Sunday, January 10, 2010

Jammu Kashmir Resolution through reconciliation

Introduction
Kashmir named as Kashyap-Mar or Kashyap-Pura and also implies a land
desicated from water: "ka" (the water ) and Shimeera (to desicate). The
ancient Greeks called it "Kasperia" and the Chinese pilgrim Hien-Tsang ,who
visited the valley in 7th century called it KaShi-Mi-Lo ". In modern times the
people of Kashmir have shortened it into "Kasheer" in the language of
natives .Major Linguistic groups are Kashmiri ,Dogri ,Gujari ,
Pahari,Ladakhi,Punjabi ,Lahanda (Pothwari), Urdu , Balti,Shina (Dardi ;
spoken chiefly in Gilgit and Gurez area),Tibetan, Burushaski(mainly spoken
in Hunza, Nagar and Yasin) (Kishtwari, Siraji, Rambani, Poguli, Banjwahi
which are included with Kashmiri ) ,Hindustani(Urdu and Hindi). Kashmir
valley , surrounded by the mountain range is inhabited as long as 4000B.C
.Crafts and handworks like Carpets, Shawls, Paper Machie , Wood Carving,
Stone Carving , Namda Work, Chain Switch , Embroidery (Crewel Work)
,Needle Work(Sozni) and Gabba making , and most important is literature
and poetry— attracted the world attention . So far as the definition of
‘Kashmir’ itself, which can be a source of confusion since ’Kashmir’ is a
term that describes both a region as well as the Valley of Kashmir.
The region of Kashmir is generally used to denote the borders of the
princely state of Kashmir which, since the partition of the Indian sub-
continent, now spans three countries, India, Pakistan and China. Kashmir as
a greater term comprises several sub-regions, each with varying and
different cultures. This child of the mighty Himalayas receives in abundance
the paternal grace in the form of captivating scenic beauty, lush green
pastures, meadows and condescending gleaming snow covered mountain
peaks which capture the changing tinges of the bright sun, in so many ways
the perennial murmuring rivers and rivulets ,and the vast lakes give it a
peculiar character to the nature lovers. In its valleys and paddocks , grow
the trees and herbs of rare quality , including the most precious of all
flowers - the Kesar (Saffron). In its forests are found the best pines ,
deodars and atypical species of animals including world famous Hangul .
From its orchards come apples, apricots, pears, walnuts and cherries of
world standard. On her green meadows graze the lambs bearing the most
superb wool , spun into fine textiles . Wular Lake (Asia’s biggest fresh water
lake), Dal lake with house boats, Gulmarg ,Pahalgam and their glaciers
besides other tourist places like Nishat, Shalimar, Harvan, Chasma Shahi,
Achabal, Kokernag ,Aharbal have given it an international fame as a tourist
spot , moreover some new places which include Kongwatan, Kousarnag,
Nagputin, Chatapal, Chohurnag, Yousmarg are emerging tourist destinations
although visited only by locals .
Kashmir is the only region in the subcontinent which has a continuous
recorded history and which dates back to 4000 B.C. Twenty-one dynasties of
Hindus, Buddhists,Kushans ,Huns ,Jains and Zoroastrians had ruled
Kashmir,which was historically regarded as one of the major Centre of
Sanskrit Scholars ,during the epic period with a Republican system of
government from the capital city of Karna-Rajapuram-gatva-Kambojah-
nirjitastava , shortened to Rajapura, and has been identified with modern
Rajauri. The oldest authentic books on Kashmir history are Nilmat Puran and
Rajatarangini.
Mauryan Emperor Ashoka is recorded to have ruled Kashmir the king was a
follower of Buddhism. Ashoka founded the old city of Srinagar near "
Pandrethan ", ( Puranadhisthan ) and also build many vihars and temples and
repaired the old shrine at Vijeshwari (modern Bijbehara), he built a Shiva
Temple, in order to win hearts of local population. After the death of
Ashoka, his son Jaluka ascended the throne of Kashmir, and the latter was
succeeded by his son King Damodar II. Jaluka was a great king who cleared
the valley from murdering foreign tribesmen which often invaded Kashmir .
Kalhan's account of Turushka Kings indicates undoubtly the Kushan rule over
Valley. The three kings mentioned by Kalhana in Rajatarangini are Huska,
Juska, and Kanishka, each of them is credited with the foundation of a
town, called after their respective names : Hushkapura, Jushkapura and
Kanishkapura. The Kushan Kings also built many temples and Vihars.
According to many scholars, Kanishka held the third great council of the
Buddhist church at Kundalvan , (Harwan, near Shalimar garden) Hien Tsang
has given the proceedings of this council. Nearly 500 Buddhist and Hindu
scholars attended the conference, and a learned Kashmiri Brahmin
Vasumitra presided over its session. Some of the great Buddhist scholars,
who took active part in this council were Ashvagosha, Nagarjuna, Vasubandu
Sugamitra and Jinamitra. Hien-Tsang had praised the intellectual calibre of
the Kashmiri scholars, which were incomparable. Many Buddhist scholars,
missionaries, and intellectuals permanently settled in the valley. Kashmir
took the leading part in the transmission of Buddhist thought and traditions
directly to Tibet, and China.
Archeological discoveries reveal the occurence of quaternary Glacial cycles
in the valley. The chief Geological formation of the ice-age are the
lacustrine deposits called the Karewas , which overlay the terminal
moraines of the first Glaciation and are comprised of two groups, Lower and
Upper, differentiated by the moraines of the second Glaciation. The fossil
remains of Elphas-hysudrious obtained in the lower Karewas point to lower
Pleistocene age.
The discovery of archaeological sites at Burzahom Srinagar were neolithic
culture is indicated by the discovery of ground and polished stone axes,
hoes, pestle, and bone , Parihaspora archeological site gives the account of
Lalitaditya reign , were he had built a temple . The archeolgical sites of
Awantipora are also of great histogrphical value.
Archeological sites like Watnar ,Hutmarah , Kutbal of Anantnag, Qusbiyar,
Balyar and Letpur of Pulwama and Zurhama site of Kupwara , of these the
most outstanding were the sites of Hutmarah ,Letpur and Kutbal which date
back to the period of Kushans and revealed artifacts influenced by Gandhara
art, thus established Gandhara Kashmir connections. Besides these
underground sites the shrine of Thagh Baba at Shah Muhalla Safa Kadal and
one another Dumath of Budshah at Soura and the large find of silver coins of
Azes ( and Azilies ) (coins of Indo-Scythians) on the banks of Vitasta (river
Jhelum) in the hills between Varahmulla(Baramullah) and Jhelum are living
examples which support the Kashmir Indo-Greek Gandhara connections .
King Praversein II in whose reign people enjoyed perfect peace and
prosperity, He was a great conqueror ,who extended the boundaries of the
state in all directions and founded the city of Praverseinpura (modern city
of Srinagar), the summer capital of the state at present. Karkota dynasty
that has given Kashmir the greatest ruler Lalitaditya Muktapid ( 724- 761 A.
D.). He is known as the Samudra Gupta of Kashmir during his reign borders
Kashmir were extended far and wide to Asia and India which include Punjab,
Kanuj, Tibet, Ladakh , Badakshan, Iran, Bihar, Gauda (Bengal) Kalinga
(Orissa), South India, Gujarat, Malwa, Marwar and Sindh .Throughout the
valley, he built very fine and massive temples, out of which the world
famous sun temple (Martand) built on Mattan Karewa, reminds the granduer
and splendour of the times when their builder ruled the state, the master
ruins of Martand built of massive lime stone with heavy columns were
influenced by Indo-Greco-Roman Archetech. . It was about 855-56 A. D. that
Karkota rule ended, and a new Utpal Dynasty assumed power in Kashmir.
The most important ruler of this dynasty was Avanti-verman who recovered
Kashmir from utter political and economic disorder. His reign witnessed a
period of peace and consolidation and prosperity. It was during this time,
that the valley rose to great heights in the realm of philosophy, art and
letters. There was an outburst of literary activity on a grand scale, and
eminent men Kallata Bhat Sura, Ratnakar, Anandavardhana, Muktakana,
Siva-Swamin, Rudrata and Mukula came to the limelight .The reign of this
King would not be complete without the mention of Suya one of the
engineering genius of Kashmir produced in ancient times. For centuries the
people of the valley had suffered the recurring curse of famines and floods.
Suya correctly assessed that these frequent calamities occured due to heavy
rains and excessive water of river Jehleum(Veth) which could not easily get
out with swiftness, through a gorge near Varahmulla, due to compressed
passage the bed got blocked with silt and huge boulders. The people
removed both the silt and stones when the great engineer threw plenty of
gold and silver coins into the river at many places. Thousands of starving
people immediately jumped into the flooded Vitasta(Jehleum) and in order
to find the coins, cleared the bed of the rocks and boulders which had
chokedup the passage. Suya, then raised stone embankments, and adopted
other protective measures. Many canals were dug-out to increase the
irrigational facilities. The result of all these measures was that a great
increase of land became available for cultivation. Suya's memory is still
preserved to this day, by the town Sayapur (Sopore) founded by him at the
point where river Jehleum, since his regulation leaves the basin of
Mahapadomsar (Wouler lake). Alberuni, who accompanied Mahmud Gaznavi
in his Indian Campaigns, specifically mentions in his book ( Tahqiq-i-Hind)
about Kashmir . Abhinav Gupta who flourished at the beginning of the 11th
century A. D. and is the exponent of Kashmir Shivaism known as Trika.
Bilhan the great Sanskrit poet who flourished in the same century was born
at Khunmoh ( a village at a distance of 5 km. towards the east of Zewan ).
In 14th century, Islam gradually became the dominant religion in Kashmir,
starting with the conversion in 1323 of king Rinchana, when on one morning
he saw Bulbul Shah(R.A) at his prayers and admiring that form of devotion,
he converted to Islam and taking the name of Sadr-u-din . Bulbul Shah's Real
name was Syed Sheriff Uddin Abdul Rehman(R.A) and title Syed Bilal that
owing to frequent use changed into Bulbul. Hence he came to be known as
Bulbul Shah or the Bulbul-e-Kashmir. Bulbul Shah sought allegiance to the
renowned saint, Shah Nemat-Ullah Farisi Shirazi, of the Suharawardy order
who, in turn, looked to Zia Uddin-Ul-Najeeb Abdul Qahiri.People called him
with the epithet of the nightingale of Kashmir.
Sufi Saint Mir Syed Ali Hamdan(R.A), who stayed in Kashmir for meditation
and preaching of Islam. He was the torch-bearer of Islam in Kashmir. His
name was Ali, and titles were Amir-e-Kabir, Ali Sa'ani, and Mir. Besides
them, the Chroniclers had mentioned several other titles: Qutub-e-Zaman,
Sheikh-e-Salikan-e-Jehan, Qutub-Ul-Aktab, Moih-Ul-Ambiya-o-Ul-Mursaleen,
Afzal-Ul-Muhaq-e-qeen-o-Akmal-Ul-Mudaq-e-qeen, Al-Sheiyookh-Ul-Kamil,
Akmal-Ul-Muhaqqiq-Ul-Hamadani etc.He traced his patrimony through his
father, Syed Shahab Uddin, to Imam Zain-ul-Abedein and finally to Hazrat
Ali(Rz.A). His mother, Syeda Fatimah(Rz.A), with seventeen links, reached
the Prophet Mohammad (S.A.W).Syed Hamdani came from an educated
family. He was intelligent and quick of mind, and read the Holy Qu'ran,
under the care of his maternal uncle, Hazrat Ala-Uddin and from him too he
took his lessons on subjects outer and intrinsic for a period of thirteen
years.He fought with Amir-e-Temur and so moved to Kashmir with seven
hundred Syeds and his followers, during the reign of King Shahab-Uddin
,when borders of Kashmir were extended upto Central Asia .
He had already sent two of his followers: Syed Taj Uddin Samnani and Mir
Syed Hasan Samnani to take stock of the situation. The ruler of Kashmir
became the follower of Mir Syed Hasan Samnani and because of the Kings
concurrence he entered Kashmir with a large following. The King and heir
apparent, Qutub Uddin, received him warmly. At that time the Kashmir
ruler was on war with Firoz Tughlaq and because of his efforts the parties
came to terms.Shah Hamdan started the propagation movement of the Islam
in Kashmir in an organized manner. The Kashmiri Muslims were unaware of
the Deeni spirit before his arrival there. The reason being, the people, who
had initiated the Movement, were saintly by nature and carried a deep
influence of the Hinduism and the Buddhism. In-spite of having been turned
Muslims they still observed many local rites and practices. Shah Hamdan did
not stay in the valley permanently but visited on various occasions. He came
to Kashmir in September 1372 AD, 1379 AD and the third time in the year
1383 AD.
Muslims and Hindus of Kashmir lived in relative harmony, since the Sufiyat`
way of life that ordinary Muslims followed in Kashmir complemented the
Rishi tradition of Kashmiri Pandits. To which Lal Ded and Nund Reshi (R.A)
played pivotal role where there was no clash of civilization during the
propagation of Islam .
Lal Ded (Laleshwari) born at village Sempore in the year 1317 A. D. She had
initiation from her spiritual Guru known as Sedu Bayu as the practice in
vogue at that time. She sang and wrote of divine love, tolerance, and
universal brotherhood. The great mystic poet chose the general language for
expression of her delicate spiritual ideas. She was the omen of new patriotic
awakening and laid the foundation of Kashmiri song and poetry. The
vakhs(verses) of Lal Ded had persuaded all shades of Kashmiris people
,irrespective of creed, colour , race or religion a way forward towards
spiritual course of living.
Nund Reshi(R.A) was the founder and most popular saint of the Reshi cult of
Kashmir. Muslim theologists describe him as Noor-ud -Din Noorani or Sheikh-
ul -Alam (the light of religion and the Sheikh of the world). But as the
darling of all Kashmiris, irrespective of caste and creed, and as per his own
repeated reference, as Nunda he was endearingly called Nund Reshi. His
pious memory still continues to be cherished by this nomenclature.
Nund Reshi born in the village Kaimoh Kulgam in 1377AD but brought up in
another village of the same Tehsil. The Shruks(sacred hymns)of Sheikh Noor-
Ud-Din (R.A) have impressed and influenced both the communities, Hindus
and Muslims, in Kashmir .
Nund Reshi's pithy saying 'Food will last as long as forests last" is a clear
indication of his instinctive foresight and intuitive acquaintance. Thus as the
saint-poet conveys in his important message, that cultivation and supply of
good material is so essential for the existence of life, depend on plants of
which forests are a part. If the forest areas are discarded gushing rain
waters would erode the slopes and soft areas. Much land would be lost and
also the grain. He uttered these words six centuries ago even before the
present concept of ecological balance and climate change , which in present
times is most burning issue on the globe thus a real eco-scientist . Nund
Reshi while giving a sermon to the village folk, cautioned them, on moral
and ethical grounds, against damages to or destruction of plants in general
and herbal plants in particular.
In 1398 the foundation stone of historical Jammia Masjid of Srinagar was laid
by Sultan Skinder at the advice of Mir Mohammad Hamdani(R.A) the oldest
and the first Masjid(Mosque) of Kashmir and also built Shah-e-Hamdan or
Khanqah-e-Moulla which is one of the oldest Muslim shrines situated on the
bank of river Jhelum in Srinagar city. It is worth to mention that Skinder is
also known as Butshikan and has been misquoted by some historians that he
ruined the temples in Kashmir , his religious tolerance can be established by
the fact that he had visited a temple at Habakadal Srinagar were a stone
has been displayed mentioning his visit to the place .
Sultan Zainul Abedin’s (1420 to 1470 A.D.) reign is considered as golden
period of Kashmir history and was popularly known as Budshah. Budshah,
the great king as it means in Kashmiri language, was one of the noblest sons
of the soil. People used to call him ‘‘Budshah” with love and affection and
even today they mention his name with great respect. Budsah’s Kashmir was
a model of economic prosperity, social justice and communal harmony in
this part of the world. As a great centre of learning and culture, Kashmir
attracted students from India, Persia, Central-Asia and Middle- East. Trade
and commerce were at their peak and all the neighboring nations held
Kashmir in great esteem. As a free patriotic nation, Kashmiris repulsed all
those forces, which posed a threat to their Independence .
Budshah’s rule of 50 years is therefore called the most prosperous period of
Kashmir history. Embassies represented Kashmir in Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Egypt, Delhi and Gujarat. With the death of Budshah began the gradual
decline of Kashmir’s golden era.
Budshah’s Shahmiri dynasty was later over thrown by Chaks who ruled the
State for quite some time meanwhile Khatoon Habiba, alias Habba Khatoon
alias Zoon , was a great romantic poet of the late sixteenth century. Born in
Chandhar (Pampore), fifteen kilometers from Srinagar, her parents used to
call her Zoon (Moon) due to her extreme beauty. They educated her but did
not appreciate her innate poetic talent. They married her to an illiterate
peasant, a total mismatch to her poetic bent of mind, but the marriage
ended in a divorce as she could not reconcile with her illiterate husband.It
is said that one day she along with her friends was heard singing love lores,
in the saffron fields, by Sultan Yousuf Shah Chak. The Sultan was so much
intoxicated with her melodious voice and poetry that he fell in love with her
at first sight and proposed marriage which her parents willingly consented.
In this way Habba Khatoon the poetess became the queen of Kashmir and a
very wise adviser to the King.' Her poetry scaled new heights of imagination
and her poems became an important part of Kashmiri' s folk literature
In 1585 A.D , after facing two defeats (and perhaps the only two during his
kingship) at the hands of Kashmiri, the independence of Kashmir came to an
end when Akbar, Moghal king of India ruled Kashmir in 1586 . Mughals ruled
the State for about 167 years . Mughals visited Kashmir quite often and took
steps to add to its loveliness by raising stylish buildings and beautiful
gardens. But Mughals did not bother much to improve common man’s lot. On
the contrary, they forcibly introduced a typical way of living on Kashmiris
eventhough not a single strategic investment was made in Kashmir . This
was a very effective recipe to deprive them of their erstwhile bravery,
militancy and self-confidence, in order to eliminate all chances of revolt by
them .
Hazratbal Shrine, situated on the bank of famous Dal Lake, is the most
important Muslim shrine of Kashmir. It commands the reverence of the
people beyond measure as the Prophet Mohammad`s (SAW) Moi-e-Muqqadas
( Holy relic) is preserved in it.
Gani Kashmiri a superb Persian poet became famous in Iran also. His
philosophical Persian poetry prompted Saib, a famous Persian poet, to
travel all the way from Iran to Kashmir in order to see Gani and have a
deeper insight into his philosophy.
With the decline of Mughal power, Kashmir was annexed by Afghans. The
Afghan rule over Kashmir, which lasted for 67 years (1752 to 1819 A.D.) was
one of cruelty and loot. Most of the Afghan governors of Kashmir crushed
the people ruthlessly. But there was something worse in store for Kashmiris.
The Sikhs conquered the State and made it a colony of theirs, literally a
prison for common Kashmiris . The Sikh rule, which lasted for only 27 years,
was worse than that of the Afghans. Continuous slavery and ruthless
suppression by foreign rulers had badly demoralized Kashmiris hence they
could not put up a concerted resistance against alien domination and
suppression and that subjected them to yet another slavery. In 1846 when
the British conquered Kashmir as a result of a defeat which they inflicted on
the Sikhs with the treacherous help of Gulab Singh, their defence minister
and made a commercial deal of Kashmir to him like a commercial
commodity for a sum Rs 7.5 million (Nanak Shahi Takas)of this most
ignominious and inhuman transaction was made on 16th March 1846 under
an agreement called the Treaty of Amritsar.
Shamus Faqir Born in 1843 and died on 1901,the mystical poems of Shamas
Faqir, the Sufi poet of note from the valley of Kashmir, exemplify this
cultural synthesis in a remarkable way.
Mystical poetry in Kashmiri (spoken by the natives of the valley) has a
richness and variety of its own, traceable to the mingling of several cultural
streams. This intermingling is specially noticeable in the poems of Shamas
Faqir, a spiritually enlightening study.
Rasul Mir, that skilled decanter of love, has a raging controversy shrouding
his age. The local traditions recorded in 1940’s spoke of a death in his
prime. Folk history states that, Mahmood Gani predicted his youthful death
(Amis Chhi jan-h-margi handi koder). His poetry, its fervent youthfulness, its
vibrant tenor, its tone of hearty yearning, its pristine emotions, all point to
a poet, untouched by the cares of decaying age. Rasul Mir was said to have
been alive in 1855 AD when Mahmood Gani passed away and died a few
years before-Maqbool Shah Kralawari (d.1874). Accordingly his demise was
reckoned between 1867-1870).
Gulab Singh and his successors ruled Kashmir with an iron hand. Some
patriots who resisted the inhuman suppression were flayed alive and others
subjected to other similar atrocities. Robert Thorp was an Englishman who
arrived in Kashmir as a tourist in 1865. The wretched condition of Kashmiris
at that time when forced labour, slavery, etc, were the order of the day
moved Thorp. Thorp travelled across the length and breadth of Kashmir
Valley to have a first hand account of the situation. He soon apprised the
British authorities, who then ruled India, about the Dogra rulers’ atrocities
on the hapless people of Kashmir.
Thorp’s exposing the Dogra rulers’ earned him their wrath and ultimately on
the morning of November 22, 1868, he was found dead probably because of
poisoning near Srinagar. Thorp was buried in a local Christian cemetery in
the heart of Srinagar city. His grave still bears an epitaph reading: “Robert
Thorp who laid has life for Kashmiris.”
Maulana Anwar Shah Kashmiri , the world famous Theologian and
accomplished religious scholar. Maulana Anwar Shah who was born in 1875 in
Lolab area of the South-west Kashmir, merits special consideration. Maulana
Anwar went outside Kashmir for higher studies and came back after
receiving education and then started delivering sermons on various aspects
of religion and theology.During his pilgrimage to Mecca also he got great
recognition for his erudition and knowledge of Islamic theology.
Dr. Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal, the greatest poet and philosopher of the
sub-continent whose grandfather migrated to Sialkot in order to explore the
better avenues of livelihood and settled there permanently. Iqbal always
boasted of being a Kashmiri and used to introduce himself in these words:
'The seeds of this flower are from the flower-gardens of Kashmir".The plight
of Kashmiris always dominated Iqbal's thinking which prompted him to take'
active part in the freedom struggle of Kashmir.
Gulam Ahmad Mehjoor ,the revolutionary poet popularly known as Shair-e-
Kashmir (the poet of Kashmir) was born at Mitrigam, Pulwama on Ist August,
1887.He is considered herald of didactic poetry in Kashmiri language. He
was the first poet of Kashmiri language to incorporate themes closer to life
and times of his age. Yet his lyrics have the magical appeal.
Abdul Ahad Azad Born in village Ranger Chadoora on 13th June 1903 , died
on 4th April 1948 at the age of 45 only cause of death was reported as
peritonitis although appendix operated by Dr. Omkar Nath successfully at
Ratan Rani Hospital Srinagar , was one of the well known Kashmiri poets of
his era. He was one of the pioneers of the modernist movement. 'Azad' is
inherently possessed of uncommon consciousness of head and heart.
On the other hand wave of repression continued until 1931 when the
Muslims of Kashmir realized that they would perish if they continued to let
the ever-increasing suppression go unchecked and unarrested. They abruptly
rose in revolt against the despotic ruler and within a couple of years
compelled him to concede to them a number of political, economic and
social rights.
Glancy commission’s report which had been established to inquire into the
Muslim uprising that broke out in the country in 1931. The issue of Pather
Masjid also made a broad base for the political mobilization of the newly
formed Muslim conference. In the end the Dogra rulers realized the
significance of the agitation around the Pather Masjid that it had to return
the mosque to the Muslim community as per the Glancy commission’s
recommendation. This success gave a morale boost to the Muslim
community and made them more bolder in their demands. In 1932, the
Mosque(Masjid) of Dara Shikoh was returned to the Muslims .Thus
archaeological protests became one of the source for Muslims of Kashmir for
raising there voice against the denial of there social, political and economic
rights.
A lot of the more recent recorded history of Kashmir can be credited to the
various travelers and historians who visited Kashmir. Abul Fazal has
recorded the state of Kashmir during the Mughal period .The Europeans, like
Moorcroft, Vigne, Walter Lawrence who visited Kashmir either as
government officials or simple travelers have recorded the history of
Kashmir in magnifique detail during the Sikhs and Dogra periods . It is not
only the political aspect of the country that they have recorded but rather
every aspect of the region, be its geography, geology, architecture or its
people with there cultures and traditions. From the grand stone temples
during Hindu period, it changed to timber and stone and later brick in the
post Muslim period.
In 1946, exactly one hundred years after their sale in 1846, Kashmiris rose in
open revolt .The movement was anyhow crushed and its leaders sentenced
to long imprisonments.
In 1947 the British divided Subcontinentand two sovereign countries India
and Pakistan came into existence . The ruler of Kashmir was being
compelled by Indian leaders to ‘accede’ to India against the wishes of the
people."The large majority of the population of the State, almost the entire
Muslim community and an appreciable number of non Muslims was totally
against the Maharjaha declaring accession to India,"writes Prem Nath Bazaz,
founder of the Kashmir Socialist Party in 1943, a reliable primary source of
history, in his book, History of freedom Struggle In Kashmir while as New
Delhi’s version states that Maharaja has by his will acceded to India through
the instrument of accession , however Islamabad maintains that Kashmir is a
dispute which should be resolved in acordance with the aspirations of
People of Jammu Kashmir .After 27th October 1947 accession , Kashmir
remained fragmented out of 222236 Sq. Kms Pakistan adminsiters 35% out of
which 13297 Sq. Kms of Azad Kashmir are autonomous , 72, 971 Sq. Kms of
Gilghit and Baltistan under their direct control , India adminstered 45% of its
land (1,39,000 Sq. Kms ) while as 20% of its land is under China (44447.2 Sq.
Kms) Kashmiris have rosen up several times in the form of revolt , in 1966
they resorted to armed struggle for a period of 4 years and in 1988 the re-
emergence of another armed revolt took place which is still going on, to
curb it India has invoked some draconian laws which resulted into the large
scale human rights violations , thus the ongoing violence has claimed more
than 80,000 lives in Kashmir .
It is important to recognize that the region is the centre of one of the most
intensely contested territorial disputes. Four wars have been fought in the
past 62 years over this area (three between India and Pakistan, and one
between India and China) and the latest Kargil War , and some consider the
situation one of the most dangerous in the world since both India and
Pakistan are nuclear powers. As a result of the dispute, many have lost their
lives, and economic development has lagged. Those who live in this region
have suffered, both from a humanitarian and economic perspective.
Politics is art of possibles, a way for balancing ,interpreting the different
forces of opinion , and it becomes a method at the times of conflict and
crisis for reconciliation , and yoking together the contending forces of
opinion –the inclination or a belief that may or may not be backed up with
evidence, but which cannot be proved with that evidence: is neither right
nor wrong, it is normally a subjective statement and may be the result of an
emotion or an interpretation of facts.
In clash and confrontation of political nature no solution is possible unless
and until the confronting parties espouse a flexible approach, growing
within or outside forces –same is true of India and Pakistan who are able to
resist the persistent demands of solution of Kashmir conflict . In reality the
prospect of internal pressure is missing- within the populace of the two
countries, who could compel governments for settlement but sarcastically
the civil society opinion is segregated. The matter of fact is that stances of
people alter with the change in government strategies. Thus making Kashmir
conflict more multifaceted , in the given situation an honourble ,viable
,acceptable and durable solution to the long pending issue is to be carved
out , which can give a win- a-win position to Kashmiris first then to India
and Pakistan , moreover the most important aspect to the resolution is no
sense of defeat to the confronting parties.

The Genesis of Conflict

The ocean of factors are responsible for the emergence of Kashmir conflict,
while seeking opinion of a Kashmiri, Indian or a Pakistani, they share
different opinions even about the genesis conflict. The Kashmir conflict soon
turned into a struggle for strategic superiority. The Kashmir dispute is
entangled in the definitions of sovereignty and the right to self-
determination-the viability of using military force to resolve border
disputes, especially those embedded in the Kashmir conflict-this aspect is
significant as the conflict exists in a weaponized environment. These factors
points to the need for evolving new approaches to deal with this problem:
Kashmir gives a description of the two sides of the LOC – the Indian
administered Jammu Kashmir having an area of 1,39000 sq.Kms and the
Pakistan administered Jammu Kashmir having an area of 84000 Sq. Kms ,
44447.2Sq. Kms lie with China including 8000 Sq. Kms of Shakshum valley
ceded in 1963 also in 1978, the Karakoram Highway was opened from
Pakistan to Sinkiang ,while as Kashmir Valley, which is administered by India
, is about 80 miles long and 35 miles wide (130 x 55 kms).
The Kashmir conflict refers to the political dispute over Kashmir, the
northwestern most region of the subcontinent. The parties to the dispute
are India, Pakistan, People of Jammu Kashmir and even China also . On 16th
March ,1846, when the British defeated Sikhs and sold Kashmir to Gulab
Singh, the ruler of Jammu thus given an employment through an infamous
deal called Treaty of Amritsar . After his death, he was succeeded by Ranbir
Singh in 1857, Partap Singh in 1885, and Hari Singh in 1925.

CLAIM OVER LADDAKH

(English translation of the Persian text of the treaty signed at Leh on second
of Asuj 1899 Bikrami - September 1842 - between the Government of
Maharajah Gulab Singh and the Government of Tibet.)
Whereas we the Officer, of the Lhasa country, viz., firstly, Kalon Surkhan,
and secondly, Depon Pishi, commander of the forces of the Empire of China,
on the one hand and Dewan Hari Chand and Wazir Ratanu, on behalf of
Maharajah Gulab Singh, on the other, agree together and swear before God
that the friendship between Maharajah Gulab Singh and the Emperor of
China and the Lama Guru Sahib Lassawalla will be kept and observed till
eternity: no disregard will be shown to anything agreed upon in the
presence of God; and we will respect the boundary of Laddakh and the
countries bordering on it as fixed since olden times. We will carry on the
trade in Shawl, Pasham and Tea as before by way of Laddakh; and if anyone
of the Shri Maharajah's enemies comes to our territories and says anything
against the Rajah, we will not listen to him, and will not allow him to
remain in our country, and whatever traders come from Laddakh shall
experience no difficulty from our side. We will not act otherwise but in the
same manner as it has been prescribed in this meeting regarding the fixing
of the Laddakh frontier and the keeping open of the road for the traffic in
Shawl, Pasham and Tea. We will observe our pledge to God, Gaitri and Pasi,
Wazir Mian Khushal Chu is witness.
Written on the second day of Asuj 1899 (September, )

Treaty of Amritsar
March 16, 1846

The treaty between the British Government on the one part and Maharajah
Gulab Singh of Jammu on the other concluded on the part of the British
Government by Frederick Currie, Esq. and Brever-Major Henry Montgomery
Lawrence, acting under the orders of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge,
G.C.B., one of her Britannic Majesty's most Honorable Privy Council,
Governor-General of the possessions of the East India Company, to direct
and control all the affairs in the East Indies and by Maharajah Gulab Singh in
person - 1846.
Article 1
The British Government transfers and makes over for ever in independent
possession to Maharajah Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body all the
hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward
of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi including Chamba and
excluding Lahul, being part of the territories ceded to the British
Government by the Lahore State according to the provisions of Article IV of
the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846.
Article 2
The eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing article to
Maharajah Gulab Singh shall be laid down by the Commissioners appointed
by the British Government and Maharajah Gulab Singh respectively for that
purpose and shall be defined in a separate engagement after survey.

Article 3
In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs by the provisions
of the foregoing article Maharajah Gulab Singh will pay to the British
Government the sum of seventy-five lakhs of rupees (Nanukshahee), fifty
lakhs to be paid on or before the 1st October of the current year, A.D.,
1846.

Article 4
The limits of territories of Maharajah Gulab Singh shall not be at any time
changed without concurrence of the British Government.

Article 5
Maharajah Gulab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the British
Government any disputes or question that may arise between himself and
the Government of Lahore or any other neighboring State, and will abide by
the decision of the British Government.

Article 6
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages for himself and heirs to join, with the whole
of his Military Forces, the British troops when employed within the hills or in
the territories adjoining his possessions.

Article 7
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages never to take to retain in his service any
British subject nor the subject of any European or American State without
the consent of the British Governnent.

Article 8
Maharajah Gulab Singh engages to respect in regard to the territory
transferred to him, the provisions of Articles V, VI and VII of the separate
Engagement between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, dated
11th March, 1846.

Article 9
The British Government will give its aid to Maharajah Gulab Singh in
protecting his territories from external enemies.
Article 10
Maharajah Gulab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British
Government and will in token of such supremacy present annually to the
British Government one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed (six
male and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere shawls.
This Treaty of ten articles has been this day settled by Frederick Currie,
Esq. and Brever-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under directions
of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Hardinge, Governor-General, on the part of the
British Government and by Maharajah Gulab Singh in person, and the said
Treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of the Rt. Hon. Sir Henry
Hardinge, Governor-General. (Done at Amritsar the sixteenth day of March,
in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty-six,
corresponding with the seventeenth day of Rubee-ul-Awal (1262 Hijree).
(Signed) H. Hardinge (Seal)
(Signed) F. Currie
(Signed) H.M. Lawrence

The Kashmir dispute dates back to the partition of British India when two
Independent states of Indian and Pakistan emerged as separate dominions in
August 1947,at the time, the princely states under British suzerainty but not
directly ruled by the British Government opted for joining either Pakistan or
India, however Kashmir remained a different case . The newborn states of
Pakistan and India are fighting an endless war to claim over Kashmir. Both
countries claiming peace as their bye word never realize the fact that the
right to rule belongs to the sons of the soil.
In June 1947, Poonch disputes assumed a militant and separatist character.
The Maharaja's armed forces responded with tremendous brutality. In
Jammu, Hindu and Sikh communalists, supported by the fascist Jan Sangh
(National Volunteer Organization, RSS) and the Sikh Akali Dal (Akali Party),
attacked Muslim villages and set them on fire, displacing some 500,000
residents.
In the case of Jammu Kashmir , the ruler was Hindu while the population
was overwhelmingly Muslim, waited for the decision to join Indian or
Pakistan . Maharaja Hari Singh hoped to keep Kashmir independent, offering
a “standstill agreement” for trade, communications, and other normal
affairs between Kashmir, India, and Pakistan, as in the British era. On 12th
August 1947 Maharaja of Jammu Kashmir decided to negotiate a standstill
agreement with India & Pakistan. Government of India sent a telegram for
Maharaja or his representative to visit Delhi for discussions. Where as Stand
Still agreement was signed with Pakistan on 18th August 1947 thus accepting
Sovereignity of Kashmir . Pakistan was authorized to operate Kashmir posts
and telegraph department. Pakistan was also obliged to supply food stuffs
and other necessary items under the agreement[i], but India pressed for
Kashmir's incorporation into India. At the same time Maharaja had to face a
powerful national movement and there had been demands for autonomy in
Gilgit, Baltistan, Hunza, and Nagar regions, autonomous vassals of Jammu
Kashmir , since the mid-nineteenth century. By September, there was an
armed uprising in Poonch, led by Muhammad Ibrahim[ii] with a view that the
Maharaja of Kashmir had no right to call in the Indian Army, because it held
that the Maharaja of Kashmir was not a heredity ruler, that he was merely a
British appointed employee. On 20th -22nd October 1947 people of Azad
Kashmir equipped with arms and the active support of tribesmen took
control of Muzaffarbad side and on 24th October 1947 they formed their
own government , The tribesmen from North West Frontier Province
descended on Baramullah, only 30 miles from Srinagar on October 24-26 and
opened up Gulmarg front . Maharaja blamed that tribesmen have entered in
the State and writes to Mountbatten “I have to inform Your Excellency that
a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request the immediate
assistance of your Government. As Your Excellency is aware, the State of
Jammu Kashmir has not acceded to either the Dominion of India or Pakistan.
Geographically my State is contiguous with both of them. Besides, my State
has a common boundary with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and with
China.” [iii] While as India claims that the Accession of the state of Jammu
Kashmir to India, signed by the Maharaja (erstwhile ruler of the State) on
26th October, 1947, was completely valid in terms of the Government of
India Act (1935), Indian Independence Act (1947) and international law and
was total and irrevocable. But evidence based on declassified military
papers that India had Patalia gunners at the Sringar airport by October 17,
1947, and has scoffed at the Indian apologists who propose that India’s
invasion of Kashmir was the triumph of improvisation. Instead, states that
India had troops mobilized for an invasion of Kashmir by October 25th,
1947 ,this would mean that India’s army was in Kashmir before the decision
of the Mahrajah. With India’s army already in Kashmir it is obvious why the
Maharajah would hand his country over to India. Because of the injustice
displayed by India, the Treaty of Accession, if it was even signed, is nullified
and void.[iv]
The Accession was also supported by the largest political party in the state,
the National Conference. “On 27th October 1947, the working committee of
the NC passed a resolution recommending the accession of Jammu Kashmir
to India, and the resolution was ratified in a special convention.”[v] In the
Indian Independence Act, there was no provision for any conditional
accession. The Instrument of Accession executed by the Maharaja was the
same as the ones executed by over 500 princely states in India claims New
Delhi . There has been no complication in any of the other cases. There
would have been none in this case either, except for Pakistan's action in
sending in tribal invaders first (in October 1947) claims India: “In the
circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided
to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. In
consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of
accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should
be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is
my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in
Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's
accession should be settled by a reference to the people.”[vi]
On 27th October, the Government of India announced that the Hindu ruler
had acceded to India and it airlifted troops and equipment to Srinagar,
where they reinforced the princely state forces, established a defence
perimeter,in Gilgit, the state paramilitary forces (the Gilgit Scouts) joined
the Azad Kashmir forces, who thereby obtained control of northern region of
the state. The Azad Kashmir forces were also joined by troops from Chitral,
whose ruler, the Mehtar of Chitral, had acceded to Pakistan but claims and
counter claims of both new born states of Pakistan and India started
aggressively over Kashmir , which result into to an armed confrontation . On
6th November , 1947 more than 0.2 million Muslims were indiscriminately
killed by Hindu Fanatics of Jammu which mostly include women children and
were supported by forces of Maharaja , which was a sheer saga of tyranny
and oppression , the motive behind the pogrom was ethnic cleansing to
change the demographical nomenclature of Jammu province especially in
the areas surrounding proper winter capital of Kashmir.

Excerpts of telegram dated 26 October, 1947 from Jawaharlal Nehru to

theBritish Prime Minister, Clement Attlee.
"For Prime Minister United Kingdom from Prime Minister India.
We have received urgent appeal for assistance from Kashmir Government.
We would be disposedto give favourable consideration to such request from
any friendly State. Kashmir's Northernfrontiers, as you are aware, run in
common with those of three countries, Afghanistan, the Union ofSoviet
Socialist Republics and China. Security of Kashmir, which must depend upon
control ofinternal tranquillity and existence of stable Government, is vital
to security of India especially sincepart of Southern boundary of Kashmir
and India are common. Helping Kashmir, therefore, is anobligation of
national interest to India. We are giving urgent consideration to question as
to whatassistance we can give to State to defend itself. I should like to
make it clear that question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not
designed in anyway to influence the State to accede to India. Our view
which we have repeatedly made public isthat the question of accession in
any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance withwishes of
people and we adhere to this view. It is quite clear, however, that no free
expression ofwill of people of Kashmir is possible if external aggression
succeeds in imperilling integrity of itsterritory. I have thought it desirable to
inform you of situation because of its threat of internationalcomplications."
Letter from Maharaja Hari Singh to Lord Mountbatten
My dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my
State and request the immediate assistance of your Government. As Your
Excellency is aware,the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not acceded to
either the Dominion of India or Pakistan. Geographically my State is
contiguous with both of them. Besides, my State has a common boundary
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with China. In their external
relations the Dominion of India and Pakistan cannot ignore this fact. I
wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion I should accede or
whether it is not in the best interests of both the Dominions and of my State
to stand independent, of course with friendly and cordial relations with
both. I accordingly approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter
into standstill agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted
this arrangement. The Dominion of India desired further discussion with
representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in view of the
developments indicated below. ln fact the Pakistan Goernment under the
standstill agreement is operating the post and telegraph system inside the
State. Though we have got a standstill agreement with the Pakistan
Government, the Govemment permitted a steady and increasing
strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to my State.
Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons
have been allowed to infiltrate into the State, at first in the Poonch area,
then from Sia1kot and finally in a mass in the area adjoining-Hazara district
on the Ramkote side. The result has been that the limited number of troops
at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the
enemy at several points simultaneously, so that it has become difficult to
stop the wanton destruction of life ad property and the looting of the
Mahura power house, which supplies electric current to the whole of
Srinagar and which has been burnt. The number of women who have been
kidnpped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on
the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer
capital of my government, as a first step to overrunning the whole
State.The mass infiltration of tribesman drawn from distant areas of the
North-West Frontier Province, coming regularly in motortrucks, using the
Manwehra-Mazaffarabad road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons,
cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provincial
Govemment of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of
Pakistan. Inspite of repeated appeals made by my Government no attempt
has been made to check these raiders or to stop them from coming into my
State. In fact, both radio and the Press of Pakistan have reported these
occurences. The Pakistan radio even put out the story that a provisional
government has been set up in Kashmir. The people of my State, both
Muslims and non-Muslims, generally have taken no part at all.
With the conditbns obtaining at present in my State and the great
emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help
from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by
me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly
decided to do so, and I attach the instrument of accession for acceptance by
your Government. The other alternative is to leave my state and people to
free booters. On this basis no civilised government can exist or be
maintained.
This alternative I will never allow to happen so long as I am the ruler of the
State and I have life to defend my country. I may also inform your
Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim
government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this
emergency with my Prime Minister.
If my State is to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at
Srinagar. Mr. V.P. Menon is fully aware of the gravity of the situation and
will explain it to you, if further explanation is needed.
In haste and with kindest regards,
Yours sincerely,
Hari Singh October 26, 1947

Reply from Lord Mountbatten to Maharaja Hari Singh

My dear Maharaja Sahib,
Your Highness' letter dated 26 October 1947 has been delivered to me by Mr.
V.P. Menon. In the circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my
Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the
Dominion of India. In consistence with their policy that in the case of any
State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the
question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of
the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and
order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the
question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the
people.
Meanwhile, in response to Your Highness' appeal for military aid, action has
been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir, to help your
own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property, and
honour of your people. My Government and I note with satisfaction that
Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim
Government to work with your Prime Minister.

Mountbatten of Burma October 27, 1947

Mountbatten's conditional acceptance of accession Text of Lord Mountbatten

's letter dated 27 October, 1947 to signify his acceptance of the Instrument
of Accession signed by the Kashmir Maharaja.
"My dear Maharaja Sahib,
Your Highness' letter dated 26 October has been delivered to me by Mr. V.
P. Menon. In the special circumstances mentioned by your Highness my
Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the
Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy that in the case of any
State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the
question if accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the
people of the State, it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and
order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader the
question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the
people. Meanwhile in response to your Highness' appeal for military aid
action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to
help your own forces to defend your territory and toprotect the lives,
property and honour of your people. My Government and l note with
satisfaction that your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form
an interim Government to work with your Prime Minister. With kind regards,
I remain, Yours sincerely,October 27, 1947.Mountbatten of Burma."

Indo-Pakistan War of 1947

Date: October 21, 1947 - December 31, 1948
Location: Kashmir
Result: Ceasefire arranged by UN pending plebiscite. Princely state of
Jammu Kashmir dissolved. Pakistan takes control of roughly one third of
Kashmir- the north-western scrublands, whereas India takes control of the
Kashmir valley and most of Jammu.
Territorial changes: Line of Control divides erstwhile princely state of
Kashmir between the Indian administered state of Jammu Kashmir (roughly
1,39000 Sq. Kms ) and the Pakistani administeted regions which
subsequently became Azad Kashmir (13,297 S. Kms ) and the Northern Areas
(72,496 Sq.Kms ).
Casualities of India : 1,104 killed [vii](Indian army)
684 killed (State Forces) [viii]3,152 wounded
Casuality of Pakistan:
1,500 killed [ix] ( Tribesmen along with Pakistani army)
2,633 killed(Armed people of Muzaffarbad and its allied areas), 4,668
wounded
As per most independent sources as many as around 9000 Indian soldiers
died and 1200 Pakistani soldiers were also killed.[x]
Commanders who took part in 1947-1948 war
India: Field Marshal K M Cariappa, Lt Gen S M Shrinagesh, Maj Gen K S
Thimayya,Maj Gen Kalwant Singh,
Pakistan : Maj Gen Muhammed Akbar Khan[xi]
Later on India took the matter to the UN Security Council in on 1st January
1948 under Article 35 chapter VI of UN Charter . The UN Security Council
through its Security Council Resolutions No. 47 (1948) , 51 (1948), 80 (1950)
and the United Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August
1948 and 5 January 1949 declared that accession of Kashmir to India or
Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and
impartial plebiscite. These UN resolutions were accepted by both India and
Pakistan . Prime Minister Nehru declared before the Indian Parliament that
India was committed to holding a free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir .[xii]
According to the Indians, Pathan troublemakers from the Northwest Frontier
(places like Chitral and Peshawar) were causing riots and agitation in
Kashmir. As a result, the Maharaja of Kashmir joined India and requested
the assistance of the Indian Army. The Indian Army arrived immediately on
27th October , next day full swing First Indo-Pak Was broke out and Pakistan
contested the allegations of India , stating that the tribesmen were local
Kashmiris who opposed the accession of Kashmir with India .
Briefly stating that when British India was given its independence, India was
supposed to be divided into two countries: India and Pakistan. All areas
which were more than 70% Muslim were suppose to go into Pakistan. The
rest would be with India.
However, the "princely states" would be left to decide on their own. They
could join Pakistan or India or they could remain independent.
UN Charter
The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San
Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on
International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945. The
Statute of the International Court of Justice is an integral part of the
Charter.
Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter were adopted by the
General Assembly on 17 December 1963 and came into force on 31 August
1965. A further amendment to Article 61 was adopted by the General
Assembly on 20 December 1971, and came into force on 24 September 1973.
An amendment to Article 109, adopted by the General Assembly on 20
December 1965, came into force on 12 June 1968.
The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security
Council from eleven to fifteen. The amended Article 27 provides that
decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven) and on all other matters
by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven), including the
concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council.
The amendment to Article 61, which entered into force on 31 August 1965,
enlarged the membership of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen
to twenty-seven. The subsequent amendment to that Article, which entered
into force on 24 September 1973, further increased the membership of the
Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four.
The amendment to Article 109, which relates to the first paragraph of that
Article, provides that a General Conference of Member States for the
purpose of reviewing the Charter may be held at a date and place to be
fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a
vote of any nine members (formerly seven) of the Security Council.
Paragraph 3 of Article 109, which deals with the consideration of a possible
review conference during the tenth regular session of the General Assembly,
has been retained in its original form in its reference to a "vote, of any
seven members of the Security Council", the paragraph having been acted
upon in 1955 by the General Assembly, at its tenth regular session, and by
the Security Council.

PREAMBLE
WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
· to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
· to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small, and
· to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained, and
· to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
AND FOR THESE ENDS
· to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good
neighbours, and
· to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
· to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods,
that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
· to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and
social advancement of all peoples,
HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO
ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives
assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers
found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of
the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to
be known as the United Nations.
CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are[Only Selected!]:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in
Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits
resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it
takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive
or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the
United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll.
CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek
a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties
to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to
determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 35
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation
of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security
Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the
attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to
which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute,
the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to
its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles
11 and 12.
Article 36
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred
to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate
procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for
the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the
parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should
also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be
referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance
with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
Article 37
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail
to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the
Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in
fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,
it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend
such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
Article 38
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council
may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to
the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.
CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES
OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council
may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures
provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with
such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such
provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or
position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take
account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These
may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication,
and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action
may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or
land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities,
including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the
facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on
the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the
Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of
Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
Article 44
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling
upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment
of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the
Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council
concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.
Article 45
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures,
Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for
combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of
readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be
determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or
agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the
assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security
Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist
the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's
military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and
security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the
regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the
permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any
Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the
Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when
the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the
participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security
Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the
disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such
forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security
Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may
establish regional sub-committees.
Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all
the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security
Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations
directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies
of which they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance
in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.
Article 50
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the
Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations
or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising
from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the
Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.

UN Resolutions over Kashmir Resolution of the Security Council of April 21,

1948
The Security Council,
Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the
dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
Having heard the representation of India in support of that complaint and
the reply and counter-complaints of the representative of Pakistan;
Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order
in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do
their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting;
Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the
question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should
be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial
plebiscite;
Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger
international peace and security,
Reaffirms the Council's resolution of 17 January;
Resolves that the membership of the Commission established by the
resolution of the Council of 20 January 1948, shall be increased to five and
shall include in addition to the membership mentioned in that resolution,
representatives of . . . . and . . . .and that if the membership of the
Commission has not been completed within ten days from the date of the
adoption of this resolution the President of the Council may designate such
other Member of Members of the United Nations as are required to complete
the membership of five;
Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian Subcontinent and
there place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the
Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of
the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and
order and to the holding of a plebiscite, by the two Governments, acting in
co-operation with one another and with the Commission, and further
instructs the Commission to keep the Council informed of the action taken
under the resolution, and to this end,
Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following
measures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to
bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a
free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and
Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan.

A. RESTORATION OF PEACE AND ORDER

1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavors:
(a) to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of
tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have
entered the State for the purpose of fighting and to prevent any intrusion
into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those
fighting in the State;
(b) To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and
the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State,
regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on
the question of the accession of the State, and that therefore they should
co-operate in the maintenance of peace and order.
2. The Government of India should:
(a) When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in
accordance with the Council's resolution of 20 January that the tribesmen
are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting
have become effective, put into operation in consultation with the
Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and
Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required
for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order:
(b) Make known that the withdrawal is taking place in stages and announces
the completion of each stage;
(c) When the Indian forces shall have been reduced to the minimum
strength mentioned in (a) above, arrange in consultation with the
commission for the stationing of the remaining forces to be carried out in
accordance with the following principles:
(i) That the presence of troops should not afford any intimidation or
appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the States;
(ii) That as small a number as possible should be retained in forward areas;
(iii) That any reserve of troops which may be included in the total strength
should be located within their present base area.
3. The Government of India should agree that until such time as the
Plebiscite Administration referred to below finds it necessary to exercise
the powers of direction and supervision over the State forces and police
provided for in paragraph 8, they will be held in areas to be agreed upon
with the Plebiscite Administrator.
4. After the plan referred to in paragraph 2(a) above has been put into
operation, personnel recruited locally in each district should so far as
possible be utilized for the re-establishment and maintenance of law and
order with due regard to protection of minorities, subject to such additional
requirements as may be specified by the Plebiscite Administration referred
to in paragraph 7.
5. If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission,
subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the
Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either
Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification.
B. PLEBISCITE
6. The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the
Government of the State invite the major political groups to designate
responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of
the administration at the Ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being
prepared and carried out.
7. The Government of India should undertake that there will be established
in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administra-tion to hold a plebiscite as
soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or
Pakistan. 8. The Government of India should undertake that there will be
delegated by the State to the Plebiscite Administration such powers as the
latter considers necessary for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite
including, for that purpose only, the direction and supervision of the State
forces and police.
9. The Government of India should, at the request of the Plebiscite
Administration, make available from the Indian forces such assistance as the
Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions.
10. (a) The Government of India should agree that a nominee of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations will be appointed to be the
Plebiscite Administrator;
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator, acting as an officer of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir, should have authority to nominate his assistants and other
subordinates and to draft regulations governing the plebiscite. Such
nominees should be formally appointed and such draft regulations should be
formally promulgated by the State of Jammu and Kashmir;
(c) The Government of India should undertake that the Government of
Jammu and Kashmir will appoint fully qualified persons nominated by the
Plebiscite Administrator to act as special magistrates within the State
judicial system to hear cases which in the opinion of the Plebiscite
Administrator have a serious bearing on the preparation for and the conduct
of a free and impartial plebiscite;
(d) The terms of service of the Administrator should form the subject of a
separate negotiation between the Secretary-General of the United Nations
and the Government of India. The Administrator should fix the terms of
service for his assistants and subordinates;
(e) The Administrator should have the right to communicate directly with
the Government of the State and with the Commission of the Security
Council and, through the Commission, with the Security Council, with the
Governments of India and Pakistan and with their representatives with the
Commission. It would be his duty to bring to the notice of any or all of the
foregoing (as he in his discretion may decide) any circumstances arising
which may tend, in his opinion, to interfere with the freedom of the
plebiscite.
11. The Government of India should undertake to prevent, and to give full
support to the Administrator and his staff in preventing, any threat,
coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence on the voters in
the plebiscite, and the Government of India should publicly announce and
should cause the Government of the State to announce this undertaking as
an international obligation binding on all public authorities and officials in
Jammu and Kashmir.
12. The Government of India should themselves and through the
Government of the State declare and make known that all subjects of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of creed, caste or party, will be
safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the
accession of the State and that there will be freedom of the press, speech
and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including freedom of
lawful entry and exit.
13. The Government of India should use and should ensure that the
Government of the State also use their best endeavors to effect the
withdrawal from the State of all Indian nationals other than those who are
normally resident therein or who on or since 15 August 1947 have entered it
for a lawful purpose.
14. The Government of India should ensure that the Government of the
State release all political prisoners and take all possible steps so that:
(a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of disturbances are
invited, and are free, to return to their homes and to exercise their rights as
such citizens;
(b) There is no victimization;
(c) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection.
15. The Commission of the Security Council should at the end of the
plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been
really free and impartial.
C. GENERAL PROVISIONS
16. The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to
nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such
assistance as it may require in the performance of its task.
17. The commission should establish in Jammu and Kashmir such observers
as it may require of any of the proceedings in pursuance of the measures
indicated in the foregoing paragraphs.
18. The Security Council Commission should carry out the tasks assigned to
it herein .

Resolution of the Commission of August 13, 1948

The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, having given careful
consideration to the points of view expressed by the representatives of India
and Pakistan regarding the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir,
and
Being of the opinion that the prompt cessation of hostilities and the
correction of conditions the continuance of which is likely to endanger
international peace and security are essential to implementation of its
endeavors to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan in effecting a
final settlement of the situation,
Resolves to submit simultaneously to the Governments of India and Pakistan
the following proposal:

PART I
Cease-fire order
A. The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High
Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order to
apply to all forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as
of the earliest practicable date or dates to be mutually agreed upon within
four days after these proposals have been accepted by both Governments.
B. The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistani forces agree to refrain
from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the
forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.(For the
purpose of these proposals forces under their control shall be considered to
include all forces, organized and unorganized, fighting or participating in
hostilities on their respective sides.)
C. The Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of India and Pakistan shall
promptly confer regarding any necessary local changes in present
dispositions which may facilitate the cease-fire.
D. In its discretion and as the Commission may find practicable, the
Commission will appoint military observers who, under the authority of the
Commission and with the co-operation of both Commands, will supervise the
observance of the cease-fire order.
E. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal
to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an
atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.
PART II
Truce agreement
Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate
cessation of hostilities as outlined in Part I, both Governments accept the
following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the
details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their
representatives and the Commission.
A
1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it
was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council,
the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the
withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and
Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the
State for the purpose of fighting.
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops
will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the
Commission.
B
1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that
the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in Part II, A, 2 hereof have
withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the
Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the
presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further,
that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of
its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the
situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will
maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the
minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are
considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and
order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems
necessary.
3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its power
to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded
and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed.
C
1. Upon signature, the full text of the truce agreement or a communiqué
containing the principles thereof as agreed upon between the two
Governments and the Commission will be made public.
PART III
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their
wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be
determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon
acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into
consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable
conditions whereby such free expression will be assured.

Resolution of the Commission of January 5, 1949

The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan,
Having received from the Governments of India and Pakistan, in
communications dated 23 December and 25 December 1948, respectively,
their acceptance of the following principles which are supplementary to the
Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948:
1. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India
or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and
impartial plebiscite;
2. A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that
the cease-fire and truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the
Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 have been carried out and
arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed;
3. (a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations will, in agreement with
the Commission, nominate a Plebiscite Administrator who shall be a
personality of high international standing and commanding general
confidence. He will be formally appointed to office by the Government of
Jammu and Kashmir.
(b) The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and
Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organizing and conducting
the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the
plebiscite.
(c) The Plebiscite Administrator shall have authority to appoint such staff of
assistants and observes as he may require.
4. (a) After implementation of Parts I and II of the Commission's resolution
of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful
conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the
Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the
Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces,
such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the
freedom of the plebiscite.
(b) As regards the territory referred to in A.2 of Part II of the resolution of
13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be
determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in
consultation with the local authorities.
5. All civil and military authorities within the State and the principal
political elements of the State will be required to co-operate with the
Plebiscite Administrator in the preparation for the holding of the plebiscite.
6. (a) All citizens of the State who have left it on account of the
disturbances will be invited and be free to return and to exercise all their
rights as such citizens. For the purpose of facilitating repatriation there
shall be appointed two Commissions, one composed of nominees of India
and the other of nominees of Pakistan. The Commission shall operate under
the direction of the Plebiscite Administrator. The Governments of India and
Pakistan and all authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will
collaborate with the Plebiscite Administrator in putting this provision into
effect.
(b) All person (other than citizens of the State) who on or since 15 August
1947 have entered it for other than lawful purpose, shall be required to
leave the State.
7. All authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir will undertake to
ensure, in collaboration with the Plebiscite Administrator, that:
(a) There is no threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue
influence on the voters in the plebiscite;
(b) No restrictions are placed on legitimate political activity throughout the
State. All subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, shall be
safe and free in expressing their views and in voting on the question of the
accession of the State to India or Pakistan. There shall be freedom of the
press, speech and assembly and freedom of travel in the State, including
freedom of lawful entry and exit;
(c) All political prisoners are released;
(d) Minorities in all parts of the State are accorded adequate protection;
and
(e) There is no victimization.
8. The Plebiscite Administrator may refer to the United Nations Commission
for India and Pakistan problems on which he may require assistance, and the
Commission may in its discretion call upon the Plebiscite Administrator to
carry out on its behalf any of the responsibilities with which it has been
entrusted;
9. At the conclusion of the plebiscite, the Plebiscite Administrator shall
report the result thereof to the Commission and to the Government of
Jammu and Kashmir. The Commission shall then certify to the Security
Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been free and impartial;
10. Upon the signature of the truce agreement the details of the foregoing
proposals will be elaborated in the consultations envisaged in Part III of the
Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. The Plebiscite Administrator will
be fully associated in these consultations;
Commends the Governments of India and Pakistan for their prompt action in
ordering a cease-fire to take effect from one minute before midnight of 1
January 1949, pursuant to the agreement arrived at as provided for by the
Commission's Resolution of 13 August 1948; and
Resolves to return in the immediate future to the Sub-continent to
discharge the responsibilities imposed upon it by the Resolution of 13 August
1948 and by the foregoing principles.

The Karachi Agreement

Text of the agreement signed between Pakistan and Azad Kashmir
Governments in April 1949. The Agreement was signed by the following:
1. Honourable Mushtaque Ahmed Gurmani, Minister without Portfolio,
Government of Pakistan.
2. Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, the president of Azad Kashmir .
3. Choudhry Ghulam Abbas, Head of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim
Conference.
This was the only Kashmiri political party on this side of the cease fire line
at that time, and the Agreement it was persuaded to sign, very seriously
limited the role of Azad Kashmir Government in the Kashmiri freedom
struggle. Therefore it is no surprise that respective governments of Azad
Kashmir have very little or no interest in the freedom of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir.
Text :::
A. Matters within the purview of the Government of Pakistan.
1. Defence (as modified under....).
2. Foreign policy of Azad Kashmir.
3. Negotiations with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
4. Publicity in foreign countries and in Pakistan.
5. Co - ordination and arrangement of relief and rehabilitation of refugees.
6. Co - ordination of publicity in connection with plebiscite.
7. All activities within Pakistan regarding Kashmir such as procurement of
food, civil supplies running of refugee camps and medical aid.
8. All affairs of Gilgit - Ladakh under the control of Political Agent.

B. Matters within the purview of Azad Kashmir Government.

1. Policy with regard to administration of AK territory.

2. General supervision of administration in AK territory.
3. Publicity with regard to the activities of the Azad Kashmir Government
and administration.
4. Advice to the honourable Minister without Portfolio with regard to
negotiations with United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
5. Development of economic resources of AK territory.

C. Matters within the purview of the Muslim Conference.

1. Publicity with regard to plebiscite in the AK territory.

2. Field work and publicity in the Indian occupied[administered] area of the
State.
3. Organisation of political activities in the AK territory and the Indian
occupied[administered] area of the State.
4. Preliminary arrangements in connection with the plebiscite.
5. Organisation for contesting the plebiscite.
6. Political work and publicity among the Kashmiri refugees in Pakistan.
7. Advise the honourable minister without Portfolio with regard to the
negotiations with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.
Cease –fire Agreement :It was agreement signed by Pakistan and India on
the 27th of July 1949. It established a cease-fire line which could be
monitored by observers from the United Nations. Article 370 of the
Constitution of India{370. Temporary provisions with respect of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir granted to Kashmir in 1949} 1. Notwithstanding
anything in this Constitution: a. the provisions of article 238 shall not apply
in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, b. the power of Parliament
to make laws for the said State shall be limited to;
i. those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in
consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the
President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession
governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters
with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that
State; and
ii. such other matters in the said Lists, as, with the concurrence of the
Government of the State, the President may by order specify.
Explanation—For the purpose of this article, the Government of the State
means the person for the time being recognised by the President as the
Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of
Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja’s Proclamation
dated the fifth day of March, 1948;
c. he provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to this
State;
d. such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to
that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President
may by order specify
i. Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the
Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-
clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the
State:
ii. Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than
those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with
the concurrence of the Government.
2. If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in
paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in second proviso to sub-
clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the
purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be
placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.
3. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of the article, the
President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to
be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and
modifications and from such date as he may notify:Provided that the
recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in
clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.
4. In exercise of the powers conferred by this article the President, on the
recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, declared that, as from the 17th day of November, 1952, the said
art. 370 shall be operative with the modification that for the explanation in
cl.(1) thereof the following Explanation is substituted namely: Explanation—
For the purpose of this Article, the Government of the State means the
person for the time being recognised by the President on the
recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the *Sadar-I-
Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of Council of Ministers
of the State for the time being in office.
Resolution of the Security Council of March 14, 1950
The Security Council,
Having received and noted the reports of the United Nations Commission for
India and Pakistan, established by the resolutions of 20 January and 21 April
1948
Having also received and noted the report of General A. G. L. McNaughton
on the outcome of his discussion with the representatives of India and
Pakistan which were initiated in pursuance of the decision taken by the
Security Council on 17 December 1949
Commending the Governments of India and Pakistan for their statesmanlike
action in reaching the agreements embodied in the United Nations
Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 for a cease-
fire, for the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and for the
determination of its final disposition in accordance with the will of the
people through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite
and commending the parties in particular for their action in partially
implementing these resolutions by
• The Cessation of hostilities affected 1 January 1949;
• The establishment of a cease-fire line on 27 July, and
• The agreement that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz shall be Plebiscite
Administrator,
Considering that the resolution of the outstanding difficulties should be
based upon the substantial measure of agreement on fundamental principles
already reached, and that steps should be taken forthwith for the
demilitarization of the State and for the expeditious determination of its
future in accordance with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants,
1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate
arrangements without prejudice to their rights or claims and with due
regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare and execute within
a period of five months from the date of this resolution a programmer of
demilitarization on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General
McNaughton's proposal or of such modifications of those principles as may be
mutually agreed;
2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for the following
purposes who shall have authority to perform his functions in such place or
places as he may deem appropriate:
(a) To assist in the preparation and to supervise the implementation of the
programme of demilitarization referred to above and to interpret the
agreements reached by the parties for demilitarization,
(b) To place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India and
Pakistan and to place before these Governments or the Security Council any
suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious
and enduring solution of the dispute which has arisen between the two
Governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir?
(c) To exercise all of the powers and responsibilities devolving upon the
United Nations Commission by reason of existing resolutions of the Security
Council and by reason of the agreement of the parties embodied in the
resolutions of the United Nations Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5
January 1949,
(d) To arrange at the appropriate stage of demilitarization for the
assumption by the Plebiscite Administrator of the functions assigned to the
latter under agreements made between the parties,
(e) To report to the Security Council as he may consider necessary
submitting his conclusions and any recommendations which he may desire to
make;
3. Requests the two Governments to take all necessary precautions to
ensure that their agreements regarding the cease-fire shall continue to be
faithfully observed, and calls upon them to take all possible measures to
ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favorable to the
promotion of further negotiations;
4. Extends its best thanks to the members of the United Nations Commission
for India and Pakistan and to General A. G. L. McNaughton for their arduous
and fruitful labours;
5. Agrees that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan shall be
terminated, and decides that this shall take place one month after both
parties have informed the United Nations Representative of their
acceptance of the transfer to him of the powers and responsibilities of the
United Nations Commission referred to in paragraph 2 (c) above.

Liaquat–Nehru Pact
The Liaquat–Nehru Pact was signed by Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali
Khan and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi on April 8,
1950.
At the time of independence, many communal riots broke out in different
areas of Pakistan and India. These riots had a great impact on the status of
minorities in the two nations. Due to brutal killings by the majority
community, a huge number of Muslims migrated from India, and Hindus and
Sikhs from Pakistan. This problem escalated during the late 1940s and early
'50s. It seemed as if India and Pakistan were about to fight their second war
in the first three years of their independence. At this critical juncture in the
history of South Asia, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan,
issued a statement emphasizing the need to reach a solution to the
problem. He also proposed a meeting with his Indian counterpart to
determine how to put an end to the communal riots and the fear of war.
The two prime ministers met in Delhi on April 2, 1950, and discussed the
matter in detail. The meeting lasted six days, and on April 8 the two leaders
signed an agreement. This pact provided a "bill of rights" for the minorities
of India and Pakistan. Its aim was to address three issues:
To alleviate the fears of the religious minorities on both sides.
To elevate communal peace.
To create an atmosphere in which the two countries could resolve their
other differences.
According to the agreement, the governments of India and Pakistan
solemnly agreed that each shall ensure, to the minorities throughout its
territories, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, and a
full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal
honor.
It also guaranteed fundamental human rights of the minorities, such as
freedom of movement, speech, occupation and worship. The pact also
provided for the minorities to participate in the public life of their country,
to hold political or other offices and to serve in their country's civil and
armed forces.

Dixon Plan
Sir Owen Dixon, a Judge of the Australian High Court who came to the
subcontinent as the United Nations' Representative for India and Pakistan
pursuant to the Security Council's Resolution of March 14, 1950. He had a
"high reputation for independence, integrity and ability", Jawaharlal Nehru
wrote to Kashmir's Prime Minister, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, on April
6 .[xiii]Girija Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA), knew him when both were envoys in Washington (1942-44).
The Report he submitted to the U.N. Security Council on September 15,
1950 is a classic; unexcelled for its elegant style, incisive analysis and
transparent honesty. No U.N. mediator received a warmer welcome. No
mediator before or since came so close to success.
The five-member U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan (1948-49) secured
accord on terms for plebiscite in its resolutions of August 13, 1948 and
January 5, 1949; arranged a ceasefire (New Year's Day) and drew up a
ceasefire line on which both sides agreed on July 27, 1949. It proved
unequal to the task thereafter, so did Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton of Canada.
The six reports of mediator Frank Graham (1951-1953 and 1956) reflect
incompetence and a passion for survival. Gunnar Jarring (1958) was
escapist. They did much harm.
When they met in London three years later, Nehru told him, as Dixon
recorded in his diary (June 1, 1953), that "of all the people who had dealt
with the Kashmir question, I was the only man who came to grips with it".
That was "The Dixon Plan". It assigned Ladakh to India, the Northern Areas
and Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PAK) to Pakistan, split Jammu between
the two, and envisaged a plebiscite in the Kashmir Valley. Pakistan
demurred at first, but agreed. It fell through because Nehru did not accept
the conditions in which the plebiscite could be held; precisely the issue on
which the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and
Graham failed. They, because of their ineptness; Dixon because he lost
patience.
Major William Alan Reid was an Observer with the U.N. Military Observers
Group in Kashmir (UNMOGIP). He was obliged to return in 1981 and retire
from the army as he had sustained serious injuries in a jeep accident on the
Srinagar-Muzaffarabad road. in New Delhi before Dixon's arrival that both
Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel were "even prepared to risk public opinion, if
the need arose" to get the plebiscite-cum-partition plan through. Before the
end of 1948 — if not earlier — Nehru had developed second thoughts on a
plebiscite in Kashmir .[xiv]But he told the British High Commissioner
Archibald Nye on September 9, 1949 that a proposal for "a plebiscite being
confined to the Valley and the area north of it [excluding Gilgit] was worthy
of consideration" .[xv]
Patel and Nehru were agreed "that a plebiscite is unreal" .[xvi] He feared
that "once the talk starts the non-Muslims in Jammu Kashmir would start
feeling uneasy and we might be faced with an exodus to India." He had
warned Nehru earlier (June 27) that Nixon was "going to try... to bring about
an agreement on the question of demilitarisation. If we are not careful, we
might land ourselves in difficulties because once demilitarisation is settled,
a plebiscite would be, as it were, round the corner" .[xvii]Ergo, scuttle all
demilitarisation proposals by the mediator. But was Patel opposed to the
Dixon Plan?
We get a fair idea of what was afoot in his daughter Maniben's diary. On
April 23, she wrote: "Vishnu Sahay clarified from map that we should give up
Kashmir Valley — retain Jammu-Ladakh." Dixon arrived in New Delhi on May
27, 1950 and met Nehru, Bajpai and Sahay. He met Patel on May 29 and July
30. Maniben recorded on July 24, "Vishnu Sahay pointed out partitioned
border about Kashmir on map" presumably the line Nehru proposed to offer
to Pakistan at the summit.
At the MEA, Bajpai told the U.S. Ambassador, Loy Henderson, on April 8,
that during the Nehru-Liaquat talks that month on the refugee influx from
East Pakistan, the Secretary-General of Pakistan's Cabinet, Mohammed Ali
"suggested that it would be helpful if Pakistan and India could come to an
understanding over Kashmir before arrival of mediator. Bajpai agreed and
outlined various methods for settlement or dispute including his own
favourite method which he described to Ali as `Lippmann's suggestions', that
is, partition plus plebiscite in Vale of Kashmir. All said Pakistan was so
deeply committed to `over-all plebiscite' he did not see how any other
method could be approved at this time" .[xviii]Dixon knew that "a just and
enduring settlement could be achieved only through a pragmatic agreement
which recognised the situation as it now stood".
At the outset Dixon felt handicapped by the lack of a political adviser
"thoroughly familiar" with India. It proved fateful. Dixon met Nehru, first on
May 27, 1950 when "Nehru reiterated that confirmation of the accession of
Kashmir to India ought to be done through a Constituent Assembly"
(emphasis added, throughout). It was elected in 1951.
Dixon went on a tour of Kashmir from June 7 to July 11 and was
unimpressed: "The valley of Kashmir lost all its beauty for me. The lakes
became nothing but stagnant swamps, the green rice fields became
quagmires of exhausted earth and water in which primitive man and his
oxen continued to wallow, and the picturesque house boats... insanitary
repositories of furniture and other junk by which infections and contagions
were passed from one lessee to another, season after season, I saw it all
through a bacteriological haze and wondered why either side wanted it." He
met on June 8 and several times later socially, Sheikh Abdullah who ran his
fiefdom as a "police state". Erik Colban (Dixon's aide) met Abdullah who
"claimed that he was keen to bury the past and try to work `hand in hand'
with the leaders of the Azad Kashmir government. Moreover, they should
push for a `united' Kashmir that could determine to which country it would
accede, `or to other forms of cooperation' with both states. Abdullah
wanted Dixon to propose a joint meeting to discuss this." He complained of
the UNCIP's failure to negotiate with him and of the omission of the option
of independence in the plebiscite.
Maulana Azad met Dixon in Kashmir: "He raised, as Nehru had done, the
question of determining the disposal of Kashmir by a Constituent Assembly.
Dixon replied that the actual communication accepting the instrument of
accession did not use any such term but said that the fate of Kashmir should
be decided by an expression of the people's will. Also, in any number of
speeches, Nehru had said that this meant by plebiscite, and that was what
India and Pakistan had agreed to. Azad, although claiming that India would
win a plebiscite, still recommended Partition with a vote only in the
disputed areas. This would minimise any migration of refugees and avoid the
need for demilitarisation... When Azad concluded by stating that Pakistan's
army must be withdrawn, Dixon replied pointedly: `I could say no more than
that you did not take votes where there were troops who might be used as
instruments of coercion'."
Dixon stayed in the "musty and repellent atmosphere of No. 1 Guest House,
Srinagar" and prepared papers on major issues. One concerned
demilitarisation, another, forms of Partition and related details.
Back in New Delhi, Dixon proposed to Nehru a summit with Liaquat. Nehru
agreed after much persuasion, so did Liaquat but wondered if Nehru was
agreeable to plebiscite. Dixon assured him that he was. The summit was
held in Delhi from July 20 to 24 without aides. They spent 18 hours, Nehru
holding forth for 10. Nehru found his main interlocutor Dixon, "a patient
listener... " Liaquat spoke for less than 30 minutes saying "little or nothing
except by way of intermittent protest against Mr. Nehru's statements". The
possibility of a partition-cum-plebiscite "had been raised". Liaquat's silence
preserved his options.
Dixon's proposals on the overall plebiscite were rejected by Nehru on the
grounds he recorded in his report. "But he was in no doubt why they were
put," as he mentioned privately in a letter: "If such a plebiscite were taken
freely and fairly (India) would undoubtedly lose it." Bajpai agreed,
expressing his "personal view".
Dixon even explored "the possibility of removing the ceasefire line as the
political boundary" so that the State could be brought under one
administration. He did not favour a coalition comprising Abdullah and
Ghulam Abbas of the PAK. But the proposals he made were starkly
unrealistic. Any competent political adviser would have warned him against
making it.
He proposed putting the State "Government in commission"; that is,
"replacing the regular constitutional administrators with appointed persons".
Ministers would continue to hold office "but they would be relieved of their
responsibilities. No Indian Prime Minister could possibly have accepted that.
It went beyond the terms for plebiscite in the UNCIP's Resolution of January
5, 1949. This was to prove fatal, eventually, on the limited plebiscite.
"Before the conference adjourned, Dixon sought an indication about India's
attitude towards Partition, with a limited plebiscite (the Valley and some
adjacent country), or plebiscites in specified areas. Nehru proffered `great
interest' and, despite the disadvantages of being seen to compromise,
undertook to provide India's view. Although not liking it, Liaquat did not
object to the proposal being raised, so long as it came from India... "
After the collapse of the summit, Dixon received from Nehru a tentative
proposal: "In Jammu the ceasefire line would become the boundary, Azad
Kashmir going to Pakistan, the remainder to India. Since the latter included
territory north of the Chenab River, India would also agree not to reduce
`sensibly, substantially or materially' its flow. The Northern Areas would be
conceded but Buddhist Ladakh in the east would remain with India. As to
the Valley, which Nehru defined generously, he agreed that prima facie it
was in doubt and that a plebiscite must be taken... This would, inter alia,
minimise refugee movement while simplifying demilitarisation and
administrative arrangements. The Valley, overwhelmingly Muslim but also
Sheikh Abdullah's power base, would be subject to a vote. The major
difference that arose was about the territory that India claimed
automatically. Because of strong pro-Pakistan areas to the east of the
ceasefire line in Jammu, Dixon felt it both unwise and mistaken to follow
this closely and warned that he would argue against it."
The 1941 Census was to be taken as the basis "modified by demographic,
geographic and other features and `present conditions' " in order to
minimise refugee movement. Dixon met Patel on July 30 who opposed a
plebiscite ("an impracticable solution (that) had never been possible.") They
discussed a partition line in Jammu. Patel said a "settlement would not be
allowed to fail over a couple of Tehsils here or a couple of tehsils there. The
issues were too big."
Dixon was informed by Francis Stuart, the Acting Australian High
Commissioner, that before the Prime Ministers' summit, the Cabinet had
"unanimously" agreed that a solution must be found quickly; rejected an
overall plebiscite; but "a settlement which gave Kashmir substantially
Pakistan, provided it included settling satisfactorily other outstanding
issues, would be acceptable; but Jammu must remain in India while losing
Ladakh would be resisted. The Army also supported an immediate political
solution."
Dixon went to Karachi, the then capital of Pakistan, and proposed another
summit to discuss a limited plebiscite. Mohammed Ali was sceptical whether
Nehru would agree to conditions for a fair poll; Liaquat, facing a divided
Cabinet, proposed outright partition, with the Valley going to Pakistan.
Dixon returned to Delhi on August 9 and secured Nehru's agreement on a
new course of action. Dixon would propose a "definite" plan for limited
plebiscite with "the territorial boundaries India might not like". Nehru would
attend a conference provided Liaquat did not reject the idea itself. Dixon
proposed to give Pakistan "much of Jammu west of the Chenab river". The
plebiscite area would be defined precisely. Dixon went to Karachi to secure
Liaquat's consent to this. He spent a week there (August 11-18). Liaquat
accepted the plan, provided Nehru would agree to a neutral administration
for the Valley. In an exchange of cables, Nehru rejected the idea — to
Dixon's annoyance. They are annexed to the Report.
Dixon was being unrealistic and impatient. Reid writes: "Although the plan
was similar in concept to that which Nehru had dismissed at the conference,
in practice it would be much different — yet it had been rejected without
any detail being sought."
True, the idea was "new". It had been aired at the summit when,
admittedly, Nehru rejected it. It was new in the sense none had proposed it
earlier. None with any political awareness would have proposed it in 1950,
either; mechanically perfect, politically impossible. "The Government in
Commission" was a concept for which the great jurist would have found
hardly any precedent. He even envisaged participation of Pakistan's troops.
Reid records that Dixon reminded Nehru that "when he, Dixon, had first used
it Nehru had requested an explanation — and then opposed the concept
strongly. But whether the proposal was old or new had nothing to do with its
merits, nor with the need to exclude any possibility of the vote being seen
as unfairly influenced. Bajpai then pointed to a paper given to Nehru during
the conference and asked why its provisions would not do: this was what the
Cabinet had expected Dixon to propose and it would not unduly interfere
with the process of Government. Dixon pointed out that that paper was now
`entirely insufficient' as its proposals applied to the whole State and dealt
only with controlling the police... He had understood from post-conference
discussions that India accepted that measures would be necessary in the
Valley to ensure a vote free from intimidation and unfairness, but it had
now denied him any chance to explain them." But the idea was
fundamentally unsound. If his "paper" fulfilled the needs of a fair vote, why
did he abandon it "now"?
One wishes that Dixon had persisted and amplified on the UNCIP's formula.
Reid asks why Nehru rejected the idea though "the Cabinet wanted a
genuine settlement". The Cabinet would have rejected any proposal for
ousting Abdullah's government. Dixon's angry comments on Nehru later were
unjust. Nehru, to be sure, reneged on his commitment on a plebiscite as this
writer demonstrated.[xix]
U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles on July 8, 1952 that "India had always been
interested in partition possibility as outlined in Dixon Report," provided that
Sheikh Abdullah's continuance in office was not affected .[xx]
In 1952, V.K. Krishna Menon told the Australian High Commissioner that
Nehru still favoured the Dixon Plan. Reid rightly holds: "Dixon came much
closer to creating the conditions necessary for a lasting settlement than has
previously been recognised. Moreover, his mission did provide some hope for
a future settlement by outlining a sensible approach." The unremitting hard
work, the exasperation he felt understandably in dealing with New Delhi and
Karachi and his illness accounted for the mediator's refusal to work any
further. But he would have returned, if both sides had invited him. They did
not.
On July 29, Henderson reported to Acheson that an informant "sent to me by
one of most powerful political figures" (was it Patel?) told him: "a). Indian
Cabinet was extremely anxious for settlement of Kashmir in near future on
basis which will leave as little bitterness as possible. b). It was absolutely
out of question, however, for India to permit Jammu with its heavy Hindu
population and its geographical position to go to Pakistan. c). Cabinet
believed only solution was that of partition plebiscite as advanced by Dixon
and believed that if Pakistan accepts this solution, GOI should be extremely
liberal in making concessions redemilitarisation and U.N. control in Valley
during course plebiscite even though it was confident that plebiscite under
such conditions would yield Valley to Pakistan. In other words, Cabinet
prepared now abandon idea of Valley going to India provided Jammu and
Ladakh would be retained and decision of Valley would be based on
plebiscite. d). Nehru, although somewhat reluctant, was willing go along
with Cabinet in this regard... " [xxi] . Was Patel more conciliatory than
Nehru, then?
Nehru expected to get "concessions from Pakistan in other spheres" as part
of the deal. Dixon, on August 15, won Liaquat's clearance for his plan. Even
after Dixon gave up on August 23, what Bajpai told Henderson on August 25
was significant. The U.S. Ambassador reported to Acheson: "I said it had
been my impression GOI really desired solution of partition-plus-plebiscite
and that if it could have most of Jammu and Ladakh it would be willing
agree to conditions for plebiscite in Valley. Bajpai... said that had been GOI
position and still was its position. GOI did not believe however, it would be
necessary replace present Government Kashmir with UN administration in
order have fair plebiscite... Public reaction in India would be so sharp that
no government which had agreed to such arrangement could survive. This
had been opinion not only of Nehru but also of other members of Foreign
Committee of Cabinet — Patel, Rajagopalachari and Ayyangar. Dixon,
however, had offered no alternative. He had taken position there could be
no fair plebiscite under Abdullah regime. It was on this issue and nothing
else discussions had broken down. GOI was still willing to discuss direct with
GOP or under auspices SC solution involving partition with plebiscite in
Valley under conditions which reasonable observers U.N. must consider
fair".[xxii].
On August 28, Henderson gave his formula to Acheson. "present government
of Kashmir could remain in office during period plebiscite so long as in
opinion administrator it was loyally cooperating in facilitating fair
plebiscite. Administrator would have authority, however, to appoint U.N.
officials to arrange for and conduct plebiscite. He would also be empowered
to appoint observers to local military units and to civilian institutions,
including juridical and police, in order to make sure there was no direct or
indirect intimidation of population, Kashmir Government would be required
accept administrator's recommendation for removal of any of its officials
who in opinion administrator were not loyally cooperating in order bring
about fair plebiscite and to revoke any administrative or judicial order
which in opinion administrator was likely interfere with fairness of
plebiscite. Such Indian military establishment as might remain in Kashmir
would also be required to remove or replace any of its personnel who in
opinion administrator were not giving proper cooperation. Administrator
should also be provided with sufficient U.N. civilian and military personnel
to replace local personnel in case in his opinion such replacements would be
advisable." This was negotiable .[xxiii]
In Srinagar, Henderson "had two secret discussions" with Sheikh Abdullah, at
his request in September 1950. He "was vigorous in restating that in his
opinion it (Kashmir) should be independent" .[xxiv]
When British and American officials met on September 18, J.J.S. Garner of
the Commonwealth Relations Office "pointed out that Dixon's efforts did,
after all, break down on a rather narrow point and that, if there really a
will on the part of the two sides to settle the problem, it should not be
impossible to devise a formula that would, on the one hand, avoid the
complete withdrawal of the Abdullah Government, and, on the other, allow
proper U.N. supervision of the plebiscite.
"Mr. McGhee, pointing out that partition-plus-plebiscite seemed to be the
most likely solution ultimately, thought we might use Dixon's report as the
basis for consolidating efforts in this direction.” [xxv]
So close and yet so far. The sub-continent would have been spared half a
century's bitter travails if Dixon had received proper backing and was
persuaded to renew his efforts. President Rajendra Prasad endorsed the
Dixon Plan in a note to Nehru on July 14, 1953. "Last year, Dr.
Radhakrishnan, (Vice-President) on his return from a visit to Kashmir, came
and told me that even Sheikh Abdullah thought that we would lose in a
plebiscite as Sheikh Abdullah himself had told him that ... but whether we
win or lose in a plebiscite, with our commitments it is not possible to say
that we shall not have a plebiscite if the other side presses for it." He
feared a refugee influx. And preferred "the suggestion of Sir Owen Dixon and
have plebiscite only in an area about which there is any doubt as to which
way it would vote. It proceeds upon the assumption that the result of
plebiscite in the areas which are left out of plebiscite is a foregone
conclusion, and therefore both as a matter of expediency and convenience,
the plebiscite should be confined to doubtful areas... One of the
implications of this may be that we may lose the Kashmir Valley, but we
shall be assured from the very beginning about getting Jammu and Ladakh,
and Pakistan similarly about the Azad area" .[xxvi]
In this, he was not being communal — unlike Dr. B.R. Ambedkar who said, on
October 11, 1951, after resigning from the Cabinet: "Give the Hindus and
Buddhist parts to India and the Muslim part to Pakistan as we did in the case
of India... If we cannot save the whole of Kashmir, at least let us save our
kith and kin" — a sentiment Shyama Prasad Mookerjee echoed.
The Dixon Plan figured in discussions in the National Conference's Working
Committee on June 9, 1953, "among the alternatives discussed was — a
Dixon plan with independence for the plebiscite area" — Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammed was "emphatically of the opinion" that this should be put up "as
first and the only practicable, advantageous and honourable solution of the
dispute" .[xxvii]A variant figured in Nehru's letter to the Prime Minister,
Mohammed Ali Bogra on September 5, 1953 — overall plebiscite but partition
based on the results in each region .[xxviii]He was only marking time. Having
put Abdullah behind the bars on August 8, he could hardly risk a plebiscite.
He said as much to Karan Singh (August 21) and sent A. P. Jain to Bakshi to
explain matters .[xxix]
In 2002, Dixon's plan of 1950 cannot be revived. But, its spirit and his
statesmanship can be. Reid deplores the nationalist historiography that mars
Indian and Pakistani writing, on Kashmir. To both, Dixon's Report of
September 15, 1950 (August 27) provides a devastating corrective. The
classic repays study even now. "The question whether Pakistan had or had
not been an aggressor had, to my mind, nothing to do with the results of a
partition and the fairness and freedom of a partial plebiscite... to agree
that the territory not immediately divided between India and Pakistan
should pass to one or the other according to the vote of the inhabitants at a
plebiscite conducted by the United Nations must be to agree a text involving
an equal interest in both countries in the result." [xxx]
Resolution of the Security Council of March 30, 1951:
Having received and noted the report of Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations
Representative for India and Pakistan, on his mission initiated by the
Security Council resolution of 14 March 1950;
Observing that the Governments of India and Pakistan have accepted the
provisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 and of the Security Council
resolution of 14 March 1950, and have re-affirmed their desire that the
future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be decided through the
democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the
auspices of the United Nations;
Observing that on 27 October 1950 the General Council of the “All Jammu
and Kashmir National Conference” adopted a resolution recommending the
convening of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of determining the
“future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir”;
observing further from statements of responsible authorities that action is
proposed to convene such a Constituent Assembly and that the area from
which such a Constituent Assembly would be elected is only a part of the
whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir;
Reminding the Governments and Authorities concerned of the principle
embodied in the Security Council resolutions of 21 April 1948, 3 June 1948
and 14 March 1950 and the United Nations Commission for India and
Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, that the final
disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance
with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a
free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United
Nations; Affirming that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as
recommended by the General Council of the “All Jammu and Kashmir
National Conference,” and any action that Assembly might attempt to take
to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part
thereof would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with
the above principle;
Declaring its belief that it is the duty of the Security Council in carrying out
its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security to aid the parties to reach an amicable solution of the Kashmir
dispute and that a prompt settlement of this dispute is of vital importance
to the maintenance of international peace and security;
Observing from Sir Owen Dixon's report that the main points of difference
preventing agreement between the parties were:
(a) The procedure for and the extent of demilitarization of the State
preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite, and
(b) The degree of control over the exercise of the functions of government
in the State necessary to ensure a free and fair plebiscite;
The Security Council,
1. Accepts, in compliance with his request, Sir Owen Dixon's resignation and
expresses its gratitude to Sir Owen for the great ability and devotion with
which he carried out his mission;
2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan
in succession to Sir Owen Dixon;
3. Instructs the United Nations Representative to proceed to the Sub-
continent and , after consulation with the Governments of India and
Pakistan, to effect the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir
on the basis of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949;
4. Calls upon the parties to co-operate with the United Nations
Representative to the fullest degree in effecting the demilitarization of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir;
5. Instructs the United Nations Representative to report to the Security
Counc
il within three months from the date of his arrival on the Sub-continent. If,
at the time of this report, he has not effected demilitarization in
accordance with paragraph 3 above, or obtained the agreement of the
parties to a plan for effecting such demilitarization, the United Nations
Representative shall report to the Security Council those points of
difference between the parties in regard to the interpretation and
execution of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949
which he considers must be resolved to enable such demilitarization to be
carried out;
6.Calls upon the parties, in the event of their discussions with the United
Nations Representative failing in his opinion to result in full agreement, to
accept arbitration upon all outstanding points of difference reported by the
United Nations Representative in accordance with paragraph 5 above; such
arbitration to be carried out by an Arbitrator, or a panel of Arbitrators, to
be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice after
consultation with the parties;
7. Decides that the Military Observer group shall continue to supervise the
cease-fire in the State;
8. Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan to ensure that their
agreement regarding the cease-fire shall continue to be faithfully observed
and calls upon them to take all possible measures to ensure the creation
and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further
negotiations and to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and
peaceful settlement;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the United Nations
Representative for India and Pakistan with such services and facilities as
may be necessary in carrying out the terms of this resolution.

The Delhi Agreement, 1952

Accordingly, the representatives of Kashmir Government conferred with the
representatives of Indian Government and arrived at an agreement. This
arrangement was later on known as the "Delhi Agreement, 1952". The main
features of this agreement were:
i. in view of the uniform and consistent stand taken up by the Jammu and
Kashmir Constituent Assembly that sovereignty in all matters other than
those specified in the Instrument of Accession continues to reside in the
State, the Government of India agreed that, while the residuary powers of
legislature vested in the Centre in respect of all states other than Jammu
and Kashmir, in the case of the latter they vested in the State itself;
ii. it was agreed between the two Governments that in accordance with
Article 5 of the Indian Constitution, persons who have their domicile in
Jammu and Kashmir shall be regarded as citizens of India, but the State
legislature was given power to make laws for conferring special rights and
privileges on the ‘state subjects’ in view of the ‘State Subject Notifications
of 1927 and 1932: the State legislature was also empowered to make laws
for the ‘State Subjects’ who had gone to Pakistan on account of the
communal disturbances of 1947, in the event of their return to Kashmir;
iii. as the President of India commands the same respect in the State as he
does in other Units of India, Articles 52 to 62 of the Constitution relating to
him should be applicable to the State. It was further agreed that the power
to grant reprieves, pardons and remission of sentences etc; would also vest
in the President of India'
iv. the Union Government agreed that the State should have its own flag in
addition to the Union flag, but it was agreed by the State Government that
the State flag would not be a rival of the Union flag; it was also recognised
that the Union flag should have the same status and position in Jammu and
Kashmir as in the rest of India, but for historical reasons connected with the
freedom struggle in the State, the need for continuance of the State flag
was recognised
v. there was complete agreement with regard to the position of the Sadar-i-
Riyasat; though the Sadar-i-Riyasat was to be elected by the State
Legislature, he had to be recognised by the President of India before his
installation as such; in other Indian States the Head of the State was
appointed by the President and was as such his nominee but the person to
be appointed as the Head, had to be a person acceptable to the
Government of that State; no person who is not acceptable to the State
Government can be thrust on the State as the Head. The difference in the
case of Kashmir lies only in the fact that Sadar-i-Riyasat will in the first
place be elected by the State legislature itself instead of being a nominee of
the Government and the President of India. With regard to the powers and
functions of the Sadar-i-Riyasat the following argument was mutually agreed
upon
a. the Head of the State shall be a person recognised by the President of the
Union on the recommendations of the Legislature of the State;
b. he shall hold office during the pleasure of the President;
c. he may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his
office;
d. subject to the foregoing provisions, the Head of the State shall hold
office for a term of five years from the date he enters upon his office;
e. provided that he shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term,
continue to hold the office until his successor enters upon his office"
vi. with regard to the fundamental rights, some basic principles agreed
between the parties were enunciated; it was accepted that the people of
the State were to have fundamental rights. But in the view of the peculiar
position in which the State was placed, the whole chapter relating to
‘Fundamental Rights’ of the Indian Constitution could not be made
applicable to the State, the question which remained to be determined was
whether the chapter on fundamental rights should form a part of the State
Constitution of the Constitution of India as applicable to the State;
vii. with regard to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, it was
accepted that for the time being, owing to the existence of the Board of
Judicial Advisers in the State, which was the highest judicial authority in the
State, the Supreme Court should have only appellate jurisdiction;
viii. .there was a great deal of discussion with regard to the "Emergency
Powers"; the Government of India insisted on the application of Article 352,
empowering the President to proclaim a general emergency in the State;
the State Government argued that in the exercise of its powers over
defence (Item 1 on the Union List), in the event of war or external
aggression, the Government of India would have full authority to take steps
and proclaim emergency but the State delegation was, however, averse to
the President exercising the power to proclaim a general emergency on
account of internal disturbance.
In order to meet the viewpoint of the State’s delegation, the Government of
India agreed to the modification of Article 352 in its application to Kashmir
by the addition of the following words:
"but in regard to internal disturbance at the request or with the
concurrence of the Government of the State."
At the end of clause (1)
Both the parties agreed that the application of Article 356, dealing with
suspension of the State Constitution and 360, dealing with financial
emergency, was not necessary.
The facts analysed above make it clear that the State of Jammu and
Kashmir enjoys a special position in the Union of India, and this position of
the State has been permitted by Article 2 of the Constitution itself. " In
arriving at this arrangement", declared Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the
then Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, "the main consideration before
our Government was to secure a position for the State which would be
consistent with the requirements of maximum autonomy for the local organs
of the State power which are the ultimate source of authority in the State
while discharging obligations as a Unit of the federation".
The Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly discussed this arrangement
and finally adopted a motion of approach on August 21, 1952.
The agreement was discussed in the Union Parliament on August 7, 1952 and
accepted.
But inspite of all these discussions and decisions in the Kashmir Constituent
Assembly, the implementation of the agreement was not forthcoming. This
aroused suspicion in the minds of the public about the intentions of the
leaders of the Government. In the working committee of the National
Conference there was sharp criticism of the Government’s policy. There was
a serious rift in the Cabinet itself. The difference of opinion reached a peak
when Sheikh Abdullah, instead of implementing the agreement, started
advocating secession, which would make Kashmir an ‘independent State’.

Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its 765th meeting on 24

January 1957, concerning the India–Pakistan Question:
The resolution is a reaffirmation of the Security Council resolution of 30
March 1951 that the convening of a Constituent Assembly and any action
taken by it would not constitute disposition of the State in accordance with
the will of the people of Kashmir expressed through the democratic method
of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the
United Nations. It was introduced by Australia, Colombia, Cuba, the United
Kingdom and the U.S.A., and supported by 10 members of the Council, the
Soviet Union abstaining.
The Security Council,
Having heard statements from representatives of the Governments of India
and Pakistan concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir,
Reminding the Governments and authorities concerned of the principle
embodied in its resolutions of 21 April 1948 (S/726), 3 June 1948 , 14 March
1950 (S/1469) and 30 March 1951 (S/2017/Rev. 1), and the United Nations
Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 (S/1100,
para. 75) and 5 January 1949 (S/1196, para. 15), that the final disposition of
that State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will
of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and
impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations,
1. Reaffirms the affirmation in its resolution of 30 March 1951 and declares
that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the
General Council of the ‘All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference' and
any action that Assembly may have taken or might attempt to take to
determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part
thereof, or action by the parties concerned in support of any such action by
the Assembly, would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance
with the above principles;
2. Decides to continue its consideration of the dispute.
24 January 1957

Indus Water Treaty and Kashmir

The British Viceroy Lord Mountbaten in the form of Kashmir imbroglio gave
the parting kick at the time of partition of British India, by dividing Punjab
and Bengal which mainly benefited India .Punjab, which provided India land
route to Kashmir. Punjab earned its name because of the five rivers –
Jhelum, Chinab, Ravi, Sutluj and Bias - regarded as one of grave conflict
between India and Pakistan and to end the water disagreement a famous
Indus water treaty was signed which is a water-sharing treaty between the
Republic of India and Islamic Republic Of Pakistan. The treaty was signed in
Karachi on September 19, 1960 by the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru and the then President of Pakistan Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub
Khan. The World Bank (Erstwhile International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development) is a signatory as a third party. The Indus System of Rivers
comprises three Western Rivers the Indus, the Jhelum and Chenab and three
Eastern Rivers - the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi; and with minor
exceptions, the treaty gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of the
Eastern Rivers and their tributaries before the point where the rivers enter
Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan has exclusive use of the Western Rivers.
Pakistan also received one-time financial compensation for the loss of water
from the Eastern rivers.
The countries agree to exchange data and co-operate in matters related to
the treaty. For this purpose, treaty creates the Permanent Indus
Commission, with a commissioner appointed by each country.
The waters of the Indus basin begin in the Himalayan mountains of disputed
state of Jammu Kashmir. They flow from the hills through the arid states of
Punjab and Sind, converging in Pakistan and emptying into the Arabian Sea
South of Karachi. Where once there was only a narrow strip of irrigated land
along these rivers, developments over the last century have created a large
network of canals and storage facilities that provide water for more than 26
million acres - the largest irrigated area of any one river system in the
world.
The partition of the Indian subcontinent created a conflict over the plentiful
waters of the Indus basin. The newly formed states were at odds over how
to share and manage what was essentially a cohesive and unitary network of
irrigation. Furthermore, the geography of partition was such that the source
rivers of the Indus basin were in Indian administered area. Pakistan felt its
livelihood threatened by the prospect of Indian control over the tributaries
that fed water into the Pakistani portion of the basin.
During the first years of partition the waters of the Indus were apportioned
by the Inter-Dominion Accord of May 4, 1948. This accord required India to
release sufficient waters to the Pakistani regions of the basin in return for
annual payments from the government of Pakistan. The accord was meant
to meet immediate requirements and was followed by negotiations for a
more permanent solution. Neither side, however, was willing to compromise
their respective positions and negotiations reached a stalemate. Pakistan
wanted to take the matter to the International Court of Justice but India
refused, arguing that the conflict required a bilateral resolution.
By 1951, the two sides were no longer meeting and the situation seemed
intractable. Which led to the deadlock and contributed to hostility. As one
anonymous Indian official said at the time, "India and Pakistan can go on
long over Kashmir, but an early settlement on the Indus waters is essential
for maintenance of peace in the sub-continent" [xxxi]. Despite the
unwillingness to compromise, both nations were anxious to find a solution,
fully aware that the Indus conflict could lead to overt hostilities if
unresolved.
In this same year, David Lilienthal, formerly the Chairman of the Tennessee
Valley Authority and of the US Atomic Energy Commission, visited the region
to write a series of articles for Colliers magazine. Lilienthal had a keen
interest in the subcontinent and was welcomed by the highest levels of both
Indian and Pakistani governments. Lilienthal was briefed by Indian State
Department and executive branch officials, who hoped he could help bridge
the gap between India and the United States and also gauge hostilities on
the subcontinent. During the course of his visit, it became clear to Lilienthal
that tensions between India and Pakistan were acute, but also unable to be
erased with one sweeping gesture. In his journal he wrote:
India and Pakistan were on the verge of war over Kashmir. There seemed to
be no possibility of negotiating this issue until tensions abated. One way to
reduce hostility . . . would be to concentrate on other important issues
where cooperation was possible. Progress in these areas would promote a
sense of community between the two nations which might, in time, lead to
a Kashmir settlement. Accordingly, I proposed that India and Pakistan work
out a programme jointly to develop and jointly to operate the Indus Basin
river system, upon which both nations were dependent for irrigation water.
With new dams and irrigation canals, the Indus and its tributaries could be
made to yield the additional water each country needed for increased food
production. In the article I had suggested that the World Bank might use its
good offices to bring the parties to agreement, and help in the financing of
an Indus Development program.[xxxii]
Lilienthal's idea was well received by officials at the World Bank, and,
subsequently, by the Indian and Pakistani governments. Eugene R. Black,
then president of the World Bank told Lilienthal that his proposal "makes
good sense all round". Black wrote that the Bank was interested in the
economic progress of the two countries and had been concerned that the
Indus dispute could only be a serious handicap to this development. India's
previous objections to third party arbitration were remedied by the Bank's
insistence that it would not adjudicate the conflict, but, instead, work as a
conduit for agreement.
Black also made a distinction between the "functional" and "political"
aspects of the Indus dispute. In his correspondence with Indian and Pakistan
leaders, Black asserted that the Indus dispute could most realistically be
solved if the functional aspects of disagreement were negotiated apart from
political considerations. He envisioned a group that tackled the question of
how best to utilize the waters of the Indus Basin - leaving aside questions of
historic rights or allocations.
Black proposed a Working Party made up of Indian, Pakistani and World Bank
engineers. The World Bank delegation would act as a consultative group,
charged with offering suggestions and speeding dialogue. In his opening
statement to the Working Party, Black spoke of why he was optimistic about
the group's success:
One aspect of Mr. Lilienthal's proposal was that the Indus problem is an
engineering problem and should be dealt with by engineers. One of the
strengths of the engineering profession is that, all over the world, engineers
speak the same language and approach problems with common standards of
judgment. [xxxiii] Black's hopes for a quick resolution to the Indus dispute
were premature. While the Bank had expected that the two sides would
come to an agreement on the allocation of waters, neither India nor
Pakistan seemed willing to compromise their positions. While Pakistan
insisted on its historical right to waters of all the Indus tributaries, and that
half of West Punjab was under threat of desertification the Indian side
argued that the previous distribution of waters should not set future
allocation. Instead, the Indian side set up a new basis of distribution, with
the waters of the Western tributaries going to Pakistan and the Eastern
tributaries to India. The substantive technical discussions that Black had
hoped for were stymied by the political considerations he had expected to
avoid.[xxxiv]
The World Bank soon became frustrated with this lack of progress. What had
originally been envisioned as a technical dispute that would quickly
untangle itself became an intractable mess. India and Pakistan were unable
to agree on the technical aspects of allocation, let alone the
implementation of any agreed upon distribution of waters. Finally, in 1954,
after nearly two years of negotiation, the World bank offered its own
proposal, stepping beyond the limited role it had apportioned for itself and
forcing the two sides to consider concrete plans for the future of the basin.
The proposal offered India the three eastern tributaries of the basin and
Pakistan the three western tributaries. Canals and storage dams were to be
constructed to divert waters from the western rivers and replace the
eastern river supply lost by Pakistan.[xxxv]
While the Indian side was amenable to the World Bank proposal, Pakistan
found it unacceptable. The World Bank allocated the eastern rivers to India
and the western rivers to Pakistan. Where India had stood for a new system
of allocation, Pakistan felt that its share of waters should be based on pre-
partition distribution. The World Bank proposal was more in line with the
Indian plan and this angered the Pakistani delegation. They threatened to
withdraw from the Working Party and negotiations verged on collapse.
But neither side could afford the dissolution of talks. India was eager to
settle the Indus issue; large development projects were put on hold by
negotiations and Indian leaders were eager to divert water for irrigation.
In December of 1954, the two sides returned to the negotiating table. The
World Bank proposal was transformed from a basis of settlement to a basis
for negotiation and the talks continued, stop and go, for the next six years.
One of the last stumbling blocks to an agreement concerned financing for
the construction of canals and storage facilities that would transfer water
from the eastern Indian rivers to Pakistan. This transfer was necessary to
make up for the water Pakistan was giving up by ceding its rights to the
eastern tributaries. The World Bank initially planned for India to pay for
these works, but India refused. The Bank responded with a plan for external
financing supplied mainly by the United States and the United Kingdom. This
solution cleared the remaining stumbling blocks to agreement and the
Treaty was signed by the Prime Ministers of both countries in 1960.[xxxvi]
The agreement also set up a commission to adjudicate any future disputes
arising over the allocation of waters. The Permanent Indus Commission has
survived two wars and provides ongoing machinery for consultation and
conflict resolution through inspection, exchange of data, and visits. The
Commission is required to meet regularly to discuss potential disputes as
well as cooperative arrangements for the development of the basin. Either
party must notify the other of plans to construct any engineering works
which would affect the other party and to provide data about such works. In
cases of disagreement, a neutral expert is called in for mediation and
arbitration. While neither side has initiated projects that could cause the
kind of conflict that the Commission was created to resolve, the annual
inspections and exchange of data continue, unperturbed by tensions on the
subcontinent.[xxxvii]
The Indus Waters Treaty is the longest agreement that has been faithfully
implemented and upheld by both India and Pakistan.[xxxviii] But Indus
Article XII does allow for modification of the treaty when agreed to by both
parties.[xxxix]
Pakistani columnists, religious leaders, and policymakers are increasingly
articulating their concern over the water dispute .In one such recent case,
Ayaz Amir, a renowned Pakistani columnist, warned: "Insisting on our water
rights with regard to India must be one of the cornerstones of our foreign
policy. The disputes of the future will be about water."[xl]
Hamid Gul, former chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
charged: "India has stopped our water."[xli]
Pakistan's Indus Basin Water Council (IBWC), a pressure group ,whose central
purpose is to address Pakistani water has expresses concerns in the public
debates over the issue. IBWC Chairman Zahoorul Hassan Dahir claimed that
"India, working in conjunction with the Jewish lobby" is using most of the
river waters, causing a shortage of food, water and electricity in
Pakistan.[xlii]
In an editorial concerning the water issues, the Urdu-language newspaper
Roznama Ausaf accusing the Pakistani government of not developing a
counter-strategy to confront India's "dangerous ambitions," the article
alluded to external supporters of India's anti-Pakistani policy, claiming that,
"India was given easy rides which helped it complete most work on Baglihar
dam." [xliii]
Nizami aaccused India of blocking water from the Chenab River and further
proclaimed that India wants to destroy Pakistan, saying: "Our crops are not
getting water. If this situation continues, Pakistan will become Sudan and
Somalia." [xliv]
Pakistani concern turned graver, regarding the water from the rivers started
in the 1990s after India began constructing a hydroelectric power project on
the Chenab River in the Doda district of Jammu Kashmir. Since the Chenab
is the key tributary of the Indus, Pakistani policymakers, religious and
political parties, and political commentators feared that India could exert
control over the waters. Such control could be used to injure the Pakistani
economy and livestock, or could be used to cause floods in Pakistan by the
release of water during times of war. Discussions of Pakistan's concerns are
most often centralized around the Baglihar dam, though it is only one of the
several water projects being developed by India in its administered part of
Jammu Kashmir.[xlv] Not to solve Kashmir issue was a hatched conspiracy in
order to keep the two infant states India & Pakistan at war, for the benefit
of the Anglo-American alliance, which later thrust the dagger of Israel in the
hearts of Arabs in the Middle East.[xlvi]

Why water Tussle

Considering the renewed awareness of geo-strategic security concerns based
on energy and resources, this should be no surprise. The combined forces of
the world’s population demographics with the impending effect of global
climate change has forced environmental and security strategists to
acknowledge both each other and the potential devastating severity of such
a crisis. Conflict over water has been a tendency of human behavior
throughout history though it does not tend to fit the traditional mold of full-
scale wars fought purely over water. Particularly since the 20th century,
water has been a significant feature of the various conflicts rather than
their sole purpose. However, now in the first decade of the 21st century,
this may no longer be the case. With the increasing pressures, especially
from rapid population growth, urbanization and climate change, this
century may in fact witness a birth of full-scale wars for fresh water.[xlvii]
The demand for water is rapidly overtaking the existing supply. Though
water covers roughly two thirds of the planet, only 3 percent of the total
water supply is fresh water, another two thirds of which is frozen in glaciers
and the polar ice caps. Further, much of the rest is in underground aquifers
or in the soil, leaving less than one percent available to the human
population. Currently 2 billion people do not have enough water for even
basic needs, approximately one third of the world’s population. Increasing
demands from exploding populations is exacerbated as these societies
become more affluent and developed because as such they tend to use more
water. While the world’s population doubled between 1950 and 1990, global
water use increased by 300 percent. Frank Rijsberman, director of the
International Water Management Institute has said, “Globally, water usage
has increased by six times in the past 100 years and will double again by
2050, driven mainly by irrigation and demands of agriculture.” The fact that
many of the critical water sources in these areas are shared by two or more
countries, coupled with the involved states’ rare agreement on how to
divide up the available supply, means that disputes over access to the
contested resources will become increasingly contentious. In fact, 145 of
the world’s countries depend on shared water systems for at least some
portion of their fresh water supply. Tensions arise whenever a member of
the shared water resource system, a riparian, attempts to increase its share
of the dwindling supply and the other members are likely to respond
forcefully. In the same light, any effort by upstream countries to dam the
river or other wise control its onward flow is almost sure to produce concern
and hostility among the downstream states. Although attempts have been
made at drafting equitable water-sharing agreements, discrepancy over the
distribution of their flow persists. Studies by independent scientists,
institutes and corporate analysts all agree the costs of increasing water
shortage affect both wealthy and developing nations, and will include
among them a significant rise in global violence. According to Michael Klare
in his book Resource Wars, “unless more progress is made in negotiating
cooperative arrangements, growing scarcity combined with rising population
will produce and increasingly unstable environment.” That instability can
quickly morph into something more severe; in water-scarce regions it is
typical for states to view combat over vital sources of supply as a legitimate
function of national security and survival. In the words of UNESCO Director-
General Klaus Toepfer in 1999, “As [water] becomes increasingly rare, it
becomes coveted, [and] capable of unleashing conflicts. More than over
land or oil, it is over water that the most bitter conflicts of the near future
may be fought.” Of the many parts of the world that will face increasing
water scarcity, it will be a particularly extreme predicament in most of
South Asia. Fresh water is emerging as its most crucial resource issue due to
the massive population growth, its largely agricultural economies, and its
rampant poverty in human and economic terms. The population of the
region is expected to hit 1.5 billion by 2020 with 50 percent of that
population below the poverty line. Further, the region’s water availability is
limited and the demand is expanding rapidly. Such a high population density
combined with a low per capita income and a predominantly agricultural
economy in water scarce regions necessitates sustainable water
management of shared sources.
Both countries of Sub-continent India and Pakistan face problems that
include flooding or drought in multiple regions, inefficient and inadequate
irrigation, inadequate supplies of clean water in both rural and urban areas,
ground water depletion and contamination, lack of pollution control and
treatment facilities, and insufficient and poorly maintained infrastructure.
Some believe that as the gap between water availability and requirements
widens, therefore it can shoot up the tension between two nuclear countries
in the region . The two countries face similar, precarious predicaments.
India has been steadily moving closer towards a ‘danger zone’ in terms of its
water supplies. In the last fifty years, per capita availability of water has
dropped by roughly 60 percent from over 5000 cubic meters in 1950 to 1800
cubic meters in 2005, a drop that may indeed be repeated in the next fifty
years. Some provinces are already below the 1000 cubic meter threshold,
the “water stress” limit per person per year as defined by the World Bank.
Below this limit the possibility for serious economic and social consequences
dramatically increases. Over-pumping underground water wells has been a
serious problem for both states for many years; for example, water levels
have been dropping at a rate of 5 percent annually in India’s Punjab and
Haryana, escalating conflict between the states themselves as well as with
the Indian national government over water allocation for their agricultural
needs .As per recent report 1/4th of India’s Agriculture land gets converted
into deserts for which deforestation is the main reason but ultimately it
leads to the shortage of water [xlviii] . Meanwhile, Pakistan is rapidly
nearing the same crisis levels: its per capita water availability has fallen
from 5,600 cubic meters at the time of independence to 1,200 cubic meters
in 2005, and its groundwater table has dropped in 26 out of 45 canal
commands. Both countries face issues in water storage because of the high
levels of silt carried by the Indus; in fact, by 2010 Pakistan may already see
a 50 percent loss in its water storage capacity.
The water shortages would be enough to generate serious concern and
tension between the two, but to add the projected human population
growth is to raise the stakes to an entirely different level. The anticipated
population increases between 1998 and 2050 run at approximately 57
percent to India and 142 percent to Pakistan. Assuming that current
predictions prove accurate, India’s population will grow to three times what
it was when it signed the Treaty, 1.3 billion by 2025. By that time Pakistan
will have more than six times its original population at 270 million. These
populations depend on the Indus system for drinking water, sanitation and
the bulk of their food: as the natural precipitation patterns are already
sparse in this largely arid region, and many local aquifers face total
depletion, irrigated agriculture is the only reliable means of producing
sufficient food. For example, 90 percent of Pakistan’s agriculture is
dependent on the Indus water system, a country already facing a shortfall in
food grain availability by about 4 million tons per year. It is feared that this
number could triple by the end of the decade, representing a collapse of
Pakistan’s agricultural productivity.[xlix] Therefore the insistence of
integrated planning, development, and management, of looking at the
basin’s water as a shared resource vital to a cooperative future rather than
state by state interpretations. The EU Water Framework Directive (EUWFD),
a model for water management and protection, emphasizes that the best
model to manage river water is according to the natural geographical and
hydrological unit, instead of according to the administrative or political
boundaries. [l] A water-sharing agreement can positively contribute to peace
and cooperation in the basin by addressing the future water needs of the
riparian countries. International laws regulating trans-boundary water
resources up to this point have been able to stave off major crises, but the
century’s escalating demand could well ‘break the dam.’ The agreements
must be sustainable, lasting and progressive. Further, it is vital to build
upon institutions at a basin level for the rational use and appropriate,
competent management of shared water systems. In the case of Pakistan
and India, pending demand will require much more of the Indus Waters
Treaty in the near future, particularly in addressing the needs of Jammu
Kashmir.[li] An integrated development plan for the conservation and
sustained management of the Indus Basin presents a powerful opportunity to
open a new pathway to a negotiated settlement of the 62 year old conflict
in Kashmir. The approach necessitates a plan jointly developed by Pakistan
and India and would involve creative solutions to the political stalemate
that could move from water management to broader bilateral
rapprochement. “A holistic approach to water resources—recognizing the
interaction and economic linkages between water, land, the users, the
environment and infrastructure—is necessary to evade the impending water
crisis in the subcontinent.”[lii] Kashmir is at the headwaters for the Indus
Rivers as well as the broader conflict between Pakistan and India. Its
situation is inextricable from that of its water, and its future depends on
finding an equitable, sustainable outcome for the region’s most valuable
resource. Failing to address the acute and escalating water issues will
generate increasingly dire consequences, particularly considering the rising
pressures of population growth and climate change. Integrated water
cooperation and sharing between Pakistan and India is important enough in
its own right, but perhaps finding a new way to navigate Kashmir’s waters
will provide the path to peace for the people of Jammu Kashmir, hence
Kashmiris must be taken into confidence while going for the negotiations
,thinking on futuristic lines another upsurge in Jammu Kashmir is in offing
which might engulf both India and Pakistan severely , therefore another
storm is gathering which is to be looked seriously .
The Indo-Pak Water Conflict from a Strategic Perspective by applying Game
Theory (Looking for the settlement )
Indo-Pak Water Conflict has experienced 62 years from their Independence
which led to the escalation of tension between two neighbouring warring
countries of the sub-continent , now both are having nuclear warheads,
which they have arrayed at each other . In this section, a game-theoretic
view of the conflict , Pakistan treated as one player, and the India , as the
other player, in the period preceding 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT)
Agreement is discussed. The central conflict is highlighted along with its
dynamics .
Two basic strategic stances the two sides could take are considered. One is
a hard-line stance, denoted by H. For India, this supports the refusal to
negotiate with Pakistan , as well as the maintenance of India’s status quo
over water resources of Kashmir . For Pakistan , it meant a refusal to accept
any resolution short of complete control over the waters . In this scheme,
no compromise might be reached. Each side, as an alternative strategy,
could take a conciliatory stance , denoted by C.
For India, such a stance is meant a willingness to negotiate a compromise
solution to the Water conflict giving a space for a more democratic
approach . For Pakistan , C indicates a similar willingness to compromise,
including halting its activities which lead to tension at least temporarily.
Please see pic 11

Next, a rank of these four states is set for both sides as follows: 4 = best; 3
= next best; 2 = next worst; 1 = worst. Thus, the higher the number, the
greater the payoff to a player. These numbers, however, do not signify any
numerical value or utility a player attaches to a state. Rather, they indicate
only that each player prefers a higher-ranked state to a lower-ranked one.
This also what makes classic-game theoretic approach is more limited
compared to, for instance, AHP analysis. In the payoff matrix shown in
Figure 1, these ranks are given by the ordered pair (x,y), where x is the
ranking of the row player (Pakistan) and y is the ranking of the column
player (India). The following is brief justification of these rankings for each
player, starting with the upper-left state and moving clockwise around the
matrix:
Compromise: (3,3). This is the next-best state for both players involving a
compromise on the issue of control to waters . [liii]For both India and
Pakistan , the benefits of this state include an end to the escalation and the
possibility of long-term peace on Water conflict .
Pakistan Capitulates: (2,4). This is the best state for India because it has all
the benefits of a compromise without having to make any concessions. It is
the next worst state for Pakistan because Water conflict achieves some
level of normalcy, India status quo remains almost intact .
Escalation of Tension : (1,2). This is the next-worst state for India because,
although it maintains control over Waters , Pakistan complaints continue; in
addition, India faces pressure from international community, especially
World Development Bank , to bring an end to the tension . It is the worst
state for Pakistan , because both India succeeds and tension continues.
India Capitulates: (4,1). This is the worst state for India which loses all
control over Waters . By contrast, Pakistan achieves its best state by gaining
full control without the need to compromise its hard-line position. The
apparent expected solution to this game is the (3,3) compromise, but this is
not the solution that standard game theory predicts. The reason is that India
has a dominant strategy of H: it is a better strategy than C whatever
strategy Pakistan chooses. If Pakistan chooses C, then (2,4) is better for
India than (3,3); If Pakistan chooses H, (1,2) is better for India than (4,1).
Presuming that India chooses H, because it is unconditionally better than C,
what will Pakistan do? Observe that Pakistan does not have a dominant
strategy: H is better if India chooses C, giving (4,1) rather than (3,3). But C
is better if India chooses H, giving (2,4) rather than (1,2). In a game in
which all parties have complete information (symmetric game), lets us
assume that Pakistan can anticipate that India will choose its dominant
strategy of H. Accordingly, its best response would be to choose C, obtaining
its next worst state of (2,4) rather than its worst state of (1,2).
The strategies that yield (2,4) or capitulation by Pakistan , are what game
theorist called a Nash quilibrium, because if either player departs
unilaterally from its strategy associated with this state (C for Pakistan , H
for India), it does worse: by changing its strategy from C to H, Pakistan
would move the situation to (1,2) or escalation of tension ; by changing its
strategy from H to C, India would move the situation to (3,3), or
compromise. By contrast, if the players both chose C, leading to
compromise, each would have an incentive to depart from C to try to
achieve its best state—(2,4) for India and (4,1) for Pakistan .
The states of (4,1) and (1,2) are also unstable in the sense that at least one
player would have an incentive unilaterally to change its strategy. Hence,
(2,4) is the unique stable state in this game.
The dominance of H for India helps to explain that parties’ refusal to keep
the Pre -(IWT) alive. However, the actions of Pakistan before–commencing
diplomatic pressure tactics or activities after 1990 , suspending them
temporarily and gives support for negotiations, both India and Pakistan
resuming them afterwards, suspending them again contradict the supposed
stability of (2,4). Within the limits of classical game theory, any use of
pressure politics of two would seem to be irrational .[liv]In order to account
for the changes in strategy by Pakistan , we next turn to the theory of
Moves(TOMs), which allows for strategy shifts by players as they attempt to
implement desired outcomes. It also allows for the exercise of threats by a
player that has the power and will carry them out if the response it seeks
from the threatened party is not forthcoming.

TOM and Threats

Game theory, as developed initially by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, is an
approach that is, in their own words, “thoroughly static.”[lv] Classical game
theory has little to say about the dynamic process by which players’ choices
unfold to produce outcomes, at least in strategic-form games that are
defined by payoff matrices like that shown in Figure 1. By contrast, TOM
adds a dynamic dimension by assuming that players look ahead before
making a move, switching strategies in anticipating of the possible moves of
an opponent.
A key concept of TOM, and one which is very helpful in analyzing the Water
conflict , is the notion of “threat power”. A player has threat power when it
can better endure an Inefficient state than can an opponent.[lvi]
An inefficient state is one that is worse for both players than some other
state. Thus in the Figure 1 game, (1,2) in an inefficient state, because it is
worse for both players than either (2,4) or (3,3).
Consider the situation in Water conflict , as depicted in Figure 1, and how
the two sides have attempted to assert their threat power signaling its
willingness to endure the mutually harmful (i.e. inefficient) state of (1,2).
Observe that by choosing H, Pakistan ensures that India is faced with its two
worst states, (4,1) and (1,2). Presented with this choice, India would
presumably select (1,2) over (4,1) by choosing H as well.
If by asserting its threat power, Pakistan took a hard-line stance—but not
because it preferred the conflict at (1,2) to capitulation at (2,4). Instead, it
hoped to force India to take conciliatory stance.
If India has a dominant strategy of maintaining its own hard-line position
(H), which is better for it whatever Pakistan does. But when India
implements its dominant strategy at the same time Pakistan threatens
India’s two worst states with its choice of H, the result to escalation of
tension . The state held throughout after 1990s, when India started building
some dams on Chenab, Indus(Kishan Ganga) and Jehleum for Hydel power
generation especially by NHPC along with Baglihar .
One way out of this situation is for both sides to agree to move to the
mutually beneficial compromise state. In the late 1999 to early 2003 there
were talks to try to arrive at such a settlement. The India position was that
Pakistan would have to renounce its hard-line stand .In essence, India ,if
insisting that Pakistan move from H to C first, shifting the game from (1,2)
to (2,4).
On the other hand, if India moves first to C, the situation would shift from
(1,2) to (4,1), at least temporarily. Then Pakistan could move to C, resulting
in the (3,3) compromise state. But this sequence of moves could be
interpreted by Indian pressure groups as India’s accepting Pakistan’s
position at (4,1), which will be unacceptable to India and also entails the
risk that Pakistan would not subsequently move on to (3,3). Hence, it is
expected that New Delhi will insist that Pakistan should make the first
conciliatory move.
If Pakistan agrees to the conditions of India demanding a reciprocal move
from India, which if agreed . This can be seen as a move by Pakistan from
(1,2) to (2,4), which is better for both players, yielding an efficient in
asymmetrical state.
If Pakistan halts its activities and ready to negotiate, thus the situation will
stand at (2,4), if India is not responsive and remains adamant on status quo
which Pakistan will consider as an offensive position. While (2,4) is India’s
best outcome, from which it has no motivation to move, Pakistan still
possessed the threat power to move back to (1,2). In short, the threat is
that if India did not move to a conciliatory stance, leading to (3,3), Pakistan
would return to a hard-line stance, reinstating the inefficient state of (1,2).
If India, doesn’t seem to have no (IWT ) conditions applied on it, further
unless Pakistan renounces its hard-line stand .Thus, the situation will halt at
(2,4) after the Pakistan declares its readiness . If India demands that
Pakistan go one step further a, sought to eliminate its adversary’s threat
power—that is, its power to revert to H and, once again, to inflict on India
one of its two worst outcomes. If Pakistan did return to H, India would
continue to implement its own hard-line stance (because it preferred [1,2]
to [4,1]), which would mean a return to escalation to tension at (1,2).
By refusing to move from (2,4) to (3,3) by accepting (IWT) conditions , India
may pass an important opportunity to achieve a lasting peace. If India did
little while it actually possesses more power in the game.
Then Pakistan will refuse to fully shun its activities which rockets the
tension , prior to further settlement, for a very good reason:
Giving up would deprive it of the only leverage it has and would
“tantamount to Surrender .” In the absence of a Pakistan threat, and the
resolve and resources to carry it out, India had no incentive to move away
from its best state of (2,4).
If India completely rejects go for settlement with Pakistan .In term of this
particular analysis,if India is unwilling to move from (2,4) to (3,3). While
India’s stay-put strategy is short run because it enjoys its best state at (2,4),
it is irrational, Pakistan is capable of reverting to (1,2),it will be ,
unquestionably, if New Delhi ’s decision not to negotiate will resume to the
escalation of tension ,thereby returning the situation to the destructive
(1,2) state.

A Path Towards Peace

The (IWT)signed in 1960 offered hope that a peaceful resolution to the
Water conflict between India and Pakistan . In what follows, the moves and
counter-moves of India and Pakistan are analyzed by applying game-
theoretic model ,efforts that laid the roundwork for final negotiations of
IWT in 1960 .
If Pakistan stops to escalate tension would have to precede any substantial
conciliatory moves on the part of the India. If India insists on the
conciliatory move. In theory, the game presented in Figure 1 can be moved
from conflict at (1,2) to compromise at (3,3)via two paths. One path to
compromise would involve India’s changing from a hard-line to a
conciliatory stance first, followed by a reciprocal change of strategies on
the part of Pakistan . As a result, the situation would initially move from
(1,2) to (4,1), and subsequently from (4,1) to (3,3). In fact, then Pakistan
will try to see if India is willing to make some concessions, even before
(IWT), by one-sidedly announced its intention to meaningful negotiations
.Then India could easily be seen as having caved into defeat in terms of
right wing political parties especially those , who want a no-talk option with
the Pakistan then Indian leadership in power need to take a bold decision .
The second possible path toward peace would require that if Pakistan
changes from a hard-line to a conciliatory stance first, followed by a
reciprocal change on the part of India. In this scenario, the situation would
initially move from (1,2) to (2,4), and subsequently from (2,4) to (3,3).
With its readiness to compromise, asserting “peace power” then Pakistan
will make the first move, shifting the situation to (2,4). But, as the breaking
of the (IWT) norms leveled by Pakistan after 1990 , conciliatory stance is not
sufficient. In some respects, India’s unwillingness to consult and build
further hydel power generation units on Jehleum,Indus(Kishan Ganga) and
even on Chenab will lead to more intimidations . Thus creating a complete
wide crack to the game then only option in that case is to leave the game
for both and consult third party mediation .

Indo –China War 1962

The 1940s saw huge change in South Asia with the Partition of India in 1947
(resulting in the establishment of the two new states of India and Pakistan),
and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. One of the
most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining
cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was
among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly-created
PRC[lvii]. At the time, Chinese officials issued no declarations of control
over Aksai Chin. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1956 argued that Aksai Chin
was already under Chinese jurisdiction, implying that there was therefore
no contradiction with his earlier statement since China did not regard the
region as "Indian controlled", and that since the British hand-over China had
regarded the McCartney MacDonald Line as the relevant border[lviii].
This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959,
Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader, the Dalai Lama, who was
fleeing Lhasa after a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule.
Border incidents continued through this period. In August 1959, the PLA took
an Indian prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the
McMahon Line[lix], and two months later in Aksai Chin a clash led to the
death of nine Indian frontier policemen[lx].
On 2 October, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev defended Nehru in a
meeting with Mao. This action reinforced China's impression that the Soviet
Union, the United States and India all had expansionist designs over China.
The PLA (People's Liberation Army) went so far as to prepare a self-
defensive counterattack plan. Negotiations were restarted between the
nations, but no progress was made[lxi].
As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line , China's
maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be
Chinese territory. In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drops
its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over
NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not
have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not
ready to concede them. This adamance was perceived in China as Indian
opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet[lxii]. India produced numerous reports on
the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform
the international debate. China believed that India was simply securing its
claim lines in order to continue its "grand plans in Tibet".[lxiii] India's stance
was that China should withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual
deterioration of the diplomatic situation. China's continuing patrols south of
the McMahon Line provoked an Indian response known as the "Forward
Policy". According to James Barnard Calvin of the U.S. Navy, in 1959, India
started sending Indian troops and border patrols into disputed areas. This
programme created both skirmishes and deteriorating relations between
India and China, the aim of this policy was to create outposts behind
advancing Chinese troops to interdict their supplies, forcing them north of
the disputed line (McMahon).[lxiv]
China viewed this as further confirmation of Indian expansionist plans
directed towards Tibet. According to the Indian official history,
implementation of the Forward Policy was intended to provide evidence of
Indian occupation in the previously unoccupied region through which
Chinese troops had been patrolling B.M Kaul(Chief) was confident, through
contact with Indian Intelligence and CIA information, that China would not
react with force.[lxv] Indeed at first the PLA simply withdrew, but
eventually Chinese forces began to counter-encircle the Indian positions
which clearly encroached into the north of McMahon Line. This led to a tit-
for-tat Indian reaction, with both forces attempting to outmanoeuver each
other. However, despite the escalating nature of the dispute, the two forces
withheld from engaging each other directly.[lxvi]
On 10 July 1962, 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian occupied post in
Chushul (north of the McMahon Line) but withdrew after a heated argument
via loudspeaker. On 22 July, the Forward Policy was extended to allow
Indian troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed
territory. Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self-
defense, all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon
Chinese forces if threatened.In August, the Chinese military improved its
combat readiness along the McMahon Line and began stockpiling
ammunition, weapons and gasoline.[lxvii] In June 1962, Indian forces
established an outpost at Dhola, on the southern slopes of the Thag La
Ridge. Two of the major factors leading up to China's eventual conflicts with
Indian troops were India's stance on the disputed borders and perceived
Indian subversion in Tibet. There was "a perceived need to punish and end
perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian
efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-
1949 status quo ante of Tibet". The other was "a perceived need to punish
and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the
border". John W. Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect
based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s, it was,
nevertheless a major reason for China's going to war. However, he argues
the Chinese perception of Indian aggression to be "substantially
accurate"[lxviii]
On 20 October 1962, the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two
attacks, 1000 kilometers apart. In the western theater, the PLA sought to
expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the
eastern theatre, the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu
river. Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass, which is in the
Indian state of Sikkim (an Indian protectorate at that time). Gurkha rifles
travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire. After four days of
fierce fighting, the three regiments of Chinese troops succeeded in securing
a substantial portion of the disputed territory. Chinese troops launched an
attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on 20 October. They
gathered themselves up into battalions on the Indian-held south side of the
river in the camouflage of the night, with each battalion assigned against a
separate group of Rajputs. At 5:14 am, Chinese mortar fire began attacking
the Indian positions. Simultaneously, the Chinese cut the Indian telephone
lines so that the Indians could not make contact with CHQ. At about 6:30
am, the Chinese infantry, who had been positioned behind the Indians in the
night, made their surprise attack and forced the Indians to leave their
trench positions. The Chinese troops overwhelmed the Indians. Proceeding
attacks from flanking positions south of the McMahon Line overwhelmed the
Indian troops and caused withdrawal from Namka Chu. Fearful of continued
losses, Indian troops escaped into Bhutan. However, Chinese forces
respected the border and ignored Tsang Le .Now the Chinese troops had
occupied the area which was under dispute in the confrontations at Thag La,
but they continued to advance into the rest of NEFA. On 23 October,
Chinese troops launched a three-pronged attack on Tawang, which the
Indians evacuated without any resistance, On the Aksai Chin front, China
already controlled most of the disputed territory. China quickly and
efficiently got rid of remnants of Indian troops. On 20 October, operations
in the Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and Pangong Lake were successful
for the PLA .Many outposts and garrisons comprised were unable to defend
against the surrounding Chinese troops. Most Indian troops positioned in
these posts fought and were either killed or taken prisoner. India did not
support its troops, as the Galwan post had been surrounded by China in
August and had received no land support from India since then. After the 20
October attack, this post was not heard from again. Late on 19 October,
Chinese troops launched various attacks throughout the western theatre. By
22 October, all posts north of Chushul had been cleared .
Later on 24 October, there was a battle on the Rezang La Ridge to defend
an air strip from impending Chinese takeover.
After realizing the magnitude of the attack, Indian Western Command
withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the south-east. Daulet Beg Oldi
was also evacuated, but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not
approached by Chinese forces. Indian troops were withdrawn so that they
could regroup and be ready if China probed south of their claim line.[lxix]
On the Eastern theatre , the PLA attacked Indian forces near Se La and
Bomdi La on 17 November. These positions were defended by the Indian 4th
Division. Instead of attacking by road as expected, PLA forces approached
via a mountain trail, and their attack cut off a main road and isolated
10,000 Indian troops.
Se La was very high, and faced with this strategic problem, the Chinese
captured Thembang, which was a supply route to Se La. On the western
theatre, PLA forces launched a heavy infantry attack on 18 November near
Chushul. Their attack started at 4:35 am, despite a mist surrounding most of
the areas in the region. At 5:45 the Chinese troops advanced to attack 2
platoons of Indian troops at Gurung Hill.
The Indians did not know what was happening, as communications were
dead. As a patrol was sent, China attacked with greater numbers. Indian
artillery could not hold off against superior Chinese forces. By 9:00 am,
Chinese forces attacked Gurung Hill directly and Indian commanders
withdrew from the area. The Chinese had been simultaneously attacking
Rezang La which was held by 118 Indian troops. At 5:05 am, Chinese troops
launched their attack audaciously. Chinese medium machine gun fire
pierced through the Indian tactical defences. The Indian troops were forced
to withdraw to high mountain positions. Indian sources believed that their
troops were just coming to grips with the mountain combat and finally
called for more troops. However, the Chinese declared a ceasefire, ending
the bloodshed. Indians suffered heavy casualties, with dead Indian troops'
bodies being found in the ice, frozen with weapons in hand. Chinese forces
also suffered heavy casualties, especially at Rezang La. This signalled the
end of the war in Aksai Chin as China had reached their claim line - many
Indian troops were ordered to withdraw from the area. China claimed that
the Indian troops wanted to fight on until the bitter end. However, the war
ended with their withdrawal, so as to limit the amount of casualties. The
PLA penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier
town nearly fifty kilometers from the Assam-North-East Frontier Agency
border. The local government ordered the evacuation of the civilians in
Tezpur to the south of the Brahmaputra River, all prisons were thrown open,
and government officials who stayed behind destroyed Tezpur's currency
reserves in anticipation of a Chinese advance. China had reached its claim
lines so the PLA did not advance further, and on 19 November it declared a
unilateral cease-fire. Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on
midnight, 21 November. Zhou's ceasefire declaration stated;
Beginning from 21 November 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will ceasefire
along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from 1 December 1962, the
Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometers behind the
line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November
1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far
been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line,
they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of
the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometers back from that
line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will
withdraw twenty kilometers from the line of actual control.
Zhou had first given the ceasefire announcement to Indian chargé d'affaires
on 19 November, (before India's request for United States air support) but
New Delhi did not receive it until 24 hours later. The aircraft carrier was
ordered back after the ceasefire and thus American intervention on India's
side in the war was avoided. Retreating Indian troops, who hadn't come into
contact with anyone knowing of the ceasefire, and Chinese troops in NEFA
and Aksai Chin, were involved in some minor battles,but for the most part
the ceasefire signalled an end to the fighting. The United States Air Force
flew in supplies to India in November 1962, but neither side wished to
continue hostilities.
Toward the end of the war India increased her support for Tibetan refugees
and revolutionaries, some of them having settled in India, as they were
fighting the same common enemy in the region. The Nehru administration
ordered the raising of an elite Indian-trained "Tibetan Armed Force"
composed of Tibetan refugees. The CIA had already begun operations in
bringing about change in Tibet.[lxx]

Aftermath: According to the China's official (communist) military history,

the war achieved China's policy objectives of securing borders in the
western sector, as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin. After
the war, India abandoned the Forward Policy, and the de facto borders
stabilized along the Line of Actual Control, however it is believed that India
has suffered huge casuality in the war ,although no authentic or official
record of causalities is available, which both countries have incurred in
Sino-Indo War .

1965(Indo-Pak War)
Date: August 1965
Location: Jammu Kashmir Administered India
Territorial Changes : No changes but ends in
cease-fire
Strength:
India: 100,000 - 200,000
Pakistan: 5,000 - 40,000
Commanders
India : Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri,Harbakhsh Singh and Gurbaksh Singh
Pakistan : Ayub Khan,Musa Khan,Tikka Khan and Nasir Ahmed Khan
Casualties and losses
India : 3000 Killed,[lxxi] 175 tanks destroyed,59 aircraft lost (Indian claim) ,
60-75 air craft lost (neutral)and 110 aircraft destroyed (Pakistani claim)
Pakistan:3800 Killed [lxxii] - 280 tanks destroyed ,20 aircraft lost (Pakistani
claim),20 aircraft lost (Neutral claim) 73 aircraft lost (Indian claim)
The estimate of deaths by independent sources were 10234 Indian soldiers
and 7000 Pakistani soldiers including Pakistani armed Volunteers.[lxxiii]
Before proceeding to full swing war of 1965 , initially “Operation Gibraltar”
was the name given to the master plan by Pakistan to infiltrate Jammu
Kashmir and start a rebellion against Indian rule. Launched in August 1965,
guerrillas, disguised as locals, entered Jammu Kashmir from Pakistan with
the intention of fomenting an armed rebellion among Kashmiri Muslims.
However, the strategy went awry from the outset as it was not well-
coordinated and the infiltrators were soon found. The debacle was followed
by an Indian counterattack…..!

The operation was a significant one as it sparked a large scale military

engagement between the two neighbours, the first since the Indo-Pakistani
War of 1947. Its success, as envisaged by its Pakistani planners, could have
given Pakistan control over a unified Kashmir; something that Pakistan
desired to achieve at the earliest opportunity. However, the plan misfired
and triggered a war (the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965) where Pakistan was put
on the defensive and forced by the Indian army to retreat back to normal
borders.
Following the First Kashmir War which saw India gaining the majority of the
disputed area of Kashmir, Pakistan sought an opportunity to win back the
areas lost. The opening came after the Sino-Indian War in 1962 after India's
war with the China and as a result the Indian Military was undergoing massiv
e changes both in personnel and equipment. During this period, despite
being numerically smaller than the Indian Military, Pakistan's armed forces
had a qualitative edge in air power and armour over India, which Pakistan
sought to utilise before India completed its defence build-up. The Rann of
Kutch episode in the summer of 1965, where Indian and Pakistani forces
clashed, resulted in some positives for Pakistan. Moreover, in December
1963, the disappearance of a holy relic [lxxiv]from the Hazratbal shrine in
Srinagar, created turmoil and intense Islamic feeling among Kashmiri
Muslims in the valley, which was viewed by Pakistan as ideal for revolt.
[
lxxv]
These factors bolstered the Pakistani command's thinking that the use of
covert methods followed by the threat of an all out war would force a
resolution in Kashmir. [lxxvi]
Assuming that a weakened Indian Military would not respond, Pakistan
choose to send in "Mujahideens" into Jammu Kashmir,administered by India.
The original plan for the Operation, code named Gibraltar, was prepared as
early as the 1950s; however it seemed appropriate to push this plan forward
given the scenario backed by then Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and
others, the aim was an "attack by infiltration" by a specially trained
volunteers , highly motivated and well armed. It was reason that the
conflict could be confined only to Kashmir. In the words of retired Pakistani
General Akhtar Hussain Malik, the aims were "to defreeze the Kashmir
problem, weaken Indian resolve, and bring India to the conference table
without provoking general war."[lxxvii] Pakistani author Pervaiz Iqbal
Cheema notes that Musa Khan, Pakistan's Chief of the Army Staff, was
reportedly so confident that the plan would succeed and conflict would be
localized to Kashmir that he did not inform the Air Force, as he believed the
operation would not require any major air action. Although Initially,
Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff Musa Khan opposed Gibraltar on the grounds
that if the operation was a non-starter, then Pakistan would not be able to
defeat India in the ensuing war. Many senior officials also were against the
plan, as a failure could lead to an all-out war with India, which many
wanted to avoid.[lxxviii]
As a result, groundwork and intelligence gathering for execution of the plan
was laid by launching "Operation Nusrat", the purpose of which was to
locate gaps in the Cease Fire Line (CFL) that were to serve as entry points
for the armed volunteers[ Mujahideen], and to gauge the response of the
Indian army and the local population. [lxxix]
Despite initial reservations by the President of Pakistan Ayub Khan, the
operation was set in motion. In the first week of August 1965, (some sources
put it at 24 July), [lxxx] armed volunteers began to cross the Cease Fire Line
dividing and were — called "Gibraltar Force" — were given different code
names, mostly after historically significant Muslim rulers.[lxxxi] The
operation's name, Gibraltar, itself was chosen for the Islamic connotations.
[
lxxxii]
The 8th century Umayyad conquest of Hispania was launched from
Gibraltar, a situation not unlike that Pakistan envisaged for Indian
administered Kashmir, i.e. conquest of Kashmir from Operation Gibraltar.
The areas choosen were mainly on the de facto Cease Fire line as well as in
the populous Kashmir Valley.
The plan was multi-pronged. [Mujahideens ] would mingle with the local
populace and incite them to a rebellion. Meanwhile guerrilla warfare
commenced , destroying bridges, tunnels and highways, harassing enemy
communications, logistic installations and headquarters as well as attacking
airfields,[lxxxiii] with a view to create the conditions of an "armed revolt" in
Kashmir — leading to a national uprising against Indian rule. It was assumed
that India would neither counter-attack,[lxxxiv] nor involve itself in another
full-scale war, and the liberation of Kashmir would rapidly follow.
Indian soldiers hoisting their national flag atop a peak in the Haji Pir pass,
which was captured soon after the infiltrators were discovered.
Despite the operational planning, [Mujahideens] were detected by Indian
forces in Kashmir. With the exception of four districts which did revolt, the
local Kashmiris cooperated with Gibraltar Force mostly in the districts of
Baramullah, Budgam , Srinagar and Anantnag by serving food and in some
areas dynamic shelter also , except few , who conveyed news of the planned
revolt to the local authorities. Gibraltar Force was soon facing attacks from
the Indian Army who moved in immediately to secure the border. The some
of the infiltrators were captured by the Indian troops, although mostly
managed to escape. India accused the Pakistani government of sending and
aiding the guerillas[ Mujahideens] although Pakistan denied any
complicity.[lxxxv] On 9th August Indian forces torched Batamaloo Srinagar
because local populace was giving dynamic shelter to [Mujahideens]
although New Delhi maintained that episode happened in the cross firing .
On August 15, 1965, Indian forces crossed the border and launched an attack
on the territory of Kashmir administered by Pakistan. Pakistani reports cite
this attack as unprovoked while assessments from India and neutral sources
cite this as a response to Pakistan's infiltration into Jammu Kashmir as part
of Operation Gibraltar.[lxxxvi]
Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three
important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end
of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made
progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Poonch and India had captured
the Haji Pir Pass, eight kilometers into Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
On September 1, 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation
Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in
Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to
Indian troops. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and
technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who
were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by
calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan
retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir
and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theatre of attack into Pakistani
Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the
operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the
Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning
points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in
Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further South.
India crossed the International Border on the Western front on September 6,
marking an official beginning of the war.[lxxxvii] On September 6, the 15th
Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II Major General
Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of
the Ichogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and
Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to
flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil
Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore.
These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore
International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary
ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. However, the
Pakistani counter attack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to
divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian
and the adjacent villages.
The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by
the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they
quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6th
September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up
those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the
Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also
crossed the Ichogil canal and captured[lxxxviii] the town of Batapore (Jallo
Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter
offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported
by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to
its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of
the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher
commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and
misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and
Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment [lxxxix]to
Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3
Jat on 21st September, for the second time but after a much harder battle
due to Pakistani reinforcements.
On the days following September 9, both nations' premiere formations were
routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armored Division, labeled the "pride of
the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division
divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th
armoured division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering
heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks. The Pakistanis followed up their success by
launching Operation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther.
Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armored Division, pushed an offensive
towards Khemkaran, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in
Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar.
The Pakistani 1st Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan,
however, and by the end of September 10 lay disintegrated by the defences
of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of
Asal Uttar (lit. meaning - "Real Answer", or more appropriate English
equivalent - "Fitting Response"). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar'
(Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton
tanks. Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed(Indian claim ) or
abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. The Pakistani
1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot
sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured Division where it didn't see action as
6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st Armoured
Division which was superior to it in strength.
The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of
the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan
suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 mile² (1,840 km²)
of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile² (545 km²) of
Indian territory. The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile
Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors,[xc] while Pakistani land gains were
primarily south in deserts opposite to Sindh . The war saw aircraft of the
Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in combat
for the first time since they achieved independence from Britain . Though
the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the
late 1940s, that engagement was very limited in scale compared to the 1965
conflict.
The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunter, Indian-manufactured
Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and a squadron
of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104
Star fighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberra bombers. During the conflict the
PAF was out-numbered by around 5:1.[xci]
The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an
assortment of Soviet and European aeroplanes. It has been widely reported
that the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF, although
some defence experts say IAF planes were in parity with Pakistan . [xcii]
IAF's de Havilland Vampire fighter-bombers were outdated in comparison to
the F-86 Sabre, the Hawker Hunter fighters were superior in both power and
speed to the F-86 according to Air Cdre (retired) Sajjad Haider, who lead
the PAF's No.19 Squadron in combat during the war.[xciii]
The F-86 claimed a fair share of Indian planes, though remaining vulnerable
to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer".[xciv] The PAF's F-
104 Star fighter of the PAF was the fastest fighter operating in the
subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as "the pride of the
PAF". However, according to Air Cadre (retired) Sajjad Haider who flew with
the PAF's No.19 Squadron, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being
"a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in
altitudes above 40,000 feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile
fighters at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment of the
region."[xcv] It can be argued that, although the IAF is believed to have
feared the Star fighter,[xcvi] in combat it was not as effective as the IAF's
far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter.[xcvii]
The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during
the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country.
The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while
the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 35. According to one
independent source, the PAF flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Star fighters and
20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving
the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted
nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force.[xcviii]
The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II.
At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical
advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall.[xcix] Pakistani
armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and
M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee
light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.[c]
The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-
gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their
own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm
M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion
Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76,
and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more
modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according
to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.[ci]
At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry
regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the
Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150
M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank
destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured
divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions - the latter being in the
process of formation. The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry
regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition
of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry
units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart
light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black
Elephant' Armoured Division, also called 'Fakhr I Hind' ('Pride of India'),
which consisted of the 17th cavalry Poona Horse, the 4th Hodson's Horse,
the 16th 'Black Elephant' Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Royal
Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being
equipped with Centurions,. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured
Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped
with Centurions.
Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour,[cii]
Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress
into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on
Amritsar.[ciii];[civ] they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such
as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armored
Division at Assal Uttar.
Although India's tank formations experienced same results, India's attack at
the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armored Division and supporting units,
was brought to a grinding halt by newly raised 6th Armoured Division(ex-
100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. The Indians lost
12 tanks at Chawinda. The Pakistanis followed up with Operation Windup,
which forced Indian forces back further. One true winner to emerge was
India's Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, which
proved superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated
reputations.[cv]However, in the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons
performed exceedingly well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other
regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a disproportionately
heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse. The
Indian Army has made much of the fact that some of its Centurions survived
repeated hits; yet have failed to point out that the majority of tanks in the
Sialkot sector were Shermans whose guns were inadequate even in 1944.
Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of
armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st
Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at
Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive
role such a the 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and the 25th Cavalry at
Chawinda, where they defeated their better equipped but clumsier foes.
The navies of India and Pakistan did not play a prominent role in the war of
1965, although Pakistani accounts dispute this.[cvi] On September 7, a
flotilla of the Pakistani Navy carried out a small scale bombardment of the
Indian coastal town and radar station of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (300
km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Codenamed Operation Dwarka, it
did not fulfill its primary objective of disabling the radar station and there
was no immediate retaliatory response from India. Later, some of the Indian
fleet sailed from Bombay to Dwarka to patrol the area and deter further
bombardment. Foreign authors have noted that the "insignificant
bombardment"[cvii] of the town was a "limited engagement, with no
strategic value."[cviii]
According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the
Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay throughout the
war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval
conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based
conflict.[cix] Moreover, they note that the Vikrant was in dry dock in the
process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted
claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine,
instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in
harbour.[cx] There were, however, unconfirmed reports of underwater
attacks near Bombay by the Indian Navy against what they suspected were
American-supplied Pakistani submarines.
The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and
sabotage Indian airbases.[cxi] On September 7, 1965, the Special Services
Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According
to Chief of Army Staff General Musa Khan, about 135 commandos were
airdropped at three Indian airfields(Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The
daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster".[cxii] Only 22
commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner
(including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and
20 were killed in encounters with the army or police[cxiii] The reason for
the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide
maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation[cxiv]
Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the
commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian
14th Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force
found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles.[cxv]
India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured
Pakistani paratroopers.[cxvi] Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that
India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos
deep into Pakistan territory,[cxvii]but these rumours were later determined
to be unfounded.[cxviii]
On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a
resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The
war ended the following day.
Finally Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexey Kosygin, hosted ceasefire
negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan)
Tashkent Agreement
On 10 January 1966, the Prime Minister of India and the President of
Pakistan, who had met in Tashkent at the invitation of the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, announced their agreement that
the withdrawal of all armed personnel of both sides to the positions they
had held prior to 5 August 1965 should be completed by 25 February 1966
and that both sides should observe the terms of the ceasefire on the
ceasefire line.
The principles of a plan and schedule of withdrawals were subsequently
agreed upon by military representatives of India and Pakistan, who had held
meetings for that purpose since 3 January 1966 at Lahore and Amritsar
under the auspices of General Marambio, the Secretary-General's
representative on withdrawals. The plan for disengagement and withdrawal
was agreed upon by the military commanders of the Indian and Pakistan
armies in New Delhi on 22 January.
At a joint meeting on 25 January, under the auspices of the Secretary-
General's representative, the parties agreed upon the ground rules for the
implementation of the disengagement and withdrawal plan. The plan was to
be implemented in two stages and the good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM
were to be requested to ensure that the action agreed upon was fully
implemented. In the event of disagreement between the parties, the
decision of General Marambio would be final and binding on both sides. The
good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM were similarly requested for the
implementation of the second stage of the agreement, as were the good
offices of the Secretary-General's representative with regard to withdrawals
of troops.

Mystery of Shastri's Death

Although officially it was maintained that Shastri died of heart attack, his
widow, Lalita Shastri kept alleging that her husband was poisoned. Many
believed that Shastri's body turning blue was an evidence of his poisoning.
Indeed a Russian butler attending to him was arrested on suspicion of
poisoning Shastri, but was later absolved of charges.[cxix]
In 2009, when Anuj Dhar, author of CIA's Eye on South Asia, asked the Prime
Minister's Office under an RTI plea (Right to Information Act), that Shastri's
cause of death be made public, the PMO refused to oblige, citing that this
could lead to harming of foreign relations, cause disruption in the country
and cause breach of parliamentary privileges.[cxx]The PMO did inform
however that it had in its possession one document related to Shastri's
death, but refused to declassify it. The government also admitted that no
postmortem examination had been conducted on him in USSR, but it did
have a report of a medical investigation conducted by Shastri's personal
physician Dr. R.N. Chugh and some Russian doctors. Furthermore, the PMO
revealed that there was no record of any destruction, or loss, of documents
in the PMO having a bearing on Shastri's death. As of July 2009, the home
ministry didn’t respond to queries whether India conducted a postmortem
and if the government had investigated allegations of foul
play.[cxxi]Circumstances of Shastri's death do indeed make a case for close
inquiry. On the night of January 11, Shastri was awakened by a severe
coughing fit. Dr. R.N. Chugh came to his aid. Shastri was unable to speak
and pointed to a flask kept nearby. A staffer brought some water which
Shastri sipped. Shortly afterward, Shastri became unconscious and attempts
to revive him proved futile.

Resolution adopted by the Security Council at its meeting on 20 September

1965 :
The Security Council;
1. demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, Sept. 22,
1965, at 0700 hours GMT, and calls upon both Governments to issue orders
for a cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed
personnel back to the positions held by them before Aug. 5, 1965;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to
ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel;
3. calls on all States to refrain from any action which might aggravate the
situation in the area;
4. Decides to consider, as soon as operative paragraph 1 of the Council's
resolution of Sept. 6 has been implemented, what steps could be taken to
assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present
conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilize all
peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, to this
end;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give
effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the
Security Council thereon.

Alfatah
(An Indegineous Armed Resistance Movement )
January 1966 local Kashmiri youth launched an armed resitance group under
the operation code named Alfatah , which was totally an indigenous move ,
under the commandership of Ghulam Rasool Zehgeer(GRZ) alias Rehman
alias Maqbool with its headquarters at Barsoo Awantipora of South Kashmir .
This kind of militant struggle was peculiar in nature , it resorted to two
decoties to raise the finances for keeping the struggle running , one in 1969
at Pulwama where they took away Rupees seventy thousand(70,000) , the
salary of teachers to which they purchased land at Barsoo and another at
Hazrat Bank around January 1970, where they have taken forcibly Rupees
one Lac(0.1million IR) , one activist who participated in the dacoity was
spotted and arrested from Srinagar medical college where he was pursuing
degree in medicine and surgery , identified as Farooq Ahmad his arrest led
to the exposure of whole Alfateh squad – remaining active for more than 4
years , whole of its members which include ; Ghulam Rasool Zehgeer, Bashir
Ahmad Bhat, Nisar Ahmad Mir , Mohammad Saleem Gilkar, Abdul Hai
Baderwahi, Mohammad Syed Khan, Mohammad Iqbal Beigh(Doda) Gull
Mohammad Ganie, Gulzar Ahmad Khaki,Ghulam Hassan Shaksaz, Mohammad
Iqbal Sheikh , Bashir Ahmad Zarger, Gull Rafiqi, Peer Mohammad Hussain,
Abdul Rashid Dar, Mohammad Yousuf Mir , Nazir Ahmad Wani, Fazal-ul- Haq
Qureshi , Ghulam Mohammad Naikoo, Advocate Mohammad Shabaan Vakil,
Mohammad Amin Bhat and Abdul Rashid Shawl were arrested , and lodged at
Jammu Central jail during jail period Ghulam Rasool Zehgeer floated an idea
to raise pro-independent political organization under the name and style
Peoples Revolutionary Front (PRF) later launched after his release , it is
worth to mention that PRF was an amalgam of Young Man’s League, Youth
League , Unity Meet and Alfateh , which Zehgeer ,on 7th May 1977 merged
with Pro-Independent political organization Mahaz-e-Azadi , although the
move taken by GRZ and was supported by Bashir Ahmad Bhat, Nisar Ahmad
Mir , Mohammad Saleem Gilkar, Abdul Hai Baderwahi, Mohammad Iqbal
Beigh, Gulzar Ahmad Khaki,Ghulam Hassan Shaksaz , Bashir Ahmad Zarger, ,
Mohammad Yousuf Mir, Mohammad Maqbool Malik , while as Nazir Ahmad
Wani , Fazal Haq Qureshi , Ghulam Mohammad Naikoo and Abdul Hamid
Bhat founded Peoples League a Pro-Pakistan political organization after
their release, in which afew members of youth League and Alfateh
amalgamated in 1974 .[cxxii]
Here it is worth to mention that Ghulam Rasool Zehgeer(GRZ) prior to
Alfateh formation around 1962 has led Red Kashmir(RK) and was charged for
murduring one Indian Security person at Nawakal along with Nazir Ahmad
Wani, Fazal-ul- Haq Qureshi and Farooq Rehmani when all went to
underground during subversive period GRZ floated an idea to launch an
indigenous armed struggle , when Farooq Rehmani was caught by police it
led to arrest of all the members of RK after the release of GRZ ,launched an
armed outfit and the operation was given the name Alfateh .
A Person Who Changed Political Consciousness Of Kashmiris
On 10th June 1966 the first group of armed NLF members secretly crossed
over to the Indian administered Kashmir commanded by Maqbool Butt and
started armed resistance against India for the complete Independence.
Maqbool Butt born on 18th February 1938 from a peasant family in
Trahagam village Tehsil Handwara, district Kupwara. His father’s name was
Ghulam Qadir Butt: his mother died when Maqbool Butt was 11 years old
pupil in the village’s primary (junior) school . He had a younger brother
Ghulam Nabi Butt. To provide mothering for his children Ghulam Qadir
married again—from second wife he had two sons, Manzoor Ahmed Butt and
Zahoor Ahmed Butt and three daughters. The early years of Maqbool Butt’s
life, like thousands of other Kashmiri children were shaped by the harsh
living conditions that characterised the life of peasants , who were toiling
hard during the reign of cruel autocratic Dogra ruler. “The feudal system in
the Maharaja’s Kashmir , forced Maqbool Butt to participate in the first
political action in his life long struggle against suppression, occupation and
for equality, freedom and social justice.”[cxxiii]
After completing his secondary school certificate, Maqbool Butt moved on to
St. Joseph College in Baramula. This was a private missionary college. Here
he gained his first degree (BA) in history and political science. The journey
on that road to great sacrifice for Maqbool Butt was started while still a
student at St. Joseph College.[cxxiv]
Thus went to other side of LOC[Azad Kashmir]. First and foremost problem
before Maqbool Butt in Pakistan was to continue his education and at the
same time find a job to meet the expenses; without that “it was hard to live
in Pakistan’. Therefore, joined ’Anjam’ (end/conclusion/performance), a
weekly magazine, as sub-editor and started working as a journalist - did his
MA (from Pehswar university) in Urdu literature and worked with ‘Anjam’ till
to the start of full time politics[cxxv]. As stated in the beginning ,on 10th
June 1966 the first group of NLF members crossed over to the Indian
administered Kashmir— Maqbool Butt, Aurangzeb, a student from Gilgit,
Amir Ahmed and Kala Khan, a retired Subedar (non commissioned officer
from AJK force) went deep into Valley ,while Major Amanullah and subedar
Habibullah remained near to the division line. The former were to recruit
Kashmiris into NLF while the latter were responsible for training and weapon
supply. Maqbool Butt along with three of his group members worked
underground for three months and established several guerilla cells in
Kashmir. Later arrested in Kashmir and lodged in Srinagar central jail and
given death sentence , where he started planning to escape from the prison
and within a month and half of his arrest managed to escape. [cxxvi]
The event that brought Maqbool Butt and the Kashmir Issue in limelight in
Kashmir, South Asia and at international level was the hijacking of an Indian
Fokker plane ‘Ganga’[cxxvii]. . With NLF dismantled and PF demoralised,
Maqbool Butt once again crossed over to the Indian administered Kashmir
against the advice of many of his friends and colleagues ,in May 1976. This
time he entered valley with Abdul Hammed Butt and Riaz Dar. Within few
days of crossing they were spotted and arrested by the Indian forces. In
1978 the Indian Supreme Court restored death sentence on Maqbool Butt
and he was transferred to Delhi’s Tihar Prison. After eight long years in
prison Maqbool Butt was hanged on 11th February 1984 , while the legal
team was waiting for Maqbool Butt’s case to be reopened on the grounds of
flaws in the trial that convicted Maqbool Butt of murder. His execution was
carried out in haste to avenge the killing of an Indian diplomat in
Birmingham,Rovendra Mahatre[cxxviii]. Thus ended the life of one of the
greatest revolutionary of modern Kashmiri history and was born what
Kashmiris remember as Shaheed- e- Azam [the greatest martyr]. The
hanging of Butt in Tihar changed the fate and fortunes of Kashmir, the
momentous change evolved in the form of an armed revolution, which some
experts on Kashmir Imbroglio believe and say , thus became an icon for
countless political groups both within and outside the valley of Kashmir.
There is no doubt that democratic traditions and institutions in India are far
well established, when it comes to Kashmir ,Indian democratic norms
proved otherwise the mortal remains of Maqbool Butt were not even handed
over to his legal heirs , which is the negation to the democratic doctrines on
the part of India.
Indo-Pakistan War of 1971
Date: 3 December – 16 December 1971
Location: Eastern front: Current Day Bangladesh (then East Pakistan)
Western front: Border between India and Pakistan (then West Pakistan)
Result :Eastern front: former East Pakistan becomes the independent state
of Bangladesh.
Western front:Ceasefire agreed between then West Pakistan and India.
Territorial changes:Eastern front: Bangladesh becomes an independent
state.
Commanders
India: Sam Manekshaw,J.S. Arora,G.G. Bewoor,K. P. Candeth
Pakistan : Gul Hassan Khan,Abdul Hamid Khan,Tikka Khan,A. A. K. Niazi
Strength
India: 500,000 troops Pakistan : 365,000 troops

Causalities
India :3,843 killed 9,851 wounded[cxxix]
1Frigate,1 Naval Plane
Pakistan : 20,000 killed,4,350 wounded,97,368 captured[cxxx],2 Destroyers
[
cxxxi],1 Minesweeper[cxxxii]
1 Submarine[cxxxiii]3 Patrol vessels, 7 Gunboats
As per independent sources it is believed that 1,000,000-3,000,000
Bangladeshis were killed as a result of this war while almost 12000 Pakistani
and 4000 Indian soldiers also got killed.[cxxxiv]

The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation war, a

conflict between the traditionally dominant West Pakistanis and the
majority East Pakistanis. The Bangladesh Liberation war ignited after the
1970 Pakistani election, in which the East Pakistani Awami League won 167
of 169 seats in East Pakistan and secured a simple majority in the 313-seat
lower house of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament of Pakistan). Awami League
leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented the Six Points to the President of
Pakistan and claimed the right to form the government. After the leader of
the Pakistan Peoples Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to yield the
premiership of Pakistan to Rahman, President Yahya Khan called the
military, dominated by West Pakistanis to suppress dissent. Mass arrests of
dissidents began, and attempts were made to disarm East Pakistani soldiers
and police. After several days of strikes and non-cooperation movements,
the Pakistani military cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25th March
1971. The Awami League was banished, and many members fled into exile in
India. Mujib was arrested on the night of 25–26 March 1971 at about 1:30
a.m. (as per Radio Pakistan’s news on 29 March 1971) and taken to West
Pakistan.
On 27th March 1971, Ziaur Rahman, a rebellious major in the Pakistani
army, declared the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Mujibur
Rahman . In April, exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-
exile in Baidyanathtala of Meherpur. The East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary
force, defected to the rebellion. A guerrilla troop of civilians, the Mukti
Bahini, was formed to help the Bangladesh Army.
The Pakistan army conducted a widespread attrocities against the Bengali
population of East Pakistan[cxxxv], leading to approximately 10
million[cxxxvi] people fleeing East Pakistan and taking refuge in the
neighbouring Indian states[cxxxvii] The East Pakistan-India border was
opened to allow refugees safe shelter in India. The governments of West
Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura established refugee camps
along the border. On 27th March 1971, the Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi, expressed full support of her government to the struggle for
independence by the people of East Pakistan. Exiled East Pakistan army
officers and members of the Indian Intelligence immediately started using
refugee camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas.By
November, war seemed inevitable; a massive buildup of Indian forces on the
border with East Pakistan had begun. The Indian military waited for winter,
when the drier ground would make for easier operations and Himalayan
passes would be closed by snow, preventing any Chinese intervention. On 23
November, Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency in all of Pakistan and
told his people to prepare for war . On the evening of 3 December Sunday,
at about 5:40 PM, the Pakistani air force launched a pre-emptive strike on
eight airfields in north-western India, including Agra which was 300 miles
(480 km) from the border. During this attack the Taj Mahal was camouflaged
with a forest of twigs and leaves and draped with burlap because its marble
glowed like a white beacon in the moonlight This attack, called Operation
Chengiz Khan and Pakistan flew no more than 50 planes to India. As a result,
Indian runways were cratered and rendered non-functional for several hours
after the attack[cxxxviii] In an address to the nation on radio that same
evening, the then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held the airstrikes as
a declaration of war against India and the Indian Air Force responded with
initial airstrikes that very night that were expanded to massive retaliatory
airstrikes the next morning . This marked the official start of the Indo-
Pakistani War of 1971. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the immediate
mobilisation of troops and launched the full-scale invasion. Indian forces
responded with a massive coordinated air, sea, and land assault. Indian Air
Force started flying sorties against Pakistan from midnight and quickly
achieved air superiority . The main Indian Objective on the Western front
was to prevent Pakistan from entering Indian soil. There was no Indian
intention of conducting any major offensive into West Pakistan . Pakistan's
PNS Ghazi, was the only submarine operated by either of the warring
nations in 1965.
In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy, under the command of
Vice Admiral Kohli, achieved success by attacking Karachi's port in the code-
named Operation Trident on the night of 4-5 December which resulted in
the sinking of the Pakistani destroyer PNS Khyber as well as the PNS
Shajehan, and a minesweeper PNS Muhafiz. This resulted in tactical Indian
success with Pakistan losing 720 sailors killed and wounded apart from losing
reserve fuel and many commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's
further involvement in the conflict(Claims India). Operation Python followed
Operation Trident which was on the night of 8-9 December in which Indian
rocket-armed motor torpedo boats attacked the Karachi Roads that resulted
in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks, as well as the sinking of three
Pakistani commercial ships in Karachi Harbour. [cxxxix]
In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command, under
Vice Admiral Krishnan, completely isolated East Pakistan by establishing a
naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistani Navy as
well as eight foreign merchant ships in their ports. From 4 December
onwards, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was deployed in which its Sea Hawk
fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan including
Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar. Pakistan responded by sending the submarine
PNS Ghazi to negate the threat. Though Indians claim to have laid a trap to
sink the submarine[cxl], the Ghazi sank off Vishakapatnam's coast under
unclear circumstances thus reducing Pakistan's control of Bangladeshi
coastline.[cxli] . But on 9 December, the Indian Navy suffered its biggest
wartime loss when the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor sank the frigate INS
Khukri in the Arabian Sea resulting in a loss of 18 officers and 176
sailors[cxlii].
The Indian Air Force flew 4,000 sorties while its counterpart, the PAF
offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali
technical personnel. This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the
deliberate decision of the PAF High Command to cut its losses as it had
already incurred huge losses in the conflict. In the east, the small air
contingent of Pakistan Air Force No. 14 Sqn was destroyed, putting the
Dhaka airfield out of commission and resulting in Indian air superiority in the
east [cxliii].
Bangladesh became an independent nation, the world's third most populous
Muslim state. Mujibur Rahman was released from a West Pakistani prison,
returned to Dhaka on 10 January 1972 and to become first President of
Bangladesh and later its Prime Minister.

Hamoodur Rahman Commission

In aftermath of war Pakistan Government constituted the Hamoodur Rahman
Commission headed by Justice Hamdoor Rahman in 1971 to investigate the
political and military causes for defeat and the Bangladesh atrocities during
the war. The commission's report was classified and its publication banned
by Bhutto .When it was declassified, it showed many failings from the
strategic to the tactical levels. It confirmed the atrocities by the Pakistan
armed forces in East Pakistan now Bangladesh . The Commission has
recommended public trial on several people involved in 1971 defeat.
Simla Agreement
The government of P akistan and Government of India are resolved that the
two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have
hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and
harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the
subcontinent, so the both countries may henceforth devote their resources
and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.
In order to achieve this objective, the Government of Pakistan and the
Government of India have agreed as follows:
i) That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall
govern the relations between the two countries;
ii) That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by
peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful
means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of
any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall
unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization,
assistance and encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance
of peaceful and harmonious relations;
iii) That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighbor lines and durable
peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful co-
existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity; and sovereignty and
non-interference in each other internal affairs, on the basis of equality and
mutual benefit;
iv) That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the
relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved
by peaceful means;
v) That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial
integrity, political independence and sovereign equality;
vi) That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of each other. Both Governments will take all steps
within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each
other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information
as would promote the development of friendly relations between them.
In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between the two
countries step by step, it was agreed that:
i) Steps shall be taken to resume communications postal, telegraphic, sea,
land including border posts, and air links including over flights.
ii) Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the
nationals of the other countries.
iii) Trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields will be
resumed as far as possible.
iv) Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.
In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time
to time to work out the necessary details.
In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both
the Governments agree that:
i) Pakistani and Indian forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the
international border.
ii) In Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control resulting from the cease-fire
of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to
the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it
unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations.
Both sides further undertake to refrain from threat or the use of force in
violation of this Line.
iii) The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement
and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.
Both governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a
mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the
representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities
and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization
of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and
civilian, resumption of diplomatic relations.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Indira Gandhi
President Prime Minister
Islamic Republic of Pakistan Republic of India
Simla, the 2nd July, 1972

Sheikh–Indira Accord, 1975

Agreed Conclusions
1. The State of Jammu and Kashmir which is a constituent unit of the Union
of India, shall, in its relation with the Union, continue to be governed by
Article 370 of the Constitution of India.
2. The residuary powers of legislation shall remain with the State; however,
Parliament will continue to have power to make laws relating to the
prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or
disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about
cession of a part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the
territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian National
Flag, the Indian National Anthem and the Constitution.
3. Where any provision of the Constitution of India had been applied to the
State of Jammu and Kashmir with adaptation and modification, such
adaptations and modifications can be altered or repealed by an order of the
President under Article 370, each individual proposal in this behalf being
considered on its merits ; but provisions of the Constitution of India already
applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir without adaptation or
modification are unalterable.
4. With a view to assuring freedom to the State of Jammu and Kashmir to
have its own legislation on matters like welfare measures, cultural matters,
social security, personal law and procedural laws, in a manner suited to the
special conditions in the State, it is agreed that the State Government can
review the laws made by Parliament or extended to the State after 1953 on
any matter relatable to the Concurrent List and may decide which of them,
in its opinion, needs amendment or repeal. Thereafter, appropriate steps
may be taken under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. The grant of
President’s assent to such legislation would be sympathetically considered.
The same approach would be adopted in regard to laws to be made by
Parliament in future under the Proviso to clause 2 of the Article. The State
Government shall be consulted regarding the application of any such law to
the State and the views of the State Government shall receive the fullest
consideration.
5. As an arrangement reciprocal to what has been provided under Article
368, a suitable modification of that Article as applied to State should be
made by Presidential order to the effect that no law made by the
Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, seeking to make any change
in or in the effect of any provision of Constitution of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir relating to any of the under mentioned matters, shall take
effect unless the Bill, having been reserved for the consideration of the
President, receives his assent ; the matters are: -
a. the appointment, powers, functions, duties, privileges and immunities of
the Governor, and
b. the following matters relating to Elections namely, the superintendence,
direction and control of Elections by the Election Commission of India,
eligibility for inclusion in the electoral rolls without discrimination, adult
suffrage and composition of the Legislative Council, being matters specified
in sections 138,139, 140 and 50 of the Constitution of the State of Jammu
and Kashmir.
6. No agreement was possible on the question of nomenclature of the
Governor and the Chief Minister and the matter is therefore remitted to the
Principals.
Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg
G. Parthasarthi
New Delhi, November 13,1974.

From 1988 onwards , once again an armed revolution re-emerged with full
public support thus Kashmir got wracked by brutal violence. Confrontation
between militants and security forces led to thousands of deaths, the
imposition of draconian laws, and massive violations of civil liberties; and
the cost ordinary people have had to pay for a conflict . Initially current
armed resistance launched by Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)in
1989 , which gave full flip to the independence ideology in Jammu Kashmir
administered by India and brought complete collapse of Indian state writ at
the same time several militant organization in Kashmir came to fore like
Hizbul Mujahidin, Al Jehad , Al Umer , Harkat-ul Mujahidin, Harkat-ul Ansar
and late Lasker-e-Toiba, Jaish Mohammad who had intoduced new type of
gurillea warfare (Fidayeen Attacks) . The conflict in Jammu Kashmir
between the Indian military and armed Kashmiri separatist groups that
began in 1989 has had devastating consequences. More than 6,00000 people(
Alhtough Indian authorites confirm figures less) have died about 10,000
missing in custody and many more have been injured or left homeless. India
has over 75,00,000 troops stationed in Kashmir directed . According to
international human rights groups, the Indian security forces have carried
out widespread detention without trial, torture and extra-judicial killings in
a bid to terrorise the local population and stamp out sympathy for the
resistance group. While the kashmiris fight for their freedom from illegal
occupation by India,they are subject to continuous torture and human rights
violation unprecedented in history.India claims it to be a Pakistan backed
terrorism whereas the truth is that it is a peoples’ movement who are part
and parcel of the armed struggle.This is clear from the Indian attitude
towards civilians.The civilians call their militants “mujahids”-those who
fight for a real cause. And India continues on its path to crush the
resistance.what can these very few events depict?

• January 20, 1990: Gawakadal massacre, At least 50 Kashmiri protesters are

shot to death by Indian paramilitary forces on the Gawakadal bridge in
Srinagar in an incident that later becomes known as the Gawakadal massacre.
• 28 February, 1990 Zakoora And Tengpora Massacre, 1990 In order to halt
massive demonstrations by the people, who were to submit a memorandum to
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP),
Indian army opened fire at Tengpora bypass and Zakoora crossing in Srinagar,
killing 26 and 21 demonstrators, respectively.
• Feberuary 23, 1991: The Kunan Poshpora incidentIndian army gang raped 23
and perhaps as amny as 100 women during a search and interrogation
operation in the village of Kunan Poshpora during night, located in Kashmir's
remote Kupwara District, and carried out one of the largest-scale mass rape in
the history of the Kashmir conflict.
• January 3, 1993: Sopore massacre Indian paramilitary forces burn
down the main market in the town of Sopore and open fire on
bystanders, killing at least 55 in what becomes known as the Sopore
massacre.
• October 22, 1993:Bijbehara Massacre51 unarmed civilians were killed
in an arbitrarily firing on a crowd, by the 74 Battalion of Indian
paramilitary Border Security Force (BSF) in Bijbehara, district
Anantnag of Indian administrated Jammu and Kashmir, during a
peaceful protest against the siege of the Hazratbal Mosque
• March 8, 1996:Jalil Andrabi murder case Jalil Andrabi, a prominent
Kashmiri human rights lawyer and pro-independence political activist
subjected to extra-judicial execution by Indian paramilitary troopers.
• February, 2001: An Indian army convoy kills 4 protesters, including
two women, as well as critically wounding 18 others - the protesters
were protesting against the killing of Jaleel Ahmed Shah.
• February 22, 2006: Doodhipora killing, 2006 Four teenagers killed by
Indian troops of 33 Rashtriya Rifles
• February 2007: Protests erupt in the Kashmir Valley as police
exhumed the bodies of civilians killed in fake encounters
• June-August, 2008: Widespread protests in Kashmir due to Amarnath
land transfer controversy. 40 unarmed civilians were killed and
hundreds injured besides hundreds jailed by Indian soldiers.
 • forces
March 19, 2009:Khaigam killing, 2009: Protesters angry about the
killing of a carpenter, allegedly by Indian paramilitary forces. In
response, villagers on Thursday staged massive protests, shouting
anti-India and pro-independence slogans.
• March 20, 2009: Indian army admits that three of its soldiers killed
two civilians in a incident which took place in the North of Indian-
occupied Kashmir.
• 29 June 2009:Baramulla killing, June 2009 Four people were killed in
an indiscriminate firing incident by Indian Armed Forces over the
unarmed protesters protesting against the overnight indecent
behaviour of a policemen in police station with a woman.
•
• June 4, 2009: Thousands of people demonstrated in India-
administrated Kashmir, against Indian soldiers for the rape and
murder of two women, Aasiya aged 16 and her sister-in-law Nelofer
aged 22. The second woman was pregnant.Hartal continued for a
month only to witness more brutalities.People expressing support to
the bereaved family killed in broad day light at their respective
homes.The brother of Aasiya(Nelofer’s husband) beated to critical
condition.
• July 9, 2009: Thousands of protesters marched towards an army base
in Indian-administered Kashmir following the death of a young woman
after being assaulted by members of India's Territorial Army. The
death is the tenth in recent weeks to be blamed on the Indian
security
While the world watches silently, the Kashmiris are calling them to witness
what they are subject to and demand justice for them.

ARMED FORCES SPECIAL POWERS ACT(AFSPA)

An Act to enable certain special powers to be conferred upon members of
the armed forces in the disturbed areas in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
BE it enacted by Parliament in the Forty-first Year of the Republic of India
as follows :-
1. Short title, extent and commencement.- (1) This Act may be called the
Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990.
(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
(3) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 5th day of July, 1990.
2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) "armed forces" means the military forces and the air forces operating as
land forces and includes any other armed forces of the Union so operating ;
(b) "disturbed area" means an area which is for the time being declared by
notification under section 3 to be a disturbed areas;
(c) all other words and expressions used herein, but not defined and defined
in the Air Force Act, 1950(45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950(46 of 1950),
shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in those Acts.
3. Power to declare areas to be disturbed areas.- If, in relation to the State
of Jammu and Kashmir, the Governor of the State or the Central
Government, is of opinion that the whole or any part of the State is in such
a disturbed and dangerous condition that the use of armed forces in aid of
the civil power is necessary to prevent -
(a) activities involving terrorist acts directed towards overawing the
Government as by law established or striking terror in the people or any
section of the people of alienating any section of the people or adversely
affecting the harmony amongst different sections of the people ;
(b) activities directed towards disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a
part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the territory of India
from the Union or causing insult to the Indian National Flag, the Indian
National Anthem and the Constitution of India,
the Governor of the State or the Central Government, may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, declare the whole or any part of the State to be a
disturbed area.
Explanation.- In this section, "terrorist act" has the same meaning as in
Explanation to article 248 of the Constitution of India as applicable to the
State of Jammu and Kashmir.
4. Special powers of the armed forces.- Any commissioned officer, warrant
officer, non-commissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in
the armed forces may, in a disturbed area,-
(a) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of
public order, after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary,
fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, against any
person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being
in force in the disturbed area prohibiting the assembly of five or more
persons or the carrying of weapons or of things capable of being used as
weapons or of fire-arms, ammunition or explosive substances ;
(b) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, destroy any arms dump,
prepared or fortified position or shelter from which armed attacks are made
or are likely to be made or are attempted to be made, or any structure used
as a training camp for armed volunteers or utilised as a hide-out by armed
gangs or absconders wanted for any offence ;
(c) arrest, without warrant, any person who has committed a cognizable
offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he has
committed or is about to commit a cognizable offence and may use such
force as may be necessary to effect the arrest ;
(d) enter and search, without warrant, any premises to make any such
arrest as aforesaid or to recover any person believed to be wrongfully
restrained or confined or any property reasonably suspected to be stolen
property or any arms, ammunition or explosive substances believed to be
unlawfully kept in such premises, and may for that purpose use such force
as may be necessary, and seize any such property, arms, ammunition or
explosive substances ;
(e) stop, search and seize any vehicle or vessel reasonably suspected to be
carrying any person who is a proclaimed offender, or any person who has
committed a non-cognizable offence, or against whom a reasonable
suspicion exists that he has committed or is about to commit a non-
cognizable offence, or any person who is carrying any arms, ammunition or
explosive substance believed to be unlawfully held by him, and may, for
that purpose, use such force as may be necessary to effect such stoppage,
search or seizure, as the case may be.
5. Power of search to include powers to break open locks, etc. - Every
person making a search under this Act shall have the power to break open
the lock of any door, almirah, safe, box, cupboard, drawer, package or
other thing, if the key thereof is withheld.
6. Arrested persons and seized property to be made over to the police.- Any
person arrested and taken into custody under this Act and every property,
arms, ammunition or explosive substance or any vehicle or vessel seized
under this Act, shall be made over to the officer-in-charge of the nearest
police station with the least possible delay, together with a report of the
circumstances occasioning the arrest, or as the case may be, occasioning
the seizure of such property, arms, ammunition or explosive substance or
any vehicle or vessel, as the case may be.
7. Protection of persons acting in good faith under this Act.- No prosecution,
suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the previous
sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of
anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred
by this Act.
8. Repeal and saving.- (1) The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special
Powers Ordinance, 1990(Ord.3 of 1990), is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under
the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the
corresponding provisions of this Act.

At political front in 1993 , All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) was

established to give political dimension to the resistance movement .
Meanwhile in 1994 JKLF announced unilateral ceasefire to start nonviolent
political resistance movement in Kashmir although some contradicted with
the decision of Yasin Malik , which led to the diversion! .
Indo-Israeli economic, military and strategic relationship

During the tenure of the Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP),
relations between India and Israel blossomed. The relations have continued
to grow ever since the Indian National Congress (INC) came to power in
2004. By 2008, bilateral trade between India and Israel exceeded US$4
billion and Israel was India's second-largest military supplier after Russia. It
was expected that Israel would overtake Russia as the largest arms supplier
to India, which it did in 2009.
As of 2008, India has bought more than US$5 billion worth of Israeli
equipment since 2002. In addition, Israel is training Indian military units and
discussing an arrangement to give Indian commandos instruction in counter-
militant tactics and urban warfare. There is also growing space cooperation
between the two. In February 2008, the Indian Space Research Organization
(ISRO) launched an Israeli spy satellite to monitor the activities of
Iran.[cxlvi]

International Commission of Jurists' Report, 1995

Human Rights in Kashmir: Report of a Mission by Sir William Goodhart
(UnitedKingdom) Dr. Dalmo de Abreu Dallari (Brazil Ms Florence Butegwa
(Uganda) Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn(Thailand) Geneva, Switzerland .
The members of the ICJ Mission were the first representatives of any
international human rights organisation to be authorised by the Indian
Government to visit Kashmir in 1995, since the start of the popular upring in
Indian administered Kashmir in 1989.
After visiting Delhi, the ICJ mission spent two days in Srinagar and two days
in Jammu. Regrettably, the Indian authorities severely restricted its
movements in Srinagar. The ICJ mission had been assured in Delhi that it
would be allowed to hold meetings in a hotel in central Srinagar, to which
anyone who wished to meet the mission would have access. However, this
assurance was overruled by Lt. Gen. Zaki, the Governor's security adviser in
Srinagar, who also refused to allow the members to accept an invitation to
visit the Bar Association's offices in the Court precinct. As a result, the ICJ
mission had to hold its meetings in a State guesthouse in a military
cantonment outside Srinagar.
Recent years have been a tragedy for Kashmir. One aspect of the tragedy
manifested itself to us on a fine summer evening in Kashmir, looking out
from an empty Pari Mahal over an empty Dal Lake, once swarming with
activity. Another aspect manifested itself in the refugee camps of Jammu
and Azad Kashmir, where victims of the tragedy demonise each other and
maimed men and assaulted women are presented to tell their well-
rehearsed stories.
International standards of human rights pertain to Jammu and Kashmir as
elsewhere. Significantly, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
establishes universal benchmarks in relation to civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights for measuring the practices of States against
international norms.
In regard to India, it is all the more significant that the country is also a
party to the 1966 ICCPR which reinforces universal standards in the civil and
political field, closely linked with the Rule of Law. The human rights
propounded in this instrument include the right to self-determination, the
right against arbitrary arrest, security of the person, freedom from torture,
and equality before the law. India is also a party to the 1966 ICESCR and the
1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. Regrettably, Pakistan has not become a party to either the
ICCPR or the ICESCR.
At the time of accession to the ICCPR, India showed her reluctance to
accept the totality of human rights standards by entering reservations to
articles 9 (right against arbitrary arrest and detention), 19 (freedom of
expression), 21 (right of peaceful assembly) and 22 (freedom of
association). Articles 19, 21 and 22 were made subject to reasonable
restrictions referred to in article 19 of the Constitution of India.
Of particular concern has been the failure of India to abide by the standards
set by the ICCPR because of a variety of legislative discrepancies dealt with
below. These have been aggravated by numerous malpractices on the part
of governmental personnel operating in Jammu and Kashmir, documented
extensively but both national and international sources.
India has treated the situation of Jammu and Kashmir as a state of
emergency but has avoided classifying it as such in international terms,
thereby obstructing the call for accountability and transparency inherent in
the comments of the Human Rights Committee.
India has been reluctant to classify the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir as a
non-international armed conflict under the Geneva Conventions for fear of
internationalising the Kashmir issue. At the time of the ICJ mission's visit to
India, it had not allowed the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), a key international organisation, offering protection and assistance
in such situations, to operate in Jammu and Kashmir. This has regrettably
prevented access to affected parties and has impeded the quest for
assistance and protection of innocent persons.
The special status of Jammu Kashmir has been eroded in recent times by
legislative and executive encroachment form India; article 370 has been
diluted by India so as to confer greater powers upon it to administer Jammu
and Kashmir.
Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 1978
By this Act, the Government may detain a person “with a view to preventing
him from acting in any manner prejudicial…to the security of the State and
the maintenance of public order.
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) 1987
The Act established special courts or “designated courts” to try those
arrested for terrorist acts and disruptive activities. It confers broad
discretion upon the authorities to arrest persons and to try them.
Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1990
This Act gives the Governor or the Central Government power to declare the
whole or part of the State to be a disturbed area and to authorize the use of
the armed forces in aid of the civil power.
Other laws
Other laws have been promulgated or revived recently with negative impact
on human rights. In February 1992, an ordinance was issued under Article
370 of the Indian Constitution extending presidential rule in relation to
Jammu and Kashmir from the previous period of three years to four years;
this prolonged the use of presidential rule as opposed to reversion to an
elected system. In July 1992 the Indian Parliament passed the Jammu and
Kashmir Legislature (Delegation of Power) Bill which transferred
parliamentary powers to deal with that state to the President of India. In
1992, the Jammu and Kashmir Government also recommended that the
central government should revive a variety of old laws so as to be able to
administer the region more closely. These included the Jammu and Kashmir
Criminal Law Amendment Act, which permitted the confiscation of property
of unlawful bodies without the need to seek approval from a designated
tribunal.
There have been grave breaches of human rights by the Indian security
forces in Kashmir.
Extra-judicial executions
The deliberate killing of people in police or military custody is simple
murder and is the most serious of all the allegations against the security
forces. The ICJ mission has no doubt that such killings have occurred on a
significant scale. What is far more difficult is to estimate the numbers,
particularly as the security forces often claim that the victim has been
killed in “crossfire”.
Torture
Numerous incidents of torture committed by government personnel have
been documented by a variety of sources.
Torture is virtually a matter of routine use in interrogation. The forms of
torture range from electric shocks to beatings, other forms of violence and
sexual abuse. To prevent hospitals from documenting torture evidenced by
patients' symptoms, since 1990 medical records have been removed from
hospitals.
Disappearances These practices occur sporadically. Most of the
disappearances do not involve killing but arise because a detainee has been
held incommunicado or been moved out of the State without notice. This is
compounded by the fact that the applications for habeas corpus are not
responded to effectively by the courts.
Rape
The most serious allegation relates to the village of Kunan Poshpora, where
it is alleged that at least 23 women were raped by soldiers of the 4th
Rajputana Rifles on the night of 23/24 February 1991.
The Indian Government was initially slow to take action against members of
the security forces accused of rape, apart from one case where a Canadian
tourist was raped. In recent months, it appears that more action has been
taken. Many rapes took place in the course of crackdowns, where men and
women in the districts being searched were separated. Changes in
crackdown procedure - including the presence of women members of the
security forces with the units conducting the crackdowns - appear to have
had some effect in reducing the number of rapes. There is no evidence that
the government has encouraged rape or used it as a deliberate policy. It
would indeed have been insane to do so, as nothing would be more
calculated to strengthen support for the militants.
Assaults
Innumerable assaults have been witnessed in Jammu and Kashmir. Many are
in relation to the cordon-and-search operations, which often end in
violence. Particularly vulnerable groups included women and children.
Doctors and other medical personnel have also been assaulted and harassed
by security forces while trying to help the injured. The patients themselves
have been assaulted while undergoing treatment and have at times been
prevented from receiving medical care. These assaults have taken place
when security forces raid hospitals.
Destruction of property and theft
There are many incidents of arson by the security forces. These have led to
hundreds of houses and shops being burnt, along with other property such as
barns and haystacks. There have also been many cases of looting and theft.
Constraints upon personal and family life
In substance, there is a state of emergency in Kashmir and this undermines
much of daily personal and family life. The curfews and instances of
violence already noted prevent children from attending school. The abuses
committed by government forces against men and women disrupt personal
and family life continually. Health services have also been affected by raids
and curfews, resulting in depletion of health personnel, particularly in rural
areas. The situation is now aggravated by the fact that militants are
increasingly violent towards innocent civilians.

Conclusions
Regarding the right of self-determination:
The peoples of the State of Jammu and Kashmir acquired a right of self-
determination at the time of the partition of India.
The right has neither been exercised nor abandoned and therefore remains
capable of exercise.
Full or limited independence for Kashmir is a possible option.
The parties should be encouraged to seek a negotiated solution to be put to
the peoples of the state for ratification in a referendum.
Both India and Pakistan should recognize and respond to the call for self-
determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir within its 1947
boundaries, inherent in the relevant United Nations resolutions. The United
Nations should re-activate its role as a catalyst in this process
Joint Statement
The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan held a bilateral meeting on the
sidelines of UN General Assembly in New York on 23rd September, 1998.
Their discussions covered the whole range of bilateral relations. The two
Prime Ministers also carried out a detailed review of new developments in
the region during the past few months.
They reaffirmed their common belief that an environment of durable peace
and security was in the supreme interest of both India and Pakistan, and of
the region as a whole. They expressed their determination to renew and
reinvigorate efforts to secure such an environment. They agreed that the
peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir,
was essential for this purpose.
The two leaders reiterated their commitment to create conditions which
would enable both countries to fully devote their resources, both human
and material, to improving the lives of their people, particularly the poorest
among them.
The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction the agreement reached
between the Foreign Secretaries on operationalizing the mechanism to
address all items in the agreed agenda of 23rd June, 1997 in a purposeful
and composite manner. They directed the Foreign Secretaries, accordingly,
to resume the dialogue on the agreed dates.
New York September 23, 1998

LAHORE DECLARATION SIGNED ON THE CONCLUSION OF PRIME MINISTER OF

INDIA 'S VISIT TO LAHORE : 21 FEBRUARY, 1999
The Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan , and the Republic of
India : -
Sharing a vision of peace and stability between their countries, and of
progress and prosperity for their peoples;
Convinced that durable peace and development of harmonious relations and
friendly cooperation will serve the vital interests of the peoples of the two
countries, enabling them to devote their energies for a better future;
Recognizing that the nuclear dimension of the security environment of the
two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between
the two countries;
Committed to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United
Nations, and the universally accepted principles of peaceful co-existence;
Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla
Agreement in letter and spirit;
Committed to the objectives of universal nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation;
Convinced of the importance of mutually agreed confidence building
measures for improving the security environment;
Recalling their agreement of 23 September, 1998, that an environment of
peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that
the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, is
essential for this purpose;

Have agreed that their respective government: -

• shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issues of
Jammu and Kashmir .
• shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal
affairs.
• shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early
and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda.
• shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and discuss concepts and doctrines
with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the nuclear
and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.
• reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to
concert their efforts towards the realization of the SAARC vision for the year
2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the welfare of the peoples of
South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic
growth, social progress and cultural development.
• reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations and their determination to combat this menace.
• shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Signed at Lahore
on the 21st day of February 1999.

Joint statement
The Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Sartaj Aziz and the Minister of External
Affairs of India, Shri Jaswant Singh met today on the sidelines of the 21st
Session of the SAARC Council of Ministers at Nuwara Eliya, Sri Lanka.
They reiterated the historic significance of the Lahore Declaration which
embodies the vision of the Prime Ministers of the two countries for ending
the legacy of tensions and conflicts of the past fifty years and for ushering a
new era of peace, security and prosperity. They discussed ways and means
to build on the Lahore Declaration which commits the two countries to build
trust and confidence, develop mutually beneficial cooperation and intensify
their efforts to resolve all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir.
The two Foreign Ministers agreed on the urgency of taking concrete
measures for implementation of the Lahore Declaration, the Memorandum
of Understanding and the Joint Statement issued during the Lahore Summit.
In this context, the Ministers agreed that the composite and integrated
dialogue process must be intensified.
The Ministers agreed to the following :
(i) The meetings of Experts for implementation of the Memorandum of
Understanding will be held over the next two months.
(ii) The next round of the composite and integrated dialogue process in
accordance with the agreed agenda will commence in May 1999 in New Delhi
and Islamabad and will be held over a period of six weeks.
(iii) They will meet shortly after the conclusion of the May - June Round of
the composite and integrated dialogue process.
(iv) The Committee on humanitarian issues composed of Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and the Ministers of State of External Affairs of
India set up the Prime Ministers at the Lahore Summit will meet in April
1999 to formalize the agreement on the issue of release of civilian prisoners
as well as to discuss other humanitarian issues.
(v) That both sides have agreed to relax the visa regime for several
categories of visitors. The specific visa relaxation measures shall be
announced by the two Governments shortly.
(vi) Delegations of experts from India shall visit Pakistan during April 1999
for identifying areas of cooperation in information technology, Y2K and
WTO-related issues.
Sri Lanka March 19, 1999.

Kargil War(1999)
Date: May-July 1999
Location : Kargil district, Kashmir
Territorial changes : Status quo
Commanders
India: Ved Prakash Malik
Pakistan : Pervez Musharraf
Strength
India: 30,000, Pakistan: 5,000
Casualties and losses
Indian Official Figures[cxlvii]:527 killed,1,363 wounded,1POW
Pakistani figures[cxlviii] :
357 Killed mainly Mujahideen(Militants) and some Pakistani troops,665
wounded ,8 POWs
As per independent sources estimates of deaths are not clearly indicated.

The Kargil War, also known as the Kargil conflict,[cxlix] was an armed
conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July
1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of
Control. The cause of the war was the infiltration of Kashmiri militants into
positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC)[cl]. Which serves as
the de facto border between the two states. During the initial stages of the
war, Pakistan claimed that the fighting was entirely started by independent
Kashmiri militants , but Indian blamed for the involvement of Pakistani
paramilitary forces[cli], led by General Ashraf Rashid.[clii]
Indian side of the LoC infiltrated by the Pakistani troops and millitants. With
international diplomatic support especially America and UK, the Pakistani
forces were forced to withdraw from positions held along the LOC. The war
is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous
terrain, which poses significant logistical problems for the combating sides.
This was only the second direct ground war between any two countries after
they had developed nuclear weapons, after the Sino-Soviet border conflict
of 1969; The conflict led to heightened tension between the two nations
and increased defence spending by India. Since Pakistan and India each had
weapons of mass destruction, many in the international community were
concerned that if the Kargil conflict intensified, it could lead to nuclear
war. Both countries had tested their nuclear capability in 1998 (India
conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever nuclear
test). Many pundits believed the tests to be an indication of the escalating
stakes in the scenario in South Asia. When the Kargil conflict started just a
year after the nuclear tests, many nations desired to end it before it
intensified.
The nature of the India-Pakistan conflict took a more sinister turn when the
U.S. received intelligence that Pakistani nuclear warheads were being
moved towards the border. Bill Clinton tried to dissuade then Pakistan
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from nuclear brinkmanship, even threatening
Pakistan of dire consequences. According to a White House official, Sharif
seemed to be genuinely surprised by this supposed missile movement and
responded that India was probably planning the same. In an article in May
2000 Dr Sanjay Badri-Maharaj claimed that India too had readied at least
five nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles[cliii].
Following the Washington accord on July 4, where Sharif agreed to withdraw
Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt ,the fighting
ceased on July 26 ,the day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas
(Kargil Victory Day) in India[cliv].

Later on November 19,2000 Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee

announced that Indian troops would halt all offensive actions against
Kashmiri separatist[Pro-freedom]groups in the state of Jammu Kashmir
during the Islamic month of Ramadan. While the military would remain on
“full alert against any attack,” it would suspend combat operations as of
November 28.
Pakistan cautiously welcomed the move and, responding to mounting
international pressure, announced on December 2 that its armed forces
would exercise “maximum restraint” along the Line of Control that
separates Jammu Kashmir from Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir. Pakistan's
military ruler General Pervez Musharraf called for tri-partite talks between
the two countries and Kashmiri groups, and offered to fly to New Delhi on
24-hours notice to meet with Vajpayee if an invitation was forthcoming.
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar hinted in a statement that
Islamabad might be prepared to accept a greater status for the Line of
Control.[clv] He said his government was prepared to stand by the July 4,
1999 statement signed by the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif .Although
Pakistan insists that Kashmir's future be decided by a referendum in both
the Pakistani- and Indian- controlled parts, as laid down in a 1948-49 UN
resolution.
But the tentative nature of the process was underscored when India ruled
out any tri-partite talks. Indian external affairs spokesman Raminder Singh
commented that, while India was ready to negotiate with all groups in
Kashmir, there was no role for Pakistan. India has always insisted that
Kashmir is an internal matter and has repeatedly opposed any Pakistani or
international involvement.
Attempts to start negotiations floundered on the same issue. Hizbul
Mujahideen, the largest armed Kashmiri separatist organisation, declared a
unilateral three-month ceasefire in July 2000. Unprecedented talks between
representatives of the group and the Indian government took place in the
Kashmiri capital of Srinagar but rapidly broke down when the Indian
government rejected Hizbul's demands for Pakistan to be included in any
negotiations over a permanent solution.[clvi]

Joint Statement
(January 06, 2004)

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India met during the
SAARC Summit in Islamabad .
The Indian Prime Minister while expressing satisfaction over the successful
conclusion of the SAARC Summit appreciated the excellent arrangements
made by the host country.
Both leaders welcomed the recent steps towards normalization of relations
between the two countries and expressed the hope that the positive trends
set by the CBMs would be consolidated.
Prime Minister Vajpayee said that in order to take forward and sustain the
dialogue process, violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented.
President Musharraf reassured Prime Minister Vajpayee that he will not
permit any territory under Pakistan 's control to be used to support
terrorism in any manner. President Musharraf emphasized that a sustained
and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results.
To carry the process of normalisation forward the President of Pakistan and
the Prime Minister of India agreed to commence the process of the
composite dialogue in February 2004. The two leaders are confident that
the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement
of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir , to the satisfaction of
both sides.
The two leaders agreed that constructive dialogue would promote progress
towards the common objective of peace, security and economic
development for our peoples and for future generations.

Islamabad
January 06, 2004

Joint Statement
1. The President of Pakistan, His Excellency General Pervez Musharraf and
Begum Sehba Musharraf visited New Delhi as guests of the Prime Minister of
India and Shrimati Gursharan Kaur on 16 to 18 April 2005.
2. While in New Delhi , the President of Pakistan called on the President of
India. He also had a meeting with the Prime Minister of India, who hosted a
dinner in his honour. The President also watched the last one-day
international cricket match between India and Pakistan .
3. The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India used the
opportunity provided by the visit to review progress in Pakistan-India
relations. They assessed positively the progress that had been made so far
through confidence building, people-to-people contacts and enhancing areas
of interactions and determined to build on the momentum already achieved.
4. They reaffirmed the commitments made in the Joint Press Statement of
January 6, 2004 and the Joint Statement issued after their meeting in New
York on September 24, 2004 and expressed satisfaction on the progress in
the peace process and the improvement of relations between the two
countries that has since been realized.
5. Conscious of the historic opportunity created by the improved
environment in relations and the overwhelming desire of the peoples of the
two countries for durable peace and recognizing their responsibility to
continue to move forward towards that objective, the two leaders had
substantive talks on all issues. They determined that the peace process was
now irreversible.
6. In this spirit the two leaders addressed the issue of Jammu and Kashmir
and agreed to continue these discussions in a sincere and purposeful and
forward looking manner for a final settlement. They were satisfied with the
discussions and expressed their determination to work together to carry
forward the process and to bring the benefit of peace to their people.
7. They also agreed to pursue further measures to enhance interaction and
cooperation across the LoC including agreed meeting points for divided
families, trade, pilgrimages and cultural interaction.
8. They condemned attempts to disrupt the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus
service and welcomed its successful operationalisation. The two leaders
pledged that they would not allow terrorism to impede the peace process.
9. They decided to increase the frequency of the bus service and also
decided that trucks would be allowed to use this route to promote trade.
They also agreed to operationalise additional routes including that between
Poonch and Rawalakot. They also look forward to early start of the bus
service between Amritsar and Lahore and to religious places such as
Nankana Sahib.
10. They agreed to re-establish the Khokhrapar-Munnabao route by 1 st
January 2006 .
11. They agreed that the Consulates General of the two countries in Mumbai
and Karachi respectively would be opened before the end of the current
year.
12. They endorsed the decisions taken in the meeting of Foreign Secretaries
of the two countries on 27-28 December 2004, and the Foreign Minister on
15-17 February 2005, on the schedule of meetings later in the year, the
agreements to be worked upon through these meetings and the measures to
be taken to alleviate the situation on prisoners.
13. On the issues of Sir Creek and Siachen, they instructed that the existing
institutional mechanisms should convene discussions immediately with a
view to finding mutually acceptable solutions to both issues expeditiously.
14. It was agreed that the Ministers of Petroleum and Natural Gas would
meet in May to explore cooperation in the sector including on the issue of
pipelines.
15. Both leaders agreed that enhanced economic and commercial
cooperation would contribute to the well-being of the peoples of the two
countries and bring a higher level of prosperity for the region. The two
leading economies of South Asia should work together for the greater
prosperity of the region.
16. The leaders decided to reactivate the Joint Economic Commission as
early as possible. They also agreed that the Joint Business Council should
meet soon.
17. The President of Pakistan conveyed his gratitude for the hospitality
provided during the visit and invited the Prime Minister to visit Pakistan .
The invitation was accepted in principle. Mutually agreed dates would be
worked out through diplomatic channels.

New Delhi
April 18, 2005 .

Joint Statement
President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had
a cordial, frank and detailed exchange of views on all aspects of India-
Pakistan relations.
Desirous of carrying forward the dialogue process, the leaders reiterated
their commitments and determination to implement the joint statement of
6 January 2004, 24 September 2004, 18 April 2005 and 14 September 2005.
The leaders agreed that the peace process must be maintained and its
success was important for both countries and the future of the entire
region.
In this context, they directed the Foreign Secretaries to resume composite
dialogue at the earliest possible.
The two leaders met in the aftermath of Mumbai blasts. The leaders
strongly condemned all acts of terrorism and agreed that terrorism is a
scourge that needs to be effectively dealt with.
They decided to put in place an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional
mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and
investigations.
The leaders decided to continue the joint search for mutually acceptable
options for a peaceful negotiated settlement of all issues between India and
Pakistan including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir in a sincere and
purposeful manner.
On the Jammu and Kashmir issue, there have been useful discussions. There
is a need to build on convergences and narrow down divergences.
The two leaders also directed the Foreign Secretaries on the following:
The Foreign Secretaries should meet shortly in New Delhi to continue the
Composite Dialogue.
To arrange consultations for an early solution of the Siachen issue. Experts
should meet immediately to agree on coordinates for joint survey of Sir
Creek and adjoining area, without prejudice to each others position on the
issue. The survey should commence in November 2006. The experts should
start discussion on the Maritime boundary.
The two sides will facilitate implementation of agreements and
understandings already reached on LoC related CBMs, including bus services,
crossing points and truck service.
The President of Pakistan renewed his invitation to the Prime Minister of
India to visit Pakistan .
Thanking the President, the Prime Minister indicated that he looked forward
to a purposeful visit at a time to be determined through diplomatic
channels.

(Meeting between President of Pakistan and Prime Prime Minister of India on

the sidelines of NAM Summit , Havana on 16 September 2006)
Demographics of Kashmir; historical
Perspective
In the 1901 Census of the British Indian Empire, the population of the
princely state of Kashmir was 2,905,578. Of these 2,154,695 were Muslims,
689,073 Hindus, 25,828 Sikhs, and 35,047 Buddhists. The Hindus were found
mainly in Jammu, where they constituted a little less than 50% of the
population. [clvii]In the Kashmir Valley, the Hindus represented "only 524 in
every 10,000 of the population (i.e. 5.24%), and in the frontier wazarats of
Ladhakh and Gilgit only 94 out of every 10,000 persons (0.94%)." [clviii]In the
same Census of 1901, in the Kashmir Valley, the total population was
recorded to be 1,157,394, of which the Muslim population was 1,083,766, or
93.6% of the population. [clix]These percentages have remained fairly stable
for the last 100 years. [clx]In the 1941 Census of British India, Muslims
accounted for 93.6% of the population of the Kashmir Valley and the Hindus
constituted 4%. [clxi]and those of Hindus 4%; the same year, in Jammu, the
percentage of Hindus was 67% and those of Muslims 27%. [clxii]In the Census
of 1901, four divisions were recorded among the Muslims of the princely
state: Shaikhs, Saiyids, Mughals, and Pathans. The Shaikhs were the most
numerous, with clan names (known as krams) including "Tantre," "Shaikh,"
"Mantu," "Ganai," "Dar," "Damar," "Lone" etc. [clxiii]The Saiyids, it was
recorded "could be divided into those who follow the profession of religion
and those who have taken to agriculture and other pursuits. Their kram
name is "Mir." While a Saiyid retains his saintly profession Mir is a prefix; if
he has taken to agriculture, Mir is an affix to his name[clxiv]The Mughals
who were not numerous were recorded to have kram names like "Mir" (a
corruption of "Mirza"), "Beig," "Bandi," "Bach," and "Ashaye." Finally, it was
recorded that the Pathans "who are more numerous than the Mughals, ...
are found chiefly in the south-west of the valley, where Pathan colonies
have from time to time been founded. The most interesting of these
colonies is that of Kuki-Khel Afridis at Dranghaihama, who retain all the old
customs and speak Pashtu[clxv]The Hindu population of Kashmir Valley in
1901 was recorded to be 60,641. [clxvi]Among the Hindus of Jammu
province, who numbered 626,177 (or 90.87% of the Hindu population of the
princely state), the most important castes recorded in the census were
"Brahmans (186,000), the Rajputs (167,000), the Khattris (48,000) and the
Thakkars (93,000)." [clxvii]

The language geography of the State has changed after 1947 when a large
chunk of the State was either administered by Pakistan or India .The new
ground situation is that all the Kashmiri, Dogri, Gujari and Ladakhi speaking
areas along with some small pockets of Dardi speaking people-Buddhist
Brukpas in Da Hanu area of Ladakh, people of Dras (Ladakh) and Gurez
(Baramulla) lie within the Indian administered part of Jammu Kashmir.
Similarly, all the Pothawri (Lahanda) speaking areas in Poonch, Mirpur etc.
remain within the Pak- administered Kashmir. As regards the Baltis, they are
divided between those living in Kargil in Indian administered Ladakh and
across the Line of Actual Control in Baltistan (Northern Areas part of
Kashmir adminsered by Pakistan ). From within the Kashmiri speaking
community, almost the entire Kashmiri Hindu minority of more than three
lakhs left valley 1980-90 when militancy surfaced in Kashmir . Precarious
condition of these minority community persons living in various parts of
India and struggling for survival[identity], their language and culture are
likely to be the worst casuality .
A study of the language demography of Jammu Kashmir State establishes the
fact that the Lahnda (Pothwari) speaking area falls almost entirely across
the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Pak-administered Kashmir. That the LAC
on the western side coincides with the specific language culture area,
provides a natural permanence to the Line of Actual Control on ethno-
linguistic lines in this sector. This should provide a key to finding lasting
solution to vexed Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan. However,
this is not true of Balti speaking area, which remains divided by the Line of
Actual Control between Kargil area of Jammu Kashmir in Indian Aminsitered
and Baltistan region of Pak-adminsitered Kashmir. Regarding the evolution
and affinities of various mother tongues in Jammu Kashmir, it is established
that most of the languages are rooted in or have close affinities with the
Indo-Aryan languages. Whereas Dogri is closely related to Punjabi, Gujari is
akin to Rajasthani. Grierson's theory subscribe that Kashmiri belongs to the
Dardic branch of languages.Grierson's theory has been used as premier by an
American geographer, J.E. Schwartzberg and advocated the merger of
Kashmir valley with the Dardic speaking areas of Pak-adminstered
Kashmir(Azad Kashmir ) on the basis of linguistic and cultural affinity, as a
separate entity .
Kashmiri is the main language spoken in the State, its spatial distribution
being limited to the central valley of Kashmir and some parts of Doda.
Though Kashmiri has no 'functional role as a written language' now, it is
"overwhelmingly the language of personal and in-group communication. It is
the medium of dreams, mental arithmetic and reflection, of communication
within the family, with friends and in market places, in places of worship
etc.'' According to a survey, the Kashmiris view their language as "an integral
part of their identity" and want it to be accorded its due role in the fields of
education, mass-media and administration. The neglect of mother tongues
by the various rulers is the most salient language issue in Jammu Kashmir,
and the earlier it is remedied, the better. However, the only silver lining is
that Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims have identified Kashmiri as their mother
tongue.
Though Pahari has not been enumerated as a separate language in the JK
State Census Reports of 1961, 1971 and 1981, of late there have been
demands for grant of some concessions to 'Paharis' in the State. The Pahari
versus Gujar issue is a potential source of ethnic conflict as both the Pahari
and Gujar interests are in conflict with each other. Both the Pahari and
Gujar identities overlap in certain aspects particularly their hill settlement
pattern and some common language features. The grant of Scheduled Tribe
status on 19th April 1991 by the central government of India The non- Gujar
Muslims of the State have been peeved at the conferment of Scheduled
Tribe status and its benefits to the Gujars. They have now demanded similar
concession and the privileges associated with it for the 'Paharis' of Rajouri,
Poonch, Kupwara and Baramulla districts, i.e., where the Gujars are in
sizeable numbers. On 17 May 1992, the non-Gujar 'Pahari Board' was set up,
with eight Kashmiri Muslims, eight Rajput Muslims, two Syeds and four non-
Muslims as its members. On 18 December 1993, the State Governor, General
K. V. Krishna Rao issued a statement urging the central government to
declare the Paharis as Scheduled Tribes.
The existing spatial distribution of Gujar speakers, does provide some sort
of linguistic territorial homogeneity, which however, needs to be further
consolidated to help in preservation and promotion of Gujari language and
ethno- cultural heritage and fulfilling their socio-economic and political
aspirations within the State. Gujars are concentrated in specific border
belts surrounding the main Kashmiri speaking area, which mostly fall within
the Indian administered side of Line of Control, is yet another aspect of
political importance because on other side similar linguistic group do occur ,
both have strong relation with each other, although emotions seem to
suppressed but can erupt any time like a sleeping Valcano` . Therefore it
demonstrates that major adjustments are to taken up .
As already stated, all the Census reports have made a clear distinction
between the Ladakhi (Bhotia) and Tibetan speaking persons in Ladakh,
former being indigenous Ladakhis and the latter being Tibetan refugee
settlers.
Gilgit/Baltistan
Gilgit-Baltistan is administratively divided into two divisions which, in turn,
are divided into seven districts, including the two Baltistan districts of
Skardu and Ghanche, and the five Gilgit districts of Gilgit, Ghizer, Diamer,
Astore, and Hunza-Nagar. The main political centres are the towns of Gilgit
and Skardu, which is under the direct control of Pakistan . The region is
home to some of the world's highest mountain ranges—the main ranges are
the Karakoram and the western Himalayas. The Pamir Mountains are to the
north, and the Hindu Kush lies to the west. Amongst the highest mountains
are K2 (Mount Godwin-Austen) and Nanga Parbat, the latter being one of the
most feared mountains in the world.
Three of the world's longest glaciers outside the polar regions are found in
Gilgit-Baltistan — the Biafo Glacier, the Baltoro Glacier, and the Batura
Glacier. On 29 August 2009, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-
Governance Order 2009, was passed by the Pakistani cabinet and later
signed by the President. It granted self-rule to the people of the former
Northern Areas, now renamed "Gilgit-Baltistan," by creating, among other
things, an elected legislative assembly, elections were held in November,
2009 and there is elected assembly now. See Pic 7

[
i])http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/80699, By :Sagar a
social activist and a senior coloumnist on Kashmir affairs)
[
ii] )Kunal Chattopadhyay ,blackwellrefrence.com/public/tocnode?id
[
iii]) Letter from Maharaja Hari Singh to Lord Mountbatten on the eve of
tribal invasion on J&K in 1947, Hari Singh October 26, 1947
[
iv] ) A research from British sources quoted by Victoria Schofield, author of
Kashmir in Conflict/ Alaistar Lamb, author of a series of books on Kashmir.
[
v] ) Cited in Riyaz Punjabi, ‘Kashmir imbroglio: the socio-political roots’,
Contemporary South Asia, 4:1 (1995), p.47. However, as Punjabi notes,
Sheikh Abdullah declared in a public meeting in September 1947 that “Our
first demand is complete transfer of power to the people in Kashmir.
Representatives of the people in a democratic Kashmir will then decide
whether the state should join India or Pakistan” (Punjabi, 1995, p.46). 39
Cited in Punjabi (1995), p.49.
[
vi] ) Reply from Lord Mountbatten to Maharaja Hari Singh’s letter ,
Mountbatten of Burma ,October 27, 1947
[
vii] ) a b Official Government of India Statement giving numbers of KIA -
Parliament of India Website. It is believed that this figure only gives the
Indian Army casualties and not the State Forces
[
viii] ) Library of Congress Country Studies / Battle Casualties of Azad
Kashmir Regiment during 1947-1948
[
ix] ) Library of Congress Country Studies/ Battle Casualties of Azad Kashmir
Regiment during 1947-1948
[
x] ) ( British war Magazine, London , 1952)
[
xi] ) Official Government of India Statement giving numbers of KIA -
Parliament of India Website. It is believed that this figure only gives the
Indian Army casualties and not the State Forces: Operations In Jammu and
Kashmir 1947-1948, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Thomson
Press (India) Limited. New Delhi 1987. This is the Indian Official History.
[
xii] ) “Kashmir has been wrongly looked upon as a price for India or
Pakistan. People seem to forget that Kashmir is not a commodity for sale or
to be bartered. It has an individual existence and its people must be the
final arbiters of their future. …….” Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru (The first Prime
Minister of Free India) (Speech in All India Congress Committee on July 9,
1951
[
xiii] ) (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru; Second Series; Volume 14, Part
I, page 205; cited as SWJN).
[
xiv] ) ( article "India-Pakistan summit, 1955"; Frontline, August 8, 2001).
[
xv] ) (SWJN; Volume13; page 225).
[
xvi] ) (Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50; Volume 1, page 317. Patel's
letter of July 3, 1950).
[
xvii] ) (SPC; Volume 10, page 353).
[
xviii] ) (Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1950; Volume V, S.
Asia; 1978; page 1,407).
[
xix] ) ((Frontline, August 3, 2001).
[
xx] ) (SWJN; Volume 18; page 430).
[
xxi] ) FRUS; page 1,417).
[
xxii] ) (FRUS; page 1,426
[
xxiii] ) (FRUS; page 1,428).
[
xxiv] ) (FRUS; page 1,434).
[
xxv] ) (FRUS; page 201).
[
xxvi] ) (Dr. Rajendra Prasad: Correspondence and Select Documents;
Volume 16; pages 91-92).
[
xxvii] ) (For text vide A. G. Noorani; The Kashmir Question; 1964; page 63).
[
xxviii] ) (White Paper on correspondence 1954; pages 18 and 42).
[
xxix] ) (SWJN; Volume 23; page 346).
[
xxx] ) ( Front Line : Volume 19 - Issue 21, October 12 - 25, 2002)
[
xxxi] ) Gulhati, Niranjan D., The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in
International Mediation, Allied Publishers: Bombay, 1973.
[
xxxii] ) ibid,93, Gulhati, Niranjan D., The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise
in International Mediation, Allied Publishers: Bombay, 1973.
[
xxxiii] ) ibid,116, ibid, Gulhati, Niranjan D., The Indus Waters Treaty: An
Exercise in International Mediation, Allied Publishers: Bombay, 1973.
[
xxxiv] ) Barrett, Scott, "Conflict and Cooperation in Managing International
Water Resources," Policy Research Working Paper 1303, The World Bank,
May 1994
[
xxxv] ) Verghese, B.G., Waters of Hope, Oxford and IBH Publishing: New
Delhi, 1990
[
xxxvi] ) Indus Case Study. Adapted from Beach, H.L., Hamner, J., Hewitt,
J.J., Kaufman, E.,Kurki, A., Oppenheimer, J.A., and Wolf, A.T. (2000).
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Resolution: Theory, Practice, and
Annotated References. United Nations University Press. Hosted at the
Transboundry Freshwater Dispute Database, Oregon State University.
[
xxxvii] ) Barrett, Scott, "Conflict and Cooperation in Managing International
Water Resources," Policy Research Working Paper 1303, The World Bank,
May 1994.
[
xxxviii] ) Indus Water Treaty Information about the treaty (including the full
text), hosted at the World Bank's website.
[
xxxix] ) .( Sridar, “Indus Waters Treaty.”)
[
xl] ) The News, Pakistan, May 1, 2009.
[
xli] ) Hamid Gul, former chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
charged: "India has stopped our water."
[
xlii] ) Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, May 6, 2008. Hafiz Zahoorul Hassan
Dahir emerges as the most vocal Pakistani personality on Indian water
projects on Kashmir. However, his organization Indus Basin Water council,
though sounding like a government authority, is a pressure group.
[
xliii] ) Roznama Ausaf, Pakistan, March 15, 2008.
[
xliv] ) Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, October 27, 2008.
[
xlv] ) According to Roznama Express newspaper of June 3, 2008, Pakistan is
also worried that another hydroelectric power project being built by India
on Kishan Ganga river, a tributary of Jhelum, will curtail water supply to
Pakistan. The Roznama Express noted that Pakistan has also threatened to
take the matter to the World Bank. According to The Times of India
newspaper of July 29, 2004, India’s Tulbul Navigation Project on Jhelum
[
xlvi] ) Mr. Ali Ashraf Khan is a Pakistani Businessman and Ex-Politician who
bid good bye to politics in order to concentrate on more useful service
benefit of the political intrigues prevalent in the National Political life of
Pakistan. He frequently writes for English and Urdu newspapers in Pakistan.
[
xlvii] ) Peter Gleick, “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and
International Security”, International Security, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer,
1993), pg. 79-112./ United Nations, Commission on Sustainable Development
(UNCSD), Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the
World, Report of the Secretary General, UN doc. E/CN.17/1997/9, 4
February 1997, pg. 8-9.
[
xlviii] )BBC Urdu and Hindi Service, dated 25th November, 2009(8.00P.M to
8.30P.M IST)
[
xlix] ) United Nations, Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD),
Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the World,
Report of the Secretary General, UN doc. E/CN.17/1997/9, 4 February 1997,
pg. 8-9./] Michael Klare. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global
Conflict. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001. pg. 139./ A.T. Wolfe,
J.A. Natharius, J.J. Danielson, B.S. Ward and J.K. Pender, “International
River Basins of the World”, International Journal of Water Resources
Development, 15, 4 (1999)./ Sandra L. Postel, Aaron T. Wolf, “Dehydrating
Conflict”, Foreign Policy, No. 126 (Sep. - Oct., 2001), pp. 60-67./ Stephen
Leahy, “Thirstier World Likely to See More Violence”, Inter Press Service, 16
March 2007./ John Vidal, “Cost of Water Shortage: civil unrest, mass
migration and economic collapse,” Guardian Newspapers, 17 August 2006./
Klare, 147./ From an interview in the 1 January 1999 edition of
Environmental Science and Technology, as cited in “Water Wars Forecast If
Solutions Not Found,” Environmental News Service, 1 January 1999,
electronic document accessed at
http://ens.lycos.com/ens/archives/Jan99/1999L-01-01-02.html./ Ashok
Swain. Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
Routledge: London, 2004. pg. 44./ Col. Steven W. Peterson, “Water Issues in
India and Pakistan”, course 5604 paper, National Defense University,
National War College, Washington DC. Accessed online at:
http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/writing/AY04/5604/04a.pdf on 10 June 2007./ S.
Waslekar, The Final Settlement: Restructuring India-Pakistan Relations
(Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2005), pg. 54-62./ Waslekar, 54-62./
“Asia: Nor Any Drop to Drink; Water in India”, The Economist, Vol.364, issue
8287, 24 August 2002, pg.31-32./ Waslekar, 54-62./ “Anticipated Population
Growth in Selected Countries of the Jordan, Tigris-Euphrates, and Indus
River Basins”, World Resources 1998-1999, Washington DC, World Resources
Institute, 1998. pg 244./ Klare, 187./ Swain, 46./ Daniel Nelson, “Water
War Warning As Tension Escalates in Kashmir”, OneWorld.net, published on
21 May 2002. Accessed online at Common Dreams News Center:
http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/headlines02/0521-
07.htm.
[
l] ) Albert Lepawsky, “International Development of River Resources”,
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 39,
No. 4 (Oct., 1963), pp. 533-550./ Kaiser Bengali (ed.), The Politics of
Managing Water, (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, and
Oxford University Press, 2003)./ Swain, “Managing Water Conflict”, 170.
[
li] ) ibid;Swain, “Managing Water Conflict”, 171-177.
[
lii] ) Waslekar, 79.
[
liii] ) ( Various schemes of compromises can be taken into account “The
Water conflict to be addressed through Brotherly Dialog”, a conference
among civil society supported by International Forum for Water conflict and
reputed Global Peace Centers of various influential countries along with
workshops and seminars. )
[
liv] ) . (But see the alternative ranking of this game as a Prisoners’ Dilemma
in the Appendix, in which case the H-H state is a Nash equilibrium.)
[
lv] ) ”( Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953: 44)
[
lvi] ) .( A rigorous definition of threat power, which only one player
assumed to possess, and an analysis of its effect in all 2 x 2 ordinal games, is
given in Brams (1994, ch. 5). Here, its effect will only be explained for the
situation in the Figure 1 game and, briefly, in Chicken and Prisoners’
Dilemma in the Appendix.)
[
lvii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q History of the Conflict with China,
1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History
Division, Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India, 1992.
[
lviii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Maxwell, Neville, India's China
War, New York, Pantheon, 1970.
[
lix] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag
ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az Calvin, James
Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command
and Staff College.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm.
Retrieved 2006-06-14. /a b c A.G. Noorani, "Perseverance in peace process",
India's National Magazine, 29 August 2003. /a b c India's Forward Policy,
Review author[s]: A. G. Noorani, The China Quarterly © 1970 School of
Oriental and African Studies
[
lx] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j Mohan Guruswamy, Mohan, "The Great India-China
Game", Rediff, 23 June 2003.
[
lxi] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision for
War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver /^ a b c d e A.G. Noorani, "Fact of
History", India's National Magazine, 30 September 2003. /^ "The Shade of
the Big Banyan" Time, Dec. 14, 1959.
[
lxii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision for
War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver /^ a b c VK Singh resolving the
boundary dispute
[
lxiii] )ibid: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision
for War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver
[
lxiv] ) a b c d e f g h Battle of Chushul
[
lxv] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Maxwell, Neville, India's China
War, New York, Pantheon, 1970.
[
lxvi] ) a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision for
War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver
[
lxvii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q History of the Conflict with China,
1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History
Division, Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India, 1992.
[
lxviii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z China's Decision for
War with India in 1962 by John W. Garver
[
lxix] ) ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Battle of Namka Chu / Burkitt, Laurie; Scobell,
Andrew; Wortzel, Larry M. (July 2003), THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: THE
CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AT 75, Strategic Studies Institute, pp.
340-341, ISBN 1-58487-126-1,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf /^ a b c
d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah the original
on ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az Calvin, James
Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command
and Staff College.
[
lxx] ) Ibid:^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae af
ag ah ai aj ak al am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az Calvin, James
Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command
and Staff College./ibid: a b c d e f g h Battle of Chushul/ Chushi Gangdruk
"Chushi Gangdruk: History", ChushiGangdruk.Org/^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n
o p q r s t Maxwell, Neville, India's China War, New York, Pantheon, 1970.
[
lxxi] ) Indo-Pakistani War of 1965/^ "Indo-Pakistan Wars". Archived from
2009-11-01. http://www.webcitation.org/query?id=1257038004976878. /^
Encyclopedia of the developing world By Thomas M. Leonard, page 806 /
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070506/spectrum/main1.htm/^ a b
Encyclopedia of the developing world By Thomas M. Leonard, page
806/http://books.google.co.uk/books?
id=pWRjGZ9H7hYC&pg=PA806&lpg=PA806&dq=pakistani+casualties+in+battl
e+of+lahore+1965&source=bl&ots=C8A8bQcxSk&sig=LDNtNeO2EMkuVzRlF7QQ
AxvZW2g&hl=en&ei=ldseSs
HdyZjAeX7JWLDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5#PPA806,M1-
[
lxxii])Indo-Pakistan Wars". Archived from the original on 2009-11-01.
http://www.webcitation.org/query?id=1257038004976878./ Indo-Pakistan
Wars The Tribune June 2, 2005. Archived 2009-11-01./^ Opinion: The Way it
was 4: extracts from Brig (Retd) ZA Khan's book May 1998, Defence
Journal/^ Ayub misled nation in ’65 war: Nur Khan 8 September 2005
Khaleej Times /^ Library of Congress Country Studies/Ibid: Encyclopedia of
the developing world By Thomas M. Leonard, page 806
[
lxxiii] ) ( British war Magazine, London , 1972)
[
lxxiv] ) http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
4#cite_note-4)
[
lxxv] ) ( http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
5#cite_note-5)
[
lxxvi] ) (http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
6#cite_note-6)
(http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-7#cite_note-
7)
(http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-8#cite_note-
8)
[
lxxvii]) http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
9#cite_note-9
[
lxxviii] )
(ibid:http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
11#cite_note-11)
[
lxxix] ) http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
10#cite_note-10)
[
lxxx] ) (http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
11#cite_note-11)
[
lxxxi] ) . (ibid:http//en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
12#cite_note-12)
[
lxxxii] ) (http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
14#cite_note-14)
[
lxxxiii] ) , (http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
15#cite_note-15)
[
lxxxiv] ) , (http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
16#cite_note-16)
[
lxxxv] ) ,
(ibid:http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
12#cite_note-12)
(http://en.wikipedia.orgr/wiki/operation_Gibraltor#cite_note-
17#cite_note-17)
[
lxxxvi] ) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-
pak_1965.htm "Indo-Pakistan War of 1965"]. Globalsecurity.com.
[
lxxxvii] ) "The Lahore Offensive". Storyofpakistan.com. 1 June 2003
[
lxxxviii] ) ^ Brigadier Desmond E Hayde, "The Battle of Dograi and
Batapore", Natraj Publishers, New Delhi, 2006
[
lxxxix] ) ^ The Tribune, Chandigarh, India - Opinions
[
xc] The Story of My Struggle By Tajammal Hussain Malik 1991, Jang
Publishers, pp 78
[
xci] ) John Fricker, "Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International issue
published 1969, page 89. URL:
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1969/1969%20-200111.html?
search=Pakistan%20Mirage%205, retrieved: 03 November 2009
[
xcii] ) Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International, issue published 5 May 1984
(page 1208). Can be viewed at FlightGlobal.com archives, URL:
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1984/1984%20-
%200797.html?search=F-86%20Pakistan Retrieved: 22 October 2009
[
xciii] ) http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-
library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/the-right-stuff-499
[
xciv] ) ^ See the main article Sabre Slayer for the complete list on this issue
including sources.
[
xcv] ) .^ a b Ahmad Faruqui, "The right stuff", published by Dawn News on
Monday 14 September 2009, URL:
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-
library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/the-right-stuff-499 Retrieved: 01
November 2009. Also published under title "The Debt Owed" on 16
September 2009 by [outlookindia.com], URL:
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?261856
[
xcvi] )Ibid: ^ a b Ahmad Faruqui, "The right stuff", published by Dawn News
on Monday 14 September 2009, URL:
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-
library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/the-right-stuff-499 Retrieved: 01
November 2009. Also published under title "The Debt Owed" on 16
September 2009 by [outlookindia.com], URL:
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?261856
[
xcvii] ) http://books.google.com/books?
id=MG5wioBJyK0C&pg=PA164&dq=india+1965+pakistan+Sabre+slayer&lr=&as
_brr=3&client=firefox-a /http://books.google.com/books?
id=p40nOZgeh84C&pg=PA161&dq=1965+pakistan+air+force+Sabre&lr=&as_br
r=3&client=fir
efox-a#PPA162,M1
[
xcviii] ) ^ John Fricker, "Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International issue
published 1969, pages 89 and 90. Can be viewed at Flight International
archives: page 89 URL:
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1969/1969%20-
%200111.html?search=Pakistan%20Mirage%205, page 90 URL:
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1969/1969%20-
%200112.html. Retrieved: 03 November 2009
[
xcix] ) A history of the Pakistan Army - Defence Journal, Pakistan
[
c] ) ^ 90mm M36 GUN MOTOR CARRIAGE “Jackson” Post W.W.II, the M36
was employed by the US Army in Korea and was distributed to friendly
nations including France, where it was used in Indo-China (Vietnam),
Pakistan..
[
ci] ) The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965 A Strategic and Operational
Analysis Major A.H. Amin, December 30, 2001 Orbat
[
cii] ) The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy By Selig
Seidenman Harrison Published 1978 Free Press, pp 269
[
ciii] ) The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia
By Devin T. Hagerty Page 70 Published by MIT Press
[
civ] ) India and Japan: The Emerging Balance of Power in Asia By Columbia
University East Asian Institute, Stanley J. Heginbotham, William Howard
Wriggins. By Columbia University East Asian Institute, Published 1971, pp
254
[
cv] ) Ibid:India and Japan: The Emerging Balance of Power in Asia By
Columbia University East Asian Institute, Stanley J. Heginbotham, William
Howard Wriggins. By Columbia University East Asian Institute, Published
1971, pp 254
[
cvi] ) . ^ a b, South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and
China By Lowell Dittmer, pp 77
[
cvii] ) ^ India's Quest for Security: defence policies, 1947-1965 By Lorne
John Kavic, , 1967, University of California Press, pp 190
[
cviii] )Ibid: a b South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and
China By Lowell Dittmer, pp 77
[
cix] ) ^ THE INDIAN END OF THE TELESCOPE India and Its Navy by Vice
Admiral Gulab Hiranandani, Indian Navy (Retired), Naval War College
Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2
[
cx] ) ^ Iqbal F Quadir - Pakistan's Defence Journal
[
cxi] )Ibid: Iqbal F Quadir - Pakistan's Defence Journal
[
cxii] ) a b Defence Journal: SSG in the 1965 War
[
cxiii] ). ^ Pak Def - SSG Regiment
[
cxiv] ) ^ a b The Fighter Gap by Shoab Alam Khan in Defence Journal
[
cxv] Defence Journal: The Way it was Extracts from Pakistan Army Brigadier
(Retd) ZA Khan's book
[
cxvi] ) Ending the Suspense September 17, 1965, TIME magazine
[
cxvii] )Ibid: The Fighter Gap by Shoab Alam Khan in Defence Journal
[
cxviii] ) Remembering Our Warriors Brig (Retd) Shamim Yasin Manto S.I.(M),
S.Bt, Q&A session: ("How would you assess the failures and successes of the
SSG in the 1965 War?") February 2002, Defence Journal
[
cxix] ) .(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lal_Bahadur_Shastri#cite_note-
hindustantimes_july11_2009-20#cite_note-hindustan_times_july_2009-20)
[
cxx] ) . ibid:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lal_Bahadur_Shastri#cite_note-
hindustantimes_july11_2009-20#cite_note-hindustan_times_july_2009-20)
[
cxxi] ) . ibid:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lal_Bahadur_Shastri#cite_note-
hindustantimes_july11_2009-20#cite_note-hindustan_times_july_2009-20
[
cxxii] ) (Source: Advocate Bashir Ahmad Bhat Vice Chairman JKLF)
[
cxxiii] ) Telling this story on 12 April 1972 from Camp Prison Lahore in a
letter written in reply to Azra Mir, the daughter of veteran Kashmiri
political activist and intellectual, G.M. Mir who was in prison with Maqbool
Butt in relation to the hijacking of an Indian plane ‘Ganaga.’
[
cxxiv] ) Responding to a question about crossing over to Pakistan in an
interview that was recorded in room number 26 of Mujahid Hotel
International, Maqbool Butt said.
[
cxxv] ) Source: Khawaja, 1997.
[
cxxvi] ) Maqbool Butt later wrote in great detail about the escape and
submitted that before the Special Trial Court in Pakistant where he was
tried along with other NLF members for ‘Ganga’ hijacking.
[
cxxvii] ) Although there are several official and common theories about the
background , but we must believe in the version which Maqbool Butt has
submitted in the special trial court in Pakistan . “Ganga, an Indian airliner
was hijacked on 30 January 1971 at 1305 hours while on its routine flight
from Srinagar to Jammu. In total it was carrying 30 people including four
crew members. The Hijackers were two young Kashmiris Hashim Qureshi and
Ashraf Qureshi, they brought the plane to Lahore”
[
cxxviii] ) Rovendra Mahatre was kidnapped in the first week of February
1984 from his Birmingham office by unknown group Kashmir Liberation Army
(KLA) who demanded among other things the release of Maqbool Butt.
[
cxxix] ) Official Government of India Statement giving numbers of KIA,
Parliament of India Website.
[
cxxx] ) Quantification of Losses Suffered
[
cxxxi] ) Indo-Pakistani War of 1971". Global
Security. /http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-
pak_1971.htm. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[
cxxxii] ) The Sinking of the Ghazi". Bharat Rakshak Monitor, 4(2).
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-2/harry.html. Retrieved
2009-10-20.
[
cxxxiii] ) Operations in the Bay of Bengal: The Loss of PNS/M Ghazi".
PakDef.
http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/navy/1971navalwar/lossofghazi.htm.
Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[
cxxxiv] ) ( British war Magazine, London , 1980)
[
cxxxv] ) ^ a b c "The U.S.: A Policy in Shambles". Time Magazine, 20
December 1971.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878970,00.html.
Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[
cxxxvi] ) ibid: ^ a b U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Sitrep: Army Terror
Campaign Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties
Elsewhere, 31 March 1971, Confidential, 3 pp.
// a b c d e "India: Easy Victory, Uneasy Peace". Time Magazine, 27
December 1971.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,905593,00.html.
Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[
cxxxvii] ) http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761588350_3/Indo-
Pakistani_Wars.html#s29. Retrieved 2009-10-20.// ibid:^ a b c "The U.S.: A
Policy in Shambles". Time Magazine, 20 December 1971.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878970,00.html.
Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[
cxxxviii] ) ^ "PAF Begins War in the West : 3 December". Institute of
Defence Studies.
http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/airforce/1971war/warinwest.html.
Retrieved 2008-07-04.
[
cxxxix] )ibid: ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l "Indo-Pakistani War of 1971". Global
Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-
pak_1971.htm. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[
cxl] ) ^ a b c "The Sinking of the Ghazi". Bharat Rakshak Monitor, 4(2).
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-2/harry.html. Retrieved
2009-10-20.
[
cxli] ) ^ a b "Operations in the Bay of Bengal: The Loss of PNS/M Ghazi".
PakDef.
http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/navy/1971navalwar/lossofghazi.htm.
Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[
cxlii] ) ^ "Trident, Grandslam and Python: Attacks on Karachi". Bharat
Rakshak. http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1971War/44-
Attacks-On-Karachi.html. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[
cxliii] ) ibid:^ a b Official Government of India Statement giving numbers of
KIA, Parliament of India Website //ibid: ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l "Indo-
Pakistani War of 1971". Global Security.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1971.htm.
Retrieved 2009-10-20.
[
cxliv] ) By Sarath Kumara,12 December 2000
[
cxlv] ) Jane's Security News indicates:
[
cxlvi] )http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India
%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-10# cite_note-10/
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-
11# cite_note-11/ http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India
%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-9# cite_note-9/
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-
8# cite_note-8/ http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India
%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-7# cite_note-7/
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-
6# cite_note-6/ http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/India
%E2%80%93Israel_relation#cite_note-5# cite_note-5
[
cxlvii] ) ^ Government of India site mentioning the Indian casualties,
Statewise break up of Indian casualties statement from Indian Parliament /^
"Breakdown of casualties into Officers, JCOs, and Other Ranks". Parliament
of India Website. http://164.100.24.208/lsq/quest.asp?qref=51302.
Retrieved 2009-05-20. /^ "Complete Roll of Honour of Indian Army's Killed in
Action during Op Vijay". Indian Army.
[
cxlviii] ) ^ a b c "President Musharaffs disclosure on Pakistani Casualties in
his book". Indian Express.
http://www.indianexpress.com/story/14208.html. Retrieved 2009-05-20./ ^
a b "Over 4000 soldier's killed in Kargil: Sharif". The
Hindu./http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/08/17/stories/200308
1702900800.htm. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
[
cxlix] ) Government of India site mentioning the Indian casualties,
Statewise break up of Indian casualties statement from Indian Parliament
[
cl] ) a b c d e f "1999 Kargil Conflict".
GlobalSecurity.orghttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil
-99.htm. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
[
cli] ) ^ Tom Clancy, Gen. Tony Zinni (Retd) and Tony Koltz (2004). Battle
Ready. Grosset & Dunlap. ISBN 0-399-15176-1. /^ "Pak commander blows the
lid on Islamabad's Kargil plot". June 12, 2009.
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/as-spell-binding-as-the-guns-of-
navarone/475330/. Retrieved 2009-06-13. /^ "Sharif admits he let down
Vajpayee on Kargil conflict". 2007-09-10.
http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/10/stories/2007091059781400.htm.
Retrieved 2007-10-06.
[
clii] ) Nawaz, Shuja, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars
Within, p. 420 (2007)
[
cliii] ) India had deployed Agni during Kargil, Article from "Indian Express"
19/6/2000 /=^ "Musharraf moved nuclear weapons in Kargil war". The
Nation. Archived from the original on 2007-12-23.
http://web.archive.org/web/20071223045736/http://www.nation.com.pk/
daily/july-2006/6/index16.php. Retrieved 2009-05-27.
[
cliv] ) Pakistan and the Kashmir militants". BBC News.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/386537.stm. Retrieved 2009-
05-20.
[
clv] ) The Times of India on November 24,1999
[
clvi] ) By Sarath Kumara,12 December 2000
[
clvii] ) ^ a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908.
Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[
clviii] ) a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford
University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[
clix] ) ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908.
Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[
clx] ) a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908. Oxford
University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[
clxi] ) ibid:^ a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908.
Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102. In 2003, the
percentage of Muslims in the Kashmir Valley was 95% ^ a b Rai, Mridu. 2004.
Hindu Ruler, Muslim Subjects: Islam and the History of Kashmir. Princeton
University Press. 320 pages. ISBN 0691116881. page 37.
[
clxii] ) ibid: ^ a b Rai, Mridu. 2004. Hindu Ruler, Muslim Subjects: Islam and
the History of Kashmir. Princeton University Press. 320 pages. ISBN
0691116881. page 37.
[
clxiii] ) ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908.
Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[
clxiv] ) ." ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908.
Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[
clxv] ) ." ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908.
Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[
clxvi] ) ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908.
Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
[
clxvii] ) ibid:a b c d e f g h Imperial Gazetteer of India, volume 15. 1908.
Oxford University Press, Oxford and London. pages 99-102.
Posted by Rao Farman Ali Chief Editor (www.onthetrack.info) at 12:49 AM

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