Professional Documents
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Multipolarity
Author(s): Charles A. Kupchan
Source: International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 40-79
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539379
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AfterPax Americana
Charles
A. Kupchan
era of unprece-
centurydraws near.The
dented peace appears to be at hand as the twenty-first
world's major powers enjoy cooperativerelations,democracyis takingroot in
many countriesthathave long sufferedunder authoritarianrule,and theworld
economy is becoming increasinglyliberalized and integrated.Contraryto the
dire predictionsof a returnto a Hobbesian world, the end of the Cold War has
not been accompanied by the fragmentationof internationalorder and the
emergenceof rivalryamong atomisticnational units.1
A sobering reality,however, must temper optimism about the emerging
internationallandscape. The peace and prosperityof the currentera rely too
heavily on a single ingredient:Americanpower. The United States serves as a
criticalextraregionalbalancer in Europe and East Asia, is the catalystbehind
multilateraleffortsto combat aggressionand peacefullyresolve long-standing
disputes,and is the engine behind the liberalizationof the world economy.But
America's preponderance and its will to underwriteinternationalorder will
Even if the U.S. economy grows at a healthyrate,Amernot last indefinitely.
ica's share of world productand its global influencewill decline as otherlarge
countries develop and become less enamored of followingAmerica's lead.2
and Senior
is AssociatePr-ofessor
Relationsat Georgetozvwn
CharlesA. Kutpchan
University
ofInternational
Fellowat theCouincilon ForeignRelationis.
The author would like to thank participantsin seminars at the followinginstitutionsfor their
thoughtfulcomments:Hebrew University,Columbia University,Universityof Californiaat San
Diego, Council on ForeignRelations,GeorgetownUniversity,Universityof Californiaat Berkeley,
Harvard University,Okazaki Institute(Tokyo), the American Center (Tokyo), and the Danish
Instituteof InternationalAffairs(Copenhagen). The critiques of Michael Barnett,Richard Betts,
AlbertFishlow,Gary Hufbauer,CliffordKupchan, JosephLepgold, Gideon Rose, Peter Trubowitz,
Ole Waever,Fareed Zakaria, and the reviewersof International
were particularlyhelpful.
Securi-ity
For researchassistance,I would like to thankJasonDavidson, Delphine Park, and Mira Sucharov.
1. See, forexample,JohnJ.Mearsheimer,"Back to the Future:Instabilityin Europe afterthe Cold
Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56.
War,"International
Secuirity,
2. For general analysis of the secular processes throughwhich the locus of preponderantpower
changes over time,see Robert Gilpin, War and Changein WorldPolitics(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1981). During the second half of the twentiethcentury,U.S. economic
Frankel,
outputhas fallenfromroughlyone-halfto one-quarterof gross world product.See Jeffrey
Blocs in the WorldEconomnic
System(Washington,D.C.: InstituteforInternational
Regioncal
Tradinig
Economics, 1997), p. 6.
Ioteoiiatioinal Seciiritiy,Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79
? 1998 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.
40
AfterPax Americana| 41
Furthermore,
the American electoratewill tireof a foreignpolicy thatsaddles
the United States with such a disproportionateshare of the burden of managing the internationalsystem.America'sunipolar momentwill not last long. To
assume that internationalorder can indefinitelyrest on American hegemony
is both illusoryand dangerous.
How should the prospect of waning American power affectthe conduct of
American grand strategy?3Several prominentschools of thoughtsuggest that
the decline of American hegemonyneed not be cause forconcern;peace will
outlast American preponderance.The optimistscontend that democracy,globalization, the spread of internationalinstitutions,and changes in the sources
of state power are eroding national boundaries and making warfarean obsolete tool of statecraft.4
The end of the twentiethcentury,however,is n6t the
firsttime in historythat studentsof internationalpolitics have proclaimed an
end to war. In the years leading up to World War I and again during the
interwarperiod, scholars and diplomats alike argued that economic interdependence,technologicalinnovation,and societal aversion to the horrorsof war
If today's optimistsprove to
were making armed conflicta historicalartifact.5
be as wrong as yesterday's,there is good reason to be worried about the
potentialconsequences of a relativedecline in U.S. power.6
Even ifthe optimistsare rightthatinternationalpoliticshave entereda more
peaceful era, the waning of Americanhegemonystillprovides cause foralarm.
3. Even if American hegemony lasts for decades more, debate about craftinga posthegemonic
order should take place now, while U.S. preponderance is still sufficientto maintain the status
quo. It is farmore prudentto put in place the foundationof a durable orderby design thansimply
to wait untilcurrentarrangementsunravel. Many analystsagree thatU.S. preponderancewill not
last,but few have given thoughtto how the prospectof decline should affectU.S. grand strategy.
One exceptionis ChristopherLayne. Layne calls fora U.S. grand strategyof offshorebalancing to
conserve U.S. resources and to help protectthe United States fromgettingdragged into distant
conflicts.He failsto address, however,how to promotepeace as the United Stateswithdrawsfrom
existingcommitments.Instead,he makes the case thatthe United States should simplystand aloof
fromthe regional conflictslikelyto emerge in the wake of an Americanretrenchment.
See Layne,
"From Preponderance to OffshoreBalancing: America's Future Grand Strategy,"Inter-inatioinal
Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 86-124.
Security,
4. On the democratic peace, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the DemocraticPeace (Princeton,N.J.:
PrincetonUniversityPress, 1993); and Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics,"American
PoliticalScienceReviezv,
Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.On the decliningutilityof
warfare,see Richard Rosecrance,The Rise of theTradinig
State (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and
JohnMueller,Retr-eat
froinDoomsday:The Obsolescence
ofMajor War(New York:Basic Books, 1989).
5. See, forexample, Norman Angell, The GreatIlliusion(New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1911).
6. Importantcritiques of the democratic peace hypothesis have been collected in two edited
volumes: Michael E. Brown,Sean M. Lynn-Jones,
and Steven E. Miller,eds., DebatingtheDemnocratic
Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is
DemocracytheAnswver?
(Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
International
Security23:2 | 42
AfterPax Americana| 43
Security23:2 | 44
International
AfterPax Americana| 45
I begin by laying out the logic of benign unipolarity.I then discuss the
descriptive and prescriptiveimplications of the notion for North America,
Europe, and East Asia. In the finalsection,I theorizeabout the dynamicsthat
would characterizeinternationalpoliticsin a world ofbenignunipolar regions,
exploringhow to effecttheirinternalcohesion as well as cooperativerelations
among them.
The LogicofBenignUnipolarity
The promotionof intraregionalpeace is the logical startingpoint of effortsto
constructa stable internationalorderto followAmericanhegemony.10
If neighbors are at peace with each other,they are likely to be at peace with-states
furtherafield.If neighborsare at war with each other,statesfurtherafield are
likely to become involved, both to contain the war and to preventthe emergence of a powerfulvictorwith extraregionalambition.
Regional unipolarityprovides orderand stabilitythroughpower asymmetry
and the structuralhierarchythat follows fromit. The preponderance of the
leading regionalstatediscourages othersfrombalancing against it and enables
the leader to underwritethe institutionsand normsof regionalorder.Whereas
roughly equivalent power produces balancing and contestationover leadership, asymmetryproduces hierarchyand a core-peripherypatternof relations.
perspectives traditionallyreserved for the study of economic bodies are being used to study
securitybodies. See, for example, John Duffield,"Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The
Contributionsof Regional SecurityRegimes,"ReviewofInternational
Vol. 20, No. 4 (October
Stuidies,
1994), pp. 369-399. And theoreticalperspectivestraditionallyreservedforthe study of geopolitics
and securityare being applied to groupingssuch as the EU. See, forexample, Ole Waever's work
on European integration,in particular,"Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretationof
Post-WallEuropean Security,"in Rick Fawn and JeremyLarkins,eds., International
Societyafterthe
Cold War (New York: St. Martin'sPress, 1996), pp. 220-260. I am indebted to Waever forinitially
inspiringme to apply the logic of empires to the EU and, consequently,to otherregional bodies
traditionallyviewed primarilyas trade groupings.For a contemporaryperspectiveon the geopoliticalimportanceof regionalzones of influence,see Charles WilliamMaynes, "A WorkableClinton
Doctrine,"ForeignPolicy,No. 93 (Winter1993),pp. 3-21. For more generalworks on contemporary
regionalism,some of which do touch on geopoliticalconcerns,see Peter Katzensteinand Takashi
Shiraishi,eds., Netzvork
Pozver:Japanand Asia (Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell UniversityPress, 1997); Edward
Mansfield and Helen Milner, eds., The PoliticalEconomny
of Regionalism(New York: Columbia
in
UniversityPress, 1997); David Lake and PatrickMorgan, eds., RegionalOrders:Butilding
Secuirity
a Nezv World(UniversityPark: PennsylvaniaState Press, 1997); Jeffrey
Frankel and Miles Kahler,
and Rivalry:Japanand the UnitedStates in PacificAsia (Chicago: Universityof
eds., Regionalismii
in WorldPolitics:
Chicago Press, 1993); and Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell,eds., Regionalismn
RegionalOrganizationand International
Order(Oxford,U.K.: OxfordUniversityPress, 1995).
10. On promotingregionalpeace as a pathway to global stability,
see JosephS. Nye, Peace in Parts:
Integration
and Conflictin RegionalOrganizationi
(Boston: Little,Brown,1971).
International
Security23:2 | 46
11. I define the terms "benign" and "self-binding"as follows. Self-bindingis the mechanism
throughwhich states render theirpower benign. Self-bindinghas quantitative,qualitative,and
proceduralcomponents.In quantitativeterms,self-bindingentailsa state'swillingnessto withhold
power, to refrainfromfullyexercisingits resourcesand influence.This strategicrestraintmay be
codified,as in the cases of contemporaryGermany and Japan, or it may be embodied only in
practice.The qualitativecomponentof self-bindingconcernsthe ends to which power is exercised.
Benign states seek to manage ratherthan maximize power, to promotejoint gains ratherthan to
behave in an extractiveand exploitativemanner,and to erectordersbased upon the notion that
the spread of shared norms and identitiesand the formationof communityat the international
level can overcome competitiverelationsamong atomisticstate units. The procedural component
of self-bindingentails a preferenceformultilateralover unilateralinitiative.Benign states favor
consensual governance,and resortto unilateraldecisionmakingonly when multilateralismfailsto
produce an acceptable outcome.
12. The.notion that greatpowers have characterand pursue different
types of behavior has firm
rootsin classical realism.Classical realistsregularlydistinguishbetween revisionistand status quo
powers. See, for example, Arnold Wolfers,"The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in
Politics(Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkins
Wolfers,ed., Discordand Collaboration:
Essayson International
UniversityPress, 1962); Randall Schweller,"Tripolarityand the Second World War," International
Studies Quarterly,Vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 73-103; Schweller,"Neorealism's Status-Quo
Bias: What Security Dilemma?" SecurityStudies,Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; and
Mastanduno, "Preservingthe Unipolar Moment." I am extendingthistypologyto include benign
powers. Revisioniststates seek to overturnthe prevailingsystemthroughacquisitive and predatorystrategies.Status quo states seek to preservethe prevailingsystemby pursuing competitive,
but not acquisitive,strategies.Benign statesseek not just to preservethe status quo, but to deepen
its stabilityand cooperativecharacterby reassuringotherstates and fosteringconsensual governance throughthe withholdingas well as the exerciseofpower. The key difference
between a status
quo stateand a benignstatestemsfromdivergingconceptionsof the sources of orderand stability.
Stabilityin a world of status quo states stems from the absence of strategicrivalry among
satisfied-but atomisticand self-regarding-stateunits still residingin an anarchic environment.
The securitydilemma does not operate because no revisioniststate exists to triggerit. Stabilityin
a world of benign states stems fromsuccessful effortsto carve out nonanarchicspace through
promotingcooperation,trust,and shared values and identities.The securitydilemma does not
operate because states no longer reside in an anarchic,self-helpsetting.
13. Consider how importantboth the structureand characterof power are to the stabilityof the
currentinternationalsystem. The asymmetryassociated with American preponderance creates
structuralhierarchy.Other major states are not balancing against U.S. preponderance in part
AfterPax Americana| 47
International
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The power-constraintdevices that work togetherwith asymmetryto produce benign unipolaritytake two forms.First,core states erectinternalrules
and institutionsthat check theirexternalpower. Societal norms against coercive intervention,checks and balances among branches of government,and
constitutionallimitson the use of forceare examples. Second, core stateserect
externalrules and institutionsthat bind themselvesto other states.17 For example, the institutionsthat govern the Franco-Germancoalition,and the EU
more generally,check the power of individual states,establishmechanismsfor
collective decisionmakingand initiative,and promote the spread of regionwide interestsand identities.18
Keohane, AfterHegemnony
(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1984),pp. 31-32. In contrast,
benign unipolarityemerges not fromthe hegemon's impositionof order,but throughnegotiation
between the core and its surroundingperiphery.The resultis a hierarchicalorder that is more
multilateralin spiritand practicethan thatenvisaged in hegemonicstabilitytheory.Furthermore,
order emerges throughthe withholdingof power as well as its application. In this sense, and
will lead
contraryto hegemonicstabilitytheory,a weaker core and one thatexercisesself-restraint
to a more cohesive and durable regionalformationthan will a strongerand domineeringone. The
less preponderantand the more benign the core, the more it relies on bargains to establishorder
and the less fearfulsmaller states are of exploitationresultingfromgross power asymmetries.
The differencesbetween hegemonyand benign unipolarityhelp resolve a long-standingpuzzle:
why regional institutionsin Europe are farmore developed than in North America or East Asia.
If power asymmetryalone were the main determinantof institutionalizedregional order,the
reverse should be true. The United States and Japan have been more preponderantin their
respectiveregionsthan has been eitherGermanyor the Franco-Germancoalition.For measures of
the relativepreponderanceof the United States,Japan,and Germanyin theirrespectiveregions,
see JostephGrieco, "Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalizationin Western
Europe, East Asia, and theAmericas,"in Mansfieldand Milner,ThePoliticalEconomyofRegionalism,
pp. 173-175.
The notion of benign unipolarityexplains why regionalismin Europe is the most advanced.
Europe's less starkasymmetriesengendergreaterrelianceon consensual governance.If Europe is
to constructunipolarity,it must do so throughnegotiationbetween core and periphery.North
America's unipolaritycomes without tryingbecause of U.S. preponderance.As a result,institutionalized governanceis emergingonly gradually,as the United States recognizesthe advantages
associated with withholdingpower and playing by the rules of multilateralism.In Asia as well, a
combinationof stark asymmetriesand fear about whetherthe core will exercise its power in a
benign mannerhas inhibitedthe emergenceof institutionalizedregionalorder.Power asymmetry
must be pronounced enough to establish hierarchy,but not so pronounced that it inhibits a
consensual regional formation.For a similar argumentabout the extentto which less hegemony
may produce more regionalism,see Donald Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter?The Reorganization
of the PacificPolitical Economy," WorldPolitics,Vol. 45, No. 4 (July1993), pp. 501-525.
17. I include both formsof power constraintin thenotionof self-bindingintroducedabove. Daniel
Deudney and JohnIkenberryuse the term"co-binding" to referexclusivelyto externalpowerconstraintdevices in which states bind one another.See Deudney and Ikenberry,"Structural
Liberalism: The Nature and Sources of Postwar WesternPolitical Order," ReviewofInternational
Studies(forthcoming).
devices thatmoderate externalrelationsamong EU membersare not as
18. The power-constraint
robust as those that govern internalpolitics within the United States,but they are based on the
same underlyinglogic. Indeed, were European integrationto deepen considerablyin the years
ahead and lead to a federal union, the power-constraintdevices that now operate among its
AfterPax Americana| 49
POLARITY
OF STRATEGIC
RESTRAINT
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AfterPax Americana| 51
International
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quently,instrumental-incentivesto self-bindeven when preponderanceprovides them the option of resortingto coercive behavior.
Third, the spread of democracy makes more likely the benign exercise of
power. Cores ruled by democraticregimes tend to pursue moderate foreign
policies toward other democracies for both institutionaland normativereasons. On the institutionalside, the checksand balances associated withdemocracy constrainthe conduct of foreignpolicy and limit the resources that the
state allocates to foreignengagement. Open debate also tends to produce
centristpolicies. On the normativeside, democraciesdevelop a mutual respect
based on theirshared commitmentto the rule of law and consensual politics.
Conflicts of interestbetween them are thereforesettled through peaceful
means.27 In addition, common domestic norms nurture a shared sense of
community,helping to forgea transnationalspace in which the rules of selfhelp competitionno longer apply.
Fourth,ongoing processes of integrationare normalizingand institutionalizing self-bindingpractices.For example, pluralisticcores (cores thatconsistof
more than one state) produce an intrinsicbinding effectthatextends into the
core's relationshipwith its periphery.Sustainingthe coherenceof the FrancoGerman coalition requires bargaining and self-limitationon behalf of both
parties,which in turnmoderatethe influencethatthe coalitionwields over the
periphery.The EU as a whole, because it institutionalizespower-constraint
devices internationallyjust as a constitutiondoes so domestically,and because it promotes regionwide interestsand identities,reinforcesself-binding
practices.
Fifth,many of the world's leading regional powers have undergone moderThe political and social legacy of World War II
ating social transformations.
reinforcesself-bindingin Germanyand Japan.Societal aversion to war and a
commitmentto wielding influencethroughotherthanmilitarymeans continue
to limitthe scope of externalambitionin both countries.28
Even in the United
has not been subjected to the devastation of war since
States,whose territory
the nineteenthcentury,aversion to the use of forceand the potential loss of
liferuns strong.29
AfterPax Americana| 53
RELATIONS
BETWEEN
BENIGN
POLES
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International
AfterPax Americana155
TheRiseofBenignUnipolarity
in NorthAmerica,
Europe,
and EastAsia
My aim in this section is to demonstratethatbenign unipolarityis not just a
theoreticalconstruct,but a geopolitical formationthat holds considerable
promiseof becoming a reality.I provide evidence thatbenignunipolar regions
are in fact taking shape and are having a powerful impact on the emerging
internationalorder.
International
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NORTH
AMERICA
AfterPax Americana| 57
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AfterPax Americana| 59
come this effortto renderbenign the continent'spower center,even if participation in Europe meant enteringa regional order craftedprincipallyby the
Franco-Germancoalition.
The United States played a centralrole in enabling Europe to pursue unipolarity.America's militarypresence essentiallytook securityissues offthe European agenda, buying time foreconomic and politicalintegrationto proceed.49
The process of integrationhas produced an effectiveunipolaritythat has
succeeded not only in eliminatingcompetitivebalancing among Europe's major powers; the EU also exertsa powerfulcentripetalforceacross the continent,
withmost currentmemberseager to participatein the innercircleof monetary
union and many of Europe's new democracies waiting impatientlyforadmission to the club.
Constructed,as opposed to natural,unipolarity,and a pluralisticratherthan
an amalgamated core, endow Europe with a center that has quite different
attributesthan that of North America. Although more unwieldy than an
amalgamated core, a pluralisticcore encourages consensual formsof politics
because the pulling and hauling of coalition management act as an internal
check and make negotiationand compromisea centralfeatureof governance.
Compromise within the core encourages compromisebetween the core and
the periphery.Core self-bindingis also far more deeply ingrained in societal
attitudesin Germany than it is in the United States. Germany is as averse to
unilateralaction as the United States is fond of it. A large part of the reason is
the extentto which Germanyhas come to equate its own interestsand identity
with those of a broader European construction.In the words of Peter Katzenstein,German "interests,pursued throughpower and bargaining,were fundamentallyshaped by the institutionalcontextof Europe and the Europeanization of the identityof the German state."50
The power asymmetrybetween core and peripheryin Europe is also less
starkthan it is in North America. The GDP of the Franco-Germancoalition is
about 80 percent of the GDP of all other EU members combined. FrancoGerman defense spending representsroughly85 percentof that of all other
dation of the European Economic Communitywas to bind Germanyto France so thattherewould
never be a repeat of the threewars thattheyhad foughtover the precedingcentury."See Frankel,
RegionalTradingBlocs,p. 241.
49. Some analysts contend thatthe process of integrationremains dependent on a U.S. presence
and that the EU would be unable to sustain its political coherencewere America's strategicrole
on the continentto wane. See JosephJoffe,"Europe's American Pacifier,"ForeignPolicy,No. 54
(Spring 1984), pp. 64-82; and Robert Art, "Why WesternEurope Needs the United States and
NATO," PoliticalScienceQuarterly,
Vol. 111,No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-39.
50. Katzenstein,"United Germanyin an IntegratingEurope," p. 15.
International
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EU memberscombined.51 Furthermore,
asymmetriesin defense capabilityare
temperedby Germany'scontinued reluctanceto assume defense responsibilities commensuratewith its size because of the legacy of World War II and
because America's presence in Europe obviates the need fora greaterGerman
role. Again, less starkasymmetryworks to the advantage of regionalcohesion.
The core does not have sufficient
preponderanceto relyon unilateralinitiative
in turnreinand thusdepends more heavilyon compromisewiththeperiphery,
forcingthe consensual bargain at the heartof Europe's constructedunipolarity.
Europe's unipolar structureis reflectedin its patternsof governance.Despite
formalinstitutionsthat seek to diffuseauthorityacross member states,most
decisions within the EU arise from agreements struckbetween France and
Germany.The union's major initiatives-the single market,monetaryunion,
and enlargement-have emanated primarilyfromParis and Bonn, not from
other European capitals or fromthe EU bureaucracyin Brussels.52This core
draws the peripherytoward the centerthroughboth inducement(the rewards
of inclusion) and threat(the punishmentof exclusion).
The prospectof materialgain has ostensiblybeen the EU's drivingforce,but
geopoliticalobjectiveslie just beneath the surface.Indeed, the evolution of the
EU is to a large extentthe storyofconsensual bargainingamong memberstates
over the constructionof benign unipolarity.Constitutionalizedself-bindingin
Germany,the checksand balances intrinsicto theFranco-Germancoalition,the
institutionaldiffusionof power across member states-these are all mechanisntsthat serve to mix empowermentand disempowerment,to create order
but also throughthe core's willingnessto reduce
throughpower asymmetry,
the benefitsof preponderanceand engage in consensual bargaining.
European monetaryunion (EMU) is only the most recentexample. Germany
will voluntarilybind its power by handing over controlof its monetarypolicy
to a supranationalauthoritythatgoverns throughconsensus and thatis politically independent.53Other European stateswill have greaterinput into monetaryissues, and the euro, not the deutsche mark,will be Europe's dominant
51. IISS, TheMilitaryBalance,1997-1998,pp. 46-100.
52. Katzenstein,"United Germanyin an IntegratingEurope," pp. 26-27, 42-43. On decisionmaking and the evolutionof EU institutions,
see RobertKeohane and StanleyHoffmann,eds., TheNew
EuropeanConmmunity:
Decisionmaking
and Institutional
Change(Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,1991);
Alberta Sbragia, ed., Euro-Politics:
Institutions
and Policymaking
in the "New" EuropeanCommunity
(Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution,1992); and Andrew Moravcsik, ed., Centralizationor
Fragmentation?:
Europe beforethe Challengesof Deepening,Diversity,and Democracy(New York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998).
53. On European monetary union, see Peter Kenen, Economicand MonetaryUnion in Europe
Frieden,
(Cambridge,U.K.: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1995); and BarryEichengreenand Jeffrey
eds., ThePoliticalEconomyofEuropeanMonetaryUnification
(Boulder,Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).
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Peace withinBenignUnipolarRegions
Benign unipolarityis in the midst of taking shape in North America and
Europe. It is a more distant vision in East Asia. If regional unipolarityis to
develop and serve as a source of structuralstabilityas American hegemony
wanes, policymakersand scholars alike need to thinkthroughhow to encourage the constructionand maintenanceof consensual regionalformations.What
variables will affecttheirinternalcohesion and determinewhethertheyprosper and deepen or lose momentumand unravel?
THE CHARACTER
AND
COHERENCE
OF REGIONAL
CORES
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International
THE BARGAIN
BETWEEN
CORE AND
PERIPHERY
AfterPax Americana| 71
THE DURABILITY
OF SELF-BINDING.
Unlike classical empires, which often
foundered as a result of revoltsfroma peripheryseeking greaterautonomy,
benign unipolar formationsare farmore likelyto fall prey to revoltsfromthe
core. It is now the core thataccepts limitson itsbehaviorby exercisingstrategic
restraintand subjectingitselfto the constraintsof a multilateralframework.
Self-bindingcan thereforego only so farbeforecore states will calculate that
the gains of sustaining benign unipolarityno longer outweigh the costs of
diminished autonomy.This insightcalls into question the conventionalwisdom thatintegrationmust keep moving forwardifregionalformationsare not
to unravel.86
It is hard to imagine, for example, that France and Germany would as a
matterof course submitto the will of theirsmaller partnersin the EU should
Paris and Bonn regularlybe outvoted on mattersof centralconcern.In North
America, taming the unilateralisturges of the United States is a far greater
challenge to regional integrationthan is encouraging the participationof the
periphery.Indeed, in Europe and NorthAmerica alike,an expectantperiphery
presses forentrywhile core states equivocate, fearfulof new obligationsand
constraints.And China's willingness to moderate the scope and characterof
its regional ambition is the single most importantdeterminantof whethera
consensual hierarchyevolves in East Asia. As policymakersshape regional
structuresof governance, they should seek an equilibrium point along the
spectrumof integration-one sufficientto committhe core to engage in selfbinding,but not so ambitiousthatit induces the core to renege on the bargain
thatunderpins regional order.
SECURITY. During past eras, core states often fell prey to their excessive
concernabout securityin theirperipheries.In contrast,today's major statesare
more likely to exhibit insufficient
concern about securityin the periphery.87
Whether contemporaryunipolar formationsface unraveling because of the
underprovision of securitydepends primarilyon the evolution of strategic
thinkingwithin respectivecores. Three main pathways exist throughwhich
International
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AfterPax Americana| 73
Peace amongBenignUnipolarRegions
My analysis should not be interpretedas a call for the end of American
hegemony and the deliberate devolution of the internationalsystem from
unipolarityto tripolarity.Instead, I take the eventual waning of American
hegemonyto be inevitable,making it unavoidable thatthe internationalcommunitywill have to choose between strivingfora benign tripolarity
by design
or settlingfor a competitivemultipolarityby default.91The case for benign
tripolarityrests in part on the arguments,outlined above, as to why the
formationof three regional blocs would not triggerthe securitycompetition
traditionallyascribed to tripolarity:the three regional formationswould be
instrumentsfor managing power, not amassing it; interregionalrelations
would benefitfromintraregionalpeace; culturaland linguisticbarrierswould
inhibit the political centralizationneeded to project power externally;and
regions would unravel fromwithin if theircore states developed predatory
intent.92At the same time,the management of interregionalrelationswould
rise in importance and necessitate the following amendments to the policy
agenda.
REGIONALISM
VERSUS
GLOBAL
MULTILATERALISM
CurrentU.S. policy is guided by the conventionalwisdom that global multilateralism should take precedence over regionalism.The more open regions
are to one another,the betterrelationswill be among them. Regional trade
arrangementsare thereforedesirable only if theydo not come at the expense
of global trade.93My analysis challenges head-on this conventionalwisdom:
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according to the logic of benign unipolarity,regionalismshould take precedence over global multilateralism.Economic and political integrationat the
regional level are essentialbuilding blocks of global integration.Global multilateralism is thereforedesirable only if it does not come at the expense of
regionalintegrationand theconstructionof stableregionalorders.APEC might
ensure vibranttrans-Pacifictrade,but it does not serve the interestsof international stabilityif puttingAmerica at the centerof East Asia's only inclusive
multilateralstructureimpedes the consolidation of a self-sustainingregional
order.The same logic applies in reverseto the EU. The EU's protectivetariffs
may create an irritantin transatlanticrelations,but they are well worth this
cost if they contributeto the coherence of a stable unipolarityin Europe.
Contemporaryregional formationsare geopolitical structures,not mere trade
groupings.The obsession of policymakerswith global multilateralismshould
accordinglygive way to a new emphasis on regionalism.94
INTERREGIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
AfterPax Americana| 75
ECONOMIC
STRAINS
OF PROTECTIONISM
OF EXCLUSION
Security23:2 | 76
International
AfterPax Americana| 77
Conclusion
Americaat presentarguablyhas more influenceover internationalpoliticsthan
any othergreatpower in history.Accordingly,it may seem paradoxical to call
upon the United States to begin preparingforthe demise of Pax Americana.
However, it is preciselybecause of its preponderantpower and the stabilityit
affordsthat the United States has the abilityand the luxury to look beyond
the horizon. Preparingforthe futureentails neitherthe retrenchment
nor the
disengagementof Americanpower. On the contrary,the United States should
sustain global hegemonyforas long as it can. But in the meantime,it should
follow three guidelines to ensure that American unipolarity,when its time
comes, peacefullygives way to a benign tripolarity.
First,the United States must deepen its commitmentto self-bindingand
ensure thatit exercisesits preponderantpower withrestraintand moderation.
Doing so means strengthening
multilateralinstitutionsand relianceon consensual formsof internationalgovernance.As the leading state in the world, the
United States,throughthe benign exercise of its power, will both enable and
encourage through emulation others to do the same. More important,the
United States needs to buy more time for unipolar regional formationsto
develop. Behavior thatinduces balancing against U.S. power would lead to the
the processes of
untimelydemise of Americanunipolarity,in turninterrupting
regionalintegrationmade possible by America'sbenignleadership.The United
States must thereforeavoid unilateralismand overbearing behavior, which
promise only to squander Americanpreponderanceand precipitatepremature
returnto a competitivemultipolarity.101
eling,but it would impair its coherenceby dilutingits core. It is also worthnotingthatunipolar
formationshave existed withouta geographicallyfixedcore. The CarolingianEmpire established
by Charlemagne in the late eighth century,for example, was ruled froma court that traveled
throughoutthe imperial realm. It is at least conceivable that Brussels could one day become
Europe's effectivepower centeror thatEurope could be governedby a mobile core,circumventing
some of the problems involved in including Russia in a broader Europe. On the Carolingian
Empire,see Louis Halphen, Charlemagne
and theCarolingianEmpire,trans.Giselle de Niee (Amsterdam: North-Holland,1977); and Heinrich Fichtenau,The CarolingianEmpire(New York: Harper
and Row, 1964).
101. On the importanceof basing U.S. grand strategyon multilateralism,
see JohnGerard Ruggie,
WinningthePeace: Americaand WorldOrderin theNew Era (New York:Columbia UniversityPress,
1996).
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