1

RULE 21 32
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993

DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES,
LTD., respondents.
Sobrevias, Diaz, Haudini & Bodegon Law Offices for petitioner.
Tan, Manzano & Velez Law Offices for private respondent.

RESOLUTION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sometime in September, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, the American President Lines, Ltd. sued Dasmarias
Garments, Inc. to recover the sum of US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
In its answer dated December 1, 1987, Dasmarias Garments, Inc. (hereafter, simply Dasmarias) specifically denied any
liability to the plaintiff (hereafter simply APL), and set up compulsory counterclaims against it.
The case was in due course scheduled for trial on April 27, 1988. On that date APL presented its first witness whose
testimony was completed on November 12, 1988. The case was reset to May 3, 1989 for reception of the testimony of two (2)
more witnesses in APL's behalf.
At the hearing of May 3, 1989, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the
depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters
rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . . "
Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in
Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the President "presently occupied by
Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.," it was necessary and it therefore prayed "that
commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive
Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral
deposition of the aforenamed persons . . . ."
The motion was opposed by Dasmarias. It contended that (a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . .
that a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the
witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;" and
(c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not by
deposition."

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Extensive argument on the matter thereafter followed, through various pleadings filed by the parties, in the course of which
APL submitted to the Trial Court (a) the letter received by its counsel from Director Joaquin R. Roces of the Asian Exchange
Center, Inc., dated November 20, 1989, advising that "this Office can only take deposition upon previous authority from the
Department of Foreign Affairs," this being "in consonance with the Supreme Court Administrative Order requiring courts or
judicial bodies to course their requests through the Department of Foreign Affairs;" and (b) a letter sent by "fax" to the same
counsel by a law firm in Taipei, Lin & Associates Maritime Law Office, transmitting information inter alia of the mode by which,
under the "ROC Civil Procedure Code," "a copy or an abridged copy" of documents on file with a Taiwan Court may be
obtained.
By Order dated March 15, 1991, the Trial Court resolved the incident in favor of APL, disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the motion to take testimonies of plaintiff's Taiwanese witnesses, Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong
Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) is hereby GRANTED. The Asian Exchange Center, Inc.
thru Director Joaquin R. Roces is hereby COMMISSIONED to take down the deposition. Compliance with the
Rules on the taking of testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories under Sections 25-29 of Rule 24,
Rules of Court is enjoined.
Let this Order be coursed through the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, pursuant to Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 4 dated April 6, 1987.
The Court opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. being the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take
the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, but only upon written interrogatoriesso as to give
defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-examination."
Dasmarias sought reconsideration by motion filed June 25, 1991 on the following grounds: (1) authority of the Asian
Exchange Center, Inc. (AECI) to take depositions has not been established, it not being one of those so authorized by the
Rules of Court to take depositions in a foreign state; (2) AECI's articles of incorporation show that it is not vested with any
such authority; (3) to permit deposition-taking by commission without the authority of the foreign state in which deposition is
taken constitutes infringement of judicial sovereignty; and (4) depositions by written interrogatories have inherent limitations
and are not suitable to matters dependent on the credibility of witnesses; oral testimony in open court remains the "most
satisfactory method of investigation of facts'" and "'affords the greatest protection to the rights and liberties of citizens."
By Order dated July 5, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied because "filed out of time" and being a mere rehash
of arguments already passed upon. In the same Order, APL was directed "to take the necessary steps to implement the order
authorizing the . . . (deposition-taking) of its witnesses not later than the end of this month, otherwise the Court will consider
inaction or lack of interest as waiver to adduce additional evidence by deposition."
Dasmarias instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals to nullify the orders of the Trial Court just
described. Said Appellate Court restrained enforcement of the orders of March 15, 1991 and July 5, 1991 "in order to
maintain the status quo and to prevent the infliction of irreparable damage and injury upon the petitioner."
After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals (Third Division) rendered judgment on September 23, 1992 denying Dasmarias
petition for certiorari and upholding the challenged orders of the Trial Court. Once again, Dasmarias sought reconsideration
of an adverse disposition, and once again, was rebuffed. Its motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1992.
Once again Dasmarias has availed of the remedy of appeal. It has come to this Court and prays for the reversal of the
Appellate Court's Decision of September 23, 1992 and Resolution dated December 11, 1992. Once again, it will fail.
Dasmarias ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:

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1) "in holding that a party could, during the trial of the case, present its evidence by taking the deposition of its
witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity not authorized by law to take depositions in lieu of
their oral examination in open Court considering that:
a) the taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action
comes to trial;
b) no urgent or compelling reason has been shown to justify the departure from the accepted
and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor
could be observed by the trial judge;"
2) "in disregarding the inherently unfair situation in allowing private respondent, a foreign entity suing in the
Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of
the trial Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses in open court subject to the
prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge;" and
3) "in sanctioning the deposition taking of . . . (APL's) witnesses in Taipei, Taiwan, a foreign jurisdiction not
recognized by the Philippines in view of its 'one-China policy,' before the AECI, a private entity not authorized
by law to take depositions."
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the
knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other
modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of
documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and
relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own
witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and
relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from
inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the Court, without
omission or suppression.
Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts;
they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The
deponent must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the
rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of
the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is
offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that that
opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for crossexamination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the
trial or hearing.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under
certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the
Rules of Court.
Sec. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any
part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party

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who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance
with any of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of
deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by
an adverse party for any purpose;
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court
finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than
fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend to testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been
unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used;
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce
all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts.
The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable
to come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness
deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity
to cross-examine him.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the
party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10,
Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before
such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already
been served (Sec. 1 Rule 24). After answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or
outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all that is required being that
"reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the action . . . (stating) the time and place for taking the
deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. . . . " (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court
intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon
notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters
shall not be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or
counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or
(3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).
Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such person or officer as
may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory. Section 12, Rule 24 provides as follows:

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Sec. 12. Commission or letters rogatory. A commission or letters rogatory shall be issued only when
necessary or convenient, on application and notice, and on such terms and with such directions as are just
and appropriate. Officers may be designated in notices or commissions either by name or descriptive title and
letters rogatory may be addressed "To the Appropriate Judicial Authority in (here name the country)."
A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued by a court of justice, or other competent tribunal, to authorize a
person to take depositions, or do any other act by authority of such court or tribunal" (Feria, J., Civil Procedure, 1969 ed., p.
415, citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 200). Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as "(a)n instrument sent in
the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another, requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon
interrogatories filed in a cause pending before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to
whom such letters are addressed" (Feria, J., op. cit., citing Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, p. 653). Section 12, Rule 24 just
quoted states that a commission is addressed to "officers . . . designated . . . either by name or descriptive title," while letters
rogatory are addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign state." Noteworthy in this connection is the
indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may be applied for and issued only after a commission has been "returned
unexecuted" as is apparent from Form 21 of the "Judicial Standard Forms" appended to the Rules of Court, which requires
the inclusion in a "petition for letters rogatory" of the following paragraph, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
3. A commission issued by this Court on the ______ day of ______, 19__, to take the testimony of (here name
the witness or witnesses) in (here name the foreign country in which the testimony is to be taken), before
_________________ (name of officer), was returned unexecuted by __________________ on the ground
that ____________, all of which more fully appears from the certificate of said __________ to said
commission and made a part hereof by attaching it hereto (or state other facts to show commission is
inadequate or cannot be executed) (emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court has issued a commission to the "Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director
Joaquin R. Roces" "to take the testimonies of . . . Kenneth H. Lee and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written
interrogatories) . . . ." It appears that said Center may, "upon request and authority of the Ministry (now Department) of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines" issue a "Certificate of Authentications" attesting to the identity and authority of
Notaries Public and other public officers of the Republic of China, Taiwan (eg., the Section Chief, Department of Consular
Affairs of the latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (Annex B of Annex N of the petition for review on certiorari) a prima
facie showing not rebutted by petitioner.
It further appears that the commission is to be coursed through the Department of Foreign Affairs conformably with Circular
No. 4 issued by Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee on April 6, 1987, pursuant to the suggestion of the Department of Foreign
Affairs directing "ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS" "to course all
requests for the taking of deposition of witnesses residing abroad through the Department of Foreign Affairs" to enable it and
"the Philippine Foreign Service establishments to act on the matter in a judicious and expeditious manner;" this, "in the
interest of justice," and to avoid delay in the deposition-taking.
Petitioner would however prevent the carrying out of the commission on various grounds.
The first is that the deposition-taking will take place in "a foreign jurisdiction not recognized by the Philippines in view of its
'one-China policy.'" This is inconsequential. What matters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by
authority of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in
which the action is pending, and in accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to
which opportunity for cross-examination of the deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse party.
Dasmarias also contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action
comes to trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the

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taking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal
is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further proceedings
in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of Court), and even during the process of execution of a final and executory judgment
(East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544).
Dasmarias further claims that the taking of deposition under the circumstances is a "departure from the accepted and usual
judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where the demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" that it is
"inherently unfair" to allow APL, "a foreign entity suing in the Philippines, to present its evidence by mere deposition of its
witnesses away from the 'penetrating scrutiny' of the trial Judge while petitioner is obligated to bring and present its witnesses
in open court subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge."
Of course the deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge;" but the procedure is not on
that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions
where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the
deponent in open court and without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed
provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the existence of any
of the exceptions for its admissibility e.g., "that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty (50)
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by
the party offering the deposition; or . . . that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment, etc." (Sec. 4 Rule 24, supra, emphasis supplied) is first satisfactorily established (See Lopez v. Maceren, 95
Phil. 754).
The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the depositions of the witnesses in question only by written
interrogatories, removing the proponent's option to take them by oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipei and actually
questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and answers and observations of the parties being recorded
stenographically. The imposition of such a limitation, and the determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure within the
Court's discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court for the condition that the deposition be taken "only upon
written interrogatories" is "so as to give defendant (Dasmarias) the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving
cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that opportunity to cross-examine will not be accorded the defendant if the
depositions were to be taken upon oral examination, which, of course, is not true. For even if the depositions were to be
taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full right to cross-examine the deponents by the law,
either by proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the cross-examination orally, or opting to conduct said cross-examination
merely by serving cross-interrogatories.
One other word. In its Order of July 5, 1991 denying Dasmarias motion for reconsideration of the earlier order dated
March 15, 1991 (allowing the taking of deposition by commission) one of the reasons adduced by the Regional Trial Court
for the denial was that the motion had been "filed out of time." Evidently, the Trial Court reached this conclusion because, as
the record discloses, the motion for reconsideration was filed by Dasmarias on June 25, 1991, twenty-five (25) days after
notice (on May 20, 1991) of the Order of March 15, 1991 sought to be reconsidered. Denial of the motion on such a ground is
incorrect. In the first place, it appears that there was a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, ending
on June 25, 1991 which was however not acted on or granted by the Court. More importantly, the order sought to be
reconsidered is an interlocutory order, in respect of which there is no provision of law fixing the time within which
reconsideration thereof should be sought.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for review on certiorari. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

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THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97654 November 14, 1994

INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION, THE HON. BIENVENIDO V. REYES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, San Pablo City, Branch 29, RICARDO L. BRUCAL, OFELIA A. BRUCAL
and DONNA A. BRUCAL, respondents.
Conrado L. Manicad for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
The attention of this Court has been invited to the supposed disregard by both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals of
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Court on written interrogatories.
Insular Life Assurance Co., Inc. ("Insular Life"), instituted this petition for review on certiorari, praying that we should reverse
the 7th January 1991 decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the 5th July 1990 Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, at San Pablo City, denying petitioner's motion (a) to dismiss the complaint of private respondents Ofelia A. Brucal
and Donna A. Brucal and (b) to declare respondent Ricardo Brucal in default on the third-party complaint.
On 04 April 1989, Ofelia Brucal, together with her daughter Donna Brucal, herein private respondents, claiming to be the
designated beneficiaries of Horacio Aquino, brother of Ofelia Brucal, brought an action against Insular Life to recover from the
latter the proceeds of an insurance policy covering the life of now deceased Aquino.
In its answer, Insular Life contended, among other things, that the insurance policy was a nullity, there having been gross
misrepresentation and material concealment in its procurement and that, in any case, the death of the insured was not
accidental, but deliberate, thereby precluding, under the terms of the policy, the recovery of the insurance proceeds.
Before pre-trial, Insular Life filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against Ofelia Brucal's husband, respondent
Ricardo Brucal, an insurance underwriter of Philam Life Insurance. Insular Life asserted that Ricardo Brucal forged, or caused
to be forged, the signature of Ricardo Aquino on the application for insurance coverage. The trial court granted the motion.
Ricardo Brucal filed his answer. The parties thereupon submitted their respective pre-trial briefs.
In the course of the proceedings that followed, Insular Life sent private respondents a request for admission along with a set
of written interrogatories. Insular Life likewise filed a motion asking the trial court to direct private respondents to produce six
(6) other alleged insurance policies, as well as other related papers, covering the life of Horacio Aquino and to allow the
inspection of the site where Aquino died. The trial court, in its 16th February 1990 Order, directed counsel for private
respondents to comment. In their manifestation, dated 02 March 1990, private respondents averred that the request of Insular
Life was merely designed to delay the proceedings and just a fishing expedition." 1
The trial court, in its 13th March 1990 Order, 2 denied the request for the production of the documents aforestated; relative,
however, to the written interrogatories, it ruled:
In the matter of the written interrogatories, Third-Party Defendant Ricardo Brucal and plaintiff objected to the
same, thru its manifestation received by the Court on March 2, 1990. The objection is anchored on
immateriality, impertinency and irrelevancy. The Court believes otherwise and rules that the plaintiffs and

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third-party defendant must answer the interrogatories within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this
Order. (Emphasis supplied.)
SO ORDERED.
Private respondents failed to give their answers to the interrogatories. On the scheduled initial presentation of evidence by
private respondents on 13 June 1990, private respondents still had not provided any answer to the written interrogatories,
prompting Insular Life to file, on 20 June 1990, a motion to dismiss the complaint and to declare third party defendant Rodolfo
Brucal in default. 3 Private respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the modes of discovery should not be utilized as to, in
effect, permit unrestrained "fishing expeditions." 4
In an Order, dated 05 July 1990, the trial court denied the motion of Insular Life, holding that "substantial justice (would) be
better served if the case (were to be) decided on (the) merits. 5 The denial was reiterated in its July 1990 Order, but the court rescheduled the hearing "to give (Insular Life) ample time to elevate the matter to the higher courts and (to) secure a ruling thereon." 6
Two months later, or on 01 October 1990, Insular Life filed with the Court of Appeals its petition for certiorari, injunction
and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order, assailing the 05th July 1990 Order of the trial court. On 11
October 1990, the appellate court issued a restraining order.
On 07 January 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision ultimately denying Insular Life's petition and
remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 7
The grounds relied upon by Insular Life is filing the instant petition before us revolve around its main predicate expressed in
the prefatory statement, viz.:
"In the interest of substantial justice," the trial court refused to dismiss the complaint or at least to consider
defendant's (Insular Life) defense and third party plaintiff's (Insular Life) action as established on account of
the adverse parties' repeated and groundless refusal to obey the trial court's Order directing them to answer
the written interrogatories preferred by defendant, in the light of the express provision to that effect of Rule 29,
Section 5 and other related provisions in the Rules of Court. 8
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 25, of the Rules of Court, on the matter of written interrogatories, state:
Sec. 1. Interrogatories to parties, service thereof. Under the same conditions specified in Section 1 of Rule
24, any party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by the party
served . . . .
Sec. 2. Answer to interrogatories. The interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully in writing
under oath. The answer shall be signed by the person making them, and the party upon whom the
interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories
within fifteen (15) days after service of the interrogatories, unless the court on motion and notice and for good
cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time.
The submission of interrogatories to parties under this rule is one of the five major procedural methods of
discovery. 9 Discovery, in general, is defined as the disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of the defendant, or as the
production of deeds, writings, or things in his possession or power, in order to maintain the right or title of the party asking it,
in a suit or proceeding. 10
In order to give life to the provisions on interrogatories, Section 5, Rule 29, of the Revised Rules of Court (a reproduction of
Section 5, Rule 24 of the old Rules of Court with an additional phrase 11 which Section 5, in turn,
was copiously taken from Rule 37[d] of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12) provides:

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Sec. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party
wilfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice,
or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25, after proper service of such
interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or
dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in
its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorney's fees.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The matter of how, and when, the above sanctions should be applied is one that primarily rests on the sound discretion of the
court where the case pends, having always in mind the paramount and overriding interest of justice. For while the modes of
discovery are intended to attain the resolution of litigations with great expediency, they are not contemplated, however, to be
ultimate causes of injustice. It behooves trial courts to examine well the circumstances of each case and to make their
considered determination thereafter. It is only in clear cases of grave abuse of that discretion when appellate courts will
interfere in their judgment. It is in this context that the case of Arellano vs. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Branch
I, 13 invoked by petitioner, must likewise be understood.
In the case at bench, the trial court, opted to decide the case on its merits. In its Order of 31 July 1990, elaborating on its
previous Order of 05 July 1990, it said:
The Court is of the considered view that the greater interest of justice will be better served if the case is tried
absent any advantage because of technicalities. The Court is not unmindful of the failure of the plaintiffs'
counsel to heed the order of the Court and is not pleased at all with it. But it is guided by established
Jurisprudence directing a liberal application of procedural rules.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court also entertains the view that the questions propounded by the defendant in the written
interrogatories can be asked by counsel to the witnesses for the plaintiffs during the trial and secure all the
answers he wants from them, and if he is not satisfied then the matters sought to be established can be
proved through its own evidence. 14
The appellate court sustained the court a quo in this wise:
We are not unaware of Section 5, Rule 29 and other related provisions of the Rules of Court regarding failure
of party to serve answers to written interrogatories. Yet, the trial court in arriving at its conclusion, liberally
construed the letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied in the interest of fair play.
The trial court mainly acted on what it believed as proper, in order that substantial justice be better served if
the case is decided on the merits.
Hence, We see no capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as equivalent to grave abuse of discretion
when the trial court decided to try the case on the merits. This is also in keeping with the rule that rules on
technicality were promulgated to secure, not to override substantial justice (Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 150 SCRA 259). 15
The real question now before us is whether or not the trial court has committed grave abuse of discretion in its questioned
order. Like the appellate court to which the matter has been initially addressed, we are not inclined to conclude that any such
clear transgression has been committed by the court a quo.
While we do not see the disquisitions made by both the court a quo and the appellate court to be lacking in good coherence,
we find it appropriate, nonetheless, to say here once again that the discovery methods under our Rules of Court do not
deserve to be taken lightly. These discovery rules can contribute in no small measure to the simplification of issues, 16 and in
thereby hastening the disposition of cases. 17 In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 18 this Court, through now Chief Justice Andres
Narvasa, has cautioned against an indifferent attitude by lawyers towards discovery procedures:

10
. . . Now, it appears to the Court that among far too many lawyers (and not a few judges), there is, if not a
regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes and operations of the modes
of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them which is a
great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the deposition-discovery mechanism, coupled with pre-trial
procedure, could, as the experience of other jurisdictions convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the
period of litigation and speed up adjudication. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial
hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for
ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties,
consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark.
At a time particularly when the judiciary is being burdened by a backlog of cases and faced with yet an apparent propensity of
parties to fully litigate their disputes, large or small, it should compel us even more now than before to pay close attention to
and heed the Court's call.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. This case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court which is hereby directed to proceed, with dispatch, in resolving the case on the
merits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 118438. December 4, 1998]

ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

CHERRY VALLEY FARMS LIMITED, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

ALLIED AGRI-BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. assails in this petition the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Cherry Valley
Farms Limited based on the implied admissions of petitioner.
On 14 October 1986 respondent Cherry Valley Farms Limited (CHERRY VALLEY), a foreign company based in
England, filed against petitioner Allied Agri-Business Development Co. Inc. (ALLIED) a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City for collection of sum of money alleging, among others that: (a) CHERRY VALLEY is a
foreign corporation with principal office at Rothwell, Lincoln, England; (b) on 1 September 1982 up to 16 February
1983, or for a period of less than six (6) months, petitioner ALLIED purchased in ten (10) separate orders and received
from respondent CHERRY VALLEY several duck hatching eggs and ducklings which in value totaled 51,245.12; (c)
ALLIED did not pay the total purchase price of 51,245.12 despite repeated demands evidenced by a letter of Solicitor
Braithwaite of England in behalf of CHERRY VALLEY; (d) instead of paying its obligation, ALLIED through its
president wrote CHERRY VALLEY on 17 July 1985 inviting the latter to be a stockholder in a new corporation to be
formed by ALLIED, which invitation however was rejected by CHERRY VALLEY on 26 September 1985; and, (e)
ALLIED's president Ricardo Quintos expressly acknowledged through a letter of 8 October 1985 the obligation of his

11

corporation to CHERRY VALLEY. The complaint also prayed that ALLIED be made to pay the sum of 51,245.12 or its
peso equivalent at the time of payment, plus legal interest from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, and
twenty percent (20%) of the total amount being claimed from petitioner as attorneys fees; and, to pay the costs of suit.
On 27 February 1986 ALLIED filed an answer[1] denying the material allegations of the complaint and contended
that: (a) private respondent CHERRY VALLEY lacked the legal capacity to sue; (b) theletter of Quintos to CHERRY
VALLEY was never authorized by the board of petitioner ALLIED, thus any admission made in that letter could not bind
ALLIED; (c) the alleged amount of 51,245.12 did not represent the true and real obligation, if any, of petitioner; (d) to
the best of the knowledge of ALLIED, not all ducks and ducklings covered and represented by CHERRY VALLEYs
invoices were actually ordered by the former; and, (e) private respondent had no cause of action against petitioner.
On 19 July 1988, CHERRY VALLEY served on ALLIEDs counsel a Request for Admission [2] dated 15 July 1988
worded as follows:

1. That the chairman of the board of directors and president of your corporation is Mr. Ricardo V. Quintos;
2. That out of the 3,000,000 subscribed shares of stock, 1,496,000 shares is (sic) owned by Mr. Ricardo
Quintos and 1,432,000 shares is(sic) also owned by his wife, Agnes dela Torre;
3. That for a period of six (6) months starting from 1 September 1982, your corporation ordered and
received from CHERRY VALLEY duck eggs and ducklings with a total value of 51,245.12 as reflected on
CHERRY VALLEY invoices issued to you;
4. That you received a letter dated 22 March 1985 from Mr. P.R.C. Braithwaite, solicitor of CHERRY
VALLEY, demanding settlement of your unpaid account of 52,245.12 for the above-stated purchases;
5. That instead of paying your obligation to CHERRY VALLEY, Mr. Ricardo Quintos, in his capacity as
president of your corporation, sent a letter to CHERRY VALLEY dated 17 July 1985 proposing the setting
up of a new corporation with CHERRY VALLEY refusing acceptance of your proposal;
6. That you received a letter dated 26 September 1985 from Mr. J. Cross, Director and Secretary of
CHERRY VALLEY refusing acceptance of your proposal;
7. That Mr. Ricardo Quintos in a letter dated 8 October 1985 admitted your indebtedness in the sum of
English Sterling Pounds 51,245.12.
It is further requested that said sworn admission be made within 10 days from receipt of this request.
ALLIED filed its Comments/Objections[3] alleging that: (a) the admissions requested were matters which the private
respondent had the burden to prove through its own witness during the trial and thus petitioner need not answer; and, (b)
the request for admission regarding the ownership set-up of petitioner corporation was immaterial and improper for not
having been pleaded in the complaint.
In its Reply[4] to Comments/Objections to Request for Admission, CHERRY VALLEY maintained that there was no
need on its part to produce a witness to testify on the matters requested for admission, for these pertained to incidents

12

personal to and within the knowledge of petitioner alone. Thereafter, on 2 August 1998, CHERRY VALLEY filed a
motion with the trial court to resolve the objections of ALLIED to the request for admission.
On 11 August 1988 the trial court issued an Order [5] disregarding ALLIEDs Comments/Objections to Request for
Admission in view of its non-compliance with Sec. 2, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court and directing ALLIED to answer the
request for admission within ten (10) days from receipt of the order, otherwise, the matters contained in the request
would be deemed admitted. ALLIED moved to reconsider the order; however, on 8 November 1988 the lower court
denied[6] ALLIEDs motion for reconsideration and directed the latter to answer the request for admission within a
nonextendible period of five (5) days from receipt of the order.
ALLIED failed to submit a sworn answer to the request for admission within the additional period of five (5) days
granted by the trial court. Hence, CHERRY VALLEY filed a motion for summary judgment [7] alleging that there was
already an implied admission on the matters requested for admission pursuant to Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.
On 23 October 1990, the trial court rendered judgment[8] against petitioner: (a) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
the sum of -51,245.12 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment plus legal interest from the date of filing of this
complaint until fully paid; and, (b) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff ten percent (10%) of the total amount due from
defendant by way of attorneys fees since no protracted trial was held in this case, plus cost of suit.
ALLIED appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 6 September 1994 the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision[9] affirming the summary judgment rendered by the trial court with the modification that ALLIED should pay the
monetary award to CHERRY VALLEY in Philippine currency and that the award of attorneys fees and costs of suit be
deleted.
Hence, the instant petition by ALLIED alleging that serious errors were committed by the Court of Appeals in
affirming the summary judgment of the trial court; that the complaint should have been instantly dismissed on the ground
of lack of personality to sue on the part of respondent CHERRY VALLEY; that the summary judgment was tantamount
to a denial of ALLIEDs right to due process for not requiring CHERRY VALLEY to produce its own witness; and, that
the admission requested were matters which CHERRY VALLEY had the burden to prove during the trial.
The petition must fail. We cannot sustain the allegation that respondent CHERRY VALLEY being an unlicensed
foreign corporation lacked the legal capacity to institute the suit in the trial court for the recovery of money claims from
petitioner. In fact, petitioner is estopped from challenging or questioning the personality of a corporation after having
acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. [10] The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue or failure of a
foreign corporation to acquire a local license was never intended to favor domestic corporations who enter into solitary
transactions with unwary foreign firms and then repudiate their obligations simply because the latter are not licensed to
do business in this country.[11]
Petitioner cannot also successfully argue that its failure to answer the request for admission did not result in its
admission of the matters stated in the request. Section 1 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Request for admission. - At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve
upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and
relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant
matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless
copies have already been furnished.

13

The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial
and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted
unless within a period designated in the request which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or
within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves
upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission
is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. [12]Upon
service of request for admission, the party served may do any of the following acts: (a) he may admit each of the matters
of which an admission is requested, in which case, he need not file an answer; (b) he may admit the truth of the matters
of which admission is requested by serving upon the party requesting a written admission of such matters within the
period stated in the request, which must not be less than ten (10) days after service, or within such further time as the
court may allow on motion and notice; (c) he may file a sworn statement denying specifically the matter of which an
admission is requested; or, (d) he may file a sworn statement setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny the matters of which an admission is requested.[13]
The records show that although petitioner filed with the trial court its comments and objections to the request for
admission served on it by private respondent, the trial court disregarded the objections and directed petitioner after
denying its motion for reconsideration, to answer the request within five (5) days from receipt of the directive; otherwise,
the matters of which the admission was requested wouldbe deemed admitted. Petitioner failed to submit the required
answer within the period. The matter set forth in the request were therefore deemed admitted by petitioner, i.e., (a) that
for a period of six (6) months starting from 1 September 1982, petitioner ordered and received from respondent
CHERRY VALLEY duck eggs and ducklings amounting to 51,245.12; (b) that petitioner received a letter dated 22
March 1985 from private respondents lawyer demanding payment of the amount of the purchases; (c) that instead of
paying the obligation to respondent CHERRY VALLEY, petitioners president Ricardo Quintos sent a letter to the former
proposing the establishment of a new corporation with CHERRY VALLEY as one of the stockholders; (d) that the
proposal was refused by the Director of CHERRY VALLEY; and, (e) that petitioners president Ricardo Quintos admitted
the indebtedness of his corporation to CHERRY VALLEY in the sum of English Sterling Pounds 51,245.12.
The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the admission rather than upon
the party seeking the admission.[14] Hence, when petitioner failed to reply to a request to admit, it may not argue that the
adverse party has the burden of proving the facts sought to be admitted. Petitioners silence is an admission of the facts
stated in the request.[15]
This Court finds that the motion for summary judgment filed by respondent CHERRY VALLEY on the ground that
there were no questions of fact in issue since the material allegations of the complaint were not disputed was
correctly granted by the trial court. It is a settled rule that summary judgment may be granted if the facts which stand
admitted by reason of a partys failure to deny statements contained in a request for admission show that no material issue
of fact exists.[16] By its failure to answer the other partys request for admission, petitioner has admitted all the material
facts necessary for judgment against itself.[17]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1994
which AFFIRMED the trial court in "ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of 51,245.12 or its peso equivalent at
the time of payment plus legal interest from the date of filing of this complaint until fully paid;" and "ordering defendant
to pay plaintiff ten percent (10%) of the total amount due from defendant by way of attorney's fees since no protacted
trial was held in this case plus cost of suit," with the modification that "Allied shall pay the monetary award of attorney's
fees and costs of suit be deleted," is AFFIRMED. Costs against herein petitioner Allied Agri-Business Development Co.,
Inc.

14

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132577. August 17, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
45399 entitled Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb v. Hon. Amelita Tolentino, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 274 of the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, People of the Philippines and Lauro Vizconde which set aside the order of respondent
judge therein denying herein respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webbs request to take the depositions of five (5) citizens and
residents of the United States before the proper consular officer of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California, as
the case may be.
The factual and procedural antecedents are matters of record or are otherwise uncontroverted.
Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for Rape with Homicide
entitled People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al. presently pending before Branch 274 of the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque, presided by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.
During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a Motion To Take
Testimony By Oral Deposition[1] praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of the following:
1.] Steven Bucher
Acting Chief, Records Services Branch
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
425 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20536
U.S.A.
2.] Debora Farmer
Records Operations, Office of Records
U.S. Department of Justice

15
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Washington D.C.
U.S.A.
3.] Jaci Alston
Department of Motor Vehicles
Sacramento, California
U.S.A.
4.] Ami Smalley
Department of Motor Vehicles
Sacramento, California
U.S.A.
5.] John Pavlisin
210 South Glasell, City of Orange
California, 92666
U.S.A.

before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of presenting them as witnesses
in court alleging that the said persons are all residents of the United States and may not therefore be compelled by
subpoena to testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.
Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose
testimonies are allegedly material and indispensable to establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by
Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that:

SEC. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any
part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party
who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in
accordance with any one of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony
of the deponent as a witness;
(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director,
or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be
used by an adverse party for any purpose;

16

(c) The deposition of a witness whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the
court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; (2) that the witness is out of the province and a greater distance
than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears
that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to
attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the
deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena or (5) upon application
and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable in the interest of justice and
with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow
the deposition to be used;
(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to
introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced and any party may introduce any other parts.
(italics supplied).
The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that: 1.] Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, contrary to the representation of respondent-accused, has no application in criminal cases; 2.] Rule 119, Section 4
of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only provides for conditional examination of
witnesses for the accused before trial not during trial; 3.] Rule 119, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside Philippine
jurisdiction.[2]
In an Order dated June 11, 1997, the trial court denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not
allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.[3]
A motion for reconsideration[4] thereto on the grounds that: 1.] The 1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking
of depositions, and 2.] Section 11 of Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court expressly allows the taking of depositions in
foreign countries before a consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, was
likewise denied by the trial court in an order dated July 25, 1997.[5]
Dissatisfied, respondent elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari[6] naming as
respondents therein the Presiding Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, the People and private complainant Lauro Vizconde. In
the petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45399, respondent Webb argued that: 1.] The taking of depositions pending
action is applicable to criminal proceedings; 2.] Depositions by oral testimony in a foreign country can be taken before a
consular officer of the Philippine Embassy in the United States; and, 3.] He has the right to completely and fully present
evidence to support his defense and the denial of such right will violate his constitutional right to due process.
Commenting[7] on the petition, the People contended that the questioned orders of the Presiding Judge are well
within the sphere of her judicial discretion and do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and that if at all, they may be considered merely as errors of judgment which may be corrected by appeal in
due time because: a.] The motion failed to comply with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; b.]
The conditional examination must be conducted before an inferior court; and c.] The examination of the witnesses must
be done in open court.
In his Comment,[8] private respondent Lauro Vizconde sought the dismissal of the petition contending that:

17
1.] The public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner [now herein respondent] Webbs
motion to take testimony by oral deposition dated 29 April 1997 as well as petitioners motion for reconsideration
dated 23 June 1997 for not being sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
a.] The public respondent correctly held that Rule 23, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
finds no application in criminal actions such as the case at bar.
b.] The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure only
provides for conditional examination of witnesses before trial but not during trial.
c.] The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not sanction
the conditional examination of witnesses for the accused/defense outside of Philippine jurisdiction.
2.] The public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Webbs motion to take
testimony by oral deposition considering that the proposed deposition tends only to further establish the admissibility
of documentary exhibits already admitted in evidence by the public respondent.

On February 6, 1998, the Fourth Division[9] of the Court of Appeals rendered judgment,[10] the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated 11 June 1997 (Annex A of
the Petition) and 25 July 1997 (Annex B of the Petition) are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. It is
hereby ordered that the deposition of the following witnesses be TAKEN before the proper consular officer
of the Republic of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California, as the case may be:
(a) Mr. Steven Bucher;
(b) Ms. Deborah Farmer;
(c) Mr. Jaci Alston;
(d) Ms. Ami Smalley; and
(e) Mr. John Pavlisin.
SO ORDERED.
From the foregoing, the People forthwith elevated its cause to this Court by way of the instant petition dispensing
with the filing of a motion for reconsideration for the following reasons: 1.] The rule that the petitioner should first file a
motion for reconsideration applies to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and there is no similar requirement in taking an appeal from a final judgment or order [11] such as the present
appeal by certiorari; 2.] Section 4, Rule 45 in requiring a petition for review on certiorari which indicates that when a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed implies that petitioner need not file a motion for reconsideration;
3.] The questions being raised before the Court are the same as those which were squarely raised before the Court of
Appeals;[12] 4.] The issues being raised here are purely legal; [13] 5.] There is an urgent need to resolve the issues
considering that the trial of the accused in the criminal case is about to end; and, 6.] The nature of this case requires a
speedy and prompt disposition of the issues involved.[14]

18

What are challenged before this Court are interlocutory orders and not a final judgment. The respondent has filed his
Comment[15] which We treat as an Answer. The petitioner, in turn, filed a Reply.[16]The petition is ripe for decision.
In urging this Tribunal to exercise its power of review over the assailed decision of the Appellate Court, petitioner
asserts that the Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error
I

IN RULING THAT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS APPLICABLE TO

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
II

IN RULING THAT THE DEPOSITION MAY BE TAKEN BEFORE A CONSULAR OFFICER OF THE
PHILIPPINES WHERE THE PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES RESIDE OR ARE OFFICIALLY STATIONED.
III

IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE TRIAL
COURT.
which can be reduced to the primordial issue of whether or not the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying
the motion to take testimony by oral depositions in the United States which would be used in the criminal case before her
Court.
In setting aside the order of the trial judge, the Appellate Courts Fourth Division reasoned, inter alia, thus:

Settled is the rule that the whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully
and completely available for justice. Thus, as the Supreme Court has ruled in Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney General and reiterated in subsequent cases:
x x x The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which give the opportunity for the most
complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is
that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute
themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a procedure is
not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in
righteous action. It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against
procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the courts powers by technicalities that part of its
authority effective for justice between the parties is many times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. The
purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of the contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which the courts are always striving to
secure the litigants. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing.In other words, it is a
means to an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just

19

judgments. When it loses the character of the one and takes on the other [,] the administration of justice
becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism. [17]
In the light of the foregoing judicial precedent, this Court finds that the public respondent gravely abused
her discretion in denying the motion to take the deposition of the witnesses for petitioner. While petitioner
had invoked Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which is found under the general classification of
Civil Procedure, it does not prevent its application to the other proceedings, provided the same is not
contrary to the specific rules provided therein. Indeed, the Rules of Court is to be viewed and construed as
a whole, and if the Supreme Court had compartmentalized the same into four divisions, it was, as petitioner
had claimed, for the purpose of organization and expediency and not, for exclusivity.
To be sure, a reading of the rules on criminal procedure, specifically Section 4, Rule 119 vis--vis Section 1,
Rule 23 would reveal no inconsistency so as to exclude the application of the latter rule in criminal
proceedings. Section 4, Rule 119 refers to the conditional examination of witnesses for the
accused before trial, while Section 1, Rule 23 refers to the taking of deposition witnesses during trial. x x x
xxxxxxxxx

While the taking of depositions pending trial is not expressly provided [for] under the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, we find no reason for public respondent to disallow the taking of the same in the manner
provided for under Section 1 of Rule 23 under the circumstances of the case. To disallow petitioner to avail
of the specific remedies provided under the Rules would deny him the opportunity to adequately defend
himself against the criminal charge of rape with homicide now pending before the public respondent and,
further, [it] loses sight of the object of procedure which is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties.
xxxxxxxxx

Even granting arguendo that Rule 23 is to be exclusively applied to civil actions, the taking of the
deposition of petitioners US-based witnesses should be still allowed considering that the civil action has
been impliedly instituted in the criminal action for rape with homicide. Since public respondent has
jurisdiction over the civil case to recover damages, she exercised full authority to employ all auxillary
writs, processes and other means to carry out the jurisdiction conferred and [to] adopt any suitable
process or mode of proceeding which includes the application of the rule on depositions pending action
under Rule 23 in the case pending before her.
Second. Depositions obtained during trial in a foreign state or country may be taken before a consular
officer of the Republic of the Philippines where the deponent resides or is officially stationed. [18] Section 5, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court is thus clearly inapplicable in the instant case since the same relates to the examination of witnesses under Section 4
thereof and not Section 1 of Rule 23. Consistent with the procedure provided [for] under Rule 23, the deposition of the petitioners witnesses,
which include four (4) officials of the United States government, will be taken before a consular officer of the Philippines where these witnesses
reside or are officially stationed, as the case may be.

20

The denial of petitioners right to present his witnesses, who are residing abroad, based on a very shaky
technical ground, is tantamount to depriving him of his constitutional right to due process. This Court
recognizes the impossibility of enforcing the right of petitioner to secure the attendance of the proposed
witnesses through compulsory process considering that they are beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine
Courts. Petitioner, however, is not without any remedy and he correctly sought to secure the testimonies of
his witnesses through the process of taking their depositions pending the trial of Criminal Case No. 95-404
in the court below under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. In any event, the prosecution would have the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for accused Hubert Webb (petitioner herein) since they will be
given the opportunity to cross-examine the deponents as in accordance with Sections 3 to 18 of Rule 132. [19]
Furthermore, no prejudice would be suffered in the taking of the depositions of petitioners US-based
witness[es]. On the other hand, a denial of the same would be prejudicial to petitioner-accused since he
would be denied an opportunity to completely present his evidence, which strikes at the very core of the due
process guarantee of the Constitution. To reiterate, it is not the function of this Court to second-guess the
trial court on its ruling on the admissibility of the pieces of documentary evidence as well as the latters
witnesses,[20] but it is definitely within this courts inherent power to scrutinize, as it does in the case at bench, the acts of respondent judge
and declare that she indeed committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Orders.

In the final analysis, this Court rules that the denial of the deposition-taking amounts to the denial of the
constitutional right to present his evidence and for the production of evidence in his behalf. The denial is
not justified by the flimsy reason that Sec. 1 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to criminal
proceedings. To rule that petitioner cannot take the testimony of these witnesses by deposition is to put [a]
premium on technicality at the expense of the constitutional rights of the accused, which this court is not
inclined to do. Particularly where the issue of the guilt or innocence of petitioner is bound to hinge heavily
upon the testimonies of his US-based witnesses, it behooves upon public respondent not only to guarantee
that accused is given a reasonable opportunity to present his evidence, but also to allow him a certain
latitude in the presentation of his evidence, lest he may be so hampered that the ends of justice may
eventually be defeated or appear to be defeated. Finally, even if respondents contention is correct, it cannot
be denied that the case at bar includes the recovery of the civil liability of the accused, which normally is
done through a civil case.
We disagree.
As defined, a deposition is -

"The testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written interrogatories, not in open court, but in
pursuance of a commission to take testimony issued by a court, or under a general law or court rule on the
subject, and reduced to writing and duly authenticated, and intended to be used in preparation and upon the
trial of a civil or criminal prosecution. A pretrial discovery device by which one party (through his or her
attorney) asks oral questions of the other party or of a witness for the other party. The person who is
deposed is called the deponent. The deposition is conducted under oath outside of the court room, usually
in one of the lawyers offices. A transcript - word for word account - is made of the deposition. Testimony of

21

[a] witness, taken in writing, under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer in answer to questions
or interrogatories x x x.[21]
and the purposes of taking depositions are to: 1.] Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in
checking and preventing perjury; 2.] Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and
defenses; 3.] Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved
except with great difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses
thereby encouraging settlements; 5.]Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard against surprise; 7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify
and narrow the issues; and 9.] Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial. [22] As can be gleaned from the foregoing,
a deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not during trial.In fact, rules
on criminal practice - particularly on the defense of alibi, which is respondents main defense in the criminal proceedings
against him in the court below - states that when a person intends to rely on such a defense, that person must move for
the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for filing a pre-trial motion.[23]
It needs to be stressed that the only reason of respondent for seeking the deposition of the foreign witnesses is to
foreclose any objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility of Defense Exhibits 218 and 219. This
issue has, however, long been rendered moot and academic by the admission of the aforementioned documentary
exhibits by the trial court in its order dated July 10, 1998.[24]
In fact, a circumspect scrutiny of the record discloses that the evidence to be obtained through the deposition-taking
would be superfluous or corroborative at best. A careful examination of Exhibits 218 and 219 readily shows that these
are of the same species of documents which have been previously introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial
court in its order dated July 18, 1997 which We noted inWebb, et al. v. People of the Philippines, et al. [25] wherein We
pointed out, among others, [t]hat respondent judge reversed this erroneous ruling and already admitted these 132 pieces
of evidence after finding that the defects in (their) admissibility have been cured though the introduction of additional
evidence during the trial on the merits.[26]
Indeed, a comparison of Exhibit 218-A which is a U.S. Department of State Certification issued by Joan C.
Hampton, Assistant Authenticating Officer of the said agency, for and in the name of Madeleine K. Albright, stating that
the documents annexed thereto were issued by the U.S. Department of Justice as shown by seal embossed thereon,
[27]
with other exhibits previously offered as evidence reveals that they are of the same nature as Exhibits 42-H [28] and 42M.[29] The only difference in the documents lies in the fact that Exhibit 218-A was signed by Joan C. Hampton for and in
behalf of the incumbent Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright whereas, Exhibits 42-H and 42-M were signed by
Authenticating Officer Annie R. Maddux for and in behalf of former Secretary of State Warren Christopher.[30]
A comparison of Exhibit 218-B[31] with the other documentary exhibits offered by respondent, likewise discloses that
its contents are the same as Exhibits 42-I[32] and 42-N.[33] The only difference in the three exhibits, which are actually
standard issue certification forms issued by the U.S. Department of Justice with blanks to be filled up, is that Exhibit
218-B is dated February 5, 1997 and signed by one of the U.S. Attorney Generals several Deputy Assistant Attorneys for
Administration for and in her behalf, while Exhibits 42-I and 42-N are both dated September 21, 1995 with another of
the said deputies signing both documents.[34]
Still comparing respondents Exhibit 218-F,[35] which is likewise a standard issue U.S. Department of Justice
Certification Form, with other documents previously introduced as evidence reveals that it is the same as Exhibits 39D[36] and 42-C.[37] The only differences in these documents are that Exhibit 218-F is dated October 13, 1995 and is signed
by Debora A. Farmer while Exhibits "-39-D and 42-C are both dated August 31, 1995 and signed by Cecil G. Christian,
Jr., Assistant Commissioner, Officer of Records, INS.[38]

22

Still further scrutinizing and comparing respondents Exhibit 218-G [39] which was also introduced and admitted into
evidence as Defense Exhibit 207-B[40] shows that the document has been earlier introduced and admitted into evidence by
the trial court an astounding seven (7) times, particularly as Exhibits 34-A, 35-F, 39-E, 42-D, 42-P, 50 and 50-F. [41] The
only difference in these documents is that they were printed on different dates. Specifically, Exhibits 218-G as with
Exhibits 34-A, 35-F, 50, and 52-F were printed out on October 26, 1995[42] whereas Exhibit 207-B as with Exhibits 39-E,
42-D and 42-F were printed out on August 31, 1995.[43]
In fact, the records show that respondents: a.] application for Non-Commercial Drivers License; b.] Documentary
records based on Clets Database Response; c.] Computer-generated thumb-print; d.] Documentary records based on still
another Clets Database Response, and e.] The Certification issued by one Frank Zolin, Director of the State of
Californias Department of Motor Vehicles, were already introduced and admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibits 66-J,
66-K, 66-H, 66-I and 66-L, respectively.[44]
It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing factual circumstances only serves to underscore the immutable fact
that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely corroborative or
cumulative in nature and in denying respondents motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment on
what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the
persuasiveness of the evidence already on record. In this regard, it bears stressing that under Section 6, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. - The court may stop the introduction of further
testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to
the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be
exercised with caution. (emphasis and italics supplied.)
Needless to state, the trial court can not be faulted with lack of caution in denying respondents motion considering
that under the prevailing facts of the case, respondent had more than ample opportunity to adduce evidence in his
defense. Certainly, a party can not feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity to present his side. [45] It must
be borne in mind in this regard that due process is not a monopoly of the defense. Indeed, the State is entitled to due
process as much as the accused.[46] Furthermore, while a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a truism that every
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.[47]
The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.[48] The deposition taking can not
be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. [49] Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of the law. There is no indication in this case that in denying the motion of respondentaccused, the trial judge acted in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave abuse of discretion x x x
implies such capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act all in contemplation of law.[50]

Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites,
to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of

23

annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power for it to prosper.[51]
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions,
the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such
cases must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but
generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of
its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower
tribunal's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors
of judgment, which are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the
findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment which are
reviewable by timely appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari. [52]
Whether or not the respondent-accused has been given ample opportunity to prove his innocence and whether or not
a further prolongation of proceedings would be dilatory is addressed, in the first instance, to the sound discretion of the
trial judge. If there has been no grave abuse of discretion, only after conviction may this Court examine such matters
further. It is pointed out that the defense has already presented at least fifty-seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixtyfour (464) documentary exhibits, many of them of the exact nature as those to be produced or testified to by the proposed
foreign deponents. Under the circumstances, We sustain the proposition that the trial judge commits no grave abuse of
discretion if she decides that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the United States could not possibly add
anything substantial to the defense evidence involved. There is no showing or allegation that the American public
officers and the bicycle store owner can identify respondent Hubert Webb as the very person mentioned in the public and
private documents. Neither is it shown in this petition that they know, of their own personal knowledge, a person whom
they can identify as the respondent-accused who was actually present in the United States and not in the Philippines on
the specified dates.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 6, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 45399 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque City is ordered to proceed posthaste in the trial of the main case and to render judgment therein
accordingly.
SO ORDERED.