Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CHAPTER I
Province of Batangas v. Hon. Alberto Romulo (2004)
Art X of the Constitution markedly increased the powers of the local
governments in order to accomplish the goal of a more meaningful local
autonomy.
Facts:
In 1998, Pres. Estrada issued EO 48 (Establishing a Program for
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization) to "facilitate the process of
enhancing the capacities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions
and services devolved to them by the Natl Govt Agencies
concerned pursuant to the LGC."
The Oversight Committee was constituted and has been tasked to
formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary
for its effective implementation.
The Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was created to
address the funding shortfalls of functions and services devolved to
the LGUs and other funding requirements of the program.
The DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by
the Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal
surveys undertaken by the DILG. The initial fund was to be sourced
from the available savings of the natl govt for CY 1998.
For 1999 and the succeeding years, the corresponding amount
required to sustain the program was to be incorporated in the annual
General Appropriations Acts (GAA).
The Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue the
implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) governing the equitable
allocation and distribution of said fund to the LGUs.
The Local Govt Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) could not be
released to the LGUs without the Oversight Committees prior
approval.
The Oversight Committee laid down guidelines and mechanisms that
the LGUs had to comply with before they could avail of funds from
this portion of the LGSEF.
Petitioners arguments:
The provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions which earmarked the
amount of P5B of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 & 2001 for the
LGSEF and imposed conditions for their release, violate the Constitution and
the LGC.
1. Sec 6, Art X of the Constitution mandates that the "just share" of the
LGUs shall be automatically released to them.
2. Secs 18 and 286 of LGC provide that the "just share" of the LGUs
shall be "automatically and directly" released to them "without need
of further action".
3. To subject the distribution and release of the P5B portion of the IRA,
classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the IRRs,
including the mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the
Oversight Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the
Constitution that the LGUs' share in the national taxes "shall be
automatically released to them." The use of the word "shall" must be
given a compulsory meaning.
4. To vest the Oversight Committee with the authority to determine the
distribution and release of the LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA of
the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy as
embodied in the Constitution and the LGC.
5. The possible disapproval by the Oversight Committee of the project
proposals of the LGUs would result in the diminution of the latter's
share in the IRA.
6. The assailed OCD resolutions provided for a different percentage
sharing scheme of the IRA among the LGUs as provided in Sec 285
of the LGC (Provinces 23%; Cities 23%; Municipalities 34%;
and Barangays 20%). Such modifications constitute an illegal
amendment by the executive branch of a substantive law.
Respondents arguments:
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the assailed
resolutions issued by the Oversight Committee are not constitutionally
infirm.
1. Sec 6, Art X of the Constitution does not specify that the "just share"
of the LGUs shall be determined solely by the LGC. The phrase "as
determined by law" in the same Constitutional provision means that
there exists no limitation on the power of Congress to determine
what is the "just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes. In other
words, Congress is the arbiter of what should be the "just share" of
the LGUs in the national taxes.
2. Sec 285 of the LGC, which provides for the percentage sharing of
the IRA among the LGUs, was not intended to be a fixed
Issue: WON the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution and the LGC (YES)
Held/Ratio:
1987 Constitution
Art X of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and
promoting the autonomy of LGUs. Sec 2 of Art X reiterates that the
territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution
confines the President's power over the LGUs to one of general
supervision and not the power of control:
o Drilon v. Lim (enunciated the distinction between the 2
powers): An officer in control lays down the rules in the
doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. The
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules,
nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If
the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or redone but only to conform to the prescribed rules.
LGC of 1991
Sec 2 of LGC also amplifies the State policy on local autonomy.
Sec 6, Art X of the Constitution reads: LGUs shall have a just share,
as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
Petitioners argument:
Under A.O. No. 267 series of 1992, the power of general supervision
of the President over local government units does not apply to the
Liga and its chapters because the Liga is not a local government unit.
The order making DILG interim caretaker divested the incumbent
officers and directors of the Liga of their right to their respective
offices without due process of law. Sec. 507 of the Loc. Gov. Code
provides that the Liga shall be governed by its own constitution and
by-laws; pursuant to such, they had a vested right to their elective
positions and may not be removed by mere issuances of the DILG.
Even assuming the Liga could be considered a local government,
there is an absence of legal basis for the appointment the DILG as
interim caretaker.
The actions contemplated by the DILG as interim caretaker go
beyond supervision and constitute control, as it sought and obtained
authority to alter, modify, nullify or set aside actions of the Liga.
Appointment of Rayos as Liga President while David was still
occupying that position which was still subject of the quo
warranto proceedings.
Issuance of DILG Memo Circular 97-173 providing
supplemental guidelines for synchronized elections that replaced
the implementing rules adopted by the Liga pursuant to its
constitution and by-laws and enjoined all heads of government
units from recognizing David and/ or honouring any of his
pronouncements relating to the Liga.
In the case of Taule v. Santos, the Court ruled that the DILG Sec. has
no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of
officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay or barangay councils.
Respondents arguments:
The Liga members are subject to the power of supervision of the
DILG since the DILG Sec. supervises the acts of local officials by
ensuring that they act within the scope of their prescribed powers and
Issue/s:
WON respondent Judge acted with GAD in appointing DILG as
interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the
National Liga Board (YES).
WON the Liga is a government organization that is subject to the
power of supervision of the DILG Sec. over local governments.
WON the designation of DILG as interim caretaker has invested
the DILG with control over the Liga and whether its Memo
Circulars issued before and during its capacity as interim
caretaker involve supervision or control
Held:
On WON the Liga is a government organization subject to the power of
supervision
The barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing unit
of government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities in
the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the
people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where
disputes may be amicably settled.
The Liga ng mga Barangay is the organization of all barangays. Its
purpose is the determination of the representation of the Liga in
the sanggunians, and the ventilation, articulation, and crystallization
of issues affecting barangay government administration and securing
solutions thereto, through proper and legal means.
prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no
judgment on this matter except to see that the rules are followed
In Bito-Onon v. Fernandez, the Court held that the Presidents power
of the general supervision, as exercised therein by the DILG
Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay.
In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled
that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an
association, federation, league or union created by law or by
authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected
government officials.
National Liga Board and its officers had violated Liga rules, the
DILG should have ordered the Liga to conduct another election in
accordance with the Ligas own rules, but not in obeisance to DILGdictated guidelines. Neither had the DILG the authority to remove
the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace them, even
temporarily, with unelected Liga officers.
(b) All property and property rights vested in any pueblo under its
former organization shall continue to be vested in the same
municipality after its incorporation under this Act.
3. Thus, based on these laws, municipalities like Catbalogan have the
right to acquire real and personal property.
4. Catbalogan should be considered the owner of the parcel because
a. upon its founding, it was given the land by the provincial
government. It acquired exclusive ownership of the parcel
for the purposes of erecting a courthouse. The records of the
case show no contrary proof.
b. It had been occupying the property far longer than the period
required for extraordinary prescription based on article 1959
of the Civil Code (occupation period: 40-45 years)
c. The presumption that it had been holding the land as an
owner had not been rebutted
Other Opinions of the Court
1. Catbalogan is the owner regardless of the fact that a document
representing the record of the concession and award of the parcel
was not presented because
a. As a very old municipality, it has undergone many changes
in staff
b. While the original capitan pedaneo may have held the
document, it would not be a surprise if through the course of
his many successors, the document may have been lost
c. It would actually be more of a surprise if the document still
existed
2. Despite the lack of the document, Catbalogans peaceful occupation
of the parcel is more than enough to represent its title.
3. Inapplicable laws and jurisprudence:
a. Law 8, Title 3, Book 6 and Article 53 of the ordinances of
good government
b. Royal decrees of February 28, 1883, August 1, 1883, and
January 17, 1885
c. Doctrine of City of Manila v Insular Government: the parcel
in this case is a building lot absolutely required by
Catbalogan at the beginning of its organization; that case
involved a common area
d. Doctrine of Aguado v City of Manila: Catbalogan, in the
exercise of the right of ownership over its own property, has
a legally recognized independent personality of its own and
is not a mere deligate of the central authority
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Issue: W/N a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of
the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191
of the Revised Administrative Code.
Held/Ratio:
1. The Presidents power to remove or suspend local elective officers is
controlled by certain provisions of the Revised Administrative Code
(RAC)
a. Lacson v. Roque President has no inherent power to
remove or suspend local elective officers. Such removal and
SEC.!2188.!Supervisory+authority+of+provincial+governor+over+municipal+officers.!!The!provincial!governor!shall!receive!and!
investigate!complaints!made!under!oath!against!municipal!officers!for!neglect!of!duty,!oppression,!corruption!or!other!form!
of!maladministration!of!office,!and!conviction!by!final!judgment!of!any!crime!involving!moral!turpitude.!For!minor!
delinquency,!he!may!reprimand!the!offender;!and!if!a!more!severe!punishment!seems!to!be!desirable,!he!shall!
submit!written+charges!touching!the!matter!to!the!provincial!board,!furnishing!a!copy!of!such!charges!to!the!accused!either!
personally!or!by!registered!mail,!and!he!may!in!such!case!suspend!the!officer!(not!being!the!municipal!treasurer)!pending!
action!by!the!board,!if!in!his!opinion!the!charge!be!one!affecting!the!official!integrity!of!the!officer!in!question.!Where!
suspension!is!thus!effected!the!written!charges!against!the!officer!shall!be!filed!with!the!board!within!five!days.!
SEC.!2189.!Trial+of+municipal+officer+by+provincial+board.!!When!written!charges!are!preferred!by!a!provincial!governor!
against!a!municipal!officer,!the!provincial!board!shall,!at+its+next+meeting,!regular!or!special,!set!a!day,!hour,!and!place!for!the!
trial!of!the!same!and!notify!the!respondent!thereof;!and!at!the!to!and!place!appointed,!the!board!shall!proceed!to!hear!and!
investigate!the!truth!or!falsity!of!said!charges,!giving!the!accused!official!full!opportunity!to!be!heard!in!his!defense.!The!
hearing!shall!occur!as!soon!as!may!be!practicable,!and!in!case!suspension!has!been!effected,!not+later+than+ten+days+from!the!
date!the!accused!is!furnished!or!has!sent!to!him!a!copy!of!the!charges,!unless!the!suspended!official!shall,!on!sufficient!
grounds,!request!an!extension!of!time!to!prepare!his!defense.!
The+preventive+suspension+of+a+municipal+officer+shall+not+be+for+more+than+thirty+days.+At+the+expiration+of+the+thirty+days,+the+
suspended+officer+shall+be+reinstated+in+office!without!prejudice!to!the!continuation!of!the!proceedings!against!him!until!their!
completion,!unless!the!delay!in!the!decision!of!the!case!is!due!to!the!fault,!neglect,!or!request!of!the!accused,!in!which!case!
the!time!of!the!delay!shall!not!be!counted!in!computing!the!time!of!the!suspension:!Provided,!That!the!suspension!of!the!
accused!may!continue!after!the!expiration!of!the!thirty!days!above!mentioned!in+case+of+conviction!until!the!Secretary!of!the!
Interior!shall!otherwise!direct!or!the!case!shall!finally!be!decided!by!said!Secretary.!
SEC.!2190.!Action+by+provincial+board.!!If,!upon!due!consideration,!the!provincial!board!shall!adjudge!that!the!charges!are!
not!sustained,!the!proceedings!shall!be!dismissed;!if!it!shall!adjudge!that!the!accused!has!been!guilty!of!misconduct!which!
would!be!sufficiently!punished!by!reprimand!or!further!reprimand,!it!shall!direct!the!provincial!governor!to!deliver!such!
reprimand!in!pursuance!of!its!judgment;!and!in!either!case!the!official,!if!suspended,!shall!be!reinstated.!
If!in!the!opinion!of!the!board!the!case!is!one!requiring!more!severe!discipline,!and!in!case!of!appeal,!it!shall!without!
unnecessary!delay!forward!to!the!Secretary!of!the!Interior,!within+eight+days!after!the!date!of!the!decision!of!the!provincial!
board,!certified!copies!of!the!record!in!the!case,!including!the!charges,!the!evidence,!and!the!findings!of!the!board,!to!which!
shall!be!added!the!recommendation!of!the!board!as!to!whether!the!official!ought!to!be!suspended,!further!suspended,!or!
finally!dismissed!from!office;!and!in!such!case!the!board!may!exercise!its!direction!to!reinstate!the!official,!if!suspended.!
The!trial!of!a!suspended!municipal!official!and!the!proceedings!incident!thereto!shall!be!given!preference!over!the!current!
and!routine!business!of!the!board.!
SEC.!2191.!Action+by+Secretary+of+the+Interior.!!Upon!receiving!the!papers!in!any!such!proceedings,!the!Secretary!of!the!
Interior!shall!review!the!case!without+unnecessary+delay+and!shall!make!such!order!for!the!reinstatement,!dismissal,!
suspension,!or!further!suspension!of!the!official,!as!the!facts!shall!warrant!and+shall+render+his+final+decision+upon+the+matter+
offices but does not have the same control over local
governments.
b. The argument that Section 79(C) of the RAC confers upon
the department head the power to order the investigation of
an official of a local government for malfeasance in office
contravenes the provisions ofparagraph 1, section 10, Article
VII, of the Constitution, since the President (and thus, his
agents like the head of the department of the interior) only
has supervision and not control of local governments. The
argument would do away with the distinction between
supervision (overseeing subordinate officers performance of
their duties, necessitating only the taking of actions to make
them perform their duties) and control (power to alter or
modify or set aside the action of a subordinate officer and to
substitute ones judgment for the latters).
c. Sec. 79 (C) of the RAC and Sec. 37 of Act 4007 shows that
Congress lodged the provincial supervision over municipal
officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to
investigate complaints against municipal officers for neglect
of duty, oppression, corruption, maladministration of office
and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude. Sec. 86 of the RAC does not add to the
power of supervision of the head of the department of the
interior over the administration of municipalities.
d. Gabriel v. Govt of Pampanga President cannot even
disapprove any ordinance or resolution of provincial boards
(except when the same is illegal). The SC used it to reason
that if he cannot even disapprove ordinances of provincial
boards, then moreso can he not substitute his judgment in
lieu of the judgment of municipal councils or provincial
boards.
e. THUS, the word offices used in Sec. 79 (C ), over which
the President has control, cannot be deemed to include local
governments.
3. [On Respondents Argument 2] Despite what seems to be an
unqualified grant of authority to investigate officials of the
government, Sec. 64 (c) of the RAC cannot be construed literally w/o
violating the constitution, as the president does not have an
unqualified power to investigate officials of co-equal branches of
government. The Presidents power to investigate is only in addition
to his general supervisory authority and as such, its application to
municipal corporations would violate the constitutional provision
4.
5.
6.
7.
Ganzon v CA (1991)
Doctrine: For the sake of local autonomy, the legislature is not deprived of
all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline. The Constitution still allows Congress to include in the local
government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
Facts:
1. Ten administrative complaints (abuse of authority, oppression, grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable
violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention) were filed against
Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo City by various personalities.
2. Cabaluna was a clerk in the City Health Office, but was assigned by
Mayor Ganzon to a job suited for a non-career service employee while a
utility worker was appointed to her former position. Mayor Ganzon did
this because Cabaluna was a supporter of Ganzon's rival candidate
Caram.
3. Dr. Ortigoza was assigned by Mayor Ganzon to perform a task not
befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City, her
office was padlocked without any explanation, salary was withheld,
given the run-around treatment in the approval of her leave, and was the
object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative
complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas.
4. Finding probable grounds on both charges, the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government issued a 60 day preventive suspension
order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11, 1988. Out of the 10,
one of which is an arbitrary detention case filed by Erbite, a Barangay
Tanod appointed by the former mayor of Iloilo. Erbite was arrested
without a warrant of arrest and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo as per
the order of Mayor Ganzon. Prima facie evidence was found to exists
against Mayor Ganzon for the aforementioned case so the Secretary of
the Department of Local Government issued a second 60 day preventive
suspension dated October 11, 1988
5. The Secretary of the Department of Local Government issued another
60-day preventive suspension. This is the third suspension in 20 months.
Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor was designated as acting mayor.
6. Mayor Ganzon instituted one action for prohibition against the Secretary
of the Department of Local Government in the RTC. A writ of
preliminary injunction was granted to him.
(1)$Preventive$suspension$may$be$imposed$by$the$Minister$of$Local$Government$if$the$
respondent$is$a$provincial$or$city$official,$by$the$provincial$governor$if$the$respondent$is$
an$elective$municipal$official,$or$by$the$city$or$municipal$mayor$if$the$respondent$is$an$
elective$barangay$official$
(2)$Preventive$suspension$may$be$imposed$at$any$time$after$the$issues$are$joined,$when$
there$is$reasonable$ground$to$believe$that$the$respondent$has$committed$the$act$or$acts$
complained$of,$when$the$evidence$of$culpability$is$strong,$when$the$gravity$of$the$offense$
so$warrants,$or$when$the$continuance$in$office$of$the$respondent$could$influence$the$
witnesses$or$pose$a$threat$to$the$safety$and$integrity$of$the$records$and$other$evidence.$
In$all$cases,$preventive$suspension$shall$not$extend$beyond$sixty$days$after$the$start$of$
said$suspension.$$
(3)$At$the$expiration$of$sixty$days,$the$suspended$official$shall$be$deemed$reinstated$in$
office$without$prejudice$to$the$continuation$of$the$proceedings$against$him$until$its$
termination.$However$'$if$the$delay$in$the$proceedings$of$the$case$is$due$to$his$fault,$
neglect$or$request,$the$time$of$the$delay$shall$not$be$counted$in$computing$the$time$of$
suspension.!
b.
c.
d.
e.
Section 69 provides all city ordinances and orders in force at the time of the
passage of this act, and not inconsistent herewith,' until modified or repealed
by ordinances passed under this act.
The assertion of the City of Manila against liability rests upon the supposed
analogy to the doctrine of principal and agent, the death of the principal
(Spain) ending the agency (Ayuntamiento de Manila). Such assertion is false
for it loses sight of the dual character of municipal corporations.
The US Supreme Court cited Lloyd v. New York where it is said:
'The corporation of the city of New York possesses two kinds of powers: one
governmental and public, and to the extent they are held and exercised, is
clothed with sovereignty; the other private, and to the extent they are held
and exercised, is a legal individual. The former are given and used for public
purposes, the latter for private purposes. While in the exercise of the former,
the corporation is a municipal government; and while in the exercise of the
latter, is a corporate legal individual.'
In Chicago Co. v. McGlinn, it was said:
'It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United
States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any
territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the
municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are intended for the
protection of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or changed by
the new government or sovereign. By the cession, public property passes
from one government to the other, but private property remains as before,
and with it those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful
use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and
regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and
constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a
cession of political jurisdiction and legislative powerand the latter is
involved in the formerto the United States, the laws of the country in
support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or
authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease
to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws
of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing
laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to other
laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and
prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that
a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the
new government, they are altered or repealed.'
The continuity of the corporate city was not inconsistent with military
occupation or the constitution or institutions of the occupying power. Thus,
the articles of capitulation concluded in these words: 'This city, its
inhabitants and its private property of all descriptions, are placed under the
special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army.' This was
quoted in President McKinley's instructions of April 7, 1900, to the
Philippine Commission.
The Treaty of Paris reads: 'And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment
or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers,
cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to
the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities,
public or private establishments . . . having legal capacity to acquire and
possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private
individuals.' Thus, the property and property rights of municipal corporations
were protected and safeguarded precisely as were the property and property
rights of individuals.
Corporate Identity and Liability were not extinguished as a result of the new
Charter granted by the 1901 Philippine Comission. The inhabitants of the old
city are the incorporators of the new. There is substantially identity of area.
The new corporation is endowed with all of the property and property rights
of the old. It has the same power to sue and be sued which the former
corporation had.
Laying out of view any question of the constitutional guaranty against
impairment of the obligation of contracts, there is, in the absence of express
legislative declaration of a contrary purpose, no reason for supposing that the
reincorporation of an old municipality is intended to permit an escape from
the obligations of the old, to whose property and rights it has succeeded.
In Shapleigh v. San Angelo, supra, this court said in a similar case:
'The state's plenary power over its municipal corporations to change their
organization, to modify their method of internal government, or to abolish
them altogether, is not restricted by contracts entered into by the municipality
with its creditors or with private parties. An absolute repeal of a municipal
charter is therefor effectual so far as it abolishes the old corporate
organization; but when the same or substantially the same inhabitants are
erected into a new corporation, whether with extended or restricted territorial
limits, such new corporation is treated as in law the successor of the old one,
entitled to its property rights, and subject to its liabilities.'
ISSUES:
1. Is RA 4790 unconstitutional?
2. Can the law be salvaged as to the 9 barrios actually in the province
of Lanao del Sur?
RULING:
1. YES, RA 4790 is unconstitutional.
Compliance with the requirement [Art VI, Sec 21 (1), 1987
Consitution] that the title of the bill is to be couched in a language
sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned
of the import of the single subject there of, is imperative. The
constitution does not exact of the Congress to read the entire text of
the bill, thus, the title must be stated in such a way as to sufficiently
express the subject of the statute.
o It does not require that the Congress employ such precision
as to mirror even the minute details of the bill. It suffices if
the title informs the legislators and persons interested of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. The test of sufficiency is whether or not the title is
misleading.
In this case, not a slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in the new town in
Lanao del Sur. It is not acceptable to say that the dismembering of
the 12 barrios is a necessary incident of the creation of a new town
that it may be reasonable inferred from the title of the law. Change of
boundaries may be made without necessarily creating a new
municipality and vice versa.
o Hume vs. Village of Fruitport: Very similar case, the title of
the act is An act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in
the County of Muskegon. It creates the impression that the
law affects only the County of Muskegon when Sec 1 of the
law included territories of both Muskegon and Ottawa
Michigan. The law was declared void.
2. NO, the law is null and void in its entirety.
We are not to assume that the Congress would still have intended to
create a new town with only the 9 barrios, excluding the 12 as stated
in the bill.
Municipal Corporations perform twin functions:
o They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out
the functions of gvernment
o They act as an agency of the community in the
administration of local affairs " It is in this character that
they are a separate entity acting in their own purposes and
not a subdivision of the State. Thus, several factors
(population, territory and income) come to the fore in the
consideration whether a group is capable of maintaining
itself as an independent municipality.
The bill, having in view the 21 barrios, stated that the territory has
become a progressive community; that the average population is
large; and that the collective income is sufficient to maintain an
independent municipality. Thus, it cannot be said that the Congress
intended to create Dianaton with only 9 barrios instead of the 21.
Petitioner filed MR, which was denied. Petitioner then filed the petition
for review.
Upon change of administration, respondent filed a manifestation
expressing its agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it needs to secure an
ECC for its proposed project.
While the petition has been rendered moot, the court decided to address the
issue raised, for the guidance of the implementors of the EIS law.
Petitioners arguments:
Petitioner: Republic, represented by (1) DENR Secretary Alvarez, (2)
DENR-Region XI Regional Exec Director Baguilat, and (3) DENR-EMBRegion XI Regional Derector, Engr. Lipayon
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the RTC, which
granted the writ of mandamus and injunction in favor of the City of Davao
The proposed project was within an environmentally critical area. The City
of Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment process to
secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate, pursuant to Sec2, PD
1586 (Environmental Impact Statement System) in relation to Sec4 of PD
1151 (Philippine Environment Policy), before it can proceed with the
construction of its project
Respondents arguments:
Respondent: City of Davao, represented by Mayor De Guzman
Arguments in the RTC: Its proposed project was neither an
environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical area;
thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system.
It was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to
issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the required
documents.
(RTC in favor of Respondent) There is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to
PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for
compliance with the EIA system), which requires LGUs to comply with the
EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government,
including government owned or controlled corporations, as well as private
corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA
process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on the
quality of the environment.
An LGU, not being an agency or
instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded under the
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Issue/s:
W/N LGUs are required to comply with the EIS law (YES)
W/N the site was within an environmentally critical area (NO)
Held/Ratio:
Nature of LGUs
Section 15 of the Local Government Code, defines a local government unit
as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it
in conformity with law.
- It performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary.
- Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and
the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public
generally.
- Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate
benefits or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage
and benefit.
- When exercising governmental powers and performing governmental
duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government. When
engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the community in
the administration of local affairs.
Section 16 of the Local Government Code provides for the duty of the
LGUs to promote the peoples right to a balanced ecology. An LGU, like
the City of Davao, can not claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586.
As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has the
duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same
objective of PD 1586.
Section 4 of PD 1586 states that no person, partnership or corporation
shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical
project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.
- The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state
and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are
juridical persons. Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are
not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.
Environmentally Critical Area
The arguments, however, presuppose that a project is environmentally
critical or within an environmentally critical area. Respondent has
sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports Dome will not have a significant
CHAPTER II
The Province of Negros Occidental v. COA, et al (2010)
Doctrine: LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the
President and the latters authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are
followed and laws are faithfully executed which means that the President
may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President cannot
lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace
the rules.
Facts:
1. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed Resolution
No. 720-A on Dec. 21, 1994 allocating P4,000,000 of its retained
earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of
1,949 officials and employees of the province.
o After a public bidding, the Committee on Awards granted the
insurance coverage to Philam Care.
2. The Province of Negros Occidental (represented by its then Governor
Rafael L. Coscolluela) and Philam Care then entered into a Group Health
Care Agreement involving a total payment of P3,760,000 representing
the insurance premiums of its officials and employees which was paid on
January 25, 1996.
3. After a post-audit investigation on January 23, 1997, the Provincial
Auditor issued Notice of Suspension No. 97-001-101 suspending the
premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the
President as provided under AO No. 103.
o The Provincial Auditor explained that the premium payment for
health care benefits violated RA 6758 otherwise known as the Salary
Standardization Law.
4. The Province complied with the directive post-facto and sent a letterrequest dated January 12, 1999 to the OP.
5. In a Memorandum dated January 26, 1999, then President Estrada
directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the amount of
P100,000.
6. However, the Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President
and instead issued Notice of Disallowance No. 99-005-101(96) dated
September 10, 1999 stating similar grounds as mentioned in Notice of
Suspension No. 97-001-101.
7. The Province appealed the disallowance to the COA however the latter
affirmed the Provincial Auditors decision to disallow the health benefits.
Petitioner adds that while it is true that LGUs are only agents of the
national government and local autonomy simply means decentralization,
it is equally true that an LGU has fiscal control over its own revenues
derived solely from its own tax base.
The Provinces aforementioned arguments are consistent with the state
policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under
Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X, and the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The Province further relied on the Civil Service Commissions
Memorandum Circular No. 33, series of 1997, issued on 22 December
1997 which provided the policy framework for working conditions at the
workplace.
o In said circular, the CSC pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 97-4684
dated 18 December 1997 took note of the inadequate policy on basic
health and safety conditions of work experienced by government
personnel. Thus, under CSC MC No. 33, all government offices
including LGUs were directed to provide a health program for
government employees which included hospitalization services and
annual mental, medical-physical examinations
Later, CSC MC No. 33 was further reiterated in AO No. 402 which took
effect on 2 June 1998. Sections 1, 2, and 4 of AO 402 state:
Section 1.Establishment of the Annual Medical Check-up Program. An
annual medical check-up for government of officials and employees is
hereby authorized to be established starting this year, in the meantime
that this benefit is not yet integrated under the National Health
Insurance Program being administered by the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PHIC).
Section 2.Coverage. x x x Local Government Units are also
encouraged to establish a similar program for their personnel.
Section 4.Funding. x x x Local Government Units, which may establish
a similar medical program for their personnel, shall utilize local funds
for the purpose.
Respondents arguments: (Note: include respondents position, reason for
opposing petitioners claim, jurisprudence, and legal basis)
According to the respondents, the benefits should be disallowed for
contravening AO 103 and RA 6758.
Respondents maintain that although LGUs are afforded local fiscal
autonomy, LGUs are still bound by RA 6758 and their actions are
subject to the scrutiny of the DBM and applicable auditing rules and
regulations enforced by the COA.
with the legislated policy on the matter or are not covered by any
legislative action are revoked.
Issue/s:
WON COA committed GAD in affirming the disallowance of P3,760,000
for premium paid for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits
granted by the Province of Negros Occidental to its officials and employees
Held/Ratio:(Note: include legal basis and jurisprudence)
Yes, the COA committed GAD in disallowing the benefits granted by the
Province of Negros Occidental.
The Court explained that from a close reading of the provisions of AO
103, the Province did not violate the rule of prior approval from the
President since Section 2 states that the prohibition applies only to
"government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards"
and that nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also
applies to LGUs.
According to the court, the requirement then of prior approval from the
President under AO 103 is applicable only to departments, bureaus,
offices and government-owned and controlled corporations under the
Executive branch.
In other words, AO 103 must be observed by government offices under
the Presidents control as mandated by Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution
Section 17. The President shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
According to the court, the Province of Negros being an LGU, is merely
under the Presidents general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article
X of the Constitution:
Section. 4.The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
The court explained that the Presidents power of general supervision
means the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates
perform their functions according to law, which is distinguished from the
Buklod:
o Prior to Ordinance Nos. 1 and 29-A, there were already laws
implementing agrarian reform, particularly: (1) Republic
Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, in effect since August 8, 1963, and
subsequently amended by Republic Act No. 6389 on
September 10, 1971, after which it became known as the
Code of Agrarian Reforms; and (2) Presidential Decree
No. 27, otherwise known as the Tenants Emancipation
Decree, which took effect on November 19, 1972.
Agricultural land could not be converted for the purpose of
evading land reform for there were already laws granting
farmer-tenants security of tenure, protection from ejectment
without just cause, and vested rights to the land they work
on.
o EMRASON failed to comply with Section 36 of the Code
of Agrarian Reforms, which provided that the conversion
of land should be implemented within one year, otherwise,
the conversion is deemed in bad faith. Given the failure of
EMRASON to comply with many other requirements for a
valid conversion, the subject property has remained
agricultural. Simply put, no compliance means no
conversion. In fact, Buklod points out, the subject property
is still declared as "agricultural" for real estate tax purposes.
Consequently, EMRASON is now estopped from insisting
that the subject property is actually "residential."
o Land reform is a constitutional mandate which should be
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4
Art. II, Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
Art. X, Section 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or
coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to
them in accordance with law.
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery
of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
Ganzon vs. CA: the concept of local autonomy does not imply the
conversion of local government units into mini-states.
The Constitution did not intend to sever the relation of partnership and
interdependence between the central administration and local government
units.
Pimentel vs. Aguirre: Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy,
the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over
local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. To enable
the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally
must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus,
policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
Limbona vs. Mangelin distinguishes: Decentralization of
Administrationwhen the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions ..x x x.. it relieves the central government of
the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns.
Decentralization of Power involves an abdication of political power in
favor of local government units. Decentralization of power is beyond our
constitutional concept of autonomy.
1. She agrees with the holding on the devolution but she opines that Dr.
Castillo abandoned her position by acquiescence. Abandonment of
office may be by non-user or acquiescence: Non-user refers to a
neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office while
acquiescence is a silent appearance of consent by failure to make any
objection or by submission to an act of which one had knowledge. It
exists where a person knows or ought to know that he is entitled to
enforce his right or to impeach a transaction, and neglects to do so
for such a length of time as would imply that he intended to waive or
abandon his right
2. Dr. Castillos manifest inaction to assert a legal right from 1992 up
to her retirement from government service in 1996 constituted
abandonment by acquiescence. The ponencias position (re
retirement or fear of reprisal from the Governor) is speculative.
S
S
Respondents arguments:
S Respondent argues that in the event the local chief executives
recommendees do not meet the qualifications for the position of
PBO, it may validly exercise its prerogative to fill-in such position.
In doing so, it should not be restricted to the list of recommendees in
the final selection of the appointee, and may consider other nominees
for the position.
S The recommendation of the local chief executive is thus merely
directory, and not a condition sine qua non to the exercise of the
DBM of its appointing prerogative.
S It must be considered that the PBO is a nationalized position under
the control and supervision of the DBM Secretary, and appointees
are primarily the choice of the national appointing official. This is
necessary to preserve and maintain the independence of said officer
from the LGU.
S Local Budget Circular No. 31, Sec. 6.0
Governor why no one met the legal requirements and ask for new
recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and
qualifications.
The judicial appointment process may be look at by way of analogy.
A president, in appointing justices and judges, cannot apply the
procedure advanced by the DBM by rejecting all JBC nominees and
appoint another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can
be no reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the
appointing powers personal choice.
Petitioners Position
4. Petitioners argue that:
(a) BP 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with
the following provisions of the old LGC and the 1973 Constitution:
11. The case of Paredes contained a strong dissent from Justice V. Abad
Santos (when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means
all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such
as in the case at bar or all of the people of two or more municipalities if there
be a merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision), reiterated
by him in Lopez, Jr. v. Comelec (1985), involving a referendum which did
not include all the people of Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum was
intended to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up
some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. It is this dissenting opinion
that guided the Court in deciding this case. The rulings in Paredes and
Lopez, Jr. are therefore abandoned.
12. The present case is different from the cases relied upon by respondents:
Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is
now afforded the present Court. The reasons in the mentioned
cases invoked by respondents herein were formerly considered
acceptable because of the views then taken that local autonomy
would be better promoted. However, even this consideration no
longer retains persuasive value.
The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that
the subject matter under consideration is of greater magnitude
with concomitant multifarious complicated problems. In the earlier
case, what was involved was a division of a barangay which is the
smallest political unit in the Local Government Code.
Understandably, few and lesser problems are involved. In the case
at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political
unit contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To
form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities
and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province
of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of
approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an
existing province whose boundaries will be consequently
substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent
effects of the division of the parent province necessarily will affect
all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and
the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the
parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably
affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case,
either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are,
therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of
14. The plebiscite conducted is declared null and void. However, the
petitioners prayer that another plebiscite be conducted wherein all voters of
Negros Occidental shall participate cannot be granted for lack of legal basis.
With constitutional infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big.
885 and also because the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is
not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government
Code, the factual and legal basis for the creation of such new province
which should justify the holding of another plebiscite does not exist.
15. The created province of Negros del Norte does not even satisfy the area
requirement in Sec. 197, (old) LGC:
It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the
exhibits submitted by the petitioners..., that the new province has a
territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This assertion
is made to negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area
of the new province cannot be more than 3,500 square kilometers
because its land area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square
kilometers, taking into account government statistics relative to the
total area of the cities and municipalities constituting Negros del
Norte.
Respondents insist that when Section 197 of the Local Government
Code speaks of the territory of the province to be created and
requires that such territory be at least 3,500 square kilometers, what
is contemplated is not only the land area but also the land and water
over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even
the submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea
within the three mile limit should be considered in determining the
extent of the territory of the new province. Such an interpretation
is strained, incorrect, and fallacious.
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most
revealing. As so stated therein theterritory need not be contiguous if
it comprises two or more islands. The use of the wordterritory in
this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the
very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that territory as therein
used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the
waters over which the political unit exercises control.
Respondent Perea alleged that there was no lawful basis for the
establishment of a second cockpit. She claimed that Tan conducted
his cockpit fights not in Combado, but in Malingin, at a site less than
five kilometers away from her own cockpit. She insisted that the
unlawful operation of Tans cockpit has caused injury to her own
legitimate business, and demanded damages of at least Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) per month as actual damages, One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) as moral damages, and
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages. Perea
also prayed that the permit issued by Te in favor of Tan be declared
as null and void, and that a permanent writ of injunction be issued
against Te and Tan preventing Tan from conducting cockfights
within the municipality and Te from issuing any authority for Tan to
pursue such activity.
Perena claimed that the amendment authorizing the operation of not
more than three (3) cockpits in Daanbantayan violated Section 5(b)
of the Cockfighting Law of 1974, which allowed for only one
cockpit in a municipality with a population as Daanbantayan.
d) Regulate, fix the license fee for, and tax any business or
profession being carried on and exercised within the territorial
jurisdiction of the city
Under cover of the General Welfare Clause as provided in this
section, LGUs can perform just about any power that will benefit
their constituencies. Thus, local government units can exercise
powers that are: (1) expressly granted; (2) necessarily implied from
the power that is expressly granted; (3) necessary, appropriate or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and (4) essential
to the promotion of the general welfare of their inhabitants.
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners arguments:
While the LGC of 1991 extends to LGUs to perform any act that will
benefit their constituents, it does not authorize them to regulate
CATV operations since pursuant to EO 205, only NTC has that
authority.
Respondents arguments:
Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant to Sec. 177(c)&(d) of the
LGC of 1983 which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses,
including the CATV industry.
Resolution No. 210 is in the nature of a contract between petitioner
and respondents, it being a grant to the former of a franchise to
operate a CATV system. To hold that E.O. No. 205 amended its
terms would violate the constitutional prohibition against impairment
of contracts.
Issue/s: W/N a LGU can regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
(cable tv) operators within its territorial jurisdiction. (NO)
Held/Ratio:
1. For more than two decades the NTC has assumed regulatory power over
the CATV industry. Presidential issuances have reinforced the NTCs
powers:
Pres. Marcos issued PD 1512 which granted Sining Makulay the
exclusive franchise to operate CATV system in any place within the
Philippines. It terminated all franchises, permits, or certificated for
CATV systems previously granted by local governments and
national government instrumentalities. Pres. Marcos subsequently
issued letter of instruction 894 vesting upon the Chairman of the
Board of Communications direct supervision over Sining Makulay.
Thereafter he issued EO 546 integrating the Board of
2. Note, however, that this does not mean LGUs are stripped of their general
power to prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the LGC.
When EO 436 decrees that the "regulatory power" shall be vested
"solely" in the NTC, it pertains to the "regulatory power" over those
matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence, such as,
the determination of rates, issuance of certificates of authority, etc.
There is no dispute that the Panlungsod has been empowered to enact
ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause
of the LGC of 1983. It continues to posses such power is clear under
Sec. 16 & 458 of RA 7160 (LGC of 1991).
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the
police power of the State to LGUs. Through this, LGUs may
prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their
constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective
territorial jurisdictions.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by
LGUs under the general welfare clause, primarily because the CATV
system uses public properties. The physical realities of constructing
CATV system allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over
CATV operators.
3. However, in enacting Resolution No. 210, the respondents strayed from
the well recognized limits of its power because:
a. It violates the mandate of existing laws.
Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting as an
agent of the national legislature. Necessarily, its act must
reflect and conform to the will of its principal.
US v. Abendan: An ordinance enacted by virtue of the
general welfare clause is valid, unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the
that the MOA entered into is a very costly error because the area agreed to be
a garbage dumpsite is inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
In 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo issued a Resolution
expressing a strong objection to the planned expansion of the landfill
operation and requesting President Ramos to disapprove the draft
Presidential Proclamation segregating 71.6 hectares from Marikina
Watershed Reservation for the landfill site in San Mateo.
Despite various objections and recommendations raised by
government agencies, the Office of the President signed Proclamation No.
635 (Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of
Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites And Similar
Waste Disposal under the Administration of the MMDA) setting aside parts
of the Marikina Watershed Reservation for use as a sanitary landfill and
similar waste disposal applications. This was due to the garbage crisis
plaguing Metro Manila and its environs.
Petitioners arguments:
The Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo and various
concerned citizens assailed the legality and constitutionality of Proclamation
No. 635. The CA denied their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for a TRO. Petitioners, pending appeal, filed a
Motion for TRO pointing out that the effects of the El Nino phenomenon
would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, cutting down thousands of mature fruit trees and forest trees,
and leveling hills and mountains to clear the dumping area. Garbage disposal
operations are also conducted on a 24 hour basis with toxic and infectious
wastes intensifying the air, ground and water pollution.
* In 1999, because of the gravity of the situation and the likelihood that
violence will erupt among the parties, President Estrada issued a
Memorandum ordering the closure of the dumpsite on December 31, 2000.
The MMDA entered into MOA with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the
Municipality of San Mateo and the City of Antipolo where the latter agreed
to further extend the use of the dumpsite until its permanent closure in 2000.
Respondents arguments:
Respondents point out that the Marikina Watershed Reservation, and
thus the San Mateo Site, is located in the public domain. Therefore, neither
the Province of Rizal nor the municipality of San Mateo has the power to
control or regulate its use since properties of this nature belong to the
national, and not to the local governments.
Issue: W/N the San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed (YES)
Held/Ratio:
The San Mateo site has adversely affected its environs and sources of
water should always be protected. According to the cases of Collado v. CA
and Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. CA, the most important
product of a watershed is water, which is one of the most important human
necessities. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility
that needs to be answered now.
The Administrative Code of 1987 and EO No 192 entrust the DENR
with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation. However, although the DENR, a government agency, owns the
Marikina Reserve and has jurisdiction over it, this power is not absolute, but
is defined by the declared policies of the State, and is subject to the law and
higher authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code
states:
1) The DENR shall be primarily responsible for the implementation
of the foregoing policy.
2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of
carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation
of the countrys natural resources.
The Local Government Code gives to local government units all the
necessary powers to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants. The
municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and were in fact
fulfilling their mandate. Section 16 allows every local government unit to
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom,
as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare, which involve promoting health and safety, enhancing the
right of the people to a balanced ecology and preserving the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
Also, under the LGC, two requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
Respondents arguments:
The COA recognizes the local autonomy of LGUs. However, the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL) sets limitations thereof.
There is no specific law passed by Congress which ordains the
conferment of such monetary reward or gratuity to the former
councilors.
Issues: (1) [TOPICAL]w/n the COA has the authority to disallow the
disbursement of local government funds (YES)
(2) w/n the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the disallowance of the monetary award given to former councillors as
authorized by Ordinance No. 8040 (NO)
Held/Ratio: LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within
the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
(1) The ruling in Guevara has already been overturned by the Court
in Caltex Philippines, Inc v COA. Under the 1987 Constitution, the
COA is vested with the authority to determine whether government
entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government
funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of these
funds.
Sec 2, par 2, Art IX-D of the 1987 Constitution provides: The
Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations
in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary,
excessive,
extravagant,
or
unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code on 1987 states the same principle.
Based on its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is
vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to
government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds
and property.
NOTE: The SC decided in favor of the COA but ruled that the petitioners
need not refund the monetary award received by petitioners.
5.
Facts:
1. On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled Establishing a program for
devolution, adjustment and equalization.
a. The program was established to "facilitate the process of
enhancing the capacities of local government units (LGUs)
in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to
them by the National Government Agencies concerned
pursuant to the Local Government Code."
b. The Oversight Committee (referred to as the Devolution
Committee in E.O. No. 48) constituted under Section 533(b)
of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of
1991) has been tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate
rules and regulations necessary for its effective
implementation
2. In Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the GAA of 1999, the
program was renamed as the Local Government Service Equalization
Fund (LGSEF).
3. The Oversight Committee (with then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
B. Zamora as Chairman) passed Resolution Nos. OCD-99-003,
OCD-99-005 and OCD-99-006. Under the allocation scheme
adopted pursuant to Resolution No. OCD-99-005, the Five Billion
pesos LGSEF was to be allocated as determined by the committee.
4. Aside from the criteria for eligibility released by the Oversight
Committee, the LGUs were required to identify the projects eligible
for funding under the one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF and
submit the project proposals thereof and other documentary
requirements to the DILG for appraisal.
a. The guidelines required (a) the LGUs to identify the projects
eligible for funding based on the criteria laid down by the
Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their project
proposals to the DILG for appraisal; (c) the project proposals
that passed the appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the
Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval. It
was only upon approval thereof that the Oversight
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Petitioners Argument:
1. The petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the
OCD resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the amount of five
billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for
the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release thereof, violate
the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates
that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be automatically released
to them. Sections 18 and 286 of the Local Government Code of
1991, which enjoin that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be
"automatically and directly" released to them "without need of
further action" are, likewise, cited.
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release
of the five-billion-peso portion of the IRA, classified as the
LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the implementing rules
and regulations, including the mechanisms and guidelines
prescribed by the Oversight Committee, contravenes the explicit
directive of the Constitution that the LGUs' share in the national
taxes "shall be automatically released to them." The petitioner
maintains that the use of the word "shall" must be given a
compulsory meaning.
o To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends
that to vest the Oversight Committee with the authority
to determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF,
which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema
to the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
# The petitioner cites as an example the
experience in 2001 when the release of the
LGSEF was long delayed because the Oversight
Committee was not able to convene that year
and no guidelines were issued therefor. Further,
the possible disapproval by the Oversight
Committee of the project proposals of the LGUs
would result in the diminution of the latter's
share in the IRA.
o Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the
assailed OCD resolutions is the improper amendment to
Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 on
the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs.
Said provision allocates the IRA as follows: Provinces
The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the LGUs in the
national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries
of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines
and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee
from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the
GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the
release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and
statutory mandate that the "just share" of the LGUs "shall be
automatically released to them."
Indeed, the Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control,
over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF,
is an anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy
as embodied in the Constitution. Moreover, it finds no statutory basis
at all as the Oversight Committee was created merely to formulate
the rules and regulations for the efficient and effective
implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991 to ensure
"compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under
the Constitution."
o The Oversight Committee's authority is undoubtedly limited
to the implementation of the Local Government Code of
1991, not to supplant or subvert the same. Neither can it
exercise control over the IRA, or even a portion thereof, of
the LGUs.
The concept of local autonomy was explained in Ganzon v. Court of
Appeals in this wise:
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy 'means a
more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization.' The
Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to
break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of local governments and as put by political
adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the
imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to
end the relation of partnership and interdependence between
the central administration and local government units, or
otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter
has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under
the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited,
and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically,
to enhance self-government.
Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy.
Batangas v. Romulo:
o The Court interpreted Art. X, Sec. 6 of the Constitution as
follows: When parsed, it would be readily seen that this
provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a just
share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall be
determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be
automatically released to the LGUs.
o Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines
automatic as involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so
that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex
nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an
automaton. Further, the word automatically is defined as in
an automatic manner: without thought or conscious intention.
Being automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory.
o While automatic release implies that the just share of the local
governments determined by law should be released to them as a
matter of course, the GAA provisions, on the other hand,
withhold its release pending an event which is not even certain
of occurring. To rule that the term "automatic release"
contemplates such conditional release would be to strip the term
automatic of all meaning.
o The only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of
the IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the
current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the
preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be
automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the
collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even
be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections
of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current
fiscal year.
Pimentel v. Aguirre: A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue.
The Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by
Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to lower the budget
deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.
o Pimentel v. Aguirre: The rule of law requires that even the best
intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods.
CHAPTER III
Aldaba vs. COMELEC (2010)
Doctrine: First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only
if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board. Second, certifications based on demographic
projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the
middle of every year.
Facts:
Bulacan was previously represented in Congress by four legislative
districts. The first legislative district comprised of Malolos City and
other municipalities.
On May 1, 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, which amended Malolos
City Charter by creating a separate legislative district for the city.
At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress
in 2007, the population of Malolos was only 223,069. However, the
bills relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director
of the NSO that the projected population of Malolos will be 254,030
by the year 2010, using the population growth rate of 3.78 between
1995 to 2000.
Petitioners arguments:
Petitioners are taxpayers, registered voters, and residents of Malolos
City.
They filed this original action for prohibition contending that RA
9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress, as
per Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Respondents arguments:
The Office of the Solicitor General contended that Congress use of
projected population is non-justiciable because it involves a
determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the
legislature to determine compliance with a constitutional
requirement.
Petitioners arguments:
(1) The proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is not qualified to become a
province because it failed to comply with the land area or the population
requirement, despite its compliance with the income requirement. It has a
total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers, which falls short of the
statutory requirement of at least 2,000 square kilometers. Moreover, based on
the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the total population of the proposed
Province of Dinagat Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory requirement
is a population of at least 250,000 inhabitants.
(2) When the Implementing Rules and Regulations conflict with the law that
they seek to implement, the law prevails. In enacting R.A. No. 9355 into law,
the House of Representatives and the Senate erroneously relied on paragraph
2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, which states that "[t]he land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands." The preceding italicized provision contained in the Implementing
Rules and Regulations is not expressly or impliedly stated as an exemption to
the land area requirement in Section 461 of the Local Government Code.
Respondents arguments:
(1) The Province of Dinagat Islands met the legal standard for its creation.
First, the Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the
average annual income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands
for the years 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices
was P82,696,433.25.
Second, the Lands Management Bureau certified that though the land
area of the Province of Dinagat Islands is 802.12 square kilometers,
it is composed of one or more islands; thus, it is exempt from the
required land area of 2,000 square kilometers under paragraph 2 of
Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code.
Third, in the special census conducted by the Provincial Government
of Surigao del Norte, with the assistance of a District Census
Coordinator of the NSO, the number of inhabitants in the Province of
Dinagat Islands as of 2003, or almost three years before the
enactment of R.A. No. 9355 in 2006, was 371,576, which is more
than the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
(2) Governor Ace S. Barbers contends that although the result of the special
census conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte on
December 2, 2003 was never certified by the NSO, it is credible since it was
conducted with the aid of a representative of the NSO. He alleged that the
lack of certification by the NSO was cured by the presence of NSO officials,
who testified during the deliberations on House Bill No. 884 creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands, and who questioned neither the conduct of the
special census nor the validity of the result.
Issues:
(1) WON RA 9355, creating the new province of Dinagat Islands, complied
with the constitution and statutory requirements under section 461 of the
LGC of 1991.
(2) WON the creation of Dinagat as a new province by the respondents is an
act of gerrymandering.
(3) WON the result of the plebiscite is credible and truly reflects the mandate
of the people.
Held/Ratio:
(1) NO. (The Court first discusses the constitutional requirements before it
moves on to discuss the statutory requirements.)
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution states:
SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected."
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed
the criteria for the creation of a province, thus:
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be
created if it has an average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices
and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office:
Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating
that "[t]he land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province
is composed of one (1) or more islands" is null and void.
In fine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the
population requirement for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands.
R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains
an approximate land area of eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares
(80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including Hibuson Island and
approximately forty-seven (47) islets x x x." R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed
to comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.
The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province,
including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local
Government Code. There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between
the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the
basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law.
The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population
requirement of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO.
Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NSO, the
population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only
106,951.
Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the
criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local
Government Code.
(2) The argument of petitioners is unsubstantiated. "Gerrymandering" is a
term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so
contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled Rodolfo
Navarro, et al., vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, as representative of the
President of the Philippines, et al. rendered a Decision, dated 10 February 2010,
declaring Republic Act No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the
criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local
Government Code in relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] for Reconsideration on
the above decision of the Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member,
House of Representatives representing the lone congressional district of Dinagat
Islands, (2) names of the candidates for the aforementioned position, (3) position
for Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4) names of the candidates for the said position, (5)
position of the Vice Governor, (6) the names of the candidates for the said
position, (7) positions for the ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and,
[8] all the names of the candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, have
already been configured into the system and can no longer be revised within the
remaining period before the elections on May 10, 2010.
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and
depending on whether the Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is
reconsidered or not, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
declare that:
a.
b.
executory, the Dinagat Islands would revert to its former status as a nonprovince. Consequently, the results of the May 2010 elections would
have to be nullified, and a special election would have to be conducted
for various positions (Governor, Vice-Governor, etc) for Surigao del
Norte. Hence the intervenors became real parties in interest with the
declaration finality of the 2010 case decision. (Hence, the imperative to
grant this Urgent Motion.)
7. Movants-intervenors filed their motion for leave to intervene and to file
motion for reconsideration. SC denied.
8. On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment
stating that the decision in this case had become final and executory on
May 18, 2010.
9. Hence, this Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment.
INTERVENORS-MOVANTS Position:
The passage of RA 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands)
operates as act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
not be able to vote for Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan and
Member, House of Representatives, Dinagat Islands. Also, the
voters of the wholeProvince of Surigao del Norte, will not be able
to
vote
for
the
Governor
and
Vice
Governor, Dinagat Islands. Given this situation, the Commission
will postpone the elections for Governor, Vice Governor,
Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District,
Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, because the election
will result in [a] failure to elect, since, in actuality, there are no
candidates for Governor, Vice Governor, Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, and Member, House of
Representatives, First Legislative District (with Dinagat Islands)
of Surigao del Norte.
c.
If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the
Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as
part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The
result of the election will have to be nullified for the same reasons
given in Item b above. A special election for Governor, Vice
Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative
District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan,
First
District,
Surigao
del
Norte
(with Dinagat Islands) will have to be conducted.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring
income; and
(2) Population or land areaPopulation which shall not be less than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by National
Statistics Office; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at
least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income
of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial
jurisdiction of a province sought to be created shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds.
RESPONDENTs Opposition: RA 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands) should be nullified for being unconstitutional.
When RA 9355 was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 sq. km. only
and a population of only 106,951. The law on the matter (Section 461 of the
LGC) requires that the province to be created either has 1) a continuous
territory of at least 2,000 sq. km., as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or 2) a population of at least 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the
NSO.
Legal Basis:
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
Section 461 of the LGC(see above)
ISSUE: WON the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is valid despite
failure to meet the requirements for the creation of a province as stated under
Section 461 of the LGC (The Court considered the first two arguments of the
intervenors-movants)
HELD/RATIO:
The passage of RA 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands)
operates as act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC.
component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461
(for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of the LGCand to reflect the true legislative
intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
Consistent with the declared policy to provide LGUs genuine and meaningful
local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for
prospective LGUs should be liberally construed in order to achieve the
desired results. Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench
on the equal protection clause as it actually defeats the purpose of local
autonomy and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution..
The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area requirement shall
not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands, is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat
Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.
Dissenting opinion:Vitug, J.
Issue 3:
Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause (Yes)
Held/Ratio:
The exemption provision merely states, Exemption from Republic
Act No. 9009 The City of x x x shall be exempted from the
income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This
one sentence exemption provision contains no classification
standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities
from those that are not exempted.
The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16
municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when
RA 9009 was enacted.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on
substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government
objective which is the purpose of the law,9[23] not limited to
existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated.
No substantial distinction - The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in
the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one
municipality from another for the purpose of the income
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!
The Cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of R.A. No. 9009.
Hence, they are in accordnce with the criteria established in the
LGC pursuant to Section 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The supposedly infringed provision is not a new constitutional
provision. It is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the
1973 constitution. The code similarly referred to in the 1973 and
1987 constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. The
rationale why the Constitution employs the clause in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code is to lay
stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the
criteria (Court noted Fr. Bernas explanation on the same).
The Court also noted that at the time of the enactment of the 1987
Constitution, BP 337, the then LGC was still in place. Had the
framers intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the
LGC, then they would have referred to BP337. Moreover, they
would not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new
LGC.
Consistent with its plenary power, Congress can, via either a
consolidated set of laws or single-subject enactment, impose the
criteria of viability and the same need not be embodied in the local
government code. Pursuing the contention of petitioners that the
criteria may not be provided for in any other law would result in the
conclusion that RA 9009 is also unconstitutional which is illogical
since they used the said law as an argument for the alleged
unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.
Court also discussed that even assuming that conversion shall be in
accordance with the criteria set forth in the LGC, the petitioners
constitutional objections would still be untenable since RA 9009
intended the lgus covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from
the P100 Million income criterion. The following is the discussion of
the Court on its exemption angle:
Originally, 164 of BP 337 provided as requirement an average
regular annual income of at least 10 Million pesos. This was
superseded by 450 of the LGC which provided for at least 20
Million pesos and was further amended by RA 9009 which provided
that there should be an average annual income of at least 100 Million
pesos for the last 2 consecutive years.
Looking at the deliberations, the Court stated that the rationale
behind the enactment of RA 9009 is the mad rush of municipalities
The basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood
laws is the clear-cut intent of Congress of not according retroactive
effect to RA 9009. [Court: The intent is the essence of the law and
the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and to give effect to
that intent. Torres v. Limjap]
Court also used presumption of constitutionality.
as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when
the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The exemption clauses found in the
individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that intent to exempt
respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Congress saw the wisdom of exempting respondent municipalities from
complying with the higher income requirement imposed by the amendatory
R.A. No. 9009. These municipalities have proven themselves viable and
capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. They were
centres of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich
havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing
tourism spots.
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its
legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution,
to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the
expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant
of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The
legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of
general concern or common interest.
Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making
powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted
R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when
Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in
1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the
creation of local government unitsincome, population, and land area.
Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the
conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No.
9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locallygenerated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent
municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement
in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very
intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and
autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for
economic growth in their respective provinces.
R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that the Cityhood Laws
amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since
the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities
from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore,
also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the
November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their
strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their
exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.
b. There was valid classification, and the Cityhood Laws do not violate the
equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
classification, provided that it: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class.
The determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect to
respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. The existence of substantial
distinction with respect to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood
Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A. No. 9009, but by
the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a), thus
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.(a) It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable
them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be
given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The
process of decentralization shall proceed from the National
Government to the local government units.
Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent
municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.
Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and
viability of respondent municipalities to become the States partners in
accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions,
which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for
cityhood up to the present. Truly, the urgent need to become a component
city arose way back in the 11th Congress, and such condition continues to
exist.
The justness in the act of Congress in enacting the Cityhood Laws becomes
obvious considering that 33 municipalities were converted into component
cities almost immediately prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. In the
enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities
covered thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt
The Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was filed
on May 14, 2009, which was within the 15-day period from their
receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution; thus, the entry of judgment
had been prematurely made.
The requirements under RA 9009 do not apply to cityhood bills
already pending with Congress upon the enactment of RA 9009.
Respondent complied with the requirements in the LGC before the
enactment of RA 9009.
Issue/s:
1. WON the Court could still modify, alter or amend its resolution
dated April 28, 2009, denying the respondents motion for
reconsideration of its November 18, 2008 Decision.
2. WON the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and Section 10 of
Article X of the Constitution as well as the Equal Protection Clause
and the right of local governments to a just share in the national
taxes.
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes.
The Court traced the events leading up to the questioned Resolution.
o 28 April 2009 Resolution:
# The Court ruled in favour of the petitioners saying
that the MR to the 31 March 2009 Resolution is
denied by a vote of 6-6. The Cityhood Laws are
unconstitutional.
# Second MR of the 18 November 2008 is denied for
being a prohibited pleading. No further pleadings
shall be entertained.
o 2 June 2009 Resolution: clarification to the 28 April 2009
Resolution.
# Although as a rule, a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure10,
when a motion for leave to file and admit a second
motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court,
the Court therefore allows the filing of the second
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10
"No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained."
11
When! the! sponsor! of! the! law! chose! the! specific! figure! of!P100! million,! no! research! or! empirical! data!
buttressed! the! figure.! Nor! was! there! proof! that! the! proposal! took! into! account! the! afterSeffects! that!
were!likely!to!arise.!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12
Section!453.!Duty!to!Declare!Highly!Urbanized!Status.It!shall!be!the!duty!of!the!President!to!declare!a!
city! as! highly! urbanized! within! thirty! (30)! days! after! it! shall! have! met! the! minimum! requirements!
prescribed!in!the!immediately!preceding!Section,!upon!proper!application!therefor!and!ratification!in!a!
plebiscite!by!the!qualified!voters!therein.!
13
Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area
(25%), and equal sharing (25%).
Issue/s:
1. W/N: RA 9716 is unconstitutional for creating a legislative district in a
province with a population less than 250,000. NO.
2. W/N: A petition for declaratory relief was the proper action in court and
W/N: petitioners have locus standi. NO.
Held/Ratio:
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14
Article!VI!!Sec!!5.!(1)!The!House!of!Representatives!shall!be!composed!of!not!more!than!
two!hundred!and!fifty!members,!unless!otherwise!fixed!by!law,!who!shall!be!elected!
from!legislative!districts!apportioned!among!the!provinces,!cities!and!the!Metropolitan!
Manila!area!in!accordance!with!the!number!of!their!respective!inhabitants,!and!on!the!
basis!of!a!uniform!and!progressive!ratio,!and!those!who,!as!provided!by!law,!shall!be!
elected!through!a!partySlist!system!of!registered!national,!regional!and!sectoral!parties!
or!organizations.!
!(3)!Each!legislative!district!shall!comprise,!as!far!as!practicable,!contiguous,!compact,!
and!adjacent!territory.!Each!city!with!a!population!of!at!least!two!hundred!fifty!
thousand,!or!each!province,!shall!have!at!least!one!representative!
!(4)!Within!three!years!following!the!return!of!every!census,!the!Congress!shall!make!a!
reapportionment!of!legislative!districts!based!on!the!standards!provided!in!this!section.!
Bagabuyo vs. Comelec and Mariano vs. Comelec were both wrongly
interpreted as the population of the legislative districts at the time
were above 250,000
The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section
461 thereof tackles the creation of a province and not the
reapportioning of a legislative district based on increasing
population.
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and
transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would
not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government
units comprising Metro Manila." There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and
the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2)
transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4)
flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and
pollution control; and (7) public safety.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot
be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate
this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the
lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government
units (LGUs).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local
Government Code of 1991.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995,
Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic
services affecting the region placed under "a development authority"
referred to as the MMDA.
a. . . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is
no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its
Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
7. Insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower
court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of
any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of
police power.
8. Where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the
legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been
delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not
precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport
and traffic management, as well as the administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs.
9. This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a
development authority created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations
and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
10. This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory
construction that a statute is to be read in a manner that would
breathe life into it, rather than defeat it,[and is supported by the
criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.[
major roads of
Metro Manila.
Viron
and
Mencorp
failed
to
produce any
letter
or
communicatio
n from the
Executive
Department
apprising the
bus
companies of
an immediate
plan to close
their
bus
terminals.
MMDA also
insists that the
EO is a mere
administrative
issuance, and
therefore
creates
no
relation to third
persons
(but
the Court here
ruled that the
EO
will
definitely
affect
third
persons, since
the creation of
mass
transportation
terminals will
entail
the
removal
of
existing
bus
terminals that
belong to the
The EO clearly
provides MMDAs
plan to decongest
traffic
by
ELIMINATING
the bus terminals
now located along
the major roads of
Metro Manila and
providing
more
access
to
mass
transport system by
creating
mass
transport facilities.
The E.O. was made
effective
immediately.
The
MMDAs
resolve
to
immediately
implement
the
Project
is
also
evident
from
telltale
circumstances,
foremost of which
was the passage by
the
MMC
of
Resolution No. 0307, Series of 2003
expressing its full
support
of
the
immediate
implementation of
the Project.
Under
the
circumstances, for
respondents to wait
for
the
actual
bus
companies.)
2. Does the
MMDA
have the
authority
to close
the
existing
bus
terminals
, as per
EO 179?
SC: NO.
Respond
ents posit that
the MMDA is
devoid
of
authority
to
order
the
elimination of
their
bus
terminals
under the E.O.
which,
they
argue,
is
unconstitution
al because it
violates both
the
Constitution
and the Public
Service
Act;
and that neither
is the MMDA
clothed
with
such authority
under R.A. No.
7924.
issuance by the
MMDA of an order
for the closure of
respondents bus
terminals would be
foolhardy for, by
then, the proper
action to bring
would no longer be
for
declaratory
relief which, under
Section 1, Rule 6of
the Rules of Court,
must
be
brought before there
is a breach or
violation of rights.
(See ruling below
this table)
known as the
Administrative
Code of 1987.
District of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A. 8999 will affect the
powers, functions and responsibilities of the petitioners and the
DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently been endowed
with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First
Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are
in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and, not
remotely, even their jobs. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus,
they can legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject
of the instant case.
2. YES ( but note that the court said that it was not necessary to declare
R.A. No. 8999 unconstitutional for the adjudication of the case
because the challenged law never became operative and was
superseded or repealed by a subsequent enactment.) - The ARMM
Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme.
While they are classified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than
ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite.
Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary
statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be
submitted to a plebiscite.
a. The court noted the deliberations of the concom regarding
the requirement of a plebiscite and concluded that the first
ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074 (first ARMM Organic Act),
as implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the functions of the
DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur (minus
Marawi City at the time) to the Regional Government. By
creating an office with previously devolved functions, R.A.
8999, in essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. The
amendatory law should therefore first obtain the approval of
the people of the ARMM before it could validly take effect.
Absent compliance with this requirement, R.A. 8999 never
became operative.
b. The court also held that it may be resolved on the reasoning
that R.A. 8999 was impliedly repealed and superseded by
R.A. 9054 (second ARMM Organic Act). Where a statute of
later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that
intention must be given effect.
c. R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances
the constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers
of the ARMM covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and
Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction over regional
urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however, ventures to
b.
c.
d.
e.
Dispositive:
Writs of certiorari and prohibition are GRANTED.
Mandamus DENIED.
Substantive
RESPONDENTs ARGUMENTS:
a. Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the
exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and
b. Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition became moot with the
proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen on 1 June 2007 as
representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City.
c. Unconstitutional: (1) the power to create provinces was not among those
granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution and (2) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe
standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the
creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause
S
S
Respondents arguments:
(Respondents are the Senate, then COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes,
Senate President Enrile, HReps Speaker Belmonte, DBM Secretary Abad,
Executive Secretary Ochoa, etc. represented by the OSG)
Basic argument: RA 10153 is valid
the Constitution mandates synchronization, citing the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution (Art XVIII Secs 1, 2, 5 on the
elections of the Members of Congress, the President and the VicePresident.
RA 9333 does not constitute an amendment to RA 9054, as it
merely filled the void left by RA 9054 in failing to schedule the
succeeding regular elections in the ARMM. Thus, the twin
requirements in RA 9054 in the enactment of the assailed laws are
irrelevant.
o Alternatively, the plebiscite requirement in RA 9054 is
limited only to cover amendatory laws affecting
substantive matters, as opposed to
administrative
concerns such as fixing election dates
The supermajority requirement is unconstitutional as (1) save in
exceptional cases not applicable to the present petitions, the
Constitution only requires a simple majority of a quorum in each
House of Congress to enact, amend or repeal laws; and (2) the rule
against the passage of irrepealable laws.
the Presidents authority under RA 10153 to appoint OICs is
pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution authorizing
the President to appoint those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint.
The granting of the President control over the ARMM is analogous
to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, authorizing the
President for a limited period to appoint sectoral representatives in
the House of Representatives.
Congress chose to authorize under RA 10153 the President to
appoint OICs who will hold office until 30 June 2013, so the
legislative mandate must be respected
Issues:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections (YES, impliedly)
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution (NO)
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and
plebiscite
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution (NO)
Petitioners arguments:
S RA 10153 is invalid for its alleged failure to comply with Consti
Section 26(2), Article VI (which provides that before bills passed by
either the House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass
through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment)
S no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since
there was no public calamity or emergency that had to be met
Court:
S Tolentino vs Sec of Finance: The presidential certification dispensed
with the requirement not only of printing and distribution but also
that of three readings on separate days
S Here, records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the
HReps to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections.
S The Tolentino case also said that the factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by
members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of
review, i.e., not a judicial review
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are:
(1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in
a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA
9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office;
(2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those
elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office; or
(3) to authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3
of RA 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office.
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates the
Constitution (NO)
As to the three options:
First Option: Holdover Option Unconstitutional
S Violates Consti Art X Sec 8 (The term of office of elective local
officials shall be three years)
S Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered
and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.
S The Consti must prevail over other laws, as in this case re: term of
local officials
S Osmena vs COMELEC: the legislature cannot, by an act postponing
the election to fill an office the term of which is limited by the
Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as
limited by the Constitution
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
Dissent by Carpio
Position:
S RA 9333 is constitutional.
S RA 10153, as to the synchronization, is constitutional. However, the
Presidents power to appoint OICs (Secs 3-5) in place of elective
ARMM officials, is unconstitutional.
S RA 9054 Sec 7(1) Art VII, authorizing ARMM elective officials to
hold over until the election and qualification of their successors, and
Secs 1 and 3 Art XVII unconstitutional
Ratio:
S Congress found sufficient in passing RA 10153 the factual bases
cited by Pres. Aquino certification of HB 4146 and SB 2756 as
emergency measures. There is no reason to depart from Tolentino vs
Sec of Finance
S RA 9333 and RA 10153 supplement RA 9054. RA 9054 only
provided for the first ARMM elections in Sec 7 Art XVIII. Congress,
in the exercise of its plenary legislative power, provided for the
scheduling of the succeeding regular elections by enacting RA 9333.
RA 10153 was enacted pursuant to the same power. The original
ARMM Organic Act, RA 6734, also only confined itself to the first
regular elections, so there arose the issue of the succeeding elections
that needed to be legislated on by Congress. RA 9333 and RA 10153
are therefore separate, stand-alone statutes that do not amend any
provision of RA 9054.
S RA 9140 pertains only to the fixing of the date of the plebiscite for
(Sec 1) and the schedule of the first regular ARMM elections (Sec 2)
of RA 9054. After the plebiscite and the elections were held in 2001,
RA 9140 is rendered functus officio and thus there is no need to
review its validity
S Assuming that RA 9333 and RA 10153 indeed amended RA 9054 as
petitioners vigorously insist, there is still no need to comply with the
requisites laid down in RA 9054 for laws amending said law,
because the requirements are unconstitutional. The 2/3 supermajority
vote (both houses voting separately, 2/3 majority required)
requirement is unconstitutional as it requires more votes than the
Consti (Sec 16 (2), Art VI which requires only a simple majority of
each house to do business). It also violates the doctrine barring the
passage of irrepealable laws as a current Congress cannot limit or
reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by
requiring a higher vote threshold than what the Constitution requires
to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed fixing such a
higher vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary
legislation, to amend the Constitution. The simple majority
requirement was based on practice, so it is almost impossible to get a
2/3 supermajority presence, much less supermajority vote. The
autonomy of ARMM does not extend to shackling Congress
S A plebiscite is mandatory only in approving creation or expansion of
the ARMM (Consti Art X, Secs 10 as to creation and 18 as to
altering boundaries of LGUs). RA 9054, although it mandates in Sec
3 Art XVII the holding of a plebiscite to approve any amendment to
extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over
until their successors are elected and qualified where the
[C]onstitution hasprescribed the term. The reason is twofold:
First, the power of Congress to fix the terms of public offices stems
from (1) its inherent power to create such public offices or (2) a
constitutionally delegated power to that effect. Thus, if a public
office is created by the Constitution with a fixed term, or if the term
of a public office created by Congress is fixed by the Constitution,
Congress is devoid of any power to change the term of that office.
Holdovers are also contrary to democratic republicanism as they
indirectly contravene the holding of periodic elections. The other
laws postponing the elections in the ARMM had holdover provisions
but that is immaterial now because the validity of those laws were
never challenged.
The basis for holding special elections is Sec 5 BP 881, which says
that COMELEC can hold special elections when for any serious
cause, the holding of an election becomes impossible in any political
subdivision
Dissent by Velasco
Position
S I agree with the Carpio dissent that Congress power to synchronize
elections does not include the power to authorize the President to
appoint officers-in-charge in place of elective officials
S There should be a holdover of the ARMM officials pending the
holding of the special elections and the election and qualification of
their successors. The appointment of an OIC is unconstitutional.
Ratio
S RA 9054 Sec 7(1) Art VII provides for the holdover of the
incumbent. The decision used the case of Osmea vs COMELEC to
declare that provision unconstitutional. However, the issue in that
case is about the desynchronization of elections, not the holdover.
Thus, the discussion on holdover is only obiter.
S Assuming that such was not an obiter, still, the present case and
Osmea do not have the same factual circumstances, so Osmea
cannot be applied based on stare decisis.
o In Osmea, RA 7065 provided for synchronization of the
national and local elections in 1995 but it also prescribed
that the national elections will be held in May, 1992 while
S
S
o
o
o
o
o
February 28, 2012 Resolution
S Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
o While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress
to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention
o
o
RA 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM
elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a
different election date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to
hold special elections, and this Court can compel the
COMELEC to do so, there is still the problem of having to
shorten the terms of the newly elected officials in order to
synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013
national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court
nor the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting
as it does to an amendment of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to three
years.
offices to be still in force and effect until another organic law for the
Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and the
same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units
Position: There can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in
only one province
Legal Basis: Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the
said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit
Respondents arguments:
Position: Ifugao alone may validly constitute CAR
Jurisprudence: Abbas vs COMELEC. The Abbas case laid down the
rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in
the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated: ". . . [I]t is thus
clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of
votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and
not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put
together, as well as in the individual constituent units hence, ". . .
[i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region (CAR) as mandated by R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon
its approval by the majority of the votes cast in the province of
Ifugao. And considering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that only the
provinces and city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the
province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably
can, alone, legally and validly constitute the CAR."
Legal Basis: Constitution, Article X, Section 18
Issue/s: Whether or not the province of Ifugao alone may validly constitute
CAR?
Held/Ratio: NO
Violative of the Constitution
o The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the
Cordillera Autonomous Region primarily because Article X,
Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution is clear that: "There shall
be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities
and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty
as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Bagabuyo vs COMELEC
Dec 8, 2008
Doctrine: The criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition
or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or
barangay and does not apply to mere legislative apportionement.
Facts:
Cagayan de Oro was originally composed of one legislative district. In 2006
RA 9371 increased the CDOs legislative districts from one to two. For the
election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of
residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod. COMELEC then issued Resolution 7837 implementing RA
9371.
Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to
the Supreme Court. He was contending that the 2nd district was created
without a plebiscite which was required by the Constitution.
Petitioners arguments:
Nature and relief prayed for: Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus,with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the COMELEC from
Resolution No. 7837 on the ground that Republic Act No. 9371 - the law that
Resolution No. 7837 implements - is unconstitutional
Position:
1. RA 9371 is unconstitutional because it constitutes as a creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which requires
that a plebiscite be held.
2. RA 9371 violates the principle of equality of representation. The
distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has only
93,719 registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is
composed mostly of rural barangays while District 2 is composed
mostly of urban barangay.
Respondents arguments:
1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the
constitutionality of a statute;
2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod
pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and was not in any
way create, divide, merge, bolish, or substantially alter the boundaries of
Cagayan de Oro.
Issue/s:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the
instant petition be dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a
local government unit?
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?
Held/Ratio:
1)The case was considered as sufficiently important as to constitute an
exception to the hierarchy of courts rule.
2) RA 9371 merely provides for legislative re-apportionment and thus a
plebiscite is not required in the case at bar.
RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the
House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section
5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government
unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation
passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article
VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision - Section 1 - provides:
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of
the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in
the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Facts:
Issue/s:
Petitioners arguments:
A city shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and
either population or land area are present:
(1)
Income an average annual income of not less than
(P20,000,000.00), for immediately preceding two (2) consecutive
years.
(2) Population or land area not less than (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an
area of at least (100) square kms, as certified by LMB. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than
the prescribed minimum requirements.
(1)
Income an average annual income of not less than
(P20,000,000.00), for immediately preceding two (2) consecutive
years.
(2) Population or land area not less than (150,000) inhabitants, as
certified by NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an
area of at least (100) square kms, as certified by LMB. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply
where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than
the prescribed minimum requirements.
The bill that eventually became RA 8535 originated in the House of
Representatives. Petitioner did not present any proof that no certifications
were submitted to the House Committee on Local Government. The
presumption stands that the law passed by Congress had complied with all
the requisites therefor.
A city shall not be created unless the following requisites on income and
either population or land area are present:
Respondents arguments:
1. The statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city with a population of not less than 250,000 complies with the "1
city-1 representative" proviso in the Constitution: Each city with a
population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1
representative" [Art VI, Sec 5(3)].
2. With regards to gerrymandering, Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author
of RA 7675, is the incumbent rep of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong,
Rep. Zamora's constituency has been diminished, which could hardly
be considered as favorable to him.
Issue: WON the plebiscite was held pursuant to Sec 10 of the LGC (YES)
Held/Ratio:
1. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is
not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion
into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence
of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
2. It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must
contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of
said laws.
3. Art VI, Sec 5(1) of the Constitution shows that the present limit of
250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that
the House of Rep shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law." It means that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Thus, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by RA 7675 is constitutional.
4. It was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
RA 7675, including Sec 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly
preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
5. (TOPICAL) The principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter
of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus,
the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the
plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of
Mandaluyong.
6. Respondent Sol-Gen is correct (see Respondents arguments #2).
Municipality of San Narciso Quezon, et. al. v. Hon. Mendez, et. al. (1994)
Doctrine: Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at
giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws,
as if existing laws have been complied with, are validly accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested
rights.
Facts:
In 1959, President Garcia issued E.O. 353 creating the municipal
district of San Andres Quezon by segregating some barrios from the
municipality of San Narciso. In 1965, E.O. 174 officially recognized
San Andres to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality.
In 1989, the municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo
warranto against the officials of San Andres. The petition sought the
declaration of nullity of E.O. 353 and prayed that the local officials
be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and
functions of their respective offices.
Petitioners argument:
E.O. 353 as a presidential act was a clear usurpation of the inherent
powers of the legislature (Pelaez v. Auditor General).
An unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no office and is
inoperative such as though it has never been passed.
Sec. 442 (d) of the Loc. Gov. Code (reproduced below) was
inapplicable to the municipality of San Andres since the enactment
referred to legally existing municipalities and not to those whose
mode of creation had been void ab initio.
Even assuming that the enactment of the Loc. Gov. Code converted
the municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality,
petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the
nullification of Executive Order No. 353 since the petition for quo
warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law.
Respondents arguments:
Since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the
municipality of San Andres was given life through E.O. 353,
petitioner municipality is estopped from questioning the creation of
the new municipality.
Because the municipality of San Andres has been in existence since
1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed.
Petitioner municipality was not the proper party to bring the action in
a petition for quo warranto, the State acting through the Solicitor
General being the proper one.
The case has become moot and academic with the enactment of the
Loc. Gov. Code, specifically citing Sec. 442 (d):
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this
Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at
the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
Issue/s:
WON the enactment of the Loc. Gov. Code converted the
municipality of San Andres, which was created by an Executive
Order, into a de facto municipal corporation (YES)
Held:
It was only after almost 30 years that the municipality of San Narciso
decided to challenge the legality of E.O. 353. In the meantime, San
Narciso and San Andres began and continued to exercise the powers
and authority of a duly created local government unit. Public interest
demands that a quo warranto proceeding challenging the legality of a
political subdivision must be timely raised.
Granting that E.O. 353 was void for being an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, peculiar circumstances in this case
evidences that San Andres has attained a status of a de facto
municipal corporation.
San Andres had been in existence for more than 6 years when Pelaez
v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded
the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of E.O.
353.
Certain governmental acts evidences the States recognition of the
continued existence of San Andres.
After 5 years as a municipal district, E.O. 174 classified it as a
fifth class municipality.
Sec. 31 of BP. 129 considered San Andres to have been covered
by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres
for the province of Quezon.
Under the ordinance apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives, San Andres has been considered to be one of
Respondents arguments:
1. Respondent Governor Geraldine B. Ecleo-Villaroman of the Province of
Dinagat Islands contends that Navarro, Bernal and Medina do not have
the legal standing to question the constitutionality of the creation of the
Province of Dinagat, since they have not been directly injured by its
creation and are without substantial interest over the matter in
controversy.
2. Governor Ecleo-Villaroman alleges that the petition is moot and
academic because the existence of the Province of Dinagat Islands has
already commenced; hence, the petition should be dismissed.
Issue: WON the result of the plebiscite is credible and truly reflects the
mandate of the people. Yes.
Held/Ratio:
1.
Allegations of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of a plebiscite are
factual in nature; hence, they cannot be the subject of this special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is a
remedy designed only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction,
including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
2. Navarro, Bernal and Medina should have filed the proper action with the
Commission on Elections. However, Navarro, Bernal and Medina
admittedly chose not to avail themselves of the correct remedy.
CHAPTER IV
Calanza v. PICOP (2009)
Doctrine: Sangunniang Panlungsods exercise original jurisdiction over
boundary disputes. The RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction over said
disputes.
Facts:
! Petitioners filed with the Mines and Geo-Sciences Development Service
of the DENR of Davao City applications for small-scale mining permits
for the purpose of extracting gold.
! The governor of Davao Oriental approved the applications and issued six
small-scale mining permits
! The mining areas applied for by petitioners were within PICOPs
logging concession area under Timber License Agreements. Petitioners
negotiated with PICOP for their entry but were turned down on the ff
grounds:
o PICOP has the exclusive right of occupation, possession and
control over the area being a logging concessionaire thereof;
o Petitioners mining permits are defective since they were issued
by the governor of Davao Oriental when in fact the mining area
is situated in Barangay Pagtilaan, Municipality of Lingig,
Surigao del Sur.
Petitioners arguments:
Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC of Davao Oriental for Injunction
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Restraining Order, Damages and Attorneys
Fees against PICOP.
! Prayer: PICOP or its agent be enjoined from preventing and prohibiting
them from entering into the mining site.
Respondents arguments:
PICOP: RTC of Davao Oriental has no jurisdiction over the complaint:
! The issuance of petitioners permits were void ab initio for violating
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7076, otherwise known as the Peoples
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, which allegedly prohibits the issuance
of mining permits over areas covered by forest rights such as TLAs or
forest reservations unless their status as such is withdrawn by the
competent authority.
Issue/s:
WON the RTC of Davao Orinetal has jurisdiction: NO.
Held/Ratio:
There is boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area
of a Local Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by two or more LGUs.
Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code
! Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary
Dispute. Boundary disputes between and among local government
units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the
same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to
the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities
within the same province shall be referred for settlement to
the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component
cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for
settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on
the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or
more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement
to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement
within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto,
it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall
be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide
the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification
referred to above.
*Sanggunians = the provincial boards of the different provinces
Section 119 of the 1991 Local Government Code
! Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court,
any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the
proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute x
x x.
The RTC does not have original nor appellate jurisdiction.
! RTC cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case since there was
no petition that was filed and decided by the sangguniang panlalawigans
of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur.
! Neither can the RTC assume original jurisdiction over the boundary
dispute since the Local Government Code allocates such power to the
sangguniang panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur.
___
Other issue:
Petitioners small-scale mining permits are legally questionable.
Republic Act No. 7076
! Approval of the applications for mining permits and for mining contracts
are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board.
! The governor of Davao Oriental is not competent to issue the permits.
Held/Ratio: YES
1. The civil case involving the boundary dispute between Cainta and
Pasig presents a prejudicial question w/c must first be decided before
the plebiscites for the creation of the barangays may be held.
a. Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental - In the interest of good
order, courts can suspend action on one case pending the
final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked
to the first.
b. City of Pasig cannot deny that portions of the areas covered
by the proposed barangays are included in the boundary
dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo. Whether the areas in controversy shall be decided
as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the
creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and
Napico.
i. Requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its
territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by
metes and bounds or by more or less permanent
natural boundaries.
ii. Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections
The boundaries [of a local government unit] must
be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only
within
the
limits
of
its
territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra
vires.
2. Holding of a plebiscite with respect to Barangay Napico does not
render Caintas petition moot since the issues in Caintas petition
before COMELEC against the holding of a plebsicite is still pending
before the RTC of Antipolo.
a. Tan v. Commission on Elections Fact that plebiscite has
been held a new province proclaimed and its officials
appointed does not mean that the court cannot inquire into
the legality of the existence of the said new province.
DISPOSITIVE: Plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan must be
held in abeyance pending the resolution of the boundary dispute between
Cainta and Pasig in RTC Antipolo, and the plebiscite ratifying the creation of
Barangay Napico should be set aside.
Respondents arguments:
Petitioners arguments:
Petitioner seeks to annul the Order issued by the RTC of Ormoc City
(Branch 35), denying the motion to dismiss.
Peitioner argues that:
the respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the claim;
there is no cause of action; and
a condition precedent for filing the complaint has not been
complied with
Issue / Held:
Whether respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the
settlement of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an
independent component city. YES
Ratio:
On the application of Section 118 of the LGC
Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of
the Complaint is Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC),
Under this provision, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a
component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city
on the other -- or between two or more highly urbanized cities -- shall be
jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local
government units involved.
government units mutually agreed to bring the dispute to the RTC for
adjudication.
CHAPTER V
No.
The SC agreed with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already
become moot and academic owing to the expiration of the period intended to
be covered by the business permit. The demanded permit for 2008-2009 has
already been superseded by the passage of time and the expiration of the
petitioners term as mayor.
Also, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit
since the exercise of the same is a delegated police power hence,
discretionary in nature as pronounced in Roble Arrastre v Villaflor citing
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC. As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the
power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of
the LGC (The General Welfare Clause)
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the
power of the respondent mayor to issue license and permits is circumscribed,
is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal corporation.
Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the
question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the
province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of mandamus.
Dissenting opinion: (if any)
Petitioners Arguments:
That the ordinance authorized the taking of private property without
due process of law and just compensation, because the construction
of an arcade will require 67.5 square meters from the 375 square
meter property.
That the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and
application when it allowed the owners of the buildings located in
the Quezon City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to
Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option (questioning the
zoning created by QC).
Alternately, he prayed for the payment of just compensation should
the court hold the ordinance valid.
Respondents Arguments:
That the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating
the use of property in a business zone. It is not an exercise of the
Respondents arguments:
Respondents: AAVA
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179:
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a mere rectifying enactment
and that Notice and hearing are required under the Uniform Guidelines
for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area, contained in
Resolution No. 12, series of 1991, of the then Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
Even assuming arguendo that there was a typographical error in the
said zoning ordinance, the proper remedy is to legislate a new zoning
ordinance, following all the formalities therefor, citing the leading case
of Resins, Incorporated v. Auditor General.
The power to evaluate, approve or disapprove zoning ordinances lies
with the HLURB under Article IV, Section 5(b) of Executive Order
No. 648. The decisions of administrative agencies on matters
pertaining to their jurisdiction will generally not be disturbed by the
courts.
Effect of Ordinance No. 91-39:
Even where the exercise of police power is valid, the same does not
operate to automatically negate all other legal relationships in existence
since the better policy is to reconcile the conflicting rights and to
preserve both instead of nullifying one against the other, citing the case
of Co v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[37] AAVA thus adopt the
finding of the Court of Appeals that even assuming that the subject
property has been validly reclassified as an institutional zone, there is
no real conflict between the Deed of Restrictions and said
reclassification.
Issue/s:
1. W/N Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is valid;
2. W/N TLC and the spouses Alfonso should be enjoined from continuing the
operation of a grade school in the subject property.
a. W/N Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39, as allegedly
corrected by Muntinlupa Resolution No. 91-179, has the effect of nullifying
the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions on the subject property; and
b. W/N AAVA is estopped from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions.
Held/Ratio:
Validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179. Muntinlupa Resolution No.
94-179, being a mere corrective issuance, is not invalidated by the lack of
notice and hearing as AAVA contends.
The purpose of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is clearly set forth in its
whereas clauses. There was indeed a typographical error in Appendix B of
Ordinance No. 91-39 is the fact that both the Official Zoning Map of
Muntinlupa and that of the Ayala Alabang Village show that the subject
property, described as Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V of Ayala Alabang is
classified as institutional.
Neither the Official Zoning Map of
Muntinlupa nor that of the Ayala Alabang Village classify Lot 25, Block
1, Phase V of Ayala Alabang as institutional.
Resins was decided on the principle of separation of powers, that the
judiciary should not interfere with the workings of the executive and
legislative branches of government. In Resins, there is a presumption of
regularity in favor of the enrolled bill, which the courts should not
speculate on. In the case at bar, it is the curative Muntinlupa Resolution
No. 94-179 which is entitled to a presumption of regularity.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the OP, which had set aside
the HLURB ruling. The authority of the HLURB is subordinate to that of
the OP and the acts of the former may be set aside by the latter. The
HLURB and the then MMC were both tasked to regulate the rezoning of
the Metropolitan Manila area. The then Municipality of Muntinlupa
submitted Resolution No. 94-179 to both the HLURB and the MMC for
their appropriate action. The MMC approved Muntinlupa Resolution No.
94-179, and this approval should be given more weight than the
disapproval of the HLURB since it was the MMC itself which issued the
Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area
(MMC Resolution No. 12, Series of 1991), the issuance alleged by AAVA
to have been violated by the Municipality of Muntinlupa.
Effect of Ordinance No. 91-39, as corrected by Resolution No. 94-179 to the
Deed of Restrictions
The RTC cited the Ortigas case and held that the earlier residential
classification can no longer be enforced due to the reclassification by
Muntinlupa Municipal Ordinance No. 91-39 of the subject property.
Petitioners arguments:
In its brief before the SC, Ortigas & Co. claims that the TC erred when
it sustained the view that Resolution No. 27, series of 1960 of the
o
Issue/s:
1. WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power
2. WON said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual
obligations assumed by FEATI Bank
Held/Ratio:
1. According to the SC, it is not proper to decide upon WON the TC erred
in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an exercise of police
power because in the first place, the validity of the said resolution was
never questioned before the lower court.
The court said that as a rule, a question of law or of fact which may be
included in an appellant's assignment of errors if those have been raised
in the court below, and are within the issues framed by the parties so that
the other party may not be taken by surprise. ->For it is well-settled that
issues or defenses not raised or properly litigated or pleaded in the Court
below cannot be raised or entertained on appeal.
The court noted that in this particular case, the validity of the resolution
was admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts below when
plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same.
o The only controversy left as stated by the TC was WON the
resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong prevails over
the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots in question.
o Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even if
impliedly, Ortigas & Co. cannot now change its position on appeal.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that it was not yet too late for
Ortigas & Co. to raise the issue of the invalidity of the municipal
resolution in question, the court was still of the opinion that its posture is
unsustainable.
o Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) empowers a
Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations"; for the municipality.
Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through
an ordinance. -> Thus, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an
ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment
or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision.
The court noted that an examination of Section 12 of the same law
which prescribes the rules for its interpretation likewise reveals that
the implied power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in
its favor" and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local
government and it shall be presumed to exist."
The same section further mandates that the general welfare clause be
liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to
local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social
welfare and material progress of the people in the community.
The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights
arising out of a contract between "a province, city or municipality on
one hand and a third party on the other," in which case the original
terms and provisions of the contract should govern. -> However, the
court said that the exceptions clearly do not apply in this case.
2. Yes, it can.
According to the court, while non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power (i.e., "the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people).
o The court said that police power is "the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful
attribute of government, the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust
or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
o Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. ->police
power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions;
it is not, confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents
resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a
democratic way of life."
o Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., "We do
not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to
property should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of
its police power.
contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper
exercise of the power.
o It noted that police power legislation then is not likely to succumb to
the challenge that thereby contractual rights are rendered nugatory."
o Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, Liberation
Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations and Maritime
Company of the Philippines v. Reparations Commission ->were also
cited by the court in support of its positionthat laws and reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts
agreed upon by the parties.
The court also rejected Ortigas & Co.s unqualified reliance on American
jurisprudence and authorities to bolster its theory that the municipal
resolution in question cannot nullify or supersede the agreement of the
parties embodied in the sales contract, as that, it claims, would impair the
obligation of contracts in violation of the Constitution.
According to the court, the views set forth in American decisions and
authorities are not per se controlling in the Philippines, the laws of which
must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its own
lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each
law and the context of other local legislation related thereto.
In conclusion, the court said that it is clear that even if the subject
building restrictions were assumed by the FEATI Bank as vendee of Lots
Nos. 5 and 6, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over
Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has
validly exercised its police power through the said resolution.
Trial Court decision AFFIRMED.
Dissenting opinion:
ABAD SANTOS, J.
Asserts that Resolution No. 27 cannot be described as promotive of the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people of Mandaluyong because accordingly, its effect is
the opposite.
o According to Justice Abad Santos, for the serenity, peace and quite
of a residential section would by the resolution be replaced by the
chaos, turmoil and frenzy of commerce and industry.
o Furthermore, to characterize the ordinance as an exercise of police
power would be retrogressive because it will set back all the efforts
of the Ministry of Human Settlements to improve the quality of life
especially in Metro Manila.
He concluded by saying that since Resolution No, 2-1 was not enacted in
the legitimate exercise of police power, it cannot impair the restrictive
covenants which go with the lands that were sold by the Ortigas & Co.
The oil companies mainly argue that the Ordinance is unfair and
oppressive since it does not only regulate but also absolutely prohibits them
from doing business.
It is also unfair and oppressive because they have already invested
billions of Pesos in the depot and its closure will result in huge losses in
income and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities.
They also take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against
them despite the fact many buildings in Pandacan do not comply with the
building code.
They also argue that 8027 is inconsistent with the DOE Act of 1992 and
the Oil Deregulation Law of 1998. They say that the legislature have
declared it a policy to ensure a continuous, adequate, and economic supply
of energy and that the DOE is empowered to administer programs for
distrbution, conservation, stockpiling, storage of energy resources. 8027
allegedly frustrates this state policy and
II. Respondents arguments:
Oil companies are merely prohibited from conducting operations in the
Pandacan area. They are not prohibited from conducting business in
appropriate zones in the City of Manila.
Respondent likewise counter that DOEs regulatory power does not
preclude LGUs from exercising their police power.
Issue/s:
2. W/N intervenors should be allowed to intervene?
3. W/N Branch 39 and Branch 41s injunctive reliefs are legal impediments
to the execution of the 2007 decision?
4. W/N the new Ordinance 8119 (Comprehensive Land Use Plan) is an
impediment to execution of Supreme Court 2007 decision?
5. W/N the Ordinance 8027 is constitutional?
Held/Ratio:
2. YES, they should be allowed to intervene because they have a real
interest. (non-topical)
3. No, the injunctive reliefs are not legal impediments to the execution of
the 2007 decision. While the intervenors were rightly granted the
injunctive reliefs by the RTC to prevent irreparable injury, the mere fact
that the ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not
entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined. The presumption is all in
favor of validity. (non-topical)
4. No, the new Ordinance 8119 did not supersede Ordinance 8027.
The Court was not informed of the new ordinance before it issued its
2007 decision. The law which direct the city courts to take judicial notice of
city ordinances is to take discretion away from the judge, it is not intended to
direct the court to actively search and monitor passed ordinances.
Also, the Court agrees with respondent that Ord. 8119 was merely meant
to carry over 8027s purpose. As can be gleaned from the minutes of the city
council sessions.
5. Yes, it is constitutional.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must be within the corporate powers of
the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance 8027 was passed by the city council in the exercise of its
police power. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).
Sec. 16 of the LGC is the General Welfare clause which states: Every
local government shall exercise the powers expressly granted. ..x x x.. the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology
LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies. Sec. 458 of the LGC gives the power to enact
ordinances to the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sec 458 (2) (a) (viii) of the LGC grants the Sanggunian the power to
reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city.
Police power of the city is also granted in the Revised Charter of Manila,
Sec. 18: To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, . general welfare of the city
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government.
However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary.
The Court agrees with the respondent that the oil companies are not
absolutely prohibited. As to the issue of loss of profits the court said that in
Issues: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over the case, it not having
furnished the Office of the Solicitor General copy of the orders it issued
therein " YES
Whether Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted the
subject ordinances" NO
Ratio:
On Jurisdiciton (IRRELEVANT)
1. Petitioners argument: the trial court failed to serve a copy of its
assailed orders upon the Office of the Solicitor General, it never
acquired jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner cited the Rules of
Court.16
2. SC: These Rules did not constitute jurisdictional defects. In fact,
Rule 3, Section 22 gives the courts in any action involving the
validity of any ordinance, inter alia, discretion to notify the
Solicitor General. ection 4 of Rule 63, which more specifically deals
with cases assailing the constitutionality, not just the validity, of a
local government ordinance, directs that the Solicitor General shall
also be notified and entitled to be heard. Respondent actually
served a copy of its petition upon the Office of the Solicitor General
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16
SEC.!22.!Notice+to+the+Solicitor+General.In!any!action!involving!the!validity!of!any!treaty,!law,!
ordinance,!executive!order,!presidential!decree,!rules!or!regulations,!the!court!in$its$discretion,!may!
require!the!appearance!of!the!Solicitor!General!who!may!be!heard!in!person!or!through!representative!
duly!designated!by!him.!(Emphasis!and!underscoring!supplied)!!
SEC.!3.!Notice+on+Solicitor+General.!!In!any!action!which!involves!the!validity!of!a!statute,!executive!
order!or!regulation,!or!any!other!governmental!regulation,!the!Solicitor!General!shall!be!notified!by!the!
party!assailing!the!same!and!shall!be!entitled!to!be!heard!upon!such!question.!
SEC. 4. Local government ordinances. In any action involving the validity of a local government
ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local government unit involved shall be
similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the
Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard.
S
S
within the coverage of the same provision because the law clearly
intended to make a distinction between the two.
The closure or transfer of her gas station is an invalid exercise of the
municipalitys police powers.
An HLURB case filed against her predecessor by the private
respondent had resolved the same issues in favor of the former, and
had thus effectively barred this action based on the principle of res
judicata.
Respondents arguments:
S While Sec. 44 does not expressly mention gasoline filling stations, a
gasoline filling station falls within the formers coverage following
the principle of ejusdem generis.
S The municipality itself was not a party to the HLURB decision,
hence one of the requisites for the application of res judicata was not
met.
Issue/s:
S WoN gasoline filling stations falls under the contemplation of Sec. 44
of the zoning regulations;
S WoN the Municipality properly exercised its police power;
S WoN the action is barred by res judicata per the HLURB decision.
Held/Ratio:
NO, THE LAW CLEARLY MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN GASOLINE
FILLING STATIONS AND GASOLINE SERVICE STATIONS. EJUSDEM
GENERIS IS NOT APPLICABLE.
NO, THE MUNICIPALITY IMPROPERLY EXERCISED ITS POLICE
POWER UNDER THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
S Under the LGCs General Welfare Clause (Sec. 16), a municipality
has the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the
health and general welfare of its constituents.
Section 16. General Welfare. Every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare
within
their
respective
territorial
jurisdictions. Local government units shall ensure
and support, among other things, the preservation
a.
c. Right to Liberty: Note that the rights contemplated in this case encompass
not only the rights of the owners of the establishments but also those of their
patrons. The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to
liberty upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.
Liberty is "the right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of
the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the
common welfare." In accordance with this case, the rights of
the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to
live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed
embraced in the concept of liberty.
Roth v. Board of Regents: the term denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a
Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.
d. General Welfare [TOPICAL]
The Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
2. Petitioner Albon then filed a taxpayers suit for certiorari, prohibition, and
injunction with damages with the RTC of Marikina against respondents (City
Mayor Bayani Fernando, City Engineer Alfonso Espirito, Asst. City
Engineer Anaki Maderal, and City Treasurer Natividad Cabalquinto).
3. The trial court dismissed petitioners action, ruling that the city
government of Marikina was authorized to carry out the undertaking
pursuant to its inherent police power. Citing White Plains Association v.
Legaspi (1991) [heldthat when (a strip of land) was withdrawn from the
commerce of man as the open space required by law to be devoted for the use
of the general public, its ownership was automatically vested in the (LGU)
and/or the Republic of the Philippines, without need of paying any
compensation to (the developer), although it is still registered in the latters
name. Its donation by the owner/developer is a mere formality], the court a
quo classified the roads and sidewalks inside the Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision as public property. Petitioners MR was denied.
4. Petitioners petition for certiorari, prohibition, injunction, and damages
before the CA was likewise dismissed. The appellate court ruled that the
questioned ordinance was valid and that the sidewalks of the subdivision
were public property, giving imprimatur to the trial courts ruling. His MR
was also denied.
Respondents Position
7. None (N.B. the Court did not seem to have required the respondents to
comment, or if it did and the respondents actually submitted their comment,
nothing regarding their position was mentioned by the Court at all).
Ruling of the Court
8. LGUs, like the City of Marikina, have police power:
Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code
(RA 7160). It is expressly vested with police powers delegated
to LGUs under the general welfare clause of RA 7160 (Sec. 16
thereof). With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable
regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their
constituents and maintain peace and order within their
respective territorial jurisdictions.
Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such
powers and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may be
but also the portion used for pedestrian travel. The part of the street
set aside for the use of pedestrians is known as a sidewalk.
Moreover, under subdivision laws, lots allotted by subdivision
developers as road lots include roads, sidewalks, alleys and planting
strips. Thus, what is true for subdivision roads or streets applies to
subdivision sidewalks as well. Ownership of the sidewalks in a
private subdivision belongs to the subdivision owner/developer
until it is either transferred to the government by way of
donation or acquired by the government through expropriation.
11. Sec. 335, LGC is clear and specific that no public money or property
shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes, in consonance with the
fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local government
funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes (Sec. 305[b],
LGC):
In Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works(1960)the Court laid down
the test of validity of a public expenditure: it is the essential
character of the direct object of the expenditure which must
determine its validity and not the magnitude of the interests to be
affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or
to the State resulting from the promotion of private interests and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business does not justify their aid
by the use of public money.
In Pascual, the validity of RA 920 (An Act Appropriating Funds
for Public Works) which appropriated P85,000 for the construction,
repair, extension and improvement of feeder roads within a
privately-owned subdivision was questioned. The Court held that
where the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged to a private person, an appropriation made by
Congress for that purpose was null and void.
In Young v. City of Manila (1941) the City of Manila undertook the
filling of low-lying streets of the Antipolo Subdivision, a privatelyowned subdivision. The Court ruled that as long as the private owner
retained title and ownership of the subdivision, he was under the
obligation to reimburse to the city government the expenses incurred
in land-filling the streets.
Favis v. City of Baguio & the Shell Company of the Phils, Ltd. (1969)
Doctrine: To determine whether a municipal body has a power to vacate or
withdraw a street from public use, look at its charter. If empowered, the city
council is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain
property is still necessary for public use.
Facts:
Antonio Favis bought a parcel of land (Lot 2E3B3B2) from the
Assumption Convent, Inc. The said lot is bounded on the southwest
by Lot 2E3B3B1 (proposed road) owned by Assumption Convent,
Inc. and part of subdivision plan PSD 2179.
Simultaneous with the sale, Assumption donated to the Baguio City
Lot 2E3B3B1 for road purposes. This donated road was used by
Favis as his means of egress and ingress from his residence to a
public street (Lapu-Lapu St).
Lapu-Lapu St. is actually Lot 27 in the amendatory plan and is a
portion of a big tract of land known as Baguio Market subdivision,
registered in the name of the city.
From its intersecting point with Dagohoy Street and going
northward, Lapu-Lapu Street is 8 m wide. It abruptly ends as it meets
portions of two lots the donated road aforementioned and the lot
owned by Olmina Fernandez. Fernandez' lot is fenced, with
buildings; and there is a sharp depression of at least 2 meters at the
precise point it meets Lapu-Lapu Street. Ocular inspection conducted
by the trial court disclosed that at the exact connecting point of
Lapu-Lapu Street and the donated road (which leads to appellant's
land), the road opening is only 2.5 meters wide.
Lot 25 (400 sq m) of the Baguio Market Subdivision is northernmost
in said subdivision. Immediately next to it, to the north, is the lot of
Olmina Fernandez aforesaid. As far back as June, 1947, the City, by
virtue of Resolution No. 115 of the City Council of Baguio leased
this Lot 25 to Shell for a ten-year period renewable for another ten
years. Shell constructed thereon a service station.
In 1961, the City Council of Baguio passed Resolution No. 132
authorizing the City thru its Mayor to lease to Shell two parcels of
land: Lot 25 of the Market Subdivision (Lot A on sketch plan) & a
parcel of land containing an area of 100 sq. m. more or less, marked
as "Lot B" on the sketch plan. Note: Lot 25 (Lot A) is the same lot
leased to Shell way back in June, 1947 and the lease of Lot B is
merely an addition. This additional area taken from Lapu-Lapu
Street is 5 m wide and 20 meters long and abuts Lot 25.
Subsequently, the City, thru its Mayor entered into a formal contract
of lease with Shell.
Shell filed for a building permit to construct a bigger station on the
leased premises. The Office of the City Engineer noted that Lot B is
for public use, and may not be leased.
Antonio C. Favis lodged a letter-protest against the additional lease
made in favor of Shell. He claimed that it would diminish the width
of Lapu-Lapu Street to five meters only; that it would destroy the
symmetry of the said street thus making it look very ugly; and that
the City was bereft of authority to lease any portion of its public
streets in favor of anyone.
The City Council of Baguio passed Resolution No. 215, amending
Resolution No. 132 by converting that "portion of Lapu-Lapu Street
lying southeast from Lot B of the sketch plan beginning at this
portion's intersection with Dagohoy Street, into an alley 5.00 meters
wide (4 m. now in actual use); declaring for this purpose, that said
Lot B shall not be a part of this alley.
Favis commenced suit for the annulment of the lease contract with
damages. He prayed that (1) defendants be ordered to stop, remove
and/or demolish whatever constructions had been introduced at the
additional leased area on Lapu-Lapu Street; (2) the building permit
and contract of lease entered into by and between the defendants be
cancelled and revoked for being null and void; and (3) defendants be
directed to pay damages. Favis filed a complaint for the restoration
of
the original measurement (8 m wide) of the dead end.
Issue: W/N the resolutions are valid. (YES)
HELD:
The 2.5 meter opening connecting the donated road and Lapu-Lapu
Street has always been that wide since the donated road was opened.
The occupancy by Shell of a portion of the road right-of-way did not
in any way put appellant to any more inconvenience than he already
had.
The resolutions in question do not have the effect of decreasing the
width of the opening because said opening is far from the leased
portion of Lapu-Lapu St. The said leased portion is on the left side of
Lapu-Lapu Street, whereas the opening lies on the right uppermost
part of Lapu-Lapu Street. That leased strip does not reach said
opening.
The EO could not have been violated because even before its
promulgation, Lapu-Lapu St. was only 8 m wide, and the said EO
did not demand widening to 10 m of existing streets. Doing so would
have entailed huge expenditure on municipal corporations as well
which have streets less than 10 meters wide for compensation for the
expropriation of private property would have to be given.
2. The city council does not have the power to close city streets like LapuLapu St. He asserts that since municipal bodies have no inherent power to
vacate or withdraw a street from public use, there must be a specific grant by
the legislative body to the city or municipality concerned.
HELD:
The city is explicitly empowered to close a city street pursuant to
subsection (L) of Sec. 2558 of the Baguio Charter which grants it the
power:
To provide for laying out, opening, extending, widening,
straightening, closing up, constructing, or regulating, in whole or in
part, any public plaza, square, street, sidewalk, trail, park,
waterworks, or water remains, or any cemetery, sewer, sewer
connection or connections, either on, in, or upon public or private
property
Unson v. Lacson illustrates the converse rule. In that case there was
no legal provision specifically vesting in the City of Manila the
power to close Callejon del Carmen. The significance of this silence
becomes apparent when contrasted with section 2246 of the Revised
Administrative Code, explicitly vesting in municipal councils of
regularly organized municipalities the power to close any
municipal road, street, alley, park or square, provided that persons
prejudiced thereby are duly indemnified, and that the previous
Issue: W/N the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit
Streets to vehicular traffic (YES)
Held/Ratio:
The Supreme Court cited its ruling in a prior case also entitled
Sangalang vs. IAC, that the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the
demands of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public
convenience. The opening of Orbit Street is also upheld for the same
rationale.
BAVAs claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter
Streets amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law or
expropriation without just compensation are without merit. The act of the
Mayor falls within the police power. Police power, unlike the power of
eminent domain, is exercised without provisions for just compensation.
The fact that the opening up of Orbit Street to vehicular traffic has
led to the loss of privacy of Bel-Air residents, does not render the exercise of
police power unjustified. The duty of a local executive is to take care of the
needs of the greater number, in many cases, at the expense of the minority.
Respondents arguments:
When they bought Lot No. 899-D-1, they did so in the belief that
they had an outlet to Escario Street through Lot No. 899-D-2, then
owned by the local government of Cebu City.
Lot 899-D-2, being a road lot, cannot be the subject of sale since it is
outside the commerce of man.
Issue: w/n respondents have a legal standing to question the reconveyance of
Lot 899-D-2-A (NO)
[TOPICAL] w/n the reconveyance of the subject lot by Cebu City to
the petitioners is valid (YES)
Held/Ratio:
Respondents have no interest in the title or possession of Lot No
899-D-2-A. They are not the proper parties to file for annulment of
petitioners title.
The case filed by respondents is for reversion of the subject lot.
Reversion is a proceeding by which the State seeks the return of
lands of the public domain or the improvements thereon through the
cancellation of private title erroneously or fraudulently issued over
it.
Section 101 of the Public Land Act states: All actions for the
reversion to the government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or
the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of
the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines.
The sole interest of the respondents is in the use of the property as
access to Escario Street. Such interest is merely tangential to any
issue regarding the ownership and possession of the property. It is
not sufficient to vest legal standing to respondents to sue for the
reversion of the property.
[TOPICAL]
The general rule is local roads used for public service are considered
public property under the absolute control of Congress. However,
under Section 10, Chapter II of the Local Government Code, the
Congress delegated to political subdivisions some control of local
roads.
Section 21 of the LGC provides: Closure and Opening of Roads-(a)
A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance,
permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley,
the non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title
acquired by the expropriation proceedings.
The Court also held in Moreno v Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority that where there is preponderant evidence of the existence
of a right to repurchase, the former owner of an expropriated
property is entitled to exercise such option once the public purpose
for which the local government initially intended the expropriated
property is abandoned or not pursued.
It was also held in the cases Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v CA, Reyes v National Housing Authority and Air
Transportation Office v Gopuco, Jr. that where there is insufficient
evidence that the former owners of expropriated properties were
granted the right to repurchase the same, the latter may not insist on
recovering their properties even when the public purpose for which
said properties were expropriated is abandoned.
There can be no doubt that Cebu City repudiated its right to use the
subject lot for other public purpose. Instead, it recognized the right
of the former owner or his successor-in-interest to repurchase the
same.
Petitioners Argument:
1. Petitioners insists that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are
synonymous and that the resolution issued by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod is a prerequisite in its exercise of the power of eminent
domain. Hence such issue can adjudicated.
2. Petitioner also argues that its Sangguniang Bayan passed an
ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No.
93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified all the acts of its mayor regarding
the subject expropriation.
Issues:
1. WON certiorari lies to assail the issuance of a resolution by the
Sanggunian Panglungsod? (NO)
2. WON the petition should be dismissed? (YES)
Held: SC affirms the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CAG.R. SP No. 70618.
1. Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of a resolution by the
Sanggunian Panglungsod.
Certiorari did not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which
was not a part of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy
involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted
Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body
declaring its sentiment or opinion
Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its discretion in
adopting Resolution No. 552. To demonstrate the absence of abuse
of discretion, it is well to differentiate between a resolution and an
ordinance.
2. The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the
Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The
absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause
of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error
in affirming the trial courts Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the
sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the
purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU
can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council
authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU,
to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be
done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation
therefor.
Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribes the
delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local
government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise, thus:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit
may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily
originates from the necessity and the taking must be limited to
such necessity.
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila:The very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover,
the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and
not follow, the taking of the land.
City of Manila v. Arellano Law College: necessity within the rule
that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary,
does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical
necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public
with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party
and the property owner consistent with such benefit.
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent has failed to
establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners
property.
Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the
Caniogan Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance
No. 42, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit
organization, and not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned
that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their
own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioners lot is
the nearest vacant space available.
The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The
necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists
an alternative facility for sports development and community
recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all
residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
Trial court ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed petition for review on certiorari before Supreme Court
Issue:
WON the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain is for a public
purpose.
Petitioners argument:
The taking of the property is for public use.
Respondents counter-argument:
Expropriation of their property was for private use, that is, for the benefit of
the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision.
SC Ruling:
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two
constitutional provisions: (1) that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation, and (2) that no person shall be
deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
In this jurisdiction, public use is defined as whatever is beneficially
employed for the community.
Petitioners Argument:
There are at least 80 houses in the place and about 400 persons will be
benefited with the use of a barangay road.
SC Ruling:
While the number of people who use or can use the property is not
determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use or purpose, the
factual milieu of the case reveals that the intended use of respondents lot is
confined solely to the Davsan II Subdivision residents and is not exercisable
in common. Worse, the expropriation will actually benefit the subdivisions
owner who will be able to circumvent his commitment to provide road access
to the subdivision, and also be relieved of spending his own funds for a rightof-way.
Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot
owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a
right-of-way for them.
Issue 1:
Whether the issuance of the Resolutions for expropriation by an LGU
constitutes a supervening event so as to suspend the writ of execution in an
ejectment case (No)
Held/Ratio:
The general rule is if judgment is rendered against the defendant, it is
immediately executory. Among the exceptions is the occurrence of
supervening events which have brought about a material change in
the situation of the parties and would make the execution inequitable.
Local government units may exercise the power of eminent domain,
subject to the limitation embodied under the law. There are two
relevant laws, the LGC and RA No. 7279 (UDHA).
The requirements for the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain under Sec. 19 of LGC are the following:
Issue 2:
Whether a formal expropriation proceeding has to be filed for an
expropriation to have binding legal effect (Yes)
[NB: The Court looked at a list of laws enacted afterCommonwealth Act No.
538 (1940) and the rationale behind them to determine whether C.A. No. 358
applies only to cases where there exist actual expropriation proceedings.20]
Section 5 of R.A. 1162: From the approval of said Act and until the
expropriation herein provided, no ejectment proceedings shall be
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
o
18
Sec. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housing shall be
acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program
sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been
acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet
been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where open-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries,
the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give
budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands.
19
Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall
include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
banking, donation to the government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation:
Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other models of acquisition have
been exhausted: Provided, further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small
property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property,
as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure
laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.
For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be acquired by
the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primary through negotiated purchase:
Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the land shall be given the right of first
refusal.
20
Sec.! 1! of! Commonwealth! Act! No.! 538! (1940):! When! the! Government! seeks! to! acquire,! through!
purchase! or! expropriation! proceedings,! lands! belonging! to! any! estate! or! chaplaincy! (capellania),! any!
action!for!ejectment!against!the!tenants!occupying!said!lands!shall!be!automatically!suspended!xxx!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21
SEC. 4.
Upon approval of this amendatory Act, no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or
prosecuted against the present occupants of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and no ejectment proceedings
already commenced shall be continued xxx
DENIED.
MR: DENIED (thereafter they appealed to the CA)
While the appeal was pending with the CA, a Notice of Garnishment
to Philippine Postal Bank, P. del Rosario and Junquera Branch Cebu
City, was served garnishing Cebu Citys bank deposit therein.
o The City of Cebu filed before the RTC a Motion to Dissolve,
Quash or Recall the Writ of Garnishment
o Contended that Account No. 101-8918-334 is not actually an
existing bank account and that the garnishment of Cebu
Citys bank account with Philippine Postal Bank was illegal,
because government funds and properties may not be seized
under writ of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgment, on obvious reason of public policy.
o DENIED
MR: DENIED
CA: partially granted appeal
Motion to Stay Execution was granted
Motion to Modify Judgment and Withdraw from the Expropriation
Proceedings was denied.
Petitioners arguments:
Decision dated March 13, 1998 was already final and executory.
Garnishment was proper for they were entitled to compensation
based on the March 13, 1998 Decision
Respondents arguments:
Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of Judgment and
Withdrawal of the (Expropriation) Case should be allowed.
o the just compensation fixed by the RTC is too high, and the
intended expropriation of the Spouses Ortegas property is
dependent on whether Cebu City would have sufficient
funds to pay for the same.
The garnishment of accounts with the Philippine Postal Bank was
illegal.
o appropriated for a different purpose by its Sangguniang
Panglungsod
o government funds and properties may not be seized under
writ of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgment,
on obvious reason of public policy.
Issue/s:
Held/Ratio:
1. NO, the CA did not err in denying the Omnibus Motion to Modify
Judgment and Motion to Withdraw from the Expropriation
Proceedings.
2. NO, the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank cannot
be subjected to garnishment.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22
SEC.!4.!Order!of!expropriation.!!If!the!objections!to!and!the!defenses!against!the!right!of!the!plaintiff!
to!expropriate!the!property!are!overruled,!or!when!no!party!appears!to!defend!as!required!by!this!Rule,!
the!court!may!issue!an!order!of!expropriation!declaring!that!the!plaintiff!has!a!lawful!right!to!take!the!
property!sought!to!be!expropriated,!for!the!public!use!or!purpose!described!in!the!complaint,!upon!the!
payment!of!just!compensation!to!be!determined!as!of!the!date!of!the!taking!of!the!property!or!the!filing!
of!the!complaint,!whichever!came!first.!
A!final!order!sustaining!the!right!to!expropriate!the!property!may!be!appealed!by!any!party!aggrieved!
thereby.!Such!appeal,!however,!shall!not!prevent!the!court!from!determining!the!just!compensation!to!
be!paid.!
After!the!rendition!of!such!an!order,!the!plaintiff!shall!not!be!permitted!to!dismiss!or!discontinue!the!
proceeding!except!on!such!terms!as!the!court!deems!just!and!equitable.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23
24
NPC v dela Cruz and Porform Dev. Corp. v Phil. Natl. Railways
Municipality of Makati v CA
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25
Municipality of Makati v CA
Respondents arguments:
Respondent on the other hand argued that:
1. Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01is not per se a tax or revenue
measure, but involves the operation and management of an
economic enterprise of the Municipality of Maasin thus, there
was no mandatory requirement to hold a public hearing for the
enactment thereof.
2. Even granting that a public hearing was required, respondent
insisted that public hearings took place on 11 August
1998 and 22 January 1999.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there is a need to exhaust administrative remedies
Whether or not a public hearing pursuant to sec. 186 of the LGC is
required for the municipal revenue code to be valid?
3. Whether or not there was a valid public hearing?
1.
2.
Held/Ratio:
1.
2.
Respondents arguments:
Respondents counter that GSIS may not successfully resist the citys notices
and warrants of levy on the basis of its exemption under RA 8291, real
property taxation being governed by RA 7160 or the Local Government
Code of 1991
Issue/s:
3) Whether GSIS under its charter is exempt from real property
taxation;
4) Assuming that it is so exempt, whether GSIS is liable for real
property taxes for its properties leased to a taxable entity
5) Whether the properties of GSIS are exempt from levy.
Held/Ratio:
GSIS is exempt from Real Property Tax
In 1936, in Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 186, the GSIS was set up as a nonstock corporation. Section 26 of CA 186 provided exemption from any legal
process and liens but only for insurance policies and their proceeds. In 1977,
PD 1146, (Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provided for
an expanded insurance system for government employees. Sec. 33 thereof
held that the System, its assets, revenues including all accruals thereto, and
benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or
duties of all kinds
In 1991, RA 7160, provided the exercise of local government units (LGUs)
of their power to tax, the scope and limitations thereof, and the exemptions
from taxations. The general provision on withdrawal of tax exemption
privileges in Sec. 193 of the LGC, and the special provision on withdrawal of
exemption from payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of the
succeeding Sec. 234, provides:
SEC. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless
otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives
granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned or -controlled corporations,
except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A.
No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
SEC. 234. Exemption from Real Property Tax. x x x Except as
provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax
previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether
natural or juridical, including all government-owned or controlled
corporation are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.
91, S-93 otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC). 6 of
the QCRC reiterated the withdrawal of exemption under 234 of the LGC.
On March 16, 1995, RA 7925, otherwise known as the Public
Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines was enacted. 23 of RA
7925 provides:
Sec. 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry.
Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted
under existing franchise, or may hereafter may be granted, shall ipso
facto become part of previously granted telecommunications
franchises sand shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to eht grantees of such franchises. Provided, however, That the
foregoing shall neither apply to nor affect provisions of
telecommunications franchises concerning territory covered by the
franchise, the life span of the franchise, or the type of service
authorized by the franchise. [Note: The Court did not discuss this in
the decision except as part of the facts]
On January 7, 1999, Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking
the exclusion of its real properties in the city from the roll of taxable real
properties. This request was denied. Bayantel appealed to the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals.
Because Bayantel did not pay the real property tax assessed. Notices of
delinquency for the amount of P43,878,208.18, were sent by the QC
Treasurer. This was followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy
against Bayantels properties with the public auction scheduled on July 30,
2002.
Threatened with the imminent loss, Bayantel withdrew their appeal and
instead filed with the QC RTC a petition for prohibition with an urgent
application for a temporary restraining order.
Petitioners arguments:
1. Bayantel failed to avail itself of the administrative remedies provided
for under the LGC. The appeal mechanics constitute as Bayantels
plain and speedy remedy
2. The language of 11 of RA 7633 is neither clear nor unequivocal.
Bayantel was in no time given any express exemption from the
payment of real property tax.
Respondents arguments:
1. The appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy.
2. Bayantel is only liable to pay the same taxes, as any other persons or
corporations on all its real or persona properties, exclusive of its
franchise.
Note: RTC: owing to the phrase exclusive of the franchise found in 11 of
RA 7633 = exemption or properties used actually, directly and exclusivey in
the conduct of its business under the franchise.
Issue/s:
4) Whether or not Bayantel is required to exhaust all
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief with the
trial court
5) Whether or not Bayantels real properties in QC are exempt
from real property taxes under its legislative franchise
Held/Ratio:
3. No. Petitions for prohibition are governed by the provision of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. In this case, with the reality that Bayantels
real properties were already levied upon on account of its nonpayment of real estate taxes, the appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy
and adequate remedy within the context of 2 of Rule 65.
Moreover, Court held, citing Ty v. Trampe, one of the recognized
exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies rule is when
only legal issues are to be resolved.
Note: The Court did not overlook the fact that an appeal to the
LBAA requires prior payment under protest of the amount of the
taxes assessed. However, the Court noted that with the prevailing
Asian financial crisis the said amount would have been difficult to
raise up and thus, the appeal may not be considered as a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy.
4. 11 of RA 7633 is an express and real intention on the part of
Congress to remove from the LGCs delegated taxing power, all of
Bayantels properties that are actually, directly, and exclusively used
in the pursuit of its franchise.
The Court noted that 14 of RA 3259 grants an exemption in favor
of Bayantel. According to the Court, the legislative intent expressed
Petitioners arguments:
Title to the real properties is under the name of MIAA but the real
owner of the property is the Republic of the Philippines as they are
for the benefit of the general public. They are thus inalienable and
not subject to real estate tax by local governments.
Sec. 21 of the MIAA charter exempts it from paying real estate tax.
Sec 234 of the LGC also exempts it from paying Real Estate Tax
since the real owner of the airport land and buildings Is the Republic
of the Philippines.
Exempt from taxation on the principle that the government cannot
tax itself.
Respondents arguments:
Sec. 193 of the LGC expressly withdrew the tax exempt privileges
of government owned and controlled corporations
Statutory construction: the express mention of one person, thing, or
act excludes all others.
Mactan International Airport vs. Marcos LGC has withdrawn the
exemption from real estate tax granted to international airports.
The deletion of the phrase "any government-owned or controlled so
exempt by its charter" in Section 234(e) of the Local Government
Code withdrew the real estate tax exemption of government-owned
or controlled corporations. The deleted phrase appeared in Section
40(a) of the 1974 Real Property Tax Code enumerating the entities
exempt from real estate tax.
Sec. 193 of LGC withdraws all tax exemptions from all persons
whether juridical or natural.
Issue: W/N: MIAA is exempt from Real Estate Tax imposed by the local
government? YES
Held/Ratio:
1. MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation it is an
instrumentality of the government
A GOCC is not exempt from real estate tax. A GOCC is defined
under the administrative code of 1987 as an agency organized as a
stock or a non-stock corporation.
MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock
divided into shares. It is not a non-stock corporation because it has
no members.(as required by the corp code)
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
powers.
ten percent (10%) of one percent (1%) for 1993-1994, twenty percent (20%) of one
percent (1%) for 1995, and thirty percent (30%) of one percent (1%) for 1996 and
the succeeding years thereafter, of gross receipts and sales derived from the
operation of the business in Quezon City during the preceding calendar year
RTC ruled that the "in lieu of all taxes" provision contained in Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7966 absolutely excused ABS-CBN from the payment of local
franchise tax imposed under Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93. The
intent of the legislature to excuse ABS-CBN from payment of local franchise
tax could be discerned from the usage of the "in lieu of all taxes" provision
and from the absence of any qualification except income taxes. Had
Congress intended to exclude taxes imposed from the exemption, it would
have expressly mentioned so in a fashion similar to the proviso on income
taxes.
CA dismissed the petition of Quezon City and its Treasurer. According to the
appellate court, the issues raised were purely legal questions cognizable only
by the Supreme Court.
Issue: W/N ABS-CBN was liable for franchise tax despite the phrase in lieu
of all taxes in its charter
Held: Yes. The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in its franchise does not
exempt ABS-CBN from payment of local franchise tax. First, The present
controversy essentially boils down to a dispute between the inherent taxing
power of Congress and the delegated authority to tax of local governments
under the 1987 Constitution and effected under the LGC of 1991.
The power of the local government of Quezon City to impose franchise tax is
based on Section 151 in relation to Section 137 of the LGC. Such taxing
power by the local government, however, is limited in the sense that
Congress can enact legislation granting exemptions. In the case of Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. (PLDT) vs. City of Davao, the SC
has upheld the power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of
local government units to impose taxes. There, the Court wrote:
"Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the
Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant
exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. The
legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means
that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts
must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations."
Congress has the inherent power to tax, which includes the power to grant
tax exemptions. On the other hand, the power of Quezon City to tax is
prescribed by Section 151 in relation to Section 137 of the LGC which
expressly provides that notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or
other special law, the City may impose a franchise tax. It must be noted that
Section 137 of the LGC does not prohibit grant of future exemptions.
Second, The "in lieu of all taxes" provision in the franchise of ABS-CBN
does not expressly provide what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from.
It is not clear whether the exemption would include both local, whether
municipal, city or provincial, and national tax. What is clear is that ABSCBN shall be liable to pay three (3) percent franchise tax and income taxes
under Title II of the NIRC. But whether the "in lieu of all taxes provision"
would include exemption from local tax is not unequivocal.
As adverted to earlier, the right to exemption from local franchise tax must
be clearly established and cannot be made out of inference or implications
but must be laid beyond reasonable doubt. Verily, the uncertainty in the "in
lieu of all taxes" provision should be construed against ABS-CBN. ABSCBN has the burden to prove that it is in fact covered by the exemption so
claimed. ABS-CBN miserably failed in this regard.
The cases cited by ABS-CBN differ from the case at bar because in the said
cases, the franchises were expressly exempt. Since ABS-CBN failed to
justify its claim for exemption from local franchise tax, by a grant expressed
in terms "too plain to be mistaken" its claim for exemption for local franchise
tax must fail.
Lastly, ABS-CBN's claims for exemption must fail on twin grounds. First,
the "in lieu of all taxes" clause in its franchise failed to specify the taxes the
company is sought to be exempted from. Neither did it particularize the
jurisdiction from which the taxing power is withheld. Second, the clause has
become functus officio because as the law now stands, ABS-CBN is no
longer subject to a franchise tax. It is now liable for VAT since R.A. No.
8424 was passed confirming the 10% VAT liability of radio and/or television
companies with yearly gross receipts exceeding P10,000,000.00.
No Dissenting Opinion
9.
10.
11.
12.
exemption from the payment of real property tax under its amendatory
franchise.
Respondents arguments: (Note: include respondents position, reason for
opposing petitioners claim, jurisprudence, and legal basis)
Bayantel states it is only "liable to pay the same taxes, as any other persons
or corporations on all its real or personal properties, exclusive of its
franchise, as found in Section 11 of its amended franchise, RA No. 7633.
Issue/s: WON Bayantels real properties in Quezon City are exempt from
real property taxes under its legislative franchise
Held/Ratio: Yes
1. There seems to be no issue as to Bayantels exemption from real
estate taxes by virtue of the term "exclusive of the franchise"
qualifying the phrase "same taxes on its real estate, buildings and
personal property," found in Section 14, supra, of its franchise, Rep.
Act No. 3259, as originally granted.
2. The legislative intent expressed in the phrase "exclusive of this
franchise" cannot be construed other than distinguishing between
two (2) sets of properties, be they real or personal, owned by the
franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly and exclusively used
in its radio or telecommunications business, and (b) those properties
which are not so used. It is worthy to note that the properties subject
of the present controversy are only those which are admittedly
falling under the first category.
3. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 effectively works to grant or
delegate to local governments of Congress inherent power to tax the
franchisees properties belonging to the second group of properties
indicated above, that is, all properties which, "exclusive of this
franchise," are not actually and directly used in the pursuit of its
franchise.
4. While Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 may be validly viewed as an
implied delegation of power to tax, the delegation under that
provision, as couched, is limited to impositions over properties of the
franchisee which are not actually, directly and exclusively used in
the pursuit of its franchise. Necessarily, other properties of Bayantel
directly used in the pursuit of its business are beyond the pale of the
delegated taxing power of local governments. In a very real sense,
therefore, real properties of Bayantel, save those exclusive of its
franchise, are subject to realty taxes.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Yamane v. BA Lepanto
Luz Yamane, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of Makati,
Petitioner, vs. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation. (25 October
2005)
Tinga, J.
Petition for tax refund
Doctrine: Ambiguity as to the application of an LGU tax on an individual
shall be strictly construed against the LGU.
Petitioner: Makati City Treasurer Yamane, assessed BA Lepanto Condo
Corp. for business tax
Respondent:
BA Lepanto Condo Corp., corporation of association of
various condo unit owners
Facts:
Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the Corporation) is a
duly organized condominium corporation constituted in accordance with the
Condominium Act, which owns and holds title to the common and limited
common areas of the BA-Lepanto Condominium (the Condominium),
situated in Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Its membership comprises the
various unit owners of the Condominium.
The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of its Amended ByLaws, to collect regular assessments from its members for operating
expenses, capital expenditures on the common areas, and other special
assessments as provided for in the Master Deed with Declaration of
Restrictions of the Condominium.
SC Ruling:
1. The Court overlooked the procedural lapse regarding appellate
jurisdiction exercised by CA in the interest of justice.27
!From!these!premises,!it!is!evident!that!the!stance!of!the!City!Treasurer!is!correct!as!a!matter!of!law,!
and!that!the!proper!remedy!of!the!Corporation!from!the!RTC!judgment!is!an!ordinary!appeal!under!Rule!
41! to! the! Court! of! Appeals.! However,! we! make! this! pronouncement! subject! to! two! important!
qualifications.! First,! in! this! particular! case! there! are! nonetheless! significant! reasons! for! the! Court! to!
overlook!the!procedural!error!and!ultimately!uphold!the!adjudication!of!the!jurisdiction!exercised!by!the!
Court!of!Appeals!!in!this!case.!Second,!the!doctrinal!weight!of!the!pronouncement!is!confined!to!cases!
and! controversies! that! emerged! prior! to! the! enactment! of! Republic! Act! No.! 9282,! the! law! which!
expanded!the!jurisdiction!of!the!Court!of!Tax!Appeals!(CTA).!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27
Besides,! we! shudder! at! the! thought! of! upholding! tax! liability! on! the! basis! of! the! standard! of! full!
appreciative! living! values,! a! phrase! that! defies! statutory! explication,! commonsensical! meaning,! the!
English!language,!or!even!definition!from!Google.!!The!exercise!of!the!power!of!taxation!!constitutes!!a!!
deprivation!of!property!under!the!due!process!clause,!and!the!taxpayers!right!to!due!process!is!violated!
when! arbitrary! or! oppressive! methods! are! used! in! assessing! and! collecting! taxes.!The! fact! that! the!
Corporation! did! not! fall! within! the! enumerated! classes! of! taxable! businesses! under! either! the! Local!
Government!Code!or!the!Makati!Revenue!Code!already!forewarns!that!a!clear!demonstration!is!essential!
on! the! part! of! the! City! Treasurer! on! why! the! Corporation! should! be! taxed! anyway.! Full! appreciative!
living!values!is!nothing!but!blather!in!search!of!meaning,!and!to!impose!a!tax!hinged!on!that!standard!is!
both!arbitrary!and!oppressive.!
!
29
The!City!Treasurer!also!contends!that!the!fact!that!the!Corporation!is!engaged!in!business!is!evinced!by!
the!Articles!of!Incorporation,!which!specifically!empowers!the!Corporation!to!acquire,!own,!hold,!enjoy,!
lease,! operate! and! maintain,! and! to! convey,! sell,! transfer! mortgage! or! otherwise! dispose! of! real! or!
personal!property.!What!the!!City!!Treasurer!!fails!!to!add!is!that!every!corporation!organized!under!the!
Corporation!Code!is!so!specifically!empowered.!Section!36(7)!of!the!Corporation!Code!states!that!every!
corporation! incorporated! under! the! Code! has! the! power! and! capacity! to! purchase,! receive,! take! or!
grant,! hold,! convey,! sell,! lease,! pledge,! mortgage! and! otherwise! deal! with! such! real! and! personal!
property! .! .! .! as! the! transaction! of! the! lawful! business! of! the! corporation!! may!! reasonably!!! and!!!
necessarily!!!require!.!.!.!.!Without!this!power,!corporations,!as!juridical!persons,!would!be!deprived!of!
the!capacity!to!engage!in!most!meaningful!legal!relations.!
(c) The penalty of two percent (2%) per month of delinquency, or twenty-four
percent (24%) per annum, as the case may be, shall continue to be imposed on the
unpaid tax from the time the delinquency was incurred up to the time that it is paid
for in full.
Petitioners Side:
1. Judges ruling was premised on erroneous grounds.
2. Private respondent cannot question the validity of the regulation
which he himself upheld and applied to other property as the regional
director of finance for region VI.
3. The regulations departure from the RPT Code is sanctioned by EO
73
and
its
implementing
guidelines,
Joint
Local
Assessment/Treasury Regulations No. 2-86 (these guidelines do not
provide a limit to the penalty)
4. Respondents recourse is to file a case questioning the validity of 286.
5. 2-86 was borne out of EO 73. 2-86 is consistent with the assailed
regulations, hence, EO 73 has the effect of validating these
regulations.
6. The Minister of Finance under section 2 of EO 73 has the authority
to promulgate necessary rules and regulations to implement the EO.
This is blanket authority to tinker with the rates of penalty in
delinquency taxes
7. The regulations are not inconsistent with the RPT Code as it only
applies to simple delinquency and not cases wherein there was
failure to promptly pay the real property tax due, including the
increase in tax due and demandable for the tax year as a result of the
application of the 1984 New or Revised Assessment of the value of
the subject property
Respondents Side:
1. The computation was erroneous since the rate applied exceeded 24%
in contravention of section 66 of PD 464 (Real Property Tax Code)
2. Both regulations are unconstitutional.
Issue:
1.
Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, there is
hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate of seventy-five
percent (75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding
calendar year based on the income or receipts realized within the territorial
jurisdiction of Davao City.
(c) the power of the City of Davao to impose a franchise tax is subject to the
in lieu of all taxes clause found in Sec 9 of R.A. No. 7294; such clause
exempts it from all taxes, both local and national, except the national
franchise tax (now VAT), income tax, and real property tax;
(d) the imposition of franchise tax by the City of Davao would amount to a
violation of the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts,
since the franchise is in the nature of a contract between the government and
Smart
Respondents arguments:
the Constitution [Art X, Sec 5] granted local government units the power to
create their own sources of revenue
Issue: WON Smart is liable to pay the franchise tax imposed by the City of
Davao
Held/Ratio: YES
1) Prospective Effect of RA 7160
Sec 137, in relation to Sec 151 of R.A. No. 7160, allowed the imposition of
franchise tax by the local government units; while Sec 193 thereof provided
for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted prior to the issuance
of R.A. No. 7160 except for those expressly mentioned therein.
The Court agrees with Smarts contention that it is not covered by Sec 137,
in relation to Sec 151 of R.A. No. 7160, because its franchise was granted
after the effectivity of the said law. The withdrawal of tax exemptions or
incentives provided in R.A. No. 7160 can only affect those franchises
granted prior to the effectivity of the law. The intention of the legislature to
remove all tax exemptions or incentives granted prior to the said law is
evident in the language of Section 193 of R.A. No. 7160. No interpretation is
necessary.
2) The in lieu of all taxes clause in RA7294
R.A. No. 7294 is not definite in granting exemption to Smart from local
taxation. Section 9 of R.A. No. 7294 imposes on Smart a franchise tax
equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the business
transacted under the franchise and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all
taxes on the franchise or earnings thereof. R.A. No 7294 does not expressly
provide what kind of taxes Smart is exempted from. It is not clear whether
the in lieu of all taxes provision in the franchise of Smart would include
exemption from local or national taxation.
The uncertainty in the in lieu of all taxes clause in R.A. No. 7294 must be
construed strictly against Smart which claims the exemption. Smart has the
burden of proving the exemption. However, it failed to do so.
Thus, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Davao. The in lieu
of all taxes clause applies only to national internal revenue taxes and not to
local taxes.
The franchise tax that the City of Davao may impose must comply with Secs
137 and 151 of R.A. No. 7160.
*Note: In this case, Sec 9 of RA 7294 has been repealed by the VAT Law
[Sec 20, RA 7716], which imposes a uniform 10% VAT on all
telecommunications companies. Thus, Smart is no longer paying the
franchise tax imposed in RA 7294.
3) Non-impairment Clause of the Constitution
there is no violation of Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. The franchise of Smart does not expressly provide for
exemption from local taxes. Absent the express provision on such exemption
under the franchise, we are constrained to rule against it. The in lieu of all
taxes clause in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7294 leaves much room for
interpretation. Due to this ambiguity in the law, the doubt must be resolved
against the grant of tax exemption.
Moreover, Smarts franchise was granted with the express condition that it is
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal.
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance: It is enough to say that the parties to a
contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the
exercise of the taxing power of the State
S
S
Respondents arguments:
S The Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding no probable cause to
hold any of the respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019.
o the subject properties have been transferred and are now
registered in the name of Calamba City under new
Certificates of Title
o the reasonableness of the purchase price for the subject lots
could be deduced from the fact that Calamba City bought
S
S
115 and 280 were the City Councils stamp of approval and authority
for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.
Respondent Mayor Lajara and City Treasurer Baroro:
S It is not sound practice to depart from the policy of non-interference
in the Ombudmans exercise of discretion to determine whether to
file an information against an accused.
S In the assailed Resolution and Order, the Ombudsman stated clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which the case was based and
as such, petitioner had the burden of proving that grave abuse of
discretion attended the issuance of the Resolution and Order of the
Ombudsman.
S Respondents claimed that out of the six PSEDC-owned lots that were
sold to Calamba City, the ownership of the four lots had already
been transferred to Pamana as evidenced by the new TCTs. They
added that even if TCT Nos. 66140 and 61703 were still in PSEDCs
name, ownership of these lots had been transferred to Pamana as
confirmed by Fr. Sulpico, the custodian of all the assets of the
Dominican Province of the Philippines.
S Respondents also refuted the alleged overpricing of the lots covered
by TCT Nos. 66140 and 61703. Respondents contended that Fr.
Sulpicos letter offering the lots at P350 per square meter had been
superseded by his own denial of said offer during the meeting of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod on 14 November 2002.
S On the absence of ratification by the City Council, respondents
explained that Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160 spoke of prior
authority and not ratification. Respondents pointed out that petitioner
did not deny the fact that Mayor Lajara was given prior authority to
negotiate and sign the subject contracts. In fact, it was petitioner who
made the motion to enact Resolution No. 280.
S On the non-conduct of a relocation survey, respondents noted that
while a relocation survey may be of use in determining which lands
should be purchased, the absence of a relocation survey would not, in
any manner, affect the validity of the subject transactions.
Issue:
WON all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots should bear the
ratification by the City Council of Calamba (NO)
Held/Ratio:
S Ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine qua
non for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf
of the city. The law only requires prior authorization from the
City Council.
Section 22(c), Title I of RA 7160 (LGC) provides: Unless otherwise
provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local
chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior
authorization by the sanggunian concerned.
Section 455, Title III of the LGC enumerates the powers, duties, and
compensation of the Chief Executive: Represent the city in all its
business transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds, contracts, and
obligations, and such other documents upon authority of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance
Clearly, when the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law
speaks of prior authorization or authority from the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and not ratification. It cannot be denied that the City
Council issued Resolution No. 28032 authorizing Mayor Lajara to
purchase the subject lots.
As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City
Council is not a condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter
into contracts. With the resolution issued by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, it cannot be said that there was evident bad faith in
purchasing the subject lots. The lack of ratification alone does not
characterize the purchase of the properties as one that gave
unwarranted benefits to Pamana or Prudential Bank or one that
caused undue injury to Calamba City.
Doctrine: It is the mayor who has the authority to file suits "for the recovery
of funds and property" on behalf of the city, even without the prior
authorization from the Sanggunian.
Facts:
Sangguniang Panlungsod (Sanggunian) of Caloocan City passed
Ordinance No. 068 authorizing the city mayor, then Mayor Macario
Asistio, Jr. to negotiate and enter into a contract of sale of the
patrimonial property of the city
Mayor Asistio, on behalf of Caloocan City, and Jose C. Go of Ever
Gotesco (Gotesco), executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
aforementioned property
However, the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the Deed of
Sale. Nonetheless, on motion for reconsideration, the COA approved
the proposed sale on the condition that the selling price is pegged at a
different price
Sanggunian passed an ordinance amending Ord. No. 068, directing
that an amended deed of absolute sale be executed between the City
and Gotesco, the terms and conditions of which be pursuant to the
COA decision
The ordinance was initially vetoed by then incumbent mayor,
Reynaldo O. Malonzo (Malonzo), on the ground that since the deed
of sale earlier executed was valid and subsisting it was not
incumbent upon him to execute an amended deed of conveyance
over the same property; the Sanggunian, however, passed Resolution
No. 0609 overriding the veto
Gotesco executed an "Express Consent to the Novation of the Deed
of Absolute Sale" with an "Amended Deed of Absolute Sale"
embodying the amendments prescribed by Ord. No. 0236. Mayor
Malonzo received the documents but refused to sign the amended
deed of sale
Department of Interior and Local Government opined that the deed
of absolute sale may be registered with the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City, the registration being a mere ministerial act on the
part of the latter. Thereafter, Gotesco tendered payment for the
property, as well as for transfer tax and and real estate tax to the City
Treasurer and to Malonzo but these payments were refused
Gotesco filed Civil Case No. C-18274, seeking the consignation of
the purchase price and tax payments
Petitioners arguments:
Relief: Reversal of CA decision
Position: The Court of Appeals had no basis for reversing its earlier
Decision since private respondents did not present any new evidence
or novel arguments, such that their motion for reconsideration
contained mere reiterations of their original submissions in their
petition. Petitioner insists that it is not guilty of forum-shopping
since the cases it filed involved different issues and causes of action.
Thus, petitioner argues, there being different causes of action, issues
and objectives between the cases, it cannot be said that forumshopping exists. Likewise, there can be no res judicata among the
cases since i) they have different causes of action; ii) the evidence
presented in Civil Case No. C-18308 are not sufficient to sustain the
cause of action in the second case; iii) there is no identity of parties;
and iv) there is no identity of subject matter. Further, petitioner
contends that its petition was seasonably filed and perfected, and
complied with the material date rule. Further, said petition was filed
in accordance with the powers and duties of a mayor, as per the
Charter of the City of Caloocan, as well as under the Local
Government Code (R.A. 7160), and thus needs no authority from the
Sanggunian in order to institute actions or suits on behalf of the city
Respondents arguments:
Position: Petition was filed out of time. Also, the petition is defective
in form since i) it violated the material data rule; ii) it was instituted
by a non-party, Reynaldo O. Malonzo, and not by the City of
Caloocan, as in fact in the attached verification, Malonzo referred to
himself as the "petitioner in the above-entitled case," and there was
no resolution from the City Council authorizing him to file the
instant petition; and iii) petitioner failed to attach a copy of the
complaint in Civil Case No. C- 18274, which is material and relevant
to the instant petition. Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that
forum-shopping and litis pendentia exist. The factual allegations in
the three (3) subject cases and even the annexes attached to the
complaint are practically one and the same; even the principal parties
are identical. Additionally, the causes of action in C-18337 are both
subject of judicial inquiry in C-18274 and C-18337, thereby
rendering it dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia or res
judicata.
Issue/s: Whether or not the case should be dismissed?
Held/Ratio: YES
The City Legal Officer has no authority to institute the action. It is
the mayor who has the authority to file suits "for the recovery of
funds and property" on behalf of the city, even without the prior
authorization from the Sanggunian. Civil Case No. C-18308 was
filed by Malonzo to enjoin the registration of what he deemed to be
an anomalous deed of sale, while Civil Case No. C-18337 was
instituted to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale and to cancel the title
issued to Gotesco. Obviously, these suits were filed, initially to
preserve, and subsequently to recover, the property subject of the
said suits, to protect the interests of the City of Caloocan over the
said parcel of land. Thus, it can be said that the institution of Civil
Cases Nos. C-18308 and C-18337 was made within the bounds of
Malonzos authority as the city mayor.
o Sec. 455 of the Local Government Code provides, among
others, the powers and duties of a city mayor, thus: (a) The
Respondents:
1. CIR has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and that the
petition states no cause of action.
1. Issue: W/N the Mayor and Members of the Municipal Board are immune
from suit?
Held: Yes.
SC:
It is obvious from the nature of the duties imposed upon, and performed by
the Department of Public Services that the City of Manila, through that
department, is not functioning in its proprietary or private capacity, but rather
in its governmental or public character. As was held in the case of Curry vs.
City of Highland Park (242 Mich. 614, 219 N.W. 745), "The collection and
disposal of garbage and acting in conserving the public health is
governmental wherein the municipality acts for the state." This must be so,
for, surely, in the collection and disposal of garbage, the City of Manila does
not obtain any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit, but acts in the
interest of health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare
as affecting the public generally. Such being the case, it follows that the
Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. The rule is
settled that in the performance of its governmental functions, a municipal
corporation, like the City of Manila, acts as an agent of the State, and as
such, is immune from suit unless consent thereto has been given. Such
consent must be expressed in unequivocal language and here no consent of
the Government has been given.
2. Issue: W/N the Union can compel the Mayor and the Members of the
Board to implement the RA? No.
The law was implemented by EO 251 promulgated by the President on June
26, 1957, with the proviso that "when the interest of the Public service so
require, the head of any department, bureau, or office may extend the daily
hours of labor for any or all of the employees under him, and may likewise
require any or all of them to do overtime work not only on work days but
also on holidays." This is in accordance with Sec. 566 of the Revised
Administrative Code. It is to be observed that there is nothing in the law in
question or in the implementing order that imposes upon the respondent
Mayor or Municipal Board of Manila the duty to apply the benefit of said
law to all employees and laborers of the city government. On the contrary,
the law gives to the respondent Mayor ample authority and discretion to
extend their work schedule beyond the prescribed number of days and hours
of labor. If the members of the petitioning union are required to work seven
days a week, as before the enactment of RA1880, it must be because their
work is demanded by the "exigencies of the service." Indeed, if the number
of their work days is reduced, or if they are given days-off on Saturdays and
Sundays, including holidays, public health and sanitation would be
undermined and endangered by the non-collection of garbage and other
refuse matters, not to mention the foul odor that would fill the city
atmosphere in those two or more days.
3. Issue: W/N the Union is entitled to overtime pay? No.
Since the members of the petitioner are government employees appointed
under the Civil Service Law and their salaries, wages, or emoluments are
fixed by law or ordinance, they have no right to overtime compensation for
work required of them in the interest of the service beyond the number of
days and hours prescribed by RA 1880. The city government may, of course,
grant its employees overtime compensation, for extra hours of work, but the
granting of such compensation is, at best, a matter of administrative policy
that is discretionary and dependent upon the city's financial conditions.
Dispositive: CIR affirmed.
Calleja v CA (1967)
Doctrine: The Municipal Attorney of a municipality, duly appointed in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 2264, is the legal officer of
the municipality, and as such legal officer he may appear in court as counsel
for the municipality or any municipal officer who is a party in a case in his
official capacity. Municipal Atty. has authority under the law to sign the
notice of appeal, as counsel for his respondents; and the notice of appeal,
which he had thus signed even if he had signed it alone, without being
accompanied by the Provincial Fiscal is valid and produces the legal
effect of bringing the appeal, from the decision in the precious civil case,
properly to the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
1. Calleja is one of the nineteen civil service eligible employees of the
Municipality of Iriga, who were separated from the service when their
positions were abolished by the municipal council for lack of funds.
2. Calleja and the others filed an action for mandamus before the CFI of
Camarines Sur against the Municipality of Iriga, the Members of the
Municipal Council, and the Municipal Treasurer, praying for their
reinstatement and payment of their back salaries. This was granted by the
CFI.
3. A copy of the decision was furnished the Provincial Fiscal who
represented the Municipality of Iriga. The Provincial Fiscal did not file a
notice of appeal from this decision except on the last day for perfecting
the appeal it was Municipal Atty. Felix (who collaborated with the
Provincial Fiscal in representing the Municipality of Iriga) who filed a
notice of appeal and an appeal bond.
4. Calleja filed a motion objecting to the approval of the appeal by the CFI
on the ground that the notice of appeal was not signed by the Provincial
Fiscal who is the only official who can legally represent the Municipality
of Iriga and its officers. Therefore, the appeal was not perfected and it
should not be given due course. CFI overruled Callejas decision.
5. Calleja filed a motion to set aside this order, to which motion municipal
Atty. Silvestre Felix filed an objection which was approved by the
Provincial Fiscal. After the denial of Calleja's motion, the case was
forwarded to the CA.
6. Calleja filed in the CA a motion to dismiss the appeal in the abovementioned case reiterating the same grounds that he adduced in objecting
to the approval of the appeal in the lower court. This motion was again
opposed by Atty. Felix, with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal. CA
denied Calleja's motion to dismiss.
7. Calleja filed a petition for certiorari in the SC, by way of an appeal from
the order of the CA denying his motion to dismiss respondents' appeal.
Petitioners arguments:
1. Calleja wants the appeal of the officials of Municipality of Iriga to be
dismissed.
2. Calleja contends that the only official who can legally represent in court
respondent municipality and its officers who are sued in their official
capacities is the Provincial Fiscal as provided in Section 1681 and 1683
of the Revised Administrative Code, and that Republic Act 2264 had not
repealed or modified said provisions.
3. Calleja contends that, inasmuch as the Provincial Fiscal is the officer
empowered to appear for the respondents, the resolution of the Municipal
Council of Iriga authorizing Municipal Atty. Silvestre Felix to represent
the municipality in all cases wherein the municipality, or any officer
thereof in his official capacity, is a party, was ultra vires.
4. Calleja contends that granting that said attorney may be allowed to
appear in the case his appearance should be with the consent, control and
under the direction of the Provincial Fiscal. It is the stand of Calleja that
when the Provincial Fiscal himself did not appeal the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 5077, nor did
he sign along with Municipal Atty. Felix the notice of appeal in said
notice of appeal had been perfected in said case, so that respondents'
appeal was not properly brought to the Court of Appeals, and, therefore,
that appeal should be dismissed pursuant to the provisions of Section 1,
paragraph (b) of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents arguments: (None was mentioned by the Court)
Issue: WON Atty. Silvestre Felix, in his capacity as Municipal Attorney for
the Municipality of Iriga, who appeared in collaboration with the Provincial
Fiscal as counsel for respondent municipality and its officials has the
authority, under the law, to sign the notice of appeal in said case, without the
accompanying signature or conformity of the Provincial Fiscal. Yes.
Held/Ratio: (Note: include legal basis and jurisprudence)
1. The Municipal Council of Iriga, Camarines Sur, approved Resolution
No. 36, series of 1961, creating the office of Municipal Attorney for the
Municipality of Iriga, pursuant to the provisions of Section 3, paragraph
3 (a) of Republic Act 2264, entitled "An Act Amending the Laws
Governing Local Governments by Increasing their Autonomy and
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, which
we have hereinbefore quoted.
Section 3, paragraph 3 (a) of Republic Act 2264 provides that the
municipality may create the office of Municipal Attorney who shall act
as the legal counsel of the municipality.
It is apparent, therefore, that the two laws have one thing in common
that is, that they provide for a legal officer or counsel for the
municipality.
Both officials, i.e., the Provincial Fiscal and the Municipal Attorney, can
act as the legal officer and/or counsel of the municipality. This
interpretation is but an implementation of the purpose for which
Republic Act 2264 was enacted that is, to increase the powers of, and
give more autonomy to, the local government which, in this particular
case, is the municipal government.
The enactment of Republic Act 2264 had the effect of modifying the
provisions of Sections 1681, 1682 and 1683 of the Revised
Administrative Code insofar as said sections may be applied to
municipalities that have duly appointed Municipal Attorneys.
The rulings of this Court in the cases of Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v.
Manotok, et al., (G.R. No. L-6528, May 25, 1953) and Enriquez v.
Jimenez (G.R. No. L-12617, April 29, 1960), which are invoked by
Calleja, have no application in the present case because in those two
cases what was in issue was the power of the municipality to employ
private counsel, instead of availing of the services of the Provincial
Fiscal in cases in court where the municipality was a party; and the facts
of those cases had taken place before the enactment of Republic Act
2264 (June 19, 1959). when those cases came up, the municipalities were
not yet empowered to create the office of Municipal Attorney.
Doctrine: Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can
represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits except in situations
where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
Facts:
The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered judgment in a civil case in favor
of petitioner municipality of Pililla against Philippine Petroleum
Corporation (PPC). The judgment ordered PPC to pay petitioner
deficiencies on business taxes due under the municipal tax
ordinance. The judgment became final and executory.
In connection with the execution of the judgment, Atty. Mendiola
filed a motion before the RTC of Morong, Rizal, in behalf of
petitioner municipality for the examination of PPCs gross sales for
the purpose of computing the business tax due. PPC argued that the
mayor of Pillillia have already received payment of the business due
as evidenced by the quitclaim documents executed by the mayor.
The Court denied the motion for examination and execution.
Atty. Mendiola filed a MR proposing a higher amount of liability on
the part of PPC. RTC denied the MR.
Atty. Mendiola filed a petition for certiorari with the SC which was
subsequently referred to the CA. PPC filed a motion questioning
Atty. Mendiolas authority to represent petitioner municipality. The
CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel
but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the
municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal
legal officer.
Petitioners argument:
Petitioners position: PPC is liable to a greater amount of business
deficiency taxes than was previously adjudged by the court.
Re: the rule on the validity of the representation of a municipal
corporation by a private counsel (stated below), the exception covers
situations where the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case as in
this case.
PPC cannot raise Atty. Mendiolas lack of authority for the first time
on appeal.
Respondents arguments:
Issue/s:
WON Atty. Mendiola, as a private counsel, may represent the
municipality of PIilla in this case (NO)
Held:
In Ramos v. CA and Province of Cebu v. IAC, the Court held that
private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in
lawsuits.
Under Sec. 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code complemented
by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only
the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a
province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is
mandatory.
Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and
provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial fiscal
shall represent the province and any municipality or
municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases
whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court
or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in
question is a party adverse to the provincial government or
to some other municipality or municipal district in the same
province. When the interests of a provincial government and
of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial
fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any
municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a
special attorney may be employed by its council.
The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent it. For this exception to apply, the fact that the provincial
fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear
on record. In this case, there is nothing in the records to show that
the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the
Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein
private counsel is without authority of law.
The exception does not include situations where the provincial fiscal
refuses to handle the case. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the
right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his
functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his
oath of office.
Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal
council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting
provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to
handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to Section 1679 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
The lack of authority of Atty. Mendiola, was even raised by the
municipality itself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's
motion for execution of his lien, which was filed with the court a
quo by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of
said municipality.
The contention of Atty. Mendiola that PPC cannot raise for the first
time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality is
untenable. The legality of his representation can be questioned at any
stage of the proceedings.
Even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty.
Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have been
revoked by the municipality when it entered into a compromise
agreement with PPC with regard to the execution of the judgment in
its favor and thereafter filed personally with the court below two
pleadings entitled and constitutive of a "Satisfaction of Judgment"
and a "Release and Quitclaim". A client, by appearing personally and
presenting a motion by himself, is considered to have impliedly
dismissed his lawyer.
CHAPTER VI
City of Manila v Teotico (1968)
(Teotico v City of Manila in syllabus)
Although the rule is that special laws such as the Manila City Charter
prevail over general laws like the Civil Code, damages arising from tort form
an exception. In a situation where a person falls into a city manhole and gets
injured, the Civil Code must prevail over the Manila City Charter.
Facts:
4. Genaro Teotico was a practicing public accountant, a businessman,
and a professor at the University of the East. He held responsible
positions in several business firms and was a member of several civic
organizations.
5. On January 27, 1958, Teotico was waiting for a jeep at loading and
unloading zone at the corner of Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila.
6. He managed to hail a jeepney. As he was walking towards the
jeepney to board it, he fell into an uncovered and unlighted manhole
(aka catch basin).
7. His head hit the rim of the manhole, causing his eyeglasses to break.
The broken pieces of his glasses pierced his left eyelid.
8. Bystanders brought him to the Philippine General Hospital, after
which, he was brought home.
9. Aside from his wounded eyelid, his other injuries were
a. Contusions on his left thigh, left upper arm, right leg and
upper lip
b. Abrasion on his right infra-patella region
c. Allergic reaction to the anti-tetanus injections given to him
at the hospital.
10. Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its
mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer, and chief of
police.
11. CFI Manila ruled in favor of Teotico. CA affirmed and additionally
sentenced the City to pay damages worth P6750.00
12. The City of Manila moved to reconsider, raising the issue of which
law governed the case, Section 4 of the Manila City Charter (RA
409), or Article 2189 of the Civil Code.
13. Section 4 of the Manila City Charter provides that:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to
persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
6. The Office of the City Engineer had already filed complaints in court
regarding the rampant theft of the covers
7. In order to prevent the theft, the City has changed the position and
layout of Manilas manholes by constructing them under the sidewalks,
covered by concrete cement covers, with openings on the side of the
gutter.
S These changes were being undertaken by the city whenever funds
were available.
At the level of the Supreme Court
8. Section 4 of the Manila City Charter should prevail over the Civil Code
because the former is a special law intended exclusively for Manila,
while the Civil Code is a general law applicable to the entire Philippines.
9. The City cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages because
S The accident occurred in a national highway
S It was not negligent
Issue/s:
Which law applies to the case, Section 4 of the Manila City Charter, or
Article 2189 of the Civil Code? Article 2189
Held/Ratio:
Applicable Law
1. Territorially speaking, the Manila City Charter is indeed a special
law and the Civil Code is merely general legislation.
2. However:
a. Section 4 of the Charter establishes a general rule which
regulates the Citys liability for damages or injury to persons
or property arising from the negligence or failure of city
officers to enforce or attempt to enforce the provisions of the
Charter or any other law or ordinance.
b. Article 2189 of the Civil Code is a particular prescription
making provinces, cities and municipalities liable for
damages for the death or injury of persons due to the
defective condition of public works under their control or
supervision.
3. Thus, in this case, Section 4 of the Charter is a general rule despite
being technically classed as a special law, while Article 2189 of the
Civil Code is the exception despite being technically classed as a
general law. Since the cause of action of this case is based on the
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the
province, city or municipality for liability to attach
! Only the exercise of control or supervision is required.
This control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is
exercised through the City Engineer.
Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensationThere shall be a city engineer, who shall be in charge of the
department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall receive a
salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. He shall
have the following duties:
xxx
(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of
waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water supply, and shall
control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in accordance
with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the
use of all private systems for supplying water to the city and its
inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their connection with the
public sewer system.
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction
and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and
regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages
or injuries sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city
officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt the
city, as in the case at bar.
Although the City Engineer receives an honorarium from the Ministry of
Public Highways, his salary from the city government substantially exceeds
the honorarium.
method of selection and copies of approve contracts were not attached to the
disbursement vouchers.cralaw
Vice Mayor Vicencio appealed to the Adjudication and Settlement Board of
the COA which affirmed the City Audior. The COA Chairperson affirmed.
Petitioners arguments: (Note: include petitioners relief, position, and
legal basis)
Petitioner Vicencio contends that the ordinance authorizes the Office of the
Vice-Mayor, and not Vice-Mayor Yambao in particular, to enter into
consultancy contracts. Notably, it was even Hon. Vice-Mayor Benjamin C.
Galauran, who was acting Vice-Mayor at the time, who entered into the 2003
Consultancy Contracts. Petitioner also argues that there is no indication from
the preamble of the ordinance, which can be read from the minutes of the
SPM meeting, that the ordinance was specifically designed to empower only
Vice-Mayor Yambao, or to limit such power to hire for the period June to
December
2003
only.cralaw
Respondents arguments: (Note: include respondents position, reason for
opposing petitioners claim, jurisprudence, and legal basis)
Same arguments as the auditing office.
Issue/s: W/N a vice mayor can enter into consultancy contracts pursuant
to an ordinance expressly granting the former mayor power.
Held/Ratio:
No.
The SC affirmed the City Auditors decision.
Under Sec. 456 of the LGC, there is no inherent authority on the part of the
city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit,
unlike that provided for the city mayor. Hence his power to enter into
contracts must be expressly granted by ordinance. Ordinance No. 15-2003
specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for
consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to
the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as
a continuing authority for any person who enters the Office of the ViceMayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.cralaw
Ordinance No. 15-2003 is clear and precise and leaves no room for
interpretation. It only authorized the then City Vice-Mayor to enter into
consultancy contracts in the specific areas of concern. Further, the
appropriations for this particular item were limited to the savings for the
period June to December 2003. This was an additional limitation to the
power granted to Vice-Mayor Yambao to contract on behalf of the city. The
fact that any later consultancy contract would necessarily require further
appropriations from the city council strengthens the contention that the
power granted under Ordinance No. 15-2003 was limited in scope. Hence,
petitioner was without authority to enter into the 2005 Consultancy
Contracts.cralaw
Section 103 of P.D. 1445 declares that expenditures of government funds or
uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a
personal liability of the of1icial or employee found to be directly responsible
therefor. The public official's personal liability arises only if the expenditure
of government funds was made in violation of law. In this case, petitioner's
act of entering into a contract on behalf of the local government unit without
the requisite authority therefor was in violation of the Local Government
Code. While petitioner may have relied on the opinion of the City Legal
Officer, such reliance only serves to buttress his good faith. It does not,
however, exculpate him from his personal liability under P.D. 1445.cralaw
Dissenting opinion: (if any)
Facts:
During the incumbency of Mayor Lopez, the city of Manila undertook a
Land for the Landless Program. The city purchased squatter-infested
properties for the purpose of selling them to the occupants at cost. Among
the properties were the lots in Tondo owned by petitioners.
The City Appraisal Committee approved Appraisal Resolution No. 15-1990 fixing the market value of the Fajardo Estate at P1,600.00 per
square meter.
The city purchased six of the lots of the Fajardo Estate consisting of
8,772.40 square meters at P1,600.00 per square meter or for a total
selling price of P13,955,840.00. The city also purchased the two
remaining lots of the Fajardo Estate consisting of 11,666 square
meters also for P1,600 per square meter or a total of P18,666,880.00.
Mayor Lopez then signed the disbursement voucher and PNB Check
No. 906350 dated August 10, 1992 payable to petitioners. This was
approved on pre-audit by the City Auditor. The City Cashier, the City
Disbursing Officer, and the City Treasurer certified as to the
availability of funds.
Newly elected Mayor Lim subsequently assumed office. He then
appointed Marzan as the new City Administrator. As such, Marzan was
required to countersign the check payment under Sections 344 and 345 of
the Local Government Code of 1991. But Colonel Balagtas, Mayor Lims
financial and budget consultant, advised Marzan not to sign the check as
there seemed to be something suspicious about the transaction, given the
large amount involved.
Mayor Lim instructed Marzan to withhold the check until the
questionable purchase of the lots had been cleared. Marzan then
informed petitioners that per order of the Mayor, their check could not
be released. Marzan received a letter from petitioners demanding the
release of the check. The City Legal Officer opined that there is no
legal obstacle to release the check.
Mayor Lim reiterated his instruction not to release the check,
explaining that he directed his aide, Herrera, to investigate the matter.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Petition for Mandamus With Damages
against Mayor Lim and Marzan.
RTC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners. The Dispositive
portion is as follows.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and judgment is
rendered as follows:
1.
Respondent Marzan is ordered to countersign
immediately PNB Check No. 906350 and, thereafter, to
deliver the same check to Fajardo and Nogales; and if the
same is not feasible, then should coordinate with the City
Treasurer for the issuance of another check for the same
amount as replacement of the old check;
2.
Respondent Marzan is likewise ordered to pay in his
personal capacity Nogales and Fajardo, the following
sums:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Petitioners filed a MR insisting that the trial court should not have deleted
the award of damages. Respondents Mayor Lim and Marzan filed with the
SC petitions for review on certiorari. It was denied on the ground that the
CA did not commit any reversible error.
CA decision was not acted upon as it had lost jurisdiction when
respondents filed their Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC.
Petitioners arguments: (Note: include petitioners relief, position, and legal
basis)
Petitioner: Rafael Fajardo and Rogelio Nogales, owners of the property
On Damages: The CA should have held respondents liable for damages.
On Jurisdiction: Until and unless a petition for review on certiorari is given
due course by this Court, the Court of Appeals never loses jurisdiction over a
case pending before it.
Respondents arguments:
Respondents: Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim and Ramon Marzan, former City
Administrator of Manila
On Mandamus and Damages: Mandamus is not the proper remedy. Marzan
should not be held liable for damages.
On Jurisdiction: When they filed with this Court their petition for review on
certiorari, the CA lost jurisdiction over the case, specifically over petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration then pending before it. The CA thus deferred to
the exercise by this court of its jurisdiction. Had the CA resolved petitioners
MR, there could be a possibility that its Resolution and that of SC might be
opposite to each other.
Issue/s:
(1) whether both respondents should be held liable jointly and severally for
damages; and
(2) whether the filing with this Court of a petition for review on certiorari
divested the Court of Appeals of its jurisdiction
Held/Ratio:
On Damages
This is a factual issue. The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before
it from the Court of Appeals, via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
CHAPTER VII
Boracay Foundation Inc. v. The Province of Aklan (represented by
Governor Carlito S. Marquez), The Philippine Reclamation Authority, and
the DENR-EMB (Region VI) (2012)
Doctrine:Under the LGC, 2 requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the
affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory
requirements, the projects implementation is illegal.
Facts:
This case is an original petition for the issuance of an Environmental
Protection Order in the nature of a continuing mandamus under the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
The parties to the case are as follows:
o Boracay Foundation, Inc. (petitioner) -> is a duly registered, nonstock domestic corporation whose purpose is to foster a united,
concerted and environment-conscious development of Boracay
Island, thereby preserving and maintaining its culture, natural beauty
and ecological balance, marking the island as the crown jewel of
Philippine tourism, a prime tourist destination in Asia and the whole
world.
o Province of Aklan (respondent Province) -> a political subdivision of
the government created pursuant to RA No. 1414, represented by
Honorable Carlito S. Marquez (the Provincial Governor).
o Philippine Reclamation Authority (respondent PRA), formerly
called the Public Estates Authority (PEA) -> is a government entity
created by PD No. 1084, which states that one of the purposes for
which respondent PRA was created was to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas. It eventually became the lead
agency primarily responsible for all reclamation projects in the
country under Executive Order No. 525, series of 1979.
o DENR-EMB (Regional Office VI) -> government agency in the
Western Visayas Region authorized to issue environmental
compliance certificates regarding projects that require the
environments protection and management in the region.
The case involves Boracay Island which was declared a tourist zone and
marine reserve in 1973 under PD No. 1801. -> The island comprises the
barangays of Manoc-manoc, Balabag, and Yapak, all within the
municipality of Malay, in the province of Aklan.
In 2005, Boracay 2010 Summit was organized by petitioner Boracay
Foundation and participated in by representatives from national
government agencies, LGUs, and the private sector.
o The Summit aimed to re-establish a common vision of all
stakeholders to ensure the conservation, restoration, and preservation
of Boracay Island and to develop an action plan that [would allow]
all sectors to work in concert among and with each other for the long
term benefit and sustainability of the island and the community.
o The Summit yielded a Terminal Report showing that there was a
need to expand the port facilities at Caticlan due to congestion in the
holding area of the existing port, caused by inadequate facilities, thus
tourists suffered long queues while waiting for the boat ride going to
the island.
The SangguniangBarangay of Caticlan, Malay Municipality, issued
Resolution No. 13, s. 2008 on April 25, 2008 stating that:
o it had learned that respondent Province had filed an application with
the DENR for a foreshore lease of areas along the shorelines of
Barangay Caticlan;
o It has strong opposition to said application, as the proposed
foreshore lease practically covered almost all the coastlines of said
barangay, thereby technically diminishing its territorial jurisdiction,
once granted, and depriving its constituents of their statutory right of
preference in the development and utilization of the natural resources
within its jurisdiction;
o The Province of Aklan did not conduct any consultations with the
SangguniangBarangay of Caticlan regarding the proposed foreshore
lease, which failure the Sanggunian considered as an act of bad faith
on the part of respondent Province.
On November 20, 2008, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of respondent
Province approved Resolution No. 2008-369, formally authorizing
Governor Marquez to enter into negotiations towards the possibility of
effecting self-liquidating and income-producing development and
livelihood projects to be financed through bonds, debentures, securities,
collaterals, notes or other obligations as provided under Section 299 of
the Local Government Code.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
LOCGOV - 093
Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Flood-affected Homeowners of Meritville Alliance
(2007)
Doctrine: Metro-wide services are those services which have metro-wide
impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures
such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the
individual local government units comprising Metro Manila. These basic
metro-wide services include:
(1) development planning; (2) transport
and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood
control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection,
and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The powers of the MMDA are
limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies,
installation of a system, and administration. The Court then holds that the
MMDA is a development authority. In other words, the MMDA is an
agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating
with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Facts:
S Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing a Decision of the
Court Appeals
S Filinvest Land, Inc., petitioner, is a domestic corporation engaged in
realty development business. Among its real estate development
ventures is Meritville Townhouse Subdivision (Meritville), the first
low-cost townhouse project in Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City. The
project site is located near the heavily-silted Naga River.
Respondents, who purchased their housing units from petitioner, are
fifty-four of the residents of Meritville.
S The area around Meritville was developed. New subdivisions were
built with elevations higher than that of Meritville. This
development turned Meritville into a catch basin from rains during
the wet season and from water coming from the Naga River every
time it overflows.
S Due to perennial flood, respondents townhouses suffered severe
damages. On various dates, respondents sent letters to petitioner
demanding that it address the problem. Petitioner then installed in the
area a pumping station with a capacity of 6,000 gallons per minute.
It also improved the drainage system. But these measures were not
Petitioners arguments:
S Theyre not responsible for the effects of the flooding.
S Under Republic Act No. 7924, it is the Metro Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) which should shoulder the responsibility,
invoking Section 3, which partly reads: SEC. 3. Scope of MMDA
Services. Metro-wide services under the jurisdiction of the
MMDA are those services which have metro-wide impact and
transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures
such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided
by the individual local government units (LGUs) comprising
Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include: xxx (d) Flood
control and sewerage management, which include the formulation
and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for
an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system.
Respondents arguments: Respondents specific arguments werent
provided in the case but the main argument, as stated in the facts, is that
petitioner is responsible for the effects of the flooding in the subdivision.
Issue/s: Whether the flooding in the Meritville has been caused by
petitioners negligence
1. Pursuant to Sec. 22, Art. VII of the Constitution mandating the President
to submit to Congress a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the
opening of every regular session, then Pres. Estrada submitted the National
Expenditures Program for Fiscal Year 2000.
In the said Program, the Pres. proposed an Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) of P121,778,000,000 following the formula
provided for in Sec. 284 of the Local Government Code (LGC).
The President approved House Bill No. 8374. This bill became R.A.
No. 8760, An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines from January One to
December Thirty-One, Two Thousand, and for Other Purposes.
(General Appropriations Act or GAA for the Year 2000).
o The act provides under XXXVII. Allocations to Local
Government Units that the IRA for local government units
shall amount to P111,778,000,000.
o Under the heading LIV. Unprogrammed Fund, it is provided
that an amount of P10 Billion, apart from the
P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund
the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the
original revenue targets submitted by the President to
Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to
be conducted by certain committees which the GAA
specifies: the Development Budget Coordinating Committee,
the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
o Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA
as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of
P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of
Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only
upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
2. Supreme Court: A number of NGOs and people's organizations, along
with 3 barangay officials filed the petition at bar against respondents
challenging the constitutionality of above-quoted provision of XXXVII
referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV Special
Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions).
Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, the Court
proceeded to resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being
impressed with public interest.
Batangas v. Romulo: Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if
there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not
Petitioners argument/s: The petitioners ask that the XXXVII and LIV
Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA be declared
unconstitutional because the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when
it made the release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could
meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than
making the release automatic.
Respondents argument/s: The above constitutional provision is addressed
not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent
the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely
prevents the executive branch of the government from unilaterally
withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive
branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, This essentially
means that the President or any member of the Executive Department cannot
unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release of the
IRA.
Issue/s: W/N the questioned provisions violate the constitutional injunction
that the just share of local governments in the national taxes or the IRA shall
be automatically released. (YES.)
Held/Ratio:
1. Ruling: The petition is granted. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1
and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are declared unconstitutional insofar as they
set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the
unprogrammed fund.
2. Constitutionality of the GAA Provisions
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution: SECTION 6. Local
government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
1. At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its
environs, parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside
by the Office of the President, through Proclamation No. 635 dated
28 August 1995, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste
disposal applications. This site extending to more or less 18 hectares,
had already been in operation since 19 February 1990 for the solid
wastes of Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Pateros,
Pasig, and Taguig.
2. This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of
San Mateo, and various concerned citizens for review assailing the
legality and constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.
3. 17 November 1988: the respondent Secretaries of DPWH and DENR
and the Governor of the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC)
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which provides:
a. The DENR agrees to immediately allow the utilization by
the MMC of its land located at Pintong Bocaue in San
Mateo, Rizal as a sanitary landfill site, subject to whatever
restrictions that the government impact assessment might
require.
b. Upon signing of this Agreement, the DPWH shall commence
the construction/development of said dumpsite.
c. The MMC shall:
i. Take charge of the relocation of the families within
and around the site;
ii. Oversee the development of the areas as a sanitary
landfill;
iii. Coordinate/monitor
the
construction
of
infrastructure facilities by the DPWH in the said
site; and
iv. Ensure that the necessary civil works are properly
undertaken to safeguard against any negative
environmental impact in the area.
4. 7,8, 10 Feb 1989: Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo wrote MMC,
DPWH, the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management,
pointing out that it had recently passed a Resolution banning the
creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila garbage within its
jurisdiction. They sought to ask the addressees to suspend and
temporarily hold operations in the San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite.
No action was taken on these letters.
5. It appears that the land subject of the MOA of 17 November 1988
and owned by the DENR was part of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation Area.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
regulate its use since properties of this nature belong to the national, and not
to the local governments
Issue/s:
1. WON the Marikina Watershed Reservation and San Mateo Site is
subject to the control or regulation of the LGU or national
governments (National through DENR)
2. WON Proclamation 635 violates the Local Government Code (YES)
Held/Ratio:
& The reorganization act of DENR defines and limits its powers over the
countrys natural resources
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources: one of the
fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural
resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in
the convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural
resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership
of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure
recognition of the states power to control their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization.
The Regalian doctrine was embodied in the 1935 Constitution, in
Section 1 of Article XIII on Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources. This was reiterated in the 1973 Constitution under
Article XIV on the National Economy and the Patrimony of the
Nation, and reaffirmed in the 1987 Constitution in Section 2 of
Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony33,
Clearly, the state is zealous in preserving as much of our natural and
national heritage as it can, enshrining as it did the obligation to
preserve and protect the same within the text of our fundamental law.
It was with this objective in mind that the respondent DENR was
mandated by then President Corazon C. Aquino, under Section 4 of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33
Sec.! 2.! All! lands! of! the! public! domain,! waters,! minerals,! coal,! petroleum,! and! other! mineral! oils,! all!
forces! of! potential! energy,! fisheries,! forests! or! timber,! wildlife,! flora! and! fauna,! and! other! natural!
resources!are!owned!by!the!State.!!With!the!exception!of!agricultural!lands,!all!other!natural!resources!
shall!not!be!alienated.!!The!exploration,!development!and!utilization!of!natural!resources!shall!be!under!
the!full!control!and!supervision!of!the!State.!!The!State!may!directly!undertake!such!activities!or!it!may!
enter! into! coSproduction,! joint! venture,! or! productionSsharing! agreements! with! Filipino! citizens,! or!
corporations!or!associations!at!least!sixty!per!centum!of!whose!capital!is!owned!by!such!citizens.!!Such!
agreements!may!be!for!a!period!not!exceeding!twentySfive!years,!renewable!for!not!more!than!twentyS
five!years,!and!under!such!terms!and!conditions!as!may!be!provided!by!law.!!In!cases!of!water!rights!for!
irrigation,! water! supply,! fisheries,! or! industrial! uses! other! than! the! development! of! water! power,!
beneficial!use!may!be!the!measure!and!limit!of!the!grant.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34
! Note! also! Sec.! 3.! Declaration! of! Policy.! S! It! is! hereby! declared! the! policy! of! the! State! to! ensure! the!
sustainable!use,!development,!management,!renewal,!and!conservation!of!the!country's!forest,!mineral,!
land,! offSshore! areas! and! other! natural! resources,! including! the! protection! and! enhancement! of! the!
quality! of! the! environment,! and! equitable! access! of! the! different! segments! of! the! population! to! the!
development! and! use! of! the! country's! natural! resources,! not! only! for! the! present! generation! but! for!
future!generations!as!well.!It!is!also!the!policy!of!the!state!to!recognize!and!apply!a!true!value!system!
including! social! and! environmental! cost! implications! relative! to! their! utilization;! development! and!
conservation!of!our!natural!resources.!
35
SEC.!1.!Declaration!of!Policy.!S!(1)!The!State!shall!ensure,!for!the!benefit!of!the!Filipino!people,!the!full!
exploration!and!development!as!well!as!the!judicious!disposition,!utilization,!management,!renewal!and!
conservation!of!the!country's!forest,!mineral,!land,!waters,!fisheries,!wildlife,!offSshore!areas!and!other!
natural!resources,!consistent!with!the!necessity!of!maintaining!a!sound!ecological!balance!and!protecting!
and!enhancing!the!quality!of!the!environment!and!the!objective!of!making!the!exploration,!development!
and!utilization!of!such!natural!resources!equitably!accessible!to!the!different!segments!of!the!present!as!
well!as!future!generations.!!
(2)! The! State! shall! likewise! recognize! and! apply! a! true! value! system! that! takes! into! account! social! and!
environmental!cost!implications!relative!to!the!utilization,!development!and!conservation!of!our!natural!
resources.!
!
The automatic release of the IRA under Section 286, LGC is a mandate to the
national government through the Department of Budget and Management to
effect automatic release of the said funds from the treasury directly to the
local government unit, free from any holdbacks or liens imposed by the
national government. However, this automatic release of the IRA from the
national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or
suspending the release thereof to particular local officials when there is a
legal question presented in the court pertaining to the rights of the parties to
receive the IRA or to the propriety of the issuance of a TRO or a preliminary
injunction while such rights are still being determined.
Balabagans share in the IRA. The petition also prayed that after notice and
hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued.
5. Respondent then issued an order setting the petition for hearing, and
directing PNB-Marawi to hold or defer the release of the IRA unless
otherwise ordered by the court. According to Sampiano, during the hearing,
his counsel asked respondent judge is the abovementioned order of deferral
was a TRO, to which respondent judge replied in the negative. Thereafter,
Sampianos counsel asked respondent judge to immediately lift said order so
as not to deprive the officials and employees of Balabagan from receiving
their salaries. Respondent judge however did not heed the request.
Background
1. This is an administrative case filed by complainants Sampiano (incumbent
mayor of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur) et al. (members of the Sangguniang
Bayan) against respondent judge. Complainants charged respondent with
gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality, and
serious acts of impropriety in connection with the issuance of an order in the
case for prohibition and injunction with TRO entitled Ogka v. PNBMarawi.
2. It appears that Sampiano filed before the Comelec a petition for annulment
of proclamation with prayer for preliminary injunction / TRO against his
rival mayoralty candidate, his uncle Ogka. The Comelec then issued three
orders, pursuant to which Sampiano was ordered to act, perform, and
discharge the duties, functions, and responsibilities as mayor to prevent
paralysis to public service pending determination and final resolution of the
controversy.
3. Aggrieved, Ogka filed an urgent MR before the Comelec. He also wrote
the chief legal counsel of PNB-Marawi and asked him not to release
Balabagans share in the internal revenue allotment (IRA) pending the
resolution of the mayoralty controversy, citing Sec. 2, Rule 19 of the
Comelec rules of procedure which provides that an MR, if not pro forma,
suspends execution of the decision. But PNB-Marawi released the IRA,
pursuant to a Comelec order.
4. So Ogka filed a special civil action for prohibition and injunction with
TRO and preliminary injunction with the RTC presided by respondent judge.
The petition prayed that a TRO be immediately issued upon the filing of the
petition ordering PNB-Marawi to cease and desist from releasing
Balabagans IRA, and for Sampiano to cease and desist from withdrawing
(a) He has jurisdiction over the petition filed by Ogka as it was not
concerned with the enforcement of election laws, as in fact it was a
petition for prohibition and injunction. He thus took cognizance of
the petition since the same asked for the auxiliary remedies of TRO
and preliminary injunction for the enforcement of a legal right or a
matter that partakes a question of law and not therefore the
enforcement of election laws.
(b) The order of deferral did not freeze the IRA but merely held or
deferred its release to any person including Ogka, a party to the
election and who holds a Comelec proclamation which was not
invalidated.
(c) He did not encroach upon Comelecs power to enforce the
election laws because he neither contracted nor annulled any
Comelec order. Under BP 129, the RTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of prohibition and injunctions.
Hence, he simply applied Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. No bond
was required of Ogka because the deferral order was only an
initiatory action necessary to determine whether it warrants the
issuance of the TRO and preliminary injunction.
(d) He did not violate the LGC because Sec. 286 of the same, on the
automatic release of IRA, is not a shield or immunity to the authority
of the courts to interfere, interrupt, or suspend its release when there
is a legal question presented before it in order to determine the rights
of the parties concerned.
Ruling of the Court
9. Respondent judge has jurisdiction over Ogkas petition for prohibition and
injunction, as it was not concerned with the enforcement of election laws. It
is basic that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint and
the law. Ogkas petition prayed that PNB-Marawi be ordered to cease and
desist from releasing Balabagans share in the IRA to Sampiano or his
agents. Undoubtedly, the RTC has jurisdiction.
10. Respondent judge did not violateSec. 286, LGC:
Sampianos claim that the [deferral order] was in contravention of
Section 286 of the LGC on the automatic release of the share of the
local government unit is untenable. We agree with respondent Judge
The city of Bacolod filed with the RTC of Bacolod a complaint for
declaratory relief and/or injunction with prayer for issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction to declare the relief of Plotea
as invalid and illegal.
CHAPTER VIII
101 Local Government
Peoples Law Enforcement Board
Carpio vs. Executive Secretary (1992)
Doctrine: The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the
Peoples Law Enforcement Boards and city and municipal mayors is not in
derogation of the NAPOLCOMs power of control over the PNP.
Facts:
Petitioner Antonio Carpio filed a petition to declare the
unconstitutionality of RA 6975 entitled An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the
Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes
According to petitioner: RA 6975 emasculated the National Police
Commission by limiting its power to administrative control over
the Philippine National Police (PNP), and therefore, control
remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the
National Police Commission and the PNP were placed.
Petitioner also asserts there is a manifest derogation of the power of
control of the NAPOLCOM over the PNP when RA 6975 vested the
power to choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of
Police in the Governors and Mayors, respectively; the power of
operational supervision and control over police units in city and
municipal mayors; participation in appointments to the positions of
Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General as well as the
administration of qualifying entrance examinations in the Civil
Service Commission; disciplinary powers over PNP members in the
Peoples Law Enforcement Boards and city and municipal mayors.
By vesting in the local executives the power to choose the officers in
question, the Act went beyond the Constitutions intent.
Issue: W/N there is usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM
(None)
LOCGOV - #102
Ignacio v Banate, Jr (1987)
Doctrine: The appointee to a Sangguniang Panlungsod who sits there as a
representative of the barangays must meet the qualifications required by law
Facts: (SC Third Div.; Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.; Nature: Pet. for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 Rules of Court)
1. Petitioner Sangguniang Barangay (SB) is the legislative body of
Barangay Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. The SB is the
disciplining authority over elective barangay officials pursuant Sec. 61 of
R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government Code or LGC).
2. Respondent Martinez is the incumbent Punong Barangay of the said
local
government
unit
(LGU).
3. Sangguniang Barangay
Administrative charge of Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption via a
verified complaint: Filed by petitioner against Martinez.
o Amended administrative complaint for Dishonesty, Misconduct
in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act: Filed by petitioner against Martinez. He was charged as
such due to acts he allegedly committed in relation to the
barangays solid waste management project and seminar/lakbayaral. It was also alleged that several attempts to discuss said
problems during sessions were all in vain because respondent
declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session.
o Martinez failed to file an Answer and was declared in default. He
was placed under preventive suspension (60 days).
o The SB rendered its decision which imposed upon Martinez the
penalty of removal from office. This was conveyed to the
Municipal Mayor of Bayombong (Mayor Bagasao) for its
implementation.
o Mayor Bagasao issued a Memorandum: SB is not empowered to
order Martinezs removal from service. However, the Decision
remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him. For
the meantime, he ordered the indefinite suspension of Martinez
since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed.
4. RTC, Branch 27, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (The case was initially
heard by Br. 28, but later raffled to Br. 27.)
Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction: Filed by Martinez
against petitioner, the SB and Mayor Bagasao questioning the
validity of its decision.
Ruling: The SB of Bayombong exceeded its jurisdiction. The proper
courts, and not the petitioner, are empowered to remove an elective
local official from office, in accordance with Sec. 60 of the LGC.
Thus, the SB Order removing Martinez from service is void. Mayor
Bagasao cannot prevent Martinez from assuming his office on the
Petitioners argument(s): The petitioners ask for the RTC decision to be set
aside and for the decision of the SB that Martinez be removed from office to
be implemented based on the following.
Administrative cases involving elective barangay officials may be
filed with, heard and decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP)
or SB concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of removal
from office. The courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of
removal, after the SP or SB finds that a penalty of removal is
warranted.
An interpretation which gives the judiciary the power to remove
local elective officials violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
The RTC, in allowing the petition to be filed before it, created an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If
the SB had no power to remove Martinez from office, then Martinez
should have sought recourse from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Respondents argument(s): The SB has no jurisdiction over a case
involving the removal of a local elective official from office.
Issue/s: W/N the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez (an elective
local official) from office. (NO.)
Held/Ratio:
1. Ruling: The instant Petition is denied and the assailed Decision of the
Bayombong
RTC
is
affirmed.
2. The Sangguniang Bayan may not remove Martinez (an elective local
official) from office.
Sec. 60 LGC conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective
local officials from office.
During the Senate deliberations on the LGC,the legislative intent to
confine to the courts (i.e., RTC, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate
courts) jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local
officials was evident.
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.: The power to remove elected officials is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in
the last paragraph of Sec. 60 LGC. The Court invalidated Art. 125,
Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of
1991 since the Oversight Committee that prepared the said rules and
Other Issue/s:
1. Capable of repetition yet evading review: Although Martinezs term as
Punong Barangay expired upon the holding of the 2007 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections and, thus, rendering this
petition moot and academic, the Court settled the legal question as it is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
2. Doctrine of separation of powers: The 1987 Constitution is explicit in
defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority of the
courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the
political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty
(Par. 2, Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The doctrine of separation of
powers is not absolute in its application. It should be applied in accordance
with the principle of checks and balances. The removal from office of
elective officials must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to
defeat the will of the voting public. The LGUs are not deprived of the right
to discipline local elective officials. They are prevented from imposing the
extreme penalty of dismissal.
3. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort
first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of
a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be
elevated to the courts of justice for review. As a general rule, no
recourse to courts can be had until all administrative remedies have
been exhausted. However, this rule is not applicable where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved are
essentially judicial. In this case, it is apparent that the SB acted
beyond its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order removing
Martinez from office. Such act was patently illegal and, therefore,
Martinez was no longer required to avail himself of an administrative
appeal Thus, his direct recourse to regular courts of justice was
justified.
Castro v. Gloria: Where the case involves only legal questions, the
litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such
judicial relief can be sought. The reason behind providing an
exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that
issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative
officer.
In Martinezs petition before the RTC, only a legal question was
raised, one that will ultimately be resolved by the courts. Hence,
appeal to the administrative officer concerned would only be
circuitous and, therefore, should no longer be required before judicial
CHAPTER IX
LOCGOV - #105
Amora, Jr. vs. COMELEC and Olandria (2011)
Doctrine: A petition for disqualification on the one hand, can be premised on
Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false.
Facts:
Petitioner Sergio Amora, Jr. filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol.
To oppose Amora, the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) fielded
Trygve L. Olaivar for the mayoralty post. Respondent Arnielo S.
Olandria was one of the candidates for councilor of the NPC in the
same municipality.
Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification
against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC was not properly
sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely
presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public,
Atty. Granada, instead of presenting competent evidence of his
identity.
Amora, on the other hand, contends that the Petition for
Disqualification is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course or cancel
a certificate of candidacy. Effectively, the petition of Olandria is
filed out of time.
Amora won the elections.
However, COMELEC ruled in favor of Olandria.
Petitioners arguments:
Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC.
Amora insists that the Petition for Disqualification filed by Olandria
is actually a Petition to Deny Due Course since the purported ground
for disqualification simply refers to the defective notarization of the
COC.
Amora is adamant that Section 73 of the OEC pertains to the
substantive qualifications of a candidate or the lack thereof as
grounds for disqualification, specifically, the qualifications and
disqualifications of elective local officials under the Local
Government Code (LGC) and the OEC. Thus, Olandrias petition
was filed way beyond the reglementary period of 25 days from the
date of the filing of the disputed COC.
Moreover, Amora maintains that his COC is properly notarized and
not defective, and the presentation of his CTC to the notary public to
whom he was personally known sufficiently complied with the
requirement that the COC be under oath.
Respondents arguments:
Respondent reiterated his arguments above.
Issue: WON Amora is disqualified.
Held/Ratio: NO.
it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an
improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for
disqualification
Section 68 of the OEC provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an
action or protest in which he is party is declared by final decision of
a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having:
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce
or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
(c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k,
v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the elections laws.
Section 40 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
Cirilo R. Valles
Position not mentioned; he questioned the qualification of
Rosalind to run as governor
Respondents: COMELEC
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
She ran for governor; her citizenship was questioned
Facts:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born in Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. At the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to
settle in the Philippines.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36
LOCGOV - 107
MORENO v. COMELEC (2006)
The phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence should be
interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced
by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who
have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment the placing of the comma (,) in the provision
means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40 (a) of the LGC.
has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case
is deemed terminated.
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil
rights lost or suspend as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was
granted.
The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy
of such order.
Section 40 (a) of the LGC
Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence;
xxx
RESPONDENTs Opposition:Since Moreno was released from probation
on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end
two (2) years thereafter. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended
the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from
running for an elective local office.
Legal Basis:
Section 40 (a) of the LGC (See above)
Dela Torre v. Comelec: Conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude
stands even if the candidate was granted probation. The disqualification
under Sec. 40 (a) of the LGC subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation.
ISSUE: WON Moreno is disqualified from running for Punong Barangay
despite being convicted of the crime of Arbitrary Detention
HELD/RATIO:
During the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified
from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the
probation.
The period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with
service of the sentence adjudged. The accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
Petitioners arguments:
For Issue 1:
Issue 1:
Whether Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice (No)
Held/Ratio:
Definition in Marquez decision: Includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade
service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject
himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not
qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice.
The criminal process of the United States extends only
within its territorial jurisdiction. That petitioner has already
left said country when the latter sought to subject him to its
criminal process is hardly petitioner's fault. In the absence
of an intent to evade the laws of the United States, petitioner
had every right to depart therefrom at the precise time that he
did and to return to the Philippines.
Clearly, a person who is aware of the imminent filing of
charges against him or of the same already filed in
connection with acts he committed in the jurisdiction of a
particular state, is under an obligation not to flee said place
of commission.
However, as in petitioner's case, his departure from the
United States may not place him under a similar obligation.
His subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and nonsubmission to the jurisdiction of the former country does not
operate to label petitioner automatically a fugitive from
justice. As he was a public officer appointed and elected
immediately after his return to the country, petitioner
Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to the
service of his office.
Issue 2:
Whether one becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact that he leaves
the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him, regardless of whether
or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight (No)
Held/Ratio:
The "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded
re-definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the
MARQUEZ Decision)
LOCGOV 109
Mercado v. Manzano (1990)
Doctrine:
1. A candidate still has interest in the matter of litigation if at the time
he sought to intervene there was no proclamation yet.
2. Dual citizenship under 40 of the LGC means dual allegiance
3. By filing a certificate of candidacy, Manzano elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
Facts:
Manzano was born in San Francisco, California to Filipino parents. As such,
he acquired US citizenship by operation of the US constitution and laws
under the principle of jus soli. He was also a Filipino citizen by operation of
the 1935 Constitution since he was born to Filipino parents.
During the May 11, 1998 elections, Manzano, Mercado, and Daza ran for
vice mayor for the city of Makati where Manzano emerged as the winner.
Manzanos proclamation was, however, suspended, in view of a pending
petition for disqualification by a certain Mamaril. COMELECs 2nd Division
in its resolution dated May 7, 1998 granted the petition and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he
is a dual citizen and hence, disqualified from running for any elective local
position pursuant to 40 of the LGC. COMELEC en banc reversed the
decision of the 2nd Division and found for Manzano.
Petitioners arguments:
1. Congress, through 40 of the LGC has commanded in explicit terms
the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local
elective office.
2. Merely taking part in the Philippine elections is not sufficient
evidence of renunciation. In any event, the alleged renunciation was
made when Manzano was already 37 years old, and as such, it was
ineffective since it should have been made when he reached the age
of majority.
Respondents arguments:
1. Under the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure
of the COMELEC, Mercado has no right to intervene:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to
intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or
proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or
proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its
discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is
so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or
proceeding. xxx
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or
disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the
Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties
and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Mercado has neither legal interest in the matter of litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-
citizens regardless of whether from the point of view of the foreign state,
such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
7. By filing a certificate of candidacy, Manzano elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
The COC contained the ff statements under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN
OR NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT
NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE
OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR
IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
WILL
MAINTAIN
TRUE
FAITH
AND
ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY
THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES
PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY,
WITHOUT
MENTAL
RESERVATION
OR
PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY
THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE
AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC: By the laws if the United States, petitioner
Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor...
Although Manzano admitted that he is registered as an American citizen
in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an
American passport which he used in his last travel to the US in April 22,
1997, this does not mean that he is still not a Filipino. (Finding was made
by applying mutatis mutandis the case of Aznar v. COMELEC)
Digested by: Leao, Maria Ofelia S.
LOCGOV - #110
ABELLA VS. COMELEC (1991)
Facts: Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a
petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running
as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in
her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that Larrazabal
was a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified
from running for the same office.
The COMELEC referred the case to its Law Department for proper action on
the ground that the petition was a violation of Section 74 of the Election
Code and, pursuant to it rules, should be prosecuted as an election offense
under Section 262 of the Code. When such issued was raised to the Supreme
Court, the court held that the pertinent provision is Section 78 in relation to
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may
be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
Section 6 of R.A. 6646 states as follows:
Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The above-stressed circumstances should explain the necessity for
continuing the investigation of the private respondent's challenged
disqualification even after the election notwithstanding that such
matter is usually resolved before the election. Independently of these
circumstances, such proceedings are allowed by Section 6 of RA.
Alternative Argument
That being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her
candidacy for the position of governor of the province of Leyte.
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province.
The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters
contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to
vote for elective provincial officials.
Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 creating the City of Ormoc
provides:
Election of provincial governor and members of the Provincial
Board of the members of the Provincial Board of the Province of
Leyte The qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified
and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the
members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte.
Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the
Constitution one comes up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc City
when organized was not yet a highly-urbanized city but is, nevertheless,
considered independent of the province of Leyte to which it is geographically
attached because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial
elective officials. While a Component City whose charter prohibits its voters
from participating in the elections for provincial office, is indeed independent
of the province, such independence cannot be equated with a highly
urbanized city; rather it is limited to the administrative supervision aspect,
and nowhere should it lead to the conclusion that said voters are likewise
prohibited from running for the provincial offices."
Respondents Arguments:
ISSUE #1: WON the petitioner was qualified to run as governor? (Does
the prohibition to vote likewise prohibit the voters to run for provincial
offices)
ISSUE #2: WON the candidate who got the second highest vote may be
proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position was
disqualified
Petitioner has established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975 to the
present and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt to purportedly change her
residence one year before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to
qualify her to ran for the position of governor of the province of Leyte
clearly shows that she considers herself already a resident of Ormoc City.
The petitioner did not present evidence to show that she and her husband
maintain separate residences, she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at
Ormoc City.
No. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from
highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters
from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province.
In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a
province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily,
component cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from
voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highly urbanized cities
which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are
geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it
the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and
be voted for the provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R. No. 80716
entitled Peralta v. The Commission on Elections, et al. dated December 10,
1987 applies to this case. While the cited case involves Olongapo City which
is classified as a highly urbanized city, the same principle is applicable.
Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional
provision, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being
voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte. We agree with the
COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to
vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the
provincial board of the Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions one,
from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective
official."
No. The Supreme Court held that while it is true that the first petition was to
deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed
before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the fact remains that the local
elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province
voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the
position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest
number of votes. The net effect is that the Abella lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate.
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines. Frivaldos certificate
of candidacy was cancelled.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it
is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The
votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid
the vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was
alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside the
questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC. The COMELEC has
not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.
Digested by: Regina C. Rosales
LOCGOV - #111
FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (1996)
Doctrine: The citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed
and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected.
Facts:
Juan Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of
Sorsogon. Raul R. Lee filed a petition with the Comelec praying that
Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or
position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled.
The Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution declaring
that Frivaldo as disqualified to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on
Lee filed a supplemental petition praying for his proclamation as the dulyelected Governor of Sorsogon. The Comelec directed the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming
candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate. Accordingly, Lee
was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of
the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. Alleging that on June
30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen
of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he
filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had
been granted. As such, when the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the
Comelec) was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30
o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the
proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor. In the alternative, he averred that
pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor not Lee
should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein
assailed Resolution holding that Lee, not having garnered the highest number
of votes, was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor;
and that Frivaldo, having garnered the highest number of votes, and having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725, is qualified to hold the office of
governor of Sorsogon
Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec. On
February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a
temporary restraining order, this Court issued a Resolution which inter alia
directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of
this petition."
Petitioners arguments:
Despite lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected
governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the
1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent
Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice
disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he
comes a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a
favorable decision from the Commission on Elections. Moreover, he claims
having successfully reacquired citizenship by repatriation under P.D. No.
725. That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree
at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. He insists that henot Lee
should have been proclaimed as the governor when the Provincial Board of
Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and
unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and
since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
Frivaldo argues that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of
the President in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994. However, the
Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably
the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he
filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under
these circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in
the processing of his application
Respondents arguments:
First, Lee argues P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that
"then President Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by
Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and
contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of
prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution," adding that in her memorandum
dated March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725,
President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any
and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined
under Letter of Instructions No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."
Second. Lee argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the
repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was
"filed on June 29, 1995 and approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x
demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.
With regard to Lees second argument, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the
repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The
mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to
conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. The requirements of
repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with. This is not
unusual since in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino
who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. Frivaldo, was a
natural-born citizen who faithfully served his country a prior to his
naturalization in the United States a naturalization made only to escape a
dictatorship and who, after the fall of the dictator, wasted no time in
returning to his country of birth to offer once more his services to his people.
Regarding Lees third argument, the law does not specify any particular date
or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence
(which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding
the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election
day).
The difficult objection is that the citizenship qualification should be
possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official)
registered as a voter. Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a
citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered
voter." And, under the law a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So
therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered
one if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election
consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not
have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if
being a voter presumes being a citizen first. The voter requirement was
included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate
the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter
IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province where he
intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government
Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require
him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual votingis the core
of this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this second
requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in
the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
Frivaldo emphasizedand Lee has not disputed that he was and is a
registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been
sustained as valid by judicial declaration. His counsel maintained that
Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in
1987,1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a
voter was questioned, but the court dismissed his eligibility as a voter and he
was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including
on May 8, 1995.
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he
intended to be elected.
Another reason why the issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the
date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of
the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code gives
any voter the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of
a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy
on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising
from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within
ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at
such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the
Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30
p.m., June 30, 1995), Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having
taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he
should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered
the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such
oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at
such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17,
1994.
Generally, under the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided. But an exception is when the statute is CURATIVE
or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing
naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino
women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other
causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization could now re-acquire
their
Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
But how can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that
said law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even
later, on August 17, 1994? It is true that the law was already in effect at the
time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only
the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the
repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be
deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application, August 17, 1994.
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the
legislative authority that the law should apply to past events i.e., situations
and transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to
benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling
them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a
retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions
subsequent to the passage of such law.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would
prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive
effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the
processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former
Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his
American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their
control.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American.
Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual
citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer
this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo
was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even
before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before
he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
Dissenting opinion, Davide J:
I depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 does not specify the time when the citizenship
requirement must be met, and that it suffices that citizenship be possessed
upon commencement of the term of the office involved;
Section 39 prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and not
those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous.
Elective local officials refers to the nature of the office, which requires the
process of voting by the electorate involved; while elected local official
refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The section
unquestionably refers to elective not elected local officials. It falls
under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled
Qualifications and Election, and paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase
"An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of
candidates.
Thus, Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for
elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be
construed to mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from
the commencement of the term of office of the elected candidate.
It is not true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship
requirement must be possessed. I submit that Philippine citizenship must be
possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at the latest on
the election day itself. Section 39 is not ambiguous nor uncertain that it
meant this to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local official is that
he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY,
CITY OR PROVINCE WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This means that
he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of suffrage. The
fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the
possession of Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it
the first qualification, as Section 1, Article V thereof provides that Suffrage
may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified
by law, x x x
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881)
expressly provides for the qualifications of a voter.:
the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of
the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost
through the marriage of a Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a
foreign country of natural-bom Filipino citizens. It involves then the
substantive right of citizenship. It means, in reality, the acquisition of "a new
right,". Therefore, it may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect
considering that one who has lost Philippine citizenship does not have the
right to reacquire it. The Constitution provides that citizenship, once lost,
may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover, it has also
been observed that the idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial
statutes are statutes relating to procedure and not substantive rights.
This Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988 and
1992 elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenshiphe
being a naturalized american citizenhe was DISQUALIFIED to be elected
as such and to serve the position. This disqualification nullified Frivaldo's
registration as a voter and declared it void ab initio. Our judgments were selfexecutory. Thus, he was never considered a registered voter for the elections
of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing that Frivaldo registered
anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did in defiance of his
disqualificationthis did not make him a Filipino citizen, hence it was
equally void ab initio.
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification
should be reckoned not from the date of the election nor the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, but from the date of proclamation, is that quo
warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's
ineligibility for public office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of
candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein is
false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the certificate of
candidacy must state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which means
that he has all the qualifications (including citizenship) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be
filed at any time not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.
Further, Frivaldo's repatriation may not be given retroactive effect. Such goes
against the spirit and letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the
principle that acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is not a
right, but a mere privilege.
Under P.D. No. 725, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by
repatriation under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the
committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is
approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that
the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If
If for the sake of argument, P.D. No. 725 is a curative or remedial statute, it
would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it explicitly
provides the date of its effectivity (June 5, 1975)
Digested by: Andrew Velasco
LOCGOV - 112
Labo v COMELEC (1992)
Doctrine: The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected unless the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate.
Facts:
Ramon Labo, Jr., and Roberto Ortega filed their candidacy for mayor
of Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992.
A disqualification proceeding (GR No. 105384) against Labo was
filed by Ortega before the COMELEC seeking to cancel Labo's
certificate of candidacy on the ground that Labo made a false
representation when he stated therein that Labo is a "natural-born"
citizen of the Philippines. Ortega presented (on May 4 1992) the
decision of this Court in Labo v. COMELEC (1989) declaring Labo
not a citizen of the Philippines as evidence.
Summons were issued on March 27, 1992 followed by a telegram on
April 1, 1992. However, Labo failed to file his answer within the
required period given. He submitted his Answer only after Ortega
already presented his evidence.
(May 9, 1992) COMELEC ruled in favour of Ortega and cancelled
LAbos certificate of candicacy.
o (May 10, 1992) COMELEC later clarified that Labo can still
be voted upon in the May 11 elections because the Order
cancelling his COC will only be final and executory 5 days
after its promulgation.
o (May 13, 1992) COMELEC also resolved, motu proprio to
suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the
elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.
(May 15, 1992) petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review
docketed as G.R. No. 105111 with prayer, among others, for the
issuance of a TRO to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino
citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his
proclamation in the event he wins in the contested elections.
Ortegas urgent motion filed with the COMELEC for the
implementation of its May 9, 1992 resolution cancelling Labo's
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38
Sec.!78.!Petition!to!deny!due!course!or!to!cancel!a!certificate!of!candidacy!!
xxx!xxx!xxx!
(e)!The!decision,!order,!or!ruling!of!the!Commission!shall,!after+five+(5)+days+from+receipt!of!a!copy!
thereof!by!the!parties,!be+final+and+executory+unless+stayed+by+the+Supreme+Court.!(emphasis!supplied)!
39
Sec.!3.!Decisions+final+after+five+days.!!Decisions+in+
preSproclamation!cases!and+petitions+to+deny+due+course+to+or+cancel+certificates+of+candidacy,!to!declare!
a!candidate!as!nuisance!candidate!or!to!disqualify!a!candidate,!and!to!postpone!or!suspend!
elections!shall+become+final+and+executory+after+the+lapse+of+five+(5)+days+from+their+promulgation,+unless+
restrained+by+the+Supreme+Court.!(emphasis!supplied)!
40
Sec.!39.!Qualifications.!!(a)!An+elective+local+official+must+be+a+citizen+of+the+Philippines;!a!registered!
voter!in!the!barangay,!municipality,!city,!or!province!or,!in!the!case!of!a!member!of!the!sangguniang!
5. No.
The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily
entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest
number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
The rule is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
o While Ortega may have garnered the second highest
number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact
remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will.
Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the
electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he
was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City
and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
o Abella v. Comelec (1991):The voters of the province
voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a
qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her
votes was counted and she obtained the highest number
of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the
election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . . What
matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected
position who is voted for and who obtains the highest
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
panlalawigan,!sangguniang!panlungsod,!sangguniang!bayan,!the!district!where!he!intends!to!be!elected;!
a!resident!therein!for!at!least!one!(1)!year!immediately!preceding!the!day!of!the!election;!and!able!to!
read!and!write!Filipino!or!any!other!local!language!or!dialect.!(emphasis!supplied)!
Chapter!2.!Vacancies!and!Succession!
!
Sec.!44.!Permanent!Vacancies!in!the!Offices!of!the!Governor,!ViceSGovernor,!Mayor!and!ViceSMayor.!!
(a)+If+a+permanent+vacancy+occurs+in+the+office+of+the!governor!or!mayor,!the!viceSgovernor!or!the+viceK
mayor+concerned+shall+become!the!governor!or!mayor.!.!.!.!(emphasis!supplied)!
Cardino:
Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it said in its
resolution that the LGC rules on succession should apply.
ISSUE:
W/N: Jalosjos made a material misrepresentation in his COC as to
hiseligibility to run for mayor and should be disqualified. YES
W/N: Cardino should be proclaimed mayor based on the rules of
succession under the LGC. YES
Held/Ratio:
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from
his criminal conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving
eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Sec78 of the
Omnibus Election Code
Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he
was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy
Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos
were stray votes.
Cardino, as the only qualified candidate garnered the highest number
of vote.
Sec 74 enumerates what should be stated in the certificate of
candidacy which includes his eligibility to run for said position
Sec78: Petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of
candidacy - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false
A sentence of prisin mayor by final judgment is a ground for
disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under
Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Thus, a person can file a petition under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code OR under Sec. 12 or Sec. 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.42 Sec. 40(a) disqualifies Those sentenced by final
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42
Section 40, Local Government CodeDisqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified.
Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts
of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of
that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election
laws.
Without which it could not be, without which there is nothing, indispensable
condition.
Republic Act No. 900622 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon
were properly counted in her favor.
Respondents arguments: He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not
substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due
course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the
COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days after the
elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.
Issue: W/N Barbara Ruby the wife of Talaga can be considered to have
validly substituted her husband and therefore retain her position as Mayor of
Lucena City.
Held: No. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid
candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section
77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate
who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a
person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same
way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.
Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A
withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the
substitute candidate submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.
To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was
absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena
City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and
ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false
declaration of his eligibility to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC
made his situation even worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the
nuisance candidate may remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or
despite the denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his
Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the
COMELEC. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all
intents and purposes the COMELECs declaration of his disqualification had
the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible
candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected.
But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the
second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least
aware of the fact of Barbara Rubys ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the
COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid
only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the decisions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara
Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with,
there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramons
ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the
elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the
period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate.
A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted,
and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined
in Section 44 of the LGC.
Dissent of BRION, J:
Held: The Vice Mayor Alcala. The case of Labo, Jr. should be applied. In
that case the SC emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest
number of votes for the contested office could not assume the office despite
the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was "not the
choice of the sovereign will." Surely, the Court explained, a minority or
defeated candidate could not be deemed elected to the office. There was to be
no question that the second placer lost in the election, was repudiated by the
electorate, and could not assume the vacated position. No law imposed upon
and compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political
leader or their representative.
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a
disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b)
the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidates
disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but
the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have
waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
When the law allows the cancellation of a candidates CoC, the law considers
the cancellation from the point of view of the requirements that every citizen
who wishes to run for office must commonly satisfy. Since the elements of
"eligibility" are common, the vice of ineligibility attaches to and affects both
the candidate and his CoC. In contrast, when the law allows the
disqualification of a candidate, the law looks only at the disqualifying trait or
condition specific to the individual; if the "eligibility" requirements have
been satisfied, the disqualification applies only to the person of the candidate,
"To sum up and reiterate the essential differences between the eligibility
requirements and disqualifications, the former are the requirements that
apply to, and must be complied by, all citizens who wish to run for local
elective office; these must be positively asserted in the CoC. The latter refer
to individual traits, conditions or acts that serve as grounds against one who
has qualified as a candidate to lose this status or privilege; essentially, they
have nothing to do with a candidates CoC.
relief, it did not raise any of the specified grounds for such action under
Sections 69 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an
election: a petition for disqualification, and a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a COC.
Section 69 refers to nuisance candidates. Section 78, on the other hand, treats
of material misrepresentation in the COC. Castillos petition made no claim
that Ramon was a nuisance candidate or that he made some material
misrepresentation in his COC. All that the petition raised against Ramons
candidacy is the fact that he had already served three consecutive terms as
mayor.
Castillo of course points out that by filing a COC for mayor after he had
already served three consecutive terms, Ramon actually misrepresented the
fact of his eligibility for that office, knowing that it was not the case. But this
argument is unavailing because at the time Ramon filed his COC the
COMELECs official stand, supported by this Courts decision in Borja, Jr.
v. Commission on Elections, was that the terms during which an elected
official was preventively suspended should not be counted for purposes of
applying the three-term limit. It was only on December 23, 2009, nearly a
month after Ramon filed his COC, that the Supreme Court reversed in
Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections the election bodys official stand.
Thus, it cannot be said that Ramon knowingly misrepresented his eligibility
when he filed his COC.
While Castillo denominated his petition as one to deny due course to or
cancel Ramons COC, and prayed for such remedies, the basic rule is that the
nature of an action is governed by the allegations in the petition, not by its
caption or prayer. A closer reading of the resolution will show that Ramon
was merely being disqualified for having served three consecutive terms. It
made no mention of Ramons COC as having been cancelled or denied due
course, and indeed gave no grounds which would justify such a result. The
ponencia cites Miranda v. Abaya to justify its stand, but fails to note that in
Miranda the Court found that there was blatant misrepresentation, which is in
clear contrast to this case.
On the issue of substitution, the law specifically provides that a candidate
who has been disqualified for any cause may be substituted by another.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate
for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Twentythree days before election day, Cayat was already
disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004
elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a second placer.
On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to
none. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which
triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in the present case
because Palileng is not a second-placer but the only placer.
Consequently, Palilengs proclamation as Mayor of Buguias,
Benguet is beyond question.
Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the
doctrine on the rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will
apply in Bayacsans favor, regardless of his intervention in the
present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayats
disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004,
resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias,
Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayats
disqualification became final only after the elections.
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC which enunciates the doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer, does not apply to the present case
because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification
before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second
placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases23 because the
judgment declaring the candidates disqualification in Labo and the
other cases24 had not become final before the elections.
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two
situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before
the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of
Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final
after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second
sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the
Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a
candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be
voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The
Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way
before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast
in Cayats favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10
May 2004 elections. Palilengs proclamation is proper because he
was the sole and only candidate, second to none.
11. Labo involved the second situation covered in the second sentence of
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law.
12. Cayats proclamation on 12 May 2004 is void because the decision
disqualifying Cayat had already become final on 17 April 2004.
There is no longer any need to ascertain whether there was actual
knowledge by the voters of Cayats disqualification when they cast
their votes on election day because the law mandates that Cayats
votes "shall not be counted." There is no disenfranchisement of the
8,164 voters. Rather, the 8,164 voters are deemed by law to have
deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray
and "shall not be counted."
13. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was never meant
to apply to a situation where a candidates disqualification had
become final before the elections.
14. In short, the COMELEC First Division Resolution of 12 April 2004
cancelling Cayats certificate of candidacy, on the ground that he is
disqualified for having been sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude, became final on 17 April 2004.
This constrains us to rule against Cayats proclamation as Mayor of
Buguias, Benguet. We also rule against Bayacsans petition-inintervention because the doctrine on the rejection of the second
placer does not apply to this case.
Digested by: Michael Marlowe G. Uy
LOCGOV 116
RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA @ "OCA", petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSEFINA P. JAREO, HON.
MAYOR RAYMUND M. APACIBLE, FRANCISCA C. RODRIGUEZ,
AGRIPINA B. ANTIG, MARIA G. CANOVAS, and DIVINA
ALCOREZA, respondents. (23 October 2003)
Carpio, J.
Petitioner: Raymundo A. Bautista, filed certificate of candidacy for Punong
Bayan but was disqualified by COMELEC
Respondent: COMELEC
Facts:
On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong
Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July 2002 barangay elections.
Election Officer Josefina P. Jareo ("Election Officer Jareo") refused
Respondents Arguments
(Bautista)
Bautista argues that without any
disqualification case formally filed
against him, the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of
his
case. The
COMELEC
cannot motu proprio act on the issue
of his alleged lack of qualification.
Even assuming that there was a
disqualification case filed against
him, it is the COMELEC sitting in
division which has jurisdiction and
not the COMELEC en banc.
Respondents
allege
that
the
Constitution vests the COMELEC
with the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations
relative
to
the
conduct
of
elections. The Constitution thus
empowers the COMELEC to pass
upon
the
qualification
of
candidates for elective office.
Furthermore, respondents submit that
the COMELECs jurisdiction to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of
disqualified candidates is already
settled jurisprudence.
Respondents Arguments
The Solicitor General submits that the
COMELEC did not deprive Bautista
of due process. Bautista had the
chance to be heard and to present
his side when he filed a letter to the
COMELEC en
banc requesting
reconsideration of the Resolutions.
Respondents likewise submit that
there was no need for presentation
and evaluation of evidence since the
issue of whether Bautista was a
registered voter is easily resolved by
looking at the COMELEC registration
records.
public office.
In Sandoval v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that: Procedural
due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it
is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its
ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party be given an
opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that
the evidence should be considered in the adjudication of the case. The
facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of petitioner without
benefit of prior notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based
solely on private respondents allegations. We held in Bince, Jr. vs.
COMELEC:
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law.
Although public office is not property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested right to public office,
it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in proceedings before the
COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and
hearing, among others. COMELEC is without power to partially or
totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation
without notice and hearing.
3. Was Bautista a registered voter in Barangay Lumbangan
when he filed his certificate of candidacy as Punong
Barangay? What are the effects of such registration (or lack
thereof) on his candidacy? (important issue)
Petitioners Arguments
(Bautista)
Bautista
admitted
in
his
affidavitdated 24 August 2002 that he
was not a registered voter of
Barangay Lumbangan.44
Respondents Arguments
Election Officer Jareo denies
Bautistas
allegations
in
her
comment filed on 10 October 2002.
! Sometime! during! the! late! part! of! the! year! 1995,! I! went! to! the! United! States! of! America! scounting!
(sic)!!for!a!good!job!!but!I!was!not!able!to!find!one!so!I!!went!home!!in!the!!year!2000!but!again!believing!
that!I!could!land!!a!job!in!the!United!States,!I!again!went!there!!but!I!was!not!able!to!get!a!!job!therein!
and!so!I"went"back"to"the""Philippines"in"the"year"2001"but"I"found""out"that"my""name"was"no"longer"
included"in"the"list"of"registered"voters"at"Barangay"Lumbangan,"Nasugbu,"Batangas.!
4.!!!!!!!Sometime! in! the! year! 2002,!!I! personally! went! to! the! Office! of! the! Local! Election! Registrar!
particularly!talking!to!Miss!Josefina!P.!Jareo!in!order!to!register!because"as"I"know,"to"run"for"the"Office"
of"Barangay"Chairman,"I"have"to"be"a"registered""voter"in"our"Barangay.!
It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss in his duty to ensure his right to vote
and to be voted for public office. As early as 2001, he was already aware that
his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters. Yet,
Bautista chose not to register anew that year despite his knowledge that he
needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run for the office of Punong
Barangay.
Bautista alleges that his non-registration as a voter of Barangay Lumbangan
was due to the refusal of Election Officer Jareo to register him sometime in
January 2002.Aside from his bare allegation that he tried to register in
January 2002, Bautista did not proffer any other proof like a duly
accomplished application form for registration to substantiate his claim
that he indeed attempted to register anew.
4. Was it proper to proclaim Alcoreza as PunongBarangay in
view of ineligibility of the winning candidate (Bautista)?
Petitioners Arguments
Respondents Arguments
(Bautista)
Bautista agreed with SolGen, who Respondent
Alcoreza,
however,
stated that the disqualification of alleges that her proclamation as the
the winning candidate Bautista elected Punong Barangay was legal
does
not
result
in
the and valid. Alcoreza claims her case
proclamation of Alcoreza who falls under the exception to the rule
obtained the second highest that the disqualification of the
number
of
votes
because winning candidate does not entitle
Alcoreza was obviously not the the candidate with the next higher
choice of the electorate. The number of votes to be proclaimed
Solicitor General emphasized that winner. Alcoreza
cites Grego v.
the COMELEC declared Bautista COMELEC which held that the
ineligible for the post of Punong exception is predicated on the
Barangay only after his election concurrence of two assumptions,
and proclamation as the winning namely: (1) the one who obtained the
candidate.
highest
number
of
votes
is
disqualified; and (2) the electorate is
fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidates disqualification so as to
bring such awareness within the realm
Respondents Side:
1. Merely filed counter-affidavits with the COMELEC with prayer to
dismiss the complaint.
Issue:
WON the petition shall prosper.
Held:
NO. There was no exhaustion of all available remedies at the COMELEC
level before resorting to Rule 65.
1. They should have sought a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC EB decision as required by Section 1, Rule 13 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. (The rule says: The following
pleadings are not allowed: d) motion for reconsideration of an en
banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense
cases.)
2. Since this complaint involves an election offense, an MR should
have been filed. Instead, after respondents called the SCs attention
to the petitioners failure to comply with the rules, the latter
advanced the excuse that they deemed it best not to seek any further
dilatory motion for reconsideration. To this, the SC stressed that the
MR is not dilatory. It is in fact the most expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding before
the COMELEC. Its purpose is to give the COMELEC an opportunity
to correct the error imputed to it. If the COMELEC refuses to correct
a patently erroneous act, then it commits a grave abuse of discretion
justifying recourse to a petition for certiorari.
3. A petition under Rule 65 can only be resorted to if there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Petitioners recourse to rule 65 is premature as they failed to file
the MR. They have not raised any plausible reason for direct
recourse to the SC.
4. The COMELEC had valid reason to dismiss petitioners complaint
for vote buying. It found that the respondents evidence had more
probative value and believable than the evidence of the
complainants and that the petitioners evidence was mere selfserving statements and uncorroborated audio and visual recording
and a photograph
5. Sec 28 of RA 6646 also requires that the complaint for vote-buying
and vote-selling be supported by affidavits of complaining
witnesses attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voters
LOCGOV - #118
BAQUIT UNDA v COMELEC (1990)
Doctrine: The vice-mayor, who succeeded the deceased protestee-mayor in
an election protest brought against the latter after his death, is the real party
in interest and should be substituted in the pleadings as the party-protestee.
Facts:
Hadji Minandang Guiling and private respondent Hadji Acmad Ditangongan
Rangiris were the rival candidates for mayor of Masiu, Lanao del Sur in the
local elections. Guiling was proclaimed winner, along with herein petitioner
as the duly elected vice-mayor. Both officials duly took their oaths of office
and entered upon the performance of their duties.
Private respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition questioning the said
proclamation, which was dismissed by COMELEC without prejudice to the
filing of an election contest. Subsequently, Mayor Guiling passed away and,
the following day, petitioner took his oath of office as mayor and forthwith
assumed and exercised the duties of said office.
Private respondent filed an election protest against the deceased Mayor
Guiling with the RTC. The summons issued to Mayor Guiling was returned
unserved since he had already been dead for over a month. Thereafter, the
protest filed by private respondent was brought to the COMELEC on
certiorari. The petitioner became a party to the election protest as an
intervenor with the approval of respondent COMELEC
COMELEC: RTC to proceed with the trial of the case because the death of
the protestee does not divest the court of jurisdiction over the election
protest.
Petitioners arguments:
(a) there is no law which allows a deceased person to be sued as a party
defendant, much less as a protestee in an election contest; and that
(b) the COMELEC misapplied the case of Vda. de De Mesa, etc., et al.,
vs. Mencias, etc., et al. whichimpliedly suggestedthat the procedure
would be to have the case dismissed without prejudice, to be refiled
against the proper protestee.
Respondents arguments:
Issue: WONthe trial court has jurisdiction over an election protest filed
against a protestee who had died prior to the filing thereof.
Held/Ratio: YES
Statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections. To that end, immaterial defects in
pleadings should be disregarded and necessary and proper amendments
should be allowed as promptly as possible.
On the procedural aspect, it is established that amendments to pleadings may
be permitted by this Court even for the first time on appeal in order to
substitute the name of the real party in interest, provided that such an
amendment would not involve a change in the cause of action or result in
undue prejudice to the adverse party.
It follows, therefore, that the election protest filed by private respondent can
and ought to be amended by striking out the name of Hadji Minandang
Guiling, as the protestee, and substituting, in his place, petitioner Baquit S.
Unda.
Vda. de De Mesa, as well as the other cases invoked and relied upon by
public respondent, do not present the same factual situation obtaining in the
case before us. In the decisions cited by public respondent, the protestees had
been duly served with summons and died either during the pendency of the
election protest or on appeal. However, we cannot allow public interest to be
fettered by procedural lapses or technicalities where the circumstances
demand and warrant the adjudication of the case on the merits as early as
practicable.
We can, however, for purposes of the present case avail of the ruling in the
Vda. de De Mesa case to the effect that Sec 17, Rule 3 of the ROC, on
substitution of parties, applies to election contests to the same extent and
with the same force and effect as it does in ordinary civil actions.
Now, under the LGC, the vice-mayor stands next in the line of succession to
the mayor in case of a permanent vacancy in the latter's position. Upon the
death of the protestee mayor in the case at bar, petitioner, as then incumbent
vice-mayor, succeeded by operation of law to the vacated office and is
ordinarily entitled to occupy the same for the unexpired term thereof. The
outcome of the election contest necessarily and primarily bears upon his right
to his present position and he is the person directly concerned in the fair and
regular conduct of the election in order that the true will of the electorate will
be upheld. His status as a real party in interest in the continuation of said case
cannot thus be disputed.
The pleadings in the election protest should properly be amended to
substitute petitioner as the party protestee, instead of his being merely an
intervenor therein, and that the proceedings be thereafter conducted
accordingly.
Digested by: Barbie Perez
LOCGOV - 119
Macalincag vs Chang (1992)
Doctrine: The Secretary of Finance has the power to preventively suspend
municipal treasurers. Designation of the replacement is not a requirement
before the subject employee is deemed preventively suspended.
Facts
S
S
S
S
Issue
WON Sec of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive
Suspension against the acting municipal treasurer of Makati (YES)
Held/Ratio
S PD 807 (Civil Service Law) Sec 41 governs Preventive Suspension:
The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect
in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that
the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his
removal from service
S There is NOTHING in the said law which requires designation of a
replacement in order to give effect to the preventive suspension
S But, BP Blg. 337 (LGC) Sec 156 Art 5 Ch 3 Title II provides for the
automatic assumption of the assistant municipal treasurer or next in
rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal treasurer. Sec
233(2) is the general repealing provision of the LGC (nothing in
Facts:
312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of
the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly ("PRA" for brevity) for the recall of Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates ("Socrates" for brevity) who assumed office as Puerto
Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA
designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association
of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA
PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 ("Recall Resolution" for brevity)
which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his
recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall
election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall
Resolution
Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No.
02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due course to the Recall
Resolution. This was dismissed by COMELEC
Edward M. Hagedorn ("Hagedorn" for brevity) filed his certificate
of candidacy for mayor in the recall election
Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo
("Gilo" for brevity) filed a petition before the COMELEC to
disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel
his certificate of candidacy
Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition against Hagedorn alleging
substantially the same facts and involving the same issues. The
petitions were all anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is
disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been
elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3)
consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election
for the same post."
COMELEC's First Division dismissed the cases. The COMELEC
declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election
Petitioners arguments:
GR 154512
o Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC
resolution
o Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates cites
the following circumstances as legal infirmities attending
the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall
Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of
Respondents arguments:
Position: Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the
September 24, 2002 recall election as the disqualification under Art.
X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution applies to the regular mayoralty
election succeeding the third consecutive term served. Nor is he
precluded from serving the unexpired portion of the 2001-2004
mayoralty term as this is not service of a prohibited fourth
consecutive full term
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Recall Resolution is valid
Whether or not Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election
Held/Ratio:
YES, The COMELEC found that the proponents of the recall sent
notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof. PRA
members had the authority to adopt the Recall Resolution because
when the PRA members adopted such, their terms of office had not
yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members
with no legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly.
As in Malonzo vs Comelec, court held it is bound by the findings of
fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and
expertise of the COMELEC
YES, because what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate
reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. Such
is not the case herein. The three-term limit rule for elective local
officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which
states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected"
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which
provides:
"Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three
(3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official was elected"
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The
first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only
consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The
second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length
of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent
is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time
interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and
after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms
service for the full term for which he was elected." The purpose of
the provision is to prevent an elective local official from voluntarily
resigning from office for the purpose of circumventing the rule on
the belief that the term during which he resigned would be excluded
in the counting of the three-term rule. In short, the provision
excluded is intended to impose a penalty on one who flouts the rule
or make a mockery of it by the simple act of resigning. Thus,
applying it in the case of Hagedorn, even if he voluntarily resigned
on his third term, he would still be barred from seeking reelection in
the May 2001 election
Hagedorn cannot likewise avail of the ruling in Adormeo vs.
COMELEC (G.R. No. 147927, 4 February 2002) because in that
case Talaga did not win in his second reelection bid, or for a third
term, in the May 1998 elections. He won in the recall election of 12
May 2000. Hagedorn, as earlier stated, fully served three successive
terms
and had served 3 consecutive terms as Municipal Mayor in 1998-2001, 20012004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running in the 2007
elections, as it would be his 4th term.
3. Potencioso admitted he was elected for 3 consecutive terms but claimed
that the service of his 2nd term was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he
succeeded as vice-mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice-Mayor
Mendoza. He therefore is not disqualified to run, the interruption not being
voluntary.
4. Petitioner: It is a voluntary renunciation therefor enot considered an
interruption.
5. COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc both ruled in favor of
Potencioso. It was an involuntary interruption, therefore not disqualified.
Important provisions:
1. Sec.8, Article X, 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such
officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
2. LGC
Sec. 43. Term of Office
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
Petitioner: Voluntary renunciation therefore not considered interruption.
Respondent: Involuntary therefore an interruption.
Issue: W/N Potenciosos succession as Vice-Mayor can be considered a
voluntary renunciation of office which cannot be considered an interruption
therefore making him disqualified to run in the 2007 elections?
Held: No.
SC:
1. Lonzanida vs. COMELEC: 2 conditions must concur to be disqualified:
i. Official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same
local government post.
ii. He has fully served 3 consecutive terms.
2. Borja Jr. vs. COMELEC: Term limit for elective officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that
the official has been elected three consecutive times; he must also have
served three consecutive terms in the same position.
3. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Under Sec.
44 LGC, if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the
highest-ranking Sanggunian Member shall become Vice Mayor. There is no
way could it be considered voluntary renunciation. The legal successor is not
given any option under the law to accept or not.
4. SC quoting COMELEC ruling: Succession by law to a vacated
government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the
performance of a public duty by a government official, the non-performance
of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges
of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions. It is
therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.
LOCGOV- 122
Mendoza vs Familara
Nov 15, 2011
Doctrine: The 3 term limit provided under the LGC applies to barangay
officials.
Facts:
Petitioners Arguments:
The three term limit provided under RA 9164 cannot be applied to
the 1994 barangay elections. Mendoza basically claims that his
winning the 1994 elections must not be counted in determining the
3 term limit because the RA 9164 came after the 1994 elections.
Respondents Arguments:
Mendoza already served 3 consecutive terms and is thus disqualified
pursuant to RA 9164
Issue:
WON the 3 consecutive term limit provided under RA 9164 is applicable to
barangay elections?
Held:
Yes, it applies to barangay elections.. However, the Court first pointed out
that the case was already moot and academic because the term of office of
the 2007 elections had already expired in 2010. (note this case was decided
in 2011)
The Court then said that the issue had already been laid to rest in Comelec vs
Cruz when it said that:
1. The three term limit did not apply retroactively to the 1994 barangay
elections because the three-term limit has been there all along as
early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987
Constitution took effect; it was continued under the [Local
Government Code] and can still be found in the current law. We
find this obvious from a reading of the historical development of
the law.
2. An alternative perspective is to view [Section] 43(a), (b) and (c)
separately from one another as independently standing and selfcontained provisions, except to the extent that they expressly relate
to one another. Thus, [Section] 43(a) relates to the term of local
elective officials, exceptbarangay officials whose term of office is
separately provided under Sec. 43(c). [Section] 43(b), by its express
terms, relates to all local elective officials without any exception.
Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective officials without
any
exclusion
or
qualification.
Either perspective, both of which speak of the same resulting
interpretation, is the correct legal import of Section 43 in the context
in which it is found in Title II of the LGC.
Digested By:
Kesterson Kua
LOCGOV - #123
KAGAWADS JOSE G. MENDOZA, ROSARIO B. ESPINO,
TERESITA S. MENDOZA, JORGE BANAL, Chairman of the Special
Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases Against Elected
Barangay Officials of the Quezon City Council and ISMAEL A.
MATHAY, JR., City Mayor of Quezon City, petitioners, vs.
BARANGAY CAPTAIN MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR., respondent. (2003)
Doctrine: Once proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is
entitled to assume office and to exercise the functions thereof. The pendency
of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming
office or from discharging his functions. Unless his election is annulled by a
final and executory decision or a valid execution of an order unseating him
pending appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the
duties of the office to which he has been elected. Thus, the taking of an oath
of office anew by a duly proclaimed but subsequently unseated local elective
official is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in
office where the COMELEC orders the relinquishment of the contested
position.
Facts:
On May 27, 1997, respondent took his oath and thereafter assumed
office as the duly proclaimed and elected barangay captain of Barangay
Batasan Hills, Quezon City, in the 1997 Barangay Elections. Roque Fermo,
his rival candidate, filed an election protest with the QC MTC. On January
18, 1999, Fermo was declared as the winner in the Barangay Elections.
Respondent filed a notice of appeal with the COMELEC while Fermo filed a
motion for execution pending appeal, which was granted by the trial court on
January 20, 1999.
Issues / Held:
the functions of the office, or from November 17, 1999, the date Roque
Fermo turned over to respondent the assets and properties of Barangay
Batasan Hills. October 28, 1999
Ratio:
On exhaustion of administrative remedies
The trial court ruled that Section 67 of the Local Government Code,
which allows an appeal to the Office of the President, is not applicable
because the decision of the City Council is final and executory.
Sections 61 and 67 of the Local Government Code, provide:
Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A
verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be
prepared as follows:
xxx
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed
before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned
whose decision shall be final and executory. (emphasis supplied)
Sec. 67. Administrative Appeals. Decisions in administrative
cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed
to the following:
xxx
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of
highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.
Decision of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.
The trial court failed to consider Section 68 of the same code which provides:
An appeal shall not prevent a decision from being final and
executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been
placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal
in the event that he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results
in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other
emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.
The phrases final and executory, and final or executory in
Sections 67 and 68 are not indicative of the appropriate mode of relief from
the decision of the Sanggunian concerned but simply mean that the
administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions. The
decision is immediately executory but the respondent may nevertheless
appeal the adverse decision to the Office of the President or to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as the case may be.
It is clear that respondent failed to exhaust all the administrative
remedies available to him. But in the case at bar, the issues of whether or not
the decision of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in disciplinary cases is
appealable to the Office of the President, as well as the propriety of taking an
oath of office anew by respondent, are certainly questions of law which call
for judicial intervention, and is under the exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion.
On the re-taking of oath
Once proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled
to assume office and to exercise the functions thereof. The pendency of an
election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or
from discharging his functions [Cereno v. Dictado, 1988, citing Estrada v.
Sto. Domingo (1969)]. Unless his election is annulled by a final and
executory decision (Ibid.) or a valid execution of an order unseating him
pending appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the
duties of the office to which he has been elected.
Respondent was proclaimed as the winner in the 1997 Barangay
Elections and thereafter took his oath and assumed office. He is therefore
vested with all the rights to discharge the functions of his office.
Although in the interim, he was unseated by virtue of a decision in
an election protest decided against him, the execution of said decision was
annulled by the COMELEC in its September 16, 1999 Resolution which,
incidentally, was sustained by this Court in Fermo v. Commission on
Elections (2000). It was held therein that [w]hen the COMELEC nullified
the writ of execution pending appeal in favor of FERMO, the decision of the
MTC proclaiming FERMO as the winner of the election was stayed and the
status quo or the last actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the
controversy was restored The status quo referred to the stage when
respondent was occupying the office of Barangay Captain and discharging its
functions. For purposes of determining the continuity and effectivity of the
rights arising from respondents proclamation and oath taken on May 27,
1997, it is as if the said writ of execution pending appeal was not issued and
he was not ousted from office. The re-taking of his oath of office on
November 16, 1999 was a mere formality considering that his oath taken on
May 27, 1997 operated as a full investiture on him of the rights of the office.
Hence, the taking anew of his oath of office as Barangay Captain of Batasan
Hills, Quezon City was not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his reassumption in office and to the exercise of the functions thereof.
An elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term.
The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term [and, hence], [a]ny
subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered.
2. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as
the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor.
3. But in the 2004 electoral derby, the Viga municipal board of
canvassers initially proclaimed as winner Jose Torres, who, in due
time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
4. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation.
5. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty
electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting
May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007
(or for a little over 1 yr and 1 month).
6. On May 2010 elections, Abundo and Torres again opposed each
other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the
mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in
seeking the formers disqualification to run. Torres filed a petition
predicated on the 3-consecutive term limit rule.
7. On June 2010, the COMELEC First Division favored Abundo, who
bested Torres by 219 votes and was accordingly proclaimed 2010
mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
8. Before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification
case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent
Ernesto Vega commenced a quo warranto action before the RTC
Virac to unseat Abundo on the same grounds Torres raised in his
petition to disqualify.
9. RTC: declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor for
having already served 3 consecutive mayoralty terms citing
Aldovino v COMELEC (preventive suspension is not a terminterrupting event as the elective officers continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his
office during this period)
10. COMELEC: affirmed RTC
11. Despite the supervening issuance by the Court of a TRO to enjoin
the enforcement of the assailed COMELEC decision, Abundo was
dislodged from his post as incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
Facts:
1. For 4 successive regular elections, viz. 2001, 2004, 2007 & 2010
national and local elections, petitioner Abundo vied for the position
of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
Petitioners arguments:
1. Aldovino is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt
with preventive suspension which does not interrupt the continuity of
service of a term.
not serve in the mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right to said
position
However, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the
functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from
holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply
barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law. (Aldovino Jr)
It is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or
disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post.
o During the intervening period of almost 2 years, reckoned
from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said
to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that
time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the
legal right to assume and serve such elective office.
o Not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said
to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose
a title which, in the first place, he did not have.
o Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated
declaration in the election protest accords him title to the
elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not
entitled to the elective office until the election protest was
finally resolved in his favor.
During the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from
exercising power or authority over the good people of Viga,
Catanduanes. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was
not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break
in his service because, as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the
election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was
exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
Petitioners argument:
The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
preventively suspended him on a ground not authorized by law, the
fraud contemplated in Sec. 13 RA 3019 only applying to government
or public funds or property.
[TOPICAL; not really the petitioners argument but the dissenting
opinions] The Ombudsmans authority to suspend local elective
officials for 6 months is limited by Sec. 63 (b) of the Loc. Gov.
Code, which provides that local elective officials can be suspended
for a maximum period of 60 days (Garcia v. Mojica, Rios v.
Sandiganbayan).
Respondents arguments:
Mirandas acts of assuming authority, issuing directives, and
appointing people to positions in the City Government constitute
usurpation of authority under Art. 177 of the RPC.
Being acts of fraud upon the government or public funds or property,
his acts warrant preventive suspension under Sec. 13 of RA 3019.
Issue/s:
Held:
On WON Sec. 13 of RA 3019 applies only to fraud involving public
funds or property
Sec. 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds
or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have
already been separated from the service, has already received
such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the
Government.
The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019
as covering two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on
the government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or
property. Nothing in R.A. No. 3019 evinces any legislative intent
to limit Section 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or
property.
On WON the crime of usurpation of authority involves fraud on the
government and public property
Fraud upon the government means any instance or act of trickery or
deceit against the government. It cannot be read restrictively to be
equivalent to malversation of funds. Fraud upon the government was
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as private respondent in this
case.
In this case, since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the
Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the
Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of
the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
Section 60 of the LGC
! The sangguniang
bayan has
no
power
to
remove
an
elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper
court may do so.
Digested by Roe Anuncio
LOCGOV 128
Manuel Laxina Sr. v. Ombudsman, DILG Sec. Jose Lina and Mayor
Feliciano Belmonte (2005)
J. Tinga
Doctrine: The Constitution mandates the Ombudsman to investigate
complaints against erring public officials. RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman or
his deputies jurisdiction over complaints on all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance. On the other hand, RA 7160 (Local Govt
Code) the sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary
authority over any elective barangay official. The aforequoted laws show
that the Ombudsman may have concurrent jurisdiction with city councils
over administrative cases against elective officials.
Facts:
1. Manuel Laxina Sr. was Brgy Chairman of Batasan Hills, QC.
Batasan Hills brgy. clerk Evangeline Ursal filed a complaint for
attempted rape against Laxina, with the NBI. Laxina was thereafter
charged with sexual harassment before the RTC of QC.
2. March 13, 2000 Ursal filed a complaint affidavit before the DILG
against Laxina for grave misconduct (due to the alleged attempted
rape). DILG referred the complaint to the QC Council as an
administrative case. Ursal then filed with the Ombudsman a similar
complaint-affidavit, charging the same thing.
3. The Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Ombudsman
exonerated Laxina, for lack of evidence.
4. July 2, 2001 Laxina was found guilty of grave misconduct and his
dismissal was ordered through a Memorandum Order by the
Ombudsman. Laxina filed an MR, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the Ombudsman. MR was denied.
5. Ursal asked the City Council to waive its jurisdiction in favor of the
Ombudsman; request was just noted.
6. As AAB ordered, QC Mayor Belmonte issued order to implement
the Ombudsmans Memorandum Order
7. CA dismissed Laxinas petition, alleging that Laxina was estopped
from impugning the Ombudsmans jurisdiction as he had already
participated in the proceedings before the Ombudsman and he only
questioned the Ombudsmans jurisdiction after it had found him
guilty of grave misconduct.
a. Ombudsmans assumption of jurisdiction was justified since
it became aware of the earlier case before the City Council
only with Laxinas filing of an MR.
b. Ombudsman was justified in not dismissing the
administrative cases as penalty for forum-shopping because
Laxina and Ursal are in pari delicto.
Petitioners Arguments:
1. Office of the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over the administrative
complaint. Ursals filing of the same administrative case before the
Ombudsman and the City Council through the DILG should have led
to the dismissal of both cases
2. He was denied due process in the proceedings before the
Ombudsman because his dismissal was ordered without substantial
evidence and without consideration of his own evidence
3. CA was wrong when it refused to prevent respondents from
prematurely implementing the memorandum order dismissing him
despite the fact that the order is not yet final and executory (based on
Lapid v. CA)
4. Estoppel cannot apply to him because he never invoked the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman or sought relief therefrom.
5. He is entitled to reinstatement because Admin. Order 7, amended by
AO 14-A of the Ombudsman decreeing that all administrative orders
Facts:
Issue/s: W/N the officials may be preventively suspended.
The Sandiganbayan suspended the municipal mayor, vice-mayor and
incumbent councilors or members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa
pending their trial for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The accused allegedly forcible took possession of the Public
Market despite a subsisting lease between the municipality and the Kilusang
Suspension was ordered pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Now the accused officers want to dissolve the suspension order of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners arguments: (Note: include petitioners relief, position, and
legal basis)
Petitioners argument is that preventive suspension is unnecessary since they
already admitted in 4 pleadings that they indeed approved Kapasiyahan Blg.
45 and wrestled management of the Public Market. As a result the fear of the
court that they might use their position to tamper with records no longer
holds ground. With the admission, there is no longer a factual issue but only
a legal question as to whether or not the cancellation by the petitioners of the
Cooperative's subsisting lease contract over the Municipal Public Market was
justified by public interest or general welfare. Absent any need for
testimonial and/or documentary evidence, any apprehension that the
petitioners might intimidate or coerce prospective witnesses against them, or
tamper with office records under their control, is "more imaginary than real".
Also their preventive suspension will "sow havoc and confusion in the
government of the Municipality of Muntinlupa since no one will be able to
run the municipality when theyre suspended.
Respondents arguments: (Note: include respondents position, reason for
opposing petitioners claim, jurisprudence, and legal basis)
Respondents are the Sandiganbayan justices. On the motion of the Public
Prosecutor, and over the opposition of the accused, the Sandiganbayan issued
on May 11, 1993 a resolution suspending them pendente lite from public
office pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall been titled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed
to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
Held/Ratio: Yes
The Court denied the petitioners motion against the suspension.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally provides that the
accused public officials "shall be suspended from office" while the criminal
prosecution is pending in court. As stated in Gonzaga, preventive suspension
is mandatory.
Petitioners claim that such suspension is unconstitutional since its a
violation of their presumption on innocence does not hold ground.
Preventive suspension is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a
penalty.
Regarding their argument that there is no more need to introduce factual
evidence given their admission, the Solicitor General correctly replied that it
is not for the petitioners to say that their admissions are all the evidence that
the prosecution will need to hold up its case against them. The prosecution
must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under
conditions which would ensure nonintervention and noninterference for
ninety (90) straight days from petitioners' camp"
Fear of paralysis of the municipality is also unfounded. There will still
remain eight (8) councilors who can meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The
President and the DILG will be the one to deal with fillinf up the temporary
vacant positions in accordance with the LGC.
Dissenting opinion: (if any)
Digested by: Chua
LOCGOV 131
TOLENTINO vs COMELEC (2010)
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
As a result of the May 14, 2007 elections, Tolentino and De Castro
were proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor and Vice Mayor of
Tagaytay City. Private respondents contested the elections results in
116 ballot boxes by filing separate election protests.
The Second Division of the COMELEC to which the protests were
raffled required the City Treasurer of Tagaytay to inventory the
protested ballot boxes and to turn them over to the Election Officer
of Tagaytay for delivery and submission to the COMELEC.
PLEB denied his motion for lack of merit, and a hearing of the case was
conducted. The PLEB also denied petitioners MR.
PLEB issued a decision finding SPO1 Acuzar GUILTY of GRAVE
MISCONDUCT (Child Abuse), punishable by DISMISSAL effective
immediately.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC.
Petitioner alleged that the decision was issued without giving him an
opportunity to be heard, that the respondent Board acted without
jurisdiction in proceeding with the case without the petitioner having been
first convicted in the criminal case before the regular court.
Under the PLEB Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was required before
the Board may act on the administrative case, considering that the charge
was actually for violation of law, although denominated as for grave
misconduct.
RTC rendered a Decision annulling the Decision of the PLEB, given that
petitioner was not given his day in Court.
The hearing at the Peoples Law Enforcement Board, although
administrative in nature, has penal sanction of dismissal and for forfeiture
of benefits of the petitioner. The petitioner should be afforded all the
opportunities of hearing which principally includes the reception of his
evidence consistent with our established rules. Due process of law
embraces not only substantive due process, but also procedural due
process.
The Court does not tolerate any form of misconduct committed by
members of the Philippine National Police. However, it equally considers
the right of the petitioner enshrined under the Bill of Rights and the
deprivation of petitioners gainful employment which is the economic life
blood of the family, especially the innocent dependents.
Respondent elevated the case to the CA, which set aside the trial courts
decision, ruling that the petition was not the proper remedy because (1)
appeal was available and (2) the issues raised were not pure questions of
law but both questions of law and fact. The existence and availability of the
right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one (1) of the
requirements for its availment is the absence of the remedy of appeal or
any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy. Petitioner should have
appealed the decision of the PLEB to the regional appellate board of the
PNP before resorting to certiorari before the court. While it is true that
there are instances where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be
resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, petitioner, however, failed
to demonstrate any ground to warrant immediate resort to it.
W/N the CA erred in ruling that petitioners resort to certiorari was not
warranted as the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB was
available to him
Held/Ratio:
The Court affirms the CA ruling.
Petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit
affair with respondents minor daughter, he being a married man, and not
for violation of law.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct,
motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It usually
refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
where no discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does
not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention but implies
wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment.
Violation of law presupposes final conviction in court of any crime
or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law
or ordinance.Criminal and administrative cases are separate and
distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence is required. Administrative cases may proceed
independently of criminal proceedings. The PLEB, being the
administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against
erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case.
Remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB to the Regional Appellate
Board was available to petitioner. Since appeal was available, filing a
petition for certiorari was inapt. The principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of
the means of administrative processes afforded to him.
Contrary to petitioners claim that he has not been afforded all the
opportunity to present his side, our own review of the records of the
proceedings before the PLEB reveals otherwise.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally
or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
Petitioners arguments:
According to Catu, Atty. Rellosa committed an act of impropriety as a
lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.
Respondents arguments:
Atty. Rellosa claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to
hear complaints referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa and
as such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth
and Pastor.
According to him, as head of the Lupon, he performed his task with
utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties.
However, the parties were not able to amicably settle their dispute and
Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case and it was then that
Elizabeth sought his legal assistance.
According to Rellosa, he acceded to her request for free because she was
financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a
patent injustice against her.
Issue/s:
WON Atty. Rellosa should be held responsible for professional misconduct
Held/Ratio:
Yes, but the court cited a different set of legal basis for his liability.
According to the court, contrary to the IBPs findings, Atty. Rellosa
cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility because it applies only to a lawyer who has
left government service and in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service.
o PCGG v. Sandiganbayan -> Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection
Petitioners arguments:
S Courts are not allowed to distinguish where the law makes no
distinction.
S RTC acted beyong its scope of jurisdiction when it constricted the
definition of insrumentality to exclude GOCCs.
S The governments challegne against Atty. Rambuyongs appearance
is directed against him alone to the exclusion of his client whose ight
to prosecute his claim as party litigant is beyond question.
Respondents arguments:
S The party who would be benefited or injured by the compulsory
inhibition of plaintiffs counsel is the plaintiff who is the real party in
interest in the original case. Rambuyongs inclusion in the present
petition is erroneous.
Issue/s: WON NPC is an instrumentality of the government such that
Rambuyong should not appear as counsel before it.
Held/Ratio: Petition is granted. Rambuyong is disqualified to appear.
S Relevant provisions in law:
o Administrative Code of 1987: SECTION 2. General Terms
Defined. Unless the specific words of the text, or the
context as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a
different meaning: xxx (4) Agency of the Government refers
to any of the various units of the Government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-
S
S
is that the person appointed in a public office did not have legal
qualifications.
According to the ruling, legal qualifications over a public office must be
provided by law.
Section 480, Article X of the Local Government Code provides for the
qualifications for the position of Municipal Administrator: he is a citizen of
the Philippines, a resident of the local government unit concerned, of good
moral character, a holder of a college degree preferably in public
administration, law, or any other related course from a recognized college or
university, and a first grade civil service eligible or its equivalent. He must
have acquired experience in management and administration work for at
least five (5) years in the case of the provincial or city administrator, and
three (3) years in the case of the municipal administrator.
The prosecution did not allege that the appointee Tiape lacked
THESE legal qualifications but merely anchored their allegation on the
one-year temporary prohibition on appointments imposed against losing
candidates.
The one-year prohibition provision says: no candidate who has lost in
any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any
office in the government
or any government-owned or controlled
corporation or in any of their subsidiaries.
Hence this petition by the Ombudsman on behalf of the People.
I. Petitioners claims and arguments:
One of the assigned errors imputed to the Sandiganbayan is its
interpretation that legal qualifications DID NOT include the one year
prohibition on losing candidates as enunciated in the Constitution (Section
6, Article IX) and the LGC (Sec. 94b).
And consequently, the petitioners say that the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it granted the Demurrer.
II. Respondents arguments:
Private respondent did not file a comment. The Court deemed that he had
waived his right.
Presumably, the Sandiganbayans ruling is its answer.
Issue/s:
1. W/N Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion?
Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The Court said that the interpretation of the Sandiganbayan has no
basis in law or jurisprudence. Their interpretation lacks cogency.
1. During the May 2001 elections, then Mayor Joseph Ruiz of Dapitan
City, running for re-election, was defeated by respondent Rodolfo H.
Carreon, Jr.
2. On June 1, 18 and 27, 2001, his last month in office, then Mayor
Ruiz issued 83 appointments, including those of herein petitioners.
3. In July, the newly elected Mayor assumed office and issued
Memorandum Orders Nos. 1 and 2 revoking the 83 appointments on
the ground that the latter violated Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Resolution No. 01-988 imposing a ban on issuing appointments in
the civil service during the election period. He also prohibited the
release of the salaries and benefits of the 83 appointees.
4. Petitioner: Patricio Sales, one of herein petitioners, in his capacity as
president of the Dapitan City Government Employees Association,
wrote the CSC Regional Office No. IX requesting its ruling on the
matter.
5. Respondent: In his position paper, respondent contended that the
questioned appointments were not only "issued in bulk" but that
there was no urgent need to fill those positions.
6. CSC Regional Office No. IX ruling: the appointments were valid
7. On appeal by respondent, the CSC En Banc reversed the regional
office and revoked the appointments
8. On a petition for review, the CA affirmed the CSC en banc
Issue: W/n the appointments were valid. NO
Ratio:
1. This case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief
executives to issue "midnight" appointments, which does not only
cause animosities between the outgoing and the incoming officials,
but also affects efficiency in local governance. Those appointed tend
to devote their time and energy in defending their appointments
instead of attending to their functions
a. Not all types of midnight appointments are illegal, but it is only
when the appointments were made en masse by the outgoing
administration and shown to have been made through hurried
maneuvers and under circumstances departing from good faith,
morality, and propriety
SEC.!2.!Duty+of+Personnel+Officers.!!It!shall!be!the!duty!of!all!Chief!Personnel!or!Administrative!Officers!
of!all!branches,!subdivisions,!instrumentalities!and!agencies!of!the!Government,!including!governmentS
owned!or!controlled!corporations!with!original!charters,!and!local!government!units,!to!post!in!three!(3)!
conspicuous!places!of!their!offices!for!a!period!ten!(10)!days!a!complete!list!of!all!existing!vacant!
positions!in!their!respective!offices!which!are!authorized!to!be!filled,!and!to!transmit!a!copy!of!such!list!
and!the!corresponding!qualification!standards!to!the!Civil!Service!Commission!not!later!than!the!tenth!
day!of!every!month.!Vacant$positions$shall$not$be$filled$until$after$publication:!Provided,+however,!that!
vacant!and!unfilled!positions!that!are:!
a)!primarily!confidential;!
b)!policySdetermining;!
c)!highly!technical;!!
d)!coSterminous!with!that!of!the!appointing!authority;!or!
e)!limited!to!the!duration!of!a!particular!project,!shall!be!excluded!from!the!list!
required!by!law.!
S
Digested by: Cielo Goo (A2015)
LOCGOV - #147
Quirog v. Aumentado (2008)
Doctrine:Both the appointing authority and the appointee are equally real
parties in interest who have the requisite legal standing to bring an action
challenging a CSC disapproval of an appointment.
Facts:
S On May 28, 2001, then-Bohol Provincial Governor Rene
Relampagos appointed petitioner Liza Quirog (who was the acting
Provincial Agriculturalist) as Provincial Government Department
Head of the Office of the Bohol Provincial Agriculture. (PGDHOPA) This appointment was confirmed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan on June 1, 2001.
S However, the director of the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office VII (CSCRO-VII) invalidated the appointment, on the ground
that it was part of the midnight appointments made by Gov.
Relampagos after the May 14 elections, in violation of CSC
Resolution No. 010988 (anti-midnight appointments resolution)
dated June 4, 2001.
S Both ex-Gov. Relampagos and petitioner filed an MR to the
CSCRO-VII order. This was, however, denied for lack of legal
personality to file the pleading because only the appointing officer
may request reconsideration of the disapproval of the appointment.
While ex-Gov. Relampagos was Quirogs appointing authority, he
could no longer file the MR because his term had already lapsed.
S Both appealed to the CSC, which set aside the previous order and
approved Quirogs appointment.
S Private respondent incumbent Bohol Gov. Erico Aumentado filed an
MR to the CSC decision, insisting that ex-Gov. Relampagos and
Quirog had no legal personality to file an MR of the disapproved
appointment and that the appointment was a midnight appointment.
This was denied.
S Private respondent filed a petition for review with the CA, which
granted the same. CA reversed the CSC decision and ruled that
Quirogs appeal should have been dismissed for outright lack of
legal personality because only the appointing authority can challenge
the CSCRO-VII order.
Petitioners arguments:
S Petitioners assail the CA resolution setting aside the CSC decision
which granted their MR to the CSCRO-VII decision and approved
Quirogs appointment.
S CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40 s.1998, Rule VI, Sec. 2.
Sec. 2. Requests for reconsideration of, or appeal
from, the disapproval of an appointment may be
made by the appointing authority and submitted to
the Commission within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the disapproved appointment.
S The use of the word may means that a request for reconsideration
from a disapproved appointment is not vested exclusively in the
appointing authority. Quirog, being the real-party-in-interest and the
one aggrieved by the disapproval, should have been allowed to
appeal.
S On the merits, the anti-midnight appointments resolution should not
be applied to this case because by the time said resolution came into
force (June 4), Quirogs appointment had already been made and she
had already taken her oath (June 1).
Respondents arguments:
S CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40 s.1998, Rule VI, Sec. 2 is clear
in laying down the rule that it is only the appointing authority which
can request for reconsideration of a CSC-disapproved appointment.
S This is likewise the holding in the case of Mathay, Jr. v. CSC
Issue/s:
S WoN a real-party-in-interest may appeal from a CSC-disapproved
appointment;
S WoN the anti-midnight appointments resolution is applicable in this
case;
S WoN Quirogas appointment was a midnight appointment.
Held/Ratio: (Note: include legal basis and jurisprudence)
YES. A REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST MAY APPEAL FROM A CSCDISAPPROVED APPOINTMENT.
S The court referred to its ruling in Abella, Jr. v CSC, where it said that
both the appointing authority and the appointee are equally real
S
S
1. The 52 petitioners in this case were all bona fide employees of the
City of Dumaguete appointed to various positions by City Mayor
Felipe Antonio B. Remollo, Jr. sometime in June 2001, shortly
before the end of his term.
2. On July 2001, the newly elected Mayor Perdices announced that he
was not recognizing the appointments made by former Mayor
Remollo. Thereafter, the Treasurer was directed not to make any
disbursements pertaining to petitioners and petitioners names were
deleted from the list of employees.
3. The petitioners filed a petition for Mandamus with injunction and
damages before the RTC of Dumaguete against the Mayor and 4
other City Officers (Civil Case). On the same day, Director II Fabio
Abucejo (Abucejo) of the Civil Service Commission Field Office
(CSC-FO), pursuant to CSC Memorandum No.001374, invalidated
and revoked the appointments made by former Mayor Remollo in
June 2001 because the appointments were in violation of Items No.
3(d) and 4 of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated 4 June 2001, which
prohibit the outgoing chief executive from making mass
appointments after elections.
4. A copy of the CSC-FOs findings were given to the petitioners and
upon receipt, they filed a motion for reconsideration before the CSC
Regional Office VII. The CSC RO dismissed this reasoning that the
motion should be filed before the CSC FO. The petitioners filed
another motion to treat their first motion as an appeal. The CSC RO
dismissed appeal and affirmed the CSC FOs decision.
5. Petitioners elevated the case to the CSC Proper. The CSC Proper
noted that generally, it is the appointing officer who appeals
invalidated appointments but relaxed the rule in this case as the
appointing authority was no longer in power. However, the appeal
was still dismissed.
6. The petitioners filed before the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA
dismissed this and affirmed the CSC decision. The petitioners filed a
petition for the review of this decision before the SC.
7. Meanwhile, the RTC granted the injunction prayed for in the Civil
Case. But upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the
respondents, the RTC lifted the injunction. The CA affrimed. This
Court also affirmed on the ground that the petitioners had already
availed the remedies of law when they appealed the decision of the
CSC FO to the CSC RO and then to the CSC Proper. Hence, the
injunction was lifted.
Facts:
1. On March 17, 1992, Montuerto was issued an appointment as
Municipal Budget Officer by then Mayor Sabitsana of the
Municipality of Almeria, Biliran. Her appointment was approved as
permanent on March 24 by the Actining Civil Service Commission
(CSC) Field Officer.
2. In 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Almeria, Biliran passed a
Resolution requesting the CSC to revoke the appointment of
Montuerto as Municipal Budget Officer for failure to secure the
required concurrence from the Sangguniang Bayan.
3. The Municipality submitted the 201 file of Montuerto showing that
the appointment lacked the SBs concurrence to the CSC Regional
Office VIII while Montuerto submitted a Joint-affidavit by the
majority of SB members stating that the concurrence on Montuertos
appointment was not highlighted during the March 1992 session and
was inadvertently omitted from the Minutes but they can still fully
recall that there was a verbal concurrence during said session.
4. The CSCRO ordered Montuertos appointment recalled. Montuerto
filed a motion for reconsideration. To resolve the motion, the
incumbent SB secretary was ordered to submit evidence showing
that Montuertos appointment was submitted to the SB for
concurrence. The SB secretary issued a Certification that there is no
record that Montuertos appointment was submitted for concurrence
however the presence of Montuerto was noted in the Minutes of the
March 1992 session.
5. The CSCRO denied the Motion for Reconsideration. The CSC
Central Office dismissed Montuertos appeal. The CA affirmed the
CSC resolution in toto. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioners argument/s:
1. Per the Joint-Affidavit by the majority of the SB members, there was
a verbal concurrence on Montuertos appointment.
Respondents argument/s:
1. Petitioners 201 file showed that her appointment lacked the required
concurrence of the local sanggunian.
Issue: Whether the appointment of petitioner as Municipal Budget Officer,
without the written concurrence of the Sanggunian, but duly approved by the
CSC and after the appointee had served as such for almost ten years without
interruption, can still be revoked by the Commission.
CHAPTER X
LOCGOV - #140
FELICIDAD UY, petitioner,versus HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS,
Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro
Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig,
Metro Manila; SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIE JAVIER,
respondents. (1994)
Facts:
1. Petitioner Uy subleased half of the second floor of a building in
Makati from private respondent Atayde where Uy operated a beauty
parlor.
2. The sublease expired but Uy was not able to remove all her
movables. An argument ensued between Uy and Atayde when the
former sought to remove her movables which led to a scuffle
between Uy and Atayde and her employees including private
respondent Javier.
3. Private respondents filed a complaint with the barangay captain of
Valenzuela, Makati on April 23, 1993. A confrontation betweeen the
parties was scheduled but only Uy appeared on the scheduled date.
4. On May 11, 1993, the Office of the Prosecutor filed two
Informations for slight physical injuries against Uy.
5. In her counter-affidavit, Uy specifically alleged the prematurity of
the filing of the complaint and filed a Motion to Dismiss for noncompliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral
to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
6. The MTC judge denied the motion. Hence this petition.
Petitioners argument:
1. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss
considering that the private respondents failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section
412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and further required
under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Private Respondents arguments:
1. Prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable in the case
of private respondent Javier since she and the petitioner are not