,
CollectiveChoiceand Social Welfare(San Francisco, 1970), II8-125; De Swaan, In Care, 14;
Fairchilds, Poverty, quotation, 17.
27 Eric J. Hobsbawm, LabouringMen: Studies in the History of Labour(London, I964),
quotation, 7; Carl Joachim Friedrich, Man and his Government:An Empirical Theory of
Politics (New York, 1963), I99-215. See also De Swaan, In Care, 189.

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POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

609

and between elites themselves. A landowner who paid his rural


laborers wages that were inadequate to live on was not only
ensured of a labor reserve through the system of charity, but, as
an overseer of the poor, his social standing grew among his peers
and among villagers, despite his actions as an employer. In addition, he was able to fulfill his duty as a Christian and so could
await the Kingdom of God with a clear conscience; he also had
the advantage of being in a better position to persuade the poor
that the world was just: "A moral order that encompasses the
poor, whom it must persuade of the rightness of property, in
justifying their exclusion also establishes their claim to part of the
surplus. The same God that forbids stealing also demands charity," as de Swaan noted. Or, as Sen wrote, "inequalities often
survive precisely by making allies out of the deprived. The Underdog comes to accept the legitimacy of the unequal order and
becomes an implicit accomplice."28
Some European poor considered assistance from authorities
a right. English and French poor in the eighteenth century felt
that the state was obliged to take measures to counter hoarding
and to prevent prices from rising in times of dearth and famine.
The authorities had to provide grain at affordable prices; otherwise, the poor would confiscate stocks from speculators, subsequently auctioning the grain at prices deemed reasonable-a taxation populaire. According to some historians, the poor also saw
poor relief as a right. This view did not imply that the poor fully
accepted the demands that charity made on them or were overjoyed with the benefits that it brought them, but merely that,
with the resources at their disposal, it seemed the best bargain
that they could strike.29
OF POOR RELIEF
At the end of the preindustrial era,
criticism of poor relief gained momentum. English critics claimed

EFFECTS

28 On focal points, see Schelling, Strategy,57-59, 91, III-II5; De Swaan, In Care, 14;
Sen, "Gender," 126.
29 Edward P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth
Century," Past & Present, 50 (I971), 76-136; cf. Louise A. Tilly, "The Food Riot as a
Form of Political Conflict in France," Journal of Interdisciplinary
History, II (1971), 23-57.
On poor relief as a right of the poor, see William Apfel and Peter Dunkley, "English
Rural Society and the New Poor Law: Bedfordshire, 1834-47," Social History, X (I985),
54-56; Himmelfarb, Idea, 4I; Woolf, Poor, 39; cf. Thompson, "Moral Economy," 136;
Lees, "Survival." On best bargains, see Sen, "Gender," 126; idem, Collective Choice, 26,
121.

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610

MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

that poor relief was ample and freely given, enabling workers to
live idly at the expense of a parish. The influential I834 Report
of the Poor Law Commission in England argued that poor relief
fostered voluntary unemployment on a massive scale. Even historians of the labor movement, such as the Hammonds and the
Webbs in the first decades of the twentieth century, accepted that
poor relief had unintended negative effects.30 Polanyi was of the
same opinion, but he also drew attention to what was to become
a main feature of revisionist literature, namely the economic rationality of poor relief. This revision began in earnest, however,
with an article written by Blaug in I963. Many objections have
since been raised to the traditional interpretation of the effects of
poor relief. The average value of assistance was so low that it
could hardly have been a major disincentive to work. Further,
the monitoring of poor relief institutions was so effective that
"labor evasion" on a large scale was unlikely. Finally, only specific
groups were given relief and in specific economic contexts. In the
absence of assistance, wage levels would not have declined nor
would the labor supply have increased. On the contrary, part of
the labor surplus would have migrated or starved. In order to
prevent this migration, higher wages would have had to be paid.
yes ?
Charity did not lead to widespread unemployment, rather, wideof
kind
a
created
charity.
particular
spread unemployment
Poor relief could have had at least two other major social
consequences. First, it could have stabilized (as it was meant to
do) or destabilized the social and political order. Second, it could
have helped the poor to survive (if assistance was sufficient),
forced them to migrate or starve (if too meager), or even attracted
numerous immigrants (if too generous). Thus charity could have multiples
effets
increased the number of the poor. In addition, medical aid could
have helped paupers, especially children, to survive, thus swelling
the ranks of the poor.31 Poor relief also had consequences for the
education and spiritual well-being of the poor, and their attitude
toward family life, sexual relations, and hygiene.
30 See Boyer, EconomicHistory, 65-83; Daniel A. Baugh, "The Cost of Poor Relief in
South-East England, 1790-1834," EconomicHistory Review, XXVIII (1975), 50-68; Mark
Blaug, "The Myth of the Old Poor Law and the Making of the New," Journal of Economic
History, XXIII (1963), 151-184; idem, "The Poor Law Report Reexamined," Journal of
EconomicHistory, XXIV (1964), 229-245; Anne Digby, "The Labour Market and the
Continuity of Social Policy after 1834," EconomicHistory Review, XXVIII (1973), 69-83.
31

See Boyer, Economic History, 173-192,

I50-I72.

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POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

6II

A number of theoretical ideas and empirical findings from studies


in the fields of history, social science, and welfare economics can
be integrated into a simple model of how poor relief functioned
in preindustrial societies (Fig. I). The model takes as its starting
point goal-oriented behavior by groups of social actors interacting
with other groups and with society as a whole. It has been assumed that, by and large, two groups of actors operated purposefully in the field of poor relief-the elites and the poor. Poor
relief is viewed as a control strategy of the elites and as a survival
strategy of the poor. Each chose the most rewarding alternative
from the range of choices that were available to the group, and
their choices were conditional on the choices of other groups.
The nature of poor relief was the outcome of this interactive
bargaining process. Preindustrial poor relief was just one strategy
of control that was open to the elites, and one strategy of survival
that was available to the poor. The functioning of poor relief was
thus dependent on their mutual cooperation, and had to be in the
interests of both parties if it were to be effective.
The existence of poor relief was profitable for European elites
in five ways: economically, socially, politically, medically, and
morally. Welfare economics demonstrates that rational members
of a social group will not necessarily purchase a public good, even
though the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. There were
three potential incentives to do so: social standing, furthering
political careers and patronage, and eternal salvation. not very clear; salvation?
The second party involved in poor relief was the poor. Many connections
church ?
Europeans lived below the poverty line. In order to survive, they
drew on a number of survival strategies, profiting from charity business?
differences
in three ways: it helped them to survive; it provided them with
between
medical and educational assistance and the means to religious Protestants
and
improvement; and a small number of those from the middle class
Catholics
who had fallen on hard times used relief as a way to preserve
their class status.
Over the course of time, the consequences of poor relief
could change both the societal contexts in which it operated and
the elements with which it interacted (these feedback loops are
indicated with arrows in Fig. I). First, charity influenced the
behavior of elites and the poor; the nature of relief influenced
their choice of strategy. Second, charity affected society as a
whole. It could regulate or deregulate the labor market, increase

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612

I MARCO H. D. VAN LEEUWEN

Fig. 1 A Simple Model of the Functioning of Poor Relief in


Preindustrial Europe
SOCIETAL CONTEXT
- preindustrial economy

- weak national and strong local


influences on poor relief
- highly unequal distribution of economic, social,
and political resources

INTERACTION

SYSTEM OF POOR RELIEF

Actors with Interests


Elites:

Poor:

- regulating labor market


- stabilizing social order
- averting turmoil

- money and goods


- facilities
- shame-faced poor:

- reducing risk of infection


-

staying in own class

civilizing the poor


status
career and patronage
salvation

Alternative Ways to Act ;


Choice by elites
Choice by poor from
from alternative control
alternative survival
strategies, among others
strategies, among others
-

increasing wages
employment projects
food subsidies
police action
dispensing poor relief

pawning
migration
begging
prostitution
crime
revolt
accepting poor relief
mutual societies

Exchange of poor relief package for desired behavior

1
EFFECTS OF POOR RELIEF
- increasing or decreasing the number of poor
- (de)regulating the labor market
- (de)stabilizing social order

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POOR RELIEF IN EUROPE

613

or decrease the number in poverty, (de)stabilize the social order,


and affect the behavior of the poor.
The simple model outlined here is, in a sense, artificial, in
that it is based on a synthesis of literature which is both incomplete
and diverse and which relates to many different localities and
periods. Only detailed empirical studies will reveal whether such
a synthesis can provide an adequate analysis of the functioning of
preindustrialpoor relief. Those studies may also help us to answer
other important questions, such as how the elites were able to
dominate social policy; what the role of the middle classes was;
how many and what kinds of poor people made use of poor relief;
and the value placed by the poor and the elite on relief as a strategy
compared with the value of other strategies.
And also: the different reliefs for different populations for instance, its
not the same unskilled workers that skilled its an important thing in
the pre industrial era ? Different kinds of workers. What about the
workers in movement ? maritime workers, sailors
rural workers ? urban workers ? the same in this period ?

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