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ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, DefendantsAppellees.
Facts:
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal
sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one percent per export sale to the US and other foreign countries. Said
company filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc, its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor,
alleging sasid ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other
things. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time.
Issue:
WON the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the EPC and uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
Held:
Yes. Though Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. is the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc at the time, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. Said ordinance shoouldnt be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for coverage of the tax.
EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesnt bar a reasonable classificationof the subject of
legislation. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong
to the same class.
People v. Mijano
GR No. 129112
23 July 1999
Per Curiam
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Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).
Facts
Plessy (P) attempted to sit in an all-white railroad car. After refusing to sit in the black railway carriage car, Plessy was
arrested for violating an 1890 Louisiana statute that provided for segregated separate but equal railroad
accommodations. Those using facilities not designated for their race were criminally liable under the statute.
At trial with Justice John H. Ferguson (D) presiding, Plessy was found guilty on the grounds that the law was a reasonable
exercise of the states police powers based upon custom, usage, and tradition in the state. Plessy filed a petition for writs
of prohibition and certiorari in the Supreme Court of Louisiana against Ferguson, asserting that segregation stigmatized
blacks and stamped them with a badge of inferiority in violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments. The court
found for Ferguson and the Supreme Court granted cert.
Issue
Can the states constitutionally enact legislation requiring persons of different races to use separate but equal
segregated facilities?
Yes. The states can constitutionally enact legislation requiring persons of different races to use separate but
equal segregated facilities.
Case Summary
Allan Bakke filed suit after learning that minority candidates with lower qualifications had been admitted to medical school
under a program that reserved spaces for disadvantaged applicants. The California Supreme Court ordered the school,
the State-run University of California, to admit Bakke. The university then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Court's Decision
A splintered Supreme Court affirmed the judgment ordering Bakke's admission to the medical school of the University of
California at Davis and invalidating the school's special admissions program. However, the Court did not prohibit the
school from considering race as a factor in future admissions decisions. Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., announced the Court's
judgment. Four justices agreed with his conclusions as to Bakke individually, and four other justices agreed with the ruling
as to use of race information in the future.
Justice Powell wrote that the guarantee of Equal Protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color. He did not, however, prohibit schools from considering race as
one factor in the admissions process.
Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that race could properly be considered in an affirmative action program, a policy of
taking positive steps to remedy the effects of past discrimination. In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its
devastating impact on the lives of Negroes, bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a state
interest of the highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure that America will forever remain a divided society. I do not believe
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires us to accept that fate.
More on the Case
The legal impact of Bakke was reduced by the disagreement among the justices. Because the Court had no single
majority position, the case could not give clear guidance on the extent to which colleges could consider race as part of an
affirmative action program.
In Texas v. Hopwood, 1996, a federal appeals court found that a University of Texas affirmative action program violated
the rights of white applicants. The law school was trying to boost enrollment of African Americans and Mexican Americans.
The court assumed that the Bakke decision was no longer legally sound, and explicitly ruled that the law school may not
use race as a factor in law school admissions. The court continued: A university may properly favor one applicant over
another because ofwhether an applicant's parents attended college or the applicant's economic and social background.
But the key is that race itself cannot be taken into account. The Supreme Court refused to review the appeals court
decision.
Affirmative action remains a controversial issue in California. In 1996, voters passed the California Civil Rights Initiative,
generally known as Proposition 209, which prohibited all government agencies and institutions from giving preferential
treatment to individuals based on their race or gender. The Supreme Court also refused to hear an appeal from a decision
upholding the constitutionality of the law.
Civil Rights Cases
109 U.S. 3 (1883)
Case
U.S. Supreme Court
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
Civil Rights Cases
Submitted October Term, 1882
Decided October 16th, 1888
109 U.S. 3
Syllabus
1. The 1st and 2d sections of the Civil Rights Act passed March 1st, 1876, are unconstitutional enactments as applied to
the several States, not being authorized either by the XIIIth or XIVth Amendments of the Constitution.
2. The XIVth Amendment is prohibitory upon the States only, and the legislation authorized to be adopted by Congress for
enforcing it is not direct legislation on the matters respecting which the States are prohibited from making or enforcing
certain laws, or doing certain acts, but is corrective legislation such as may be necessary or proper for counteracting and
redressing the effect of such laws or acts.
Page 109 U. S. 4
The XIIIth Amendment relates only to slavery and involuntary servitude (which it abolishes), and, although, by its reflex
action, it establishes universal freedom in the United States, and Congress may probably pass laws directly enforcing its
provisions, yet such legislative power extends only to the subject of slavery and its incidents, and the denial of equal
accommodations in inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement (which is forbidden by the sections in
question), imposes no badge of slavery or involuntary servitude upon the party but at most, infringes rights which are
protected from State aggression by the XIVth Amendment.
4. Whether the accommodations and privileges sought to be protected by the 1st and 2d sections of the Civil Rights Act
are or are not rights constitutionally demandable, and if they are, in what form they are to be protected, is not now
decided.
5. Nor is it decided whether the law, as it stands, is operative in the Territories and District of Columbia, the decision only
relating to its validity as applied to the States.
6. Nor is it decided whether Congress, under the commercial power, may or may not pass a law securing to all persons
equal accommodations on lines of public conveyance between two or more States.
These cases were all founded on the first and second sections of the Act of Congress known as the Civil Rights Act,
passed March 1st, 1875, entitled "An Act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights." 18 Stat. 335. Two of the
cases, those against Stanley and Nichols, were indictments for denying to persons of color the accommodations and
privileges of an inn or hotel; two of them, those against Ryan and Singleton, were, one on information, the other an
indictment, for denying to individuals the privileges and accommodations of a theatre, the information against Ryan being
for refusing a colored person a seat in the dress circle of Maguire's theatre in San Francisco, and the indictment against
Singleton was for denying to another person, whose color was not stated, the full enjoyment of the accommodations of the
theatre known as the Grand Opera House in New York,
"said denial not being made for any reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any
previous condition of servitude."
The case of Robinson and wife against the Memphis & Charleston R.R. Company was an action brought in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee to recover the penalty of five hundred dollars
Page 109 U. S. 5
given by the second section of the act, and the gravamen was the refusal by the conductor of the railroad company to
allow the wife to ride in the ladies' car, for the reason, as stated in one of the counts, that she was a person of African
descent. The jury rendered a verdict for the defendants in this case upon the merits, under a charge of the court to which
a bill of exceptions was taken by the plaintiffs. The case was tried on the assumption by both parties of the validity of the
act of Congress, and the principal point made by the exceptions was that the judge allowed evidence to go to the jury
tending to show that the conductor had reason to suspect that the plaintiff, the wife, was an improper person because she
was in company with a young man whom he supposed to be a white man, and, on that account, inferred that there was
some improper connection between them, and the judge charged the jury, in substance, that, if this was the
conductor's bona fide reason for excluding the woman from the car, they might take it into consideration on the question of
the liability of the company. The case was brought here by writ of error at the suit of the plaintiffs. The cases of Stanley,
Nichols, and Singleton came up on certificates of division of opinion between the judges below as to the constitutionality
of the first and second sections of the act referred to, and the case of Ryan on a writ of error to the judgment of the Circuit
Court for the District of California sustaining a demurrer to the information.
The Stanley, Ryan, Nichols, and Singleton cases were submitted together by the solicitor general at the last term of court,
on the 7th day of November, 1882. There were no appearances, and no briefs filed for the defendants.
The Robinson case was submitted on the briefs at the last term, on the 9th day of arch, 1883.
Page 109 U. S. 8
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Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
Citation. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Brief Fact Summary. After its decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, the Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) determines that the lower courts in which the cases originated were the proper venue for determining
how to best implement racial desegregation.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The lower courts in which the cases of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka first originated are
the proper venue for determining how to best implement racial desegregation in light of varied school problems and
different local conditions.
Facts. The Supreme Court, after ruling that racial segregation in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, determined that the lower courts in which the cases of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
first originated would be the proper venue in determining how to implement racial desegregation. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that these lower courts should structure this desegregation because of varied local school problems and
local conditions. The Supreme Court stated the lower courts would be guided by equitable principles, recognizing the
need for elimination of obstacles in making the transition to desegregation.
Issue. How to implement the racial desegregation in public education in light of the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka.
Held. Remanded. The lower courts, which originally heard these cases, will determine how to implement racial
desegregation in public schools with all deliberate speed.
Discussion. In light of the ruling of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, declaring segregation in public schools
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the lower courts to implement racial desegregation with
all deliberate speed.
Bolling v. Sharpe
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioners, Negro minors (Petitioners), allege the segregation in the public schools of the
District of Columbia deprives them of Due Process of law under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Racial segregation in public schools is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution.
Facts. The Petitioners, were denied admission to a public school in the District of Columbia based solely on their race.
The Petitioners filed suit in the District Court seeking aid in admission. The District court dismissed the complaint. The
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari before the judgment of the Court of Appeals
because of the importance of the constitutional question presented. The District of Columbia is governed by federal law,
not state law therefore the 14amendment of the Constitution does not govern the District of Columbia. Instead the
Petitioners argue that segregation of public school children violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Issue. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution is violated by the segregation of public
school children in the District of Columbia?
Held. Yes, the racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
Discussion. The District of Columbia is governed by federal law rather than state law. Thus, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth amendment is not applicable. The Supreme Court found in this case that segregation of public school
children is also unconstitutional based on federal laws because personal liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment were violated.
Loving v. Virginia
Facts of the case
In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the
District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the
state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a
year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).
Question
Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally "odious to a free
people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found,
had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument that
the statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial classifications were
not subject to a "rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the Virginia law
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice Earl
Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed
by the State."
Shapiro v. Thompson
Brief Fact Summary. Welfare applicants were denied assistance because they resided in the District of Columbia for less
than one year prior to filing their application for assistance.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Denying welfare assistance to needy families who do not meet a residency requirement, but
would otherwise qualify is unconstitutional unless the denial is supported by a compelling interest.
Facts. Appeals from a decision of a three-judge District Court held unconstitutional State or District of Columbia statutory
provisions, which denies welfare assistance to residents of the State or District who have not resided within their
jurisdictions for at least one year immediately preceding their applications for such assistance.
Issue. Whether the imposition of a one-year residency requirement on welfare assistant applicants is unconstitutional.
Held. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan). Yes. The one-year residency requirement is unconstitutional because it
discriminates against need . . . families who have not met the residency requirement even though the status of these
families is no different than families meeting the residency requirement. The one-year residency requirement is not
supported by a compelling state interest. The statutory provisions violate the constitutional right to travel because it has
the effect of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the State. The residency requirement also violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the requirement denies public assistance to poor persons otherwise
eligible solely on the ground that they have not been residents of the [state] for one year at the time their applications are
filed. The judgment is affirmed.
Dissent. The dissenting opinions are as follows:
Chief Justice Earl Warren (J. Warren). Congress does not have the power to act under one of its enumerated powers to
impose minimal nationwide residency requirements or authorize the States to do so.
Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan). The strict scrutiny standard of review should not apply to this type of case. The standard
should be reserved for those cases dealing with racial classifications or to other classifications traditionally recognized by
the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court). The Court could have upheld the residency requirement if it
applied its traditional and proper approach to equal protection whereby this case would only need be examined under
the rational basis test.
Concurrence. Justice Potter Steward (J. Stewart). The Court simply recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional
right, [the right to travel,] and gives to that right no less protection than the Constitution itself demands . . . .
Discussion. Although this case extended the strict scrutiny standard of review to classifications directly impacting the right
to travel, it did not provide clear guidance as to when in these cases strict scrutiny should be applied or to what extent it
should apply when the right to travel is affected.