Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A non-cognitivist theory of ethics implies that ethical sentences are neither true nor false, that is,
they lack truth-values. What this means will be investigated by giving a brief logical-linguistic
analysis explaining the different illocutionary senses of normative sentences. The analysis will
make sense of how normative sentences play their proper role even though they lack truth
values, a fact which is hidden by the ambiguous use of those sentences in our language. The
main body of the article explores various non-cognitivist logics of norms from the early attempts
by Hare and Stevenson to the more recent ones by A. Gibbard and S. Blackburn. Jorgensens
Dilemma and the Frege-Geach Problem are two important aspects of this logic of norms.
Jorgensens Dilemma is the problem in the philosophy of law of inferring normative sentences
from normative sentences, which is an apparent problem because inferences are typically
understood as involving sentences with truth values. The Frege-Geach Problem is a problem in
moral philosophy involving inferences in embedded contexts or in illocutionary mixed
sentences. The article ends with a taxonomy of non-cognitivist theories. See also Ethical
Expressivism.
Table of Contents
1. Metaethical assumptions
1. Different illocutionary acts
2. Difference between language and metalanguage
3. Ambiguity of normative sentences
4. Definitions of ethical non-cognitivism
2. The problem of a logic of norms
1. Jorgensens dilemma: its importance for non-cognitivism
3. From earlier non-cognitivism to the new norm-expressivism
1. C. L. Stevenson and the role of persuasion
2. R. M. Hare and the dictive indifference of logic
3. The new norm-expressivism
4. The Frege-Geach Problem
1. Blackburn solutions to the Frege-Geach Problem
2. Gibbard solution to the Frege-Geach Problem
5. The significance of the Geach-Frege Problem and Jorgensens Dilemma for noncognitivism
6. A Taxonomy of Ethics
7. References and Further Reading
1. Metaethical assumptions
In this section, we will introduce some preliminary linguistic notions that will allow us to give a
better account of the cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism divide.
Canonically, forms of language are mainly divided in two species: cognitive sentences (cognitive
use of language) and non-cognitive sentences (instrumental use of language). Cognitive
sentences are fact-dependent or bear truth-values, while non-cognitive sentences are, on the
contrary, fact independent and do not bear truth-values.
Cognitive sentences typically describe states of affairs, such as The earth is square or
Schwarzenegger won the last California election; such sentences are verifiable and can be
either true or false. On the other hand, sentences such as You shall not steal,, You ought to pay
your taxes, and Dont shut the door, please, do not describe states of affairs nor can be
understood as carrying falsehood or truth, but they rather have a different kind of illocutionary
force.
commands:
!p
or questions:
?p
According to Reichenbach (1947, p. 337), illocutionary acts are not true or false. They are
indeed instruments constructed with the help of propositions, and therefore they belong to
language; this is what distinguishes them from other instruments devised to reach a certain aim.
We can distinguish two not necessarily separated - elements within an illocutionary act,
namely the propositional indicator (p) and the indicator of illocutionary force (F). What is called
propositional content (or proposition, or radical-proposition) is symbolized with p and it is the
invariant ingredient in an illocutionary act (in our example above is: your going to shut the
door or the possible state of affair you are going to shut the door). Indeed, it describes the
descriptive content of a sentence; or, in other words, it stands for a possible state of affair
containing meaning and, consequently, having truth-values.
On the contrary, illocutionary acts show the way a proposition is used or what illocutionary force
the sentence belongs to. Therefore, illocutionary force has no semantic meaning whatsoever and
so it does not form part, for example, of the conceptual amount of a norm sentence. Importantly,
illocutionary forces are not alethic modalities-like (such as is necessary that); they are not like
intensional operators and therefore they cannot be used for creating propositions starting from
propositions. For this reason Freges Rule states signs of illocutionary force cannot (a) being
iterated and (b) fall under the range of propositional connectives.
Finally, the illocutionary dimension has a perlocutionary element attached. According to
Levinson (1983, p. 237), a perlocutionary act is specific to the circumstances of issuance and is
therefore not conventionally achieved just by uttering that particular utterance, and includes all
those effects, intended or unintended, often indeterminate, that some particular utterance in a
particular situation may cause. The main difference between a perlocutionary act and an
illocutionary act stands on the fact that the former has a conventional nature, as it can be
represented in explicit form using the performative formula; this conventional nature does not
apply to perlocutionary act. In the following, we will see the importance of perlocutionary acts
within the emotive theories of ethics, which represent a kind of non-cognitivist theory.
distinguished from either a coercive or a discoercive law, is not properly speaking a law. It is not
the expression of an act of will exercised at the time: it is a mere notification of the existence of a
law, either of the coercive or the discoercive kind, as already subsisting; of the existence of some
document expressive of some act of will, exercised, not at the time, but at some former period
(Bentham, 1789, p.).
More recently, von Wright made that intuition more precise, explaining, Tokens of the same
sentences are used, sometimes to enunciate a prescription (that is, to enjoin, permit, or prohibit a
certain action), sometimes again to express a proposition to the effect that there is a prescription
enjoining, or permitting or prohibiting a certain action. Such propositions are called normpropositions [or descriptive sentences of norms] (von Wright, 1963, p. viii). Norms should be
carefully distinguished from normative propositions, i.e. descriptive propositions stating that
p is obligatory (forbidden or permitted) according to some unspecified norm or set of norms.
Normative propositions - which can be regarded as propositions about sets (systems) of norms also contain normative terms like obligatory, prohibited, etc. but these have a purely
descriptive meaning (Alchourrn e Bulygin, 1981).
The most influential analysis on the nature of normative sentences (especially in the field of
philosophy of law) was carried out by Hans Kelsen (especially in Kelsen, 1941).
claim a logic of norms is very problematic or even impossible to build: while for prescriptivists
(in particular in Hares theory or in von Wrights works) the possibility for a logic of norms is
open, although problematic.
indirectly applies the rules of logic to the imperative sentences so that entailments of the latter
may be made explicit.
Jorgensens first solution acknowledges the application of logic only within the propositional
content (or indicative factor) without using the normative (or imperative) constituent. This
solution is very similar to R.M. Hares dictive indifference of logic (Hare, 1949 and 1952) in
which, we will see, logic is valid only at the phrastics level. Jorgensens second solution, on the
other hand, seems to propose that normative sentences and descriptive sentences are linked
through an isomorphic relation; that is prescriptions hold as the same logical rules as their
descriptive counterparts. G.H. von Wright (1963) will successively explore this solution.
Therefore Jorgensen, differently from Ayer, moved to an idea of ethics, which is called
moderate emotivism close to Stevensons (1944) and Hares (1949). In fact, Jorgensen
acknowledges a descriptive component within prescriptive sentences and also he thinks that it is
possible to apply logic to norms.
If we believe norms are lacking of truth-values but a logic of norms is possible, we are thinking
about an objectivist and non-cognitivist theory of norms, such as Hares; while if we believe that
logical inference cannot be applied to sentences lacking of truth-values, therefore we have a noncognitivist and subjectivist theory of norms, such as Ayers.
Supervenience is a feature moral sentences share with descriptions too. This issue is discussed
also in the philosophy of mind. In moral philosophy, the issue of supervenience concerns the
relationship which is said to hold between moral properties and natural or non-moral properties.
Alternatively, it is put forward as a claim about a certain feature of moral terms or moral
predicates. When it is said of trust that it is, say, good, trust is good because or in virtue of
some subjacent or underlying property of it. Generally, it is held that these subjacent properties
are natural properties of trust.
For Hare overridingness is a feature, not just of evaluative words, properties, or judgments, but
of the wider class of judgments which have to have, at least in some minimal sense, reasons or
grounds of explanations (Hare, 1989). Basically, Hare believes that overridingness and
universalizability are similar concepts in that both involve a universal premise such as in the
Golden Rule.
From a logical-linguistic point of view, Hare distinguishes in a sentence between a phrastic and
a neustic:
I shall call the part of the sentence that is common to [assertive and imperative] moods () the
phrastic; and the part different in the case of commands and sentences () the neustic (Hare,
1952).
Roughly speaking, a phrastic is that component in the sentence we called the descriptive
component above, and a neustic is the illocutionary part in a sentence. According to Hare,
logical connectives are part of phrastics; combinations of those connectives are able to create,
are valid in the case we deal with normative sentences as well as we deal with descriptive
sentences. It is, indeed, the proper function of these connectives to establish relations between
sentences; in other words, the validity of a reasoning depends upon the logical links subsisting
among phrastics. Hares thesis is called dictive indifference of logic: we shall see () that
these connectives are all descriptive and not dictive. In fact, it is the descriptive part of sentences
with which formal logicians are almost exclusively concerned; and this means that what they say
applied as much to imperatives as to indicatives; for to any descriptor (or phrastic) we can add
either kind of dictor (or neustic), and get a sentence (Hare, 1949). Therefore no difference will
subsist between a logic of imperatives and a logic of assertions: The method of reasoning used
in () [imperative] inferences is, of course, exactly which is used in indicative logic: these
considerations in no way support that there can be a separate Logic of Imperatives, but only
that imperatives are logical in the same way as indicatives (Ibid.). Phrastics, indeed, are the
same in imperatives and assertions, and we can assert that any formula of formal logic which is
capable of an indicative interpretation is capable also of an imperative one, that is, we can
substitute an indicative neustic with an imperative one, leaving the phrastic unchanged (Ibid.).
Blackburn, on one hand, rehabilitates emotive theories of morals and, on the other hand, says
contrary to Mackies error theory our use of realist terminology is respectable and not in
contract with its projective origin. We will see in the next section how Blackburn can make
room for a logic of norms.
Gibbards (1990) central concept is the idea that calling something rational is to express ones
acceptance of norms that permits it. It applies to the rationality of actions, and it applied to the
rationality of beliefs and feelings (ibid.). For Gibbard, cognitive analyses fail to recognize that
judging a behavior as rational means to endorse it; even classical non-cognitivist analyses fails
this point as they admit that moral judgment are not feelings, but judgments of what moral
feelings it is rational to have. Feelings we think, can be apt or not, moral judgments are
judgments of when guilt and resentment are apt.
The primary function of norms (which Gibbard justifies on evolutionary basis) is to facilitate the
social cooperation, and while true factual sentences are coupled with world representations,
normative ones have the function of making social cooperation stable, and not linked to
environmental and social changes. Gibbards theory is a non-cognitivist but naturalistic one,
which is necessary to give an account of rationality in terms of accepting a norm which is, in its
turn, a standard for rationality of actions; on the contrary it would turn in a vicious circle.
Norms rule everybodys feelings and actions and they are the main component of a moral
judgment; to judging an action as wrong, in Gibbards terms, it means that an actors feelings of
guilt and judging peoples anger are apt feelings. Of course, these will be changing from culture
to culture. Finally, Gibbard suggests that normative judgments because their social function
commit us to adopt higher level norms to encourage social cooperation.
Gibbards key concept is accepting a norm which is to justify on a psychological theory of
meaning in a similar way to Stevensons theory. For Gibbard, a norm is a significant kind of a
psychological state of the mind, which is not fully understandable for us. Therefore, Gibbards
theory rests on an ambiguity; on one hand, value judgments are lacking of truth-values, but on
the other hand, they express the existence of someones mental states.
forbidden). What appears between slashes shows that our argument is an attitude or a belief,
which express a first order attitude (such as The playing for West Ham is wrong).
The main limit of Blackburns solution of the Frege-Geach problem concerns the nature of the
H! and B! operators, while iterated in a higher order sentence. Blackburns formulation does not
make clear the illocutionary role of the operator. If we interpret all the operators in the formula
(a) in an expressive (or prescriptive) way, (that is lacking of truth-values), the whole expression
will not make sense. According to Barcan Marcus (1966), iteration of normative operators looks
like stammering. Otherwise. if we interpret (according to Blackburn) the external operator H! in
an expressive (or prescriptive) way and those into the slashes as descriptive ones, we will have a
correct way of interpreting operators but no solution to the Frege-Geach problem. The formula
(a) above, indeed, is formally correct but does not solve the problem about the identity of
meaning for example between the antecedent of the 1st conditional in the Modus Ponens shown
above (which is descriptive) and its 2nd sentence (which is normative).
Actually Gibbards solution to the Geach-Frege problem is rather a bypass method to avoid the
problem because he explains the functioning of normative language by means of descriptive
language and semantical models. According to Sinnot-Armstrongs criticism (1993), Gibbards
analysis appears to be compatible with a realist view on norms because of his ambiguous use of
normative judgment (which is a state of mind) and his use of possible world semantics.
6. A Taxonomy of Ethics
The following scheme is a development from R. M. Hares A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories
(Hare, 1997, p. 42)
Descriptivism: Meanings of moral sentences are wholly determined by syntax and truth
conditions.
Naturalism: Truth conditions of moral sentences are non-moral properties.
Objectivistic naturalism: These properties are objective.
Subjective naturalism: These properties are subjective.
Intuitionism: Truth conditions of moral sentences are sui generis moral properties.
Non-descriptivism: Meanings of moral sentences are not wholly determined by syntax and truth
conditions.
Searle, J.R. (1969): Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, London,
O.U.P.
Singer, M. (1985): "The Generalization Principle", in Potter, N.T. e Simmons M. (eds.)
Morality and Universality, Boston, Dordrecht, pp. 47-73.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1993): "Some problems for Gibbard's norm-expressivism",
Philosophical Studies, pp. 297-313.
Stevenson, C.L. (1944): Ethics and Language, New Haven, Yale U.P
Unwin, N. (1999): "Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic", The
Philosophical Quarterly, 51(202), pp.60-75
von Wright, G. H. (1963): Norm and Action. A Logical Inquiry, London, Routledge &
Kegan Paul
Warnock, M. (1978): Ethics since 1900, Oxford, Oxford U.P.,
Williams, B. A. O. (1985): Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge (Mass.),
Cambridge U.P.
Author Information
Antonio Marturano
Email: marturano@btinternet.com
University of Exeter
United Kingdom