Other Cases

TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
and MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Children begin by loving their parents. After a time they judge

them. Rarely, if ever, do they forgive them. Indeed, parenthood is a
riddle of no mean proportions except for its mission. Thus, a mothers
concern for her childs custody is undying - such is a mothers love.
[1]
The right of the mother to the custody of her daughter is the issue in
the case at bar.
In this petition for review, Teresita Sagala-Eslao seeks the reversal
of the Court of Appeals decision dated March 25, 1994, which affirmed
the trial courts judgment granting the petition of Maria Paz CorderoOuye to recover the custody of her minor daughter from her mother-inlaw, Teresita Sagala-Eslao.
[2]
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are as

follows:
From the evidence, it appears that on June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz
Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married; after their marriage, the
couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband, at 1825,
Road 14, Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; that out of their marriage, two children
were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao who was born on February 23, 1986 and
Angelica Eslao who was born on April 20, 1987; in the meantime, Leslie was
entrusted to the care and custody of petitioners mother in Sta. Ana, Pampanga,
while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondents house; on August 6,
1990, petitioners husband Reynaldo Eslao died; petitioner intended to bring
Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust
the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her son just died
and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at
least compensate for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the petitioner
returned to her mothers house in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
[3]
[4]
[5]
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James ManabuOuye, a Japanese-American, who is an orthodontist practicing in the United
States; their acquaintance blossomed into a meaningful relationship where on
March 18, 1992, the petitioner and Dr. James Ouye decided to get married; less
than ten months thereafter, or on January 15, 1993, the petitioner migrated to
San Francisco, California, USA, to join her new husband. At present, the
petitioner is a trainee at the Union Bank in San Francisco, while her husband is
a progressive practitioner of his profession who owns three cars, a dental clinic
and earns US$5,000 a month. On June 24, 1993, the petitioner returned to the
Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the United
States; the petitioner then informed the respondent about her desire to take
custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. James Ouye,
expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their
support and education; however, respondent resisted the idea by way of
explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and
accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. Because of the adamant
attitude of the respondent, the petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer,
Atty. Mariano de Joya, Jr., who wrote a letter to the respondent demanding for
the return of the custody of Angelica to her natural mother and when the
demand remain[ed] unheeded, the petitioner instituted the present
action. Miss
[6]
[7]
After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the Court grants the
same and let the corresponding writ issue. As a corollary, respondent Teresita
Sagala-Eslao or anyone acting under her behalf is hereby directed to cause the
immediate transfer of the custody of the minor Angelica Cordero Eslao, to her
natural mother, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the respondent court affirmed in full the decision of the
trial court.
Hence, the instant petition by the minors paternal grandmother,
contending that the Court of Appeals erred:
I
IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT MARIA PAZ CORDEROOUYE, DID NOT ABANDON MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO, TO THE
CARE AND CUSTODY OF THE PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALAESLAO.
Miss
II
IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO COMPELLING REASON TO

SEPARATE MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO, FROM PRIVATE
RESPONDENT MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO.
III
IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, IS

FIT TO BE GIVEN THE CUSTODY OF MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO.
The petition is without merit.

Being interrelated, the issues shall be discussed jointly.
Petitioner argues that she would be deserving to take care of
Angelica; that she had managed to raise 12 children of her own herself;
that she has the financial means to carry out her plans for Angelica; that
she maintains a store which earns a net income of about P500 a day,
she gets P900 a month as pension for the death of her husband, she
rents out rooms in her house which she owns, for which she earns a
total of P6,000 a month, and that from her gross income of roughly
P21,000, she spends about P10,000 for the maintenance of her
house.
Despite the foregoing, however, and petitioners genuine desire to

remain with said child, that would qualify her to have custody of
Angelica, the trial courts disquisition, in consonance with the provision
that the childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody convinced this Court to
decide in favor of private respondent, thus:
[8]
On the other hand, the side of the petitioner must also be presented here. In this
case, we see a picture of a real and natural mother who is x x x legitimately, anxiously, and desperately trying to get back her child in
order to fill the void in her heart and existence. She wants to make up for what
she has failed to do for her boy during the period when she was financially
unable to help him and when she could not have him in her house because of
the objection of the father. Now that she has her own home and is in a better
financial condition, she wants her child back, and we repeat that she has not
and has never given him up definitely or with any idea of permanence.
[9]
The petitioner herein is married to an Orthodontist who has a lucrative practice

of his profession in San Francisco, California, USA. The petitioner and her
present husband have a home of their own and they have three cars. The
petitioners husband is willing to adopt the petitioners children. If the children
will be with their mother, the probability is that they will be afforded a bright
future. Contrast this situation with the one prevailing in the respondents
[grandmothers] house. As admitted by the respondent, four of the rooms in her
house are being rented to other persons with each room occupied by 4 to 5
persons. Added to these persons are the respondents 2 sons, Samuel and
Alfredo, and their respective families (ibid., p. 54) and one can just visualize
the kind of atmosphere pervading thereat. And to aggravate the situation, the
house has only 2 toilets and 3 faucets. Finally, considering that in all
controversies involving the custody of minors, the foremost criterion is the
physical and moral well being of the child taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parties (Union III
vs. Mariano, 101 SCRA 183), the Court is left with no other recourse but to
grant the writ prayed for.
[10]
Petitioner further contends that the respondent court erred in finding

that there was no abandonment committed by the private respondent;
that while judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed
for the purpose is not here obtaining as mandated in Art. 229 of the
Family Code because petitioner failed to resort to such judicial action, it
does not ipso facto follow that there was in fact no abandonment
committed by the private respondent.
Petitioner also argues that it has been amply demonstrated during
the trial that private respondent had indeed abandoned Angelica to the
care and custody of the petitioner; that during all the time that Angelica
stayed with petitioner, there were only three instances or occasions
wherein the private respondent saw Angelica; that private respondent
never visited Angelica on important occasions, such as her birthday,
and neither did the former give her cards or gifts, not even a single
candy; that while private respondent claims otherwise and that she
visited Angelica "many times" an insists that she visited Angelica as
often as four times a month and gave her remembrances such as
candies and clothes, she would not even remember when the fourth
birthday of Angelica was.
[11]
We are not persuaded by such averments.

In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407, we stated, viz:
[12]
xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants
to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of
their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a
task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred
trust for the welfare of the minor.
[13]
[14]
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an
orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows
the same.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children,
are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company.
[19]
Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the

custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter
was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or
renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
childrens home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case
at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts
that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of
the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and
sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by
the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the
parental relationship.
[20]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from dated March 25,

1994 being in accordance with law and the evidence, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED and the petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.
MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which went sour. The
innocent victims are two children horn out of the same union. Upon this Court now falls the
not too welcome task of deciding the issue of who, between the father and mother, is more
suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted,
and happy young adulthood.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976
in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita
was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California
to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984,
Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a
common law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind
Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the
Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States,
their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on
January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990.
Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was always nagging her about money
matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying
expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita
left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She claims, however, that she
spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her
children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to
leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a
criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of
conviction in the bigamy case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. (Per
Judge Harriet O. Demetriou, Branch 70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-222,Rollo). Teresita,
meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the
children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended
Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole
parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and
to be approved by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices de Pano and
Ibay-Somera concurring, reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and
visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main contending that the
Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial court; that the Court of Appeals
further engaged in speculations and conjectures, resulting in its erroneous conclusion that
custody of the children should be given to respondent Teresita.
We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody over the children through
an automatic and blind application of the age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code which
reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the
children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.
The decision under review is based on the report of the Code Commission which drafted
Article 213 that a child below seven years still needs the loving, tender care that only a
mother can give and which, presumably, a father cannot give in equal measure. The
commentaries of a member of the Code Commission, former Court of Appeals Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy, in a textbook on the Family Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy
believes that a child below seven years should still be awarded to her mother even if the
latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her husband. This is on the theory that moral dereliction
has no effect on a baby unable to understand such action. (Handbook on the Family Code of
the Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law rather than an
appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should apply to those facts. The task of
choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be
determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or
over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests.
Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and
award the custody on the basis of that consideration. In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA
183 [1980]), we laid down the rule that "in all controversies regarding the custody of minors,
the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of
the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents", and in Medina vs. Makabali (27 SCRA 502 [1969]),
where custody of the minor was given to a non-relative as against the mother, then the
country's leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained its basis in this manner:
. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child,
Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on the
care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines. Art. 363), and that for compelling
reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the
mother (do). This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of legal
institutions, the patria potestas has been transformed from thejus vitae ac
necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring
was virtually a chattel of his parents into a radically different institution, due to
the influence of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect is now
supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is no power, but a task;
no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a
sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
As a result, the right of parents to the company and custody of their children
is but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to provide the
children with adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic
training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356).
(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family
Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age,
the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is
not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his
choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the
court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a
third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind
celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age
on January 12, 1995. Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly
intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they
would want to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to
investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial
responsibility.
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover
the choice of the children and rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit,
respondent court simply followed statutory presumptions and general propositions applicable
to ordinary or common situations. The seven-year age limit was mechanically treated as an
arbitrary cut off period and not a guide based on a strong presumption.
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least, her counsel are
more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother separated from her children
and the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a key issue in court
rather than the feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While the
bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether
father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say
that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the
suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the
paramount consideration.
We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because it
gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant
factors bearing on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, Rita
Flores Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting her from the Assumption College
where she was studying. Four different tests were administered. The results of the tests are
quite revealing. The responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing the
psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by Rosalind
was an incident where she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man who lived in
their house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother even on the
telephone. She tended to be emotionally emblazed because of constant fears that she may
have to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the United States to live with her
mother. The 5-1/2 page report deals at length with feelings of insecurity and anxiety arising
from strong conflict with the mother. The child tried to compensate by having fantasy
activities. All of the 8 recommendations of the child psychologist show that Rosalind chooses
petitioners over the private respondent and that her welfare will be best served by staying
with them (pp. 199-205, Rollo).
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of
securing the travel clearance required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer
Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the United
States and be reunited with her mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was
more attached to her Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The child was found
suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. The application for travel
clearance was recommended for denial (pp. 206-209, Rollo).
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in the law applies to
the date when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a decision
is rendered. This argument is flawed. Considerations involving the choice made by a child
must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the child. The matter
of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a
future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be reexamined and adjusted (Unson III v. Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure, the welfare, the
best interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that
either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both children are over 7
years of age and are thus perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent choice.
According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful reunion in the trial court,
with the children crying, grabbing, and embracing her to prevent the father from taking them
away from her. We are more inclined to believe the father's contention that the children
ignored Teresita in court because such an emotional display as described by Teresita in her
pleadings could not have been missed by the trial court. Unlike the Justices of the Court of
Appeals Fourth Division, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin personally observed the children and
their mother in the courtroom. What the Judge found is diametrically opposed to the
contentions of respondent Teresita. The Judge had this to say on the matter.
And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner [Teresita] in similar light, or
with more understanding, especially as her conduct and demeanor in the
courtroom (during most of the proceedings) or elsewhere (but in the
presence of the undersigned presiding judge) demonstrated her ebulent
temper that tended to corroborate the alleged violence of her physical
punishment of the children (even if only for ordinary disciplinary purposes)

and emotional instability, typified by her failure (or refusal?) to show
deference and respect to the Court and the other parties (pp. 12-13, RTC
Decision)
Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and impartiality of the expert witnesses.
Respondent court, in turn, states that the trial court should have considered the fact that
Reynaldo and his sister, herein petitioner Guillerma Layug, hired the two expert witnesses.
Actually, this was taken into account by the trial court which stated that the allegations of
bias and unfairness made by Teresita against the psychologist and social worker were not
substantiated.
The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence of the expert witnesses
and the objectivity of the interviews were unshaken and unimpeached. We might add that
their testimony remain uncontroverted. We also note that the examinations made by the
experts were conducted in late 1991, well over a year before the filing by Teresita of
the habeas corpus petition in December, 1992. Thus, the examinations were at that time not
intended to support petitioners' position in litigation, because there was then not even an
impending possibility of one. That they were subsequently utilized in the case a quo when it
did materialize does not change the tenor in which they were first obtained.
Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must be construed to have
been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of the parties, but to assist the court in
the determination of the issue before it. The persons who effected such examinations were
presented in the capacity of expert witnesses testifying on matters within their respective
knowledge and expertise. On this matter, this Court had occasion to rule in the case of Sali
vs. Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert examines certain
contested documents, at the request, not of a public officer or agency of the
Government, but of a private litigant, does not necessarily nullify the
examination thus made. Its purpose, presumably, to assist the court having
jurisdiction over said litigation, in the performance of its duty to settle
correctly the issues relative to said documents. Even a non-expert private
individual may examine the same, if there are facts within his knowledge
which may help, the court in the determination of said issue. Such
examination, which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert private
individual, does not, certainly become null and void when the examiner is an
expert and/or an officer of the NBI.
(pp. 991-992.)
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon, et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may
place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance
with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert
testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide,
considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the
witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he
testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study
and observation of the matters about which he testifies, and any other
matters which reserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert
may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all
the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge
utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur.,
1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the
evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose
ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion.
(p. 359)
It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity to assess the witnesses'
character and to observe their respective demeanor that the trial court opted to rely on their
testimony, and we believe that the trial court was correct in its action.
Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez stated that Rosalind
and her aunt were about to board a plane when they were off-loaded because there was no
required clearance. They were referred to her office, at which time Reginald was also
brought along and interviewed. One of the regular duties of Social Worker Lopez in her job
appears to be the interview of minors who leave for abroad with their parents or other
persons. The interview was for purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old child and had
nothing to do with any pending litigation. On cross-examination, Social Worker Lopez stated
that her assessment of the minor's hatred for her mother was based on the disclosures of the
minor. It is inconceivable, much less presumable that Ms. Lopez would compromise her
position, ethics, and the public trust reposed on a person of her position in the course of
doing her job by falsely testifying just to support the position of any litigant.
The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude graduate in Psychology and
an M.A. degree holder also in Psychology with her thesis graded "Excellent". She was a
candidate for a doctoral degree at the time of the interview. Petitioner Reynaldo may have
shouldered the cost of the interview but Ms. Macabulos services were secured because
Assumption College wanted an examination of the child for school purposes and not
because of any litigation. She may have been paid to examine the child and to render a
finding based on her examination, but she was not paid to fabricate such findings in favor of
the party who retained her services. In this instance it was not even petitioner Reynaldo but
the school authorities who initiated the same. It cannot be presumed that a professional of
her potential and stature would compromise her professional standing.
Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:
1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her marrying Reynaldo at the
time she had a subsisting marriage with another man.
2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a love affair with one of the
Reynaldo's fellow NSC employees.
3. She is incapable of providing the children with necessities and
conveniences commensurate to their social standing because she does not
even own any home in the Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.

It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the compelling reasons under the
law which would justify depriving her of custody over the children; worse, she claims, these
findings are non-existent and have not been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a child under 7 years of
age not to be separated from the mother, without considering what the law itself
denominates as compelling reasons or relevant considerations to otherwise decree. In
the Unson III case, earlier mentioned, this Court stated that it found no difficulty in not
awarding custody to the mother, it being in the best interest of the child "to be freed from the
obviously unwholesome, not
to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had placed herself . . . might
create in the moral and social outlook of [the child] who was in her formative and most
impressionable stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age.
They understand the difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant
immorality. Their best interests would be better served in an environment characterized by
emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the
records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In
fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care which the
mother is not in a position to extend.
The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not supported by the records.
The findings of the trial court are based on evidence.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on December 17,
1984 in California (p. 13, Respondent's Memorandum; p. 238, Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision).
Less than a year later, she had already driven across the continental United States to
commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married
on October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her
having contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried to picture
Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado
on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of
the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such tale. And even if this story were given credence, it
adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this Court about Teresita's values. Rape is
an insidious crime against privacy. Confiding to one's potential rapist about a prior marriage
is not a very convincing indication that the potential victim is averse to the act. The
implication created is that the act would be acceptable if not for the prior marriage.
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only much later. In fact,
the rape incident itself is unlikely against a woman who had driven three days and three
nights from California, who went straight to the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon
arriving went to bed and, who immediately thereafter started to live with him in a relationship
which is marital in nature if not in fact.
Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the various witnesses that while
married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales
right there in the house of petitioner Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Perdencio had been
assigned by the National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in Pittsburgh and was
staying with Reynaldo, his co-employee, in the latter's house. The record shows that the
daughter Rosalind suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing
her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was
Teresita who left the conjugal home and the children, bound for California. When Perdencio
Gonzales was reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita followed him and was seen in his
company in a Cebu hotel, staying in one room and taking breakfast together. More significant
is that letters and written messages from Teresita to Perdencio were submitted in evidence
(p.12, RTC Decision).
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall
under "compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the
children over seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral
activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and
exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her
conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have become final (pp.
210-222,Rollo).
Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform the role of a sole
parent and substitute mother because his job is in the United States while the children will be
left behind with their aunt in the Philippines is misplaced. The assignment of Reynaldo in
Pittsburgh is or was a temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a steel
mill component and various equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in the
Philippines. Once the purchases are completed, there is nothing to keep him there anymore.
In fact, in a letter dated January 30, 1995, Reynaldo informs this Court of the completion of
his assignment abroad and of his permanent return to the Philippines (ff.
p. 263, Rollo).
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both
over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from
the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements
found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the
second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years.
Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two
years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons
and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the
unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth
by her behavior.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the
Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the
minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No
special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION G.R. No. 177861

AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE
RECORD OF BIRTH,
EMMA K. LEE, Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
PEREZ,** and
MENDOZA, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE,

LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG,
JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE,
ROSA LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY
LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD
LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE,
and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by Promulgated:
RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact,
Respondents. July 13, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad
testificandum and a parents right not to testify in a case against his children.
The Facts and the Case

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered
the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children,
namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin
K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-
Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh

children).
In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan
(Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children
believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of
Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius
children with Lee (collectively, the Lees other children) claimed that they,
too, were children of Lee and Keh.This prompted the Lee-Keh children to
request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the
matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its
report:
[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is
certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger
woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation
and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a
quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly
to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as
their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the
status of his second family and secure their future. The doctor
lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary
had not the father and his second family kept on insisting that
the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK
CHENG.[1]
The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of
the Lees other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of
Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38
years old at the time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was
born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and
so forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lees other children,
Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly
gave birth to such other children, numbering eight.
On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two
separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City[2] in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the
certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other
children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate
her true mothers name.
In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex
parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu,
Emma Lees presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the
motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was
oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule
on parental privilege, she being Emma Lees stepmother.[3] On August 5,
2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and
oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious
object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma
Lees mother.
Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh childrens motion for
reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the
CA rendered a decision,[4] setting aside the RTCs August 5, 2005 Order. The
CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad
testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under
Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that
Tius advanced age alone does not render her incapable of testifying. The
party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she
would be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner
Emma Lee failed to do.
Since the CA denied Emma Lees motion for reconsideration by
resolution of May 8, 2007,[5] she filed the present petition with this Court.
The Question Presented
The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA

erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction
of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the
certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Kehs
daughter.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the
subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was
unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be
badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh childrens theory that
she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.
But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and
oppressiveare proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of
documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a
tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule
21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:
SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may
quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made
and, in any event, at or before the time specified therein if it is
unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books,
documents or things does not appear, or if the person in
whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the
reasonable cost of the production thereof.
Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v.

Court of Appeals[6] that the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action
for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees other children,
Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the
suit was to establish the fact that Lees other children were not children of
Keh. Thus:
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such
as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular

fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the
correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were
intended to establish that for physical and/or biological
reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their
birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the
petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to
impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but
to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There
is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all
between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.[7] (Underscoring
supplied)
Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action,

obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of
Lees other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so
could not give testimony that Lees other children were not hers. The LeeKeh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tius testimony
and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the
attendance of such a material witness.
But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu
to come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in
court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it
would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her
stepdaughter.
1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be
inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and condition to come to
court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the
satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time the
Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before
the trial court. The RTC would have to update itself and determine if Tius
current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to
court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued
to her.
Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her
to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial courts duty is to protect every
witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially
true where the witness is of advanced age.[8]
2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her
stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Evidence, which reads:
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person
may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of

the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the
Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of
actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and
other direct ascendants or descendants.
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them
because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a family
tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common
ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those
who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those
from whom he descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92555.
G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014

FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child abuse, a violation
of Republic Act No. 7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she physically maltreated
for having accidentally bumped her knee while she was drowsing off on a bamboo sofa as he
entered the classroom. Her maltreatment left him with physical injuries, as duly certified by a
physician.
Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is the question that this appeal must
determine, in light of the Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the Philippines2 that:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuseunder
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable
doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity
of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under
the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, summed up the factual antecedents in its
comment,3 as follows:
On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan
Elementary School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his
classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who
was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6). Roused from sleep, petitioner
asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his
seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6), petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then,
she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan's body hit a
desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears
and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6;
TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan,
accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying and
told his mother about the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and his Aunt Evangeline
Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza (TSN, February 1, 1999,
p. 4) who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan's aunt and
Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he
was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station
(TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).
The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads, in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abuse in the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City
(RTC), and the case was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information alleged as follows:
The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of the Deputy OMBUDSMAN for the
Visayas accuses FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE LAW (Section 10
(a) of R..A. 7610), committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a
public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan Elementary School, with a Salary Grade below 26,
under the DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously maltreat her pupil Michael
Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old child, by pinching him on different parts of his body, and thereafter
slumping him to the ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan Gonzales to lose his consciousness and
has suffered injuries on different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child abuse,5 disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10 (a),
Article VI of R.A. 7610, the Court sentences her to an indeterminate prison term ranging from four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as minimum, to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been proved.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed decision
promulgated on May 11, 2005,7 with a modification of the penalty, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSINGthe appeal

filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered on June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in
Criminal Case No. 46893 with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correctional, as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the
maximum thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the petitioner submits that:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the petitioner
constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and not under the
Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioner's constitutional
right to due process and her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
her was not violated when the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly recited in
the information.10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner is raising are mainly
factual and, therefore, not reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that the affirmance of her
conviction by the CA was in accord with the pertinent law and jurisprudence, and supported by the
overwhelming evidence of the trial; and that the information charging her with child abuse was
sufficient in form and substance.11
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions of law in her
present recourse. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to questions of law. The
immediate implication of the limitation is to have the findings of fact by the CA, which affirmed the
findings of fact by the trial court, conclude the Court by virtue of its not being a trier of fact. As
such, the Court cannot analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section 4,
Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the following situations are the exceptions in
which the Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts, to wit: (a) the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts
went beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (g) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are contrary to those
of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate
courts are premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(k) all other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower courts' findings of fact. A
further exception is recognized when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.12 Yet,
none of the exceptions applies herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered
by Michael Ryan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his
dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as an act of discipline that she as a schoolteacher could
reasonably do towards the development of the child. She insists that her act further came under the
doctrine of in loco parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her
infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even
fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.13 She could not justifiably claim that she acted only
for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no
less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a
school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental
authority (i.e., in loco parentis),viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over
the person of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising
special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child, (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner's physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided
by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital
in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996,
barely three hours from the time the boy had sustained his injuries. Her Medical Report stated as
follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of Dr.
Castigador, the trial judge observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused by the
extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the ears
of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and tenderness
at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified that
during her examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put pressure on the
said area. She stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact with a hard object.
Wound No. 3 is located on the victim's left inner thigh. According to her this could not
have been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is located on the
upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as
he walked.14
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly:
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
chanrobleslaw
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment
of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act
by deedsor by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner "went overboard
in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael
Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as]
the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a
sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down
on the floor."15 On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had
been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of
fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to
adjust again.16 Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner
was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of
Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan's physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first
or only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination
that she had also experienced the petitioner's cruelty.17 The petitioner was also convicted by the
RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of another child named
Dariel Legayada.18 Such previous incidents manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for
violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of June 26, 2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was insufficient in
form and substance, in that the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly alleged
therein; and that her constitutional and statutory right to due process of law was consequently
violated.
The petitioner's submission deserves scant consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the proximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged against the petitioner in the
context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
7610, supra,and thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner's challenge against the sufficiency of
the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time
she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did
not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not do so,
resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delicto because no evidence had
been adduced thereon.20 The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court. The
explanation tendered by the trial judge for the omission was misplaced, however, because even
without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony on the victim's feelings, the lower courts still had
the authority to define and allow civil liability arising from the offense and the means to fix their
extent. The child abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as
moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold
that both lower courts committed a plain error that demands correction by the Court. Indeed, as the
Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People,21 it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper
penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the
accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its
recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1)
the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the
accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his
wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there
is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek
the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the
final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter
of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are
properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be
worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It
cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they be
true to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and
cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the
legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction
or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also
determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the
complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived. 22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of the victim, and
in that respect the Court believes and holds that P20,000.00 is reasonable. The victim was likewise
entitled to exemplary damages, considering that Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes such
damages if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The child
abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated her being a public schoolteacher, a factor in
raising the penalty to its maximum period pursuant to Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610. The
amount of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages is imposed on in order to set an example for the
public good and as a deterrent to other public schoolteachers who violate the ban imposed by
Article 233 of the Family Code, supra,against the infliction of corporal punishment on children under
their substitute parental authority. The lack of proof of the actual expenses for the victim's
treatment should not hinder the granting of a measure of compensation in the form of temperate
damages, which, according to Article 2224 of theCivil Code, may be recovered when some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being no
question about the injuries sustained requiring medical treatment, temperate damages of at least
P20,000.00 are warranted, for it would be inequitable not to recognize the need for the treatment.
Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of civil liability, to be reckoned
from the finality of this decision until full payment.
The penalty for the child abuse committed by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to
the Child's Development. (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the RTC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years,
two months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense was aggravated by the petitioner being a
public schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610, which commands that the
penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public
officer or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the information and
established by evidence as well as admitted by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however,
because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime committed by the petitioner
with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose three periods are six years and one day to six
years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight months and one day to seven
years and four months, for the medium period; and seven years, four months and one day to eight
years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence should come from the
maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and one day
of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence should come from prision
correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum
period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days, and the maximum
is seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to
theMODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum; (b) the petitioner shall
pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and P20,00Q.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each item of
the civil liability reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner
shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-32026 January 16, 1986

RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF ABSENCE OF ROBERTO L. REYES. ERLINDA
REYNOSO REYES,petitioner,
vs.
HON, JOSE P. ALEJANDRO, in his capacity as Judge, Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Branch II, Cavite City, respondents.
PATAJO, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dismissing the petition
filed by petitioner-appellant Erlinda Reynoso Reyes to have her husband Roberto Reyes
declared an absentee.
In a petition filed on October 25, 1969 Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the
absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from
their conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and his
whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left no will nor any
property in his name nor any debts.
The evidence presented by petitioner in support of her petition established that she and
Roberto L. Reyes were married on March 20, 1960; that sometime in April 1962 her husband
left the conjugal home due to some misunderstanding over personal matters; that since then
petitioner has not received any news about the whereabouts of her husband; that they have
not acquired any properties during their marriage and that they have no outstanding
obligation in favor of anyone; that her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the
absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and
Article 384 of the Civil Code.
After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since Roberto L.
Reyes left no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an absentee. It said:
A perusal of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court on absentees reveals that it is
based on the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on absence. And
the reason and purpose of the provisions of the New Civil Code on absence
(Arts. 381 to 396) are: (1) The interest of the person himself who has
disappeared; (2) The rights of third parties against the absentee, especially
those who have rights which would depend upon the death of the absentee;
and (3) The general interest of society which may require that property does
not remain abandoned without someone representing it and without an owner
(Civil Code by Francisco, Vol. 2, pp. 930- 931, 1953 Ed.).
It will thus be noted that said provisions of the New Civil Code are concerned
with absence only with reference to its effects on property (2 Manresa, 101102, Civil Code by Francisco, Vol. 2, p. 932. 1953 Ed.). Article 384, New Civil
Code, which is reproduced from Article 184 of the old Code, and relied upon
by herein petitioner, refers to the second period or stage of absence, and
specifically indicates the precise moment when the same may begin. Thus,
this article provides that after the lapse of two (2) years without any news
about the absentee or since the receipt of the last news, and five (5) years in
case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his
property, his absence may be declared by the Court. The primordial purpose
of this declaration is to provide for an administrator of the property of the
absentee. It cannot be said that because of the comma (,) between the words
'news' and 'and', the two-year period mentioned in the first part of the law has
no reference to or bearing on the property of the absentee. Manresa states
that the only reason for the different periods is because in one case (2 years)
the absentee has not left a person in charge of the administration of his
property, and in the other case (5 years) the absentee has provided for his
absence by appointing an administrator of his property dispensing in a way
the giving of news about himself (2 Manresa, 127-128). It is worth to note, in
this connection, that the first period or stage of absence as covered by Article
381 of the New Civil Code provides for provisional measures-the
appointment by the Court of a person to represent the absentee' in all that
may be necessary'-when a mere presumption of his absence arises. It should
be noted that the appointment of a 'representative' of the absentee is for the
protection of the interest of the latter. This is clear from the provisions of
Article 382 which enjoins the judge to 'take the necessary measures to
safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee. ... Moreover, it is not
enough that a person is declared an absentee. The law (see Articles 381,
382 and 383) requires the judge to appoint a representative for the absentee
precisely to safeguard the property or interest of the latter. It is thus
imperative that the declaration of absence be for a specific purpose, and that
purpose can be no other than the protection of the interest or property of the
absentee. Castan, in his commentary, emphatically states that there must be
an immediate necessity for the representation of the absentee in some
specific urgent matters (Vol. 1, pp. 182-183).
The same observation and commentary can be said of the corresponding
complimenting provisions of Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, particularly
Sections 6 and 7 thereof which make it mandatory upon the Court to appoint
a representative, trustee or administrator who shall safeguard the rights and
interest of the absentee.
Considering that neither the petition alleges, nor the evidence shows, that
Roberto L. Reyes has any rights, interest or property in the Philippines, there
is no point in judicially declaring him an absentee.
We affirm the order of the lower Court dismissing the petition. As this Court said in Jones vs.
Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 197:
... For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence
made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole
purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that
the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to he living, that
such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present
so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III,
paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68). (On page 183).
The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which
have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article
384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191,
Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of an classes of property in
the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code). The petition to declare the
husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in
the hands of the wife may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings, Peyer vs.
Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the order of the
lower Court dismissing the petition to declare Roberto L. Reyes an absentee. With costs
against petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 29, 2005
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo
P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7,
2001, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and
legally married to RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERAMANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the existence of the
first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was
married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was
then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.[4] He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996.
She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina
was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was
39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one
thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tinas resistance,
Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage
on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought
his parents to Baguio City to meet Tinas parents, and was assured by them
that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of
March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C.
Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTCof Baguio City, Branch 61.[5] It
appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was single.
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life.
Through their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress
Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making
himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was
jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap
her.[6] Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did
not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries
from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that
Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of
the marriage contract.[7] She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she
learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their
own vows.[8]
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar
where she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with
her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus
Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship
was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a love-bite on
her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared
he was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good
faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to
court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first
wife because she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was
charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail
after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina
believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not
heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the
private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of
moral damages, plus costs of suit.[9]
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first marriage
had been dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even if true,
did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this
Court in People v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court further ruled that even if the
private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously married,
the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not
criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private
complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He
maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was
of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted
that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be
malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by
malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial
court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To
support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United
States v. Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.[12]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos
defense of good faith and reliance on the Courts ruling in United States v.
Enriquez[13] were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family
Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this
Court in Republic v. Nolasco,[14] the OSG further posited that as provided in

Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to
marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto
should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover,
the OSG maintained, the private complainants knowledge of the first
marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the
State and not just against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed
by the trial court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision
appealed from with modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of
the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the
contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply.
Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should
have been a judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent
spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v.
Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals[16] to support its ruling. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision
promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it
hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as
maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE CANNOT
BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE
CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41
OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS
MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT ANDIN
LAW.[18]
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second
element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married
Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been absent for 21 years since 1975; under
Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He
points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code,
one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive,
shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the
second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with
respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse
arises by operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee
is dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his
first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or
whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the
presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two
requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner
concludes that he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided
for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions
remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code
does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before
the rule on presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that contrary
to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is
only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The private
complainant was a GRO before he married her, and even knew that he was
already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her
financial support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with
a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the
CA affirming the petitioners conviction is in accord with the law,
jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim,
the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy,
reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse
legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser castigado con la pena de prision
mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the
juridical tie of marriage established by law.[20] The phrase or before the
absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated in the
Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression
that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of
death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of
presumed death like annulment of marriageshould be a justification for
bigamy.[21]
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to
prove the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she
contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been
lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage.[22] It is essential in the prosecution
for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.[23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second
marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente)
which is an essential element of a felony by dolo.[24] On the other hand,
Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy: (1)
the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the
celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first

marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects
until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.[25] As the Court
ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the
Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same

view as Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1)
an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention
constituting the felony of the act.[28] He explained that:
This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly
incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of
the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there
is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be
supported by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be
deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second
marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is
dead, because of the many years that have elapsed since he has had any
news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be
deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent
intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime.[29]
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with
bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony
by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed
voluntary.[30]Although the words with malice do not appear in Article 3 of
the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word voluntary.[31]
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt
act without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers
injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to
have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have
been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man
intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the
absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a
reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.[34]
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a

confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea.[35]
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to
Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence,
the marriage is presumed to subsist.[36] The prosecution also proved that the
petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity
of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent
when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact
or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony
by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance
of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law.Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he
married the private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more
than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of
a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as
required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41
of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the
petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part
when he married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could
not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to
discharge his burden.
The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings in
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or
useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of
the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from
the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because
he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith
based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the
State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the State shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Marriage
is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals
and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be
surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner
prescribed and the causes specified by law.[37] The laws regulating civil
marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or
general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing
essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an
ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it
enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two
willing spouses and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume
new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of
life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to
innocent parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take
means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of
death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent
spouse[38] after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such
means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the present spouse
contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of
the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe what they wish to be true, is a
maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first
because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the
existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts,
easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective
condition of individuals.[39] Only with such proof can marriage be treated as
so dissolved as to permit second marriages.[40] Thus, Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage dependent not
only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts
easily capable of accurate judicial cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis
for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or
not, the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age
of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order

that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including
the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1)
A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an

aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for
four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and
has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for
seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is
created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial
declaration.[42] However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the
foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.[43]
With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years
under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to
four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,[45] without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As

explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:[46]
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent
bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following
conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party
must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of
the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention
in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article
40, of the Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of

instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract
a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with
bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the
rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v.
Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is not necessary to
have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of
absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its
sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of
the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the
law only requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present
does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse
is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time
of the celebration of the marriage.[48] In In Re Szatraw,[49] the Court declared

that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or
she had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another
proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled
that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or
she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and
executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an
appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains
subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated
that it should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a
superfluous and meaningless act.[50] The Court also took note that a petition
for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be
made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court declared that
the words proper proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can
only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a
deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,[52] the Court rejected
the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil
Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person
after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw,
Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the
provision of Article 349 or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper
proceedings is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined
that such provision presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been
legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared
presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage
is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true.[53] A second
marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of
Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.[54] Former Senator Ambrosio
Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial
decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such
decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits
that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give
rise to bigamy.[55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of
the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and
convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.[56]
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the
amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for
the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage
only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent
spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse
will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead.[57] Such judgment is proof of the good faith
of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if
the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse
reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by former
Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
providing that the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy
in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that
for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or
she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the
declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the latters reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present
spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the
Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the missing
spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in
contracting a second marriage is already established.[58]
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now

Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified. He says
judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for

declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of
procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full
grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively
dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that
the clause before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x
x x should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil
Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there
is bigamy.[59]
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an
eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse
is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive
death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement
of his estate.[60] Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of
the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith.[61] Justice Regalado
opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the
provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however, appears to
have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, which requires a
summary hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse before the other spouse can remarry.
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of
the presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.[62]
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA
for awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The
petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the
cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of
them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling
inPeople v. Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was
disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant
failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private
complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The
appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases
enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from
awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled
that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil de Filipinas
autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto,
violacin, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en
esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base
legal para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.[64]
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on
the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not
bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.[65] An award for moral
damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there
must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission
factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is
the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the
award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[66]
Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in
criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the
Civil Code and analogous cases,viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may
bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all
cases where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral
anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another,
otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific
acts in Article 2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases
bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling,
in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)[68]
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article

2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral
damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the
petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. This provision contains what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but
also in the performance of ones duties. The standards are the following: act
with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The
elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b)
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.[69]
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of
law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in
the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.[70] If the provision
does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20
provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the
other hand, Article 21 provides that any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision
is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight
to prove for specifically in the statutes. Whether or not the principle of abuse
of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article
21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the
circumstances of each case.[71]
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and
proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought
his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents
made the same assurance that he was single. Thus, the private complainant
agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage
that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her
duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband.
For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private
complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another
before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioners chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a
single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained
the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the
consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have married
lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man
who it turned out was not her lawful husband.[72]
The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit
before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were
willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she
did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral
damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,[73] the New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent
physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are
not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at
p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all
recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery
may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though
they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99
A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendants
conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously
wrongful. It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue the plaintiff
became entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages.
See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery
Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law
of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because
of the defendants bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she
not only was embarrassed and ashamed to go out but couldnt sleep but
couldnt eat, had terrific headaches and lost quite a lot of weight. No just
basis appears for judicial interference with the jurys reasonable allowance
of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher,
37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.[74]1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as
they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals
and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the

petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides,
even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery.
As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to
do an act which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to
be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he
has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages
sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v.
Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E.
892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false representation by the
defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff
was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to
have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally violated the
law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be no
bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her
damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the
promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not
her husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved
to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be
recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley,
106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of
action upon any transgression of the law by herself but upon the
defendants misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed,
innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the
defendants fraud for which damages may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter
into the marriage relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions.
Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819;
Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37
N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33
L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery
where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no
moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the
defendants misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of
action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its
aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which
the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520,
154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.[76]
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the
award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner, vs.

Children begin by loving their parents. After a time they judge

As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are as

IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO COMPELLING REASON TO

IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, IS

The petition is without merit.

Despite the foregoing, however, and petitioners genuine desire to

The petitioner herein is married to an Orthodontist who has a lucrative practice

Petitioner further contends that the respondent court erred in finding

We are not persuaded by such averments.

Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from dated March 25,

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

punishment of the children (even if only for ordinary disciplinary purposes)

4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION G.R. No. 177861

COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE,

The Facts and the Case

Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh

The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA

Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v.

Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action,

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSINGthe appeal

In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the petitioner submits that:

G.R. No. L-32026 January 16, 1986

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842

Court in Republic v. Nolasco,[14] the OSG further posited that as provided in

celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether the first

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a

of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order

A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an

prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As

The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of

of the celebration of the marriage.[48] In In Re Szatraw,[49] the Court declared

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now

remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the

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