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PARUNGAO vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 96025 May 15, 1991

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds allegedly committed
by him as a municipal treasurer. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan acquitted him of
malversation of public funds but convicted him instead of illegal use of public funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of illegal use of public funds?
RULING: Technical malversation is not included in nor does it necessarily include the
crime of malversation of public funds charged in the information. Since the acts
constituting the crime of technical malversation were not alleged in the information, and
since technical malversation does not include, or is not included in the crime of
malversation of public funds, he cannot resultantly be convicted of technical
malversation.
What the respondent court should have done was to follow the procedure laid
down in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
Section 11. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged, if there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the court
shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case
upon the filing of the proper information. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal use of public funds.

PEOPLE vs. AYUMAN

427 SCRA 248


FACTS: This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Brach
19, Cagayan de Oro City where the accused, Conrado Ayuman, was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and was sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of death and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000. On April 22, 1997
at around 10:15 in the morning, Ermita Ayuman, the wife of the accused, rushed her
five-year old son Sugar Ray to the Emergency Room of the Northern Mindanao Medical
Center. When a nurse, took the child's vital signs, it appeared that he was dead on
arrival.
Ermita's statement was noted in the emergency room record. An autopsy was done to
the dead body of Sugar Ray. On April 23, 1997, Sugar Ray was buried. The accused
was nowhere to be found. Neither did he report for work from April 23 to May 21, 1997.
During the burial, Ermita cried and shouted, "Dong, forgive your father. Dong, don't
leave us." Afterwards, she went to the precinct and gave a testimony to SPO1 Catulong
against her husband for killing their son. At that time, his son was already buried. The
couple then went to the Office of the Prosecutor to "tell the truth."
ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of parricide.
RULING: The decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification and the accused
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages. The elements of
the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse; The
key element here is the relationship of the offender with the victim. All the above
elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution, specifically on the basis of
circumstantial evidence. And also, the circumstances cited by the trial court, when
viewed in their entirety, were as convincing as direct evidence and as such, negate the
innocence of the accused. Otherwise stated, the prosecution established beyond a
shadow of doubt, through circumstantial evidence, that accused committed the crime of
parricide. Here is a father who mercilessly abused his own son and refused to bring him
to the hospital, although on the verge of death, for prompt medical treatment. Such a
heartless conduct is condemnable and is extremely contrary to human nature. Every
father is expected to love his children and shower them with acts of affection and
tenderness.

PEOPLE vs. PUEDAN


388 SCRA 266
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8,
Malaybalay City, finding the accused guilty of murder and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of his victim Florencio Ilar the
sum of P50,000. According to the Prosecution, in the morning of February 21, 1995,
Florencio Ilar, accompanied by his grandson, Reymark, went to the house of Luceno
Tulo to buy a piglet. Luceno was fashioning out a mortar for pounding palay near his
house when Florencio and Reymark arrived. Florencio told Luceno that he wanted to
buy a piglet from him. Accused suddenly arrived and stabbed Florencio five times, with
a sharp, pointed knife locally known as plamingco. Terrified of what he witnessed,
Luceno fled towards the house of his neighbor. Young Reymark ran back to his parents
house and told his mother, Erlinda, what transpired. Erlinda ran swiftly to Lucenos place
but Florencio was already dead, bathed in his own blood and lying by the side of the
rice paddy. The body remained where it had fallen until the arrival of the police later that
day. On the part of the Defense, the wife of the accused, Leah testified, admitted having
an illicit relationship with the deceased. Their relationship had been going on for two
years and was known in their barangay, except her Roger. In the morning of February
21, 1995, Florencio came to their house, while she was breastfeeding her child, and
was looking for her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the Trial Court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of
murder instead of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING: The Decision of the Trial Court was affirmed. By raising Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code as his defense, accused admitted that he killed the victim. By
invoking this defense, he waived his right to the constitutional presumption of innocence
and bears the burden of proving [1] That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises
his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age and living with him), in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; [2] That he or she kills any or both
of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious physical injury in the act or
immediately thereafter; [3] That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his
wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse; To satisfy this burden, accused must prove that he actually surprised his wife
and Florencio in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man during or immediately
thereafter. What is important is that his version of the stabbing incident is diametrically

opposed to the convincing accounts of Prosecution Witnesses. Further eroding the


defense of the accused is the fact that he immediately fled right after the stabbing
incident. He hid for about three years until he was arrested.

PEOPLE vs. ABARCA


153 SCRA 735
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte,
sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of
murder with double frustrated murder. The case was elevated to this Court in view of the
death sentence imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the
penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we
required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the
case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us
that he wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal. On July 15, 1984 at
around 6:00 PM, accused Francisco Abarca went home and found his wife, Jenny, and
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the
accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was
then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away. The
accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. At around 6:30 p.m. he got an M-16
rifle and went back to his house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He
proceeded to the hangout of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mah-jong
and fired at him three times with his rifle. Koh was hit and died instantaneously. Arnold
and Lina Amparado who were occupying the adjacent room were also hit by the shots
fired by the accused. Arnold and Lina Amparado were rushed to the hospital and were
rendered timely medical assistance that prevented their deaths.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted
under exceptional circumstances can be applied in the instant case dissolving the
criminal liability of the accused for the murder of the deceased.
RULING: YES. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides: Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or
both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person;
and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.
These elements are present in this case.

Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca caught his wife
with Koh and the time he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct by-product of Abarcas
rage. Therefore, Abarca is not liable for the death of Koh.
However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the two other persons
he shot in the adjacent room but his liability shall not be for frustrated murder. In the first
place, Abarca has no intent to kill the other two persons injured. He was not also
committing a crime when he was firing his gun at Koh it being under Art. 247. Abarca
was however negligent because he did not exercise all precaution to make sure no one
else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for less serious physical injuries through
simple negligence for the injuries suffered by the two other persons who were in the
adjacent room when the incident happened.

PEOPLE vs. CORICOR


79 PHIL. 672
FACTS: Appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Pedro Lego in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs, having been found by
the lower court guilty of murder committed on September 15, 1941. Based upon
circumstantial and testimonial evidences that were presented it was found out that the
wife of the accused was having illicit sexual relationship with the victim and that the
accused has caught them in actual sexual activity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty for the crime of murder.
RULING: YES. We are of the opinion that the circumstances under which Pedro Lego
was killed by appellant were as narrated in the latter's testimony and, accordingly, the
appealed decision must be modified, so as to reduce the penalty to that provided in the
following article of the Revised Penal Code.
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any
legally married person, who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer
the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from
punishment.
These rules shall applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to
their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters
are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or
shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled
to the benefits of this article.

PEOPLE vs. MALLARI


404 SCRA 170
FACTS: While Joseph and Liza (wife) were watching a basketball game at the barangay
basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed weapons,
arrived and attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When they
were not able to catch up with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked near the
basketball court and continued chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the latter, which
caused his instantaneous death.
Appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it convicted
Rufino of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a motor vehicle is a qualifying circumstance for the
crime of murder?
RULING: The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing
Joseph. Upon catching up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which
Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino
to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
The case of People v. Muoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the present
case. In the said case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the accused therein in
looking for the victim and in carrying the body of the victim to the place where it was
dumped. The accused therein shot the victim, which caused the latters death. In the
present case, the truck itself was used to kill the victim by running over him.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another by
means of a motor vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies
the killing to murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. In view of
the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating
circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on
Rufino.

PEOPLE vs. WHISENHUNT


368 SCRA 586
FACTS: In the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused whisenhunt did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Elsa "Elsie" Santos
Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a bladed weapon in different parts of her
body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of her death and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse by then and there
chopping off her head and different parts of her body.
ISSUE: Should the accused-appellant be convicted of the crime of murder?
RULING: In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully proven by
the prosecution without a shadow of doubt, to wit: that Elsa Santos Castillo was brought
to accused-appellants condominium unit on September 23, 1993; that on September
24, 1993, accused-appellants housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and
accused-appellant gave it to her, saying that it was in his bedroom; that on September
25, 1993, accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the dismembered body
parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accused-appellants bedroom; that accusedappellant disposed of the body parts by a roadside somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna;
that accused-appellant also disposed of Elsas personal belongings along the road
going to Bagac, Bataan; that the mutilated body parts of a female cadaver, which was
later identified as Elsa, were found by the police and NBI agents at the spot where
Demetrio pointed; that hair specimens found inside accused-appellants bathroom and
bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from Elsas head; and that the bloodstains
found on accused-appellants bedspread, covers and in the trunk of his car, all matched
Elsas blood type. Even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be
murder because of the dismemberment of the dead body. One of the qualifying
circumstances of murder under Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code is
"outraging or scoffing at (the) person or corpse" of the victim. There is no question that
the corpse of Billy Agotano was outraged when it was dismembered with the cutting off
of the head and limbs and the opening up of the body to remove the intestines, lungs
and liver. The killer scoffed at the dead when the intestines were removed and hung
around Victorianos neck as a necklace, and the lungs and liver were facetiously
described as "pulutan."

The trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder,
qualified by outraging and scoffing at the victims person or corpse. This circumstance
was both alleged in the information and proved during the trial. At the time of its
commission, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal maximum to death. No
aggravating or mitigating circumstance was alleged or proved; hence, the penalty shall
be imposed in its medium period. Therefore, the trial courts imposition of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua was correct, and need not be modified.

PEOPLE vs. CONTINENTE


339 SCRA 1
FACTS: That on or about the 21st day of April, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill, with evident and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and employ
personal violence upon the person of COL. JAMES N. ROWE, a U.S. Army Officer, by
then and there firing at him while then on board a Toyota car, hitting him on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds, which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of said Col. James N. Rowe in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
That on or about the 21st day of April 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, accused
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and with the use of armalite rifles and
motor vehicles, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and employ personal violence upon the person of JOAQUIN BINUYA, by then and there
firing at him while then on board a Toyota car, hitting him on the scalp and body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of murder, but nevertheless did not
produce it, by reason of causes independent of their own will, that is the timely
intervention of medical assistance, to the damage and prejudice of said Joaquin Binuya
in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta was
credible.
RULING: The testimony of Meriam Zulueta does not suffer from any serious and
material contradictions that can detract from her credibility. The trial court accorded full
faith and credence to her said testimony. The defense failed to adduce any evidence to
establish any improper motive that may have impelled the same witness to falsely testify
against the appellants. It is well-settled rule that the evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because such
court has the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine if
they are telling the truth or not.

PEOPLE vs. ANTONIO


335 SCRA 646
FACTS: Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound
right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber
Beretta pistol of appellant Antonio. Prior to the shooting, appellant and the victim spent
several hours having fun playing "pusoy dos." The situation turned ugly, however, when
Tuadles could not pay to appellant Antonio his alleged winnings. An argument arose,
with appellant Antonio and Tuadles standing face to face three (3) feet away from each
other.
According SG Bobis who witnessed the said crime; Tuadles and Antonio were
arguing. Antonio even called out: Sarge! Sarge! Sarge! Just before the shooting, Bobis
heard Antonio saying: Putang ina ka kasi.
ISSUE: Whether or not the shooting was attended with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery for the crime of murder?
RULING: If Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill Tuadles, there
was no reason to call for a Sergeant (Sarge) or any eyewitness for that matter. The
aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack was
arrived at on the spur of the moment. The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness
of an attack makes the killing a murder because of treachery is not consistent with the
decisions of this Court.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar, where we held that there
was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal altercation. More
recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced that: There would be no treachery when
the victim was placed on guard, such as when a heated argument preceded the attack,
or when the victim was standing face to face with his assailants and the initial assault
could not have been unforeseen. Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal code.

PEOPLE vs. TEEHANKEE


249 SCRA 54

FACTS: Court records show that Roland John Chapman, Maureen Hultman, and
another friend, Jussi Leino, were coming home from a party at around three o'clock in
the morning of July 13, 1991. Leino was walking Hultman home along Mahogany street
in Dasmarias Village, Makati City when Teehankee came up behind them in his car. He
stopped the two and demanded that they show some identification. Leino took out his
wallet and showed Teehankee his Asian Development Bank ID. Teehankee grabbed the
wallet. Chapman, who was waiting in a car for Leino, stepped in and asked Teehankee:
"Why are you bothering us?" Teehankee drew out his gun and shot Chapman in the
chest, killing him instantly. After a few minutes, Teehankee shot Leino, hitting him in the
jaw. Then he shot Hultman on the temple before driving away. Leino survived and
Hultman died two months later in hospital due to brain hemorrhages caused by the
bullet fragments. Teehankee was arrested several days later on the testimony of several
witnesses. The witnesses were Domingo Florence and Agripino Cadenas, private
security guards, and Vincent Mangubat, a driver, all three being employs of residents of
the village.
ISSUE: Whether the shooting was attended with treachery.
RULING: Appellant claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman and
Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman consciously
and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the
crime. Appellant asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman.
Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of events leading to the shooting.
He testified that for no apparent reason, appellant suddenly alighted from his car and
accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him
his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on.
Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was
wrong. There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt,
and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all
Chapman could utter.

Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no
chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that
appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that
appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were
strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting was
short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. We have
consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself,
constitute treachery. Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only
be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold
that treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that
after shooting Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement.
Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car. When
appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance
between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to sit
beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two
were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a
completely defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse
of time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a
period which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated
by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of
Leino are concerned.

PEOPLE vs. MANERO


218 SCRA 85

FACTS: This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown. A
hapless foreign religious minister was riddled with bullets, his head shattered into bits
and pieces amidst the revelling of his executioners as they danced and laughed around
their quarry, chanting the tune "Mutya Ka Baleleng", a popular regional folk song,
kicking and scoffing at his prostrate, miserable, spiritless figure that was gasping its last.
Seemingly unsatiated with the ignominy of their manslaughter, their leader picked up
pieces of the splattered brain and mockingly displayed them before horrified spectators.
Some accounts swear that acts of cannibalism ensued, although they were not
sufficiently demonstrated. However, for their outrageous feat, the gangleader already
earned the monicker "cannibal priest-killer" But, what is indubitable is that Fr. Tulio
Favali was senselessly killed for no apparent reason than that he was one of the Italian
Catholic missionaries laboring in heir vineyard in the hinterlands of Mindanao.
In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive manhunt
which resulted in the capture of the perpetrators except Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and two
unidentified persons who eluded arrest and still remain at large.
Informations for Murder, Attempted Murder and Arson were accordingly filed
against those responsible for the frenzied orgy of violence that fateful day of 11 April
1985. As these cases arose from the same occasion, they were all consolidated in
Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding that the crime committed
was murder.
RULING: From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were
not merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage
murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers
and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if
not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They surrounded the
house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that
the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. 27 Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to
ensure success of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the
conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the
attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not have delivered

the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit
the criminal acts.

PEOPLE vs. UNLAGADA


389 SCRA 224
FACTS: ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE alias Lapad" was charged and
subsequently convicted by the court a quo and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P100,000.00 as moral damages,P50,000.00 as
temperate damages, and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.In the evening
Danilo Laurel left his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to
attend a public dance at Rizal St., Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental. Two (2) hours later, or around 11:00 o'clock that evening, Danilo asked
Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities outside
the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink and bought two (2) bottles of
Gold Eagle beer at a nearby store.
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to relieve
him. According to Edwin, he was only about three (3) meters from Danilo who was
relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo
and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his assailant with a half-filled
bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of men numbering about seven (7),
ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones
and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo
was being mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and
died before he could be given any medical assistance.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the testimony of prosecution witness was credible; and


2. Whether the lower court is right in convicting the accused of murder
qualified by treachery and not death in a tumultuous affray.

RULING: Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons,
not composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking
each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous
manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision
mayor. Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving

himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused walked
past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There
was hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant; the attack was completely without
warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense.
The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death. Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period which, as correctly imposed by the
court a quo, is reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE vs. MARAMARA


317 SCRA 222
FACTS: The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate
convicting the accused CresencianoMaramara of murder and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victims heirs the amount of P10,000 as
medical and funeral expenses and P50,000 as moral damages. The accused
challenged the findings of the trial court in order to secure an acquittal or, at the least,
being held liable only for the death of MiguelitoDonato in a tumultuous affray as defined
in Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code.
The information against the accused alleged that in the evening of November 18, 1991,
in Barangay Calpi, Claveria, Masbate, the accused, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of nighttime, assaulted and shot with a
handgun MiguelitoDonato and hit the latter on the chest, thereby inflicted the wound
which caused his death.
ISSUE: Whether accused is guilty of death caused in tumultuous affray instead of
murder.
RULING: There was no merit in accuseds position that he should be held liable only for
death caused in tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was
in such situation that accused came at the scene and joined the fray purportedly to
pacify the protagonists when Miguelito attacked him causing four stab wounds in
different parts of his body. Assuming that a rumble or a free-for-all fight occurred at the
benefit dance, Article 251 of the Revised Code cannot apply because prosecution
witnesses Ricardo and RegarderDonato positively identified the accused as Miguelitos
killer. While the accused himself suffered multiple stab wounds, which at first, may lend
verity to his claim that a rumble has ensued and that Miguelito inflicted upon him these
wounds, the evidence was inadequate to consider them as mitigating circumstance
because defenses version stood discredited in light of the more credible version of the
prosecution as to the circumstances surrounding Miguelitos death. However, the
Supreme Court did not subscribe to trial courts appreciation of treachery, which was
discussed only in the dispositive portion of the decision and which was based solely on
the fact that the accused used a firearm in killing the victim Miguelito.
In the absence of any convincing proof that the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted means by which he committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, the Supreme Court resolved the doubt in favor of the accused. And since

treachery was not adequately proved, the accused was convicted of homicide only. The
Supreme Court modified the judgment appealed from and found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the killing of Miguelito Donato without the attendance of any
modifying circumstance. Accordingly, the Court sentenced the accused to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years,
and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all its accessory penalties,
and to pay the heirs of Migueltio in the amount of P10,000 as actual damages and
P50,000 as death indemnity.

SISON vs. PEOPLE


250 SCRA 58
FACTS: Tension and animosity between Cory loyalists and Marcos loyalists broke into
violence. On July 27, 198, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known
Coryista. The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to
be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalist. They applied a permit to hold a rally but it
was denied. Despite this setback, three thousand gathered at the Rizal Monument led
by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. No ticket could be produced. Colonel Dula
Torres gave them ten minutes to disperse. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and
said gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators. The police pushed the crowds
and used tear gas to disperse them.
At about 4:00 pm, a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden.
Annie Ferrer was there and they informed her of the dispersal and Ferrer angrily
ordered them gulpihin ninyo ang mga Cory hecklers! A few minutes later, she was
arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted kailangan gumanti tayo ngayon! a
commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking
the persons in yellow. The man in yellow t- shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers
appeared to be Marcos loyalists. Thay caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and
mauled him. He was hit on various parts of his body. Sumilang tried to pacify the
maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them but the maulers pursued Salcedo.
Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo but Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as
another man boxed Salcedo on the head. De Los Santas, Tan boxed Salcedo while
Pacadar. Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw, Sision repeatedly boxed him.
Salcedo managed to get away but accused Tan, Pacadar pursued him, mauling
Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life. The mauling resumed at the Rizal
monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed and lost
consciousness. Sumilang with a help of traffic enforcer brought Salcedo to Medical
Center Manila but was refused admission. So they took him to PGH where he died upon
arrival. The trial court rendered decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan,
Richard De Los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder
qualified by treachery. Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Ferrer
but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused except for Tamayo. The court
convicts Tamayo of homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the crime committed is
murder and not death caused in a tumultuous affray?
RULING: For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established
that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for
the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these
several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous
manner;(4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted
serious physical injuries or who used violence be can be identified.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons
and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some
person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel
in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one
individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists,
but this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It
was only a while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists
picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in
inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous
quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
As the lower courts found, the victims assailants were numerous by as much as
fifty in number and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took
advantage of their superior strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by
Salcedo to escape and free himself. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his
pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of
superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing of murder.

DADO vs. PEOPLE


392 SCRA 46
FACTS: The present case is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Kudarat finding the Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso guilty
of the crime of homicide. The information charged both Dado and Eraso with murder
allegedly committed by said the accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and treachery, and shot Silvestre Balinas thereby inflicting
gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his instant death.
The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas and
Rufo Alga were as follows: On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan
Kudarat Police Station formed three teams to intercept some cattle rustlers. The Team
composed of the petitioner SPO4 Geronimo Dado and CAFGU members Francisco
Eraso, AflredoBalinas and Rufo Alga waited behind a large dike. Alfredo Balinas and
Rufo Alga, who were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, were positioned between the
petitioner, who was armed with a caliber .45 pistol, and accused Francisco Eraso, who
was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. At around 11:00 of that same evening, the team saw
somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters. When he was about 5 meters away
from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso was making some
movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flashlight,
Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter,
petitioner fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim turned out to be
Silvestre Butsoy Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas. Eraso embraced Alfredo
Balinas to show his repentance for his deed.
ISSUE: Whether accused is guilty of homicide instead of illegal discharge of firearm
only.
RULING: In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found
that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioner Dado and accused Eraso conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no
longer necessary to establish who caused the fatal wound in as much as conspiracy
makes the act of one conspirator the act of all. Although the agreement need not be
directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be
convincingly shown. In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Erasos seemingly
concerted and almost simultaneous acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather
than the result of a common plan to kill the victim. Evidently, the prosecution failed to
prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim were particles of
a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner. Hence,
the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide and acquitted the petitioner of the
crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. A new decision was entered finding
petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm and

sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

PEOPLE vs. SALUFRANIA


389 SCRA 224
FACTS: Filomeno Salufrania by boxing and strangling MARCIANA ABUYOSALUFRANIA, his lawfully wedded wife and who was at the time 8 months on the family
way, caused upon her injuries resulting in her instantaneous death and the death of the
child who was still in its maternal womb. Thus Filomeno was charged with the complex
crime of parricide with intentional abortion committed. The lower court found Filomeno
guilty as charged and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, the
automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court. Filomeno alleges that the trial court
erred in finding him guilty of the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion, as
there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused for the complex crime of parricide
with intentional abortion is proper?
RULING: No. Filomeno Salufrania should not be held guilty of the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion but of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been
expelled there from.
It has been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8)
months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon
her by her husband Filomeno; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo
died together with the fetus in her womb. The abortion was caused by the same
violence that caused the death of the wife, Marciana Abuyo, such violence being
voluntarily exerted by Filomeno upon her. However, the intent to cause the abortion has
not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the
immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show intent to
cause an abortion. In fact, Filomeno must have merely intended to kill his wife but not
necessarily to cause an abortion.

PEOPLE vs. GENOVES


61 PHIL. 382
FACTS: Crispin Genoves and deceased Soledad Rivera were laborers in adjoining
cane fields. Rivera claimed that the yoke of the plow which the accused was repairing
belonged to her and tried to take it by force. The accused struck her with his fist causing
her to fall to the ground. She got up and returned to the quarrel where she received
another fist blow on the left cheek causing her to fall again to the ground. Immediately
after the incident, the deceased proceeded to the municipal building, she complained to
the chief of police of pain in the abdomen as she was pregnant at the time. For a few
days, the deceased suffered from hemorrhage and pain which resulted in the painful
and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she way carrying, but the
other baby could be delivered. Both babies were dead.Genoves was convicted in the
Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros of the complex crime of homicide with
abortion. An appeal was made by the accused.
ISSUE: Should the accused be held guilty for the death of the victim and her unborn
child?
RULING: It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause premature delivery, and the
evidence shows a complete sequel of events from the assault to her death. The
accused must be held responsible for the natural consequences of his act. However, the
mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that inflicted
and provocation are present, as the offended party by force induced the accused to use
force on his part. The abortion in this case is unintentional abortion denounced by
Article 257 of the Revised Penal Code. On the whole case, the period of confinement is
fixed at twelve years and one day to fourteen years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal and the indemnity is fixed at P1, 000.

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