NATO-Russia Security Challenges in The Aftermath of Ukraine

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
ISSN: 1468-3857 (Print) 1743-9639 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fbss20
NATORussia security challenges in the aftermath

of Ukraine conflict: managing Black Sea security
and beyond
Sharyl Cross
To cite this article: Sharyl Cross (2015) NATORussia security challenges in the aftermath of
Ukraine conflict: managing Black Sea security and beyond, Southeast European and Black Sea
Studies, 15:2, 151-177, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2015.1060017
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060017
Published online: 20 Jul 2015.
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Date: 18 November 2015, At: 10:19
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2015

Vol. 15, No. 2, 151177, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060017
NATORussia security challenges in the aftermath of Ukraine

conict: managing Black Sea security and beyond
Sharyl Crossa,b*
a
Kozmetsky Center, St Edwards University, 3001 South Congress Avenue, Austin, TX

78704, USA; bKennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Washington, DC, USA
Downloaded by [200.198.136.137] at 10:19 18 November 2015
(Received 23 March 2015; accepted 31 March 2015)

NATOs relationship with the Soviet Union and then Russia has been central to
dening the European regional and global security conguration for decades.
This article explores the potential consequences of the Ukrainian conict for the
current and future NATORussia relationship. The analysis focuses on dening
specic challenges and risks for NATO and Russia in managing the evolving
security environment of the Black Sea region. The author offers an assessment
of the potential for future NATORussia clashes or cooperation in the Black
Sea, and for broader regional and global security. Some recommendations are
suggested for managing the future NATORussia relationship during this period
of heightened uncertainty and risk.
Keywords: NATO; Russia; Ukraine; Black Sea; Sevastopol
Men will not put up with terrible conditions like these for the sake of a cross or an
honor, or because they have been threatened: there must be another, higher motivation. This motivation is a feeling that surfaces only rarely in the Russian, but lies deeply embedded in his soul a love of his native land. Only now do the stories of the
early days of the siege of Sevastopol, when there were no fortications, no troops,
when there was no physical possibility of holding the town & there was nevertheless
not the slightest doubt that it would be kept from the enemy of the days when
Kornilov, that hero worthy of ancient Greece, would say as he inspected his troops:
We will die, men, rather than surrender Sebastopol, & when our Russian soldiers,
unversed in phrasemongering would answer: We will die! Hurrah!-only now do the
stories of those days cease to be beautiful historic legend and become a reality, a
fact. You will suddenly have a clear and vivid awareness that those men you have just
seen are the very same heroes who in those difcult days did not allow their spirits to
sink but rather felt them rise as they joyfully prepared to die, not for the town but for
their native land. Long will Russia bear the imposing traces of this epic of
Sebastopol, the hero of which was the Russian people. (Tolstoy 1855/1986)
Nikolai Tolstoy, serving as an ofcer in the Russian Army in the Crimean War. (The
Sebastopol Sketches, December 1855)
Introduction
The relationship between NATO and the former Soviet Union and now Russia has
been at the centre of European and international politics for over 60 years. Manfred
*Email: sharylcross@stedwards.edu
2015 Taylor & Francis
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S. Cross
Woerner signalled a clear change in the EastWest relationship in response to

transformation in the former Soviet bloc during the rst ever visit of a NATO
Secretary General to Moscow in 1990: The time for confrontation is over. The
hostility of mistrust of the past must be buried. We see your country, and other
countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization, no longer as adversaries but
as partners (NATO 1990).
Despite these overtures, NATO and Russia have not been able to achieve the
stated intention of forging a partnership. Russias sensitivity regarding the enlargement of the NATO Alliance has been a consistent source of serious tension.
Although few might have anticipated the deterioration of the European/Eurasian
security environment that we have witnessed as a result of the Ukrainian conict,
in many respects, Russias clash with the West over Ukraine might have been
anticipated.
Regrettably, despite all the changes and new opportunities that were created as
a result of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War, NATO
nations and the Russian Federation still remained very much locked into a perceptual mindset of a bifurcated Europe. While many in the international security
community attempted to move the frame of reference to new realities and building
a common European security community among nations with signicant shared
interests, there were also those who continued to frame and amplify issues in terms
of the great game or contest among the West and Russia. Therefore, rather than
fostering a collaborative security community in which nations in the Balkans,
Caucasus or Central Asia could maintain and develop ties both with the EuroAtlantic community and Russia, these countries were positioned so as to have to
make a choice either the West or Russia.
The tensions between Russia and the West have culminated in the current crisis
in Ukraine, which threatens not only to devastate the society, but also to unravel all
progress achieved in building greater peace and security in Europe and the world
since the end of the Cold War. The recent annexation of Crimea and intervention in
support of separatist groups in the East represent a desire of the Russian leadership
and society to re-assert Russias role in protecting perceived interests and challenging United States and Western inuence among their close neighbours.
Moscows behaviour with respect to Ukraine has elicited strong objection in the
West. At the Wales Summit of September 2014, the 28 members of the NATO Alliance issued the statement suggesting that Russias aggressive actions against
Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at
peace (NATO 2014) and also afrming that NATO nations condemn in the
strongest terms Russias escalating illegal military intervention in Ukraine
(NATO 2014). NATOs Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted in January 2015
that: Crimea has been annexed-borders have been changed by use of force -for the
rst time since the Second World War. And we see that Russia is destabilizing
Ukraine and supporting the separatists in eastern Ukraine (NATO 2015a).
Alexander Vershbow, NATOs Deputy Secretary General, described the consequences of Russias action for the international security environment in Oslo in
2015, noting that
To the East, Russia has torn up the international rule book. It has returned to a
strategy of power politics. It threatens not just Ukraine, but European and global security more generally Russias aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated incident,
153
but a game changer in European security. It reects an evolving pattern of behavior

that has been emerging for several years (NATO 2015b)
Russias recent actions in Ukraine have resulted in sanctions from the West and
repositioning of United States (US) and NATO forces and resources in Europe
aimed to reassure allies. Experts in the US, Russia and Europe warn that we have
moved into a new Cold War or even potential Hot War with the Russian
Federation since the rules of the game during the current period of conict are far
more ambiguous than during the decades of the Cold War.
Building NATORussia security collaboration: interests, opportunities and
perpetual tensions
The NATORussia relationship has been central in the evolution of Russias relationship with the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. George F. Kennan,
principle architect of Americas post-Second World War containment strategy, had
predicted in 1997 that Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of
American policy in the Cold War era (Kennan 1997). Kennan warned that
Such a decision may be expectedto impel Russian foreign policy in directions
decidedly not to our liking (Kennan 1997). Indeed, perhaps there has been no
single greater irritant in Russias post-Cold War relationship with Western countries
than the issue of NATOs continued existence, enlargement, increasing relevance
and success. Because of Moscows confrontational relationship with NATO during
the decades of the Cold War, the growth of the NATO Alliance closer to the territory of the Russian Federation has tended to be perceived as a deliberate strategy
to encircle or weaken Russia. The fact that nations of Eastern and Central Europe/
Georgia and Ukraine frequently justied interest in pursuing membership in NATO
with the aim of seeking protection from Russia only strengthened that perception
of NATOs intentions in Moscow.
There has been a pattern in the United StatesRussian relationship largely inuenced by NATO issues characterizing each presidential transition. Initially, both Bill
Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, and Barack Obama
and Dmitry Medvedev pledged commitment to develop strategic partnership, but
inevitably clashes of interests thwarted the realization of this objective.1
While Clinton and Yeltsin had expressed the desire for USRussia partnership
and even friendship, two major issues involving NATO were central during the
decade of the 1990s, leading to more sobering appraisals of prospects for realizing
these strategic partnership aspirations. Despite US/NATO attempts to downplay
Russias opposition to NATO enlargement, every Russian President has expressed
sustained objections to expanding the Alliance. Former Soviet President, Mikhail
Gorbachev, made the point (conrmed in an interview with the author) that he had
a gentlemens agreement with ofcials of the rst George H.W. Bush Administration that removal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and German unication
would not be followed by NATO expansion.2 As early as 1994, Russias President
Boris Yeltsin warned of a Cold Peace falling over Europe, stating that plans for
expanding NATO would create new divisions and sow seeds of distrust.3
The Kosovo air war was the second critical factor that deated the initial high
expectations for building Russias cooperation with NATO. While Russian peacekeepers had been successfully deployed to serve alongside NATO forces in former
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Yugoslavia, Moscows traditional interests in the Balkan region and historic ties to
Orthodox Serbs created differing views on sources of conict in the region and
positions regarding appropriate responses to the implosion of former Yugoslavia.
Russians tended to conclude that NATO enlargement and the NATO Kosovo air
war demonstrated that Western countries would take advantage of Russias transitional domestic turmoil and weakness. Following the Kosovo war, Russian ofcial
foreign and security documents reected reassessment of the potential for cooperation with Western nations. Russias rst Foreign Policy Concept of 1993 was decidedly pro-Western, stating that Russia and the West possess common understanding
of the main values of world civilization and common interests (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation 1993), while Russias National Security Concept
issued in 2000 noted that NATOs transition to the practice of using military force
outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could
destabilize the entire global strategic situation.4
NATO and Russia had initially established the Permanent Joint Council (PJC)
to manage consultations and security collaboration, but the PJC was dissolved during the period of greatest strain over the Kosovo conict. In the aftermath of the
Kosovo war in February 2000, during the visit of NATOs Secretary General Lord
George Robertson to Moscow, a joint statement was issued with Russias President
Vladimir Putin agreeing to re-establish NATORussia dialogue on a wide range of
security issues (NATO 2000, 20). In May 2002, the NATORussia Council (NRC)
was established, providing for Russian participation in consultative decision-making
from the outset with the then 19 NATO member countries, rather than after a decision had been reached as in the prior PJC arrangement. Thus, while Russia would
not have a veto over NATO actions, Moscow could be assured a place at the table
and active role in the decision-making process from the point of initial deliberation
for any Alliance action.
Until the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, NATO and Russia resumed
cooperation in addressing several critical security issues and to develop an extensive range of practical security collaboration in the areas of military-to-military
exchanges, counterterrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, maritime security, airspace
initiatives, cyber security, crisis management, civil emergency planning and more.
However, although most in Moscow considered the mechanisms for consultation in
the NRC to constitute a signicant improvement over the prior PJC arrangement,
still NATO and Russia had by no means reached the full potential for security collaboration. Russians continued to complain that they would never accept junior
partner status in NATO and to resist NATO enlargement.
George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin established a positive personal rapport at
the outset. One might remember George W. Bush making the famous comment during his rst meeting with the Russian leader in Slovenia in 2001 indicating he had
looked into Vladimir Putins soul and found him to be straightforward and that he
could be trusted. However, differences over continued NATO enlargement, recognition of Kosovos independence, the Iraq War and missile defence culminated in
Russias intervention in Georgia and concern about new Cold War at the conclusion of the Bush presidency.
Vladimir Putins posture toward NATO became increasingly combative in the
latter stage of his rst presidency. At the Munich conference in 2007, Putin charged
that it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the
modernization of the Alliance itself or ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary,
155
it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust (Putin
2007). After failing to comply with the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty requiring Russia to withdraw forces from Moldova and Georgia,
Putin announced in July 2007 that Moscow would no longer participate in the CFE
Treaty which had been regulating the deployment of troops and weapons systems
in Europe since 1990. The NATORussia relationship was further strained by the
possibility of fast-track or eventual NATO membership for neighbouring nations on
Russias borders, Georgia and Ukraine. Russia had also opposed recognition of
Kosovos independence, and would later claim that independence on the part
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia held greater historical legitimacy than in the case of
Kosovo. In 2008, Putins successor, Dmitry Medvedev, would advance a new
European Security Treaty proposal suggesting Russias complete dissatisfaction
with the current European security architecture (Ofce of the President of the
Russian Federation 2008).
Russias incursion into Georgia in August 2008 shocked Western ofcials and
prompted a fundamental reassessment of Moscows intentions toward neighbouring
nations and the wider international community. In response to the Russo-Georgian
War of August 2008, the NRC was temporarily suspended. NATO condemned the
decision of the Russian Federation to extend recognition to South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. In the immediate aftermath of the Georgian military intervention, circumstances between Russia and the West had led several specialists of the American,
European and Russian academic communities to argue that it was obvious that a
new Cold War had developed or would inevitably dene the US/EuropeanRussian
relationship.
By January 2009, when Barack Obama assumed the Presidency, the state of
USRussian relations was more strained than at any period during Russias postSoviet experience. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2009, US Vice
President Joseph Biden pronounced early on that the new Administration sought to
press the reset button with Moscow, suggesting there are many areas where the
United States can and should be working together with Russia.5 One of the major
objectives in the Declaration of Alliance Security issued at NATOs 60th Anniversary in 2009 aimed to build a strong and cooperative relationship with the Russian
Federation (NATO 2009a).
In May 2009, NATO Allied Ministers formally resumed the NRC. They
agreed to use the NRC as a forum for dialogue with Russia on all issues, to
include areas where they agree to disagree with a view toward resolving problems and building practical cooperation. NATO and Russia would not agree on
the issue of recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Allies assured that the
option of Georgian membership in NATO remained open, but also signalled that
the timetable for Georgian accession into NATO would not be immediate or
fast-track.
Shortly after assuming responsibility as NATOs Secretary General in September
2009, Anders Fogh Rasmussen delivered his rst speech in Russia at Moscow State
Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) entitled NATO and Russia, partners
for the future (NATO 2009b). Rasmussen stressed that he had been committed
from the rst day in his position as NATO Secretary General and Chair of the
NRC to work toward transforming the NATORussia relationship into a true
strategic partnership (NATO 2009b). Secretary General Rasmussen advanced a
three-point strategy for improving NATORussia relations concentrating on
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enhancing practical security cooperation, building condence and trust, and

undertaking joint review of common twenty-rst-century security challenges.
In June 2010, following bilateral meetings held in Washington, President
Barrack Obama suggested that he and Russias President Dmitry Medvedev had
succeeded in resetting the USRussian relationship.6 Obama noted that the two
leaders discussed issues of disagreement to include Moscows conict with
Georgia, and at the same time pledged to broaden cooperation in other critical
areas. Signicantly, in a period of only a few months, the United States and Russia
succeeded in concluding a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreeing to
mutual reductions and inspections. In addition, Russia had agreed to provide NATO
critical transit support in Afghanistan which would later include access through the
Ulyanovsk base on Russian soil.
Russias then President Dmitry Medvedev expressed commitment to work
together with NATO members toward creating a modernized partnership. While
consultations in the NRC had been suspended in the aftermath of the Georgian
War, the exchanges were resumed with both parties emphasizing that the NRC must
remain operative even in times of serious tension to ensure continued exchange of
information and problem-solving. In November 2012, NATO and Russia completed
the Joint Review of Twenty First Century Common Security Challenges that further
dened the extensive range of shared security challenges faced by NATO and
Russia, and identied priorities for deepening cooperation in counterterrorism and
other areas.
Representing agreement on the part of all 28 members, the NATO Strategic
Concept issued in 2010 explicitly afrmed that the allies want to see a true
strategic partnership between NATO and Russia (NATO 2010). The document
conrmed further that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined , and
that NATO poses no threat to Russia, and a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual condence, transparency, and predictability can best serve
our security (NATO 2010).
Although the re-set appeared to reverse the downward spiral in US/NATO
Russia relationship, differences again emerged. Despite initial expectations that successfully concluding an agreement on European missile defence could serve as a
game changer shifting the USRussia relationship to a genuine strategic partnership, the United States/NATO nations and Russia remained deadlocked in failing
to reach an agreement. Russias President Dmitry Medvedev had initially proposed
a sector approach whereby Russia would be responsible for intercepting missiles
over Russias territory bound for NATO nations. The Obama administration rejected
the proposal outright noting that NATO could never rely on non-NATO countries
to include Russia for protecting the security of Alliance members. The United
States and NATO would insist on retaining responsibility for managing the interception of missiles that might be targeted at the territories of NATO members.
Moscow insisted that they would reject any proposal disrupting the current deterrence regime or that NATOs interceptors might be targeted today or in the future
at Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles limiting the capacity to respond to a
rst strike. After failing to make progress in overcoming differences on missile
defence, the Moscow leadership threatened to respond with measures, including
placing Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad to counter the deployment of NATO
ballistic missile defence assets.
157
Russias parliamentary and presidential elections in 20112012 were also a

source of tension. Many in Western nations and among Russias intellectuals were
dismayed at a political process that appeared to fall far short of standards for
European-style democratic practice. Suppression of protest movements and storming the homes and conscating money and equipment of opposition leaders undermined the legitimacy of Russias political process. The lack of a strong organized
opposition virtually ensured Putins return to the presidency with the potential that
he would serve for two more six-year terms. Signicant differences between the
United States, NATO and Russia were evident in the response to the Arab Spring
and the conicts, especially in reacting to the implosion in Libya and Syria.
Moscow tended to favour stability and the status quo in the region, while the
United States and NATO have been more inclined to commit force in support of
regime change. There were concerns among Moscows leadership that mass movements fuelled by social media as in North Africa and the Middle East might prompt
similar upheavals to Russias south or even within the territory of the Russian
Federation. Other points of friction in the USRussia relationship including the
imposition of the Magnitsky Act and Edward Snowden issue also tended to impede
the initial progress of the re-set.
Immediately prior to Moscows intervention in Ukraine, there was a perception
that the Obama administration was turning attention away from Russia. Any
momentum to move past an initial re-set appeared to stall. NATOs enlargement,
out-of-area missions and the perceptions of US dominance of the NATO agenda
had continued to present a sustained source of difculty for Moscow over the
decades since the end of the Cold War.
Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin might have anticipated that the United
States and Russia would emerge from the Cold War as two leading or hegemonic
powers in world politics that could cooperate in addressing major international
security challenges. Instead of two leading powers working in the interest of world
security, Russia found its status and inuence considerably diminished. NATOs
intervention in former Yugoslavia left the perception in Moscow that their views or
objections would not be taken seriously among the United States and its Western
allies. As a historic European power and major superpower during the decades of
the Cold War, this state of reduced status and inuence was unacceptable for the
Moscow foreign policy community. Gorbachev and Yeltsin came to be perceived
among many in Russia as having compromised Russias interests with the West.
Historian of the Russian Academy of Sciences Henry A. Tromenko perhaps best
captured the sentiment in an interview with the author in Moscow in 1995, stating:
How many compromises has our nation made in foreign and security policy since
Gorbachev introduced reforms? And how many compromises has your country
made in response? Not one. And now NATO will expand 7
The desire to restore Russias great power status or to avoid being relegated to
a position of weakness as in the 1990s has been a major priority for Russias foreign policy community during the PutinMedevdev tandem leadership. Presidential
statements and ofcial foreign policy documents have called to reassert a strong
and self-condent Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
2007; Ofce of the President of the Russian Federation 2014). The Russian
national identity is largely based on a perpetual great power image and a special
destiny in the world unique to Russias culture and experience (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2008b, 2013). There have been consistent
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suggestions that the current global power balance featuring US dominance will
not advance Russias interests, and Moscow has sought to formalize strategic
partnerships with China and other nations to balance US power and to promote
transition of the international community to a multipolar world order featuring several poles of inuence (Valdai Club 2014). The Moscow leadership emphasizes
that critical decisions in the international sphere must be made on a collective
basis, rather than by unipolar decision-making authority (Valdai Club 2013,
2014).
Putin appears to be determined to assert Russias inuence in playing a critical
role in regional conicts as was evident in Moscows proposed diplomatic settlement temporarily preventing the imposition of US military action against of the
regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria in 2013. Syria hosts the only Russian military
base outside the CIS at the port of Tartus, and military sales between the countries
have been signicant. Russia and China have held to a position of non-interference
in Syrian internal affairs, while the United States and other NATO nations have
periodically called for the use of force prompted by the objective of ending the
human rights abuses of Bashar al-Assads regime.
Vladimir Putin and many in the Moscow foreign policy community and society
have had difculty coming to terms with the loss of empire resulting from the dismantling of the Soviet Union. As Igor A. Zevelev has observed, the United
Kingdom possessed a distant empire, but the Soviet Union was an empire where
no borders divided Russia from its neighbours (Zevelev 2008 cited in Cross 2009,
220). At the same time, Putins widely cited statement of 2005 that the collapse of
the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century
should not imply that his intention was to reconstitute the empire. While not seeking to reconquer Ukraine or other nations of the former Soviet Union, Moscow
does want to make sure that regimes are instituted and sustained in these societies
that will present no harm to Russias interests. Moscow tends to assume a posture
of entitlement in its so-called zone of privileged interests, and has not been able
to deal with Georgia or Ukraine (or other neighbours) as genuinely sovereign
nations deserving status of complete autonomy from Russian inuence and control.
Moscows Foreign Policy Concept issued in July 2008 established the pretext for
Russias intrusion in post-Soviet neighbouring nations by including a reference to
protecting Russians living outside its borders, a provision signalling a prelude for
intervention in Georgia and later Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation 2008a). In commenting on the Ukrainian conict, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov afrmed this commitment, noting that an attack on
Russian citizens is an attack on the Russian Federation, perhaps suggesting that
Moscows intervention following Ukraine, in the Baltics (particularly in Estonia or
Latvia with signicant Russian populations) or elsewhere, could not be ruled out.8
The concept of Novorossiya has been invoked by Vladimir Putin establishing a
basis for Moscow to carve out an alternative pillar to Western inuence in the
international community. In describing Russias interests in Ukraine, Putin made
the point in 2014 that: I would like to remind you that what was called
Novorossiya back in the tsarist days Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson,
Nikolayev and Odessa were not part of Ukraine back thenThe center of the
territory was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiya. Russia lost those
territories for various reasons, but the people remained (Taylor 2014). Putin and
his colleagues make clear that Russia must establish a democracy and foreign
159
policy orientation consistent with Russias traditions, culture and moral values.
Traditional Russian cultural values are often contrasted with the decadence of the
West in contemporary Russian society and media. Moscows national narrative has
been directed for several years toward presenting Western society as the other.
Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov have also suggested that Russias foreign policy
should be guided by religious values. The concept of the Russkiy Mir (Russian
World) refers to Russian citizens and the Russian diaspora based on the Russian
Orthodox faith, common historical memory and values. The relationship between
the Kremlin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Orthodox Church has become
much closer under Putins leadership. In his 2013 speech to the Valdai forum,
Vladimir Putin states: We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic community are
actually rejecting their roots, including Christian values that constitute the basis of
Western civilization. They are denying moral principles and all traditional identities
(Cathey 2013; Curanovic 2015; Valdai Club 2013). Russias policy in Ukraine
is thus depicted as not only important for securing national interests, but also
reecting the (Christian) moral obligation to assist those in need and in terms of a
civilizational clash between traditional Russian cultural and religious values and
nihilistic materialism and lack of commitment to moral heritage in the West
(Cathey 2013; Curanovic 2015; Valdai Club 2013).
Vladimir Putins popularity within Russia is largely explained as a result of the
perception that he is willing to stand rm in support of Russias interests in dealing
with the West. Russia has come to resemble a modern Czarist regime in Putins
second term. Putins deance of the West on Ukraine has only enhanced his support at home, and to appear to compromise Moscows interests on Ukraine could in
fact unleash an erosion of domestic support for Putins leadership.
Uncertainty regarding Russias future political development and lack of clarity
with respect to Russias desire for either integration with the Western security
community or rather strategic independence has been a major barrier to deepening
NATORussia security collaboration. Russias statements and actions were ambiguous in viewing NATO as both bloc threat and at the same time, potential partner. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation issued in 2010 included
among main external military dangers
the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law,
and to move the military infrastructure of NATO members closer to the borders of the
Russian Federation
and at the same time the document lists the development of relationswith
other intergovernmental organizations (the European Union and NATO) under
the heading main tasks to deter and prevent military conict. Clearly, Putins
return to the presidency in 2012 was accompanied by greater distancing from the
West, preference for strengthening Russias reliance on structures perceived as
alternatives to NATO, such as the CSTO collective security organization and
Eurasian Union, and building stronger ties with China and the BRIC nations.
Moscows current leadership calls for establishing strategic alternatives to Western
integration and practices for managing security. However, even in the aftermath of
the initial repercussions and mutual reprisals resulting from the conict in Ukraine,
the new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation issued in December 2014 still
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leaves open the possibility of a dialogue of equals with the West. Many analysts
made an issue of the description of NATO and NATO enlargement in the 2014
Military Doctrine as a danger or threat, but such references concerning NATO
appeared in the previous iteration. The new 2014 Military Doctrine does emphasize
the need for non-bloc models, and presents a more threatening description of the
global security environment than the prior version.
Despite the fact that the United States/NATO nations and Russia have different
strategic visions and objectives, Russias cooperation remains critical for European
and global security. Nations of the NATO Alliance share a vast array of common
security interests which are also of highest priority for the Russian Federation for
today and in the decades ahead, such as arms control, weapons of mass destruction,
proliferation, countering violent extremism and terrorism, preventing escalation of
regional conicts apart from the European continent and more. Russia can be a
potential spoiler, signicantly damaging NATO interests, and the risk of confrontation between NATO and Russia has reached the greatest level since the collapse of
the USSR as a result of the crisis in Ukraine. Russias vast territory and geographic
reach adjoining Europe, the Middle East and Asia makes the nation a major player
for regional and global security. Russia retains a nuclear arsenal rivaling that of the
United States, and combined gas/oil resources as a leading global net energy exporter. Russias status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council with veto
authority, and membership in other major international organizations provides the
capacity for exerting considerable inuence in shaping the world security agenda
and determining vital collective security responses. NATOs resources and capabilities are not innite, and thinking more about how to ensure the constructive
development of US/NATO relationships with both Russia and China and other
emerging powers as well as out-of-area international organizations that might share
responsibilities and costs in global security is only reasonable. NATO nations have
certainly recognized the importance of Russia to European and global security, and
thus managing this relationship has presented among the most serious challenges
for the Alliance.
The NATO leadership had hoped that establishing the unique NATORussia
partnership might provide a basis for constructive security collaboration, even with
Moscows objections to NATO enlargement and allied out-of-area missions.
NATOs intention has and remains to establish a reliable security partnership with
Russia. However, Moscow has never been able to overcome the perception of
NATO as a military bloc poised against Russia, and they do not view NATO as the
proper organization to ensure adequate representation of Russias interests in major
European, Eurasian and global security spheres. In March 2000, Vladimir Putin surprised the audience when asked about joining NATO, when he responded why not
?9 but only of the basis of equal of partnership 10 Putin has consistently
suggested the Russia would work with NATO, but only from a position of strength
or on an equal basis.
Battle for the future of Ukraine
Tensions between NATO and Russia have reached an unprecedented scale as a
result of the recent conict in Ukraine and Russias annexation of Crimea. The
struggle in Ukraine over developing closer ties with the European Union or the
Customs Union brought the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in
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February 2014, opening a power vacuum for the pro-Western Euromaidan movement to move to the forefront of Ukrainian politics. The involvement of external
powers, the United States, European nations and Russia taking sides in the conict
has led to an implosion of the nation dividing Ukraine in an EastWest civil war.
NATO reacted by suspending all practical civilian and military cooperation with
Russia, though political channels of communication have remained open. At the
Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO announced the creation of a Rapid
Reaction Force to reassure allies and as President Barack Obama said to serve as
a signal to Russia to avoid any future potential aggression similar to the ongoing
ghting in Ukraine 11 The allies demanded that Russia stop and withdraw its
forces from Ukraine and that Russia must use its inuence with the separatists to de-escalate the situation and to take concrete steps to allow for a political
and a diplomatic solution which respects Ukraines sovereignty, territorial integrity,
and internationally recognized borders (NATO 2014).
The United States and its NATO allies have repositioned equipment and forces
in the Baltics, East-Central Europe and the Black Sea region. Additional multinational exercises among NATO allies and plans for military training are underway
for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to enhance capacity to work alongside NATO
forces as well as to provide for their own defence. In June 2014, the US Congress
authorized President Obama to advance the European Reassurance Initiative, providing for additional US troop rotations and presence across Europe, but especially
on the territory of newer NATO allies.12 This initiative authorized funding for air,
land, and naval exercises involving US forces in collaboration with NATO allies
and partners in Europe and Eurasia. This funding initiative supports US European
Commands Operation Atlantic Resolve directed toward afrming US commitment
to collective security among NATO allies and partners in Europe in response to
Russias intervention in Ukraine.13
The Obama Administration together with members of the European Union have
imposed harsh sanctions on the Russian Federation in response to Russias behaviour in Ukraine, and the United States Congress has pressured the US President to
provide lethal military aid to the government in Kiev to assist in countering the
threat posed by separatist groups receiving support from Russia in Eastern Ukraine.
Particularly in the United States, Vladimir Putin has been widely demonized in the
public and media as a result of actions in Ukraine with former US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton comparing the Russian leader to Adolf Hitler. The movement
of United States forces in Europe is intended to bolster capacity in the event of
further attempted encroachments from Moscow among NATO nations.
At the same time, outrage among European nations over Moscows violation of
Ukrainian sovereignty notwithstanding, statements among NATO allies have
emphasized that they still continue to believe that a partnership between NATO
and Russia based on respect for international law would be of strategic value
(NATO 2014). NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg afrmed again in early
2015 that We continue to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship with
Russia, including reciprocal condence building and transparency measures He
continued:
We have for many years worked together with Russia in ghting terrorism. And terrorism is a threat and a problem for many countries, including Russia. And thats the
reason why we still strive for a more cooperative and constructive relationship with
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Russia. Because we think it is important that Russia-which is our biggest neighbor in

Europe-and NATO are able to work together on important issues, like for instance,
ghting terror (NATO 2015a)
NATO Ambassador Vershbow also afrmed:
We do not seek confrontation with Russia. And neither are we looking for regime
change. What we do want is for Moscow to change its behavior; to abide by the very
good rules that Russia itself once subscribed to; & to return to the spirit of
cooperation (NATO 2015a)
Much of the academic and policy analysis on the Ukraine crisis tends to focus on
offering assessments of the importance of Ukraine for Russia and the West.
Moscow ofcials frequently refer to the existential importance of Ukraine for
Russia, and in contrast, some suggest that Ukraine is insignicant for the United
States. Neither of these descriptions is quite accurate. Ukraine is clearly of fundamental strategic and economic importance for Russia, and of considerable
geostrategic and economic interest certainly for Europe and to a lesser extent
(though surely not insignicant) for the United States.
Ukraine, the second largest nation in Europe, has rich agricultural land and
signicant hydro-carbons and mineral resources. The nation holds Europes third
largest shale gas elds, and Ukraine has been a main transit route for Russian
natural gas provided to Europe. The location of Ukraine at the Black Sea also
signicantly enhances the geostrategic signicance of the nation.
For Russia, Ukraine holds a much higher importance than either Kosovo or
Georgia. Given the cultural-religious heritage of Kievan Rus, Ukraine has been
viewed historically as a part of Russia. Russias former Permanent Representative
to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, explained Moscows objection to Ukraines membership
in NATO stating that Ukraine was in fact the Mother of Russia, and that separation from Ukraine could never be accepted.14 Reecting on the return of Crimea to
Russia, Vladimir Putin afrmed: We have always believed in Russia that Russian
and Ukrainian are one people.15
If one should doubt the historic signicance ascribed to Crimea and Sevastopol
for Russia, the observations offered in 1855 during the period of the Crimean War
of the then young ofcer Leo Tolstoy at the outset of this article afrms that the
area would always remain a priority for Russia. In a speech marking the oneyear
anniversary of the signing of the treaty with Crimea, Putin praised the patriotism
and support the Russian people had shown for Crimean Sevastopol return to his
native shores, and stated that We are talking about the historical origins of the
sources of our spirituality and statehood and the importance to link generations and times, as did much of our historic ancestors for our country 16 The
Sevastopol port and Crimea have been depicted in Russian literature and culture as
representing a central theater in the Crimean War and the Second World War for
the display of Russian military glory and valour. Crimea had been part of Russia
from the time of the establishment of the naval base under Catherine the Great in
1783 until Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Kramer
2014). Sevastopol provides Russia ice-free port access year round, and the means
to project maritime and other military and commercial assets into the Balkans,
Mediterranean and the Middle East. The lease accord Russia signed on the Black
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Sea port with Ukraine in 1997 was set to expire in 2017, but Ukraines former
President Viktor Yanukovich had offered an extension of the lease to 2042. There
have been periodic disputes between Ukraine and Russia over the past several years
regarding terms of implementation of the prior agreement. With the ouster of
Yanukovich, Moscows determination to draw a line with respect to Ukraine must
be largely motivated by the desire to maintain control of the Black Sea port and
eet.
Since Ukraines independence in 1992, a number of factors have continued to
place strain on the RussiaUkraine relationship. The historical memories and
national identity within Ukraine remain torn between the West and East along
ethnic Ukrainian and Russian allegiances and Catholic and Orthodox afliations.
In the past, the Western and Central territories of Ukraine had been tied to the
Hapsburg Monarchy, Poland, and Lithuania, while the North Black Sea and Eastern regions were more closely aligned with Russia. Today, disputes still exist
over the place of Kievan Rus with respect to the historical development of the
Ukrainian nation and Russia. The legacy of the Soviet empire still inuences the
bilateral relationship between contemporary Russia and Ukraine, and Ukraines
energy dependence on Russia has continued to leave Kiev vulnerable to
Moscows leverage. The protection of the rights of ethnic Russians (17% of
Ukraines population) residing in Ukraine and the majority Russian population in
Crimea has been a major issue between Kiev and Moscow. Alleged Western
involvement in Ukraine and Georgia during the coloured revolutions, and
Moscows apprehensions about these neighbouring countries moving closer to
NATO and the European Union have been central sources of tension. Ukraines
former pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovichs initial rejection of the EU
accession agreement in favour of supporting Moscows Customs Union triggered
the current conict in February 2014.
Ukraine faces tremendous challenges ahead as the nation suffers endemic
problems lacking viable and legitimate institutions and capacity for effective governance. Excessive state control, corruption and pervasive cronyism have continued
to inuence the political and economic systems in Ukraine since independence.
Even prior to the devastation resulting from the current implosion of the country,
Ukraine suffered budget decits, hyperination, and comparably low GNP ($3960
in 2013), with a standard of living below that of several neighbouring nations in
Europe and Eurasia possessing far fewer resources than Ukraine. The nation faces
serious challenges in meeting the scal demands necessary for economic recovery.
Long-term investment (in terms of decades) in political, security and economic
capacity building will be necessary to develop the institutional structures and traditions necessary for Ukraines growth. The challenges of recovery and future growth
will only be magnied by the losses incurred as result of conict on Ukraines soil,
and the difculties compounded in the country because of competing views among
major external powers regarding the future of the nation. Perhaps most important,
the Ukrainian people must determine whether differences among various groups
can be reconciled and minority relationships can be protected in some type of federal structure once again uniting the Eastern and Western areas of the country.
Whether those who identify with the Ukrainian language and historical narrative
and allegiance toward Europe can coexist alongside those who prefer to more closely align with a Russian-led cultural and geostrategic world in the aftermath of
such a violent struggle remains to be seen. Absent reconciliation within the country
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and well-orchestrated sustained provisions of support from the outside, Ukraine

could remain locked in a prolonged frozen conict leaving the beleaguered nation
in a state of uncertainty with little hope for progress.
Black Sea case: risks and challenges

Maintaining access to the port city of Sevastopol and security of the Black Sea
Fleet constitute the primary strategic source of the current conict between
Ukraine and Russia. As a result of Russias annexation of Crimea and the war in
Ukraine, the Black Sea region has again become a theatre of heightening tension
and risk between NATO and Russia. The Black Sea has always served as a critical centre for the mix of commerce and cultures of Europe, the Middle East, and
Asia, and has been prone to regional conict involving leading external powers.
Historically, the region was controlled by ancient Greece and Rome, the
Byzantine and Ottoman empires, Czarist Russia, and by the Soviet Union. Russia
clashed with European powers and Ottoman Turks over securing control in the
Black Sea region during the Crimean War 18531856. The current mix of the six
Black Sea littoral nations, including NATO members Bulgaria, Romania and
Turkey together with Russia and conict-ridden Ukraine and Georgia creates an
environment potentially ripe for becoming a serious regional ashpoint.
Russias annexation of Crimea, seizure of the Ukrainian eet and plans for further upgrading and expanding military presence in the region has altered the prior
balance of power in the Black Sea area.17 Russia intends to construct a new naval
base at Novorossiysk by 2016, and to deploy additional warships and submarines
to the area.18 In December 2014, Russias Ministry of Defense announced that 80
new warships would be added to the Black Sea Fleet by 2020.19 Even prior to the
Crimean War, Moscow had been implementing upgrades of the Black Sea Fleet.20
Moscow signed an agreement with Abkhazia in 2014 to enhance military ties and
further strengthen control over the Eastern Black Sea.21 The Russian Ministry of
Defence has announced plans to modernize the Crimea Belbek airbase including
housing modern SU-27 aircraft, SU-30 ghter bombers, MIG-29 ghters, and
TU-22 long-range bombers.22 Russia is deploying additional ground units to the
area with the most sophisticated equipment and weaponry.23 Reports suggest that
Moscow intends to divert the prior funding allocation for leasing the area from
Ukraine to upgrade and expand its military forces positioned in the region. Analysts
have observed that the combined navies of Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia are no
match for Russias naval presence in the region. With the second most powerful
military force among NATO nations, Turkeys naval presence is more substantial,
but not sufcient alone to challenge Russias regional naval capacity.
The Black Sea is also critical for NATO and Euro-Atlantic security. The
region includes not only NATO member nations and partners, but also other
countries that aspire to NATO membership. Strides have been made over the past
few decades to enhance regional security cooperation, democratic transition and
security sector reform. NATO nations require unfettered access to the Black Sea
region for ensuring security in the Balkans and Middle East. The region is
critical for NATOs communication and access in Afghanistan for managing the
post-war transition. Securing regional energy infrastructure through the Black Sea
region is vital for meeting Europes energy needs (Baran and Smith 2007;
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Triantaphyllou 2007). Prior regional cooperation in combatting piracy, search and

rescue, and counterterrorism initiatives among NATO nations, to include Russia,
and the Black Sea regional neighbours have also been signicant.
In November 2014, NATOs Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, US
General Philip Breedlove, warned that Russias military assets being installed in
Crimea could bring an effect on almost the entire Black Sea region 24
NATO nations have stepped up activity in the Black Sea in response to Russias
actions in Ukraine and the region. Although there are provisions established by
the Montreaux Convention of 1936 restricting the passage of warships of outside
countries to 21 days in the Black Sea area, the United States and NATO partners have managed to extend rotations of vessels through the region by basing
in NATO regional nations and combining assets.25 Operation Atlantic Resolve
launched by NATO in 2014 to reassure allies of maintaining security in light of
Russian intervention in Ukraine included among several tasks the deployment of
Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Truxton to the Black Sea in March 2014,
involving participation in exercises with the Romanian and Bulgarian naval
forces (Pellerin 2015; US Department of Defense 2014). The USS Vella Gulf,
USS Taylor, and USS Donald Cook have also conducted operations in the Black
Sea since the Crimean annexation.26 By summer 2014, both NATO nations and
Russia were holding exercises in the Black Sea region.27 Exercise Sea Breeze
14 brought together US forces with NATO allies and partner nations aimed to
enhance interoperability and cooperation in the Black Sea region.28 The exercises involved ships from the United States, United Kingdom, Greece, Italy,
Romania and Turkey, along with naval patrol planes, from the United States
and Turkey. In turn, Russia also conducted exercises during the same period
involving 20 ships and 20 aircraft including SU-24 ghters with a scenario
directed toward the destruction of enemy ships in the sea and organization of
air defense of naval groups and coastal infrastructure.29
Russian ofcials have complained that there have been NATO violations of
the 21-day limit stipulated in the Montreaux Convention (Demirtas 2014).
Russias Military Doctrine of December 2014 cites ballistic missile defence assets
in Romania and the rotation of NATO naval ships in the Black Sea as external
risks.30 In turn, NATO ofcials have expressed concerns about Russias deployment of anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems from the Crimean peninsula. Moscow
claims that they are forced to develop counter-measures in response to increased
NATO presence in Black Sea.31 NATO plans to continue to stage persistent joint
exercises and rotations in the Black Sea to respond to Moscows efforts to
increase its regional strategic presence. In early March 2015, Vladimir Putin
suggested that Moscow could deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea if deemed
necessary.32
During the period of the recent conict over Crimea and Ukraine, there have
been some reported encounters between NATO military warships and Russian
aircraft. In April 2014, a Russian Sukhoi SU-24 made 12 passes at Navy
destroyer USS Donald Cook in the Black Sea (Shinkman 2014; Ybarra 2014). It
was reported that the Russian SU-24 came within 1000 yards of the American
ship, at an altitude of 500 feet above sea level (Shinkman 2014; Ybarra 2014).
Problems with the Aegis system detecting the aircraft in this instance generated
concerns about Russian capacity to disrupt or interfere with these systems
(Shinkman 2014; Ybarra 2014). Black Sea buzzes were reported again in
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September 2014 when the Canadian frigate Toronto was overown by two
Russian Sukhoi SU-24s and an Antonov AN-26 transport plane.33 In both
instances, Russians acknowledged the presence of aircraft in the area, but denied
the low-altitude yovers. The Russian yovers were described by US and
Canadian military ofcers as unnecessarily provocative, unprofessional and
entailing risks for escalating tensions. Military accounts suggest that these
instances have occurred more frequently than reported in the press. Although
these incidents appear to have been nothing more than the desire to demonstrate
presence, the possibility for accidents or mishaps particularly in areas of regional
dispute or hostilities where additional forces are being deployed could provoke
serious responses with the potential of escalation.
Turkey holds the greatest capacity among littoral Black Sea nations for challenging Russias growing military presence in the region. Russia and Turkey have a
history of rivalry in the Black Sea region. Turkey joined other NATO member
nations in expressing opposition to Crimeas secession, and Ankara has ties and
concerns regarding the treatment of the minority community of Crimean Tatars. At
the same time, Russia and Turkey might share a certain afnity as a result of being
marginalized from the European community in certain respects. For example, writing in the Turkish source Analist Magazine, Russias former Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov recently offered the observation that:
The prospect of full Turkish membership to EU remains elusive no wonder that in
both our countries many intellectuals, politicians and opinion makers are now thinking
about alternative futures for Russia and Turkey the two nations with their rich
histories, great cultures, economic potentials and geopolitical ambitions can hardly
accept the position of being nothing more but a part of the European periphery
(Ivanov 2015).34
Ankara currently depends on Russia for 60% of its energy supplies and approximately 40 billion in annual trade. In December 2014, Russia and Turkey signed an
agreement to construct a pipeline across the Black Sea to replace Russias previous
South Stream agreement with Bulgaria. Under the terms of this agreement, Turkey
will receive a 6% discount on Russias natural gas, though the project will still be
difcult to complete and entail substantial costs. During the discussions over signing the agreement, Russias President Vladimir Putin referred to Turkey as a strategic partner (De Waal 2014; Ofce of the President of the Russian Federation
2015). Prior, regional Turkish security initiatives among the six Black Sea littoral
nations aimed toward condence building and enhancing security including Black
Sea Naval Force (BLACKSEAFOR) established in 2001, and Operation Black Sea
Harmony 2004 might be jeopardized as a result of Russias actions in Ukraine. The
United States had also supported these efforts as a means for building greater transparency, predictability and security in the region. Maintaining the work of regional
cooperative forums in security and commerce during this difcult period in which
Moscow participates such as the projects of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
(BSEC) zone will be important.35 Given Turkeys inuence in the Black Sea region,
membership in NATO and interests with respect to the Russian Federation, the
country might be positioned to exert signicant inuence toward containing or
potentially mitigating the tendency toward escalating tensions in the Black Sea
region.
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Stakes and risks for NATORussia, suggestions for strategy (cautious longterm management and selective engagement versus isolation or confrontation)
In reecting on developments between the United States, NATO and Russia since
Russias independence, one can identify critical mistakes with potentially tremendous signicance for international security. First, perhaps most signicant, the
tendency remained to insist that a choice must be made for new democracies in
Europe and Eurasia to either seek deeper integration in the Euro-Atlantic security
community or to rely on Russia and the emerging structures of the Eurasian Union
to the East. The fact is that there should never have been a need for newly independent nations of Europe and Eurasia to make a choice between East and West.
There is no reason that these middle-size (Ukraine) and smaller nations (Georgia),
and others should not pursue closer security and economic integration both with
the Euro-Atlantic community (NATO, EU and others) and with Russia. These
nations require stability and peace in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security environments as an essential prerequisite for meeting the vast demands and challenges
required to support continued productive development in the decades ahead. The
fact that these countries have been positioned to declare allegiance to one side or
the other has been detrimental to their societies, and for the entire contemporary
Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. It would be important to make
every possible effort to promote an environment in which these countries can pursue productive engagements toward both the West and Russia without suffering
adverse consequences to their respective interests. Given the current state of division, it will be no easy task to shift the zero-sum narrative enforcing the belief that
a gain for one side excludes the other, but we must recognize that this lingering
EastWest mindset has been counterproductive in every respect.
Second, expectations regarding United States, NATO and Russia partnership
have been unrealistically high. In areas where the focus was directed toward building practical forms of security cooperation, there were successes and overall
progress. However, in holding single issues in which obvious differences exist in
terms of priorities and interests such as missile defence up as a game changer or
hinging the entire relationship with Russia on a single issue, disappointments inevitably developed when there was a failure to meet expectations. Both the West and
Russia should have been more cautious in placing too much emphasis on any one
issue as a test for the relationship. The United StatesNATO and Russia relationship should be managed in the context of a broad-ranging security agenda so that
no single conict or difference can derail the bilateral and multilateral agenda,
where so many critical security interests are at stake for all parties.
The United States and NATO nations and Russia have not been able to reach
agreement on forming a post-Cold War European security community that would
satisfy Moscows expectations for status and inuence consistent with Russias
traditional role in Europe. Dmitry Medvedevs European Security Treaty proposal
advanced in 2008 was an attempt to open dialogue on options, but never accomplished more than some preliminary review in Western nations. Given Russias signicance in European security, it was important for Western nations to strive
toward meeting Moscows desire for securing an appropriate role in the European
security institutions and community. Rather, as indicated, Moscow came to believe
that they would be in a position of continually sacricing Russias interests with
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the West, and that existing security structures in Europe were not suited to
advancing Russias fundamental interests.
The United States narrative of Cold War triumphalism, often neglecting to offer
any credit at all to Mikhail Gorbachev and the Russian side in contributing to the
end of the Cold War, only fuelled the view that Russia lost with the collapse of the
Soviet Union. At the same time, if Medvedevs proposal for a new European security architecture was initially intended to suggest that NATO should be replaced or
dismantled, this was certainly an unreasonable expectation. Nevertheless, both
NATO nations and Russia might have been well served by devoting greater focus
and creativity to exploring all possible means for adjusting current structures and
practices to more suitably incorporate post-Soviet Russia in a way that would be
commensurate with Russias place and capacity in the European security
community.
A common European security community to include Russia only makes sense
as a means of enhancing the security and quality of life for all of Europe and
beyond. The problem was anticipating dramatic results to materialize immediately
without recognizing the long-term commitment to developing institutional ties and
reliable networks with Russia that would be required. Perhaps bolder innovative
measures were needed earlier on to demonstrate serious intention and resolve on
the part of the United States, Europe and NATO allies to include Russia in the
European security community. A large-scale commitment such as the Marshall Plan
was probably not possible or even necessary for Russia following the collapse of
the USSR, but there are countless other ways that United States and European
allies might have signalled greater willingness to support Russia as an equal
player with respect to the European and wider international security institutions and
issues.
At this point, it is difcult to be optimistic regarding the future of the US/NATO
Russia relationship. While Democrats and Republicans in the United States agree on
almost nothing, both sides can nd common ground when it comes to expressing outrage, dissatisfaction and complete lack of trust regarding Russia and Russias current
leadership. President Barrack Obamas re-set policy is now widely deemed a failure,
and in the worst case, depicted as a strategy of appeasement.
In Russia, Putin has the support of his population to stay the current course
with respect to Ukraine. Again, Putins domestic approval rating exceeding 80% is
at least in part explained by the perception in the Russian public that they have a
leader who will stand rm in Russias interests, especially with respect to the
United States. It would be a mistake to underestimate the resolve of the Russian
public in tolerating the pain of United States and EU-imposed sanctions. As a society, they have endured much in the past, and the Russian public is more likely to
accept such material hardships, rather than yield to pressures that seem unjustied
or even discriminatory.
The Ukrainian conict also makes quite obvious the serious differences of viewpoints that divide Europe and Russia. Europes condemnation of Russias annexation of Crimea as a breach of international law and a threat to the security of the
international order contrasts sharply with Moscows description of Crimeas referendum as a reection of the will of the people claiming that Kosovos independence
constituted more of a violation of international law. Russian ofcials and media
tend to emphasize the role of the Fascist fringe in the anti-Yanukovich opposition,
and neglect to acknowledge the core focus of the Euromaidan movement prompted
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to support the ouster of the corrupt Viktor Yanukovich because he stood as an

impediment to Ukraines deeper productive integration with the Euro-Atlantic
community.
Throughout the past two decades since Russias independence, there were
efforts toward opening credible lines of communication, but there was a lack of
sufcient appreciation of the critical need for promoting wider Western engagement
with Russias foreign policy community and society. Prior conferences held
between NATO and partner universities in Russia provided excellent means for
reaching the Russian foreign policy community and next generation to better
explain US and NATO intentions and policies. While few minds might have been
changed as a result of these discussions, still such open forums for exchanging
views can contribute to overcoming misunderstanding and distortions. As a result
largely of media efforts, many in the Russian public today believe that the United
States seeks to undermine or even destroy Russia. NATO members and Moscow
might have considered the bold measure of instituting a NATORussia Defence
College following Russias independence to provide channels to facilitate routine
discussion and collaboration between NATO and Russian military institutions. The
limited exchanges that were permitted in professional military education between
NATO nations and Russia at least helped to open some lines of communication.
Without sufcient dialogue, it was very easy for misconceptions about Western
intentions to prevail throughout Russias defense community.
Given the prior tensions between Russia and NATO and the West over Kosovo,
Georgia, and NATO enlargement, in many ways, the conict over Ukraine was predictable. However, few anticipated that the United States/NATO relationship with
Russia would deteriorate so dramatically. Both Russia and the West are preparing
for a long period of strained relationship, and there is not likely to be much
opportunity for reversing this chill for many years to come if ever. In retrospect, it
may be that the period since the early 1990s represented only a brief juncture when
a NATORussia partnership might have been possible, but that any opportunity for
re-dening the post-Soviet relationship with Russia on a more positive reciprocal
basis has been lost at least for the foreseeable future, if not indenitely.
It is imperative to exercise caution in the current circumstances. Every effort
should be made to avoid the acceleration of the drift toward further confrontation.
The potential costs and risks ahead are quite signicant for all sides. Management
of the crisis in Ukraine will have signicant and lasting implications in shaping the
geopolitical and security environment in Europe and beyond for years to come.
All sides should recognize that there is no future ahead for Ukraine without
Moscows cooperation. There have been thousands of civilian and military casualties since the outbreak of war in Ukraine.36 Every possible measure should be
pursued to limit further loss of life and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences
of the conict. Supplying additional lethal arms to Ukraine will only worsen the
situation, and potentially lead to a widening escalation of conict. The recent conclusion of the Minsk II ceasere agreement brokered among German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, French President Francois Hollande, and Russian and Ukrainian
Presidents Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroschenko provides some foundation for
securing peace, but all rests with the implementation of the terms of the agreement
in Ukraine, especially in the besieged regions of the Eastern areas of the country.
The Russian leadership and media have touted the agreement as a successful initiative on the part of the Russian leader with his German, French and Ukrainian
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counterparts in the absence of United States presence. In this respect, Putin has
now established signicant stakes in successful implementation of the agreement,
but it remains to be seen whether he can exercise sufcient inuence on the leadership of the Peoples Republic of Donetsk and pro-Russian separatist forces in
Eastern Ukraine toward achieving a cessation of the conict.
NATO, and especially the United States foreign policy community, must
dene major interests with respect to Russia and long-term desired end-states for
both Russia and Ukraine. Especially among the US foreign policy community,
there has been an absence of focus on dening core American interests with
respect to Russia, and how specic policy measures are likely to advance efforts
in achieving those objectives. The calls of vocal US Senators for war with
Russia or the demonization of Vladimir Putin overwhelmingly dominate the
media and even much of the discussion among experts. In fact, the re-set was
not a complete failure, but re-set could never represent more than a temporary
transition, and there was no clear strategy advanced to follow the initial period.
A long term well-crafted pragmatic strategy that NATO and European partners
can support toward a desirable end-state with the Russian Federation is sorely
needed.
One might revisit the wisdom of the decision to enlarge NATO, and there were
certainly costs in terms of the NATORussia relationship. However, there is no
doubt that NATO and the potential of the NATORussia relationship will remain a
critical factor in regional and wider global security in the decades ahead. NATO
has managed to successfully transition from an exclusively collective defence
institution to a collective security organization suited to respond to critical emerging
transnational security challenges. The recent enlargement of the Alliance and new
partnership relationships have only strengthened the diversity of the organization
and thereby capacity for engaging nations of Europe, Eurasia and beyond.
Largely due to images from the past, Moscow cant appreciate the practical contributions that NATO has made to support the implementation of complex and difcult reforms in the aspiring new member nations over the past several years. NATO
and the EU provided the associations and assistance to emerging democracies of
the Baltics, Central and South Eastern Europe, and Eurasia that no other agents
were in a position to offer. When the newly independent countries of the former
Warsaw Pact faced the difcult tasks of building democratic societies and defence
transformation, they turned by choice (not force) to the institutions and communities of the Euro-Atlantic community for consultation and resources in introducing
dramatic security sector and democratic reforms.
There will continue to be nancial challenges for the United States and all
NATO members, but this also creates incentive for greater and even more efcient
cooperation and collaboration. Notwithstanding the pivot to Asia, the Ukraine
conict only further underscores the importance for the United States to remain
engaged in Europe. The United States must fully appreciate the importance of our
long-standing partnerships in Europe, and continue to devote attention and
resources to maintaining these relationships which should be even more critical in
what promises to be a very turbulent security environment of the future. The democratic partnerships of the transatlantic community provide a foundational base
needed for safeguarding interests and security for the United States, Europe, and
the broader world community.
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It would be a mistake for the United States and Europe to attempt to isolate
Russia. The plunging of the rouble and potential economic meltdown in Russia is
only likely to have wider economic and security consequences in the West.
Moscow cant fully offset difculties in the relationship with the West by turning
to China, India, Brazil and other nations, but rather Western partners remain critical
for Russia in meeting long-range economic development needs. The best hope for
Russias gradual (again in terms of decades) evolution toward a more democratic
society is by sustaining and enhancing associations and networks with democratic
nations of Europe and the transatlantic community.
It should be understood that it is unrealistic and counterproductive to believe
that the West would be capable of orchestrating regime change in Russia. The vulnerability of Russias political system stems from the fact that control rests excessively in one individual Vladimir Putin. However, criticism and pressure from the
West is only likely to further enhance the popularity of the Russian leader. Vladimir
Putin does not represent the most extreme anti-Western force within contemporary
Russian politics. The alternatives could bring an even more anti-Western orientation
to the Kremlin, and the democratic liberal opposition in Russia presently lacks
sufcient support or a single strong personality that could challenge Putin.
The United States and NATO would be better served to pursue a well-coordinated strategy of long-term management of selective engagement with the Russian
Federation, rather than implementing measures that would further isolate Russia
from the West or lead to renewed confrontation. The developments surrounding the
conict in Ukraine have not changed the fact that the United States, NATO and
Russia share common interests with respect to a range of critical security areas.
The threat posed by the global violent extremist networks of ISIS, Al Qaeda and
afliates constitute a grave threat to humanity and it would be so much better if the
United States, NATO and Russia could cooperate to counter such challenges, rather
than diverting resources in a resurgent EastWest struggle. There is a need to
remain exible and responsive in order to effectively meet the inevitable and
unanticipated challenges and threats that are sure to emerge in a dynamic security
environment of unprecedented complexity. Strong networks enlisting a diversity of
national partners become more integral than ever to successfully meeting emerging
transnational security challenges. The United States, European nations and Russia
would all stand to benet by working to build the mechanisms and culture of security cooperation necessary to manage the daunting challenges of the twenty-rst
century security environment. Continuing to seek to engage Russia in security collaboration, rather than exclusion from the Western security community, over a period of decades provides the best hope for building trust and long-term constructive
ties. All our communication channels should leave open the possibility of continuing to develop the common transatlantic and European security community for the
twenty-rst century.
Since the period of the outbreak of conict in Ukraine in February 2014, it has
been particularly important for the United States and Europe to maintain a unied
response toward Russia. The United States was able to generate support for sanctions against Russia, but several Western nations would not welcome US supply of
lethal military assistance to Ukraine, potentially risk escalating and widening the
conict. Although there was initial agreement on the sanctions regime against
Russia, there is evidence of potential division ahead. Poland, the Baltic nations and
the UK remain rmly in support of sanctions against Russia, while other European
172
S. Cross
nations may be less willing to support this course. German Chancellor Angela
Merkel has signalled that the sanctions could be reversed if the ceasere brokered
in Minsk can be secured. To the extent that the West can project consistency in
maintaining the relationship with Russia, there is less opportunity for Moscow to
exploit differences.
NATO must be very clear about what the Alliance would be prepared to do in
support of members in response to Russias actions. One of the factors that might
have contributed to prompting the conict in Georgia was signalling that the
George W. Bush Administration could be prepared to offer military support or even
to confront Russia in defence of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. This
might have emboldened the Georgian President who chose to interpret communication from Washington in ways that contributed to precipitating the conict. In the
end, there were limits to support the United States would be prepared to render to
a non-NATO member bordering the Russian Federation.
It is important that the NATO Alliance provide clear indication both in communications and actions regarding the circumstances under which Article V would be
invoked. Russian incursions into the territory of a NATO country Poland, Romania,
Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, crosses a different threshold than threats to Georgia or
Ukraine. Russias new form of hybrid warfare combining cyber, media, and heavy
reliance on local contacts that has characterized the involvement in Ukraine in support of pro-Russian separatists raises serious questions for the NATO Alliance
about actions that actually would constitute an attack on a NATO member nation.
For example, how might Russia leverage ties with Russian communities in the
Baltic nations short of outright deployment of forces and where would such activity
cross the line prompting a NATO response?
Providing reassurances regarding NATO resolve to protect apprehensive allies,
particularly those new members with historic fears of Russia, is of course necessary. Steps such as Operation Atlantic Resolve increasing continuous land, air and
sea presence in Europe reinforcing NATOs Article V readiness and sending a clear
signal to Russia are important. At the same time, there is a delicate balance to manage increased presence while not risking further escalation or provocation. There
should be no ambiguity that any Russian intrusion against NATO allied members
would be countered by collective NATO reaction. Moscow is not likely to directly
confront NATO in the Black Sea or elsewhere or undertake actions that might provoke an Article V response.
It is critical that the United States/Europe, NATO and Russia maintain open
lines of communication during this period to avoid misperception and misunderstanding that can provoke dangerous responses. Again, while there were well-established rules during the Cold War, the current security arena is in state of disruption
and uncertainty, where the potential for miscalculation, accidents, and escalation of
conict with unintended consequences for all sides is surely possible. The fact that
the PJC and NRC were both suspended during the Kosovo (1999) and Georgian
(2008) conicts was cause for concern regarding the reliability of these channels.
The NRC might provide a valuable mechanism for maintaining communication
lines with Russia during this tense period. At a minimum, both NATO and Russia
should keep lines of communication and consultation open in the NRC and through
bilateral military-to-military channels to manage future differences, conicts or even
crisis situations.
173
In March 2015, Vladimir Putin disclosed that he was prepared to place Russias
nuclear forces on alert to ensure the annexation of Crimea (Smith-Spark,
Eshchenko, and Burrows 2015).37 Since the Ukrainian conict, Russian aircraft
have repeatedly violated European airspace, at times causing close encounters with
commercial ights (Quinlivan 2014).38 Again, during a period of escalating tensions and heightened uncertainty, all sides must exercise caution and refrain from
actions that might be misinterpreted or unnecessarily provocative. The United
States, Europe, and Russia should avoid unpredictable behaviour or violations of
standards for regulating transit in the air and sea that could incite a damaging
reaction or accident.
All should realize that Ukraine is not a viable candidate for NATO membership
at this time. Even prior to Russias destabilizing intervention, Ukrainian society
was divided on NATO membership, and the nation had not made sufcient progress in political or defence transformation to make the country a qualied candidate for NATO membership in the immediate future. Together with the European
Union, NATO can still be an important source of support in the context of the
NATOUkraine partnership to encourage Ukraines continued progress on
democratic reform and defence transformation, economic reform, implementing further measures to counter corruption and to encourage national reconciliation and
protection of minority rights.
It is important that NATO not allow Russias action in Ukraine to jeopardize
progress for aspiring NATO member nations. While Moscow must be realistic
about the relationship of NATO to Ukraine, it is also important for Russia not to
expect to hold a veto authority over the future of nations which elect to undertake
the rigorous measures to meet the criteria for NATO membership and if broad support for membership exists in these societies. There are many reasons that a nation
might seek membership in NATO aside from the motivation to secure protection
from Russia. The support that members of the Alliance can provide in offering
experience in democratic and defence reform, and sharing security capacities is
invaluable particularly for smaller and middle-level powers with competing
developmental needs. It could be quite detrimental for the future of aspiring NATO
member nations in the Balkans (Montenegro, and others) should the threat of
prompting reprisals from Russia prevent these countries from advancing toward
integration in the institutional structures of the Euro-Atlantic community.
A nal point on the Black Sea region, NATO and the littoral nations of the
Black Sea region would be wise not to lose sight of the progress that has been
made over the past two decades in enhancing regional collaboration and cooperation to ensure security of this critical area. Again, during this period of heightening
tension and increasing military presence in the region, the danger for escalating
conict surely exists. Every effort should be made on the part of NATO and
nations of the region to maintain clear communication, and to attempt to sustain
efforts and resources toward continuing to promote regional security and economic
growth of the Black Sea region. Without cooperation of all parties of the region, to
include Russia, resources are likely to be dissipated and the risk of accidents or
confrontation could entail scenarios that would not be advantageous to any country
of the region.
The United States/NATO relationship with Russia has not developed so as to
maximize the potential for productive security collaboration over the past two
decades. The United States, Europe and Russia have not achieved what those
174
S. Cross
statesmen that deserve credit for bringing the dramatic end to the Cold War might
have hoped. We have not managed to overcome the decit of trust, and the lingering images of the divisions of the Cold War still remain very much xed in the
frame of reference for so many in our foreign policy communities, media and
societies. Unfortunately, there has been a failure to fully appreciate the opportunity
created by the opening offered at the beginning of the decade of 1990. At the same
time, Russia has moved much closer to Europe and the West in many respects, and
NATO and Russia have managed to cooperate in a number of critical security
areas. The United States, European nations, NATO and Russia do not have to be
friends or even partners. During the period of the Cold War, the United States,
Western European powers and Russia managed to cooperate in areas of critical
shared security interest such as arms control. The stakes in the relationship between
the NATO allies and Russia are potentially enormous, and this relationship can
shape the future security architecture and landscape in Europe, Eurasia and the
wider global community for decades ahead. No one should underestimate the challenges and difculties in repairing the damage created as a result of the recent war
in Ukraine, but all efforts must be devoted to avoiding a further deterioration of the
situation and circumstances in ways that none of us would desire.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. For additional discussion of the pattern in U.S.-Russian relations see, Cross (2009:
205221) and Cross (2013: 124).
2. M. Gorbachev, 1999. Discussion with the author, Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow,
Russia, April.
3. B. Yeltsin, 1995. Remarks at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) Summit, Budapest, in 5 December 1994 cited in Peace and Security: Dening
Roles of for the UN, NATO and CSCE. Foreign Policy Bulletin: The Documentary
Record of United States Foreign Policy, vol. 4, issue 45, January 1995: 11.
4. Rossisyskaya Gazeta, January 18, 2000.
5. Biden Vows Break with Bush Era Foreign Policy. Reuters, February 7, 2009 and for
additional assessment of the re-set policy see the authors prior article see Cross
(2013, 124).
6. Obama, Medvedev Say Reset USRussia Relations. Associated Press, June 24, 2010.
7. H.A. Tromenko, 1995. Discussion with the author, Institute of USA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, September 18. For further reference see, Cross
(2002, 158) also published at NATOs Academic Forum, http://www.nato.int/acad/fel
low/9901/cross.pdf (accessed April 8, 2105).
8. Ukraine crisis: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov Warns Moscow Will Respond
if Interests Attacked. The Independent, April 23, 2014.
9. Putin says Why Not? to Russia Joining NATO. Washington Post, March 6, 2000.
Also see, Russia Could Join NATO if Terms Equal. Reuters, March 5, 2000.
10. Ibid.
11. Obama: New NATO Force a Signal to Russia. VOAnews, September 5, 2014.
12. European Reassurance Initiative. Operation Atlantic Resolve.US European Command,
Communication and Engagement Directorate, US Department of Defense, June 26, 2014.
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0514_atlanticresolve/FactSheet_OperationAt
lanticResolve_3Jul14.pdf (accessed April 8, 2015).
13. Operation Atlantic Resolve. Ibid.
175
14. Ambassador Dmitri Rogozin, Remarks in Brussels, Belgium at a conference session

hosted by the EastWest Center, New York, November 25, 2008.
15. Speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin Marking the First Anniversary of the
Crimean Signing. Reuters, March 20, 2015.
16. Ibid.
17. Russia Terminates Black Sea Fleet Agreements with Ukraine. ITAR-TASS, April 2,
2014.
18. Russias Black Sea Fleet Will Get 80 New Warships to Repel NATO. The Moscow
Times, September 23, 2014.
19. Ibid.
20. The Russian State Armament Program (SAP) 20112020, cited in Delanoe (2014).
21. Putin Just Tightened His Control of the East Black Sea. Associated Press, November
25, 2014.
22. Putin Orders Vast Expansion of Russias Black Sea Fleet with New Base in Territory
He Seized from Ukraine-As Fighting Continues in War-Torn Country. UK Mailonline,
December 14, 2014; Russian Air Force Sends 14 Advanced SU-27 and SU-30 Warplanes to Belbek Air Base in Crimea. International Business Times, November 26,
2014.
23. Russia Moves Heavy Armour in Crimea. Janes Defense Weekly, April 1, 2014. See
also, Delanoe (2014).
24. NATO Commander Warns Russia Could Control Whole Black Sea. BBC News,
November 26, 2014.
25. Montreaux Convention 1936, December 11, 1936.
26. U.S. Destroyer Donald Cook Returns to Black Sea. USNI News, December 29, 2014.
27. Video: Dueling NATO, Russia Naval Exercises on Black Sea. Navy Times, July 11,
2014.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, December 26, 2014.
31. Russia to Counteract NATOs Boosted Presence in Black Sea-Envoy. Russia Today,
December 27, 2014.
32. Putin Says Russia Was Ready for Nuclear Confrontation Over Crimea. Reuters, March
15, 2015. See also, Smith-Spark, Eshchenko, and Burrows (2015).
33. NATO Ship in Black Sea Buzzed by Russian Planes, Russia Disputes Account. USNI
News, September 9, 2014.
34. This article was originally published in Turkish in Analist Magazine, 2015 http://www.
usakanalist.com/detail.php?id = 822200 (accessed April 8, 2015).
35. BSEC Celebrates its 20th Anniversary. Black Sea News, no. 26, December 26, 2012.
See also Black Sea News, no. 27, June 2014.
36. UN Chief Gravely Concerned as Civilian Death Toll from Ukraine Conict Continues to Rise. UN News Center, February 5, 2015. See also, 50,000 Casualties in
Ukraine? German Intel Calls Kievs 6K Toll Not Credible. Russia Today, February 8,
2015.
37. See also, Putin Says Russia Was Ready for Nuclear Confrontation Over Crimea.
Reuters, March 15, 2015.
38. See also, Russian Bombers Disrupt Commercial Flights in Irelands Airspace. The
Moscow Times, March 4, 2015.
Notes on contributor
Sharyl Cross is director of the Kozmetsky Center at St. Edwards University in Austin
(2013present) and Global Policy Fellow at the Kennan Institute Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC (20132015). From 2005 to 2013, she was a
professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen Germany where she served as director of Academics for both the Program in
Advanced Security Studies and Senior Executive Seminar. While residing in Germany, she
was a routine lecturer on NATORussia security issues for courses at the NATO School in
Oberammergau. From 2004 to 2005, Dr Cross was at the United States Air Force Academy,
176
S. Cross
where she had been appointed Distinguished Professor of Political Science. In 1999, she
was a resident Senior Fulbright Scholar in Moscow serving on the faculty of the Moscow
State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation (MGIMO) and the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of
Sciences. She earned a PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Los
Angeles, and was a resident fellowship scholar and consultant at the RAND Corporation
completing programmes in Russian area and policy studies. She has published extensively
on US/NATORussia security Issues, Russian foreign policy and security sector reform.
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