Professional Documents
Culture Documents
By
Neelam Daryanani
September 2008
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My gratitude goes to the authors in the bibliography, whose work has been a
rich source of reference and information.
ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on understanding the reasons for the prohibition of interest.
Lending without interest is a difficult concept to grasp for those educated in the
Western system as interest is the backbone of all conventional modes of finance. This
paper takes the several different perspectives to probe if there are valid reasons other
than a religious prohibition on interest.
Chapter one and two provide a background and historical perspective on the
Islamic Financial Industry.
Finance.
Chapter eight
highlights the more common Islamic Financial Instruments with some examples and
provides some comparison to western financial models as well.
This paper looks closely at the religious prohibition of interest and also how it
affects an individual, a corporation and the economy as a whole. It highlights the
perils of the current banking system.
prohibition and draws attention to the negative effects of riba. The author hopes that
with this, future financial engineers in the Islamic System will be cautious in imitating
conventional banking practices and focus instead on financial products that embody
the spirit of Islamic Finance.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
Chapter 1
6
6
Chapter 2
11
Chapter 3
12
12
14
15
16
16
Chapter 4
18
18
26
Chapter 5
30
31
32
36
Chapter 6
A Corporate Perspective:
Focusing on the Agency Costs of Debt
42
48
49
50
52
53
Chapter 7
10
Chapter 8
Chapter 7
Conclusion
56
56
57
57
58
58
58
59
59
60
60
60
62
62
63
63
65
66
67
68
71
Notes
74
Reference
76
Appendix
Appendix I
Leverage of East Asian Corporations from 1992-1996
Appendix II
Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt from 1992-1996
Appendix III Cash Flow Coverage EBITA/Interest Payable
Appendix IV Cumulative Output Loss for Each Crisis Country 1997-2002
Appendix V GDP Growth Rates for Each Crisis Country 1991-2002(%)
82
82
82
83
83
84
Chapter 1
Background of the Islamic Financial Industry
In the last two decades, Islamic banks have grown in size and number around
the world. Exponentially increasing demand around the world for Shariah-compliant
financial products and services is the driving force of the Islamic banking industrys
rapid expansion. Islamic assets worldwide are currently estimated to be $500 billion
as compared to about $150 billion in the mid-1990. It is still growing at 10% per year
over the past 10 years, placing Islamic finance in a unique global asset class. Islamic
banks market shares stand at 17% and 12% in the six Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries and Malaysia respectively. The table below is an example of the
massive growth in some sectors of Islamic Finance.
Table I
top performers ranked in the top 2% of its category with an approximate return on
investment of 13%. Because Amana cannot invest in companies that charge interest
or those with large debts, it has not been impacted by the fallout from the credit
crunch. Similarly, other Islamic mutual funds weathered the recent credit turmoil
highlighting the validity of following Islamic principles in investing.
Chapter 2
The Resurgence of Islamic Finance
Even in the 7th century, Muslims already had a thriving economy based in
Islamic principles. While Europe was still in the Dark Ages, culture and knowledge
thrived in the Islamic world. Until the 13th century, Islamic financial instruments
rivaled what was available in Western economies. Although banks did not exist,
innovative financial instruments were a part of commercial life like bankers without
banks.
However, in the 15th century, as Western civilizations went through the age of
renaissance, scientific discoveries and industrialization, the Muslim word stagnated
(Warde, 2000).
The colonization during the 16th and 17th century delayed the
development of Islamic financial models. By the late 17th century, European banks
were established in Turkey, Egypt and Iran (Zineldin, 1990). A new economic system
that was an offspring of the marriage of capitalism and imperialism was founded in
Europe. By the 19th century, most of the Islamic world was brought into a Western
system that embraced interest and disassociated socio-ethical norms from the
economic system.
The rebirth of the interest in Islamic Finance occurred in the late 1970s with
the development of Islamic Financial Institutions. Three factors contributed to this
(Archer et. al., 2002). First, Islamic nations gained political independence in the
1950s and 1960s. Second, an awareness of an Islamic identity was rising. Third,
Middle Eastern countries were flushed with funds due to oil production and the sharp
oil increase in 1973-1974. The sudden flush of petrodollars necessitated the need for
Islamic financial vehicles.
In Southeast Asia, the first Islamic Bank was established with the conception
of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (1983). This led to the eventual dual-banking
system currently in place in Malaysia. The phenomenal growth of Islamic finance
and its impact on the Malaysian financial system is displayed in the table below.
Table 2
Source:
In the 1990s leading European and American banks such as HSBC, ABN
Amro, Goldman Sachs, Standard Chartered, Citibank etc. began to focus on interest
free banking and offered either Shariah-compliant products or opened Islamic
subsidiaries, signaling the vast and untapped potential in the Islamic Financial market.
Subsequent events included the development of the Dow Jones Islamic Market
(DJIM) family of indexes to help investors invest according to Islamic guidelines, the
creation of a sizable array of Shariah compliant equity funds and the extension of
Islamic principles to fields of insurance, leasing and real estate finance. The stages of
evolution of the Islamic financial services industry are illustrated below:
10
1970's
Insitution:
-Commercial Islamic
Banks
Products:
-Commercial Islamic
banking products
Area:
-Gulf/Middle East
1980's
Insitution:
-Commercial Islamic
Banks
-Takaful
-Islamic investment
companies
Products:
-Commercial banking
products
-Takaful
Area:
-Gulf/Middle East
-Asia Pacific
1990's
Insitution:
-Commercial banking
products
-Takaful
-Islamic investment
companies
-Asset management
companies
-Brokers/Dealers
Products:
-Commercial banking
products
-Takaful
-Mutual Funds/Unit
trusts
-Islamic bonds
-Shariah-compliant
stocks
-Islamic stockbroking
Area:
-Gulf/Middle East
-Asia Pacific
2000's
Insitution:
-Commercial banking
products
-Takaful
-Islamic investment
companies
-Islamic investment
banks
-Asset management
companies
-E-commerce
-Brokers/Dealers
Products:
-Commercial banking
products
-Takaful
-Mutual Funds/Unit
trusts
-Islamic bonds
-Shariah-compliant
stocks
-Islamic stockbroking
Area:
-Gulf/Middle East
-Asia Pacific
-Europe/Americas
-Global Offshore
Market
Though still evolving, the resurgence of the Islamic Finance and the demand
of Shariah compliant products fulfill the prediction of the pioneers of modern Islamic
finance on the viability of equity sharing, ethical, and justice oriented socio-economic
system.
11
Chapter 3
The Concepts of Islamic Finance
The term Islamic Finance denotes financial transactions that adhere to the
provisions of the Shariah (Islamic Law). Islam is as a complete way of life with its
own legal code that dictates the conduct of Muslims in every aspect. The laws and
norms of the Shariah are derived from four major sources: The Quran, The Sunnah,
Qiyas and Ijmaa (Al-Omar and Abdelhaq, 1996). The first two are the primary
sources that guide Muslims on any issue. In the absence of any clear guidance, the
remaining sources are relied on as a secondary source.
Islamic finance has its origins from the teachings of the Shariah, which
dictates the following principles that Islamic financial institutions must strictly adhere
to:
a. All transactions must be interest free
b. Avoidance of speculative activities.
c. The implementation of Zakat.
d. Compliance to Islamic Investment Ethics
While the Quran prohibits riba unambiguously and denounces this practice as
being unjust and exploitative, it does not clearly specify whether riba is interest or
usury, resulting in many debates on what constitutes riba.
12
The interpretations on riba can be lumped under three main headings: the
liberal, mainstream and conservative. Briefly, the liberal view supports the narrowest
definition of riba by equating riba with usury. Usury is defined as an excessive rate of
interest compounded at short intervals. In this view, bank interest is outside of the
sphere of riba. The mainstream view argues that any contractual increase is riba,
encompassing bank interest. The conservative view includes both usury and bank
interest while also accounting for all other forms of economic exploitation.
The idea that a financial system can operate without a rate of interest, as
prescribed in the mainstream view of riba, is perplexing to many accustomed to a
fractional-reserve banking system.
discussing Islamic finance are: How does an entire financial system operate without
there being a price of capital? How does an Islamic financial structure allocate
funds? How do investors get a return on their investment if there is no charge for the
use of their funds? What is the basis for the prohibition of the most fundamental
variable in a financial system?
The abolition of interest (riba) is a central tenet of the Islamic system, but it is
not an adequate description of the system as a whole (Khan & Mirakhor, 1986). In
Islam, money is merely potential capital that must be put into productive use, with a
certain risk involved for it to justify a return. That interest is justified as a result of
savings is rejected as by Muslim scholars as such a moral justification only applies if
the savings is used for additional investment to create additional capital and wealth
(Iqbal & Mirakhor, 1987). Individuals who abstain from consumption and save
should not be rewarded for it unless it is turned to productive investment. The Islamic
13
Nine hundred years ago, Imam Al-Ghazzali, a celebrated Muslim thinker and
philosopher wrote Riba is prohibited because it prevents people from undertaking
real economic activities. This is because when a person having money is allowed to
earn more money on the basis of interest, either in spot or deferred transactions, it
becomes easy for him to earn without bothering himself to take pains in real
economic activities.
because the interests of humanity cannot be safeguarded without real trade skills,
industry and construction. (Hamid, 2006)
14
virtual economy to have a terrible potential for disrupting the underlying real
economy. This was evidenced in the collapse in 1995 of Barings, Britains oldest
bank. It is also believed to have precipitated, if not caused, the 1997 Asian meltdown
(Gray, 1998).
transactions like Options, Futures, Swaps and Forward contracts (Ayub, 2002). It is
also illegal to have any business associated with the gambling industry in general.
15
Zakat
Zakat is one of the five fundamental pillars of Islam. This principle states that
all things belong to God, and that wealth is held by human beings in trust. The word
Zakat means both 'purification' and 'growth'. Our possessions are purified by setting
aside a proportion for those in need. The Quran has repeatedly encouraged Muslims
to pay Zakat.
Those who believe perform good deeds,
establish prayer and pay Zakat, their reward is
with their Lord, neither should they have any
Fear, nor should they grieve.
16
This
Islam supports private wealth creation in a way that there are no abnormal
profits because of unfair competitive advantages. Islamic financial institutions, in
turn, ensure reasonable returns on assets and equity and strive to promote the socioeconomic welfare of the societies in which they operate (Siddiqi, 2004).
17
Chapter 4
A Deeper Understanding of the Prohibition of Riba:
A Religious Perspective
What is Riba?
Riba is usually translated into English as usury or interest, but in Islam, it has
a broader meaning. Riba is derived from the root word rbw. It means growing, or
exceeding or self-generated expansion. When applied to commercial activities this
implies that money accrues value intrinsically with the mere passage of time elevating
the concept of money from a medium of exchange to idolatry, a forbidden concept in
Islam.
The Quran has taken such a hard approach towards interest is mainly because
Islam stands for establishing a just and economic system free from all kinds of
exploitation (Chapra, 1985).
This first verse promises a divine reward for providing charity but does not
clearly define the cause of forbidding riba, neither does it provide a clear definition of
18
the term. It merely emphasizes that riba provides benefit to an individual instead of
society as a whole, as it only profits the wealthy. It has also been interpreted as
emphasizing the spiritual gain in Zakat.
The second verse below provides some clarity to the definition of riba. It
shows a graduated increase in the prohibition by using a stronger term take instead
of give. It describes the practice of the Jews in Medina who employed a similar
restriction of interest, as prohibited in the Book of Deuteronomy, but only among
themselves. Some jurists interpret this verse to imply that the usury banned to the
Jews & Muslims are the same and narrowing down the prohibition of riba, as the Jews
did, is viewed unfavorably in the Quran.
The third verse is also most often used to justify that the prohibition of riba
only pertains to usury, or the doubling and redoubling of the principal. There is
disagreement on whether this verse is meant to restrict the ban on riba or merely to
express the increasing aspect of the principal. As expressed by Sayyid Qutb, the
multiplying effect is no more than a description of the state of affairs and not a
condition relevant to the imposition.
19
And finally, the last verse of the Quran, stringently denounces the practice of riba.
The succeeding verses to the text above1 emphasize divine chastisement. This
last verse establishes a clear distinction between trade and riba. The text But if you
repent, you can have your principal is the argument used to justify the prohibition
of all interest because it implies that even a minimal amount above the principal is an
increment and therefore it is riba.
20
The debate on what constitutes riba rages on due to the lack of clear definition
in the Quran. Other sources are used by judicial scholars to understand and determine
what constitutes riba.
concealed (khafiyy). The obvious riba pertains to riba in loans (riba al-nasia) and the
concealed to riba of excess or riba of barter (riba al-fadl). Sanhuri differentiated
between the Quranic riba (riba al-jahilyah), which is forbidden per se, and the riba in
delay (riba al-nasia) to differentiate between the prohibition of usury and bank
interest. He also reiterated that the riba in barter is forbidden only to close the roads
to the pre-Islamic riba.
21
The riba of barter (riba al-fadl) is prohibited from the statement attributed to
the Prophet:
Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat,
barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for salt like
for like, equal for equal, hand to hand; if the
commodities differ, then sell as you wish, provided that
the exchange is hand-to-hand. (Ubada Ibn al-Samit).
The basic rules that guide the prohibition of riba of barter were derived from
hadiths, a set of statements attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. Other than the
Zahiris, who refused to extend the application of the commodities to other than those
stated in the hadith, the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi
and Hanbali agree that they are only some examples of items that are prohibited.
However, they disagree on what other items are covered in the prohibition as they
have dissenting opinions on the underlying reasons for the prohibition.
The Hanafi approach was the broadest, stating that any item sold by weight or
volume was subject to the rules of riba in barter. The Shafis, only applied this
prohibition to metals like gold or silver, and included all kinds of food to the
prohibition. The Malikis provided the narrowest interpretation by limiting the scope
of metals to gold and silver. With respect to food, they limited the scope to nonperishable staple food items. The Hanbalis position is less clear, but it is generally
understood that they follow the same view as the Hanafis.
22
There is one exception to the rule regarding trades that involve the barter of
goods: As long as the counter-values are of different genera, all jurists agree that the
parties could make their own terms of exchange providing it was a spot transaction.
In the case of trades involving the same genera, traders are encouraged to enter in to
back-to-back trades. Thus, the rules of riba of barter are a prohibition of trading with
a class of goods on the basis of differences in quality. The result of the prohibition of
riba in barter is ensuring that traders mark to market to ensure market efficiency.
While during the time of the Prophet Muhammad, barter transactions were a
prevalent aspect of the economy; it is not in todays commercial transactions. The
significance of this debate lies in the treatment of money as a commodity. Majority of
the Muslim scholars agree that treating currencies as a commodity is prohibited. Gold
and silver were used as the basis of exchange for value during that time and
currencies are used in modern financial transactions for the same reason.
Ibn Qayyim, a well known Hanbali jurist explains that currency needs to be
fixed and regulated to value artifacts sold accurately. If currencies were to fluctuate
in prices like normal commodities, then financial transactions would be impaired. The
risk of commoditization of a currency encourages speculative transactions that are
unrelated to commerce and leads to the destabilization of productive sectors of the
economy.
Finally, the riba in loans or the riba in delay is (riba al-nasia) defined as a
contractual increase or benefit, whether or not it is monetary, on loaned capital. The
word nasia means to postpone or defer. Under this definition of riba, all forms of
23
The riba in delay also limits transactions covering the trading of the six
commodities, discussed in the riba in barter, on a deferred basis. While the riba in
barter does not prohibit the trading of same genera of commodities as long as the
counter-values are equal and the delivery is immediate, the riba in delay prohibits the
trading of the same commodities if the delivery is deferred even if the counter-values
are equal. While the four schools agreed that the prohibition for deferred trade
covered the six commodities and agreed that it also covered other deferred trades as
well, they differed on the scope of the prohibition against deferred trades.
For the Malikis, the prohibition against the six commodities was because they
were food items, and all deferred trades where both the counter-values involved food
was forbidden by the riba of delay. The Shafis applied the same theory to the
deferred trade of food. Both schoolsShafi & Malikiagreed that gold and silver
were subject to both the rules of riba in barter and riba in delay as they served as
pricing instruments. However, with respect to commodities that were not subject to
the rules of riba in barter and were not food items, the Malikis permitted deferred
trades unless:
24
The Shafis, on the other hand, permitted all deferred trades as long as the
counter values were not food, and that particular transaction would have been
permitted under the rules of riba in barter.
The Hanafis
prohibited the deferred trading of all commodities sold by weight or volume, unless
one of the counter-values was gold, silver or copper or a good not sold by weight or
volume.
prohibited even if the counter values were equal. The Hanbalis follow similar views
as the Hanafis.
Thus, the Shafis took the narrowest view of the riba of delay as the rules of
riba of delay were not applicable to the trade as long as the counter-values were not
subject to the rules of riba in barter.
interpretation to the principle, while the Malikis took a stand between these two
extremes. All the schools however, permitted deferred trades if one of the two
counter-values was gold, silver or copper and the other counter value was food or any
other commodity.
perishable goods for non-perishable items. As long as the trade did not violate the
formal rules of the riba of delay or the riba of excess, then the jurists were
unconcerned with the pricing terms agreed on between the parties involved.
There are varying opinions on the applications of the prohibition of riba. Ibn
Rushd explains that the controversial nature of riba is due to the drawing of analogy
from the prohibitions found in the Prophetic teachings. Applying the doctrine of riba
to transactions other than those specified in the texts is knows as the analogy of
25
resemblance.
Whatever the disagreements are, the majority agree that riba is prohibited by
the Prophet Muhammad. A summation of why Riba is prohibited in the Quran is
provided below (Siddiqi, 2002):
26
to the modern meaning of usury as excessive interest, but rather a prohibition of all
interest regardless of rate.
Judaism contains the same strong ethical and lawful bans against the taking of
interest as in Islam. The Hebrew word for interest ribith is very close to riba in
Islam. In the Torah, the prohibition of usury or interest is almost always used in the
context of protecting the poor from injustice.
The prophet Ezekiel (18:48), referred to as Hizqeel in the Quran (21:85) writes that
The upright man ...oppresses no one, returns pledges, never steals, gives
his own bread to the hungry, his clothes to the naked. He never charges usury on
loans, takes not interest.
27
In the New Testament, there is a tale of how Jesus evicted the money changers
from the temple in Jerusalem for practicing a kind of usury. Jewish pilgrims arriving
in Jerusalem to pay the temple tax needed a half shekel coin as this was the only silver
coin that did not portray the head of a pagan Roman emperor. The usurers of the
Temple changed Roman coins for the half shekel. The exchange of coin for coin was
simultaneous, but the usurers took more weight of silver from the pilgrims than they
gave. This is very similar to the Islamic prohibition of riba in barter involving
currencies.
In the Book of Deuteronomy (Deuteronomy 15:1-11)3 it exhorts creditors to
grant a remission of debt every seven years until such a time as there will be no poor
individuals within the community.
intolerable, and having no place in their ideal city-states (Divine, 1967). Aristotle held
the view that moneys purpose was solely as a medium of exchange; money was a
sterile thing, incapable of bearing fruit. He believed that the taking of interest
wrongly involved gain from money itself, instead of from the activities of exchange
which money was meant to facilitate (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1998; Gordon, 1982),
a view that is strongly endorsed in the Islamic prohibition of riba.
In the Indian or Vedic usury laws, the political sage Kautilya also provided
some rulings on the restriction of interest loans to the poor for fourth-century BCE.
He provided a distinction between production loans and consumption loans in relation
to interest in Vedic society ((Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1998).
Islam is not the only religion to ban interest as exploitative. Major religions
and cultures have banned usury since antiquity but the anti-usury stance has been
displaced by modern moral ambivalence. If moral oppositions are raised at all, they
are to the taking of excessive amounts of interest rather than the taking of interest per
se. This is, in fact, the meaning conveyed through modern use of the term usury.
Islam is one of the few segments that believes, from a majority perspective, in the
absolute prohibition of interest.
29
Chapter 5
The Prohibition on Interest:
A Consumer Perspective
One of the primary arguments for the necessity of debt and lending at interest
is that it helps to smooth consumption needs.
negative income shocks, he relies on debt to meet his short-term consumption needs,
and when he has a surplus year he lends to others who are experiencing negative
income shocks. The resulting levels of borrowings have led to a society that is
overburdened by debt. Some of the most pressing issues in consumer debt include,
but are not limited to, the rapidly increasing levels of credit card debt, swelling
consumer bankruptcy & the practice of predatory payday lending.
The poorer sections of society who have difficulty accessing credit markets
turn to payday lenders. These lenders provide a high interest 2-4 week loan backed
by a postdated personal check that a borrower promises to repay out of his next
paycheck. The nature of payday lending is similar to the credit card concept of a
revolving interest if the borrower is unable to make a full payment within the due
date. The result is a continuous flow of interest-only payments at very short intervals
that never reduce the principal. As payday loans are exempt from many state and
local usury laws, it has become an easy access to funding for credit impaired
households, and many become chronic borrowers. This practice has a serious wealth
depleting effect on already financially fragile families.
For those individuals that can access credit markets, they turn to alternative
forms of funding like credit cards. In America, a recent study (Demos, 2005) revealed
30
that Americas escalating $US800 billion credit card debt is incurred not just by the
poorer sections of society but also by the middle class. Almost 70% of poor & middle
class Americans are dependent on their credit cards as a safety net to pay for basic
living expenses and health. These are expenditures that are normally state-subsidized
and evidence that current systems in existing capitalist economies are inefficiently
distributing wealth across all sections of society.
It is not just the United States that is caught up in high levels of personal debt
but also Southeast Asian countries like Taiwan and Korea. They experienced high
growth in credit card debt with 9% and 15% respectively as compared to the 7%
growth in the United States in 2005.
Per Capita
% of Total
Loans
Korea
Korea (2002)
Taiwan, China
675
2,006
1,369
5.5
21.3
6.7
% of
Household
Loans
11.0
45.1
14.9
1,181
3.3
8.2
4.6
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand
Japan
United States
168
379
59
527
2,854
3.0
1.5
2.5
1.8
10.5
6.1
2.9
14.0
6.6
37.0
3.4
1.4
2.0
1.6
6.8
% of GDP
4.2
14.7
8.8
reach 3.8 million at the end of 2003, constituting 17% of the economically active
population. In five years, distressed credit card debt rose from 7.5% of total credit
card receivables to 34%. It even led to disruptive contagion in Korean financial
markets contributing to a weakening corporate capital spending into 2004.
By
resorting to debt as a short-term fix, the issue is exacerbated as they fall deeper into
debt, which has a long-term negative impact due to increasingly unproductive
segments in society requiring government assistance.
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
H1
2004
Hong Kong
4.8
3.9
8.6
13.5
8.2
5.4
Korea
N.A.
7.5
7.3
11.8
34.0
N.A.
Malaysia
5.2
5.1
4.6
4.1
4.7
4.2
Philippines
22.6
22.0
21.6
18.7
19.4*
N.A.
Singapore
2.7
2.9
2.6
1.7
3.5
3.2
Whereas
32
To control for the negative aspects of consumer lending, usury laws were
established for the protection of the poor & the needy from predatory lending
practices.
Usury laws are considered as the one the earliest types of consumer
protection laws, in place for over a millennia in a wide variety of cultures to protect
the needy from the greedy (Berger, 2002).
The concept of
insurance here is that individuals will be willing to lend money at a lower interest rate
i.e. below the free-market interest rate when they are rich in order that they are able to
borrow money under these conditions when they are poor. The costs of usury are
reduced, under this principle, for two reasons. First, their rationale applies only to
consumption loans; hence they limit the restrictions on interest only to these types of
33
loans. Second, they maintain that credit will not be reduced since the insurance
rationale states individuals would ex ante prefer income to be transferred from the
state where they are lending to the state of the world where they are borrowing.
Their model hinges on the fact that the loan supply is highly inelastic. Therefore,
under that assumption, if usury laws only apply to consumption loans and if people
are willing to lend funds for such purposes, then it is possible that the benefit of the
lower interest rate will be Pareto-improving.
projected that credit supply would decline from lowering a prevailing usury ceiling
from 6% to 4% (Persky, 2007). A century later, Adam Smith similarly argued that
efforts to cap the charging of interest on loans would raise the cost of borrowing, as
the borrowing was going to occur in any case and this regulation, instead of
preventing, has been found from experience to increase the evil of usury; the debtor
being obliged to pay, not only for the use of the money, but for the risk which his
creditor runs by accepting a compensation for that use. He is obliged, if one may say
so, to insure his creditor from the penalties of usury (Persky, 2007).
Modern day studies show evidence that usury laws do restrict the amount of
credit available to the poor. Using a collection of company-level data from large
national creditors during 1971, a study examined lending volumes across states found
34
that that the supply of loans fell sharply as state rate ceilings fell from observed
maximum rates of 40% to the minimum of 10% (Greer, 1974). A 1972 National
Commission on Consumer Finance report noted that legal rate ceilings may reduce
the price of personal loan credit to some borrowers, but when ceilings are sufficiently
low to affect the observed market rate in a significant way, there is a substantial
reduction in the number of borrowers included in the legal market. Another study
found that low income households in states with usury ceilings had significantly
lower levels of consumer credit than low-income households in states without usury
ceiling. There is a similar outcome for middle-income households, but the drop in
credit is not as large (Villegas, 1989).
Scheinkmans argument that usury laws act as effective means of social insurance
achieving an efficient redistribution of wealth.
To sum up, debt is required for consumption smoothing, and to ensure that
borrowers are protected, usury state laws are established. However, this merely leads
to the shrinking of the supply of credit.
consumers resort to usurious activities like pay-day lending and credit card borrowing
to meet basic needs. This leads to spiraling personal debts and higher bankruptcies.
Ultimately, society bears the burden of supporting unproductive sectors. Therefore,
the argument that presupposes debt as a necessary need is dubious. How then is it
possible to achieve social welfare while banning debt and interest?
35
The spiraling costs of debt with usurious interest payments, similar to the
Islamic riba al-jahilyah, have been proven to have disastrous results to consumers
welfare. Prager (as cited in Schein, 2003) notes that there would be no lending at all
on zero interest rates no matter how limited were the savings options of individuals.
Similarly, Glaeser & Scheinmans model also argue that banning interest altogether
would not be social welfare improving.
The Islamic model refutes both these arguments as lending without interest
occurs using Islamic Financial instruments.
embodied in the concept of Zakat, the religious duty imposed on Muslims to donate a
proportion of their disposable income to members of the community who are in need.
Zakat seeks to remove systemic conditions that promote economic exploitation of
human beings by others, a core concept in all Islamic teachings.
consumption that is beyond his means as this often leads to high debts and personal
bankruptcies. It serves as a reminder to the rich to share their wealth with those who
are impoverished. As such, it is instrumental in meeting the social and economic
needs of members of its community without requiring them to resort to usurious
36
loans. Lastly, it serves to prevent the morbid accumulation of wealth in few hands
and to diffuse it before it assumes threatening proportions (Mannan, 1970). The
depreciation of money in the levy encourages individuals to either donate this
amount as required by their faith or find investment opportunities to offset the
decrease in value of their holdings leading to the circulation of wealth within the
community.
The Quranic verse dealing with the disbursement and the beneficiaries of
Zakat reads as follows:
The State revenues are only for the poor and the
destitute, and those who work for these (revenues),
and those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and for
freeing the necks (of prisoners and slaves), and those
heavily charged, and in the path of God, and for the
wayfarers; a duty imposed by Allah, Allah being
knower, wise.
These eight categories are, in fact, very comprehensive and are seen by a
number of contemporary scholars as defining the social responsibilities of a Muslim
State. The two principal categories are the poor and the needy.
categories refer to the needythe difference between them being that one begs and
lets his needs be known, while the other does not inform others of his needs (Islahi,
1988). The other categories include individuals who are appointed collectors of Zakat,
recent converts to Islam, and the emancipation of slaves. These uses of Zakat widen
37
the scope from merely caring for subsistence levels of food, clothing and shelter to
preventing the exploitation of individuals and taking care of community needs. Zakat
is not only meant to serve as a broad safety net but also to help promote community
growth and prevent economic exploitation. This is evident in the last three uses
prescribed helping those heavily indebted, for promoting the cause of God, and
helping travelers.
These basic categories for Zakat were outlined in the seventh century when
resources were limited and poverty was pervasive. Today, authorities try to make
these teachings relevant to the community while complying with the original tenets of
Zakat. In Malaysia, for example, the Baitulmal Division of the Islamic Council, has
expanded the definition of Those in bondage or to free slaves to include three
items: To free Muslims from ignorance; to free a Muslim community from a very
oppressive condition; and to free those trapped in prostitution. In Malaysia hospitals,
medical and cash aids to the destitute and poor, patient treatment fund, etc. are
serviced by Zakat. In Yemen public hot bath, water facilities, wells for irrigation and
household water use arranged through Zakat funds have been used to sustain hundreds
of citizens for decades (Carapico, 1998).
The endorsement of Zakat to help those who are heavily indebted can be taken
to mean helping victims of hardships & natural disasters. In the days of Caliph Umar
bin Al-Khattab, the State provided interest-free loans to individuals to help them get
back on their feet. Therefore in Islam, unlike in Western cultures, the absence of
interest does not necessarily curtail lending for benevolent reasons. In present day
Islamic economies, Zakat is used to provide disaster-relief funding. Small business
38
loans are also familiar means of promoting economic enterprise as the payment of
Zakat has also been integrated in Islamic Financial Institutions. In two Islamic Banks,
namely bank Islam Malaysia (Berhad) and the Bahrain Islamic Bank, Zakat is paid at
approximately 6.13% and 1.69% respectively in addition to the conventional income
tax. Some Islamic banks provide the privilege of interest free loans only to the
holders of investment account with them. Some extend it to all bank clients. Some
restrict it to needy students and other economically weaker sections of the society. Yet
some other Islamic banks provide interest free loans to small producers, farmers and
entrepreneurs who are not qualified to get finance from other sources.
39
should be imposed on types of wealth that were prevalent in the seventh and eighth
century namely: agricultural produce, livestock, precious materials and minerals but
they have differing rates of taxation for each of these categories ranging from 2.5%
for precious metals to 20% for minerals. Many Islamic economists have suggested
that the levy should be extended to modern income-generating activities like
manufacturing and services. More conservative jurists object to this view and insist
that such innovative interpretations violate the Quran. As a result of these debates,
state officials in most countries where Zakat is compulsory fall back on a compromise
solution by extending the scope of coverage to include new sources of income. At the
same time, they keep close to the original rates for traditionally recognized revenue
resources. Around the simple moral premise of Zakat, as with Riba, there has
developed a wide array of complex rules, exceptions and penalties.
There is also dispute on how Zakat should be administered. At first all these
taxes were paid directly to the government but in the time of the third Caliph Uthman,
it was decided that Muslims could spend the tax directly to its beneficiaries as
prescribed by the Quran without the intermediation of the government. While there
is still some dispute as to whether Zakat should be administered by the state or private
individuals, in the great majority of Muslim countries, decentralization has remained
the pattern for Zakat payment. Consistent with this decentralized policy, Zakat is
collected by a range of social agencies, including religious schools, welfare
associations, village councils, and local networks of family and neighbors. However,
in countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Malaysia, the government has
reestablished the policy of governing Zakat through state agencies.
40
Zakat provides a practical and moral basis for welfare provision in an Islamic
society eliminating an individuals propensity to fall prey to the evils of usury while
trying to meet his consumption needs. It allows for interest-free loans for poverty or
calamity stricken individuals.
It provides for
41
Chapter 6
A Corporate Perspective:
Focusing on Agency Costs of Debt
portfolio? has led to numerous studies attempting to find the optimal capital structure
for organizations. This is a significant decision for any business organization not only
because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational stakeholders, but also
because of the impact such a decision has on an organizations ability to deal with its
competitive environment.
42
value of the firm and its leverage due to a debt tax shield effect. Under this model,
organizations can and should utilize 100% debt for financing investments but
empirical studies show this is not the case.
The incentive to utilize debt, and its corresponding tax shelters, is weakened
by agency costs of debt which is encountered in a highly leveraged company. Jensen
& Meckling (1976) identify three agency costs of debt:
The wealth loss that arises in the presence of debt in a firms capital structure
is primarily due to the risk shifting behavior of the owner- manager. He operates the
firm on behalf of equity, and is only concerned with cash flows from non-bankrupt
states. As a result, he will tend to accept projects that are too risky but with large payoffs in good states. The bondholders anticipating this maximizing behavior of the
owner-manager will charge a higher price for the debt capital resulting in a reduced
value of the firm. The residual loss is the agency cost resulting from the need to
raise funds through debt to make the investment.
Bondholders would naturally want to restrict the manager from such riskshifting behaviors and will write contracts to control managerial behavior. The cost
43
of writing & enforcing the contract, and the reduced profitability of the firm as a
result of restrictions on managerial flexibility is defined as monitoring cost.
Ultimately, it is the owner-manager of the firm who will pay these costs as
bondholders will factor this in when deciding on the price of the debt. The firms
manager, in order to minimize these costs that reduce the value of the firm, will
undertake in advance to provide bondholders with reports that allow them to monitor
managerial behaviors. These are costs are known as bonding costs. Asymmetry of
information increases monitoring and bonding costs as bondholders try to grasp the
actual value of the firm.
Debt provides a tax benefit to firms but at the same time, it also adds on
pressures of fixed payments on principal and interest. If the firm is unable to meet
these obligations, then it goes into bankruptcy, and ownership of the firms assets are
legally transferred to the bondholders. In theory, if bankruptcy were costless, then
there would be no effect to the firms value. In practice, however, the costs of
bankruptcy decrease a part of the remaining value of the firm and the total value of
the firm falls. Prior to purchasing bonds, the bondholder estimates the probability of
occurrence of bankruptcy and will charge a higher price for the debt accordingly,
leaving the owner-manager to bear the entire wealth effect of the costs of bankruptcy.
Research suggests that while out-of-pocket bankruptcy costs may not be necessarily
huge; the firm may still suffer due to indirect costs. Management time is diverted,
key employees leave the organization, and customer and supplier confidence may be
shaken. This is particularly true of firms with intangible assets such as reputation,
patents and human capital. Thus, intangibility of assets increases agency costs of
debt.
44
A firm may ultimately avoid bankruptcy but still incur agency costs similar to
that discussed above if they are in a state of financial distress. Financial distress is
defined as a low cash-flow state in which the firm incurs loses without being
bankrupt.
Myers (1977) agrees with Jensen and Mecklings analysis that suboptimal
investment policy is an agency cost induced by risky debt. However, he presents a
different argument. Myers argues that debt, specifically risky debt, in some states of
nature, will restrain firms from investing in positive NPV projects leading to
underinvestment. This occurs when shareholders perceive that the profits will be used
to pay off existing debt holders. The cost of the suboptimal investment strategy
reduces the market value of a firm and this loss is ultimately absorbed by the
companys shareholders. He argues that a firm which has no debt or can issue riskfree debt will make decisions that maximize firm value. Thus, in the absence of
corporate taxes, the optimal solution is to issue no risky debt. In the presence or
corporate tax and interest tax shields, there is a trade off the between the tax
advantage of debt and the suboptimal behaviors of owner-managers. In addition,
when growth options are available, the opportunity cost of underinvestment is due to
leverage, thus high growth firms should rely more on equity financing rather than debt
45
financing to maximize firm value. Growth firms lose more of their value when they
go into distress.
Myers concludes that there is a definite limit to how much firms can borrow.
He proposes that credit rationing can occur in perfect capital markets. A firm can
only borrow up to a certain point, after which it cannot borrow more by offering to
pay a higher interest rate as it may actually decrease the amount of credit available to
the firm.
While the tax-shield on interest rates generates an initial increase in the market
value of the firm, after a certain point these tax-shields have diminishing returns.
Once a company is over-leveraged, the value of the firm drops due to the agency costs
of debt. Islam supports the view that debt is not meant for business transactions. In
fact, the only type of debt allowed is where there is no expectation of return (Qard
Hassan). It is a benevolent loan allowed more for charitable rather than business
intent. The prohibition of usurious interest in Islam is rooted in the belief that it leads
to exploitation and a destruction of value. This is illustrated in how an ownermanagers behavior changes in the presence of debt in his organizations capital
structure. Both the manager-owner and the bondholder try to maximize their
46
respective values to the detriment of the other, the overall result being a loss in the
firms market value.
decreased when the bank becomes a partner in equity or hybrid instruments as it has
access to all the information needed to carefully assess the financial situation of the
entrepreneur.
The interest regime accepts only those projects whose expected returns are
higher than the cost of debt, and therefore filter out projects which could be
acceptable under the Islamic profit sharing system (Zaher & Hassan, 2001). By
rejecting positive NPV value projects, there is an impact not just to the firm that loses
value, but to the community as it means fewer jobs that might otherwise have been
created by new investments. High leverage also makes an organization vulnerable to
external shocks and on an aggregate scale can affect an entire economy.
47
Chapter 7
An Economic Perspective:
The East Asian Crisis
How well has the prevailing economic & financial systems served in
promoting the real well-being of sovereign countries?
Capitalism, the most dominant economic system, has not been able to narrow
the gap between the haves and the have-nots. There exists a huge income gap in
this system as it reinforces the unequal distribution of capital skewed in favor of the
wealthy. Likewise, Socialism promoting collective ownership of production factors
and control of distribution factors has failed to induce both collective development
and personal self-actualization, thus retarding the process and rate of economic
growth.
production, distribution and supply by a whole classless society, could not co-exist
with human dynamisms and aspirations. It fell short of bringing about economic
satisfaction in individual and collective life.
Looking at how well the current international architecture has served most
economies, the single most striking piece of evidence of its failure is the high
frequency of financial crises, particularly since 1973. The frequency of banking
crises since 1973 is about 10% per annum for each country out of 21 mainly
developed countries and about 12% for a wider sample of 56 countries which include
emerging market economies (Bordo 2002; Eichengreen 2002).
48
Table 6
This frequency is approximately double the rate during the Gold Standard
1880-1913 when each country faced a one in twenty risk of crises in any given year.
It is higher than the Bretton Woods era (1945-1973) of pegged but adjustable
exchange rates and limited capital mobility. Other than the interwar period (19191939) which includes the Great Depression, it is the highest incidence of crises since
1880.
The 1997 East Asian crises highlight how excessive reliance on short-term and
foreign currency nominated debt leads to economic instability. As Rogoff (2003)
notes:
private flows to emerging markets are remarkable for their
unpleasant side effects - wild booms, spectacular crashes, overindebtedness, excessive reliance on short-term and foreign-currency
denominated debt, and protracted stagnation following a debt crisis.
[There] is an excessive reliance on dangerous forms of debt, such
as foreign-currency denominated debt and short-term debt, which
aggravate the pain of crises when they occur.
49
sequence of events which shake the confidence of lenders in the firms ability to
obtain cash flows to meet payment commitments. This describes the events that led
to the twin crisis of East Asia. Our interest lies in how the private sectors behavior
led to the financial crisis that also triggered the currency crisis.
Leverage
180
160
Hong Kong
Total Debt/Equity
140
Indonesia
120
Korea
100
Malaysia
Philippines
80
Singapore
60
Taiwan
40
Thailand
20
0
1
Table 7
Source:
The levels of leverage across the East Asian countries prior to the crisis varied
widely. Thailand and Koreas high leverage ratios contrasted with the moderate
50
debt/equity ratios of Hong Kong, Philippines and Taiwan (Appendix 1). An important
observation, however is that the debt equity ratio was rapidly increasing as shown in
Table 7. In Thailand, for example, leverage increased from 91% in 1992 to 155% by
the end of 1996. Similar trends are observed in Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia.
This rapid build up of leverage was due to high levels of investment propelled
by firms goals of high growth. Growth was regarded as more important that profit or
firm value maximization and high levels of investment led to a decline in the
profitability of the corporate sector.
The crisis hit when speculators recognized that the inflows of capital
investments would dry up in the near future as the private sector, overburdened with
debt, would be unable to service its interest payments. The table below shows the
deteriorating ability of the East Asian corporations to cover interest payments by
1996.
51
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
10
12
EBITDA/Interest Payable
1996
Table 8
Source:
Since the capital inflows were supporting the pegged exchange rate, once they
stopped, the government ran out of foreign exchange reserves resulting in a currency
crisis. This crisis was driven by the unsustainable deficit of the private sector which
led to the reversal of capital inflows.
The twin crisis was a result of the interaction between the currency markets
and the banking sector. Since bank lending was mainly used to fuel a bubble in the
stock and real estate markets, the crisis led to a corresponding collapse in asset prices.
The resulting credit crunch led to many corporate bankruptcies. The sale of assets of
these failing companies generated further declines in asset values and the further
deterioration of both the financial and corporate sectors.
52
The costs of the financial crises were massive. An estimate of the costs using
forgone output for the four Asian countries hardest hit by the financial crises,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia & Thailand, are estimated at US$917 billion for the
period of 1997-2002. Indonesia experienced larger falls in output and income during
and after the crisis than that of the USA in the Great Depression. It is also estimated
that the poverty headcount in Indonesia doubled after the crisis, from 7-8% in 1997 to
18-20% in 1998 (Suryahadi et al. 2000). The rest of the other Asian countries actual
output had not returned to its potential level by 2002.
Table 9
The output losses also led to lower economic growth for the years following
the crisis (1997-2003). Average growth before the Asian crisis was at 7.3 % for
Korea, 8% for Indonesia & Thailand, and 9.6% for Malaysia. The average growth
over 1997-2002 was 4.5% in Korea and 0.5% in Indonesia (Appendix 5).
features such as financial and legal systems, underdeveloped financial markets and
the role of each respective government that contributed to the East Asian crisis, the
53
high levels of corporate debt was a main contributing factor that precipitated the
crisis.
Islamic Finance proposes the shift to a more equity oriented financial system
as a way of reducing the volatility in financial markets. Equity financing improves
economic health as banks will have more incentives to do their jobs properly when
making risk- assessments. The IMF also favors equity financing by arguing:
54
The
Equity-based & hybrid Islamic products, which combine features of debt &
equity, mitigates the risks of a pure debt instrument. Equity, while more costly during
an economic upturn, offers more flexibility as profit sharing only occurs when the
organization is financially healthy. Islamic hybrid instruments have the same
flexibility as pure equity instruments, and a fixed payment that has a debt like
aspect that insures the discipline of payment without the expanded liability caused by
interest rates.
Islamic Finance relies on this system which minimizes the risk of bank failures
and increases the stability of the banking system. This removes the destabilizing
effect of interest rates and leads to a more stable exchange rate system. Thus, a
system that does not rely on the erratic behavior of interest leads to a more stable
investment climate, and ultimately a more stable economy.
55
Chapter 8
Islamic Modes of Finance:
In Theory & Practice
While all Islamic financial contracts do not involve the payment of interest,
some are classified as debt-like as it involves regular payment schedules to prevent
default similar to conventional debts. The most common instruments in this category
are Bai Murabahah & Bai Muajjal, Ijara & Ijara wal Iqtina, Istisna & Bai Salam,
and Qard Hassan.
56
The Bai Muajjal is similar to the Bai Murabahah transaction in most aspects.
The key difference is that the Islamic Banks allows a deferment of the payment
through installment to facilitate the purchase of the asset.
From a modern
However, there are serious misgivings about the popularity of this mode of
finance. As returns are larger the longer the period of repayment stipulated in the
57
contract, many argue that there is no difference in pricing the sale of an asset in
excess of it original amount to riba as it represents a fixed rate of interest to the lender
(Siddiqui, 1983 & Saeed, 1996). Additionally, when a when a debtor is unable to
make a payment within the specified time, in theory, Islamic Institutions should give
him time to repay the debt. However, in practice, with the support of Religious
Supervisory Boards, Islamic Banks charge a fine to be incorporated in the contract.
This is aligned to conventional finance practice of charging extra interest charges as
penalties.
Murabahah financing and interest-based financing are comparable and the difference
lies only in their contractual features.
Ijara is similar to a conventional leasing concept where the lessor, the Islamic
bank, leases the asset to the lessee for rental payments covering a specified period of
time but with no option to own the asset. Ijara wal Iqtina, on the other hand, is
similar to a lease to purchase option in conventional finance.
58
2. The ownership of the asset remains with the lessor who is responsible for
its maintenance.
3. The leasing contract is terminated when the assets stops giving service
for which it was rented. If the asset gets damaged during the contract
period the contract still remains valid.
4.
The price of the asset, if sold to the lessee once the contract expires,
cannot be predetermined. It can only be settled when the contract is
expired.
conventional finance except that in Islamic instruments the rate of return is based per
59
transaction rather that to time. In addition, unlike conventional forward contracts, the
purchaser pays for the entire transaction in cash at the time of contract to facilitate
working capital requirements e.g. a manufacturer needing capital to produce a final
good for the buyer. The entire risk is also borne by the buyer alone, unlike in forward
contracts where it is borne by both parties. In return for the advance payment and the
added risk, the buyer receives a more favorable price for the goods. An important
feature of the Bai Salam contract is that the underlying asset must be standardized, of
a determinate quality and easily quantified.
Istisna is a deferred delivery sale similar to a Bai Salam contract. It is a predelivery financing and leasing model used mostly to fund long-term and large scale
activities very similar to the conventional work-in-progress financing of capital
projects like construction. Unlike the Bai Salam which requires an upfront cash
payment, Istisna may be paid in installment payments at any agreed upon time, even
exceeding the delivery date. This model is still a very new product in Islamic finance.
Benevolent Loan:
Qard Hassan is a zero return loan that the Quran exhorts Muslims to make to
the needy.
administrative fee as long as it is not tied to the amount or the maturity of the loan.
In theory, this loan is meant more as an act of kindness than a financing tool
for business. There may be some situations where a firm may be eligible for such a
loan; it is questionable whether it should be a mainstream and regular form for
60
financing for Islamic enterprises (Chapra, 1985). While not required, the recipient of
a benevolent loan can choose to reward the provider with a return in excess of the
original amount loaned. In practice, although banks cannot insist on payments above
the loan, they provide this facility expecting corporate borrowers to return the loan
with sums above that which was originally borrowed.
The popularity of debt-like contracts has been attributed to issues like adverse
selection (Kuran, 1993; Khan & Mirakhor 1987) where Islamic Banks get capitalists
that have not successfully received loans from conventional banks. They are more
likely to have high-cost investments and more likely to divert borrowed funds.
Although Islamic debt-like contracts are widely used, there is some dispute on
their acceptability due to the underlying fixed return on investments implicit in the
contracts. Most Islamic scholars agree that these contracts are permissible, but should
61
still be restricted or avoided as they may open back doors to the forbidden riba
(Siddiqui, 1983; Khan, 1987). Other concerns are that mark-up financing may inhibit
economic growth as it discourages entrepreneurs from investing in new projects.
The heart of Islamic Finance lies in the profit sharing principle. Profit sharing
modes seek to avoid debt-financing and instead use partnership and equity-financing,
similar to venture capitalism.
arrangement between two or more transacting parties, which allows them to pool their
resources to invest in a project to share in profit and loss. Most Islamic economists
contend that PLS based on two major modes of financing, namely Mudarabah and
Musharakah, is desirable in an Islamic context wherein reward-sharing is related to
risk-sharing between transacting parties. (Dar and Presley, 2000)
This Islamic product is essentially a joint venture where the main investment
is capital. Two or more persons contribute to the financing and management of the
business in equal or unequal proportions. This product is similar to the modern
concept of partnership except that in conventional finance, banks are not allowed to
be partners in this type of contract. Under this type of equity finance, the profit
agreement and the length of the joint venture is decided upon in advance. Loss is
shared in proportion to the capital contribution unless the loss is proven to be due to
negligence of one party.
62
may not necessarily be equal and that the mutual agency only covers areas of trade
and commodities agreed upon. Liabilities are only limited according to each partners
capital contribution to the total investment.
63
An unrestricted
Mudarabah does not place any of the above restrictions on the trading activities of the
entrepreneur.
Mudarabah can involve multiple parties. In this case shares are issued to
represent a stake in the business. Shares are issued in the form of certificates which
are transferable. The shareholder is entitled to a proportion of the profit or loss of his
capital. Neither the return of the principal nor profit is guaranteed to the holder
similar to a conventional stock market; the difference being that the Mudarabah
certificate must comply with Shariah laws.
64
Sukuk
offering in Singapore combined both the features of Musharakah and Ijara. It was a
S$25M Musharakah bond for the purchase of an office building. The Islamic Council
(MUIS) entered into a Musharakah Agreement contributing S$9M with the bond
investors contributing S$25M. Capital contributions and profit sharing ratios were at
26.5% and 73.5% respectively. The Ijara Agreement was entered between Fusion
Company, the building owner, and Freshmill Pte. Ltd. who would manage the
tenancies and guarantees as annual Ijara income of S$1.19M to be shared equitably
between MUIS and the bond investors based on the profit ratios.
65
Funds
Mobilizing
Entity
Special Purpose
Mudarabah
SPM
SPM/SPV
SPV
Pool of Assets
(Ijarah/Leases)
Assets
Ijarah Assets
Liabilities
Sukuk
Certificates
Servicing
Investors: IFI
IFIs, Conventional
Institutional Investors,
Pension Funds
etc
66
debt for debt is not allowed in Islam. The sale of a document representing money is
similar to the trading of monies which is considered riba.
Sukuk securities are still largely concentrated in Malaysia and the Gulf States
focusing mainly as assets in Islamic jurisdictions but it is a rapidly growing business
with the involvement of private companies, state corporations, governments, Islamic
financial institutions and even Western investment banks.
Modes of Finance
1. Al-Mushakarah
1.4
0.7
0.5
2. Al-Mudarabah
7.0
7.3
3. Al-Istisna
0.9
1.3
0.7
4. Al-Ijarah
4.3
3.0
1.4
5. Al-Murabahah
6.4
48.3
49.1
47.4
23.3
27.9
15.9
15.3
15.7
Total
100
100
100
The core is Islamic Finance lies in equity financing but in practice these
modes of finance are largely ignored. Most Islamic Financial Institutions rely on
Murabahah, a financing mode that is high in risk-avoidance and promises a relatively
high return which allows them to compete effectively with conventional banks. This
67
is illustrated above using Bank Negara as an example. Equity and hybrid equity
modes account for only 8.4% and have been declining in the succeeding years while
debt-like modes account for a substantially high percentage
This pattern is also repeated in other banks as evidenced by the data provided
by the Islamic Development Bank on all its member countries in the table below.
While Murabahah is widely accepted in Islamic finance, there is nothing unique about
it. The reliance on this type of financing negates anything distinctly from Islamic
from Islamic Financial Institutions.
Table12
Source:
68
69
In order for Islamic Finance to realize its objectives it is important to close the
gap between theory and practice. Understanding the reasons behind the reluctance to
use profit sharing Islamic modes will help to develop more instruments that close this
space. There is already some discussion among Islamic scholars that developing
more hybrid instruments will help to decrease the reliance on debt-like contracts and
promote more equity sharing which is in the spirit of Islamic Finance.
70
Chapter 9
Conclusion
In order for Islamic finance not follow the same route, it is imperative to
understand not just the religious reasoning for this prohibition but the social,
corporate and economic implications as well. From a social perspective, the use of
debt and consequently interest as a tool to smooth consumption has led to higher
personal bankruptcies, and the dependence on predatory lending practices that lower
instead of improving the social welfare of individuals. Usury state laws have not
successfully protected individuals from the evils of usury.
In contrast, Islam
Islamic mark-up modes reduce the bankruptcy costs that arise in case of default as the
assets are unambiguously owned by the lender until it is fully paid. On an aggregate
economic scale the negative effects of debt are magnified to such an extent that it can
lead to an economic crisis as depicted by the example of the East Asian Crisis. A
more equity based firm, using pure equity or hybrid instruments, can avoid the pitfalls
induced by conventional debt.
foreign debts. The term and structure of the assets and liabilities are symmetrically
matched through profit sharing arrangements. In addition, close link between the
process of real-asset creation & value addition on one hand and the financial &
monetary expansion on the other hand ensures a more stable economy that avoids the
volatile swings of a highly credit based economy.
accepted by one bank or in one specific country may be rejected by another e.g.
Malaysias approval for a Murabahah Sukuk which is quite controversial. Forming a
council that represents the different schools of thought to determine uniform rules and
policies will help to expedite the introduction and uniform acceptance of new
products.
72
effectively with the conventional banks. This will help to resolve issues of adverse
selection and moral hazard that they are currently subjected to.
73
Notes
1
God deprives riba of all blessing but blesses charity; he loves not the ungrateful
sinner.
Those who believe, perform good deeds, establish prayer and pay the Zakat, their
reward is with their Lord; neither should they have any fear, nor shall they grieve.
O believers, fear God, and give up the riba that remains outstanding if you are
believers.
If you do not do so, then be sure of being at war with God and his Messenger. But, if
you repent, you can have your principal. Neither should you commit injustice nor
should you be subjected to it.
If the debtor is in difficulty, let him have respite until it is easier, but if you forgo out
of charity, it is better for you if you realize.
And fear the Dar when you shall be returned to the Lord and every soul shall be paid
in full what it has earned and no one shall be wronged.
(Surah al-Baqarah, verses 276-81)
Leviticus 25:3537, it says: If your kinsman, being in straits, comes under your
authority, and you hold him as though a resident alien, let him live by your side: do
not exact from him advance or accrued interest, but fear your God. Let him live by
your side as your kinsman. Do not lend him money at advance interest, or give him
your food at accrued interest.
Every seventh year you shall practice remission of debts. This shall be the nature of
the remission: every creditor shall remit the due that he claims from his fellow; he
74
shall not dun his fellow or kinsman, for the remission proclaimed is of the Lord. You
may dun the foreigner; but you must remit whatever is due you from your kinsmen.
(Y)ou shall not deduct interest from loans to your countrymen, whether in food or
anything else that can be deducted as interest; but you may deduct interest from loans
to foreigners. Do no deduct interest from loans to your countrymen, so that the LORD
your God may bless you in all your undertakings in the land that you are about to
enter and possess.
works have made attempts to extend this model to open developing economies
75
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Appendix
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Hong Kong
26
23
33
36
39
Indonesia
59
54
58
81
92
Korea
123
129
127
132
NA
Malaysia
31
29
38
45
62
Philippines
81
78
50
49
69
Singapore
37
34
33
45
58
Taiwan
71
73
71
67
65
Thailand
71
81
103
135
155
Source:
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Average
Hong Kong
58
62
63
64
61
62
Indonesia
52
56
56
50
45
52
Korea
64
52
53
52
N/A
55
Malaysia
66
64
61
61
59
62
Philippines
51
52
60
58
54
55
Singapore
77
82
80
60
78
75
Taiwan
64
66
65
68
61
65
Thailand
64
64
62
60
60
62
Source:
82
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Ave.
Hong Kong
19.29
25.85
21.77
13.59
11.07
18.31
Indonesia
0.03
0.52
2.18
3.07
2.44
1.65
Korea
1.42
1.41
1.89
1.77
1.07
1.51
Malaysia
9.09
9.76
11.73
9.62
6.74
9.39
Philippines
1.89
2.59
2.93
4.31
3.68
3.08
Singapore
12.4
14.37
11.7
8.8
8.05
11.06
Taiwan
5.73
4.71
6.3
5.12
4.08
5.19
Thailand
4.63
4.12
3.83
2.47
1.92
3.39
Source:
US$ Billion
% of GDP, 2002
Indonesia
345.9
113
Korea
178.1
26
Malaysia
87.8
69
Thailand
305.2
157
Total
917.0
72
83
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Average
(1997(19972002)
Indonesia
7.8
4.7
-13.1
0.8
4.9
3.4
3.7
0.5
Korea
7.3
5.0
-6.7
10.9
9.3
3.1
6.4
4.5
Malaysia
9.6
7.3
-7.4
6.2
8.5
0.3
4.1
3.0
Thailand
8.2
-1.4
-10.5
4.5
4.8
2.2
5.4
0.7
84