Professional Documents
Culture Documents
154037
April 30, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
BENJAMIN VERGARA, JONA SARVIDA, MILAGROS
MAJOREMOS, MAJORIE JALALON, MAY JOY MENDOZA (@ May
Joy Sandi), and JOY SABALLA (@ Josephine Saballa), MABELYN B.
VERGARA, RIO SARVIDA, FRANCISCO MAJOREMOS, in their
respective behalves and in behalf of ROY JALALON, ROMMEL
MENDOZA and DELFIN SABALLA,petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Ormoc, Branch 12; SPO3 ANGELO S. LLENOS and the CITY
JAIL WARDEN OF ORMOC; and ELEUTERIA P. BOLAO,
respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in Dr. A.
Santos Ave., Paraaque City. On December 24, 2001, they were arrested by
Ormoc City policemen by authority of a Warrant of Arrest dated November
19, 2001 issued by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona in Sp. Proc. No. 3695-0 for
Issuance of Letters of Administration, Distribution and Partition pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City (Branch 12).1
The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria P.
Bolao, as Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers,
praying that petitioners be held guilty of indirect contempt for not complying
with the probate court's order dated October 9, 1999 directing them to pay
their monthly rentals to respondent Bolao.2
It appears that pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Allers,
respondent Bolao included the property leased by Taripe to petitioners in the
inventory of the estate. The probate court issued the assailed Order dated
October 5, 1999, portions of which read as follows:
1.
SUBMITTED FOR RESOLUTION is an omnibus motion filed by
the Petitioner-Administratrix, informing among others, the submission of the
Inventory of the Estate of the decedent, referred as Motion-Annex 'A' thereof.
The Inventory shows that the properties left by the deceased consists of Real
and Personal Properties, as well as Credits and Collectibles, itemized under
letter heading A, B, and C of the Inventory, respectively.
2.
The Real Properties are occupied by some lessees, namely: Cargo
Bridge Philippines Corporation, represented by its President Mr. Bernhard
Ashauer, Jr.; Mrs. Lea Amorcillo, Mrs. Milagros Majoremos, Mr. Danilo
Aguylo, Mrs. Marjorie Jalalon, Mrs. Jona Sarvida, Mrs. Analyn Malunes,
Mrs. Edna Rubi, Mrs. Josephine Saballa, Mr. Benjamin Vergara, Mr. Jerry
Peligro, Mrs. Mary Joy Sandi, and Mr. Jaime Cabarse, all inside the Allers'
Property Compound at 8110 Dr. A. Santos Ave., San Dionisio, Paraaque
City.
xxx
xxx
xxx
5.
It is further shown that all known intervenors, lessees and heirs were
served of the motion and notified of the hearing, with no opposition except
intervenor Berlito P. Taripe, based on his claim against the estate, which
may be treated in due time for claims against the estate. However, the motion
under consideration refers to the return to the court of the true Inventory of
the Estate of the deceased within three (3) months as directed under Section
1, Rule 83 which sets a specific period of time to submit, otherwise it is
violated. The opposition is not tenable.
6.
Finding the motion meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED. As
prayed for, the Inventory of the Estate attached therewith as Motion-Annex
'A' (sic) and considered as a compliance of the required return of the true
Inventory of the estate of the decedent.
7.
Further, the lessees above-cited and listed in the Inventory are
directed to pay their respective monthly rental regularly starting the month of
August, 1999, including arrears if any, to the duly appointed Special
Administratrix Mrs. Eleuteria P. Bolao, until further notice.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Let copies of this Order together with the Inventory served to all above-cited.
SO ORDERED.3 (Emphasis Ours)
Copies of the order were sent on October 12, 1999 to petitioners via
registered mail.4
Five months later, on motion of respondent Bolao, as Special
Administratrix, the probate court issued a writ of execution on March 3, 2000
to enforce the aforesaid order dated October 5, 1999. The Sheriff submitted a
return dated August 10, 2000 stating that on June 5, 2000, he met with
petitioners but failed to collect the rentals due on the property as Taripe had
already collected from them three months advance rentals.5
On August 4, 2000, respondent Bolao filed a motion to require petitioners to
explain why they should not be cited in indirect contempt for disobeying the
October 5, 1999 order of the probate court.6 Petitioners were served copies of
the motion by registered mail.7 The probate court granted the motion in its
Resolution dated September 7, 2000, portions of which read as follows:
The Motion to Exclude Certain Parcels of Land as part of the Estate of the
decedent is also denied for lack of merit. The properties sought to be
excluded by intervenor Bertito P. Taripe are titled/registered in the name of
the decedent and therefore they should be included in the inventory of the
intestate estate of Anselma Allers.If intervenor has claims against the estate,
he should file a separate action against the Administratrix in accordance
with Rule 87 of the Revised Rules of Court. As it is, intervenor cannot claim
ownership over properties registered in the name of the decedent by mere
motion.
The Return of the Deputy Sheriff of the Writ of Execution is noted.
Petitioner's motion to let the lessees explain why they should not be cited for
contempt for disobeying the Court's order is granted. All lessees listed on the
Writ of Execution are hereby ordered to explain within twenty (20) days from
receipt of this order why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of the
Court for disobeying the Court's Order dated October 5, 1999, and the Writ
of Execution dated May 29, 2000.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis Ours)
Petitioners were furnished copies of the said Order on September 27, 2000 by
registered mail.8
Six months later, in a letter dated March 18, 2001, some of the petitioners,
together with the other tenants of the property, informed the probate court
that they are "freezing" their monthly rentals as they are in a quandary as to
whom to pay the rentals.9
Respondent Bolao then filed on March 20, 2001, a motion to cite petitioners
in contempt, which was set for hearing on May 11, 2001.10 In its Order dated
May 11, 2001, the probate court found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt
and ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to undergo
imprisonment until they comply with the probate court's order for them to
pay rentals.11
Petitioners again wrote the probate court on June 11, 2001 asking that the
indirect contempt "slapped" against them be withdrawn. They stated that their
failure to attend the May 11, 2001 hearing was due to financial constraints,
most of them working on construction sites, receiving minimum wages, and
repeated that the reason why they are freezing the monthly rentals is that they
are uncertain as to whom to remit it.12
Upon motion of respondent Bolao, the probate court, per its Order dated
November 16, 2001, issued a warrant of arrest on November 19, 2001. On
December 24, 2001, petitioners were arrested.
On December 26, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.13 On January 3, 2002, the
appellate court ordered the temporary release of petitioners. 14 After due
proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision on March 26, 2002
denying the petition for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. This Court's resolution ordering the
temporary release of the lessees is hereby RECALLED. The lessees are
ordered REMANDED to the custody of the Jail Warden of Ormoc City until
they have complied with the orders of the probate court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed herein
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, based
on the following grounds:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
ORDER DATED OCTOBER 5, 1999 (ANNEX "E") PARTICULARLY
THE PORTION THEREOF WHICH SUMMARILY DIRECTED THE
LESSEES TO TURNOVER THEIR MONTHLY RENTALS OF THE
APARTMENTS OF BERLITO P. TARIPE TO ELEUTERIA P. BOLAO
AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX, IS UNLAWFUL;
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
MOTION FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT FILED BY
RESPONDENT ELEUTERIA P. BOLAO AGAINST THE LESSEES IS
NOT THE PROPER REMEDY AND THAT THE ORDER OF THE
COURT A QUO GRANTING SAID MOTION AND DECLARING THAT
THE LESSEES ARE GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT IS A
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO TO ISSUE WARRANT OF ARREST
AND THE SAID WARRANT SO ISSUED AS WELL AS THE ACTUAL
ARREST OF SAID LESSEES IN COMPLIANCE THEREWITH, ARE
UNLAWFUL;
IV.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THE
TEMPORARY RELEASE OF THE LESSEES PERMANENT.16
The crux of petitioners' arguments is that they were not notified of the motion
filed by respondent Special Administratrix Bolao, submitting an inventory
of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, which includes the property
occupied by them. Such being the case, petitioners contend that the order
dated October 5, 1999 granting the motion and directing them to pay the
rentals to Bolao is unlawful hence, their refusal to comply with it is not
contumacious.17 They also assail the appointment of respondent Bolao as
Special Administratrix for having been made without the required bond, 18
and that she has no authority to file the motion for indirect contempt, as her
powers are limited.19
When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that the
notice was served must prove the fact of service.20 The burden of proving
notice rests upon the party asserting its existence.21 In civil cases, service
made through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the
mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing
compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13. In the present case, as proof that
Despite the foregoing, we find that the trial court's finding of contempt and
the order directing the imprisonment of petitioner to be unwarranted. The
salutary rule is that the power to punish to contempt must be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not
retaliatory idea of punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-restraint.31
In Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations,32 the Court quoted the
pronouncements of some American courts, to wit:
Except where the fundamental power of the court to imprison for contempt
has been restricted by statute, and subject to constitutional prohibitions where
a contemnor fails or refuses to obey an order of the court for the payment of
money he may be imprisoned to compel obedience to such order. [Fla.
Revell v. Dishong, 175 So. 905, 129 Fla. 9; Va. Branch v. Branch, 132 S.E.
303; 144 Va. 244]. (17 C.J.S. 287).
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . It has been said that imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion
for civil purpose cannot be resorted to until all other means fail [Mich.
Atchison, etc. R. co. v. Jennison, 27 N.W. 6, 60 Mich. 232], but the court's
power to order the contemnor's detension continues so long as the contumacy
persists [Ark.Lane v. Alexander, 271 S.W. 710, 168 Ark. 700] (17 C.J.S.
289).33
which we hereby adopt as proper guidelines in the determination of whether
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the order of the trial court finding
petitioners guilty of indirect contempt of court and directing their
imprisonment for their contumacious refusal to pay the rentals to the
administratrix.
In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution expressly provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt.
Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil debt or one not arising from a
criminal offense.34 It means any liability to pay arising out of a contract,
express or implied.35 In the present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of
the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the
rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the order for the
principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom
to pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had
originally leased the subject property to them. Clearly, the payment of rentals
is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section
8, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court to wit:
SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in
the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the
respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court concerned
until he performs it. (7a)
2
if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are
insufficient to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property
of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to
satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the
personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful
fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or
any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like
manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.
(c)
Garnishment of debts and credits. The officer may levy on debts
due the judgment obligor and other credits, including bank deposits, financial
interests, royalties, commissions and other personal property not capable of
manual delivery in the possession or control of third parties. Levy shall be
made by serving notice upon the person owing such debts or having in his
possession or control such credits to which the judgment obligor is entitled.
The garnishment shall cover only such amount as will satisfy the judgment
and all lawful fees.
The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days
from service of the notice of garnishment stating whether or not the judgment
obligor has sufficient funds or credits to satisfy the amount of the judgment.
If not, the report shall state how much funds or credits the garnishee holds for
the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, or certified bank check
issued in the name of the judgment obligee, shall be delivered directly to the
judgment obligee within ten (10) working days from service of notice on said
garnishee requiring such delivery, except the lawful fees which shall be paid
directly to the court.
In the event there are two or more garnishees holding deposits or credits
sufficient to satisfy the judgment, the judgment obligor, if available, shall
have the right to indicate the garnishee or garnishees who shall be required to
deliver the amount due; otherwise, the choice shall be made by the judgment
obligee.
The executing sheriff shall observe the same procedure under paragraph (a)
with respect to delivery of payment to the judgment obligee. (8a, 15a)
while Section 10 of the same Rule refers to execution of judgments for
specific acts such as conveyance, delivery of deeds or other specific acts
vesting title; sale of real or personal property, delivery or restitution of real
property, removal of improvements on property subject of execution and
delivery of personal property.
The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section
9 as quoted above. Until and unless all the means provided for under Section
9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a
information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the
jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quogranted the motion and ordered
dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the
offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with
'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this
order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.
Two issues are tendered for resolution, namely: first, are "lewd designs" an
indispensable element which should be alleged in the complaint?, and,
second, does the present appeal place the accused in double jeopardy?
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an
accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c)
the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted,
or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the
court a quo was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the
record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Hence,
the only remaining and decisive question is whether the dismissal of the case
was without the express consent of the accused.
The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the trial
judge upon his motion to dismiss. However, he vehemently contends that
under the prevailing jurisprudence, citing People vs. Bangalao, et al. (94
Phil. 354, February 17, 1954), People vs. Labatete (L-12917, April 27, 1960),
5
People vs. Villarin (L-19795, July 31, 1964), and People vs. Cloribel (L20314, August 31, 1964), an erroneous dismissal of a criminal action, even
upon the instigation of the accused in a motion to quash or dismiss, does not
bar him from pleading the defense of double jeopardy in a subsequent appeal
by the Government or in a new prosecution for the same offense. The
accused suggests that the above-enumerated cases have abandoned the
previous ruling of this Court to the effect that when a case is dismissed, other
than on the merits, upon motion of the accused personally or through counsel,
such dismissal is to be regarded as with the express consent of the accused
and consequently he is deemed to have waived [[4]] his right to plead double
jeopardy and/or he is estopped [[5]] from claiming such defense on appeal by
the Government or in another indictment for the same offense.
This particular aspect of double jeopardy dismissal or termination of the
original case without the express consent of the defendant has evoked
varied and apparently conflicting rulings from this Court. We must untangle
this jurisprudential maze and fashion out in bold relief a ruling not
susceptible of equivocation. Hence, a searching extended review of the
pertinent cases is imperative.
The doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was enunciated and formally
labelled as such for the first time in 1949 in People vs. Salico, supra, with
three justices dissenting. 6 In that case, the provincial fiscal appealed from
the order of the trial court dismissing, upon motion of the defendant made
immediately after the prosecution had rested its case, an indictment for
homicide, on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that the
crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, or,
more specifically, that the municipality of Victorias in which the crime was
allegedly committed was compromised within the province of Negros
Occidental. Rejecting the claim of the accused that the appeal placed him in
double jeopardy, this Court held that the dismissal was erroneous because the
evidence on record showed that the crime was committed in the town of
Victorias and the trial judge should have taken judicial notice that the said
municipality was included within the province of Negros Occidental and
therefore the offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the
court of first instance of the said province. In ruling that the appeal by the
Government did not put the accused in peril of a second jeopardy, this Court
stressed that with "the dismissal of the case by the court below upon motion
of the defendant, the latter has not been in jeopardy," and "assuming,
arguendo, that the defendant had been already in jeopardy in the court below
and would be placed in double jeopardy by the appeal, the defendant has
waived his constitutional right not to be put in danger of being convicted
twice for the same offense." Mr. Justice Felicisimo Feria, speaking for the
majority, reasoned that
... when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the
dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense;
because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the
court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of
conviction against him.
The Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in People vs. Marapao (85
Phil. 832, March 30, 1950), Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 Phil. 299, March 5,
1951), People vs. Pinuela, et al. (91 Phil. 53, March 28, 1952), Co Te Hue vs.
Encarnacion (94 Phil. 258, January 26, 1954), and People vs. Desalisa (L15516, December 17, 1966).
In Marapao, the defendant was indicted for slight physical injuries in the
municipal court of Sibonga, Cebu. After the prosecution had rested its case, a
continuance was had, and when trial was resumed, the court, upon motion of
the defense, ordered the case dismissed for failure of the prosecution to
appear. However, the court reconsidered this order upon representation of the
fiscal who appeared moments later, and ordered the defense to present its
evidence. The accused moved to get aside the latter order on the ground that
it placed him in double jeopardy. Acceding to this motion, the court
dismissed the case. Subsequently, the accused was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu with the offense of assault upon a person in authority,
based on the same facts alleged in the former complaint for slight physical
injuries. Again, upon motion of the accused, the trial court dismissed the new
indictment on the ground of double jeopardy. From this order, the
prosecution appealed. In upholding the appeal of the Government, this Court
observed that although the information for assault necessarily embraced the
crime of slight physical injuries for which the accused was indicted in the
justice of the peace court,
... it appears that the appellee was neither convicted nor acquitted of the
previous charge against him for slight physical injuries, for that case was
dismissed upon his own request before trial could be finished. Having
himself asked for such dismissal, before a judgment of conviction or acquittal
could have been rendered, the appellee is not entitled to invoke the defense of
double jeopardy.
defendant's express consent. This Court sustained the view of the Solicitor
General, thus:
waived the plea of double jeopardy in connection with an appeal from the
order of dismissal, appellees here are not precluded from making such plea.
We are inclined to uphold the view of the Solicitor General. From the
transcript of the notes taken at the hearing in connection with the motion for
dismissal, it appears that a conference was held between petitioner and the
offended party in the office of the fiscal concerning the case and that as a
result of that conference the offended party filed the motion to dismiss. It also
appears that as no action has been taken on said motion, counsel for
petitioner invited the attention of the court to the matter who acted thereon
only after certain explanation was given by said counsel. And when the order
came the court made it plain that the dismissal was merely provisional in
character. It can be plainly seen that the dismissal was effected not only with
the express consent of the petitioner but even upon the urging of his counsel.
This attitude of petitioner, or his counsel, takes this case out of the operation
of the rule.
To paraphrase, had the dismissal been anchored on the motion to dismiss, the
defendants would not have been entitled to protection against double
jeopardy.
accordingly. The former pleaded not guilty and subsequently filed a motion
to quash on the ground that being brothers and sisters of the principal
accused, they were exempt from criminal responsibility for the acts charged
against them in the information. Thereupon, the prosecution moved to amend
the information so as to allege that the defendants profited from the effects of
the crime. In view of this development, counsel for the defendants moved to
withdraw their motion to quash, and objected to the proposed amendment
which sought to change materially the information after plea without the
consent of the accused. Without acting on the petition to withdraw the motion
to quash, the trial court denied the motion of the prosecution on the ground
that the proposed amendment would substantially affect the fundamental
rights of the accused who were exempt from liability under the information
because of their relation to the principal culprit. Then the prosecution moved
for the dismissal of the case against the alleged accessories with reservation
to file a new information. The court ordered the dismissal without ruling on
the reservation. Subsequently, a new information was filed virtually
reproducing the previous one except that now there was an added allegation
of intent to gain. The lower court quashed the new information upon motion
of the accused on the ground of double jeopardy. On appeal by the
prosecution, this Court, thru Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that the plea of
double jeopardy was erroneously sustained because
Again, in People vs. Reyes, et al., supra, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief
Justice Paras, reiterated the Acierto ruling thus:
In the first place, the accused-appellees herein filed a motion to quash on the
ground that they incurred no criminal liability under the facts alleged in the
information in the preceding case, No. Q-972, and the trial court instead of
allowing the withdrawal of the motion to quash, virtually sustained the same
when it denied the fiscal's motion to amend, thereby forcing the latter to
dismiss the case; hence, it can not be held that the former case was terminated
without the express consent of the accused. Secondly, the defendants
themselves showed that the information in the previous case was insufficient
to charge them with any criminal offense, in view of their relationship with
the principal accused; and it is well established doctrine that for jeopardy to
attach, there must be an information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction. Lastly, the herein accused having successfully
contended that the information in the former case was insufficient to sustain a
conviction, they cannot turn around now and claim that such information was
after all, sufficient and did place them in danger of jeopardy of being
convicted thereunder. If, as they formerly contended, no conviction could be
had in the previous case, they are in estoppel to contend now that the
information in the second case places them in jeopardy for the second time.
Their case comes within the spirit of the rule laid down in People vs. Acierto.
We come now to the case of People vs. Casiano. In this case the accused was
charged with estafa in a complaint filed with the justice of the peace court of
Rosales, Pangasinan. The accused waived her right to preliminary
investigation and the record was accordingly forwarded to the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan where the provincial fiscal filed an information for
"illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes." Upon
arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the defense filed
a motion to dismiss on the thesis that there had been no preliminary
investigation of the charge of illegal possession and use of false treasury or
bank notes, and that the absence of such preliminary investigation affected
the jurisdiction of the trial court. The motion was granted on the ground that
the waiver made by the defendant in the justice of the peace court did not
deprive her of the right to a preliminary investigation of an entirely different
crime. On appeal to this Court, it was held that the dismissal was erroneous
because the allegations of the information filed in the Court of First Instance
were included in those of the complaint filed in the justice of the peace court
where the defendant had already waived her right to a preliminary
investigation. On the question of whether the appeal placed the defendant in
double jeopardy, this Court, thru Mr. Chief Justice (then Associate Justice)
Concepcion, observed that the situation of Casiano was identical to that of the
accused in Acierto
Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient, but the
case is dismissed upon the petition of the accused on the ground that the
complaint or information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not
bar another prosecution for the same offense and the defendant is estopped
from alleging in the second information that the former dismissal was wrong
because the complaint or information was valid.
In this particular case, upon motion of the defendants, the trial court
dismissed the information because it did not allege the use of violence,
notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged was coercion under article
287 of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, however, this Court ruled that the
dismissal was erroneous because "although the offense named in the
information is coercion, it does not necessarily follow that the applicable
provision is the first paragraph, since the second paragraph also speaks of
'coercions'. Inasmuch as the recitals in the information do not include
violence, the inevitable conclusion is that the coercion contemplated is that
described and penalized in the second paragraph."
... were she to plead double jeopardy in this case, for such plea would require
the assertion of jurisdiction of the court of first instance to try her and that the
same erred in yielding to her plea therein for lack of authority therefor. In the
language of our decision in the Acierto case, it is immaterial whether or not
the court a quohad said authority. It, likewise, makes no difference whether
or not the issue raised by defendant in the lower court affected its
jurisdiction. The fact is that she contested its jurisdiction and that, although
such pretense was erroneous, she led the court to believe that it was correct
and to act in accordance with such belief. The elementary principles of fair
dealing and good faith demand, accordingly, that she be estopped now from
taking the opposite stand in order to pave the way for a plea of double
jeopardy, unless the rule of estoppel laid down in the Acierto case is revoked.
As a matter of fact, said rule applies with greater force to the case at bar than
to the Acierto case, because the same involved two (2) separate
proceedingsbefore courts deriving their authority from different
sovereignties, whereas the appeal in the case at bar is a continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court, which like this Supreme Court, is a creature
of the same sovereignty. In short the inconsistency and impropriety would be
more patent and glaring in this case than in that of Acierto, if appellant herein
pleaded double jeopardy in this instance.
This Court then forthnightly stated that "the rule of estoppel applied in the
Acierto case should be maintained, because:
1. It is basically and fundamentally sound and just.
2. It is in conformity with the principles of legal ethics, which demand good
faith of the higher order in the practice of law.
3. It is well settled that parties to a judicial proceeding may not, on appeal,
adopt a theory inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court.
xxxxxxxxx
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not.
If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory
that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred on appeal, from assailing
such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S. 861-863).
8
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and
decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be
permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower
courthad jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the
parties, has nobearing thereon.
Twelve days after Casiano, this Court, in People vs. Archilla, supra, invoked
anew the doctrine of estoppel. In this case Alfreda Roberts, together with
Jose Archilla, was charged with bigamy. After pleading not guilty, Roberts,
through his counsel, filed a motion praying that the complaint be quashed
with regard to her on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not
constitute the offense charged for failure to aver that "insofar as Alfreda
Roberts is concerned, her marriage to Jose Luis Archilla was her second
marriage ..." On appeal, the prosecution contended that the trial court erred in
granting the motion to quash, because the complaint was sufficient and at
least charged the accused as an accomplice. The defendant maintained that
even if that were true, the quashing of the information amounted to her
acquittal which prevented the prosecution from taking the said appeal as it
would place her in double jeopardy. Mr. Justice Felix Bautista Angelo,
writing for the majority, ruled that the trial court erred, and proceeded to
emphasize that the accused
... cannot now be allowed to invoke the plea of double jeopardy after
inducing the trial court to commit an error which otherwise it would not have
committed. In other words, appellee can not adopt a posture of double
dealing without running afoul with the doctrine of estoppel. It is well-settled
that the parties to a justiciable proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt a theory
inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court (Williams v.
McMicking, 17 Phil. 408; Molina v. Somes, etc.). Consequently, appellee is
now estopped from invoking the plea of double jeopardy upon the theory that
she would still be convicted under an information which she branded to be
insufficient in the lower court.
The accused in this case now before us nevertheless insists that the Salico
doctrine and "necessarily analogous doctrines" were abandoned by this Court
in Bangalao, Labatete, Villarin and Cloribel.
In Bangalao, the complaint filed by the victim's mother alleged that the rape
was committed "by means of force and intimidation" while the information
filed by the fiscal alleged that the offended party was a "minor and demented
girl" and that the defendants "successively had sexual intercourse with her by
means of force and against the will of Rosita Palban." After the accused had
pleaded not guilty, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the case on
the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the offense of rape
charged by the fiscal since it was distinct from the one alleged in the
complaint which did not aver that the victim was a demented girl". The lower
court sustained the motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On
appeal by the prosecution, this Court held that the trial judge erred in
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, but ruled, however, that the
appeal could not prosper because it placed the accused in double jeopardy.
As the court below had jurisdiction to try the case upon the filing of the
complaint by the mother of the offended party, the defendants-appellees
would be placed in double jeopardy if the appeal is allowed.
After mature analysis, we cannot agree that this Court in Bangalao impliedly
abandoned the Salico doctrine on waiver. Bangalao was decided solely on
the question of jurisdiction. This Court, however, after holding that the lower
tribunal had jurisdiction, decided outright to repress the appeal by the
Government on the ground of double jeopardy without considering whether
the appealed order of dismissal was issued with or without the express
consent of the accused (this aspect of double jeopardy not being in issue).
Hence, the ruling in Salico that the dismissal was with the express consent
of the accused because it was granted upon his instigation thru a motion to
dismiss was not passed upon in Bangalao.
A case of striking factual resemblance with Salico is People vs. Ferrer (100
Phil. 124, October 23, 1956). In this case, after the prosecution had rested, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court had not been published. Acting on this motion, the lower
court dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed. This Court found that the
evidence on record, contrary to the finding of the trial court, amply proved
the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal. However, without the defendant
interposing the plea of double jeopardy, this Court held that "the Government
however meritorious its case cannot appeal the order of dismissal without
violating the right of the defendant not to be placed in double jeopardy."
Again, like in Bangalao, this Court did not consider the nature of dismissal
whether it was with or without the express consent of the defendant.
The accused in the case at bar avers that the Salico doctrine was formally and
expresslyabandoned in People vs. Labatete, supra. In the latter case, the trial
court, upon motion of the defendant, dismissed the original information for
estafa on the ground that it did not allege facts constituting the offense
charged. The information recited that the accused had contracted a loan from
the complainant, giving as security the improvements and products of his
property (a piece of land), without averring that the said property, which was
allegedly mortgaged by the accused to the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, formed part of the security. Consequently, the fiscal filed an
amended complaint alleging that the accused also gave as security the land in
question, which he later mortgaged to the damage and prejudice of the
complaining creditor. This amended information was also dismissed upon
motion of the defendant on the ground of double jeopardy. This Court, in
sustaining the appealed order of dismissal, held:
If the amended information were to be admitted, the accused will be deprived
of his defense of double jeopardy because by the amended information he is
sought to be made responsible for the same act of borrowing on a mortgage
for which he had already begun to be tried and acquitted by the dismissal of
the original information.
xxxxxxxxx
... the trial court found that the accused could not be found guilty of any
offense under the information. The judgment entered was not one of dismissal
but of acquittal, and whether the judgment is correct or incorrect, the same
constitutes a bar to the presentation of the amended information sought to be
introduced by the fiscal. (Emphasis supplied)
In not applying the Salico doctrine, this Court, through Mr. Justice Alejo
Labrador, expounded:
... The judgment of the trial court (in People vs. Salico) was in fact an
acquittalbecause of the failure on the part of the fiscal to prove that the crime
was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. The judgment was in fact
a final judgment of acquittal. The mere fact that the accused asked for his
acquittal after trial on the merits (after the prosecution had rested its case) is
no reason for saying that the case was "dismissed" with his express consent
and he may again be subjected to another prosecution.
From the above named statement, it is clear that what in Salico was
repudiated inLabatete was the premise that the dismissal therein was not on
the merits and not theconclusion that a dismissal, other than on the merits,
sought by the accused, is deemed to be with his express consent and therefore
constitutes a waiver of his right to plead double jeopardy in the event of an
appeal by the prosecution or a second indictment for the same offense. This
Court, in Labatete, merely pointed out that the controverted dismissal in
Salico was in fact an acquittal." Reasoning a contrario, had the dismissal not
amounted to acquittal, then the doctrine of waiver would have applied and
prevailed. As a matter of fact we believe with the majority in Salico that the
dismissal therein was not on the merits and therefore did not amount to an
acquittal:
If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is
not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again
prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction; and
it is elemental that in such case the defendant may again be prosecuted for the
same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Granting, however, that the Salico doctrine was abandoned in Labatete, it
was resurrected in Desalisa. Moreover, Labatete never mentioned the
doctrine of estoppel enunciated in Acierto which had been repeatedly
reaffirmed.
To bolster his contention that the Salico doctrine has been dropped from the
corpus of our jurisprudence, the accused cites People vs. Villarin, supra. Here
the accused appealed to the Court of First instance his conviction in the
inferior court for acts of lasciviousness with consent. After conducting the
preliminary investigation, the fiscal charged the accused with corruption of
minors. Villarin pleaded not guilty, and before the case could be heard, his
counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the information did not
allege facts constituting the crime charged. Acting on this motion, the trial
court dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution, this Court thru Mr.
Justice Felix Angelo Bautista, held that the dismissal was erroneous, but that
this error
... cannot now be remedied by setting aside the order dismissal of the court a
quoand by remanding the case to it for further proceedings as now suggested
by the prosecution considering that the case was dismissed without the
express consent of the accused even if it was upon the motion of his counsel,
for to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy. The only exception
to the rule on the matter is when the dismissal is with the consent of the
accused, and here this consent has not been obtained. (Emphasis supplied)
Villarin gives the impression, as gleaned from the above statement, that this
Court therein sustained the plea of double jeopardy on the ground that
dismissal was without the express consent of the defendant as it was ordered
"upon the motion of his counsel" and not upon motion of the defendant
himself. This conclusion is rather unfortunate and must be rectified, for the
settled rule is that the acts of counsel in a criminal prosecution bind his client.
Thus, in People vs. Romero (89 Phil. 672, July 31, 1951), this Court held
categorically that
The fact that the counsel for the defendant, and not the defendant himself
personally moved for the dismissal of the case against him, had the same
effect as if the defendant had personally moved for such dismissal, inasmuch
as the act of the counsel in the prosecution of the defendant's cases was the
act of the defendant himself , for the only case in which the defendant cannot
be represented by his counsel is in pleading guilty according to Section 3,
Rule 114, of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
On this consideration alone, we cannot agree with the accused in the case at
bar that this Court in Villarin intended to abandon the Salico ruling. Had the
motion to dismiss filed by Villarin's counsel been considered as one made by
the defendant himself, as should have been done, the Villarin case should
have been resolved consistent with the doctrine of waiver in Salico and/or
that of estoppel in Acierto.
As a final citation in support of his theory, the accused in the case at bar
invokes People vs. Clolibel, supra, where this Court, in sustaining the plea of
double jeopardy interposed by the defendants, stated inter alia:
In asserting that Criminal Case No. 45717 may still be reinstated, the
petitioner adopts the ruling once followed by the Court to the effect that a
dismissal upon the defendant's own motion is a dismissal consented to by him
and, consequently, will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense, because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver
of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents
the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment
of conviction against him. (People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 772) But, this authority
has long been abandoned and the ruling therein expressly repudiated.
Thus, in the case of People v. Robles, G.R. No. L-12761, June 29, 1959,
citing People v. Bangalao, L-5610, February 17, 1954; People v. Diaz, L6518, March 30, 1954; People v. Abano, L-7862, May 17, 1955; and People
v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956, We said:
... In reaching the above conclusion, this Court has not overlooked the ruling
in People vs. Salico, 47 O.G. 4765, to the effect that a dismissal upon
defendant's motion will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense as said dismissal was not without the express consent of the
defendant, which ruling the prosecution now invokes in support of its appeal;
but said ruling is not now controlling, having been modified or abandoned in
subsequent cases wherein this Court sustained the theory of double jeopardy
despite the fact that dismissal was secured upon motion of the accused.
(Emphasis supplied)
Also, the rule that a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal is not without the
express consent of the defendant, has no application to a case where the
dismissal, as here, is predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial.
(People vs. Tacneng, et al., G.R. No. L-12082, April 30, 1959). (emphasis
supplied)
The above statements must be taken in the proper context and perspective. As
previously explained, Bangalao, Ferrer, and even Labatete, did not actually
abandon the doctrine of waiver in Salico (and not one of the said cases even
implied the slightest departure from the doctrine of estoppel established in
Acierto). In Diaz, Abao, Tacnengand Robles which are cited above, like in
Cloribel, the dismissals therein, all sought by the defendants, were considered
acquittals because they were all predicated on the right of a defendant to a
speedy trial and on the failure of the Government to prosecute. Therefore,
even if such dismissals were induced by the accused, the doctrines of waiver
and estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a
dismissal not amounting to an acquittal.
This Court, through Mr. Justice Marceliano Montemayor, held in People vs.
Diaz (94 Phil. 714, March 30, 1954):
Here the prosecution was not even present on the day of trial so as to be in a
position to proceed with the presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused. The case was set for hearing twice and the prosecution without
asking for postponement or giving any explanation, just failed to appear. So
10
the dismissal of the case, though at the instance of defendant Diaz may,
according to what we said in the Gandicela case, be regarded as an
acquittal. (emphasis supplied)
A similar result was reached by this Court thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, in
People vs. Abano (97 Phil. 28, May 27, 1955), in this wise:
After a perusal of the documents attached to the petition for a writ of
certiorari, we fail to find an abuse of discretion committed by the respondent
judge. He took pains to inquire about the nature of the ailment from which
the complaining witness claimed she was suffering. He continued the trial
three times, to wit: on 27 May, 1 and 12 June. The defendant was entitled to a
speedy trial. When on 15 June, the last day set for the resumption of the trial,
the prosecution failed to secure the continuance thereof and could not
produce further evidence because of the absence of the complaining witness,
the respondent judge was justified in dismissing the case upon motion of the
defense ... The defendant was placed in jeopardy for the offense charged in
the information and the annulment or setting aside of the order of dismissal
would place him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
(emphasis supplied)
Then in People vs. Tacneng (L-12082, April 30, 1959), Mr. Justice Pastor
Endencia, speaking for a unanimous Court, stressed that
... when criminal case No. 1793 was called for hearing for the third time and
the fiscal was not ready to enter into trial due to the absence of his witnesses,
the herein appellees had the right to object to any further postponement and
to ask for the dismissal of the case by reason of their constitutional right to a
speedy trial; and if pursuant to that objection and petition for dismissal the
case was dismissed, such dismissal ammounted to an acquittal of the herein
appellees which can be invoked, as they did, in a second prosecution for the
same offense. (emphasis supplied)
And this Court proceeded to distinguish the case from People vs. Salico, thus:
We are fully aware that pursuant to our ruling in the case of Peo. v. Salico, 45
O.G. No. 4, 1765-1776, and later reiterated in Peo vs. Romero, L-4517-20,
July 31, 1951, a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal was not without
the express consent of the defendant. This ruling, however, has no
application to the instant case, since the dismissal in those cases was not
predicated, as in the case at bar, on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial,
but on different grounds. In the Salico case, the dismissal was based on the
ground that the evidence for the prosecution did not show that the crime was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which, on appeal, we
found that it was, so the case was remanded for further proceedings; and in
the Romero case the dismissal was due to the non-production of other
important witnesses by the prosecution on a date fixed by the court and under
the understanding that no further postponement at the instance of the
government would be entertained. In both cases, the right of a defendant to a
speedy trial was never put in issue. (emphasis supplied)
The gravamen of the foregoing decisions was reiterated in People vs. Robles
(L-12761, June 29, 1959) where the trial court, upon motion of the defendant,
dismissed the case on the ground that the failure of the prosecution to present
its evidence despite several postponements granted at its instance, denied the
accused a speedy trial. In rejecting the appeal of the Government, this Court
held:
In the circumstances, we find no alternative than to hold that the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 11065 is not provisional in character but one which is
tantamount to acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for
the same offense.
consideration did not terminate the action on the merits, whereas in Cloribel
and in the other related cases the dismissal amounted to an acquittal because
the failure to prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a case
against the accused, who, in the first place, is presumed innocent.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two
sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the
defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must
not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal.
Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said
doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our
jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is set aside. This case is hereby
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with
law. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
In Cloribel, the case dragged for three years and eleven months, that is, from
September 27, 1958 when the information was filed to August 15, 1962 when
it was called for trial, after numerous postponements, mostly at the instance
of the prosecution. On the latter date, the prosecution failed to appear for
trial, and upon motion of defendants, the case was dismissed. This Court held
"that the dismissal here complained of was not truly a 'dismissal' but an
acquittal. For it was entered upon the defendants' insistence on their
constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure
to appear on the date of trial." (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the factual setting in the case at bar, it is clear that there is no
parallelism between Cloribel and the cases cited therein, on the one hand, and
the instant case, on the other. Here the controverted dismissal was predicated
on the erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was defective
and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not on the
right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to
prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in this case now under
11
Brief Background
Petitioner,
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen
years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque
City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of
suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled
a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of
the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose
interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to
as the Vizconde massacre.
The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by
Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio
Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.[2] The prosecution presented
Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These
included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the
security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the
Webbs household, police officer Biongs former girlfriend, and Lauro G.
Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.
For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime
and saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared the
strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United
States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as
documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense
presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the
incredible nature of her testimony.
ABAD, J.:
But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events
surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer
has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial
court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the
object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on
the ground that the governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has
resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
Issues Presented
Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not
the Court should acquit him outright, given the governments failure to
produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus
depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.
In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb,
acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and
sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:
1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and
identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and
two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and
rebut Alfaros testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the
crime after its commission.
The Right to Acquittal
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,[7] that he is entitled to outright
acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the
in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accuseds
lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on
reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at
some future time.
Now, to the merit of the case.
Alfaros Story
Based on the prosecutions version, culled from the decisions of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening,
Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as
passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu
from Artemio Dong Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Tony Boy Lejano, Miguel Ging Rodriguez,
Hospicio Pyke Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro
recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Paraaque in January
1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December 1990.
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a
message for him to a girl, whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde.
Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmelas house
at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Paraaque City.
Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a
Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who
were on a Nissan Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street,
alighted, and approached Carmelas house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a
woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela
twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her
Webbs message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she
could not go out yet since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return
after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then told the group to
drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they
drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela
lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers,
parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She
13
approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to
leave the house for a while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before
midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led to
the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink
her cars headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so
Carmela would know that she had arrived.
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in
her own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped
off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaro looked for
her group, found them, and relayed Carmelas instructions to Webb. They
then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking
lot, Alfaro told the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb
of Carmelas male companion, Webbs mood changed for the rest of the
evening (bad trip).
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After
about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He
said, Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna. Lejano said, Ako ang
susunod and the others responded Okay, okay. They all left the parking lot in
a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the
third time. They arrived at Carmelas house shortly before midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizcondes house and the next. While waiting
for the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a
suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the Vizcondes residence to
cause a brownout (Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito). But Alfaro
shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, Malakas lang ang tama mo. When
Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told the
others again that they would line up for Carmela but he would be the first.
The others replied, O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami.
Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left
open. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the garage,
Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes Nissan Sentra and
loosened the electric bulb over it (para daw walang ilaw). The small group
went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela
opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb
looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed for the
dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano
asked her where she was going and she replied that she was going out to
smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura
pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After
about twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a womans voice ask, Sino
yan? Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden to her car. She found her
other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked her,
Okay ba?
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde
house, using the same route. The interior of the house was dark but some
light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a
ladys bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was
looking for, he said: Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi. She asked him
what key he wanted and he replied: Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door
pati na rin ng susi ng kotse. When she found a bunch of keys in the bag, she
tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did not find the
car key.
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was
at a spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television
that remained on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she
approached the masters bedroom from where the noise came, opened the
door a little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she
walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela while she lay with her back on
the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at the foot of the
bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears
while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She
met Ventura at the dining area. He told her, Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo.
Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the others who
were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car
and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano,
and Ventura came out of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a
stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he
forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in
anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and
drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel
at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down.
Someone threw something out of the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence,
steel gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the
compound and gathered at the lawn where the blaming session took place. It
was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde house
learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmelas mother, then
Jennifer, and finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, Bakit
naman pati yung bata? Webb replied that the girl woke up and on seeing him
molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and pulled his hair.
Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly
stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the
house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb
ordered him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and said to him, Pera
lang ang katapat nyan. Biong answered, Okay lang. Webb spoke to his
companions and told them, We dont know each other. We havent seen each
otherbaka maulit yan. Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her fathers
house.[12]
1. The quality of the witness
Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four
years, bothered by her conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come
forward and do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed her
story, working for the NBI as an asset, a stool pigeon, one who earned her
living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI
handlers. She had to live a life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her
subsistence and vices.
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI AntiKidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section,
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December
1994 as an asset. She supplied her handlers with information against drug
pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the
capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando
Bacquir. Alfaros tip led to the arrest of the leader of the Martilyo gang that
killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her very
14
special treatment and she became its darling, allowed the privilege of
spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
WITNESS SACAGUING:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that
papapelan ko na lang yan?
A. No, sir.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her
about it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that
she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre.
Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI
to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press
her, she told him that she might as well assume the role of her informant.
Sacaguing testified thus:
WITNESS SACAGUING:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
A. I said, hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness.
Q. Why not?
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
WITNESS SACAGUING:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde
murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to
bring the man to me. She told me later that she could not and the man does
not like to testify.
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
xxxx
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the
circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde family.
Thats what she told me, Your Honor.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what did you say?
xxxx
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that
man and she promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and
together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a state witness and
help us in the solution of the case.
A. She told me, easy lang kayo, Sir, if I may quote, easy lang Sir, huwag
kayong
COURT:
How was that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang
yan.
xxxx
xxxx
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which
even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt,
yes.
Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying
details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime scene
and there were lots of speculations about them.
Secondly, the police had arrested some akyat-bahay group in Paraaque and
charged them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men
they apprehended and filled these up with details that the evidence of the
crime scene provided. Alfaros NBI handlers who were doing their own
investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the
NBI offices and practically lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear
of these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.
15
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage
light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the cars hood, using a chair, to
turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso akyat-bahay gang, Webb and his
friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly
knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It
did not make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the cars hood and be seen
in such an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.
And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBIs star witness, their badge of excellent
investigative work. After claiming that they had solved the crime of the
decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound credible and,
obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of
becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She was their darling of an asset.
And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI,
a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the trial
court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong
effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel Ging
Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI
found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan
Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaros Miguel Rodriguez and
showed him to Alfaro at the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking
Michael, exclaiming: How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a
disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me. As it turned
out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.[13]
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to
implicate to settle some score with him but it was too late to change the name
she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for
what they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers
from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and
the common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant
presence in this case.
Two. Ventura, Alfaros dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her
life to Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she
agree to act as Webbs messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to
Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it
out the whole night with Webb and his friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it
came to a point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela,
clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as
a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she
was not yet an asset then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in
drugs to think clearly and just followed along where the group took her, how
could she remember so much details that only a drug-free mind can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time,
Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends
should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for
Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre
Avenue where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was
Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaros trailing Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to
Webb did not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a critical
witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to
come with his friends and harm Carmela.
16
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmelas house the third
time around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the
pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the
gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and his
friends agreed with him to go to Carmelas house and gang-rape her. Why
would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously
with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into
her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to
feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty
minutes, a woman exclaimed, Sino yan? On hearing this, Alfaro immediately
walked out of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this
because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela became
conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked
away because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential
confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of getting
involved in what was not her business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge
of what went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one
of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She went
back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of the
masters bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmelas mom and her
young sister whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro
testified that she got scared (another shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of
the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did
not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and
turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This
woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the
house, knowing that they were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was
suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum swing
indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.
4. The supposed corroborations
Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony, the prosecution
presented six additional witnesses:
Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of
Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb
grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan
returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as their
Standard Operating Procedure required.[18]
But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not
common for a security guard to challenge a Congressmans son with such
vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor
did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitors entry into the
subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of
seeing Webbs ID but not in recording the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at
BF Homes Executive Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents
house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from
the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him
again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt
and shorts, passing through a secret door near the maids quarters on the way
out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day.[19]
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished
June 30, 1991 from the other days she was on service at the Webb household
as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one of the
Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the details
that happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a
selective photographic memory and this only damaged her testimony.
17
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there
for only four months to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of
her employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they
were asleep.
And it did not make sense, if Alfaros testimony were to be believed that
Webb, who was so careful and clever that he called Biong to go to the
Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his
group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for
laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed
habit.
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biongs girlfriend around the time the Vizconde
massacre took place. Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing
mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30,
when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De
Birrer, to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked
him up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried
blood from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling handkerchief.
She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer
and hid it in his steel cabinet.[21]
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator
flashing a badge to get into the village although Biong supposedly came in at
the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also
remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up
the crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning
there on the following morning to dispose of some of the evidence in the
presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he
steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours
later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
At most, Birrers testimony only established Biongs theft of certain items
from the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the
sanctity of the crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the
crime. Birrers testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other
accused.
Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her
wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called
Bagyo, because he was a Paraaque politicians son. Unfortunately, Lauro did
not appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the rejected fellow
was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that
Carmela and Webb had an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be
believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around midnight. She
even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.
5. The missing corroboration
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecutions core
theory that Carmela and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been
unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his
friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressmans son, courted the young
Carmela, that would be news among her circle of friends if not around town.
But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came
forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win
her favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be
so if they had become sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with
her testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmelas friends or her
friends friends would testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing
them together in some popular hangouts in Paraaque or Makati. Alfaros claim
of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted
into Webb and Carmelas life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed
to fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes with
the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in
the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is quite unreal.
What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house
with a male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was
also Carmelas lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly had
for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmelas relatives, friends, or people
who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody
has come forward to testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite
the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a role in it, he
never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special friend normally
would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of
Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.
Webbs U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.
a. The travel preparations
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife,
Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of
independence, hard work, and money.[22] Gloria Webb, his aunt,
accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via
United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and
his aunt used their plane tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and
his basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even
invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along
Makati Ave.[23] On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took
girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema
Square. His basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina Calma, a blind date
arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for
Webb's despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos
and Jay Ortega.[24]
b. The two immigration checks
18
The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California,
with his Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight 808.[25] Before
boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at
the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer,
Ferdinand Sampol checked Webbs visa, stamped, and initialed his passport,
and let him pass through.[26] He was listed on the United Airlines Flights
Passenger Manifest.[27]
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where
his entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration
Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant Information
System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb
presented at the trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service,[28] the computer-generated print-out of the USINS indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991,[29] and the US-INS
Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier August 10, 1995
Certification.[30]
c. Details of U.S. sojourn
In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latters daughter,
Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Glorias house in Daly City,
California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi
Esguerra, Glorias grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain
Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.[31]
In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake
Tahoe to return the Webbs hospitality when she was in the Philippines.[32]
In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to
Anaheim Hills, California.[33] During his stay there, he occupied himself
with playing basketball once or twice a week with Steven Keeler[34] and
working at his cousin-in-laws pest control company.[35] Webb presented the
companys logbook showing the tasks he performed,[36] his paycheck,[37]
his ID, and other employment papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a
driver's license[38] and wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer Cabrera.[39]
On June 28, 1991, Webbs parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the
Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son
when he came to visit.[40] On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the
company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a
car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car.[41] Later that day, a visitor at the
Brottmans, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the plates of his new
car.[42] To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of
California Department of Motor Vehicle[43] and a car plate LEW
WEBB.[44] In using the car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic
citations.[45]
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon,[46]
bought a bicycle at Orange Cycle Center.[47] The Center issued Webb a
receipt dated June 30, 1991.[48] On July 4, 1991, Independence Day, the
Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic.[49]
Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less
than a month. On August 4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with
the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.[50] There, he met Armando
Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends,
watching movies, and playing billiards.[51] In November 1991, Webb met
performing artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who was
invited for a dinner at the Rodriguezs house.[52] He left the Rodriguezs home
in August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda
Pagaspas. He stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October 26,
1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and
Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S.
was confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed his entry.[53]
Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with
enclosed letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records
Operations, Office of Records of the US-INS stated that the Certification
dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he boarded
his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No. 103,[54]
certified by Agnes Tabuena[55] confirmed his return trip.
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine
Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his passport indicated his
return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita
Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webbs reentry.[56] Upon his
return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael
Jose once again saw Webb playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball
court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webbs
alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webbs alibi cannot stand against Alfaros
positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and,
apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of
this, to the lower courts, Webbs denial and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the
accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi.
So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the
rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans noose in the
face of a witness positively swearing, I saw him do it.? Most judges believe
that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate.
This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the
truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over
such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard
against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly
finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he
saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the
accuseds claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an
identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as
forthrightly and unequivocally, He did it! without blinking an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two
criteria:
First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on
past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in
gold.
And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable,
not inherently contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never
saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.
19
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet
the above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her
conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool
pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police
assets are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecutions worst
possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she
volunteered to play the role of a witness in the Vizconde killings when she
could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the
details that the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her
familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly
incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even
when they were trying to slip away quietlyjust so she can accommodate this
crime scene feature. She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining
table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the physical
evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura climbing
the cars hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did
not need to darken the garage to force open the front doorjust so to explain
the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping
Carmela is incongruent with their indifference, exemplified by remaining
outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and
passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like
if it was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaros story that she agreed to serve as
Webbs messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and staying with him till the
bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes incredulity.
To provide basis for Webbs outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to
the main road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And,
inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she
claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape
Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on
personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a woman woke
up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she
nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite
inexplicable.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court
entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is
willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable,
lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being,
like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on
the testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the
role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio
Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes
of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from
detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau
of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court
within five days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
It is clear that the notice of appeal was filed within the 15-day reglementary
period. The motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered in open court
on January 23, 1980, was filed on February 2, 1980, date of its posting by
registered mail. Only ten days had elapsed from the earlier date. The running
of the period was suspended while the motion was under study and until a
copy of the order denying the same was furnished the private prosecutor on
March 18, 1980. When two days later, on March 20, the fiscal and the private
prosecutor jointly filed a notice of appeal, only 12 days of the period of
appeal had been consumed. The appeal was thus perfected on time,
conformably to Rule 122, Section 6, of the Rules of Court, reading as
follows:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed
from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a
motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion
shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.
The trial court thus lost jurisdiction over the appealed case on March 20,
1980, and was obligated to elevate the records thereof to the appellate court.
Having become functus officio, it could no longer issue the challenged orders
of April 14, 1980, and May 12, 1980, dismissing the appeal.
The question of whether or not the civil award in a criminal case may be
appealed is not new and has been resolved earlier by this Court. It is settled
that this can be done by the private prosecutor on behalf of the offended party
or his successors. The adequacy of the award may be challenged on the
ground that it is not commensurate with the gravity of the injuries sustained
as a result of the offense committed by the accused, Thus, we have held that
In this instance, this court, in its resolution dated November 28, 1933,
declared the appeal of the accused abandoned. Therefore, the only question
left to be decided is the appeal of the private prosecution with regard to the
civil liability of the accused.
The trial courts resolution that, because the cause had been appealed by the
accused, it had lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration filed by the private prosecution rune days after the date of the
judgment, is unfounded.
The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution
and to appeal for purpose of the civil liability of the accused (section 107,
General Orders, No. 58), necessarily implies that such right is protected in the
same manner as the right of the accused to his defense. If the accused has the
right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of conviction, the
offended party should have the right within the same period to appeal from so
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, and his appeal should not be
made dependent on that of the accused. 9
However, the civil indemnity may be increased only if it will not require an
aggravation of the decision in the criminal case on which it is based. In other
words, the accused may not, on appeal by the adverse party, be convicted of a
more serious offense or sentenced to a higher penalty to justify the increase in
the civil indemnity. This rule is applicable in the present case.
The petitioners are urging that the civil award in the sum of only P500.00 be
increased because the accused should not have been found guilty of only less
serious physical injuries but of homicide. They are not confining themselves
to the civil aspect of the challenged decision. In their own words, their appeal
involves "both the criminal aspect and the civil liabilities in the criminal
cases." 10 This is not permitted under the rule on double jeopardy. 11
Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the
Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy." This provision is based on the old case of Kepner v. United
States, 12 where the U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the
Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the
prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the
penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy. It has
been consistently applied since then in this jurisdiction.
It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal, much less
then can the offended party or his heirs, who are mainly concerned only with
the civil indemnity.
The prohibition operates as a "bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information." 13 There is no
question that the crime of less serious physical injuries, of which the accused
in this case was convicted, is necessarily included in the offense of homicide.
But the petitioners argue that double jeopardy will not attach because the
judgment convicting the accused of less serious physical injuries is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion and therefore null and void. This argument is
flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court
was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the
intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer
be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error
may be.
In People v. City Court of Silay, 14 the trial court granted the defendant's
motion to dimiss a charge for falsification after the prosecution had rested,
holding that the guilt of the accused had not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. The Court disagreed. Nevertheless, it held through Justice MunozPalma that "however erroneous the order of the respondent court is, and
although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, such error cannot
now be lighted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy."
We have made similar rulings in several other cases, among them People v.
Hernando, 108 SCRA 121, People v. Francisco, 128 SCRA 110, and People
v. Villarin, 11 SCRA 550.
The cases cited by the petitioners are not in point because they all involve not
errors of judgment but denial of due process resulting in loss or lack of
jurisdiction. 15 The prosecution in each of these cases was allowed to appeal
because it had not been given its day in court. In the present case, a full trial
was held and both the prosecution and the defense were accorded the right to
be heard before the judgment was reached. There is no doubt at all that the
trial court had the requisite jurisdiction to pronounce the challenged sentence.
Even assuming it was incorrect, it was certainly not invalid.
It follows that the appeal should be limited to the civil award corresponding
only to the offense found against the accused, to wit, less serious physical
injuries. The award cannot be related to the victim's death, of which the
defendant has been absolved by the trial court. The problem then is whether
or not the sum of P500.00 was sufficient indemnification for the wound
which, the trial court has held, was not the proximate cause of the victim's
death.
The determination of this question should normally be made by the appellate
court after examining the factual issues as originally resolved by the trial
court. This would require elevation of the records of the case to the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the usual procedure and an exchange again of
pleadings and arguments between the parties that will further prolong this
case. But we do not believe that such delay is necessary. We can decide the
appeal ourselves to expedite decision of this case. We have carefully studied
the pros and cons of this problem and can rule on it directly on the basis of
the record before us and in the interest of speedy justice.
Accordingly, we hold that the sum awarded by the trial court to the
petitioners, for the less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the victim
and not for his death is sufficient recompense. Therefore, the increase
sought is denied.
While the Court sympathizes with the petitioners for their tragic loss, it is
unable to accord them a more satisfactory material settlement because it is
limited by the findings of the trial court and inhibitions of double jeopardy. If
an error has been committed somewhere and on this it is not necessary for
us to rule that error will nonetheless not relax the application of the
salutary rule on double jeopardy. It must be, as it is here, upheld.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent court dated April 14, 1980, and
May 20, 1980, are SET ASIDE. However, the appeal sought shall no longer
be necessary because the questioned civil award in the amount of P500.00 is
hereby directly AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur
23
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-75983. April 15, 1988.]
MANUEL R. CRUZ; PAULINO M. ARCEO; ELPIDIO G. CACHO;
ROGELIO P. GARCIA; MANUEL M. DELA CRUZ; WILLIAM H.
LORENZANA; PABLO P. GARCIA; RODRIGO A. HALASAN;
ADRIANO B. CASTILLO; LEONARDO L. PAQUINTO; NESTOR T.
LIWANAG; ALEXANDER P. ROXAS; PABLO M. MERCADO;
EDUARDO P. GARCIA; GERARDO M. LUCAS; LEONIDES G.
MAABO; BRAULIO DEPUSOY; ALFREDO M. TILA; JEOFREY T.
METEORO; BENIGNO G. BANTOLINO; ANTONIO P. DATUL;
RENATO V. VENGCO; EDGARDO TERRENAL; EDUARDO D.
DELFIN; CORNELIO C. TACDERAN; AMANCIO D. LORIESTO;
JOSE A. SELOTERIO; APOLONIO E. ONIA; DOMINGO MARCO;
ARTURO VILLASANTA; ANTONIO OCCASIONES; TEODORO C.
CARANDANG; ROGELIO A. GARCIA; ROMEO A. BASENSE;
HARRY B. BENLIRO; ROLANDO B. BENLIRO; JAMES A.
UMADHAY; VICENTE A. GENER; ERNESTO A. CARPIO;
MANUEL S. SALARDA; GETULIO B. BRAGA, JR.; ARCADIO D.
CELENDRO; VIRGILIO P. GOMEZ; SERGIO R. PREYE;
CIRIACOM. DELA GUARDIA; RODITO B. SORIASO; ANTONIO D.
PUMAR; FEDERICO B. VECINAL; CESARIO D. VECINAL;
LORETO D. VECINAL; ROGELIO D. VECINAL; MARCELO B. DE
MESA; JULIAN DE MESA; GAVINO B. DE MESA; REMIGIO B. DE
MESA; DANILO B. DE MESA; ROLANDO P. TOLENTINO;
ANASTACIO P. DEL ROSARIO; REYNALDO C. REYES; BENITO B.
PAGANIBAN; ROMUALDO M. MONTENEGRO; ROMULO C.
OCAMPO; DEMOCRITO M. SILVESTRE; SALLY B. DIMAISIP;
FILIPINO B. DE LEON; NARCISO G. VIGO; TOMAS C. AMORTE;
CATALINO S. CRUZ; EDUARDO F. JAVIER; ROGELIO L.
CARICUNGAN; ERNESTO R. BARADI; RENE P. CORTEZ;
EDUARDO D. RAMIREZ; DONATO G. CABONITALIA; CAMILO
PATAO; JOSE TORRES; ISABELO NARNE; ERIC F. PICHAY;
DELFIN PIANO; FRANCISCO PIANO; RUDY G. ROMERO; MARIO
G. MERCADO; JUANITO PIANO; REYNOSO J. LAGMAY; PABLO
S. CALLEJO; FLORANTE SAGUN; RUSSEL A. PAULINO; LAUREL
LAMACA; RUFINO GAMBOA; TIRSO F. BALA, JR.; ANTONIO
CRUZ; BENITO PUGAL; CASIMIRO PATAO; ROGELIO PATAO;
EULOGIO PUGAL; CARLITO PUGAL; ANDRES PATAO; VICENTE
ARCANO; MARIANO YTURIAGA; RODOLFO MANUEL;
EDUARDO ABIHAY; MANUEL CARREON; CAMILO PIANO;
LUCIO ARIMADO; PABLO ACIERTO; EDUARDO PASCUAL;
SYLLABUS
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in this Court on October 1,
1986 1 to test the legality of the continued detention of some 217 so-called
"political detainees" 2 arrested in the nine-year span of official martial rule
and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made
to stand trial for common crimes 3 before various courts martial; 4 if any of
these offenses had any political color, this had neither been pleaded nor
proved.
Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26 confirmed as military
personnel. 5 One hundred and fifteen (115) accused had been condemned to
die. Forty-six (46) were sentenced to life imprisonment. To nine (9) others
were meted prison terms of from twenty to thirty years; to forty-one (41),
prison terms of ten to twenty years; and to three (3), less than ten years.
The present status of their cases are disparate, as might be expected. As of the
date of filing of the petitions in this Court, the sentences of sixty-eight (68)
had become final upon their approval by the Office of the President, 6
seventy-five (75) cases were pending review in either that Office or before
the Board of Military Review, while the appeal or review of the remaining
seventy-three (73) cases either had been expressly suspended pending the
outcome of these petitions, or are simply not dealt with in the records.
Presidential amnesty was granted to petitioner Virgilio Alejandrino, 7 yet to
this date he remains a prisoner at the Penitentiary, as do Domingo Reyes,
Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patano, Andres Parado and Daniel Campus,
although they were acquitted of the charges against them, 8 and Reynaldo C.
Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos, who appear to have fully served the
sentences imposed on them by the military commissions which convicted
them. 9
The petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment
of all military tribunals as well as General Order No. 8 ordaining their
creation, and the nullity of all the proceedings had against them before these
bodies as a result of which they had been illegally deprived of their liberty.
Their plea is for the grant of a rental of their respective cases in the civil
courts, where their right to due process may be accorded respect. 10 The writ
of habeas corpus issued on July 31, 1937, two weeks after an amended
petition 11 was filed with leave of court, reiterating the arguments originally
pleaded, and setting forth the additional claim that the pronouncement of this
In fine, the Court holds that the merits of the indictments against all these
civilians are solely for the civil courts to weigh and decide upon after due
proceedings. Otherwise stated, they are entitled to the retrial they have
explicitly requested of their respective cases in the civil courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as petitioners
Virgilio Alejandrino, 26 Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patono,
Andres Parado, Daniel Campus, 27 Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los
Santos 28 are concerned. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby
ordered to effect the immediate release of the above-mentioned petitioners,
unless there are other legal causes that may warrant their detention.
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho, William
Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino, Getulio B. Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte,
Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay,
Pablo Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto
Somera, Edulino Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano,
Sofronio Galo, Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando Tudin, Rosendo
26
(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in
relation to Presidential Decree No. 9.
The accused were:
1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc
2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana
3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
4. Antonio Occaciones
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
6. Enrique Labita
7. Oscar Yaun
8. Joaquin Tan Leh alias Go Bon Huat alias Taowie
9. Eusebio Tan alias Go Bon Ping
10. Vicente Tan alias Go Bon Beng alias Donge
11. Alfonso Tan alias Go Bon Tiak
12. Go E Kuan alias Kunga
13. William Tan alias Go Bon Ho
14. Marciano Benemerito alias Marcing alias Dodong
15. Manuel Beleta, and
16. John Doe (Annex A, Petition).
(Names italicized are the petitioners herein.)
Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President
Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce
Enrile, withdrew his earlier order (issued in response to the requests of the
defendants' lawyers) to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case
was retained in the military court (Annexes A to C of
Supplemental/Amended Petition, pp. 72-88, Rollo). All the accused were
detained without bail in the P.C. Stockade in Camp Crame.
Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty."
Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as a state witness. He was released
from detention on May 5, 1975 (p. 4, Rollo).
Almost daily trials were held for more than thirteen (13) months. The
testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35 defense witnesses filled up
twenty-one (21) volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages (p.
75, Rollo).
On June 10, 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was
promulgated by the Military Commission finding five (5) of the accused
namely:
1. Luis Tan
2. Ang Tiat Chuan
3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
4. Antonio Occaciones, and
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
28, 1988, he recommended no bail for all the accused (pp. 8-9, Rollo)
because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances; (1) prize or
reward; and (2) use of a motor vehicle (p. 65, Rollo).
Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City,
were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo.
Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo issued
an order on October 26, 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit
certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever
they are now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing
the above-entitled cases, within five (5) days from receipt" of his said order
(Annex F, Petition). The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order
for, as a matter of fact, there is no Supreme Court order to re-file the criminal
cases against the herein petitioners and their twelve (12) coaccused in Crim.
Case No. MC-1-67 of the now defunct Military Commission No. 1, because
none of them, except Antonio Occaciones, were parties in the Cruz vs.
Enrile habeas corpus cases (160 SCRA 700).
On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed
this petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the informations in
Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of respondent Judge
dated October 26, 1988 be annulled, and that the public respondents or any
other prosecution officer "be permanently enjoined from indicting,
prosecuting and trying them anew for the offenses charged therein because
they had already been acquitted of the same by Military Commission No. 1 in
Crim. Case No. MC-1-67" (p. 23, Rollo).
On November 23, 1988, the First Division of this Court dismissed the
petition for being premature as:
... the petitioners have not yet filed a motion to quash the allegedly invalid
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88825 (Annexes D and E)
whose annulment they seek from this Court (Sec. 3, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure). The filing in the lower court of such motion is the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy of the petitioners. The existence of that remedy
(which they have not yet availed of) bars their recourse to the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition in this Court (Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of
Court (p. 41, Rollo.)
Upon the petitioners' filing a motion for reconsideration informing this Court
that the lower court had issued warrants for their arrest (p. 48, Rollo), we
issued a temporary restraining order on January 16, 1989 enjoining the
respondents from implementing the orders of arrest and ordering them to
comment on the petition (p. 50, Rollo).
The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction
and gravely abused his discretion in reprosecuting them upon the supposed
authority of Cruz vs. Enrile for the following reasons:
28
1. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in fact direct the filing of
informations by the Secretary of Justice against THOSE who, like the
petitioners, WERE ACQUITTED after court martial proceedings during the
period of martial law.
2. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not apply to the petitioners who were
not parties in that case, who were not heard, and over whom the court did not
acquire jurisdiction.
3. The reprosecution of the petitioners would violate their right to protection
against double jeopardy.
4. The State is estopped from reprosecuting the petitioners after they had
been acquitted by the military tribunal which the State itself had clothed with
jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal cases against them. The State may
not retroactively divest of jurisdiction the military tribunal that tried and
acquitted them (pp. 14-15, Petition).
5. The retroactive invalidation of the jurisdiction of the military court that
acquitted the petitioners would amount to anex post facto ruling (p. 81, Rollo,
Supplemental Petition).
6. The information against the petitioners in Crim. Case No. 88-825 is null
and void because it was filed without a prior preliminary investigation, nor a
finding of probable cause, nor the written approval of the Chief State
Prosecutor (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
In his Comment dated February 1, 1985 (should be 1989), Fiscal Barrios
disclosed that the information in Criminal Case No. 88-824 for illegal
possession of firearm was "already withdrawn by the prosecution at a hearing
on January 27, 1988" (should be 1989?) (pp. 66-68, Rollo). The reason for
dropping the charge is not stated. It may be because Benemerito, the gunman
who was convicted of this felony and sentenced to death by the Military
Commission, is already dead-possibly executed. Hence, only the information
for murder (Crim. Case No. 88-825) against the petitioners and twelve (12)
others, including those already dead, is pending in the lower court (p. 37,
Rollo). He defended the reprosecution of the petitioners on the ground that it
will not constitute double jeopardy because the nullity of the jurisdiction of
the military tribunal that acquitted them prevented the first jeopardy from
attaching, thereby nullifying their acquittal. For the same reason, res
judicata is not applicable. Neither prescription, because "it had been
interrupted by the filing of the earlier charge sheets with the Military
Commission" (p. 67, Rollo).
The Solicitor General, in his separate comment, argued that the proceedings
involving civilians before a military commission were null and void because
we ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over
civilians, hence, their decisions, whether of conviction or acquittal, do not bar
re-prosecution for the same crime before a civil court (p. 102, Rollo).
In effect, the Court applied one rule for those civilians who were convicted
by the military courts and were still serving their sentences, and another rule
for those who were acquitted, or pardoned, or had finished the service of their
sentences. The Court applied a rule of retroactive invalidity to the first group
(whom the Court ordered to be reprosecuted before the proper civil courts)
and another of prospective invalidity for the others (whom the Court ordered
to be released from custody).
In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in
principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still
ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there
should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before
the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be
disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or
the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of
the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be
ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and
not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, is no longer possible, the accused
should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the
violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a court martial which
sentenced him to death without receiving evidence in his defense. It would be
a cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority for
reprosecuting civilians regardless of whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been
accorded a fair trial and regardless of whether they have already been
acquitted and released, or have accepted the sentences imposed on them and
commenced serving the same. Not everybody who was convicted by a
military court, much less those who were acquitted and released, desires to
undergo the ordeal of a second trial for the same offense, albeit in a civil
court. Indeed, why should one who has accepted the justness of the verdict of
a military court, who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing
to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another
hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to
serve a heavier penalty? Even if there is a chance of being acquitted the
second time around, it would be small comfort for the accused if he is held
without bail pending the completion of his second trial which may take as
long as, if not longer than, the sentence he has been serving or already served.
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military
tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (19711981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in
the exercise of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be
justly ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and
invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences
29
which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and
which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus,
did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533,
where the question arose as to whether the declaration of nullity of the
creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the
local government thus abolished:
In Norton vs. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice Field said: 'An unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed.' Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board of
commissioners created under an invalid statute were unenforceable.
Executive Order 386 'created no office.' This is not to say, however, that the
acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate
powers are a nullity because the executive order is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed.' For the existence of
Executive Order 386 is 'an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.' As
Chief Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage District vs.
Baxter State Bank:
'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording
no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. vs. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of
a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and
of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among
the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state
and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity, cannot be justified.
There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation
of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling
many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that
municipality. (Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533)
The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the
petitioners and their co-accused before Military Commission No. 1. The
Article IV, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the enactment of
an ex post facto law or bill of attainder.
We need not discuss the petitioners' final argument that the information
against them is invalid because there was no preliminary investigation, no
finding of probable cause by the investigating fiscal and no prior approval of
the information by the City Fiscal before it was filed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted.
Respondent State Prosecutor and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, at Cagayan de Oro City, are hereby ordered to discharge
the petitioners from the information in Criminal Case No. 88-825. The
temporary restraining order which we issued on January 16, 1989 is hereby
made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
30
- versus -
G.R.
Nos. 138874-75
illegal detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Present:
DAVIDE,
JR., C.J.
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARESSANTIAGO,
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO
MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
LARRAAGA
IV
THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY
DEFENSE EVIDENCE;
V
THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF
MARIJOY; AND
VI
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS.[1]
B.
I
AZNAR
31
II
D.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF
APPELLANT AZNAR.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH
PENALTY ON THE APPELLANTS.[2]
C.
I
Aznar filed a reply alleging that the Solicitor General read out of context
certain portions of the Affidavit. He argued that the
Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that,
at the time of his arrest, there was no evidence against him. On March 4,
2005, the Solicitor General filed a rejoinder stating that Aznars reply actually
supports the undersigned counsels (Solicitor Generals) position that Atty.
Villarins Affidavit is utterly inadequate to prove his innocence or at least
even acquit them on reasonable doubt, thus, it would be useless to call for
new trial on the basis of such Affidavit. On March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a
sur-rejoinder insisting that the Affidavit should be given due consideration.
Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to James
Andrews alleged minority, we find all the motions bereft of merit.
At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration does not impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule again
on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere reiteration of the
issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in our
Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs.
Velasco,[8] we ruled that, "this would be a useless formality of ritual
invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth in
the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the
movant."
The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants
Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao and Balansag, it being apparent that the
points raised therein are not neoteric matters demanding new judicial
determination. They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth in their
respective briefs which we already considered, weighed and resolved before
we rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we
deem it necessary to stress once more our basis in convicting appellants.
The following is a prcis of the issues submitted by appellants in their
motions:
This Court erred
third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process
when it excluded the testimony of other defense witnesses; and
fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of
Marijoy.
In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the
case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, averting general conclusions
from isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a criminal
case opens its entire records for review.[9]
I
bits and pieces of story form part of Rusias narration. Now, with such strong
anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies of disinterested
witnesses, why should we not accord credence to Rusias testimony? Even
assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy of
belief in view of his character, it is not so when considered with the other
evidence presented by the prosecution.
II
Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial courts
rejection of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently
weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses
who testified on affirmative matters.[11] Being evidence that is negative in
nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence. [12] On
top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it
is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the accused. [13]
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is
appellants alibi supported by witnesses who were either their relatives,
friends or classmates, while on the other end is the positive identification of
the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way,
related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain
that the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows
that the appellants failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the
requirements of time and place.[14] They failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the
Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is
clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James
Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on July
16, 1997.
Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required
proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes
only one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are
four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the defense witnesses
admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning,
afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larraagas presence in Cebu City on July
16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. Four (4)
witnesses identified Larraaga as one of the two men talking to Marijoy and
Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on
July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larraaga approach
Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident
reminded her of Jacquelines prior story that he was Marijoys admirer. Shiela
confirmed that she knows Larraaga since she had seen him on five (5)
occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July
16, 1997, at about 8:00 oclock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to
two (2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2)
men as Larraaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a
game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala
Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center,
corroborated the foregoing testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In
addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he
saw Larraaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The
latter was leaning against the hood of a white van.[15] And over and above all,
Rusia categorically identified Larraaga as one of the participes criminis.
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that
of Rusia, we are convinced that Larraaga was indeed in Cebu City at the time
of the commission of the crimes and was one of the principal perpetrators
thereof.
At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time
that Larraaga was charged with or complained of pruriently assaulting young
female students in Cebu.Months before the abduction of Marijoy and Jackie,
the parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about Larraagas
attempt to snatch their young daughter and drag her in a black, stylish Honda
Civic. It happened just near the gate of Rochelles school, thus, showing his
impudence. We quote a portion of the transcript of stenographic notes dated
September 23, 1998, thus:
ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:
Your Honor please, this is a . Inspector Era handed to this
representation a copy of a Letter dated September 25, 1996, addressed to
the Student Affairs Office, University of San Carlos,P. del Rosario Street,
Cebu City, and this is signed by Leo Abayan and Alexander Virtucio and
noted by Mrs. Aurora Pacho, Principal, University of San Carlos, Girls
High School, and for the record, I will read the content:
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year high
school student of your University of San Carlos-Girls High School, are
writing your good office about an untoward incident involving our
daughter and another student of your school.
33
xxxxxx
That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other classmates,
Michelle Amadar and Keizaneth Mondejar, while on their way to get a
ride home near the school campus, a black Honda Civic with five young
male teenagers including the driver, suddenly stopped beside them, and
simultaneously one of them, which was later identified as FRANCISCO
JUAN LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of your school, grabbed
Rochelle by her hand to try to get Rochelle to their vehicle. She resisted
and got away from him. Sensing some people were watching what they
were doing, they hurriedly sped away.
We are very concerned about Rochelles safety. Still now, she is suffering
the shock and tension that she is not supposed to experience in her young
life. It is very hard for us parents to think about what shed been
through.[16]
The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not
enhance Larraagas chance of securing an acquittal.
III
Larraaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial courts exclusion
of Professor Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional
Director, as defense witnesses. Professor Bailen was properly excluded. First,
he is not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist. And second, his report
consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already
several months old. Anent Atty. Villarins failure to testify before the trial
court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which Aznar
submittedvia his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 2004,
raises nothing to change our findings and conclusions. What clearly appears
in said Affidavit is a man trying toimpress people that he was the one
responsible for solving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a promotion.
The trial court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality in his
intended testimony. Indeed, we agree with the Solicitor Generals observation
that such Affidavit is neither helpful nor encouraging to Aznars cause. We
quote his keen reflection on the matter:
xxxxxx
Third. Atty. Villarins affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof,
acknowledged that the body found in the Carcar ravine was that of Marijoy.
and rejected heretofore, except his own unsubstantiated opinions (i.e. not
facts as required by evidentiary rules), his self-congratulatory remarks,
and his unmitigated frustration over failing to get a promotion when
almost everyone else did.[17]
Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortuns separate study to show
that the examination conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is
inadequate. Such study cannot be classified as newly-discovered evidence
warranting belated reception. Obviously, Larraaga could have produced it
during trial had he wished to.
IV
Knowing that the prosecutions theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia
testimony, appellants endeavor to destroy it by claiming that the body found
at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy. We
must reiterate the reasons why we cannot give our assent to such
argument. First, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo,[18] a fingerprint expert, testified
that the fingerprints of the corpse match those of Marijoy. [19] Second, the
packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items
placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained. [20] Third,
the body had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was
abducted.[21] And fourth, the members of the Chiong family personally
identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy[22] which they eventually buried.
They erected commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every
place which mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very moment,
appellants still fail to bring to the attention of this Court any person laying a
claim on the said body. Surely, if the body was not that of Marijoy, other
families who had lost someone of similar age and gender as Marijoy would
have surfaced and claimed the body. The above circumstances only bolster
Rusias narration that Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine,
following Josmans instruction "to get rid" of her.
On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only
seventeen (17) years and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the
crimes were committed, the records bear that on March 1, 1999, James
Andrews birth certificate was submitted to the trial court as part of
the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence,[23] with the statement that he was
eighteen (18) years old. On March 18, 1999, appellants filed a Manifestation
of Erratum correcting in part the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence by
alleging that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years old. [24]
34
Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this stage
of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National
Statistics Office, and(2) Baptismal Certificate. He prays that his penalty be
reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.
The entry of James Andrews birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus
it is extremely difficult for us to determine the veracity of his claim.
However, considering that minority is a significant factor in the imposition of
penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General (a) to secure from
the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics
Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrews Birth Certificate, and
thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration
filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews
claim of minority.
Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and
penalty, there being nothing in his motion which warrants a reconsideration
of our Decision.
In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task
of evaluating every piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial
court in response to appellants plea for the reversal of their conviction. But,
even the element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by appellants is
an ignis fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of their
submissions. Verily, our conscience can rest easy on our affirmance of the
verdict of the trial court, in light of appellants clear culpability which
demands retribution.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants
Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and
Ariel Balansag are herebyDENIED. The Solicitor General
is DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City,
as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James
Andrews Birth Certificate, and (b) within ten (10) days therefrom, to file
an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James
Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews claim of minority.
The motion is likewise DENIED insofar as James Anthony Uy is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
35
4)
He is required to report regularly to respondents or their
representatives.
The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an
improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by the
respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.
The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant
petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the
legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the
respondents."
The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's
detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as
to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a
motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was
temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of
National Defense with the approval of the President. The respondents stated.
"Since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the
respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and
academic as in similar cases.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition has become
moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release.
It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are
restrictions imposed on him. These are:
1)
His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that
petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro
Manila.
In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and
transported against their will to Davao were no longer under any official
restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile
without asking for official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to
return to Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused
by the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed the hope that
its "decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government
of laws and to protect individual liberty from Megal encroachment."
In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not
become moot and academic. Other precedents for such a conclusion are not
wanting.
The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:
2)
His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of
respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of
residence.
3)
His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should
not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass
media representatives nor give any press release or information that is
inimical to the interest of national security."
belief in the existence of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological
spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illigally
deprived of liberty by deprived or physical coercion.
In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court ruled:
Although the release in the custody of the Deputy Minister did not signify
that petitioners could once again enjoy their full freedom, the application
could have been dismissed, as it could be withdrawn by the parties
themselves. That is a purely voluntary act. When the hearing was held on
September 7, 1978, it turned out that counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V.
Tupaz could have academic in a hasty manner when he set forth the above
allegations in his manifestation of August 30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C.
Espinas, who appeared for petitioners, while conceding that there was such a
release from confinement, also alleged that it was conditioned on their
restricting their activities as labor union leaders to the premises of the Trade
Unions of the Philippines and ABSOLUTE Services, presumably in
Macaraig as well as the Ministry of labor. As the voting was to take place in
the business firm in Bataan, the acts set would nullify whatever efforts they
could have exerted. To that extent, and with the prohibition against their
going to Bataan, the restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so, the moot and
academic character of the petition was far from clear.
In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from
involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one
or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the
light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or
those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the
writ.
The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the
restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not be lifted.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the
temporary release of the petitioner are declared null and void. The temporary
release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No costs,
SO ORDERED.
visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of
Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture
and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary
writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention,[1] or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from
the one entitled thereto.[2] Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time
and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit
to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider
in that behalf."[3]
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object
of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient
cause.[4] It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully
prevented from exercising legal custody over another person.[5]
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio[6] is to reverse the decision[7] of the
Court of Appeals and its resolution[8] dismissing the application for habeas
corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and
enforce consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio[9] is to annul that
portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon
Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia
(age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he
stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children,
Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a
consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo
City a petition[10] for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight
and impaired judgment.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal.[16]
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged
that respondents[11] refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband
and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.[17] The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.[18]
38
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86
years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful
restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not
request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his
wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he
did not object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals
observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the
relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices.
In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he
opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his
family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to
Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not
prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and
absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals.
case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to
do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live
with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of
habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a
matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and womans free
choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for
lack of merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the
decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to
respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano
Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this
will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Es m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights
in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such
right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subjects sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that
the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or
refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of
a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In
39
March 8, 1918
peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and was told by the justice of the
peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount,
Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was informed that he had
lost the case. Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in order
to appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50;
MALCOLM, J.:
3.
That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against
four persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house,
where he secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was
thereupon shelved.
This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the defendants
and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of
Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga. The appeal also submits the
larger question of the attitude which the judiciary should take interpreting and
enforcing the Libel Law in connection with the basic prerogatives of freedom
of speech and press, and of assembly and petition. For a better understanding,
the facts in the present appeal are the first narrated in the order of their
occurrence, then certain suggestive aspects relative to the rights of freedom
of speech and press and of assembly and petition are interpolated, then the
facts are tested by these principles, and, finally, judgment is rendered.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance for
the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper action, and
report. The justice of the peace was notified and denied the charges. The
judge of first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3
established. In view of this result, the judge, the Honorable Percy M. Moir,
was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the
Governor-General that the respondent be removed from his position as justice
of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is
ordered that the proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive
Secretary."
First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of
Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive
Secretary through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five
individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace
of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking
for his removal. Crossfield and O'Brien submitted this petition and these
affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition
transmitted by these attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently of
considerable standing, including councilors and property owners (now the
defendants), and contained the statements set out in the information as
libelous. Briefly stated the specific charges against the justice of the peace
were.
Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first
instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing; documents were
introduced, including a letter sent by the municipal president and six
councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was
the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of
the peace, had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the judge of
first instance ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and
acquitted him the same. Attorneys for complainants thereupon appealed to
the Governor-General, but whether the papers were forwarded to the
Governor-General as requested the record does not disclose.
1.
That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against
Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that
he would draw up complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3
which she paid; also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took
from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
2.
That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which
was on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of the
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was
instituted on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following information:
That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of
Macabebe, Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and
criminally and with malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman
Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place justice of the peace of
Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, and published a
writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous
against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, in which
writing appear among other things the following:
That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of this town of
Macabebe, on account of the conduct observed by him heretofore, a conduct
highly improper of the office which he holds, is found to be a public
functionary who is absolutely unfair, eminently immoral and dangerous to the
community, and consequently unworthy of the office.
That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a clear and positive
manner by facts so certain, so serious, and so denigrating which appear in the
affidavits attached hereto, and by other facts no less serious, but which the
undersigned refrain from citing herein for the sake of brevity and in order not
to bother too much the attention of your Honor and due to lack of sufficient
proof to substantiate them.
That should the higher authorities allow the said justice of the peace of this
town to continue in his office, the protection of the rights and interests of its
inhabitants will be illusory and utopic; rights and interest solemnly
guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Rights, and justice in this town will not
be administered in accordance with law.
That on account of the wrongful discharge of his office and of his bad
conducts as such justice of the peace, previous to this time, some respectable
citizens of this town of Macabebe were compelled to present an
administrative case against the said Roman Punsalan Serrano before the
judge of first instance of Pampanga, in which case there were made against
him various charges which were true and certain and of different characters.
That after the said administrative case was over, the said justice of the peace,
far from charging his bad and despicable conduct, which has roused the
indignation of this town of Macabebe, subsequently performed the acts
abovementioned, as stated in the affidavits herewith attached, as if intending
to mock at the people and to show his mistaken valor and heroism.'
All of this has been written and published by the accused with deliberate
purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and reputation of the justice of the
peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and thus exposing him to public hatred
contempt, and ridicule. All contrary to law.
It should be noted that the information omits paragraphs of the petition
mentioning the investigation before the judge of first instance, the affidavits
40
upon which based and concluding words, "To the Executive Secretary,
through the office of Crossfield and O'Brien."
The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception of
Felix Fernandez, Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari,
guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10 and one thirty-second
part of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
New attorneys for the defense, coming into the case, after the handing down
of the decision, file on December 16, 1916, a motion for a new trial, the
principal purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed by the then
counsel for the defendants to the admission of Exhibit A consisting of the
entire administrative proceedings. The trial court denied the motion. All the
defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino appealed
making the following assignments of error:
1.
The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants
for a new trial.
2.
The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the
objection in advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in
evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this
case arose.
3.
The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the
introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which the
petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
4.
The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement
was unqualifiedly privileged.
5.
The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden
was on the defendants to show that the alleged libelous statements were true
and free from malice.
6.
7.
The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is especially true of all the defendants,
except Felipe Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and Jose T. Reyes.
We have thus far taken it for granted that all the proceedings, administrative
and judicial, were properly before this court. As a matter of fact counsel for
defendants in the lower court made an improvident objection to the admission
of the administrative proceedings on the ground that the signatures were not
identified and that the same was immaterial, which objection was partially
sustained by the trial court. Notwithstanding this curious situation by reason
of which the attorney for the defense attempted to destroy through his
objection the very foundation for the justification of his clients, we shall
continue to consider all the proceedings as before us. Not indicating
specifically the reason for this action, let the following be stated: The
administrative proceedings were repeatedly mentioned during the trial. These
proceedings were the basis of the accusation, the information, the evidence,
and the judgment rendered. The prosecution cannot be understood without
knowledge of anterior action. Nothing more unjust could be imagined than to
pick out certain words which standing by themselves and unexplained are
libelous and then by shutting off all knowledge of facts which would justify
these words, to convict the accused. The records in question are attached to
the rollo, and either on the ground that the attorneys for the defense retired
the objection to the introduction of the administrative proceedings by the
prosecution, or that a new trial should have been had because under section
42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "a case may be reopened on account of
errors at law committed at the trial," or because of the right of this court to
call in such records as are sufficiently incorporated into the complaint and are
essential to a determination of the case, or finally, because of our conceded
right to take judicial notice of official action in administrative cases and of
judicial proceedings supplemental to the basis action, we examine the record
as before us, containing not alone the trial for libel, but the proceedings
previous to that trial giving rise to it. To this action, the Government can not
explain for it was the prosecution which tried to incorporate Exhibit A into
the record.
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain
principles which make up the law of libel and slander, we feel warranted in
seizing the opportunity to intrude an introductory and general discussion of
freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition in the Philippine
Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus to clear up certain
misapprehensions on the subject and to place these basic rights in their proper
light.
Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set down that
freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the
Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was consequently
ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de Cien Aos" (The Philippines
a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms sine quibus non,"
which the Filipinos insist upon, said: "
of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the
privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of
malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of
probable cause will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls
[1845], 3 How., 266.)
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would
be slanderous and actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344; 1 Jur.[N.
S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to the basic
rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition, having
emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute must be construed with
reference to the guaranties of our Organic Law, and having sketched the
doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of this case with
these principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a
private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might
also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a
government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice
of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching
him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not
have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the
press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and
thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the
justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good
faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that
malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person
thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the
privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous
matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character,
42
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC be
enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges this Court to declare
the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross
violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police
power; (3) in the nature of an ex-post facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair
Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth.
Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely
product endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his
candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan
political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. Activities
included under this definition are:
and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
Neither is Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 a gross violation of the nonimpairment clause. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield
to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.[5] Equal opportunity to
proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial
resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to the
public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard this
interest. Time and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public
interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of
the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or
protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the
impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police
power.[6]
Furthermore, this Court notes that the very contracts entered into by
petitioner provide that the endorsers photograph and image shall be utilized
in whatever form, mode and manner in keeping with norms of decency,
reasonableness, morals and law;[7] and in whatever form, mode and manner
not contrary to law and norms of decency,[8] and in whatever form, mode
and manner in keeping with norms of decency, reasonableness, morals and
law.[9]
Petitioner also claims that Section 32 of Resolution No. 6520 is in the nature
of an ex post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the assailed
provision makes an individual criminally liable for an election offense for not
removing such advertisement, even if at the time the said advertisement was
exhibited, the same was clearly legal. Hence, it makes a person, whose name
or image is featured in any such advertisement, liable for premature
campaigning under the Omnibus Election Code.[10] A close scrutiny of this
rationale, however, demonstrates its lack of persuasiveness. Section 32,
although not penal in nature, defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for
said offense. Laws of this nature must operate prospectively, except when
they are favorable to the accused. It should be noted, however, that the
offense defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of propaganda
materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other
materials showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all
advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or
mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display
thereof becomes a candidate for public office. Nor does it prohibit or consider
an offense the entering of contracts for such propaganda materials by an
3.2. Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any
particular political party or candidate for public office;
3.3. Cloth, paper or cardboard posters whether framed or posted, with an area
not exceeding two(2) feet by three (3) feet, except that, at the site and on the
occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said
meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet in
size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may be displayed five
(5) days before the date of the meeting or rally and shall be removed within
twenty-four (24) hours after said meeting or rally;
3.4. Paid advertisements in print or broadcast media: Provided, That the
advertisements shall follow the requirements set forth in Section 4 of this
Act; and
3.5. All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by the Omnibus
Election Code or this Act.
xxx
46
review and (2) exhibited the same without its permission, thus, violating
Section 7[4] of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1986[5] and Section 3,[6]
Chapter III and Section 7,[7] Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and
Regulations.[8]
In their answer,[9] respondents explained that the The Inside Story is a public
affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, the airing of
which is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression
and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority and
jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
On February 5, 1993, after hearing and submission of the parties memoranda,
the MTRCB Investigating Committee rendered a Decision, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the aforementioned premises, the respondents are ordered to
pay the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for nonsubmission of the program, subject of this case for review and approval of the
MTRCB.
Heretofore, all subsequent programs of the The Inside Story and all other
programs of the ABS-CBN Channel 2 of the same category shall be
submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing; otherwise
the Board will act accordingly.[10]
On appeal, the Office of Atty. Henrietta S. Mendez, Chairman of the
MTRCB, issued a Decision dated March 12, 1993 affirming the above ruling
of its Investigating Committee.[11] Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated April 14, 1993.[12]
Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, Quezon City. It seeks to: (1) declare as
unconstitutional Sections 3(b),[13] 3(c),[14] 3(d),[15] 4,[16] 7,[17] and
11[18] of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3,[19] 7,[20] and 28[21] (a) of the
MTRCB Rules and Regulations;[22] (2) (in the alternative) exclude the The
Inside Story from the coverage of the above cited provisions; and (3) annul
and set aside the MTRCB Decision dated March 12, 1993 and Resolution
dated April 14, 1993. Respondents averred that the above-cited provisions
47
preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristos religious
program from petitioners review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of The Inside Story is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However,
there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that
freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the
jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there
is no justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story which, according to
respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of
expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs
imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments
and agencies, and (2) newsreels. Thus:
SEC. 7. Unauthorized showing or exhibition. It shall be unlawful for any
person or entity to exhibit or cause to be exhibited in any moviehouse,
theatre, or public place or by television within the Philippines any motion
picture, television program or publicity material, including trailers, and stills
for lobby displays in connection with motion pictures, not duly authorized by
the owner or his assignee and passed by the BOARD; or to print or cause to
be printed on any motion picture to be exhibited in any theater or public place
or by television a label or notice showing the same to have been officially
passed by the BOARD when the same has not been previously authorized,
except motion pictures, television programs or publicity material imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies,
and newsreels.
Still in a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents contend that the The
Inside Story falls under the category of newsreels.
Their contention is unpersuasive.
48
It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB has
authority to review The Inside Story. Clearly, we are not called upon to
determine whether petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the Constitution providing that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, of oppression or the press. Petitioner did not disapprove or ban the
showing of the program. Neither did it cancel respondents permit.
Respondents were merely penalized for their failure to submit to petitioner
The Inside Story for its review and approval. Therefore, we need not resolve
whether certain provisions of P. D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB Rules and
Regulations specified by respondents contravene the Constitution.
Consequently, we cannot sustain the RTCs ruling that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7
and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules
and Regulations are unconstitutional. It is settled that no question involving
the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites
for judicial inquiry, namely: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper
party; (2) that there must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the
question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the
49
November 9, 1983
the answer of respondent Mayor was filed on his behalf by Assistant Solicitor
General Eduardo G. Montenegro. 5 It turned out that on October 19, such
permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as the denial was
sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to police
intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing
such permit at this time and at the place applied for." 6 To be more specific,
reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of
subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend." 7
Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the
recommendation of the police authorities, that "a permit may be issued for
the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area
where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be
ensured." 8
The oral argument was heard on October 25, 1983, the very same day the
answer was filed. The Court then deliberated on the matter. That same
afternoon, a minute resolution was issued by the Court granting the
mandatory injunction prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of
the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could
justify the denial of a permit. On this point, the Court was unanimous, but
there was a dissent by Justice Aquino on the ground that the holding of a rally
in front of the US Embassy would be violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the
City of Manila. The last sentence of such minute resolution reads: "This
resolution is without prejudice to a more extended opinion." 9 Hence this
detailed exposition of the Court's stand on the matter.
1.
It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of
the cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the
denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances." 10 Free speech, like free press, may be Identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment. 11 There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, 12
prosecution for sedition, 13 or action for damages, 14 or contempt
public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of
unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in
order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public
highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but
rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they
ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most
familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of
the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public
convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted
exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to
protection." 31
5. There is a novel aspect to this case, If the rally were confined to Luneta, no
question, as noted, would have arisen. So, too, if the march would end at
another park. As previously mentioned though, there would be a short
program upon reaching the public space between the two gates of the United
States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard. That would be followed by the handing
over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the
Anti-Bases Coalition. The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961. It was concurred in by
the then Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of ratification
was signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and was thereafter
deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15.
As of that date then, it was binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph
of the Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion
or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or
impairment of its dignity. " 32 The Constitution "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. ..." 33
To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally
accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the
land. 34 That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any
intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or
impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the
permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Moreover,
respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius
51
of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other
purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its
invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the
primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly. Even if shown then to be applicable, that question the confronts
this Court.
6.
There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects
of a litigation, the judgment must be confined within the limits of previous
decisions. The law declared on past occasions is, on the whole, a safe guide,
So it has been here. Hence, as noted, on the afternoon of the hearing, October
25, 1983, this Court issued the minute resolution granting the mandatory
injunction allowing the proposed march and rally scheduled for the next day.
That conclusion was inevitable ill the absence of a clear and present danger
of a substantive, evil to a legitimate public interest. There was no justification
then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of tree speech and
peaceable assembly. These rights are assured by our Constitution and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 35 The participants to such
assembly, composed primarily of those in attendance at the International
Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All
Foreign Military Bases would start from the Luneta. proceeding through
Roxas Boulevard to the gates of the United States Embassy located at the
same street. To repeat, it is settled law that as to public places, especially so
as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent
on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. If it
were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise
to an equal protection question. The principle under American doctrines was
given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "The question, if the
rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to
the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to
The relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the
bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects." 36 There
could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked
by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then,
only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing
official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining
whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
8.
By way of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.
Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public
official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the
view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether
favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual
freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot
be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, even more so than on the
other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring
respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no
sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously
termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment."
Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of
justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and
primacy. Clearly then, to the extent that there may be inconsistencies between
this resolution and that of Navarro v. Villegas, that case is pro tanto modified.
So it was made clear in the original resolution of October 25, 1983.
9.
Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance
No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign
mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it finds
support In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the distance
between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it
could be shown that such a condition is satisfied. it does not follow that
respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial
of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a case
of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right
of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that
52
the distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated,
Should it come, then the qualification and observation of Justices Makasiar
and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate
accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing
less.
10.
Ordinarily, the remedy in cases of this character is to set aside the
denial or the modification of the permit sought and order the respondent
official, to grant it. Nonetheless, as there was urgency in this case, the
proposed march and rally being scheduled for the next day after the hearing,
this Court. in the exercise of its conceded authority, granted the mandatory
injunction in the resolution of October 25, 1983. It may be noted that the
peaceful character of the peace march and rally on October 26 was not
marred by any untoward incident. So it has been in other assemblies held
elsewhere. It is quite reassuring such that both on the part of the national
government and the citizens, reason and moderation have prevailed. That is
as it should be.
WHEREFORE, the mandatory injunction prayed for is granted. No costs.
53
settled issues, and that he had timely presented his arguments, the results
would still be the same.
We review the highlights of our decision dated August 4, 2003.
1. OLD WORLD ANTECEDENTS
In our August 4, 2003 decision, we made a painstaking review of Old World
antecedents of the religion clauses, because one cannot understand, much less
intelligently criticize the approaches of the courts and the political branches
to religious freedom in the recent past in the United States without a deep
appreciation of the roots of these controversies in the ancient and medieval
world and in the American experience.[17] We delved into the conception of
religion from primitive times, when it started out as the state
itself, when the authority and power of the state were ascribed to God.[18]
Then, religion developed on its own and became superior to the state,[19] its
subordinate,[20] and even becoming an engine of state policy.[21]
We ascertained two salient features in the review of religious history: First,
with minor exceptions, the history of church-state relationships was
characterized by persecution, oppression, hatred, bloodshed, and war, all in
the name of the God of Love and of the Prince of Peace. Second, likewise
with minor exceptions, this history witnessed the unscrupulous use of religion
by secular powers to promote secular purposes and policies, and the willing
acceptance of that role by the vanguards of religion in exchange for the
favors and mundane benefits conferred by ambitious princes and emperors in
exchange for religions invaluable service. This was the context in which the
unique experiment of the principle of religious freedom and separation of
church and state saw its birth in American constitutional democracy and in
human history. [22]
Strictly speaking, the American experiment of freedom and separation was
not translated in the First Amendment. That experiment had been launched
four years earlier, when the founders of the republic carefully withheld from
the new national government any power to deal with religion. As James
Madison said, the national government had no jurisdiction over religion or
any shadow of right to intermeddle with it. [23]
The omission of an express guaranty of religious freedom and other natural
rights, however, nearly prevented the ratification of the Constitution. The
restriction had to be made explicit with the adoption of the religion clauses in
the First Amendment as they are worded to this day. Thus, the First
Amendment did not take away or abridge any power of the national
government; its intent was to make express the absence of power.[24] It
commands, in two parts (with the first part usually referred to as the
Establishment Clause and the second part, the Free Exercise Clause), viz:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. [25]
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, it should be noted, were not
designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goalto promote
freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the
Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs
with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the Establishment
Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for
religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were
intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to
influence individual religious beliefs and practices.[26]
In sum, a review of the Old World antecedents of religion shows the
movement of establishment of religion as an engine to promote state
interests, to the principle of non-establishment to allow the free exercise of
religion.
2. RELIGION CLAUSES IN THE U.S. CONTEXT
The Court then turned to the religion clauses interpretation and construction
in the United States, not because we are bound by their interpretation, but
because the U.S. religion clauses are the precursors to the Philippine religion
clauses, although we have significantly departed from the U.S. interpretation
as will be discussed later on.
At the outset, it is worth noting that American jurisprudence in this area has
been volatile and fraught with inconsistencies whether within a Court
decision or across decisions. For while there is widespread agreement
regarding the value of the First Amendment religion clauses, there is an
equally broad disagreement as to what these clauses specifically require,
permit and forbid. No agreement has been reached by those who have studied
the religion clauses as regards its exact meaning and the paucity of records in
the U.S. Congress renders it difficult to ascertain its meaning.[27]
U.S. history has produced two identifiably different, even opposing, strains of
jurisprudence on the religion clauses. First is the standard of separation,
which may take the form of either (a) strict separation or (b) the tamer
55
Rather, the state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers. State power is no more to be used so as to
handicap religions than it is to favor them.[35] The strict neutrality approach
is not hostile to religion, but it is strict in holding that religion may not be
used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action,
whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or
obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis of government action. It
does not permit, much less require, accommodation of secular programs to
religious belief.[36]
The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however, is if applied in
interpreting the Establishment Clause, it could lead to a de facto voiding of
religious expression in the Free Exercise Clause. As pointed out by Justice
Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Abington School District v.
Schempp,[37] strict neutrality could lead to a brooding and pervasive
devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious
which is prohibited by the Constitution.[38] Professor Laurence Tribe
commented in his authoritative treatise, viz:
To most observers. . . strict neutrality has seemed incompatible with the very
idea of a free exercise clause. The Framers, whatever specific applications
they may have intended, clearly envisioned religion as something special;
they enacted that vision into law by guaranteeing the free exercise of religion
but not, say, of philosophy or science. The strict neutrality approach all but
erases this distinction. Thus it is not surprising that the [U.S.] Supreme Court
has rejected strict neutrality, permitting and sometimes mandating religious
classifications.[39]
Thus, the dilemma of the separationist approach, whether in the form of strict
separation or strict neutrality, is that while the Jeffersonian wall of separation
captures the spirit of the American ideal of church-state separation, in real
life, church and state are not and cannot be totally separate. This is all the
more true in contemporary times when both the government and religion are
growing and expanding their spheres of involvement and activity, resulting in
the intersection of government and religion at many points.[40]
b. Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation
The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a
different view of the wall of separation, associated with Williams, founder of
the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect
the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the church from the
state.[41] This doctrine was expressed in Zorach v. Clauson,[42] which held,
viz:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines
the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or
dependency one or the other. That is the common sense of the matter.
Otherwise, the state and religion would be aliens to each other - hostile,
suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches could not be required to pay even
property taxes. Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire
protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into their
places of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our legislative
halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the
proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; so help me God in our
courtroom oaths- these and all other references to the Almighty that run
through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the
First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the
supplication with which the Court opens each session: God save the United
States and this Honorable Court.
xxx xxx xxx
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.
We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. . . When the state
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by
adjusting the schedule of public events, it follows the best of our traditions.
For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the
public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to
find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous
indifference to religious groups. . . But we find no constitutional requirement
which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to
throw its weight against efforts to widen their effective scope of religious
influence. [43]
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that religion plays an important role in the
public life of the United States as shown by many traditional government
practices which, to strict neutrality, pose Establishment Clause questions.
Among these are the inscription of In God We Trust on American currency;
the recognition of America as one nation under God in the official pledge of
56
of judicial scrutiny. After Sherbert, this strict scrutiny balancing test resulted
in court-mandated religious exemptions from facially-neutral laws of general
application whenever unjustified burdens were found. [60]
Then, in the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,[61] the U.S. Court again ruled
that religious exemption was in order, notwithstanding that the law of general
application had a criminal penalty. Using heightened scrutiny, the Court
overturned the conviction of Amish parents for violating Wisconsin
compulsory school-attendance laws. The Court, in effect, granted exemption
from a neutral, criminal statute that punished religiously motivated conduct.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held, viz:
It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the
eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice
of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not
deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a
state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming
protection under the Free Exercise Clause. Long before there was general
acknowledgement of the need for universal education, the Religion Clauses
had specially and firmly fixed the right of free exercise of religious beliefs,
and buttressing this fundamental right was an equally firm, even if less
explicit, prohibition against the establishment of any religion. The values
underlying these two provisions relating to religion have been zealously
protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly high
social importance. . .
The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. . .
. . . our decisions have rejected the idea that religiously grounded conduct is
always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that
activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to
regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote
the health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal government in the
exercise of its delegated powers . . . But to agree that religiously grounded
conduct must often be subject to the broad police power of the State is not to
deny that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even
under regulations of general applicability. . . .This case, therefore, does not
become easier because respondents were convicted for their actions in
refusing to send their children to the public high school; in this context belief
and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments. . . [62]
The cases of Sherbert and Yoder laid out the following doctrines: (a) free
exercise clause claims were subject to heightened scrutiny or compelling
interest test if government substantially burdened the exercise of religion; (b)
heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test governed cases where the
burden was direct, i.e., the exercise of religion triggered a criminal or civil
penalty, as well as cases where the burden was indirect, i.e., the exercise of
religion resulted in the forfeiture of a government benefit;[63] and (c) the
Court could carve out accommodations or exemptions from a facially neutral
law of general application, whether general or criminal.
The Sherbert-Yoder doctrine had five main components. First, action was
protectedconduct beyond speech, press, or worship was included in the
shelter of freedom of religion. Neither Sherberts refusal to work on the
Sabbath nor the Amish parents refusal to let their children attend ninth and
tenth grades can be classified as conduct protected by the other clauses of the
First Amendment. Second, indirect impositions on religious conduct, such as
the denial of twenty-six weeks of unemployment insurance benefits to Adel
Sherbert, as well as direct restraints, such as the criminal prohibition at issue
in Yoder, were prohibited. Third, as the language in the two cases indicate,
the protection granted was extensive. Only extremely strong governmental
interests justified impingement on religious conduct, as the absolute language
of the test of the Free Exercise Clause suggests. [64]
Fourth, the strong language was backed by a requirement that the government
provide proof of the important interest at stake and of the dangers to that
interest presented by the religious conduct at issue. Fifth, in determining the
injury to the governments interest, a court was required to focus on the effect
that exempting religious claimants from the regulation would have, rather
than on the value of the regulation in general. Thus, injury to governmental
interest had to be measured at the margin: assuming the law still applied to all
others, what would be the effect of exempting the religious claimant in this
case and other similarly situated religious claimants in the future? Together,
the fourth and fifth elements required that facts, rather than speculation, had
to be presented concerning how the governments interest would be harmed
by excepting religious conduct from the law being challenged. [65]
Sherbert and Yoder adopted a balancing test for free exercise jurisprudence
which would impose a discipline to prevent manipulation in the balancing of
interests. The fourth and the fifth elements prevented the likelihood of
exaggeration of the weight on the governmental interest side of the balance,
by not allowing speculation about the effects of a decision adverse to those
interests nor accepting that those interests would be defined at a higher level
of generality than the constitutional interests on the other side of the balance.
[66]
Thus, the strict scrutiny and compelling state interest test significantly
increased the degree of protection afforded to religiously motivated conduct.
While not affording absolute immunity to religious activity, a compelling
secular justification was necessary to uphold public policies that collided
with religious practices. Although the members of the U.S. Court often
disagreed over which governmental interests should be considered
compelling, thereby producing dissenting and separate opinions in religious
conduct cases, this general test established a strong presumption in favor of
the free exercise of religion.[67] Most scholars and courts agreed that under
Sherbert and Yoder, the Free Exercise Clause provided individuals some
form of heightened scrutiny protection, if not always a compelling interest
one.[68] The 1990 case of Employment Division, Oregon Department of
Human Resources v. Smith,[69] drastically changed all that.
Smith involved a challenge by Native Americans to an Oregon law
prohibiting use of peyote, a hallucinogenic substance. Specifically,
individuals challenged the states determination that their religious use of
peyote, which resulted in their dismissal from employment, was misconduct
disqualifying them from receipt of unemployment compensation benefits.
[70]
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected the claim that free exercise of
religion required an exemption from an otherwise valid law. Scalia said that
[w]e have never held that an individuals religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is
free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free
exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition. [71] Scalia thus declared
that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability of the ground
that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes). [72]
58
Justice Scalias opinion then reviewed the cases where free exercise
challenges had been upheldsuch as Cantwell, Murdock, Follet, Pierce, and
Yoderand said that none involved the free exercise clause claims alone. All
involved the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, or the right of
parents to direct the education of their children. [73] The Court said that
Smith was distinguishable because it did not involve such a hybrid situation,
but was a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity
or parental right. [74]
Moreover, the Court said that the Sherbert line of cases applied only in the
context of the denial of unemployment benefits; it did not create a basis for
an exemption from criminal laws. Scalia wrote that [e]ven if we were
inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment
compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a
generally applicable criminal law. [75]
The Court expressly rejected the use of strict scrutiny for challenges to
neutral laws of general applicability that burden religion. Justice Scalia said
that [p]recisely because we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of
almost conceivable religious preference, and precisely because we value and
protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming
presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of
conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order. The Court said
that those seeking religious exemptions from laws should look to the
democratic process for protection, not the courts. [76]
Smith thus changed the test for the free exercise clause. Strict or heightened
scrutiny and the compelling justification approach were abandoned for
evaluating laws burdening religion; neutral laws of general applicability only
have to meet the rational basis test, no matter how much they burden religion.
[77]
Justice OConnor wrote a concurring opinion sharply criticizing the rejection
of the compelling state interest test, asserting that (t)he compelling state
interest test effectuates the First Amendments command that religious liberty
is an independent liberty, that it occupies a preferred position, and that the
Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty, whether direct or
indirect, unless required by clear and compelling government interest of the
highest order.[78] She said that strict scrutiny is appropriate for free exercise
challenges because [t]he compelling interest test reflects the First
neutrality. After all, laws not aimed at religion can hinder observance just as
effectively as those that target religion.[92] Government impairment of
religious liberty would most often be of the inadvertent kind as in Smith
considering the political culture where direct and deliberate regulatory
imposition of religious orthodoxy is nearly inconceivable. If the Free
Exercise Clause could not afford protection to inadvertent interference, it
would be left almost meaningless.[93] Third, the Reynolds-Gobitis-Smith[94]
doctrine simply defies common sense. The state should not be allowed to
interfere with the most deeply held fundamental religious convictions of an
individual in order to pursue some trivial state economic or bureaucratic
objective. This is especially true when there are alternative approaches for the
state to effectively pursue its objective without serious inadvertent impact on
religion.[95]
At bottom, the Courts ultimate concern in Smith appeared to be two-fold: (1)
the difficulty in defining and limiting the term religion in todays pluralistic
society, and (2) the belief that courts have no business determining the
significance of an individuals religious beliefs. For the Smith Court, these
two concerns appear to lead to the conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause
must protect everything or it must protect virtually nothing. As a result, the
Court perceives its only viable options are to leave free exercise protection to
the political process or to allow a system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself. [96] The Courts characterization of its choices have been soundly
rejected as false, viz:
If one accepts the Courts assumption that these are the only two viable
options, then admittedly, the Court has a stronger argument. But the Free
Exercise Clause cannot be summarily dismissed as too difficult to apply and
this should not be applied at all. The Constitution does not give the judiciary
the option of simply refusing to interpret its provisions. The First
Amendment dictates that free exercise of religion must be protected.
Accordingly, the Constitution compels the Court to struggle with the contours
of what constitutes religion. There is no constitutional opt-out provision for
constitutional words that are difficult to apply.
Nor does the Constitution give the Court the option of simply ignoring
constitutional mandates. A large area of middle ground exists between the
Courts two opposing alternatives for free exercise jurisprudence.
Unfortunately, this middle ground requires the Court to tackle difficult issues
59
standing alone would not allow Amish parents to disregard the compulsory
school attendance law, and under the Courts opinion in Yoder, parents whose
objection to the law was not religious would also have to obey it. The fatal
flaw in this argument, however, is that if two constitutional claims will fail on
its own, how would it prevail if combined?[99] As for Sherbert, the Smith
Court attempted to limit its doctrine as applicable only to denials of
unemployment compensation benefits where the religiously-compelled
conduct that leads to job loss is not a violation of criminal law. And yet, this
is precisely why the rejection of Sherbert was so damaging in its effect: the
religious person was more likely to be entitled to constitutional protection
when forced to choose between religious conscience and going to jail than
when forced to choose between religious conscience and financial loss. [100]
Thus, the Smith decision elicited much negative public reaction especially
from the religious community, and commentaries insisted that the Court was
allowing the Free Exercise Clause to disappear.[101] So much was the uproar
that a majority in Congress was convinced to enact the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993.[102] The RFRA was adopted to negate the
Smith test and require strict scrutiny for free exercise claims. Indeed, the
findings section of the Act notes that Smith virtually eliminated the
requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise
imposed by laws neutral toward religion.[103] The Act declares that its
purpose is to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, and to guarantee its application in all cases
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and to provide a
claim of defense to a person whose religious exercise is substantially
burdened by government.[104] The RFRA thus sought to overrule Smith and
make strict scrutiny the test for all free exercise clause claims. [105]
In the City of Boerne v. Flores, [106] the U.S. Supreme Court declared the
RFRA unconstitutional, ruling that Congress had exceeded its power under
the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the law. The Court ruled that
Congress is empowered to enact laws to enforce the amendment, but
Congress is not enforcing when it creates new constitutional rights or
expands the scope of rights. [107]
City of Boerne also drew public backlash as the U.S. Supreme Court was
accused of lack of judicial respect for the constitutional decision-making by a
coordinate branch of government. In Smith, Justice Scalia wrote:
Like most protections found in the Bill of Rights, the religion clauses of the
First Amendment are most important to those who cannot prevail in the
political process. The Court in Smith ignores the fact that the protections
found in the Bill of Rights were deemed too important to leave to the political
process. Because mainstream religions generally have been successful in
protecting their interests through the political process, it is the nonmainstream religions that are adversely affected by Smith. In short, the U.S.
Supreme Court has made it clear to such religions that they should not look to
the First Amendment for religious freedom. [110]
(3) Accommodation under the Religion Clauses
A free exercise claim could result to three kinds of accommodation: (a) those
which are found to be constitutionally compelled, i.e., required by the Free
Exercise Clause; (b) those which are discretionary or legislative, i.e., not
required by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by the
Establishment Clause; and (c) those which the religion clauses prohibit.[111]
Mandatory accommodation results when the Court finds that accommodation
is required by the Free Exercise Clause, i.e, when the Court itself carves out
an exemption. This accommodation occurs when all three conditions of the
compelling interest test are met, i.e, a statute or government action has
burdened claimants free exercise of religion, and there is no doubt as to the
sincerity of the religious belief; the state has failed to demonstrate a
particularly important or compelling governmental goal in preventing an
exemption; and that the state has failed to demonstrate that it used the least
restrictive means. In these cases, the Court finds that the injury to religious
conscience is so great and the advancement of public purposes is
incomparable that only indifference or hostility could explain a refusal to
make exemptions. Thus, if the states objective could be served as well or
almost as well by granting an exemption to those whose religious beliefs are
burdened by the regulation, the Court must grant the exemption. The Yoder
case is an example where the Court held that the state must accommodate the
religious beliefs of the Amish who objected to enrolling their children in high
school as required by law. The Sherbert case is another example where the
Court held that the state unemployment compensation plan must
accommodate the religious convictions of Sherbert.[112]
In permissive accommodation, the Court finds that the State may, but is not
required to, accommodate religious interests. The U.S. Walz case illustrates
this situation where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
tax exemption given by New York to church properties, but did not rule that
the state was required to provide tax exemptions. The Court declared that
(t)he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means
co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause.[113] Other examples are Zorach v. Clauson,[114] allowing released
time in public schools and Marsh v. Chambers,[115] allowing payment of
legislative chaplains from public funds. Parenthetically, the Court in Smith
has ruled that this is the only accommodation allowed by the Religion
Clauses.
Finally, when the Court finds no basis for a mandatory accommodation, or it
determines that the legislative accommodation runs afoul of the establishment
or the free exercise clause, it results to a prohibited accommodation. In this
case, the Court finds that establishment concerns prevail over potential
accommodation interests. To say that there are valid exemptions buttressed
by the Free Exercise Clause does not mean that all claims for free exercise
exemptions are valid.[116] An example where accommodation was
prohibited is McCollum v. Board of Education,[117] where the Court ruled
against optional religious instruction in the public school premises.[118]
Given that a free exercise claim could lead to three different results, the
question now remains as to how the Court should determine which action to
take. In this regard, it is the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test which
is most in line with the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach.
Under the benevolent-neutrality theory, the principle underlying the First
Amendment is that freedom to carry out ones duties to a Supreme Being is an
inalienable right, not one dependent on the grace of legislature. Religious
freedom is seen as a substantive right and not merely a privilege against
discriminatory legislation. With religion looked upon with benevolence and
not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under
certain circumstances.
Considering that laws nowadays are rarely enacted specifically to disable
religious belief or practice, free exercise disputes arise commonly when a law
that is religiously neutral and generally applicable on its face is argued to
prevent or burden what someones religious faith requires, or alternatively,
requires someone to undertake an act that faith would preclude. In essence,
then, free exercise arguments contemplate religious exemptions from
otherwise general laws.[119]
should also follow this approach in light of the Philippine religion clauses
history. As a result, in a case where the party claims religious liberty in the
face of a general law that inadvertently burdens his religious exercise, he
faces an almost insurmountable wall in convincing the Court that the wall of
separation would not be breached if the Court grants him an exemption.
These conclusions, however, are not and were never warranted by the 1987,
1973 and 1935 Constitutions as shown by other provisions on religion in all
three constitutions. It is a cardinal rule in constitutional construction that the
constitution must be interpreted as a whole and apparently conflicting
provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that will give to
all of them full force and effect. From this construction, it will be ascertained
that the intent of the framers was to adopt a benevolent neutrality approach in
interpreting the religious clauses in the Philippine constitutions, and the
enforcement of this intent is the goal of construing the constitution.[129]
[citations omitted]
We therefore reject Mr. Justice Carpios total adherence to the U.S. Courts
interpretation of the religion clauses to effectively deny accommodations on
the sole basis that the law in question is neutral and of general application.
For even if it were true that an unbroken line of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions has never held that an individuals religious beliefs [do not] excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate, our own Constitutions have made significant
changes to accommodate and exempt religion. Philippine jurisprudence
shows that the Court has allowed exemptions from a law of general
application, in effect, interpreting our religion clauses to cover both
mandatory and permissive accommodations.[130]
To illustrate, in American Bible Society v. City of Manila,[131] the Court
granted to plaintiff exemption from a law of general application based on the
Free Exercise Clause. In this case, plaintiff was required by an ordinance to
secure a mayors permit and a municipal license as ordinarily required of
those engaged in the business of general merchandise under the citys
ordinances. Plaintiff argued that this amounted to religious censorship and
restrained the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession, to wit: the
distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the people of
the Philippines. Although the Court categorically held that the questioned
ordinances were not applicable to plaintiff as it was not engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said merchandise for profit, it also ruled that
applying the ordinance to plaintiff and requiring it to secure a license and pay
a license fee or tax would impair its free exercise of religious profession and
worship and its right of dissemination of religious beliefs as the power to tax
the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment.
The decision states in part, viz:
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent. (citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Another case involving mandatory accommodation is Ebralinag v. The
Division Superintendent of Schools.[132] The case involved several Jehovahs
Witnesses who were expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, in violation of the
Administrative Code of 1987. In resolving the religious freedom issue, a
unanimous Court overturned an earlier ruling denying such exemption,[133]
using the grave and imminent danger test, viz:
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of
religious freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in
his dissenting opinion in German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners
from the schools is not justified.[134] (emphases supplied)
In these two cases, the Court itself carved out an exemption from a law of
general application, on the strength directly of the Free Exercise Clause.
We also have jurisprudence that supports permissive accommodation. The
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union[135] is an example of the
application of Mr. Justice Carpios theory of permissive accommodation,
where religious exemption is granted by a legislative act. In Victoriano, the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350 was questioned. The said R.A.
exempt employees from the application and coverage of a closed shop
62
compelling state interest test, but as explained previously, the use of the test
was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in American Bible Society,
Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the clear and present danger and grave
and immediate danger tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible
or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having
been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach,
thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present
case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The compelling
state interest test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of
human conduct has different effects on the states interests: some effects may
be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test
that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil,
whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any
interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights - the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights, in
the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional
order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such
higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the aid of Almighty God in
order to build a just and humane society and establish a government. As held
in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can
limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a
right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead,
only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right
to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a
compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion,
especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining
which shall prevail between the states interest and religious liberty,
reasonableness shall be the guide. The compelling state interest serves the
purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording
protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in
Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the
end, the compelling state interest test, by upholding the paramount interests
of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty
will not be preserved. [137] (citations omitted)
At this point, we take note of Mr. Justice Carpios dissent, which, while
loosely disputing the applicability of the benevolent neutrality framework and
compelling state interest test, states that [i]t is true that a test needs to be
applied by the Court in determining the validity of a free exercise claim of
exemption as made here by Escritor. This assertion is inconsistent with the
position negating the benevolent neutrality or accommodation approach. If it
were true, indeed, that the religion clauses do not require accommodations
based on the free exercise of religion, then there would be no need for a test
to determine the validity of a free exercise claim, as any and all claims for
religious exemptions from a law of general application would fail.
Mr. Justice Carpio also asserts that [m]aking a distinction between permissive
accommodation and mandatory accommodation is more critically important
in analyzing free exercise exemption claims because it forces the Court to
confront how far it can validly set the limits of religious liberty under the
Free Exercise Clause, rather than presenting the separation theory and
accommodation theory as opposite concepts, and then rejecting relevant and
instructive American jurisprudence (such as the Smith case) just because it
does not espouse the theory selected. He then asserts that the Smith doctrine
cannot be dismissed because it does not really espouse the strict neutrality
approach, but more of permissive accommodation.
Mr. Justice Carpios assertion misses the point. Precisely because the doctrine
in Smith is that only legislative accommodations are allowed under the Free
Exercise Clause, it cannot be used in determining a claim of religion
exemption directly anchored on the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, even
assuming that the Smith doctrine actually espouses the theory of
accommodation or benevolent neutrality, the accommodation is limited to the
permissive, or legislative exemptions. It, therefore, cannot be used as a test in
determining the claims of religious exemptions directly under the Free
Exercise Clause because Smith does not recognize such exemption.
Moreover, Mr. Justice Carpios advocacy of the Smith doctrine would
effectively render the Free Exercise protectiona fundamental right under our
Constitutionnugatory because he would deny its status as an independent
source of right.
b. The Compelling State Interest Test
63
to contend that the states interest is important, because our Constitution itself
holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in
specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which
must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule
otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of
right by itself.
Thus, it is not the States broad interest in protecting the institutions of
marriage and the family, or even in the sound administration of justice that
must be weighed against respondents claim, but the States narrow interest in
refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondents faith
finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the
objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to
what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are
granted.[151] This, the Solicitor General failed to do.
To paraphrase Justice Blackmuns application of the compelling interest test,
the States interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a
criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does
not, in fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition. In the case at bar, the State
has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against respondent or her partner. The State has never sought to
prosecute respondent nor her partner. The States asserted interest thus
amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Incidentally, as echoes of the words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and Vitug, in
their concurring opinions in our Decision, dated August 4, 2003, to deny the
exemption would effectively break up an otherwise ideal union of two
individuals who have managed to stay together as husband and wife
[approximately twenty-five years] and have the effect of defeating the very
substance of marriage and the family.
The Solicitor General also argued against respondents religious freedom on
the basis of morality, i.e., that the conjugal arrangement of respondent and
her live-in partner should not be condoned because adulterous relationships
are constantly frowned upon by society;[152] and that State laws on
marriage, which are moral in nature, take clear precedence over the religious
the defense of religious freedom, therefore none of the cases cited by Mme.
Justice Ynares-Santiago apply.[166] There is no jurisprudence in Philippine
jurisdiction holding that the defense of religious freedom of a member of the
Jehovahs Witnesses under the same circumstances as respondent will not
prevail over the laws on adultery, concubinage or some other law. We cannot
summarily conclude therefore
that her conduct is likewise so odious and barbaric as to be immoral and
punishable by law.[167]
Again, we note the arguments raised by Mr. Justice Carpio with respect to
charging respondent with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and we reiterate that the dissent offends due process as respondent
was not given an opportunity to defend herself against the charge of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Indeed, there is no evidence of
the alleged prejudice to the best interest of the service.[168]
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on
her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state
interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom
- may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom,
however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so
the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation
will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the
absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.
Mr. Justice Carpios slippery slope argument, on the other hand, is nonsequitur. If the Court grants respondent exemption from the laws which
respondent Escritor has been charged to have violated, the exemption would
not apply to Catholics who have secured church annulment of their marriage
even without a final annulment from a civil court. First, unlike Jehovahs
Witnesses, the Catholic faith considers cohabitation without marriage as
immoral. Second, but more important, the Jehovahs Witnesses have standards
and procedures which must be followed before cohabitation without marriage
is given the blessing of the congregation. This includes an investigative
process whereby the elders of the congregation verify the circumstances of
the declarants. Also, the Declaration is not a blanket authority to cohabit
without marriage because once all legal impediments for the couple are lifted,
the validity of the Declaration ceases, and the congregation requires that the
couple legalize their union.
At bottom, the slippery slope argument of Mr. Justice Carpio is speculative.
Nevertheless, insofar as he raises the issue of equality among religions, we
look to the words of the Religion Clauses, which clearly single out religion
for both a benefit and a burden: No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof On its face,
the language grants a unique advantage to religious conduct, protecting it
SO ORDERED.
Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it
has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its
legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious
67
Alejandro Estrada vs. Soledad Escritor A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006
BILL OF RIGHTS
Alejandro Estrada vs. Soledad EscritorA.M. No. P-02-1651June 22, 2006
Court Administrator (OCA) and ordered the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) to intervene in the case.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
An administrative complaint was filed by Estrada against Escritor
before Branch 253 of the RTC of Las Pinas City for living with a man not her
husband and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Escritor is
the court interpreter of RTC Branch 253. Estrada believes that Escritor is
committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act. She was charged with committing disgraceful and
immoral conduct under Book V, Title I, Section 46 (b) (5) of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Escritor was already a widow when she entered the judiciary in 1999.
She started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage
more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with
another woman. They have a son. After ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness in
conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her
congregation, the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society.
Once all legal impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the
declarations ceases and the couple should legalize their union. Insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal
arrangement and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.