Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 96025 May 15, 1991
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds allegedly committed
by him as a municipal treasurer. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan acquitted him of
malversation of public funds but convicted him instead of illegal use of public funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of illegal use of public funds?
RULING: Technical malversation is not included in nor does it necessarily include the
crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information. Since the acts
constituting the crime of technical malversation were not alleged in the information, and
since technical malversation does not include, or is not included in the crime of
malversation of public funds, he cannot resultantly be convicted of technical
malversation.
What the respondent court should have done was to follow the procedure laid
down in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Section 11. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged, if there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court
shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal use of public funds.
ISSUE: Whether the Trial Court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of
murder instead of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING: The Decision of the Trial Court was affirmed. By raising Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code as his defense, accused admitted that he killed the victim. By
invoking this defense, he waived his right to the constitutional presumption of innocence
and bears the burden of proving [1] That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises
his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age and living with him), in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; [2] That he or she kills any or both
of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in the act or
immediately thereafter; [3] That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his
wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse; To satisfy this burden, accused must prove that he actually surprised his wife
and Florencio in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man during or immediately
thereafter. What is important is that his version of the stabbing incident is diametrically
Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca caught his wife
with Koh and the time he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct by-product of Abarcas
rage. Therefore, Abarca is not liable for the death of Koh.
However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the two other persons
he shot in the adjacent room but his liability shall not be for frustrated murder. In the first
place, Abarca has no intent to kill the other two persons injured. He was not also
committing a crime when he was firing his gun at Koh it being under Art. 247. Abarca
was however negligent because he did not exercise all precaution to make sure no one
else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for less serious physical injuries through
simple negligence for the injuries suffered by the two other persons who were in the
adjacent room when the incident happened.
The trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder,
qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victims person or corpse. This circumstance
was both alleged in the information and proved during the trial. At the time of its
commission, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death. No
aggravating or mitigating circumstance was alleged or proved; hence, the penalty shall
be imposed in its medium period. Therefore, the trial courts imposition of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua was correct, and need not be modified.
FACTS: Court records show that Roland John Chapman, Maureen Hultman, and
another friend, Jussi Leino, were coming home from a party at around three o'clock in
the morning of July 13, 1991. Leino was walking Hultman home along Mahogany street
in Dasmarias Village, Makati City when Teehankee came up behind them in his car. He
stopped the two and demanded that they show some identification. Leino took out his
wallet and showed Teehankee his Asian Development Bank ID. Teehankee grabbed the
wallet. Chapman, who was waiting in a car for Leino, stepped in and asked Teehankee:
"Why are you bothering us?" Teehankee drew out his gun and shot Chapman in the
chest, killing him instantly. After a few minutes, Teehankee shot Leino, hitting him in the
jaw. Then he shot Hultman on the temple before driving away. Leino survived and
Hultman died two months later in hospital due to brain hemorrhages caused by the
bullet fragments. Teehankee was arrested several days later on the testimony of several
witnesses. The witnesses were Domingo Florence and Agripino Cadenas, private
security guards, and Vincent Mangubat, a driver, all three being employs of residents of
the village.
ISSUE: Whether the shooting was attended with treachery.
RULING: Appellant claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman and
Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman consciously
and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the
crime. Appellant asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman.
Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of events leading to the shooting.
He testified that for no apparent reason, appellant suddenly alighted from his car and
accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him
his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on.
Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was
wrong. There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt,
and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all
Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no
chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that
appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that
appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were
strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was
short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. We have
consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself,
constitute treachery. Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only
be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold
that treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that
after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement.
Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car. When
appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance
between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to sit
beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two
were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a
completely defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse
of time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a
period which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated
by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of
Leino are concerned.
FACTS: This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown. A
hapless foreign religious minister was riddled with bullets, his head shattered into bits
and pieces amidst the revelling of his executioners as they danced and laughed around
their quarry, chanting the tune "Mutya Ka Baleleng", a popular regional folk song,
kicking and scoffing at his prostrate, miserable, spiritless figure that was gasping its last.
Seemingly unsatiated with the ignominy of their manslaughter, their leader picked up
pieces of the splattered brain and mockingly displayed them before horrified spectators.
Some accounts swear that acts of cannibalism ensued, although they were not
sufficiently demonstrated. However, for their outrageous feat, the gangleader already
earned the monicker "cannibal priest-killer" But, what is indubitable is that Fr. Tulio
Favali was senselessly killed for no apparent reason than that he was one of the Italian
Catholic missionaries laboring in heir vineyard in the hinterlands of Mindanao.
In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive manhunt
which resulted in the capture of the perpetrators except Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and two
unidentified persons who eluded arrest and still remain at large.
Informations for Murder, Attempted Murder and Arson were accordingly filed
against those responsible for the frenzied orgy of violence that fateful day of 11 April
1985. As these cases arose from the same occasion, they were all consolidated in
Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding that the crime committed
was murder.
RULING: From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were
not merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage
murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers
and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if
not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the
house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that
the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. 27 Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to
ensure success of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the
conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the
attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not have delivered
the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit
the criminal acts.
RULING: Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons,
not composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking
each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous
manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision
mayor. Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving
himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused walked
past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There
was hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant; the attack was completely without
warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense.
The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death. Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period which, as correctly imposed by the
court a quo, is reclusion perpetua.
treachery was not adequately proved, the accused was convicted of homicide only. The
Supreme Court modified the judgment appealed from and found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the killing of Miguelito Donato without the attendance of any
modifying circumstance. Accordingly, the Court sentenced the accused to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years,
and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all its accessory penalties,
and to pay the heirs of Migueltio in the amount of P10,000 as actual damages and
P50,000 as death indemnity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the crime committed is
murder and not death caused in a tumultuous affray?
RULING: For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established
that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for
the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these
several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous
manner;(4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted
serious physical injuries or who used violence be can be identified.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons
and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some
person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel
in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one
individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists,
but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It
was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists
picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in
inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
As the lower courts found, the victims assailants were numerous by as much as
fifty in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took
advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by
Salcedo to escape and free himself. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his
pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of
superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing of murder.
sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.