SISA

Report No. 25

THE NATIONAL INTERNAL

SECURITY POLICY
OF PAKISTAN - AN ASSESSMENT

Khawaja Khalid Farooq

Dr. Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi

Oslo, June 2014

Centre for International and Strategic Analysis

SISA 2014

All views expressed in the report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Centre for
International and Strategic Analysis. The text may not be printed in full or part without the permission of the
author.

Queries can be directed to:
Centre for International and Strategic Analysis
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Pakistani Government has just recently introduced a National Internal Security Policy
(NISP) for Pakistan the first ever for the country. It has been receiving mixed reviews; some
observers say it is inadequate to counter terrorism in Pakistan, while the state maintains that it
is a panacea. The most critical issue that is presumably tackled by the document is that of
intelligence coordination between the different law enforcement agencies in Pakistan. But
NISP struggles to conceptualize the ways in which it will lay down procedures for this
coordination, without replication of existing roles and the triggering of jurisdictional turf
wars. In addition, many such forces mandated with this duty exist in Pakistan.
Particularly problematic with the NISP is the envisaged role of the National Counter
Terrorism Authority (NACTA), which is slated to become the premier homeland security
organization in Pakistan. Its main responsibilities will involve coordinating intelligence,
countering extremism, reforming the madrasahs, as well as deradicalizing youth and
prisoners. As such, it is literally tasked with single-handedly pulling Pakistan back from the
brink of extremism. This report highlights the herculean challenges facing NACTA before it
can perform its new duties effectively. Complex political issues which have remained highly
contentious in Pakistan complicate matters. Any new policy no matter how well drafted
faces implementation issues in real life, and the Pakistani establishment has yet to even
acknowledge many of these.
Even though the NISP document is a huge improvement from previous ones, it is certainly
over-ambitious to think that NACTA will by default acquire the capability to drive a national
consensus on counter-extremism. Pakistan remains deeply divided by emotive discourses at
variance with each other and many of these narratives are able to command large followings.
Madrasahs are one such issue; organized along sects, they are resistant to adapt to modernity.
Perhaps the biggest hurdle in implementing an ambitious document like NISP is that Pakistan
is a developing country. It has a limited amount of resources as opposed to more developed
states; similarly it is a state which still needs to work out issues concerning the balances of
power between the centre and the provinces in regards to jurisdiction in terrorism-related
cases. The report concludes that Pakistan suffers from a lack of regulatory quality whereby
plans, laws, structures and documents are drawn up, but the practical implementation of these
is far from ideal. These state deficiencies also plague the effective implementation of the
National Internal Security Policy of Pakistan.

Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................... 3

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5
INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION ........................................................................................................... 7
NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM AUTHORITY .......................................................................... 17
POLICE AND THE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING APPARATUS ..................... 24
THE MADRASAH CONUNDRUM ............................................................................................................ 33
A COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-EXTREMISM NARRATIVE ................................. 38
CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................................. 42
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................... 49

INTRODUCTION1
The government of Pakistan launched its National Internal Security Policy (NISP) on
February 25, 2014, ostensibly to counter terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.2 This is
an unprecedented document, the first ever of its kind in Pakistan. The first part of NISP
is secret, based on administrative and operational matters.3 The second component is
the strategy part which is based on focused dialogue, military operations, and how the
breakdown of dialogue will lead to military operations when needed. The third and last
component is operational, which deals mainly with joint intelligence sharing. The
strategy visualizes a 'comprehensive' plan to counter terrorism and extremism in
Pakistan because, as the document says, close to 50,000 people have been killed,
including over 5,000 personnel of the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) since the
country joined the US-led war on terror after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The document
estimates the loss to the Pakistani economy to the tune of $78 billion over the last ten
years.4

The NISP envisages both soft and hard interventions. Political ownership and faith in
the democratic process in Pakistan are stated as major components of the soft measures,
which envisage a Comprehensive Response Plan (CRP).5 The CRP ostensibly aims to win
the hearts and minds of the general populace, and focuses on shaping the national
narrative, development, dialogue, reintegration and related legal reforms, etc. A
Combined Deterrence Plan (CDP) envisages that the approach of the National Internal
Security Apparatus (NISA) needs to change from a reactive to a proactive stance.6

The budget allocated for the NISP for the period 2014-18 stands at 32 billion PKR.7
About 22 billion will be available to the provinces in order to improve the capacity of
provincial law enforcement, while about Rs.10 billion have been earmarked for

1 The report has been funded through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA). All

views expressed are those of the author.

2 The NISP is available on the National Counter Terrorism Authority Pakistan (NACTA) website, at
http://NACTA.gov.pk/. The link for the NISP is
http://NACTA.gov.pk/Download_s/Rules/030314_NISP_ConceptPaper.pdf.
3 Ejaz Haider, National Internal Security policy and the Road ahead, Newsweek, February 26,2014,
http://newsweekpakistan.com/national-internal-security-policy-and-the-road-ahead/
4 Supra Note 1.
5 Saleem Safi, National Internal Security Policy; an analysis, Discussion paper, Pakistan institute of
legislative development and transparency (PILDAT), March 2014.
6 Supra Note 1.
7 32 billion Pakistani Rupees equal approximately 326 million US Dollars

strengthening the Federal counter-terrorism (CT) structures such as National Counter

Terrorism Authority (NACTA), by setting up Rapid Response Forces (RRF), Civil Armed
Forces Headquarters in the Ministry of Interior (MOI), and the modernization of Law
enforcement Agencies. 8 NISP implicitly acknowledges the importance of police
organizations in Pakistan, and assumes active involvement of police apparatuses
through specialized Counter-Terrorism Departments (CTDs), each of which will have a
RRF.9 Police have a vital role in supplying on ground intelligence to the Directorate of
Internal Security (DIS) through an envisaged National Internal Security Operation
Center (NISOC), both of which shall be managed by NACTA.10 The RRFs are projected as
the specialist counter-terrorism tactical wings, created by both the Federal Government
and Provinces for conducting 'Intelligence based operations' with CTD/ police support
where required. Thus, there will be an RRF in each province, as well as one in Islamabad,
the seat of the Federal Government. This Federal RRF within the Islamabad Capital
Territory (ICT) Police will presumably be trained by master trainers.11 Aerial support
would be available to the RRFs through the Air Wing of the MOI, for which a support
grant of about US $ 25 million dollar has already been made available.12

The DIS is at the heart of the Combined Deterrence Plan (CDP), and is supposed to
coordinate the activities of the NISA under the broad counters of NISP, through the
organizational interface of NACTA.13 This intelligence coordination mechanism would
presumably feed into threat assessment, which is supposed to lead to actionable
intelligence. The NISOC at the DIS is supposed to coordinate and collate this intelligence
from all the pillars of the National Internal Security (NIS) apparatus, which essentially
means that intelligence would then be collated under one roof at NACTA, and then
disseminated to relevant stakeholders.14

NISP has been hailed in government circles as a major step forward in Pakistan's quest
for internal security, and is undoubtedly a critical step, if nothing else than for the fact

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Supra Note 4

13 Supra Note 1.
14 Ibid.

that it is Pakistan's first such strategy document dealing with terrorism and extremism.
Focal CT structures and institutions have mushroomed globally which coordinate
counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts, like the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in USA the Joint
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
(OSCT) in the United Kingdom, as well as the Australian Council of Australian
Governments (COAG) and National Counter Terrorism Committee (NCTC), amongst
many others. This has resulted in national strategies like the American 4Ds, Britain's
4Ps,15 etc. Pakistan lagged behind till a policy document was presented, with ex-Prime
Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani's counter-terrorism policy of 3Ds Dialogue, Development,
Deterrence being projected as a major step forward.16 A unanimous resolution passed
on October 22, 2008 by the Parliament of Pakistan gave 14 guidelines for National
Counter Terrorism Policy by the Parliaments Committee on National Security (PCNS).

The committee also stressed the need for a comprehensive CT Strategy, the need of a
focal institution to integrate CT/CE efforts, and the formation of NACTA to
coordinate and unify national CT efforts. However, premier Gilani's 3Ds policy could
not be effected, and focal CT structures like NACTA which sprung from its wake have
remained ineffective till now. The NISP is the latest attempt at a rationalization of a
security policy for Pakistan; ostensibly it is poised to take over from where 3Ds halted,
and puts a much more detailed plan in action. Better yet, it is backed by budgetary
allocation, which implies that the government is at last serious at putting this into
action. However, deeper nuances of the policy space which dominate the sphere of
internal security in Pakistan need to be explored in order to comprehend how the policy
may work out. A factor wise analysis of some of the important features of the NISP is
undertaken below.

INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION
Ostensibly, NISP was drafted because there was a lack of coordination among the
security and intelligence agencies, and they needed to be brought under one umbrella, a

15 4Ds = Defeat, Deny, Diminish and Defend; 4Ps = Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare.
16 Jalil Abbas Jilani, Pakistan implementing 3D policy to ensure peace, The Nation, April 29, 2009,

http://www.nation.com.pk/politics/29-Apr-2009/Pakistan-implementing-3D-policy-to-ensure-peace-
Jalil-Abbas-Jilani.

fact that has been recognized for the first time through a document of this magnitude by
the Pakistani government. This has been said to be a major accomplishment;17 even
though about two dozen security agencies have been working in Pakistan related in one
way or the other to the security situation, there has been till date little coordination
between them. The NISP proposes that this duplication of roles leading to wastage of
resources would be resolved through the policies put in place through the document.
NISP states that integrated efforts through an institutionalized monitoring framework
under democratic leadership to elicit support and cooperation of local and international
stakeholders would be the mechanism used for achieving these objectives.18 This is
indeed an objective to aspire for, but it remains to be seen how the document will be
translated into practice.

17 Maiza Hameed, National Internal Security Policy 2014-18, Pakistan Observer, March 26, 2014,

http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=237463.
18 Supra Note 1.

Figure 1-LEAs and Intelligence agencies in Pakistan19

19 Replicated from Hassan Abbas, "Reforming Pakistans Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure; Is It

Too Flawed to Fix?", USIP Special Report, 2011.


Figure 2- A Roadmap of all LEAs20

Pakistan has a myriad of security agencies, forces, paramilitaries, authorities, bureaus,
etc. which deals with seemingly different spheres, but in practice replicate much of each
other's work. The primary law and order responsibilities in Pakistans four provinces
are vested in their provincial governments. In the realm of criminal law and procedure,
however, both central (federal) and provincial legislatures can enact laws (central law

20 Ibid.

10

takes precedence over provincial law). The police are supervised at a provincial level.
Confusingly, the MOI exercises overall supervision, but provincial Inspector Generals
(IGPs) of the police service report directly to their respective chief ministers, and the
police structures headed by these IGPs are funded from the provincial budgets. In
principle however, the IGPs are Federal Government servants. Accordingly, police and
paramilitary forces in the capital city of Islamabad, and Levies and Khasadars in FATA,
are under the direct jurisdiction of the Federal Government. The police of AJK and Gilgit-
Baltistan are managed by their respective governments (somewhat similar to the
situation in the provinces), although the Federal Government has more direct leverage
because of the special legal status of these regions. Among the countrys paramilitary
forces, Pakistan Rangers, Frontier Corps KP, and Frontier Corps Baluchistan, are often
called upon to support police for tackling law and order situations, in addition to their
routine border duties. All of these forces are led by senior serving army officers. The
training facilities and service conditions provided to these forces are better than those
offered to the police.21

There are two sets of law enforcement organizations in Pakistan: those that operate
under the Federal Government and those under the jurisdiction of provincial police
organizations. Nineteen major organizations operate directly under the Federal
Government, dealing with a variety of law enforcement responsibilities (including
intelligence gathering, border and coast surveillance, and policing), and answering to
different authorities. The capital police, (Islamabad) and the four provincial police forces
act largely independent of each other. The senior command positions are filled from the
ranks of the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP) cadre, a central career service organization
that can station officers in any part of the country. A disconnect between senior PSP
police leadership and junior officers (who belong to provincial police services) has
developed over time, as officers who rise through ranks seldom get senior command
positions.

Under the constitution, it is the duty of the Federal Government to protect the provinces
against external aggression and internal disturbance, and for this purpose it commands

21 Ibid. Also, see Hassan Abbas, Transforming Pakistans Frontier Corps. Terrorism Monitor, March 30,

2007.

11

the armed forces to defend the country against external threats. 22 Parliament has
constitutionally defined powers23 to enact laws relating not only to the armed forces of
the Pakistani Federation, but also to its various paramilitary forces, commonly referred
to as Civil Armed Forces. 24 The parliament also exercises powers to regulate the
activities of federal agencies and institutes for research, training, and can also seek to
authorize specialized research.25 Most of this control is exercised by the MOI of the
Federal Government under Federal Governments Rules of Business, 1973, formulated
under Article 99 of the Constitution. This sanctions the Coordination of policy matters
relating to Police as being the responsibility of the Interior Division (Ministry of
Interior).26 The Rules of Business also say that Police Commission and Police Awards
are under the purview of the Interior Division,27 as is the internal security of the
country, including the deployment of Pakistan's civil armed forces, such as the Pakistan
rangers, Pakistan coast guards, and the Federal Investigation Agency. The MOI also have
at their disposal the services of the National Police Bureau to coordinate the activities of
the different police forces across the country, as well as the National Police Academy and
the National Police Management Board. The MOI is furthermore tasked with assistance
in the modernization of the police forces of the provinces. Thus, even this cursory
review of its powers reveals that the MOI certainly does not suffer from any lack of
authority in regulating law and order within Pakistan, which presumably makes sense.

There are many components of the state security apparatus which have been used in
one form or the other to tackle terrorism even before NISP came into existence. There
are many stipulations of the NISP that should have been functioning regardless of when
the policy came in, or whether it existed or not. The mechanisms envisaged under NISP
by setting up new structures could have been handled by effective resource utilization of
already existing organizations. The research and coordination element envisaged in
NACTA for example (see below), could have been handled with an effective National
Police Bureau function, presumably one of the functions of the bureau anyways, at least

22 Article 243 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

23 Entry 1 of the Federal Legislative List (Part I).
24 For a more detailed discussion , see Asad Jamal, Police organizations in Pakistan, HRCP-CHRI Report,
2010.
25 Entry 16, Federal Legislative List Part I, Constitution of Pakistan.
26 Supra Note 21.
27 Ibid.

12

relating to the police. The provincial police all have positions known as the R&D wing
under the Central Police Offices (CPOs), which are headed by a senior Additional
Inspector General of Police. Unfortunately, these positions have at best been toothless
talking shops, instead of providing an invaluable data coordination mechanism, for
instance with the National Police Bureau as the focal point for all provincial R&Ds. The
National Police Bureau is an organization that could have streamlined this practice
instead of having a sideline role, but that is apparently now water under the bridge.
These entities could have been made effective, and would have been invaluable as a
means of civilian intelligence coordination mechanisms. The fact that that such
institutions are already there but not performing their mandated functions highlights
that the issue in Pakistan is NOT the absence of institutions, but rather their capacity to
deliver. This issue also highlights the fact that even if mechanisms like NACTA is put into
practice satisfactorily, they will still have to deal with disarrayed coordination
mechanisms within NISA, such as the police. With the police being only one of the grass
roots organizations (needing extensive reforms) which generates and feeds intelligence
into the NACTA-driven DIS, the technological adage 'garbage in garbage out' would
have to be considered more seriously. It also needs to be examined that even though
the parliament has the power to sanction research, why has the NISP been so late in
coming? Any number of institutions predating NACTA could have been mandated with
drawing up the NISP; presumably the issue has more to do with capacity than the
absence or coordination of relevant organizations.

Then there is the issue of duplication of roles, which assumes an even greater meaning
in the context of tactical forces to deal with counter-terrorism. Setting up forces like the
FRR force are huge tasks requiring intensive resources, training, capability, and
seamless coordination mechanisms. A developing country like Pakistan has to seriously
consider the immense resources associated with setting new entities like the RRFs,
especially since there already exist many forces which have traditionally dealt with
terrorism and security for a long time, or have the inherent ability to do so.

An organization under MOI which assumes particular importance in this context is the
Frontier Constabulary, which has been at the forefront of fighting insurgency in
Pakistan. Created as an independent force under the North West Frontier Constabulary

13

Act, 1915, it serves the purpose of a federal armed force in Pakistan's FATA areas, since
the police cannot enter most of the tribal regions under rules operating since British
times.28 The MOI has at its disposal another force which is of critical importance to
maintaining law and order in Islamabad, the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) Police.
The unit has the strength of more than 10,00029 and is considered one of the better
policing forces in the country.30 The ICT Police also has a specialized counter-terrorism
function, albeit of a smaller scale. Even though the Federal RRF has been placed under
the ICT Police, it remains to be seen how it will be assimilated into a conventionally run
police force.

Both the abovementioned forces have been facing the brunt of terrorism in Pakistan,
and have been frontline forces against it, though undoubtedly with chequered histories
of successes and failures. Both these forces could have been capacity built or made
specialists in counter-terrorism without raising a new force, which would have been less
resource intensive than setting up entirely new structures. They both perform counter
terrorism functions for the Pakistani Federation, and it remains to be seen how they
would devolve to the RRFs, and whether the new RRFs would be able to perform these
functions without jurisdictional overlaps and inter-departmental turf wars. The ICT
Police could have had its capacity built up in counter-terrorism, and deployed a much
smaller RRF type tactical force from within itself, since ICT Police already has a
functional police apparatus. Granted, it lacks capacity and potent intelligence
coordination mechanisms at the moment, but efforts at rectifying such concerns could
have been more fruitful than erecting a new and untested force. Since the Federal RRF
would also be under the authority of the MOI similar to the ICT Police the same NISA
intelligence coordination mechanisms with NACTA could have been instituted. However,
presence of a force within a force, i.e. RRF within ICT Police, is bound to create friction
between the two, especially as the RRF would ostensibly be better paid. Moreover, it
reveals the proclivity of policy-makers to think in terms of quick fixes, creating new
bodies rather than mending flaws in existent ones.


28National Public Safety Commission, Annual Report 2006, April 2008.
29 Islamabad Capital Territory Police website, Total Strength:

http://www.islamabadpolice.gov.pk/Pages/CustomPages/TotalStrength.aspx. Also see Supra Note 1.

30 Ibid.

14

One can also investigate the previous attempts to set up Specialized Federal Counter
Terrorism forces, like for instance within the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and
NACTA (dealt below in detail). The FIA31 is the federal body dealing with special crimes
that have either a national or transnational spread, such as organized crime, cyber-
crime, white collar crime and terrorism often in coordination with international crime
agencies like Interpol. In accordance with the apparent need to create a specialist unit,
in July 2003, the Special Investigations Group (SIG) under the FIA was created to
identify, arrest and interrogate terrorists; detect terrorist financing, and coordinate with
the provincial government in investigating major terrorist incidents. Its strength,
however, was surprisingly low, and till date it has not produced any important results
regarding counter-terrorism. SIG was renamed as Counter Terrorism Wing (CTW) in
2003, with training and equipment provided by the governments of USA, Australia, UK
and Germany. However despite such aid, CTW has investigated a surprisingly small
number of cases of terrorism in its role as a specialist CT structure. Correspondingly, the
provincial police CT structures, the CIDs (now CTDs) have investigated thousands of
cases; thus, one of the perceptions of the provincial CIDs is that international donor
agencies 'misplace' their confidence and funds in federally mandated entities like CTW.
CTW is just one of the models of a specialized civilian counter-terrorism body that did
not become vibrant enough to take over the CT functions from the centre; the other one
being NACTA (till now). Since federal civilian bodies like the two mentioned above
demonstrate a trend of being incapable of delivering the required expertise, it remains
to be seen how the new federal bodies will come along. However, this time around,
NACTA clearly has sufficient budgetary allocation, which should remove the often stated
rationale for inefficiency according to many officials in such organizations; that they do
not have enough financial resources.

Even at a superficial glance, it seems that there are a number of forces fighting at the
behest of the Federal Government, many of which have been at the forefront of
combating terrorism. There are others as well, for instance the Pakistan Rangers, that
have also been deployed in various troubled areas, like certain parts of Karachi and
elsewhere to quell trouble. However, the Rangers have been beset by allegations of high

31 Federal Investigation Agency website: http://www.fia.gov.pk/.

15

handedness and jurisdictional friction with police in Karachi recently, thus raising the
issue that forces acting in aid of civil powers need to have defined limits. Except for
perhaps FIA's CTW which has not been able to reach a certain critical mass, these are
forces which are already thousands strong. It remains to be seen how the new RRFs will
take over terrorism related functions of bodies that are already engaged in fighting
terrorism in the country. How many of these functions would remain with the existing
bodies and how many would be granted to the RRFs? Will there be jurisdictional
overlaps, and how will these be resolved in that case? Will it make sense to pull back
entities like the Rangers for example, who have by now set up infrastructures in their
areas of deployment, and may already have better insight into the local problems than
newly raised bodies like the RRFs? As provincial RRFs will be operating in many spaces
in which federal bodies are already present (Karachi and many parts of KP for example),
will issues of centre-province coordination arise? If so, will they be resolved through
new laws? Will the devolution of law and order to provinces through the eighteenth
constitutional amendment affect the process of implementation of NISP (see below)?
What happens to existing mechanisms relating to CT like for example, the CTW within
FIA? What will such forces do with their existing strengths; will there be the usual
duplication, even triplication of roles? If the RRF, especially the federal one, are not
streamlined properly, would they become resource pools to which the government may
intermittently resort for providing VIP security escorts? This brings to mind the
provincially raised elite force phenomenon in Punjab; it began as commendable efforts
to build a tactical force, but now many, if not most, are now solely deployed for VIP
protection duties. Would the RRF, especially the Federal RRF, become a resource pool
for multifarious duties, gradually diluting its CT efficacy? There are many more
questions like these which will be encountered and addressed for the implementation of
the NISP to be successful.

Perhaps one of the biggest problems, at least with the civilian side of the NISP, is that of
capacity. A plethora of analysis by expert observers, both Pakistani and international,
has pointed out that especially the Pakistani police forces are poorly managed, ill-
equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicized and chronically corrupt.32 There seems to

32 Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan:

Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success, April 2009, available at:

16

be a deep-rooted malaise that has hindered or practically stopped efforts at

implementing reforms in the system, and there is a gradually growing weariness with
the extremely slow capability of the police forces to implement reforms (see section on
police below). This capacity gap obviously impedes police forces in Pakistans ability to
step up to challenges, and a mere increase in numbers by raising new forces the
traditional favored response to crises in Pakistan has not proved effective in
stemming the tide of terrorism.33 This inertia is also observable in other parts of the
NISA. Assuming that the duplication of roles is somehow eliminated or reduced
resulting in more resources being streamlined and made available for the NISP the
issues of capacity gaps and weak regulatory practices still remain. As such, these issues
will be daunting tasks for the Pakistani establishment to overcome in the short run.

NATIONAL COUNTER TERRORISM AUTHORITY
The rationale for NACTA appears to be the need for focal institutions and national CT
strategies as regards to organizations that can coordinate national counter-terrorism
efforts after 9/11. Ostensibly, in this spirit, Pakistani government has aimed to give a
tremendous boost to NACTA, making it the most important stakeholder in the
development of the NISP. NACTA will be revived and efforts will be made to improve
coordination between all the intelligence agencies under a joint intelligence directorate,
the directorate of internal security (DIS); a NACTA driven research wing which will lead
national counter-terrorism and counter-extremism efforts. NACTA was given legal
standing through a piece of legislation passed by both the houses of the parliament in
November 2012 as the cabinet finally approved the draft NACTA bill which had been
proposed in 2009. The NACTA Act thus came into effect on April 11, 2013, finally giving
legal status to the organization, which had in fact been lying dormant since its inception
in January 2009. The bill mandated NACTA to be an independent authority, but placed it
under the administrative control of the Pakistani MOI. The head was designated as
'National Coordinator,' a nomenclature carried over from its previous existence as a
body struggling for organizational identity. As such, NACTA is not a new phenomenon,
but has been around for some years now. In its establishment, NACTA was tasked with
drawing up national CT and CE strategies in accordance with a consultative process with
relevant stakeholders. Ostensibly, even then, the main purpose of NACTA was to

http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20-%20Police%20Reforms%20in%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf.
33 Ibid.

17

organise loosely coordinated efforts to combat terrorism, thereby improving

coordination and reducing clutter in the system. However, till now, it has not been able
to do much on that front, mainly due to a lack of resources and legal status. When it was
set up, there were statements issued by the MOI that NACTA would work as a think tank;
it would conduct research and propose measures for a national counter-terrorism action
plan. However, although many such plans were chalked out, they never saw the light of
day.34 There were national coordinators who did not stay for more than a couple of
months, or in some cases even less. For example, the organization experienced a swift
turnover of four national coordinators in 2011. As such, as a result of NACTAs many
problems, the interest of international donors faded away. Proposed funding such as the
15 million Euros pledged by the EU never saw the light of day; many other promises
were also gradually withdrawn.35 Furthermore, international bodies, such as Interpol,
which initially had expressed their enthusiasm in supporting the organization also lost
interest, as NACTA seemed immersed in legal issues involving its identity and
structure.36 At various times it was proposed to be an authority, an attached department
of the MOI, a corporation, etc.

The new NACTA Act37 envisages NACTA as being presided over by a high level Board of
Governors(BOG) headed by the prime minister; its members will be chief ministers of
all provinces and Gilgit-Baltistan, the prime minister of AJK, minister for law and justice,
one senator to be recommended by the Senate chairman, one parliamentarian (MNA) to
be recommended by the National Assembly (NA) Speaker, Ministry of Interior secretary,
Inter-Services Intelligence DG, Intelligence Bureau DG, Military Intelligence DG, national
coordinator, Federal Investigation Agency DG and the inspectors general of police of all
provinces, AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan. The board will be endowed with the power to
exercise all functions of the authority, and will also be responsible to approve policies
and annual budgets prepared by the authority. The bill requires all federal ministries
and provincial departments including corporations, bodies, set ups, controlled or
administered by or under the authority of Federal or Provincial Governments, to

34 Qaiser Butt, Civilian or military outfit? Tussle over who should lead counter-terror body, Express
Tribune, June 1,2011, http://tribune.com.pk/story/179949/civilian-or-military-outfit-tussle-over-who-
should-lead-counter-terror-body/.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Can be found on the official NACTA website, Supra Note 1.

18

provide information and data required for carrying out the purposes of the law. This
was deemed essential to give teeth to NACTA; before the promulgation of the new
NACTA law and NISP, whenever NACTA would consult stakeholders, it was not taken
seriously. Now it might finally be in a position to demand compliance in order to meet
its official obligations. However, it remains to be seen how the NACTA BOG will
coordinate with the premier parliamentary oversight body the Cabinet Committee on
National Security (CCNS) which also carries National Security Division's (NSD)
representation. The coordination interface and mechanism has not yet been clearly
defined, and may therefore cause jurisdictional overlaps and power struggles between
NACTA's BOG and the CCNS. The only oversight mechanism elaborated so far by the
government is that NISP agenda items would have priority in every cabinet meeting, but
such privileges hardly describe an elaborate device of civilian oversight by the
parliament. It might have been better that the relationship between the parliamentary
oversight body (CCNS) and NISP could have been set down in detail.

The issue of civil-military relations also assumes critical importance in this regard. The
role of the Pakistani Army reveals its distrust of politicians, which is sometimes more
than vindicated by lackluster performance of the civilian machinery. This highlights the
state's inability to construct an acceptable political framework for the management of
the state, including the acquisition and exercise of state power. The military's powerful
position within Pakistan's political system makes it the most formidable and
autonomous political actor in Pakistan, capable of influencing the nature and direction
of internal and external politics; in the strategic, foreign and even economic dimensions.
In this case, in practical terms it is difficult to see NACTA taking a dominant role in this
new security policy unless the military allows it, but why would the army give away a
sizeable chunk of its power to a civilian led body like NACTA? It is pertinent here in this
regard to mention that a stipulation built into the NACTA bill gives veto powers to the
security agencies if they deem any action not in consonance with NACTA's mandate. If
NACTA does not acquire the required abovementioned teeth, it will just be another body
with a glorified name attached to it, nothing more. This will merely become a cosmetic
touch like many others. Correspondingly, if NACTA does indeed obtain the authority it
needs, will it be able to stand at par in terms of capability with the decidedly more
effective military-driven entities with which it portends to coordinate? Judging from

19

previous experience, NACTA may require a long time before getting up to speed
(presumably if it gets there, in an ideal world) in terms of resourcing, capability,
delineation of hierarchy and jurisdiction, and other administrative matters which have
plagued fledgling organization in Pakistan for years. Will the more effective players have
the patience and the margin to wait for NACTA to sort itself out? Does Pakistan have the
margin of time when the precarious problem of terrorism is escalating in width and
breadth?

There have many times been a disconnect between intent and action when Pakistani
policymakers develop strategies in security-related matters. For instance, there has
been plenty of talk about madrassah-reforms during President Musharraf's reign.
Furthermore, NACTA has been in consistent birth throes ever since 2008 with
continuous claims of being 'reborn' every year. Therefore, concerted focus from most of
the administrative machinery of the Pakistani state apparatus is needed to implement
the 'wish lists' envisaged in the NISP; sometimes this reasoning seem more like wishful
thinking than facts on the ground. Would it not have been more logical to augment the
capability of existing forces rather than creating new ones from scratch? Given the vast
resources needed to train, equip, and operationalize the NISP, consuming tremendous
amounts of time, intent, capability and expertise; where will all these factors come from?
All these questions demand answers, and these will not be easy to come by.

NACTA has published an organogram on the NISP document,38 which shows a three
pronged hierarchy; headed overall by the national coordinator and assisted by the
deputy national coordinator, there will be three streams of DIS, Research and an
administrative function carried out by a chief of staff. The NISP implementation plan39
reveals NACTA's role not only with NISA, but also with multifarious persons, ministries
and departments like politicians, civil society, scholars, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
planning division, Ministry of Education, vocational assistance department like TEVTA
and NAVTEC, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Council of Islamic ideology, Ittehad ul
madaaris Pakistan, provincial education departments, Ministry of Law and Justice,
prisons, prosecutions, Ministry of Information and broadcasting, Pakistan

38 Supra Note 1.

39 Ibid. It is shown as a table showing various ministries and departments with which NACTA would

interact to implement the plan.

20

telecommunication authority, PEMRA, Saffron Ministry and many others. In an ideal

world, NACTA would receive cooperation from all government departments, regardless
of which sphere they are in. In the practical world of Pakistani politics, however, it is
never that simple. Tensions between Federal and Provincial Governments exacerbate
the lack of coordination, driven by which political party heads the province, and how its
relations with the Federal Government are.

Particularly problematic is the issue of province-centre cooperation seen through the
lens of the 18th Constitutional Amendment of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan. The devolution process that followed this amendment in has entailed a major
shift in Federation-Provinces relationship, fulfilling a long standing demand of
provincial autonomy and fiscal space for community, as well as area specific
development. It was unanimously passed with the support of all political parties in the
Parliament and was promulgated on April 20, 2010. The Act includes 102 amendments
in all, which amended, substituted, added or deleted various provisions of the
constitution. During this devolution, seventeen federal ministries were devolved to the
provinces, but at the same time new divisions and ministries were created at the federal
level to absorb the retained functions of the devolved ministries. However, there have
been pot-holes from the very beginning; the provincial governments were eager to get
the additional powers and possibly resources, but there were serious concerns about
their administrative and financial capabilities, legal and contractual requirements and
human resource. For example, devolution of the Agriculture Ministry raised the major
question of national targets set for cash crops and commodities, their pricing and
subsidies. Similarly, devolution of Higher Education raised the issue of uniformity of
curriculum in an already politically polarized environment. In fact this devolution has
raised more questions than it answers. However, the major challenge for the provinces
is to create fiscal space to adjust to new financial liabilities and absorb the workforce. It
requires not only capacity building, enacting enabling laws, amending procedures and
revenue generation, but also fighting their cases for transfer of assets in the Council of
Common Interest (CCI). 40 Lastly, the devolution puts an onus on the provinces to
continue this process of decentralization and bring the government as close to the

40 The Council of Common Interest is a constitutionally defined body that has the specific mandate of

resolving inter-provincial and coordination of province-center relations.

21

people as possible, but that is far from being achieved due to the reasons above, as well
as many others.

Most importantly, law and order is a devolved provincial function, and thus the
provincial governments have authority over it. The issue of political ownership thus
raises its head; if the province is ruled by a political party which is sympathetic to the
Federal Government and NACTA (it being a federal body), then coordination will be
better, or vice versa. Since many of the departments with which NACTA envisages
cooperation have been devolved to the provinces, it remains to be seen what kind of
coordination mechanisms NACTA would be able to generate, especially in provinces
ruled by a party in opposition to the government. If NACTA faces more hurdles in one
province compared to the other, would it be able to claim being the convener of national
consensus on an issue? Even more importantly, would NACTA be able to handle an
entire spectrum of issues? Indications like this were tangible even during the drawing
up of the NISP, when officials from the opposition party Tehreek-e-Insaaf which leads
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province complained that they were never formally
consulted in drawing up the NISP.41

To put things into perspective, if NISP was to be rolled out effectively, NACTA would be
instrumental not only in implementing NISP, but also at raising public awareness on
the perils of letting terrorism and radicalization grow and on ways and means to curb it.
It would also undertake efforts at generating realization of the issues of radicalization,
religious extremism, and terrorism, and secondly, at countering radicalization and
terrorism by creating required responses on ideological, educational, academic,
legislative and social fronts. It would also be mandated to create a constituency for
counter-terrorism and peace among a cross section of Pakistani intelligentsia, media,
policymakers and religious scholars. A comprehensive implementation of the strategy
would involve educationists, who could be required to evaluate outmoded Islamist
curricula and replace them with more tolerant non-sectarian versions. Scientists can be
involved to jam illegal FM radio transmissions; the media can generate public service
messages and programs promoting tolerance. Threat priorities need to be established,

41 Ismail Khan, Pakistan most terror-hit nation , Dawn, February 23, 2014,

http://www.dawn.com/news/1088864.

22

which stands true for the future of the War on Terror not only in the Pakistani, but in the
global context as well. Intelligence coordination in the 21st century will keep growing
more complex, as counter-terrorism in the future will require complex investigations
involving multiple countries, a variety of types of communication, and numerous
sources of intelligence. As such, it entails a collective requirement for an ever evolving
need for more sophisticated forms of counter-terrorism and greater resources. Add to
that the potential for 'managing' a Federal RRF, NACTA increasingly starts to resemble a
'Jack of all trades'. It is the era of specialized bodies, and ostensibly NACTA has been
created as a focal point for CE and CT efforts. However, the plethora of roles that have
been thrust upon it from tactical issues, to terrorism research, to deradicalization
programs and preventive measures aimed at countering extremism by their very
nature convert NACTA into a 'non- specialist' entity. This is because these are all distinct
disciplines with certain overlapping contexts, but sometimes very different approaches.
Such concerns are why bodes like JTAC in UK for instance, remain essentially
intelligence coordination bodes; or why tactical forces remain tactical forces with the
'brains' bring located somewhere else, but in close coordination. The NISP itself lists
down a number of focal bodies of different nations, and it is clear from the list itself that
most of these bodies have focused, or at least sharply overlapping roles, making them
specialist bodies.42 So, a body which does intelligence coordination will only perform
such a function, while deradicalization regime enforcers would work under a different
environment and so on. National Counter Terrorism Centre (USA), Joint Terrorism
Analysis Centre (JTAC, UK), Joint Counter Terrorism Centre (JCTC, Germany), Australian
Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO, Australia), National Security Coordination
Secretariat (NSCS, Singapore)43 are such specialized bodies mentioned in NISP.44 The
NISP mentions only four entities which have more expansive functions in addition to
coordination mechanisms: National Counter Terrorism Centre (India), Counter
Terrorism Coordinating Agency (Indonesia), Directorate of Counter Terrorism
Coordination (Turkey), and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service.45 Ostensibly,
NACTA has been poised to have more expansive powers beyond just coordination of
intelligence, since its research wing will presumably interact with almost the entire

42 Supra Note 1.Annex 5, global counter terrorism models.
43 The entities from Singapore are duplicated in the table for unknown reasons.
44 Supra Note 39
45 Ibid.

23

gamut of administrative structures in Pakistan. This is besides the fact that it might
possibly be steering the Federal RRF as well, giving it a tactical oversight role, even
though that has not been forthcoming in the document as such. For an organization like
NACTA that has had a chequered past, in a developing country like Pakistan which faces
a huge number of challenges, perhaps a more limited but more specialized role would
have been better. A holistic homeland security role is a more ambitious target that
NACTA could have gradually aspired to. If NACTA does succeed in fusing all these
capabilities together, all the meanwhile resolving issues of civilian-military relations,
resources and capability, it might just be a novel (and a very successful such) body in the
world. If it does not, there is the potential of NACTA being swamped by the huge number
of roles being thrust upon it.

POLICE AND THE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING APPARATUS
NACTA would presumably oversee the organizational restructuring and creation under
the NISP of a Directorate of Internal Security (DIS), wherein 33 civilian and military
intelligence and operational agencies would be represented to integrate tactical,
operational and strategic levels of civil and military verticals. Essentially, this means
that all civil and military intelligence agencies would coordinate intelligence data
amongst themselves. This would probably be one of the most important restructuring
that would come out of the NISP, as the level of disconnect between these entities
remains quite large, as does the variance in their level of capabilities. It seems that the
only intelligence agency which has been comparably more successful at countering
terrorism in Pakistan is the military driven Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).46 Its civilian
counterpart, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), used to have a thriving counter-terrorism
wing, but is currently not comparable to ISI's more expansive CT capabilities. The
civilian intelligence apparatus lags far behind in capability, especially the police, which is
unfortunate since they are supposedly the first responders to terrorism. They should
ideally be poised to generate invaluable intelligence due to ubiquitous presence of police
stations throughout the country. Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) has proven to be the
most viable mechanism for especially investigating terrorism, and the grass roots
presence of police in Pakistan should ideally be a huge factor for adopting this model.
ILP should be a collaborative exercise, that starts with information-gathering at all

46 A majority of stakeholders involved in the intelligence coordination apparatus agree to this. It is

beyond the scope of this paper to make value judgments.

24

levels of the organization that is then analyzed in order to create useful intelligence
and an improved understanding of the operational environment.47 This is especially
useful in context of intelligence coordination within police, effectively strengthening the
NISA at large, with the police potentially being one of the biggest intelligence generating
sources from the civilian angle.

The strengthening of police has been stated to be primary goal in the NISP. Previous
trends, however, demonstrate that the progress in equipping the police in Pakistan with
better skills has been slow, done mostly in terms of sporadically increasing manpower.
In 2009, it was stated by the previous government that the Federal Government would
raise an additional 20,000 policemen, ostensibly to fight terrorism which had hit its
peak in Pakistan.48 Presumably, the target was not achieved, since the Pakistani Police
faces not just problems of under resourcing, but also of capacity gaps, which often
preclude many reforms.49 Hence, it remains to be seen how the RRFs in provinces and
federation will be recruited, and what their capacity levels will be. However, since the
reform package visualized in the NISP comes with a purse attached, there may be some
improvements in the recruitment accountability standards compared to those of the
police. The province of Punjab has for instance started the process of recruitment of the
RRF under CTD through an ostensibly independent National Testing Service (NTS),
which may yield positive results. However, there are issues which will need to be
resolved which go beyond mere numbers or recruitment.

The tactics and targets of the various terrorist groups operating in Pakistan are in a
constant state of flux, posing a formidable challenge to a Pakistani police force with
limited resources, poor training, and inadequate equipment. Pakistans police services
have failed to develop any systematic and advanced counter-terrorism strategy owing to
the lack of modern investigative tools, requisite skills and incentives. Law-and-order
issues, as well as the cumbersome and time consuming VIP protection responsibilities

47 Practical Guide to Intelligence-led Policing, new jersey state police, center for policing terrorism at the
Manhattan institute , September 2006,
http://www.newjersey.gov/njsp/divorg/invest/pdf/njsp_ilpguide.pdf
48 Supra Note 21.
49 Pak police ill-equipped against terror, Agence France-Presse, 31 March 2009,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Pak-police-ill-equipped-against-terror-analysts/H1-Article1-
395066.aspx

25

devour a significant chunk of police resources.50 The police culture is synonymous with
corruption, nepotism, and political manipulation. The police in Pakistan is one of
Pakistans most poorly managed organizations. Recent half-hearted measures like the
Police Order of 2002 emulated the Japanese National Safety Commission system, seeking
ensure oversight of the police by both elected and nominated members at the local
(district), provincial, and national levels. Police complaints authorities at the provincial
and federal levels were also planned. The police still retained operational autonomy,
while various responsibilities and tasks (ranging from investigations, intelligence, watch
and ward, and guard duties) were divided among separate police departments in order
to improve the overall efficiency of the system.51 However, much of what was envisaged,
like giving powers to neutral and independent safety commissions, was eventually taken
back, or never materialized.52 Especially proposals related to accountability were never
properly implemented, and the supervisory mechanisms at the district, provincial and
national levels remained in limbo or were mainly talking shops. The committees which
were supposed to provide grass root oversight and accountability of police the district
Public Safety and Police Complaints Commissions (DPSPCCs) have had almost a
negligent existence, and where they exist, are merely convened meetings by the district
police officer (DPOs) to show that the formality has been fulfilled. The provincial
oversight body, the Provincial Public Safety and Police Complaints Commission
(PPSPCC) was authorized under the order to take steps to prevent the police from
engaging in any unlawful activity arising out of compliance with unlawful or mala fide
orders. 53 Unfortunately, the notification and establishment of PPSPCCs throughout
Pakistan has also been very poor. Similarly, beyond releasing periodic reports, the
National Public Safety Police Complaints Commissions (NPSPPCs) have existed more on
paper than on ground, and have done very little beyond a few reports produced to
reform the police into an independent, accountable and efficient force.

50 The budget for VIP protection varies in urban and rural areas, but on average consumes around 30
percent of the functional operating (as opposed to total budget, more than 90% of which is said to be
consumed by salaries) police budget. It is estimated to be around 50 percent in major urban centers of the
country.
51 See, The Police Order, 2002 (with amendments and updates) (August 2007). Available at:
www.nrb.gov.pk/publications/Police_order_2002_with_amendment_ordinance_2006.pdf
52 For details, see Reforming Pakistans Police, International Crisis Group Asia Reports, no. 157(July 14,
2008).
53 Article 80(1)(b) of the Police Order, 2002.

26

The police only numbers 350,000 policemen for a population of around 172 million, a
ratio of 1:477.54 The police are so involved in performing guard and VIP duties for an
increasing number of foreign dignitaries, politicians, and officials that it has no time for
'real work.'55 Law and order is now a provincially devolved subject, and there is a feeling
by the police in provinces that they do not get their due share of attention. Sometimes
the focus get unduly diverted to the federal scene, while many feel that the real work lies
with the provincial law enforcement agencies, i.e. CIDs and the police. The Pakistani
police investigate terrorism cases very badly at the court, and present these to the court.
Hence most of issues related to trying terrorism trials relate to this poor initial
investigation which determines most of all how the case would look at the prosecution
stage. The prosecution can only manage whatever investigative leads have been given to
it, while the judiciary can only rule on how the case is presented to it by the prosecution.
Thus, the biggest responsibility lies with the police; it must come up with cogent and
acceptable levels of investigation, which can be presented properly by the prosecution
in court. This is exactly what the police in Pakistan has not been able to do for so many
reasons, and that is precisely why many, if not most of the capacity gaps in indicting
terrorists lawfully, are due to the inability or incompetence of police to present its case
through proper a investigation or not following procedure.

This lack of proficiency lies embedded in structural problems within the police, the most
important of which being a lack of capability. The police officers in Pakistan are inducted
at the level of a constable56 and progress to inspector the highest investigating level
without any special training or even a proper notion of concepts concerning the
legalities involved in prosecution. To give the devil his due, the incentives given to police
are grossly inadequate as compared to the hazards faced by operational police officers
facing the eye of the storm. For instance in Balochistan, the CID till recently got a hazard
allowance set according to 2002 pay scales, which come down to about
Rs.1500/month.57 It has since been revised, but is still hardly adequate to attract the
best talents to a profession in which the officers have to stand in the frontline against

54 Statistics from National Police bureau.
55 Pakistan: Police Weakness Mars Fight against Extremism, Oxford Analytica, February 5, 2009.
56 This does not apply to the PSP, who are inducted as Assistant superintendents of police (ASPs) through

the Federally conducted Civil services Exam (CSS). However, the PSPs rarely if ever investigate an Anti
terrorism case personally; they prefer to be 'supervisory' officers.
57 12 GBP/month at exchange rates for that time

27

suicidal militants and deadly organizations. The level of work required is

disproportionate to the resources given. The police officers working cases often
complain that they lack the necessary resources (money, fuel, food, vehicles) for the
investigative process, causing them to sometimes use funds coming from their own
pockets; an experience they come face to face with on a regular basis in their
professional careers(hence the proclivity of police towards corruption). However, the
pressure of senior police officers forces the Investigating Officers (IOs) to get cases to
closure by putting up challans (cases sent to court), no matter what. Reporting a
terrorist case as untraced is frowned upon, as the senior officers themselves experience
a lot of pressure from higher echelons within the police, who in turn face pressure from
their political masters. Thus, many terrorism suspects are usually incriminated on flimsy
evidence, the consequence of which being the failure to convict terrorists in special anti-
terrorist courts (ATCs). This is because sending a terrorist case as 'untraced' reflects
badly on the police officers and their superiors. This lack of credibility of police is
reflected in the courts; the judges, as well as prosecutors, sometimes do not take
evidence tendered by police seriously.

The police does not have jurisdiction in all areas, especially in most of the troubled areas
like FATA. There are a few other non-policing areas as well, such as the 'A' and 'B' areas
in Balochistan. 'A' areas are controlled by police, and the district attorney has some level
of coordination with police, albeit of a very unsatisfactory level. 'B' area is policed only
by locally (mostly local tribes) raised levies, and they have virtually no comprehension
of prosecution or investigation. Indeed The level of policing in this area is so poor that
revenue officials are tasked with investigating high profile terrorism cases. Many
Tehsildars and Naib Tehsildars 58 have been given powers of judicial magistrates
throughout the 'B' area in Balochistan for instance, due to shortage of qualified people
on ground. It is therefore not hard to imagine that investigations and the subsequent
coordination with prosecutors would be very unsatisfactory. Across the board in
Pakistan, there is complete disconnect between the pillars of prosecution; all work in
almost total isolation from each other, with hardly any overlaps.

58 Revenue officials at the lower rungs of the service, but critically important as the basic tier of revue

collection since British times.

28

There is a huge issue of lack of coordination even within the police, as they do not
necessarily cooperate even with each other regarding terrorist challans (forwarding of
case to court), which the (operations) Station House Officer (SHO, officer in charge of a
police station) has to produce before the court. He does not help in adducing the
evidence, and since the investigation wing is grossly under prioritized compared to
operations, the case suffers as a consequence. Most police officers want to be posted in
the operations wing, as the operations wing has more powers; like the power of the SHO
to register a case, which gives him leverage on liberty of a person. Few people desire to
join the investigation wing due to the lack of resources compared to the operations
wing, even though the salaries are exactly the same. Also, the operations wing is
considered much more 'lucrative' (regarding corruption) than the investigations wing.
It is widely considered that the 'cream' of police gravitates to the operations side, since
it is ostensibly more lucrative, carries more clout, and attracts better talent. The
investigations wing is considered to be staffed with either incompetent people, or with
persons who do not have the clout to obtain job in other areas within the police. This
perception is rampant among policemen throughout Pakistan. This has a direct bearing
on terrorist cases, since it is the operations wing SHO which registers the case, but the
investigation wing which is supposed to investigate them; often the investigation wing
IO or person in-charge have to practically run after the operations SHO concerned in
order to complete the formalities of challan. In short, the investigations wing of police
does not have the same capability, resources or even motivation as the operations wing.
The investigation wing do not get too much cooperation from the operations wing,
which makes life harder since the operations people command most of resources in the
mutual administrative areas of both wings. As such, they are forced to practically pursue
their cases to be sent to court by the operations wing. Not only do the different wings
not coordinate with each other, but there is hardly any inter-provincial coordination
either. There is no coordination mechanism in actual practice which operates on
Standard Operating Procedures to allow officers of one provincial police to carry out
operations in another province. Generally, the Home Departments of both provinces
carry out lengthy communications before such operations materialize, which may make
timely investigations redundant. Therefore, the policing mechanisms of the provinces
communicate poorly even though the high level boards consisting of IGPs meet on a
periodic basis. The CIDs (precursors of CTD, who are to be owners of the provincial

29

RRFs) are beset by resource problems, both in the human dimension and in terms of
logistics. The CIDs (re-designated as CTDs) have traditionally had a 'hand me down' role
in terrorism cases, whereby suspects are handed to police for arrest and presentation in
court, after they have been grilled by security agencies. This is because the agencies are
not covered by legislation which gives them powers of arrest. Such a system creates a
vacuum between the investigation and the intelligence generation process, because the
prosecution ceases to have the assistance of people who know the actual facts on
ground. This vacuum enormously affects the trial. Police are supposedly the first
responders to the crime scene, but in actual practice tend to be more of an ambulance
service than an investigation unit, often destroying the evidence at the crime scene.
Since the security agencies are presumably much more efficient than the police in
working out cases, they do not necessarily trust the police with them. Therefore, when
the military authorities investigate cases, they have largely done the needed work; little,
if any evidence, is handed down to the LEAs.

The 'purest' civilian CT organization that has traditionally existed in the provinces have
been the provincial CIDs, which predate 9/11; some like the Punjab CID have faced
sectarian terrorism since the early nineties, long before terrorism became so widely
prevalent. They are in essence the face of the civilian CT in the provinces. However,
paradoxically, they have always been dependent on the district polices powers in order
to make arrests. The scenario in which CT investigations are carried out by this
institutions is as follows: they investigate or generate intelligence in terrorism cases,
and then hand down the case for registration or challan to district police, who in many
instances, are improperly briefed or disinclined to work on terrorism cases. This
disinclination or lack of briefing is relevant in the context concerning how security
agencies hand over terrorism suspect to police as well. Concerning the apprehension of
such suspects, the police, even though cursorily briefed about the manner in which the
recoveries took place, how confessions were recorded to the military, etc, has to start
the investigation from scratch. As such, they look for stories that fit with the facts given
to them by security agencies. Thus, the police often has to concoct stories in order to
cover these lacunae, which sometimes border on the ludicrous; they range from what is
known as 'mukhbari' or 'spy information,' to officers having seen the principal accused
just 'standing around' five minutes after the blast, to just overhearing someone

30

conspiring to perpetrate terrorist activity in a crowded area.59 It is presumably with this

poor performance in mind that the Punjab Government decided to reorganize its CTD
with what it called its provincial anti-terrorism force (ATF).60 Apparently, this would
become the new RRF under NISP. Other CID forces have hardly fared any better. It needs
to be remembered that it is these CTDs which are proposed to be reorganized as the
group to which the provincial RRFs will have to answer.

There is the other side of the mirror as well; it is a considered opinion of some
investigators that keeping the accused with the army agencies is useful, as the police
cannot do enough in the remand period that they are given to hold the terrorists. This
has been recently corrected in the form of extending the custody period to 90 days in the
latest anti-terrorism act amendments, but the poor capability of the police to investigate
terrorism remains essentially unchanged.

It is an established fact that besides the (variable) capability of the CIDs that the police
does not have any credible intelligence about militant organizations. In fact, many police
officers shy away from inquiries, since this takes them into the realm of 'fruitless and
dangerous' investigations. Thus, much of this 'mukhbari' comes from the agencies,
which have a tremendously larger intelligence network regarding terrorism than the
police. However, since the police only has vague ideas of how this information was
generated, they tend to fumble with these cases in court, fabricating most of the
evidence in the case, called 'padding; Consider this judgment from an ATC: "This is one
of those routine cases where the police use spy information to fill in the blanks without
any legal basis or morality. By bringing out accused already in jail and making him an
accused in this untraced case is nothing but a mockery of law."61 Thus, it's discernible
that spy information does not carry any credible lineage with the ATCs, who view it as a

59 State vs. Imdad Hussain and others, Offences Under Section 302, 324, 109, 427, 337(a), 1(III) PPC.

Section 3, 4 ESA 1908. Section 6, 7 ATA 1997. P.S. Margala, Islamabad. Terrorist attack on welcome camp
of chief justice of Pakistan. Case was heard in Anti terrorist Court 1, Rawalpindi, and the suspects were
acquitted because of what was described as defective investigation by the Police, a very common
happening in anti-terrorist courts.
60 Asad Kharal, Poor performance: Punjab to merge counter terrorism dept in new force, The Express
tribune, October 23,2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/621222/poor-performance-punjab-to-merge-
counter-terrorism-dept-in-new-force/
61 This was in the case of a terrorist attack on the army, presumably a terrorist offence which the army
would have taken seriously but the Police could not take up as required. See State vs.Sulman Shaukat, U/S
3/4 Expl.Act,324 PPC,7ATA. Case acquitted from Anti Terrorist Court Kohat.

31

device by the police to cover up corruption and incompetence. This does not make life
any easier for the police, even when they actually have been handed bonafide terrorists
by the army to 'pad' and present them to court.

Recent pieces of legislation legalizing eavesdrop-powers through intercept warrants like
Investigation for Fair Trial Act 2012 could also shrink some of the grey area in which the
ILP can legally operate if rolled out properly. The Investigation For Fair Trial Bill, 2012,
is a piece of legislation which has drawn a lot of attention, as it allows certain law
enforcement agencies to use modern evidence gathering techniques and surveillance
devices against terrorists. It potentially makes various forms of modern evidence
admissible in court, which obviates the need to rely heavily on ocular-based direct
evidence, which has been the norm in Pakistan for decades. The bill has also drawn a fair
amount of criticism due to the potential of posing a direct threat to the privacy and civil
liberties of citizens, since it is feared that security agencies would be empowered to
intercept communications as they see fit. It has been said that this may come in clash
with constitutional guarantees like Article 14 and 8 of the Constitution of Pakistan,
which guarantee inviolability of privacy of citizens. However, the government essentially
claims that this law plugs gaps, since existing laws neither comprehensively provide for
nor specifically regulate use of advanced and modern investigative techniques such as
covert surveillance and human intelligence, property interference, wire tapping and
communication interception that are used extensively in other countries, including the
US, the UK and India.62 Thus, even with this superficial review of the situation, the
possibility of the police becoming a major and reliable supplement in civilian
intelligence generating to NISA seems low. Recent legislations like the abovementioned
Fair Trial Act and the recent amendments to the 1997 Anti Terrorist Act have
supposedly rectified some of the deficiencies in the system. However, they have also
been blamed for correspondingly rendering these laws more draconian and less human
rights compliant, in effect adding additional procedural loopholes in some cases. In any
case, the CTDs and police structures would have to undergo drastic re-invention to
become even remotely efficient within the NISP.

62 Sultan Hali, How fair is Fair trial bill?Pakistan Observer, December 28, 2012,

http://pakobserver.net/201212/28/detailnews.asp?id=189007

32

THE MADRASAH CONUNDRUM

On the topic of religious schools or madrasahs, the NISP says: It is important to mention
upfront that not all madaaris are a problem and therefore these must not be viewed
negatively as a whole. However, there were problems within some madaaris which have
spread extremism, it adds, noting financing from unidentified sources and the
publication and distribution of hate material.63 The document notes that the vast
majority of madaaris in Pakistan fall outside government control, and that there are
allegations that some madaaris are also involved in preaching violence and propagating
hatred toward other sects and non-Muslims. A large number of terrorists, either are, or
have been students of madaaris where they were brainwashed to take up arms against
the state, the paper adds.64 There is no doubt that radical reformation of the madrasah
system in Pakistan is needed, as they have been at the eye of the storm regarding
terrorism, militancy, extremism and sectarianism, as well as for creating divisions
within the society.

However, it needs to be remembered that this is not the first time that the Pakistani
State has attempted to introduce madrasah reforms. Reforms in madrasah education has
been underway for some time, but post-9/11, the United States and other Western
countries have forced the Pakistani government to take more immediate measures in
this regard. Since then, irrespective of being elected or non-elected, the government has
been trying to introduce some reforms in the madaaris,65 but these attempts have failed
to materialize in any substantive way, mainly due to differences between the
government and the madaaris.66 Aspects of the madaaris reforms pertain to registration
of madaaris, curriculum reforms, inclusion of modern subjects and the presence of
foreign students; all of these suggestions have been discussed in order to bring madaaris
education at par with mainstream education systems. In the backdrop of reforms, the
government initially drafted the Model Deeni (religious) Madaaris and Madrassa Board
Ordinance 2001, which was passed by the Federal Cabinet on June 21, 2002. According
to the ordinance, the government would issue a gazette notification for the

63 Supra Note 1.
64 Ibid.
65 Lexically, the plural of singular Madrassah. The words madaaris can be used interchangeably.
66 Manzar Zaidi, The Madrassah challenge in Pakistan, Centre for International and Strategic Analysis(

SISA)Norway, Report no. 3 - 2013, March 2013,

http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner%202013/2013-03-04__SISA3_Madrassa_Education_-
_Syed_Manzar_Abbas_Zaidi.pdf

33

establishment of Pakistan Madaaris Education Board. Such reforms would ostensibly

have modernized the education system by setting up model religious schools. Their
affiliations would be approved on the recommendation of Council of Islamic Ideology,
the official mouthpiece of the state on religious matters. 67 The board visualized
obtaining the authority to set curriculum and examination systems, and to hold teacher
training programs. However, the implementation of these reforms has not materialized;
only 449 out of the almost 25,000 madaaris under this law have been registered, while
only three model madaaris have been established throughout Pakistan. In June 2002,
the government drafted Voluntarily Registration of Regulations Ordinance 2002 and
passed it through the Federal Cabinet. It could nevertheless not be promulgated as
staunch resistance from the madaaris prevented President Pervez Musharraf to sign the
decree.. Through this ordinance, the madaaris were to be asked to register voluntarily,
while funding through foreign financial assistance was banned. In October 2004, as a
next step, the government introduced the Government Madrassa Reforms Program
2004. According to this document, the madrasah curriculums must include English,
Mathematics, Social Studies and General Science, besides religious subjects on the
primary and secondary level. On the higher level, English, Computer Sciences,
Economics and Pakistan Studies were also to be taught. This program remained only
marginally successful.68

The issue of madrasah registration is very important in the current debate. In this
context, the Directorate of Research and Coordination (DRC) within NACTA has been
tasked with this for maintaining databases of them. However, it remains to be seen how
the DRC will approach this problem in a way that is different from past attempts.
Historically, madaaris are registered as charity organizations under the Societies
Registration Act 1860, but requirements for registration were removed in 1990. The
issue of registration once again surfaced during Musharrafs time in office in the form of
heated debates, culminating in the governments promulgation of the Societies
Registration (Amendment) Ordinance 2005 for the registration of madaaris; an
amended version of the Societies Registration Act 1860. This act stipulated oversight of
madaaris by requiring them to issue annual reports of their activities including the

67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.

34

annual budget and receipts of revenue and expenditure to the registrar. All madrasahs
were prohibited to teach or publish any literature or material that promoted terrorism,
sectarianism or religious hatred. However, this ordinance too did not work out as
planned. The Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaaris Pakistan (ITMP) the umbrella body
representing madaaris resented this intervention by state, claiming that the
government was unduly seeking credentials from madaaris.69

These attempts at madaaris reform predate Musharraf times; during the Benazir Bhutto
era, the government tried to ban the registration of new madaaris, but did not succeed.
Registration remained closed for many years after the Bhutto's regime, and the
government propagated that madaaris were not willing to register themselves. During
the Musharraf era, negotiations started with the madaaris in order to get them
registered. This was attempted in the ambit of Societies Registration Act 1860, under
which madaaris were registered since 1950; resulting in an amended version of the
document with the addition of section 91.

The main problem concerning madaaris is the presence of unregistered or ghost
madaaris. The total number of madaaris affiliated with the wafaqs70 is approximately
28,000; besides them, a large number of unregistered madaaris are also present in the
country. Scores of these unregistered madaaris escape scrutiny of the government since
those are usually built as an additional room in mosques, where students get Nazira
Quran and Hifz (learning Quran by heart) lessons. For the abovementioned reasons, the
mushrooming of unregistered madaaris has become a severe problem for the
government, particularly since many of these unregistered madaaris are located beyond
the reach of the Federal Government in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
or other remote areas of the country. Tremendous growth of madaaris has been
witnessed in the last 25 years especially in the era of Zia-ul-Haq. His Islamization
policies resulted in an explosion of madaaris in order to obtain a large recruitment base
of fighters to support the Afghan Mujahedeen in their war against the Soviet Union.

69 Ibid.
70 Wafaqs are madrasah boards, which are groupings of madrasahs organized along sectarian lines. So
there will a wafaq for Shia sects, the Wafaq ul Madaaris Shia and so on for every sect. Wafaqs are the
mouthpieces for that sectarian style of teaching, and they usually nominate spokespersons which interact
with the state if required.

35

There is no credible information for the number of unregistered madaaris, particularly,

since these are generally located in remote areas. Thus, many such ghost madaaris
escape detection.71

The state has tried many times to implement reforms, but it seems that even the systems
of education in madaaris have not been completely understood by the policy makers,
who have merely tried to plug in perceived gaps. Detecting these ghost madrasahs will
be exceedingly difficult, but have cross cutting implications if successful. The madrasah
stakeholders will be reluctant to register or will attempt to hide these ghost madrasahs
from the fiscal authority, and may even mobilize religious street power in the shape of
mass protests if steps are forcibly taken. Religious entities in Pakistan may not have the
electoral power often claimed by analysts, but they can certainly mobilize very effective
street power in furtherance of religious or political agendas. It remains to be seen how
DRC will overcome this inevitable resistance in regards to how the registration of
madrasahs will play out. Furthermore, there is the issue of stigmatization of reforms; the
government started madrasah reforms in the backdrop of 9/11, commonly perceived by
madaaris as under pressure from Western powers. Thus, any efforts in this regard are
perceived as part of a foreign agenda by the madaari religious establishment. Not
enough research was done to understand these Islamic systems of education, and the
term reform was used even when there was no consolidated pool of knowledge about
the madaaris education system. This lack of vision and strategy created differences
between the stakeholders. Irrespective of concerned ministries and departments, the
debate about these systems gained an emotive element. This mitigated the impacts of
any proposed reforms, since it was unclear what was needed to be done to control the
madaaris in order to curb terrorism, and what substantive reforms were needed to
upgrade this education system.

Initially, different Wafaqs held negotiations with the government individually. Later on,
they developed an umbrella organization consisting of five Wafaqs, the ITMP mentioned
earlier. It needs to be noted here that Wafaqs are constituted on basis of religious sects,
so the very basis of madaaris is sectarian in nature. They differentiate between each
other on this basis, but are pragmatic enough to come together on issues of reform,

71 Ibid.

36

which the ITMP terms as a conspiracy of the West. ITMP admits that even though there
have been few arrests of terrorists from madaaris: most neither produce terrorists, nor
are hideouts for extremists. They argue that the condition of the public sector
educational institutions concerning radicalization is also very bad, but question why the
government is concentrating on madaaris instead of improving the mainstream
educational system in the public sector.72 The ITMP are of the view that the government
has consistently failed to take any concrete decision regarding madrasah reforms, since
it does not appear to be serious in this regard. As the main government arm
spearheading these reforms, ITMP holds the bureaucracy responsible for the lack of
progress, and further claims that since madaaris are in the realm of the private sector,
the government cannot effectively control them. Reform in accordance with
government aspirations are thus not possible; ITMP puts forward the argument that the
government is privatizing its various institutions, but it is surprising that it is trying to
control religious seminaries.73 The situation is complicated by the fact that madaaris are
hugely popular due to being a form of social NGOs; a perception which gives them the
potential to mobilize street power against the state if it tries to implement reforms.
Many madaaris provide free board, lodging and meals for the ultra-poor who have no
other means of subsistence. Furthermore, these people even have a chance at earning a
livelihood as Imams in mosques or religious teachers after they graduate. Added to this
is the fact that even though there is a huge aura of producing terrorists, a very tiny
minority of them actually have been implicated in such crimes, 74 except for some
madaaris in FATA, KP and border area of Balochistan. However, as elaborated earlier,
they are organized along sects, which undoubtedly contribute to increasing sectarian
tensions in the country. Sectarian terrorism gains fuel from unabashed propagation of
one's own sects, while relentlessly bashing others. Furthermore, any attempt at reform
will have to cater to the fact that a huge number of people who get their livelihood from
the madaaris' social NGO function will need alternate means of livelihood and support, a
herculean task for Pakistan. The madaaris are religious entities, and will use the
inherent religiosity in Pakistani ethos to generate resistance against what they perceive
as foreign sponsored attempts at reform. The DRC of NACTA will have to grapple against

72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.

37

these odds to be successful in order to achieve the necessary reforms in madaaris

outlined in the NISP.

A COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-EXTREMISM NARRATIVE
The policy document offers a candid and introspective look at where Pakistan has been
failing in its efforts to fight terror, calling on the government to build a national
narrative on extremism and terrorism.75 Opinion polls in the past have shown that
there is no overwhelming public consensus on tackling extremist groups. Most of the
emphasis of the government has been on strengthening laws in a series of legislative
developments, the most recent of which is the promulgation of the Pakistan Protection
Ordinance. However, many issues need rethinking within NISP to develop a national
narrative that go beyond mere laws. Pakistan has since its inception been beset with
internal contradictions and continues to remain unstable, unsure, and insecure about its
future. This insecurity has manifested itself in Pakistan looking for regional co-operation
and an enhanced optimism about its military capabilities. A narrow survivalist model of
national security has dominated the political discourse of the country and continues to
be the central pillar in Pakistan's strategic calculations. National security is a larger
concept than just defence. It comprises the utility of power and the psychology of
national vulnerability that go far beyond the mere protection of its territory.

The threat of extremism and radicalization has exponentially risen in Pakistan in the
course of the last decades. These phenomena are much more confusing in the sense that
they are widely diffused but sufficiently ambiguous in Pakistan inasmuch as they are not
identifiable as an enemy per-se. Conservative values are cherished in Pakistani society,
and a stream of reports in the Western media about extremism, fundamentalism,
and the conservative mind-set of the Pakistani public as a monolithic entity does nothing
to reveal the nuances of the problem. Most Pakistanis continue to live peaceful and
mundane existences marked by a mixture of progressiveness, conservatism, and
traditional Islamic values.76 A society that displays such values is not easily understood
by the West, and sometimes even by itself. Bearded men or veiled women are not signs
of extremism in Pakistani society by default, but the presence of extremist and fanatics

75 Supra Note 1

76 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, 'Hating the Taliban, Hating the United States: Trajectories of Pakistan's Anti-

Americanism', American Foreign Policy Interests, 2009, 31: 6, 376 388.

38

who arise from within the population cannot be denied. Since the factors which give
rise to this 'spawning' is not even properly understood by the Pakistani public and
policy makers alike, it is not surprising that they continue to remain ambiguous for the
world at large.

The problem is compounded by the fact that even identifiable terrorist entities in
Pakistan have morphed into fluid command and control structures that do not show up
on the security radar clearly. Al-Qaida particularly remains elusive partly because of its
propensity to rapidly alter its command and control structures in response to changing
circumstances.77 The difficulty in substantiating linkages is that the organization has
become decentralized in Pakistan by integrating itself into local jihadist movements.
Even Bin Laden's death may not reveal much more about the changing structure of al
Qaeda in Pakistan, since it probably exists in a networked structure composed of small
'cells' found in jihadist organizations such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi(LJ), as well as in
'clusters' of these cells within the larger Taliban umbrella organization.78 Thus, even
though the entity is clearly recognizable as an enemy, the structure of the entity is not,
since it is so fluid. Many militant entities have transformed into more ambiguously
demarcated organizations, such as the LJ, which has expanded its ambit of sectarian
terrorism significantly in the last few years. What was previously a hit and run entity
seems to have become more organized, but its organizational structure nevertheless
remains unknown. Even more confusingly, the TTP the biggest enemy of the state is
not a monolithic entity but rather a constantly morphing conglomerate of loosely
connected 'militant franchises' which could be formed from anything from a few
militants to organized bands of thousands.79 Thus, even on superficial scrutiny, such
kind of fluid structures of the enemies clearly present a dilemma of comprehension to
the state.

77 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, Pakistan's Security Dilemmas; On Doctrines, Perceptions and Institutional
Interests, Centre for International and Strategic Analysis (SISA) Norway, Report no.6, June 2013,
http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner%202013/2013-06
14_SISA6_Report_PakistansSecurityDilemmas_Manzar_Zaidi.pdf
78 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, ''Geographic Trajectories of Al-Qaida and Taliban Terrorist Groups in
Pakistan', Journal of Strategic Security, Journal Volume 3, Number 1- Spring 2010 Issue.
79 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, 'The Taliban Organization in Pakistan', RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, No. 5, October
2009.

39

The parameters of setting out a national security doctrine thus need to be

comprehended in their intensity, which can be defined in terms of how much
preparation is needed to cater to the scale of activities by the enemy which constitutes a
certain quantum of threat.80 A state facing a dilemma of comprehension of what its
opponents look like (in terms of structure, intent , capability etc.) will not be able to
make a rational choice decision as to when and how to prepare for a full out war,
counterinsurgency, engagement or any other measure to counter the enemy. Trends
now show that the Pakistani military is much more successful in tackling the militants
head on. Of course, the state may get to learn about these enemies gradually, but the
learning curve has been and will continue to be painful as long as ambiguity about the
enemy remains. This is a major challenge for the state.

The civilian criminal justice structure has correspondingly remained incapable of
lawfully convicting terrorists, allowing many to escape through the judicial process,
despite the many laws which are enacted but not properly implemented. Civilian
structures, like the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) and the
NACTA, had largely been talking shops till now, which is a general reflection of poor
governance by civilian structures across the board. Politicians have not been able to add
much clarity to this unsatisfactory state of affairs so far. They have also failed to mobilise
the Pakistani public properly in eradicating the twin menace of terrorism and
extremism, even though the public itself is now overwhelmingly against terrorism and
seems to long for peaceful existence. Even though legal frameworks such as robust
counterterrorism laws are needed, ideological sanction is also important in the fight
against terrorism in order to ease the apprehensions of the common Pakistanis. Even
though there have been fatwas issued by the federally-driven Council of Islamic Ideology
(CII) as a religious narrative by the state, the council needs much more public
credibility; especially after the negative publicity it has accrued regarding its
controversial fatwas about women and allowing child marriage.81 The CII has recently
declared that Pakistani men would not need to seek permission from their wives for re-

80 Supra Note 1.
81 The Council was established to review Pakistan's existing legislation to be in line with religious Shariah
laws, but many analysts believe its constitutional mandate is against the principles of the modern nation-
state. See Wajahat Ali, Ideological battle brews in Pakistan between religious, secular factions, Channel
News Asia, May 2, 2014, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/ideological-battle-
brews/1092492.html

40

marrying, and has declared the ban on child marriages as against Islam. 82 Other
ministries such as the now provincially devolved youth, womens affairs and the
religious affairs ministries could have been galvanised to take up traction following from
the initiatives of the CII (if it had remained non-controversial), within the ambit of a
security doctrine. However, one can clearly see that there are religious tensions even
amongst the pinnacle of state driven religious entities, and it remains problematic to
grant to such bodies ideological steer on policies regarding counter-extremism and de-
radicalization. On the other hand, stand-alone initiatives by NACTA will not go in any
concerted direction as has been demonstrated by various such initiatives before. For
that very reason, some form of parliamentary committee on national security may be
used by the government to reinvigorate the parliamentary oversight, so that top level
ownership of NACTA-driven initiatives can take place; a BOG, no matter how powerful,
may not be enough. Complete sincerity in politico-religious engagement at the very top
levels may be required.

On the other hand, extremism as a philosophy is by now deeply ingrained and rapidly
spreading in large sections of Pakistani society. Representations of extremism in the
media, both local and international, are blurred by an indistinct categorization of origin
and purpose. This may be affecting strategies and policies towards containment of
extremism and radicalization of certain groups and communities. Constraints in
carrying out extensive research of extremism are due to lack of resources and
information, whereas even if information is made available, its reliability is
questionable. Also, the politics of research may not allow for accuracy of information,
whereas sources of accurate information may not be available for academic analysis due
to security constraints. Subjectivity of opinions is another issue affecting objective
analysis, especially since historical data is not available in the majority of areas which
need to be investigated. Furthermore, there has to be dependence on subjective analysis
and hypothetical conclusions. NACTA will have to bridge all these gaps, and the DRC,
which is responsible for implementing the soft measures will be put to the test.

It should be the governments priority to identify and document reasons for growing
extremism within Pakistan and list identified extremist groups through available

82 Ibid.

41

sources of information. Furthermore, it is paramount to identify vulnerable groups and

individuals with tendencies to join extremist factions. These groups will include male
and female students of public and private education centres/madrasahs/unemployed
youth/under trial and imprisoned juveniles and adults. This should be the thrust of
NACTA's implementation of the DRC within NISP. This would still require extensive
consultations from opinion leaders and information gatekeepers throughout the country
in order to make the strategy implementation more representative of the national
consensus about terrorism in Pakistan. This would entail widespread consultations with
experts, LEAs, religious scholars, interviews with interred terrorists, civil society, etc.
This component would require that DRC becomes integrated and comfortable in not
only the domain of the public sector, but should also aim to win over the confidence of
the wider sphere of citizens and civil society.

One of the solutions has been the establishment of a counter-terrorism environment
created by politicians through legislation, budgets and policy decisions. Legislation will
be a part of the directing tangential forces of counter-terrorism. In Pakistan, such
legislation is resonated by the anti-terrorist acts passed by the government, which
sometime gives sweeping powers to the law enforcing agencies. The inherent global
challenge in these developments will be balancing the rights of citizens and fundamental
constitutional guarantees against the increasing threat from terrorism. This is the
delicate balancing act that counter terrorism and extremism in the future will continue
to face, especially for the security agencies directly involved in these operations. Thus,
the main challenges for CT and CE in the future will be the level of coordination
required, which seems to be exponentially increasing in scale. These are huge
challenges, and it remains to be seen how they will be dealt with by the NISP.

CONCLUSIONS
NISP certainly has enormous significance, which a news article succinctly sums up by
saying: "The significance of the 100-page document is not trivial. Is the first time that
not just a serious effort has been made to capture key challenges to national internal
security in a seamless single narrative by an elected dispensation but that it identifies
gaps between the states responsibilities and actions and offers solutions to address
these deficiencies. But perhaps the most important aspect of NISP is that it offers the

42

first integrated sweep of the challenges and solutions from a civilian

perspective..(which is a departure from the vaguely defined) threats facing Islamic
Pakistan from obscure or imagined sources based outside Pakistan rather than the
internal threats that the NISP focuses on. NISP is not just a first by being a clear civilian
perspective on a turf traditionally dominated by the security establishment but also bold
in its diagnosis in policy articulation..it is a big step forward in weaning control of the
narrative that defines the purpose of the state as being in service of its subjects rather
than vice versa.83

However, one of the significant factors that need to be examined is NOT the document,
but rather the long time it took for the government to articulate it. This fact is telling for
the implications of the fundamental challenges facing the political forces in Pakistan
when trying to create a new narrative.84 Admittedly, these are wish lists that seem to
have been produced as though a hurried study of existing international models was
carried out. However in the case of Pakistan the country may not be able to undertake
such ambitious models in its current state of development. The dilemma escalates when
there are other challenges with which the state has to cope, such as economic problems
commonly faced by developing countries. These concerns will exacerbate the
uncertainty horizon for such states, since what may be a perfectly viable strategy for a
financially secure state may not be feasible for one facing economic hardship. Socio-
cultural factors also cause limitation of choice; such as the religious environment of the
state when facing national security uncertainty, ethnic and nationalist violence, etc.85 As
Michael Mandelbaum, an academic and analyst of the phenomenon has argued, Similar
security policies recur throughout history and across the international system in states
that, whatever their differences, occupy similar positions in the international system. . .
The security policies of very strong states are different from those of very weak ones,
and both differ from those of states that are neither very strong nor very weak.86 Thus,

83 Adnan Rehmat, In the drivers seat, finally?, The News on Sunday, March 9, 2014,
http://tns.thenews.com.pk/drivers-seat-finally/#.U2MrCPmSy8B
84 Ibid.
85 Manzar Zaidi, Pakistan's Security Dilemmas; On Doctrines, Perceptions and Institutional Interests, Centre
for International and Strategic Analysis (SISA) Norway, Report no.6, June 2013,
http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner%202013/2013-06-
14_SISA6_Report_PakistansSecurityDilemmas_Manzar_Zaidi.pdf
86 Michael Mandelbaum,' The Fates of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 2, 4.

43

there are certain structural paradigms that will nudge a state towards a certain national
security and foreign policy path which resonate with their international standing. As
that standing improves or deteriorates, the choices for a national security and foreign
policy trajectory expand or shrink simultaneously. Academic Robert Gilpin sates that, a
more wealthy and a more powerful state . . . will select a larger bundle of security and
welfare goals than a less wealthy and less powerful state,87, which implies that its
foreign policy goals and national security goals will be broader and more expansive.
Correspondingly, states with fewer resources at their disposal will have fewer choices in
rationalizing an expansive security doctrine. It is only when states reach a certain level
of development that they can attempt to explore possibilities of expansive doctrines
with more international outreach.88 Such resource constraints may also be relevant in
context of NISP.

There is certainly a Pakistani context to implementing the NISP; mere cognizance and
admission of facts may not be enough to make the policy materialize. From centre-
province relations to civilian-military relations to devolution to stakeholder reticence or
inertia to move out of status quo, NISP would have to overcome obstacles which have
proved insurmountable till now. For instance, NACTAs birth pangs reveal the
organizational ethos, when federal entities (the MOI and Prime Minister's Secretariat)
were involved in turf wars over which one would take primacy in leading NACTA. The
problem is exacerbated when it is taken to the next level; centre-province relations,
which remain tenuous in Sindh, KP and Balochistan, three of the four provinces.89 When
Federal Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar presented the 100-page policy in the presence
of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the minister stated that it was a debatable policy, and
every parliamentarian had the right to discuss it since it was a national policy, and not
solely the ruling party Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz's (PML-N) initiative.90 Before
drafting the NISP, the government had written letters to the chief ministers of all the
four provinces and the leaders of all the national parties. However, even though the

87 Robert Gilpin, 'War and Change in World Politics'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp.
2223, 9495.
88 Fareed Zakaria, 'From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of Americas World Role'. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 23.
89 Leaving aside AJK and Gilgit Baltistan, which have special administrative structures.
90 Hadi Aziz, Much-awaited National Security Policy presented in National Assembly to handle terrorism,
The News tribe, Feb 26th, 2014, http://www.thenewstribe.com/2014/02/26/much-awaited-national-
security-policy-presented-in-national-assembly-to-handle-terrorism/

44

policy was prepared in six months, no political party except the MQM gave suggestions
on how it should be formed.91 This put questions marks on stakeholder ownership of the
NISP when it reaches the implementation phase.

Another issue is the 'force paradigm'; ever since insurgency raised its head in Pakistan,
the armed forces have been the most effective (some would say the only) force deployed
in a counterinsurgency campaign against the terrorists. The presence of foreign jihadis,
and Afghan trained jihadis returning to Pakistan complicates the issue. Value judgments
aside,92 the Pakistani army is a critical player in the countrys struggle against terrorism.
Not only because they are supposed to, but also because they have been thrust into
these roles as civilian structures like the police are at the moment inept to handle such
roles. The only operational deradicalization campaigns erected in the aftermath of the
incursions in Swat in 2009 the projects Sabahoon and Mishal were both military
driven initiatives, and there have never been any viable civilian projects to compare.
Thus, lofty ambitions and principles aside, pragmatically, any civilian initiative will have
to start on a learning curve and has to win over the military as a willing partner in order
to be successful. The civilian-military debate seems to be raised more and more in
Pakistan now, but mere slogan mongering will not get anywhere unless both the entities
sit down and decide to work in complete harmony, rather than the isolated silos that
they are accustomed to.

The interplay between power and politics also needs to be considered. Politics plays a
huge part in any security strategy, since internal conditions may be as instrumental as
shaping doctrine as external ones. Put simply, national strategy may become the flag
bearer of political stances rather than rational choice strategic ones. Such aspirations for
gaining and retaining power may also evolve into hegemony.93 Hegemonic postures will
tend not only to give a global orientation, but will also intentionally diffuse the context of
the enemy. Thus, instead of clearly identifiable enemies, esoteric threats such as chaos,
'terror', instability, etc. will become dominant themes. As then President George Bush
articulated US strategy even before the Persian Gulf War, As the world's most powerful

91 Federal Cabinet approves National Security Policy, Pakistan Defence,

http://defence.pk/threads/Federal-cabinet-approves-national-security-policy.301782/
92 Which are beyond the scope of this paper anyways.
93 Supra Note 72.

45

democracy, we are inescapably the leader, the connecting link in a global alliance of
democracies. The pivotal responsibility for ensuring stability of the international
balance remains ours.94 This resonates with the fact that America now has multiple
enemies and its alliances like the Global War On Terror has tended to see waxing and
waning periods. Thus, as seen with the American case, no matter how much it is glossed
over, power struggles and turf wars play a huge part in national security doctrines, as
they may for Pakistan.

Even then, bold admissions of problems plaguing the security establishment are a first in
Pakistan. "From acknowledging that religion in its worst avatars such as sectarianism is
tearing the country apart to emphasizing that the two dozen security agencies are
competing for resources rather than supplementing efforts for shared outcomes; from
finally confirming that hate is indeed being taught in educational institutions leading to
intolerance to rejecting demands for extremist interpretations of religion by the state;
from accepting the compulsion of building institutional capacities on counter-terrorism
to pledging to eliminate implementation gaps that allow margins for militant groups to
dictate terms to the state, NISP looks like it is not just some stop-gap style as a substitute
for substance.95

Perhaps the biggest issue to overcome will be that of regulatory quality, which may be
defined in governance parlance as an official body exercising authority over some area
of citizens' activity in a supervisory or governing capacity. Regulatory agencies typically
should be concerned with making and supervising implementation of rules and
regulations, and imposing supervision or oversight for the benefit of the public at large.
Such tasks in the modern world now require sometimes great expertise, since the
rapidly changing world requires rapid implementation of public authority in certain
sectors, especially when reform is to be effected in government service delivery. This
reform is indicated by governance indicators. Such indicators measuring the robustness
of governance in Pakistan have tended to dramatically decline over the past decade; for
example, Pakistans World Bank World Governance Indicator ranking fell from 15.9 in
2000 to a low of 0.5 in 2009, placing Pakistan lowest in South Asia, even behind

94 National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, March 1990,

http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/national_security_strategy_90.pdf
95 Supra Note 85.

46

Afghanistan.

96

Even though the transition to a democratically elected civilian

government in 2008 was initially hailed as a giant leap forward, there was not been
much progress even though the 2008 government completed its tenure, the first
democratically elected government to do so. Even with the second government in place,
indicators of economic performance and the state of democracy have not improved
significantly enough to indicate robust governance. For instance, the Bertelsmann
Transformation Index (BTI) of stateness marginally declined from 4.6 to 4.5 (out of 10)
between 2006 and 2010.97 Even now, little seems to have changed. State responsiveness
tends to remain static, and state capability concerning the provision of public goods has
significantly declined.

Pakistan was ranked at the 35th percentile of the World Banks World Governance
Indicators (WGI) on Regulatory Quality in 2008, considerably up from 29 in 2007, but
down from 38.5 in 2006.98 After a series of plateaus and dips, in 2013, it was still quite
bad. Pakistans regulatory systems are weak, primarily because regulations are often
poorly specified, regulatory agencies lack capacity, policy is inconsistent and there is a
lack of transparency. Legislation is sometimes passed, but then not fully rolled out or
implemented. This raises several questions: Where are the key bottlenecks in the
system? Is failure to implement legislation due to lack of capacity or other politico-
economic reasons?

One consequence of patronage politics is that peoples direct experience with the state
is extremely limited. The public education system, land revenue administration, courts
and police remain the primary interfaces. Yet incorporation of the law and order system
into local patronage networks has created a market for dispute resolution. Inequality
has shrunk in urban areas, contributing to poverty reduction, while in rural areas
inequality has increased. This trend occurred while growth was still robust indicating
that inequality is widening for the unskilled rural poor, and closing for the more
educated and skilled urban population. Growth levels are currently not sufficiently high
to reverse this trend, and the 2010 floods have pushed more rural people below the
poverty line. Although there have been reform interventions to protect gender and

96 Supra Note 72.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.

47

minority rights, this remains an area where progress is constrained by deep-set

structural inequalities and the rise of conservative values. The gulf between the political
elite and the majority is mirrored by civil society, and indirect rule has opened up an
unregulated chasm in state-society relations which civil (and uncivil) society of one form
or another has often filled. At one level, Pakistan has an impressive history of activism to
protect gender, minority and democratic rights and advocate for social improvement,
yet at another level Pakistan has a history of violent community-based political and
sectarian organizations.99

Regulatory reform proves difficult as specialization, role separation and coordination is
perceived as threatening or unnecessary, especially within bureaucracy in Pakistan.
Regulation is a hot issue in all sectors in the country and the challenge is to move the
exploration of reforms beyond the tendency to think either of departmental silos or
large additional bureaucracies. In this environment, successful implementation of the
18th Amendment will be determined by the ability of legislators and the bureaucracy to
properly align incentives for reform, which has not been forthcoming so far.

Notwithstanding the need for NISP, and 'its heart being in the right place', there will be
immense challenges posed when trying to institutionalize it. The strengthening of
institutions and peace-building work are needed to address the key issues of indirect
rule, regionalism and radicalization. Challenges such as contested religious values,
ethnic divisions and insecure boundaries, as well as the lack of institutional and fiscal
capacity pose severe challenges to institutionalizing robust structures. Unless regulatory
frameworks are drastically improved or redefined, the typical knee jerk reaction of
creating large bureaucracies to deal with rising challenges will keep failing.

99 Ibid.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AJK
ATA
ATC
BOG
CAF
CCNS
CDP
CE
CII
CRP
CT
CTDs
CTW
DG
DIS
DRC
FATA
ICT
ILP
IO
ITMP
LEAs
LJ
MNA
MOI
NACTA
NISA
NISOC
NISP
PSP
PTI
R&D
RRF
SHO
TTP
VIP

Azad Jammu and Kashmir

Anti Terrorist Act
Anti Terrorist Court
Board of Governors
Civil Armed Forces
Cabinet Committee on National Security
Combined Deterrence Plan
Counter Extremism
Council of Islamic Ideology
Comprehensive Response Plan
Counter Terrorism
Counter Terrorism Departments
Counter Terrorism Wing
Director General
Directorate of Internal Security
Directorate of Research and Coordination
Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
Islamabad Capital Territory
Intelligence Led Policing
Investigating Officer
Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaaris Pakistan
Law Enforcement Agencies
Lashkar e Jhangvi
Member National Assembly
Ministry of Interior
National Counter Terrorism Authority
National Internal Security Apparatus
National Internal Security Operation Center
National Internal Security Policy
Police Service of Pakistan
Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf
Research and Development
Rapid Response Force
Station House Officer
Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan
Very Important Person

49