People v Echavez, 95 SCRA 663 (1980)

Facts: Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed separate informations against sixteen people for
squatting which waspunishable under PD No. 772. FIve of the informations were
raffled to Judge Vicente Echavez, Jr. TheJudge dismissed the five informations before
the accused could be arraigned. One of the Judge'sgrounds for the dismissal was
that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to thecultivation
of a grazing land. The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered.Issues:
Whether PD No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to
agricultural lands.
Ruling/Held: No. The court ruled that PD No. 772 does not apply to pasture lands
because its preambleshows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities or more particularly to illegalconstructions in squatter areas made by
well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involvespasture lands in rural
areas

IT IS A WELL ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE THAT WERE A STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS,

COURTSMAY EXAMINE BOTH THE PRINTED PAGES OF THE PUBLISHED ACT AS WELL
ASTHOSE EXTRINSIC MATTERS THAT MAY AID IN CONSTRUING THE MEANING OF
THESTATUTE, SUCH AS THE HISTORY OF ITS ENACTMENT, THE REASONS FOR
THEPASSAGE OF THE BILL AND PURPOSES TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MEASURE
.COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs.ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC.,
(Formerly: Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.), respondent. G.R. No. L-28329
August 17, 1975
FACTS:Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and operates
a petroleum refining plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No.
387 which provides: "During the five years following the granting of any concession,
the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all equipment, machinery,
material, instruments, supplies and accessories," respondent imported and was
assessed the special import tax (which it paid under protest).Court procedures: The
Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that respondent ESSO was subject
to the payment of the special import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as
amended by R.A. No. 2352, and dismissed the protest. On March 1, 1962,
respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the Commissioner of
Customs who, on March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector of
Customs. 3On July 2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court of Tax
Appeals for review of the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. The Court of Tax
Appeals, on September 30, 1967, reversed the decision of herein petitioner
Commissioner of Customs and ordered refund of the amount of P775.62 to

respondent ESSO which the latter had paid under protest. Statutes subject of
construction :a. R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) title, Art. 103, Art. 102,
Art. 104;b. R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW), as amended by R.A. No. 2352 title
ISSUE: WON the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO from custom
duties granted byR.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) should embrace or
include the special import tax imposed by R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW).
HELD: Yes. Petition denied
Vera v. Cuevas
Facts:
Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of
filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The products of private respondent,
Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold
whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the
brand "Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the
brand "Dutch Baby." Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk
Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a corporation organized for the principal purpose
of upholding and maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk
industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk
products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order. Failure to comply will result to
penalties. Section 169 talks of the inscription to be placed in skimmed milk wherein
all condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part
has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall be
clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the language in
which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other equivalent words.
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from requiring the
respondents to print on the labels of their product the words "This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age.". Also, it ordered the
Fair Trade Board to perpetually restrain from investigating the respondents related
to the manufacture/sale of their filled milk products.

Issue:
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section 169 of the Tax
Code.

Held:
No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The use of specific
and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed
milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause
"all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in
part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed
milk" under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms
are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.
The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the
former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise
removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then
be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and
filled milk. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both
to skimmed milk and filled milk. Also, it has been found out that "the filled milk
products of the petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious,
wholesome and suitable for feeding infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to
the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with filled milk have not suffered any
defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been fed with filled milk."
Hence, applying Section 169 to it would cause a deprivation of property without due
process of law.

PAFLU vs. Bureau of Labor Relations

Fernando, Acting C.J. (August 21, 1976)

Facts:

On February 27, 1976, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. held a

certification election on who would be the exclusive bargaining agent of all its
employees. The National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) won, with 429
votes as against the 419 votes of the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU). 4 votes were cast wherein no union was preferred. The Director of Labor
Relations, Carmelo Noriel, then certified NAFLU as the exclusive bargaining agent of
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc.s employees.

Despite winning by a majority, which is what is required under the Rules and
Regulations implementing the Labor Code, to be the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent, PAFLU sought to invoke the doctrine in Allied Workers Association of the
Philippines vs. Court of Industrial Relations, wherein spoiled ballots should be
counted in determining the valid votes cast. As there were 17 spoiled ballots, PAFLU
argued that there was grave abuse of discretion by Director Noriel in certifying
NAFLU.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine in Allied Workers Association of the Philippines
vs. Court of Industrial Relations should be applied in this case?

Held: No, it should not.

Ratio:

First off, only 10 of the spoiled ballots were for PAFLU, so even if they were all
counted, PAFLU would still lose with 424 votes to 429 for NAFLU.

The essence of the certification process is to give every labor organization

the opportunity in a free and honest election to be the exclusive CBA of employees.
PAFLU was given a fair election, and lost. In the US, it is also the rule that only a
majority of all valid ballots will be needed to win the election.

As the country is on a wide-scale industrialization project, a stable structure

of law and order in the productive sector is needed, that need it best attained
through a collective bargaining regime. Requiring an absolute majority to be
obtained by the valid CBA would unnecessarily protract the process and frustrate
the goal looked to.

No fault of a grave or serious character can be imputed to Director Noriel as

the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Industrial
Relations was promulgated under the Industrial Peace Act. The Labor Code
superseded the Industrial Peace Act, and the present relative majority rule should
be first proved to be in repugnant to the Labor Code, which was not done.

High repute must also be given to the contemporaneous construction placed

by the executive officials entrusted with applying the statute. The Rules and
Regulations implementing the Labor Code were issued by Secretary Ople of the
Department of Labor and took effect in 1975, the Labor Code taking effect in 1974.
There was more than enough time for a serious study of such regulations to avoid
any inconsistency with the Labor Code.

G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991CECILIO S. DE VILLA

vs.
CA
FACTS:On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the RTC
Branch 145, Makati with violation of BatasPambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner allegedly
issued a check payable to private respondent, Roberto Lorayez, in the total amount
of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00 knowing that at the time of issue he had
no sufficient funds in or credit with draweebank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment. The check was dishonored by the drawee bank upon
presentmentfor the reason insufficient funds. Petitioner failed to pay respondent
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor.Petitioner moved to dismiss the
information maintaining that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged
since thecheck was payable in dollars (foreign currency) and drawn against a
foreign bank.The RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequentlydenied by the RTC.The
petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari
with the CA seeking to declare the nullity of RTC orders. The Court of
Appealsdismissed the petition. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also
denied by the CA. Thus, petitioner filed petition withSC.
ISSUE:1.
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in
question.2.
Whether or not a check drawn against the dollar account with a foreign bank is
covered by BP Blg. 22
RULING: The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
I. WON RTC has jurisdiction

The RTC has jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the statute in force at the time of commencement of the action. The
Rules of Court provide that in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense
was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place The court also
stated that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information.
In this particular case, the information filed against petitioner specifically alleged
that the offense was committed in Makati, and therefore, the same is controlling
and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the RTC of Makati. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a
complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. Moreover, in the
case of Que v. People of the Philippines, the court held that the determinative factor
in determining venue is the place of the issuance of the check. On the matter of
venue for violation of BP 22, the Ministry of Justice laid down the following
guidelines the pertinent portion of which reads:
(1)
Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered