Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 136164-65
April 20, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDGAR LEGASPI y LIBAO, accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
On February 17, 1997, accused-appellant Edgar Legaspi y Libao was charged with the crimes
of rape and robbery in two separate Informations filed with Branch 170 of the Regional Trial
Court National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Malabon. The Informations respectively
read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 17640-MN
That on or about the 11th day of February, 1997, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
while armed with a bladed weapon, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
HONORATA ONG Y GUEVARRA, against her will and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 17641-MN
That on or about the 11th day of February, 1997, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
while armed with bladed weapon, with intent to gain and by means of force, violation and
intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and divest cash
money in the amount of P500.00 to the damage and prejudice of the said HONORATA ONG Y
GUEVARRA in the aforementioned amount of P500.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(Rollo, pp. 4-5.)
Since the charges were related, the prosecution's motion that the two cases be jointly tried
was granted. For its part, the defense pointed out that accused-appellant had been previously
treated at the National Center for Mental Health from February 28 to March 2, 1996. It moved
that the arraignment of accused-appellant be deferred pending determination by the Center as
to whether accused-appellant was mentally fit to stand the rigors of trial. This motion was
likewise granted.
Accused-appellant was finally arraigned on November 18, 1997, following submission of the
report dated September 1, 1997 of the National Center for Mental Health stating that accusedappellant could stand trial. Upon his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and
trial thereafter ensued, with the prosecution presenting three witnesses, namely, the
complainant Honorata Ong, NBI Medico-Legal officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, and barangay
tanod Gerardo Ocampo. The defense, on the other hand, presented accused-appellant and
SPO4 Salvador Ibo.
On November 6, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 17640-MN, the Court finds accused Edgar Legaspi y Libao guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, and considering the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling and nighttime, hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH, and to pay Honorata Ong the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages plus cost of the suit;
2. In Criminal Case No. 17641-MN, the Court finds accused Edgar Legaspi y Libao guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ROBBERY and there being the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as
maximum and to pay Honorata Ong the sum of P500.00 plus cost of suit;
SO ORDERED.
(Rollo, p. 18.)
The supreme penalty of death having been imposed for the rape, the case is now before this
Court on automatic review. As for accused-appellant's conviction for robbery, accusedappellant did not appeal therefrom, thus, as to that portion of the judgment against him, the
same has become final and executory (Section 3[c], Rule 122).
The facts, as shown by the records, are as follows:
At around 2:00 in the morning of February 11, 1997, complainant Honorata Ong, who was
then sleeping inside her house with her three daughters, was awakened by the sound of their
door opening. She initially thought that it was her husband coming home from work. When
Honorata opened her eyes, however, she saw a man armed with a knife standing by her feet.
More terrifying, the man already had his pants and briefs down on his knees and he was
pointing to her eldest daughter. Alarmed, Honorata told the man not to touch her daughter.
The man poked his knife at her and told her to stand up and then was made to lie down on the
adjacent sofa. Thereafter, the man removed Honorata's panties and had sex with her. All this
time, he had his knife at Honorata's neck. Honorata noticed that the man reeked of alcohol.
After slaking his lust, Honorata's assailant stood up then asked for money. Since the man still
had his knife pointed at her, Honorata could do nothing but comply. She gave him the only
money she had, several bills amounting to P500.00.
After threatening Honorata and her daughters with death if she reports the incident, the man
left. Honorata, out of fear, could do nothing but close the door. Later that day, however,
Honorata mustered enough courage to narrate her defilement to her sister-in-law and upon
describing him, Honorata's sister-in-law exclaimed that she knew a person living in Manapat
Street fitting the description.
That afternoon, Honorata, together with her husband, reported the incident to the barangay
captain. Thereafter, the captain, along with two tanods patrolled the area and, on the next day,
they managed to nab a person who fits the description given by Honorata of her assailant.
When the suspect was brought to the barangay hall for confrontation, he was positively
identified by Honorata as the rapist. This person, later identified as accused-appellant Edgar
Legaspi y Libao, was thus detained by the police.
The next day, Honorata had herself medically examined at the NBI but no evident signs of
extra-genital physical injuries were found on her body.
On the other hand, all that accused-appellant could interpose as defenses were denial and
alibi, stating that at the time of the alleged incident, he was at his home in Manapat Street
sleeping. Accused-appellant also testified that he had been previously convicted of homicide
and Roberto Eugenio, the victim therein, was a resident of the exact same address where

complainant Honorata was living. Accused-appellant hinted at the possibility that relatives of
Roberto Eugenio had conspired with complainant Honorata to get rid of him.
Incidentally, Rivera Street where the alleged crime occurred is only two streets away from
Manapat. Moreover, aside from Honorata's address, accused-appellant did not present proof
that the relatives of Roberto Eugenio knew complainant Honorata.
Given the above circumstances, the trial court, as earlier mentioned, found accused-appellant
guilty of rape aggravated by dwelling and nighttime, and of robbery aggravated by dwelling;
and thereupon, imposed upon him the supreme penalty of death for the rape, and an
indeterminate penalty of six months to nine years for the robbery.
Accused-appellant's plea for reversal is founded on the arguments that his guilt was not
shown beyond reasonable doubt, and that complainant Honorata's testimony is replete with
inconsistencies. He also insists on his alibi and alleged insanity.
We have carefully reviewed the record and we find the above contentions devoid of merit.
In support of his first, second, and third assigned errors, which accused-appellant discussed
jointly, he points to the discrepancies between Honorata's testimony in open court and the
entry in the police blotter. Accused-appellant harps on the fact that as described in the blotter,
the alleged rapist had an "ala Babalu face" (having an attenuated chin similar to that of the
late comedian Babalu) and a mole on the upper left part of his lips, while accused-appellant is
not "Babalu" and his mole is located not on the left but on the right side of his face.
That the facial features of accused-appellant differ from the description of Honorata's assailant
as found in the police blotter detracts not a whit from the credibility of Honorata's testimony. It
must be kept in mind that Honorata positively identified accused-appellant as her rapist, not
only during the investigation conducted by the police on the morning of January 15, but also
during the trial. At the Malabon Police Station, Honorata identified accused-appellant thus:
T:
Bakit naman po kayo nandito ngayon sa aming himpilan at nagbigay ng malaya at
kusang loob na salaysay?
S:
Para po ipagharap ng reklamo ang taong ito (affiant pointing/identifying person of
EDGAR LEGASPI y LIBAO, @ EGAY, 29 years old, single, jobless, and residing at No. 86
Manapat Street, Barangay Tanong, Malabon, MM who is presently inside this room).
T:
Ito po bang taong ito ay dati na ninyong kilala?
S:
Hindi po.
T:
Bakit naman po ninyo gustong ipagharap ng reklamo ang taong ito?
S:
Ni rape niya ako.
(Original Record, p. 80.)
During the trial, Honorata likewise identified accused-appellant as the person who sexually
violated her. She testified that she was able to recognize accused-appellant because the
fluorescent lamp inside her house was lit at the time of the incident.
Q:
It was dark. Why were you able to see that person?
A:
Because the light inside the house is on, sir.
Q:
And you saw that person?
A:
Yes, sir.
(tsn, August 18, 1998, p. 3.)
Likewise, we have heretofore held that a man and a woman cannot be physically closer to
each other than during the sexual act (People vs. Fuertes, 296 SCRA 602 [1998]). We thus

have on record Honorata's positive identification of accused-appellant as her assailant.

Coupled with the oft-quoted doctrine that entries in police blotters, though regularly done in
the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth stated in
such entries since they are usually incomplete and inaccurate (People vs. Padlan, 290 SCRA
388 [1998]), we hold that any discrepancy in the police blotter entry and the open court
testimony of Honorata does not affect her credibility.
It must also be remembered that the entry in the police blotter was made at 6:30 on the
morning of February 12, 1997, only a few hours after the rape and robbery. At that time,
Honorata may not have yet fully recovered from the traumatic ordeal she had gone through,
resulting in an inaccurate entry in the police blotter: Besides, minor lapses are to be expected
when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall (People vs.
Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]).
On the other hand, accused-appellant claims that if Honorata were indeed raped on the sofa
of her one-room house, the creaking of the sofa and her moans would have awakened her
three sleeping daughters. He asserts that, strangely, this did not happen.
That Honorata's daughters, aged 3, 6, and 9 years, did not wake up during the assault is not
as incredible as accused-appellant would make it out. The failure of the three children to wake
up during the commission of the rape was probably due to the fact that they were sound
asleep. It is not unusual for children of tender ages to be moved from their sleeping mats and
transferred to another bed without eliciting the least protest from them, much less, awakening
them (People vs. Mustacisa, 159 SCRA 227 [1988]). It is also to be noted that among poor
couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem
despite the presence of other persons around them. One may also suppose that growing
children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions
and suspirations in the night (People vs. Ignacio, 233 SCRA 1 [1994]).
As to accused-appellant's submission that the absence of spermatozoa in Honorata's organ
negates the commission of rape, the same rings hollow, the presence or absence of
spermatozoa being immaterial in the prosecution of a rape case, as it is well-settled that it is
penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, that constitutes rape (People vs. dela Paz,
Jr., 299 SCRA 86 [1998]). That there was penetration is shown by Honorata's testimony, thus:
Q:
When he removed your panty what did he do next?
A:
He inserted his organ in mine, sir.
Q:
How did you come to know it was his penis that entered your private part?
A:
I felt pain, sir.
(tsn, August 18, 1998, p. 5.)
Finally, accused-appellant contends that Honorata lied when she claimed not having known
accused-appellant or his family prior to the incident. Accused-appellant takes this to be
indicative that Honorata plotted with the family of Roberto Eugenio to get rid of him. As proof
of Honorata's alleged prevarication, accused-appellant presented the voter's registration
record of a certain Roberto Eugenio, allegedly accused-appellant's victim in a homicide case
four years prior to the incident in question, indicating that Roberto's address was 27-D Rivera
Street, Taong, Malabon, Metro Manila, the exact same address of Honorata.
Accused-appellant has not presented proof that Honorata knew Roberto Eugenio or his
relatives. Neither has he shown that any relative of Eugenio still resides at Honorata's
address, 27-D Rivera Street. Moreover, mere residence at the same address is not proof that

Honorata conspired with the relatives of Roberto Eugenio in an attempt to get rid of accusedappellant. False testimony or incriminatory machinations must be proved by evidence more
substantial than a voter's registration record.
In his defense, accused-appellant raises the defense of alibi, claiming that he was asleep at
his house at #86 Manapat Street, Taong, Malabon at the time of the incident. Accusedappellant's defense of alibi must, however, be looked upon with suspicion, not only because it
is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be easily fabricated and concocted
(People vs. Tulop, 289 SCRA 316 [1998]). For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not
only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that
it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity
(People vs. Ballesteros, 285 SCRA 438 [1998]).
In the case at bar, accused-appellant has failed to meet both requisites. Aside from his
testimony that he was asleep at the time of the incident, no other witness came forward to
corroborate his version. Moreover, Manapat Street is only two streets away from Rodriguez
Street, the scene of the crime. Accused-appellant even admitted during the trial that this was
only a five-minute walk from his residence. Counterbalanced against Honorata's conduct
immediately after the incident and her positive identification of accused-appellant as her
assailant, accused-appellant's defense of alibi is unavailing. In the words of the trial court:
Honorata did not know the accused before the incident. She immediately revealed the fate
that befell on her to her sister-in-law. They then reported the incident to the barangay and
thereafter to the police authorities; executed a sworn statement; submitted herself to a
physical examination by a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI; and subscribed and swore to a
complaint for rape which would necessarily result in her exposure to the rigors of public trial.
The spontaneity of these acts clearly demonstrates her sincere desire to bring the accused to
justice. Moreover, no married woman in her right mind would subject herself to public scrutiny
and humiliation in order to perpetuate a falsehood. Neither would she take the risk of being
alienated from her husband and family had she not been violated and robbed of her money.
(RTC Decision, p. 4-5.)
In accused-appellant's last assignment of error, he claims that the court a quo erred in not
ruling that he is entitled to the exempting circumstance of insanity. For insanity to be
considered, Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code requires a complete
deprivation of rationality in committing the act, i.e., that the accused be deprived of reason,
that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete
absence of the power to discern. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved,
however, for there is a presumption that acts penalized by law are voluntary (People vs.
Medina, 286 SCRA 44 [1998]).
To prove his insanity, accused-appellant's counsel points to his confinement at the National
Center for Mental Health prior to the incident in question. Likewise, his counsel claims that
when Honorata saw accused-appellant, the latter's pants and briefs were already down on his
knees. He takes this to be an indicium of insanity.
Mere prior confinement does not prove that accused-appellant was deprived of reason at the
time of the incident. Firstly, accused-appellant did not submit proof that he was adjudged
insane by the National Center for Mental Health, only that he had been confined therein. Note
also that accused-appellant had already been discharged from the Center prior to the incident.
Even if accused-appellant were adjudged insane prior to the incident, his discharge implies

that he was already considered well. In fact, the psychiatric evaluation report of accusedappellant states that his disorder "runs a chronic course with periods of exacerbations and
remissions." If the insanity is only occasional or intermittent in nature, the presumption of its
continuance does not arise. He who relies on such insanity proved at another time must prove
its existence also at the time of the commission of the offense (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil.
87). This, accused-appellant has failed to do.
Neither does having one's pants and briefs on one's knees indicate deprivation of reason. If
anything else, it shows the lechery and depravity of accused-appellant. Mental depravity
which results not from any disease of the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral
system, where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from responsibility for
crimes committed under its influence (People vs. Medina, supra). The Court cannot, therefore,
appreciate the defense of insanity brought by accused-appellant.
In sum, we find that the trial court did not err in finding Honorata's testimony to be clear,
straightforward, and worthy of credence, and consequently, in finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
We now come to the proper penalty. Under Article 335 (now Article 266-B) of the Revised
Penal Code, "whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death."
According to the trial court:
The rape charge was committed in the victim's dwelling at nighttime. Dwelling and nighttime
are aggravating circumstances in rape (People vs. Padilla 242 SCRA 629). On the other hand,
the aggravating circumstance of nighttime cannot be appreciated in the robbery charge
because of (sic) the notion to commit the crime was conceived only shortly when the rape was
committed at darkness. However, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is a different story
and should be considered. Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence against or
intimidation of person because this class of robbery can be committed without the necessity of
trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house. Entrance into the dwelling house of the
offended party is not an element of the offense (People vs. Cabato 160 SCRA 98). Finally, for
sexually assaulting a married woman thereby grievously wronged (sic) the institution of
marriage, the imposition of exemplary damages by way of example to deter others from
committing the crime is just (sic) warranted.
(RTC Decision, pp. 5-6.)
Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, the trial
court imposed the supreme penalty of death on accused-appellant for the crime of rape.
However, a cursory examination of the Information filed against accused-appellant would
show that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling are not specified therein.
Now, at the time the trial court rendered its decision, the non-allegation of generic aggravating
circumstances in the information was immaterial, since the rule then prevailing was that
generic aggravating circumstances duly proven in the course of the trial could be taken into
account by the trial court in determining the proper imposable penalty even if such
circumstances were not alleged in the information (People vs. Deberto, 205 SCRA 291
[1992]).
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the Information,
resulted in the imposition of the supreme penalty of death upon accused-appellant. In People

v. Gallego (G.R. No. 130603, August 15, 2000), We had occasion to rule, thus:
In People v. Albert (251 SCRA 136 [1995]), we admonished courts to proceed with more care
where the possible punishment is in its severest form death because the execution of
such a sentence is irrevocable. Any decision authorizing the State to take life must be as
error-free as possible, hence it is the bounden duty of the Court to exercise extreme caution in
reviewing the parties' evidence. Safeguards designed to reduce to a minimum, if not eliminate,
the grain of human fault ought not to be ignored in a case involving the imposition of capital
punishment for an erroneous conviction "will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice."
The accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an
aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between life and death in order for
the Court to properly "exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence." This, the
accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance raising the penalty
imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the
information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable,
we cannot allow the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the
accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him.
In a series of cases under the regime of Rep. Act No. 7659, the Court did not appreciate the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling which would have increased the imposable penalty to
death when such circumstance was not alleged in the information. In People v. Gaspar, et al.
(318 SCRA 649 [1999]), the Court found that apart from treachery, dwelling also attended the
killing of the victim. Despite this finding and the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the
Court nonetheless did not appreciate dwelling and-imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and not the greater penalty of death. Hence, in the case at bar, considering that the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the information, we cannot appreciate
it and raise the penalty imposed upon Raul Gallego from reclusion perpetua to death.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The principle above-enunciated is applicable to the case at bar. Consequently, we hold that
due to their non-allegation in the Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling cannot be considered in raising the
penalty imposable upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to death.
Parenthetically, the above rule is inapplicable for the crime of robbery committed by accusedappellant, the same not involving the imposition of the death penalty. For said crime, what
remains applicable is the old rule that generic aggravating circumstances if duly proven in the
course of the trial could be taken into account by the trial court in determining the proper
imposable penalty, even if such circumstances were not alleged in the Information. Thus, for
the crime of robbery, the trial court correctly imposed an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
It is to be noted carefully that the rule on generic aggravating circumstances has now been
formalized in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000. Section 8 of Rule 110 now provide that:
SECTION 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of
the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

(Emphasis supplied.)
Likewise, Section 9 of the same Rule provides:
SECTION 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged
as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Sections 8 and 9 were discussed by this Court En Banc on June 20, 2000. According to the
minutes of said session:
Justice Puno then invited the attention of the Court to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110. He
explained that the proposal requiring the allegation of qualifying circumstances in the
information reflects the recent decisions of the Court, especially in heinous crimes. However,
the Court concerned itself with the proposed requirement of likewise alleging aggravating
circumstances in the information. Justice Panganiban raised the question of what to do with
an aggravating circumstance which was not alleged but was proved and not objected to
during trial. Justice Melo answered that it cannot be used to increase the penalty if it was not
alleged even if proved. Justice Puno explained that the proposal strengthens the right to due
process of an accused, part of which is to be shielded from surprises.
Chief Justice Davide and Justice Panganiban agreed and emphasized that the presence of
aggravating circumstances can make the difference between life and death where the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal maximum to death or reclusion perpetua to death.
Justice Panganiban added that the prosecutors will now be compelled to prepare well-worded
information.
To make sure that the circumstances that need to be alleged are not missed out in the
information, Justice Mendoza suggested that the Court can prescribe an updated form in the
Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the Rules now require qualifying as well as aggravating circumstances to be expressly
and specifically alleged in the Complaint or Information, otherwise the same will not be
considered by the court even if proved during the trial. And this principle is applicable in all
criminal cases, not only in cases were the aggravating circumstance would increase the
penalty to death. With this, the Court gives fair warning to prosecutors that henceforth, they
must prepare well-crafted information that allege the circumstances qualifying and aggravating
the crimes charged, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court in determining the
proper imposable penalty.
The Court further notes that while the trial court awarded the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, it failed to award civil indemnity to
the victim. Prevailing jurisprudence holds that in rape cases, the victim should be awarded
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages for the injury
evidently suffered. Moreover, the fact that the victim was raped inside her house in the
presence of her children justifies the trial court's imposition of exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review finding accused-appellant

EDGAR LEGASPI y LIBAO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape in Criminal
Case No. 17640-MN is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to suffer the
reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Honorata Ong the sum of Fifty Thousand
pesos as civil indemnity, another Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.
Pardo, J ., on sick leave.
De Leon, Jr., J ., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38297 October 23, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO CAPALAC, defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
It was not unexpected, considering the close family ties so traditional among Filipinos. that the
stabbing, apparently without provocation, of one Moises Capalac by Jimmy Magaso, would be
attended with serious, if not tragic, consequences. It happened on September 20, 1970 at
around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the scene of the gory incident being a duly licensed
cockpit in the City of Iligan. The aggressor, attempting to escape, was confronted by two
brothers of Moises, Jesus Capalac, originally included in the information but now deceased,
and appellant Mario Capalac. The attempt of Magaso to board a jeep was unsuccessful, he
having alighted after two shots were fired in succession. Knowing that he was completely at
the mercy of the two brothers, he raised his hands as a sign of surrender, but they were not to
be appeased. He was pistol-whipped by appellant Mario Capalac, being dealt several blows
on the head and the face. After he had fallen to the ground, Jesus Capalac stabbed the
deceased on the chest three or tour times. He was brought to the hospital where he died, the
cause, according to the coroner's report, being "hemorrhagic shock due to a wound of the
heart."
The above facts are not open to dispute, the decision of the lower court and the briefs for both
appellant and appellee being substantially in agreement. After trial duly held, Mario Capalac

was convicted of murder. The lower court found that the crime was committed with evident
premeditation and treachery. The lower court also held that appellant took advantage of his
position as a police officer and employed means or brought about circumstances which added
ignominy to the natural effects of his act. It sentenced him to suffer the death penalty. Hence,
this case is before this Tribunal for automatic review. 1
The brief for the appellant prays for the reversal of the judgment and assigns four errors as
having been committed by the lower court. The first error speaks of the absence of conspiracy.
The second and the third deny the existence of the qualifying as well as the aggravating
circumstances, Lastly, the brief imputes as error of the lower court what it referred to as
"discarding the ante mortem statement of the victim." As will be shown, there is no basis for
reversal. The judgment, however, calls for modification. Murder was committed, the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia being quite evident. The aggravating circumstances, however, were
not proved. Moreover, the lower court did not take into consideration the existence of the
mitigating circumstance of the immediate vindication of a grave offense. Hence, the imposition
of the death penalty was not warranted.
1. The circumstances indicative of the manner by which the two brothers, as well as their two
companions, who apparently were not apprehended as they were not included in the
information, attacked the hapless victim, would suffice to show conspiracy. They apparently
had one purpose in mind, to avenge the stabbing of Moises Capalac. Such a reaction, as
noted at the outset, is quite understandable. It was not to be expected that they would even
bother to inquire why their brother was stabbed. It was enough that it was done. They were
impelled by a common purpose. They acted in concert. There is sufficient basis for the finding
of conspiracy then. As far back as United States v. Magcamot, 2 a 1909 decision, Justice
Mapa stressed as the essential element for conspiracy to exist the "concurrence of wills" and
"unity of action and purpose." 3 A recent decision is partial to the phrase, "tacit and
spontaneous coordination," in the assault. 4 A careful analysis of the evidence by the lower
court can yield no other conclusion but that conspiracy was duly proved.
2. crime was one of murder, the qualifying circumstance of treachery being present. The
specific language of the Revised 'Penal Code calls for application: "There is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 5 Magaso's
situation was hopeless. Any defense he could have put up would be futile and unavailing. His
hands were raised in surrender. That notwithstanding, he was pistol-whipped. When lying
prostrate on the ground, he was stabbed. It must be remembered that, according to the
testimonial evidence, there were two other persons assisting the brothers Capalac. If they
were not included in the information, the explanation would appear to be that they managed to
elude capture. There was no risk, therefore, to the aggressors, no hope for the victim. 6 The
trial court committed no error then in appreciating the circumstance of treachery as being
present.
3. The lower court erred, however, in finding the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, of means being employed or circumstances brought about to add ignominy to
the natural effects of the act, and of the crime being committed with the offender taking
advantage of his official position as having attended the commission of the crime. As early as
1903, Justice Mapa, in United States v. Alvares, 7 made clear that an aggravating
circumstance must be "as fully proven as the crime itself. 8 He added: "Without clear and

evident proof of their presence, the penalty fixed by the law for the punishment of the crime
cannot be increased. 9 Moreover, insofar as evident premeditation is concerned, there is this
relevant excerpt from the same opinion: "The record contains no evidence showing that the
defendant had, prior to the moment of its execution, resolved to commit the crime, nor is there
proof that this resolution was the result of meditation, calculation and persistence. 10 In People
v. Mendova, 11 it was emphasized that it should not be "premeditation" merely; it is "evident"
premeditation. 12 A recent decision, People v. Anin, 13 ruled that the perpetration of a criminal
act "evidently made in the heat of anger" did not call for a finding that there was evident
premeditation. 14 What is required is that the offense was "the result of cool and serene
reflection." 15 What was done by the brothers of Capala, cannot be categorized as falling
within the norm of means being employed or circumstances being brought about to add
ignominy to the natural effects of the act. It is well to stress that they were prompted by their
desire to avenge their brother, They went after Magaso, the victim. They assaulted him,
relying on the weapons they carried with them. Jesus stabbed him and appellant Mario pistolwhipped him. They did what they felt they had to do to redress a grievance. It cannot be said,
therefore, that they deliberately employed means to add ignominy to the natural effects of the
act. It is quite apparent that all they were interested in was to assure that there be retribution
for what was done to their brother. The mere fact that appellant Mario Capalac is a member of
the police force certainly did not of itself justify that the aggravating circumstance of advantage
being taken by the offender of his public position be considered as present. He acted like a
brother, instinctively reacting to what was undoubtedly a vicious assault on his kin that could
cause the death of a loved one. It would be an affront to reason to state that at a time like that
and reacting as he did, he purposely relied on his being a policeman to commit the act. He
pistol-whipped the deceased because he had his pistol with him. It came in handy and he
acted accordingly. 16 That he was a policeman is of no relevance in assessing his criminal
responsibility.
4. There is another aspect of the decision that calls for correction. The mitigating circumstance
of immediate vindication of a grave offense was not considered. There is no ambiguity in the
language of the Revised Penal Code: "That the act was committed in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degree. 17 What was done was an immediate vindication of the
stabbing perpetrated by Magaso on appellant's brother Moises. For relatively less serious
crimes than this, this Court has taken into consideration this mitigating circumstance. 18
Certainly it seems probable that the reason why, the lower court failed to do so was the fact
that appellant was a member of the police force. That is not conclusive. What is decisive is the
fact that the brothers Capalac, responsive to what is a traditional norm of conduct, reacted in a
manner which for them was necessary under the circumstances. That was a fulfillment of what
family honor and affection require. The aggressor who did them wrong should not go
unpunished. This is not to justify what was done. It offers though an explanation. At the same
time, the rule of law, which frowns on an individual taking matters into his own hands, requires
that every circumstance in favor of an accused should not be ignored. That is to render justice
according to law. This mitigating circumstance calls for application.
5. There is no point in discussing the fourth assigned error, namely, that the ante mortem
statement of the victim should have been given weight by the Court. Such exhibit, 19 even if
considered a dying declaration, would not call for a reversal. It consisted of seven questions

and answers. The answers to the second and the third questions referred to what happened to
Magaso and who was responsible. His answer was that he was stabbed, and that it was done
by Jesus Capalac. The other questions dealt with when and where it happened as well as
whether or not he was in possession of his senses, and a rather unnecessary question as to
whether he was aggrieved.<re||an1w> This Court, as was the lower court, is aware that
the stabbing was by Jesus Capalac, not by appellant. It does not thereby mean that no
criminal liability was incurred by him. In the light of the foregoing, and following the case of
People v. Rosel 20 where the murder was qualified by the circumstance of treachery and there
was likewise considered the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave
offense, the penalty imposed on the accused should be "ten years and one day of prision
mayor to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal." 21
WHEREFORE, the accused is found guilty of murder, but the decision of the lower court is
hereby modified. The accused is sentenced to ten years and one day of prision mayor
minimum to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal maximum. In all
other respects, the lower court decision stands affirmed.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ.,
concur.
Aquino and Gutierrez, JJ., took no part.
Makasiar, J., I reserve my vote.
Vasquez, J., I reserve my vote.
De Castro, J., concur in the result.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 He remained the sole accused, there being an order of the lower court of February 12, 1972
dismissing the charge against his brother, Jesus, who, had died in the meanwhile.
2 13 Phil. 386.
3 Ibid.
4 People v. Aleta, L-40694, August 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 542, per Aquino, J
5 Article 14, par. 16 of the Revised Penal Code.
6 Cf. People v. Ong, L-34497, Jan. 30, 1975, 62 SCRA 174; People v. Mabuyo, L-29129, May
8, 1975, 63 SCRA 532; People v. Bautista, L-38624, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 460 (where
deceased had no chance to defend himself); People v. Tizon, L-29724, Aug. 29, 1975, 66
SCRA 372; People v. Payao, L-29364, Nov. 21, 1975, 68 SCRA 70; People v. Pajenado, L26548, Jan. 30, 1976, E9 SCRA 172; People v. Mojica, L-30742, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 502;
People v. Palencia, L-38957, April 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 679; People v. Benito, L-32042, Dec.
17, 1976, 74 SCRA 271; People v. Pascual, L-29893, Feb. 23, 1978, 81 SCRA 548; People v.
Plateros, L-37162, May 30, 1078, 83 SCRA 401; People v. Alegria, L-40392, Aug. 18, 1978, 84
SCRA 614; People v. Cuadra, L-27973, Oct. 23, 1978, 85 SCRA 576; People v. Barbosa, L39779, Nov. 7, 1978, 86 SCRA 217; People v. Damaso, L-30116, Nov. 20, 1978, 86 SCRA
370.
7 3 Phil. 24.
8 Ibid, 32,
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid, 31-32.
11 100 Phil. 811 (1957).

12 Ibid, 818.
13 L-39046, June 30,1975, 64 SCRA 729.
14 Ibid, 734.
15 Ibid.
16 Cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil 150 (1911); People v. Yturriaga, 86 Phil. 534 (1950);
People v. Ordiales, L-30956, November 23, 1971, 42 SCRA 239.
17 Article 13, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
18 Cf. United States v. Ampar, 37 Phil, 201 (1917); People v. Diokno, 63 Phil. 601 (1936);
People v. Rosel, 66 Phil. 323 (1938); People v. Domingo, 118 Phil. 1384 (1962) only
alternatively.
19 Exhibit 1.
20 66 Phil. 323 (1938).
21 Ibid, 326.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 73489 April 25, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CIC LORETO GAPASIN, PC NICANOR SALUDARES, LORENZO SORIANO, alias "Olit",
AMOR SALUDARES, FRANK SALUDARES, BEL SALUDARES, and NICK SALUDARES,
accused, CIC LORETO GAPASIN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Silvestre Br. Bello for accused-appellant.
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVI, Isabela in
Criminal Case No. IV-781, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
qualified by treachery, with the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and the aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of public position and
evident premeditation. The trial court sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay to the heirs of the late Jerry Calpito, Sr., the sum of P88,596.00 as actual

or compensatory damages; P30,000.00 as death indemnity; P20,000.00 as moral damages;

P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the costs.
I
The information in Criminal Case No. IV-781 reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1979, at Barangay San Jose, municipality of Roxas,
province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused CIC LORETO GAPASIN, PC NICANOR SALUDARES, LORENZO SORIANO alias
Olit, AMOR SALUDARES, FRANK SALUDARES, BEL SALUDARES, and NICK
SALUDARES, conspiring and confederating together and all helping one another, with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously,
with intent to kill, attack and shoot Jerry Calpito, with an Armalite rifle SN No. 3267485
Cal. 5.56 duly issued to the accused PC soldier under Memorandum Receipt dated
September 17, 1979 by the 118th PC Company, inflicting multiple gunshot wounds on the
body of the latter, step and kick (sic) the victim several times, causing his instantaneous death
due to hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the deceased Jerry Calpito in the amount of P12,000.00, Philippine Currency.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of (1) ignominy, the
accused having stepped and kicked the body of the deceased; (2) abuse of superior strength,
and (3) taking advantage of public position, with respect to the accused CIC Loreto Gapasin
who is a PC soldier" (Rollo, pp. 35-36).
A warrant for the arrest of all the accused was issued on December 14, 1980. However, as of
January 10, 1980, only Nicanor Saludares and appellant had been arrested. On January 17,
1980, the trial court granted the petition for bail of the two accused and fixed the same at
P20,000.00 each. Having posted bail, Nicanor Saludares was ordered released on January
22, 1980. On the
other hand, appellant was ordered by the court to remain in the custody of
Capt. Alexander M. Bellen, commanding officer of the 118th Constabulary Company, in Roxas,
Isabela.
On February 4, 1980, Frank, Bel and Amor, all surnamed Saludares, were arrested. Lorenzo
Soriano, alias Olit, was arrested the following day. They were all allowed to post bail bonds in
the amount of P20,000.00 each and thereafter they were released from custody.
On the strength of LOI No. 947, as amended by LOI No. 1011, vesting jurisdiction on the
Military Tribunals of all crimes against persons and property committed with the use of
unlicensed firearms, the provincial fiscal filed a motion praying that Criminal Case No. IV-781
be transferred to the Military Tribunal and that the bail bonds posted be cancelled. The
prosecution reiterated the motion in a manifestation dated August 21, 1980.
Accordingly, on August 27, 1980, the trial court ordered: (a) the cancellation of the bail bonds
of the accused; (b) the issuance of the warrants of arrest for all the accused except for
Nicanor Saludares, who was reported to have died; (c) the turn over of appellant to the
Provincial Warden of Isabela as he was not entitled to technical rearrest under Executive
Order No. 106; (d) the turn over to the said Provincial Warden of all the other accused upon
their rearrest; and (e) thereafter, the turn over of the case and the accused to the Military
Tribunal thru the Provincial Commander of the PC/INP, Ilagan, Isabela for further proceedings.
Pursuant to the endorsement dated September 19, 1980 of Lt. Col. Oscar M. Florendo,
Isabela Provincial Commander, appellant, together with Lorenzo Soriano, Amor Saludares and
Bel Saludares, was rearrested; while Nick and Frank Saludares remained at-large. On

September 29, 1980, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against Nicanor
Saludares on account of his death on June 7, 1980.
The accused, however, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of August 27, 1980
on the grounds that the case was not covered by LOI
No. 947, the crime having been committed on October 6, 1979 or several days before the
issuance of said LOI. The trial court denied their motion.
By virtue of General Order No. 69 dated January 12, 1981, the records of the case were
transferred back to the trial court from the Military Tribunal. On April 1, 1981, the prosecution
moved for the recommitment of the accused to the provincial jail. The defense opposed the
motion fearing retaliation from a provincial jail guard, who was a relative of the victim. On May
12, 1981, the trial court denied the motion and set the arraignment of the accused on June 1,
1981.
On May 18, 1981, Col. Florendo informed the trial court that Bel and Amor Saludares have
escaped from the Rehabilitation Center of the Provincial Command on April 10, 1981.
On May 29, 1981, the provincial fiscal moved for the reconsideration of the Order of May 12,
1981, alleging that the accused were not actually detained at the PC Headquarters and that,
except for appellant, the accused have absconded. Hence, to prevent a miscarriage of justice,
the provincial fiscal prayed for the recommitment of accused Soriano and appellant at the
provincial jail and for the issuance of the warrants of arrest for Amor, Bel and Frank Saludares.
The trial court granted the motion and issued warrants of arrest. Despite diligent efforts,
however, the other accused were not rearrested and hence, trial proceeded against accused
Soriano and appellant only. On June 1, 1981, they both pleaded not guilty.
Two years later, on June 1, 1983, the trial court denied appellant's application for bail but
granted that of accused Soriano, whose bail bond was fixed at P30,000.00. Being so
persistent, appellant filed a second motion for bail, which was denied by the trial court on June
1, 1984. He filed a third motion to fix bail, which was likewise denied.
Relying on the provisions of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1850, appellant filed an urgent motion
praying that he be transferred to the custody of Col. Alfonso M. Mesa, then Provincial
Commander of Isabela. The trial court denied the motion. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied, appellant filed a petition for certiorari before the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
apply Section 4 of P.D. No. 1850. The appellate court granted the petition and ordered the
immediate transfer of appellant to the custody of his military commander.
Meanwhile, accused Frank Saludares was arrested and he entered a plea of not guilty at his
arraignment. He was later allowed to post bail. Since Soriano and Frank Saludares were both
out on bail, the defense opted to present evidence on behalf of appellant only and to submit
the case for decision as soon as possible. Thus, after almost six years, trial on the case
ensued.
II
According to prosecution witness Alberto Carrido, he and Rodrigo Ballad left the house of
Enteng Teppang at about 2:00 P.M. of October 6, 1979 after attending the "pamisa" for the
deceased father of Teppang. Jerry Calpito followed them. While they were walking along the
barangay road, Calpito was shot by appellant with an armalite rifle. When Calpito fell on the
ground, appellant fired more shots at him. Thereafter, accused Amor Saludares planted a .22
caliber revolver on the left hand of Calpito. Upon hearing the shots, Faustina Calpito ran to
succor her fallen husband.

Accused Nicanor Saludares pointed his gun at Faustina while accused Soriano fired his gun
upwards. Saludares warned that he would kill any relative of Jerry Calpito who would come
near him. Faustina and the other relatives of the victim scampered away as the Saludares'
group chased them.
The body of Calpito was autopsied by Dr. Bernardo Layugan, who found that the victim
sustained four bullet wounds: (1) on the right lateral side of the arm fracturing the humerus; (2)
on the right lateral side of the thorax between the 7th and 8th ribs with exit wound at the
sternum; (3) on the left side of the thorax, anterior, between the 5th and 6th ribs; and (4) on
the right fronto-parietal portion of the head "severing the skull and brain tissues" (Exh. "F"). Dr.
Layugan opined that the victim was in a standing position when he was shot by someone
positioned at his right.
Appellant invoked self-defense. He testified that he was issued a mission order on September
23, 1979 to investigate a report regarding the presence of unidentified armed men in Barrio
San Jose, Roxas, Isabela. The following day, he was instructed by Sgt. Dominador Ignacio to
get in touch with Nicanor Saludares who may be able to give him information on the identities
of the persons with unlicensed firearms in the place. When appellant met Nicanor Saludares
on September 29, 1979, he was informed that Jerry Calpito had an unlicensed firearm.
On October 5, 1979, Nicanor Saludares went to the P.C. Headquarters in Roxas and told
appellant that it would be best for him to see Jerry Calpito the following day as a relative of the
latter would be buried. The next day, appellant went to Barangay San Jose, arriving there at
12 noon. Instead of going to the cemetery, he went to the house of Nicanor Saludares. From
there, they went to the house of Enteng Teppang to attend the "pamisa." While they were
having lunch, Nick Saludares advised appellant against confronting Calpito because it would
create a disturbance at the "pamisa." He also told appellant that Calpito would surely pass his
(Saludares) house on his way home.
Appellant and Nicanor Saludares positioned themselves inside the yard of the latter. When
appellant saw Calpito, he went out of the yard into the barangay road. When Calpito was
about three meters away from him, appellant asked him what was bulging in his waist. Instead
of answering, Calpito took a step backward, drew his firearm from the waist and fired twice at
appellant. He missed because appellant dropped to the ground simultaneously firing his
armalite.
After fifteen minutes, the police arrived and took the body of the victim to the morgue.
Appellant was brought to the P.C. Headquarters in Roxas, where he was investigated.
III
The appeal hinges primarily on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Appellant claims
that the prosecution witnesses, all of them being relatives of the victim, were naturally biased
against him.
This Court has time and again reiterated the principle that it will not interfere with the findings
of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies unless the trial
court has plainly overlooked undisputed facts of substance and value which would have
altered the result of the case (People v. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613 [1992]). Findings of the
trial court are generally accorded great respect by an appellate tribunal for the latter can only
read in cold print the testimonies of the witnesses.
In the trial before the lower court, the eye-witnesses testified in their local dialect and their
testimonies had to be translated to English. In the process of converting into written form the
testimonies of the witnesses, not only the fine nuances but a world of meaning apparent only

to the trial judge, may escape the reader of the translated words (People v. Baslot, 209 SCRA
537 [1992]).
The fact that the prosecution witnesses are relatives of the victim does not necessarily
indicate that they were biased as to impair their credibility. In the absence of proof of ill motive
on the part of witnesses, relationship between them and the victim does not undermine their
credibility. On the contrary, it would be unnatural for persons such as the relatives of the victim
who themselves seek justice to commit the injustice by imputing the crime on persons other
than those who are actually responsible (People v. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56 [1992]).
Appellant's claim of self-defense is belied by the finding of the trial court that the victim was
shot by someone who was standing on his right side. Appellant's version that he was in front
of the victim when the latter fired a shot at him and that he retaliated while dropping on the
ground, crumbles in the face of the physical evidence that the victim sustained two gunshot
wounds which entered the right side of his body and a gunshot wound on the right side of his
head. The nature and number of wounds inflicted by the appellant disprove the plea of selfdefense (People v. Bigcas, 211 SCRA 631 [1992]).
Had appellant and Nicanor Saludares, Sr. not intended to harm the victim, they could have
simply apprehended him. Or, having verified that Calpito possessed an unlicensed firearm,
appellant could have reported the matter to his superiors so that warrants for Calpito's arrest
and the seizure of his unlicensed firearm could have been obtained.
Appellant contended that the crime committed is homicide. The trial court correctly ruled that
the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was indeed committed.
Treachery attended the commission of the crime. The two conditions to constitute treachery
were present in the case at bench, to wit: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives
the person who is attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted (People v. Narit, 197 SCRA 334 [1991]).
Appellant deliberately executed the act in such a way that his quarry was unaware and
helpless. This can be gleaned from his act of waiting for the victim behind the hollow-block
fence of Nicanor Saludares and shooting the victim from his right side.
Evident premeditation was indubitably proven by the evidence showing that the execution of
the criminal case was preceded by cool thought and reflection. Appellant's resolution to carry
out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a clear judgment was
shown (People v. Castor, 216 SCRA 410 [1992]).
In view of the presence of treachery which qualified the killing as murder, the evident
premeditation should be considered only as a generic aggravating circumstance (People v.
Fabros, 214 SCRA 694 [1992]).
The information alleged three other generic aggravating circumstances: ignominy, abuse of
superior strength and taking advantage of public position. The trial court correctly ruled out
ignominy on the strength of the autopsy conducted by the doctor who failed to find any other
injuries such as bruises and contusions which may indicate that the victim was kicked by his
assailants. It also correctly held that treachery absorbed abuse of superior strength (People v.
Moral, 132 SCRA 474 [1984]).
The trial court properly appreciated taking advantage of public position as an aggravating
circumstance. Appellant, a member of the Philippine Constabulary, committed the crime with
an armalite which was issued to him when he received the mission order (People v. Madrid,
88 Phil. 1 [1951]).

Voluntary surrender may be considered in appellant's favor but this is offset by the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position. Therefore, only the generic
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation may be appreciated against appellant. As
such, the correct penalty would have been death in accordance with Articles 248 and 64(3) of
the Revised Penal Code Were it not for the fact that such penalty is constitutionally abhorrent.
Hence, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The trial court correctly exercised its discretion in imposing moral, compensatory and
exemplary damages (People v. Rabanes, 208 SCRA 768 [1992]; People v. Quilaton, 205
SCRA 279 [1992]).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-35123-24 July 25, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUDY TIONGSON, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Felipe L. Gozon for defendant-appellant.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of October 26, 1971, the accused Rudy Tiongson
escaped from the Municipal Jail of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, together with George de la
Cruz and Rolando Santiago, where they were detained under the charge of Attempted
Homicide. While in the act of escaping, the said Rudy Tiongson killed Pat. Zosimo Gelera, a
member of the police force of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, who was guarding the said

accused, and PC Constable Aurelio Canela of the PC Detachment stationed in Bulalacao,

Oriental Mindoro, who went in pursuit of them.
By reason thereof, Rudy Tiongson was charged with Murder, in two separate informations,
committed as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. R-DJC-243:
That on the 26th day of October, 1971, at 6:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at Rizal, of
the Municipality of Bulalacao, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, RUDY TIONGSON, conspiring
and confederating with Rolando Santiago and George de la Cruz, who are both at large by
reason of their forced escape, and with treachery, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously waited in
ambush, waylaid and shot one C2C AURELIO M. CANELA, a member of the local Philippine
Constabulary Command, while the latter was in hot pursuit of said accused who had earlier
escaped from custody, thus fatefully resulting to the instantaneous death of the victim.
That the commission of the offense was qualified by the circumstance of treachery, and
aggravated by the circumstances of evident premeditation, in contempt of or with ingult to the
public authorities, nocturnity, committed in an uninhabited place and with abuse of superior
strength.
2. Crim. Case No.R-DJC-244
That on the 26th day of October, 1971, at 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, inside of
the Municipal Building, of the Municipality of Bulalacao, Province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
RUDY TIONGSON, conspiring and confederating with George de la Cruz and Rolando
Santiago, and under the pretext that they would answer the call of nature, convinced Police
First Class Patrolman Zosimo Gelera to allow them to go out from their being confined and
detained in the Municipal Jail of same Municipality by virtue of a previous offense, and while
still hardly out of said jail ganged up said Zosimo Gelera, took the latter's service pistol and
with it, with treachery, shot point blank said police officer at his right cheek, tragically resulting
to the victim's instantaneous death and thereafter, made good their escape.
That the offense is qualified by the circumstance of treachery, and aggravated by the
circumstances of evident premeditation, in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities
and with abuse of superior strength.
Upon arraignment, the said accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to both
informations. The trial court, however, did not render judgment outright, but ordered the
prosecution to present its evidence, after which, it sentenced the said accused to suffer the
death penalty in each case, to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of P12,000.00
and to pay the costs.
The death penalty having been imposed, the cases are now before the Court for mandatory
review.
1. Able counsel appointed for the accused first claims that the acceptance of the plea of guilty
was precipitate since the trial judge did not ascertain from the accused that the latter was
aware of the consequences of his plea of guilty and that he fully understood the significance
and meaning thereof. Wherefore, he prays that the cases be returned to the court below for
proper proceedings.
The norm that should be followed where a plea of guilty is entered by the defendant,
especially in cases where the capital penalty may be imposed, is that the court should be sure
that defendant fully understands the nature of the charges preferred against him and the

character of the punishment provided by law before it is imposed. For this reason, the Court
requires that in every case under a plea of guilty, where the penalty may be death, the trial
court should call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of
the defendant and not only to satisfy the trial judge but to aid the Supreme Court in
determining whether accuse understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance
and consequences of his plea. 1
In the instant case, the trial judge required the taking of testimony as to the circumstances
under which the crime was committed before passing judgment so that the resulting verdict
cannot in any way be branded as deficient.
2. Counsel also contends that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not warrant,
nor support, the finding that the killing of Pat. Zosimo Gelera was qualified by treachery since
the prosecution failed to present any eyewitness who directly saw the killing of Pat. Gelera.
The Solicitor General agrees with counsel for the accused.
According to the Revised Penal Code, 2 "there is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make."
In the instant case, it does not appear how and in what position the victim was when he was
killed so that it cannot be said for certain that the accused had adopted a mode or means of
attack tending directly to insure or facilitate the commission of the offense without risk to
himself arising from the defense or retaliation which the victim might put up.
Pat. Nicandro Garcia of the Bulalacao police force merely declared that he was in his house,
about 15 meters away from the municipal building when the accused Rudy Tiongson and his
companions escaped from prison , 3 and he did not see the accused shoot Pat. Gelera. 4
Police Chief Edwardo Borwangga did not also see the accused Rudy Tiongson shoot Pat.
Gelera. He declared that Pat. Gelera was already dead when he arrived at the municipal
building in the afternoon of October 26, 1971. 5
PC Sgt. Teotimo Saway, who led the pursuit of the escaped detainees, declared that he was in
one of the, stores in front of the Bulalacao municipal building, about 60 meters away, when he
heard two (2) gunshots coming from the direction of the municipal building, 6 and Pat. Gelera
was already dead when he saw him. 7
The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act of killing a human being must be proved
in an evident and incontestable manner, mere presumptions or deductions from hypothetical
facts not being sufficient to consider them justified. Thus, in the case of U.S. vs. Barbosa, 8 the
Court said that "since the case does not furnish any evidence to the effect that Barbosa had
formed the deliberate, premiditated intention to take the life of his wife, and there was no
eyewitness as to the manner in which the deceased was strangled, consequently there is no
provision of law under which we can hold that the crime was committed with treachery, and it
must be borne in mind that the qualifying circumstances of a crime in its commission, in order
to be considered, must be established by competent evidence as well as the crime to which
they relate.
In the case of U.S. vs. Perdon, 9 the Court said that since "neither this witness nor any other
gives any particulars whatever as to the manner in which the aggression was made, nor how
the act which resulted in the death of the deceased began and developed; and this being the
case, it can not be established from mere suppositions, drawn from circumstances prior to the
very moment of the aggression, that the accused had employed means tending to insure its

success without any danger to his person, which constitutes treachery (alevosia) as defined
by the Penal Code. The circumstances specifying an offense or aggravating the penalty
thereof must be proved as conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or presumptions
being insufficient to establish their presence according to law. No matter how truthful these
suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and can not produce the effect of
aggravating the condition of the defendant."
The Court, in U. S. vs. Asilo, 10 I also ruled that since it was not established "that the
aggressors employed any means which might have rendered all defenses impossible for the
deceased, inasmuch as no one witnessed the very act of aggression, there is not sufficient
ground to establish the conclusion that the attempt which deprived Anastacio Claridad of his
life was made with treachery (alevosia). The treachery can in no way be presumed, but must
be fully proven in order to be appreciated for the effects of the Penal Code."
In People vs. Ramiscal, 11 the Court rejected the claim that treachery was present because
"at the time that the accused inflicted the wound upon the deceased there was not a single
eyewitness, for when the witnesses Umali and Chua Chuan entered the store the wound had
already been inflicted."
The Solicitor General also agreed with the defendant's counsel that treachery is not present in
the killing of PC Constable Aurelio M. Canela since the deceased was actually warned by PC
Sgt. Saway not to remain standing but seek cover because of the known presence of the
accused in the vicinity, but that the said deceased disregarded the warning.The pertinent
portion of the testimony of PC Sgt. Saway reads, as follows:
FISCAL SADICON:
Q Were you alone while you were pursuing those three escaping prisoners?
A No, sir.
Q Who was your companion if there was any?
A Pat. Nicandro Garcia, sir.
Q While you were pursuing these prisoners what happened next?
A When we were already along the mountain then watching for the appearance of the three
escapees, I saw C2C Aurelio Canela, sir.
Q What does this C2C mean?
A Constable Second Class, sir.
Q After seeing C2C Aurelio Canela approaching while you were waiting for the three escapees
what did you do?
A I signaled him to lie flat and indicated to him where the escapees seem to be moving, sir.
Q Then what did C2C Canela do upon your signal?
A He continued walking towards me and at the precise moment I signaled him again to lie
down because the escapees-prisoners were there, sir.
Q After that what happened?
A He did not heed my instruction and because of that I approached him and tried to hold him
instructing him to lie down but on that precise moment two shots were fired, sir.
Q From what direction those two shots came from?
A From my left approximately 4 meters away from me, sir,
Q What happened after hearing those two shots?
A I saw Canela already hit and shouting "aruy", sir. 12

Considering that PC Constable Canela had been sufficiently forewarned of the presence of
the appellant in the vicinity and that he was not completely deprived of an opportunity to
prepare and repel or avoid the aggression, treachery cannot be appreciated.
Since treachery, which would qualify the killing of Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela to
Murder, was not present, the crimes may only be punished as Homicide. It may be true that a
judicial confession of guilt admits all the material facts alleged in the information, including the
aggravating circumstances listed therein, as stated by the trial judge, yet where there has
been a hearing and such circumstances are disproven by the evidence, they should be
disallowed in the judgment. 13
3. We also agree with the parties that the aggravating circumstances of (1) evident
premeditation, (2) in contempt of or with insult to public authorities, (3) uninhabited place, and
(4) abuse of superior strength were not present in the commission of the crimes.
Evident premeditation must be ruled out in view of the absence of sufficient proof that a plan
to kill the victims existed, the execution of which was preceded by deliberate thought and
reflection. Besides, with respect to the killing of PC Constable Canela, only ten minutes
passed from the time the accused escaped from the Municipal Jail up to the time he shot PC
Constable Canela near the cemetery, 14 so that there was no lapse of time during which he
could have deliberately planned the killing of the said PC Constable and meditated on the
consequences of his act.
The aggravating circumstance that the crimes were committed in contempt of or with insult to
the public authorities cannot also be appreciated since Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela
were the very ones against whom the crime were committed. Besides, Pat. Gelera and PC
Constable Canela are not persons in authority, but merely agents of a person in authority. 15
5. The lower court also found that the killing of PC Constable Canela was committed in an
uninhabited place. It has not been shown, however, that the offense was committed in an
isolated place, far from human habitation. In order that the aggravating circumstance of the
commission of a crime in an uninhabited place may be considered, it is necessary that the
place of occurrence be where there are no houses at all, a considerable distance from the
village or town, or where the houses are a great distance apart. 16 Here, PC Sgt. Saway
merely declared that the place where PC Constable Canela was shot was about 700 meters
away from the Municipal Building of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro, 17 which does not satisfy
the requirement. Besides, the record does not show that the place was intentionally sought by
the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime. The accused was trying to evade his
pursuers, PC Constable Canela among them, and their encounter was purely by chance. The
lower court, therefore, erred in finding that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place.
6. Finally, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength must also be ruled out
since there is no direct evidence that the accused employed superior strength in the killing of
Pat. Gelera. The accused was then a detainee and was unarmed while Pat. Gelera had his
service pistol with him. With respect to PC Constable Canela, the accused was alone against
three armed pursuers, namely: PC Sgt. Saway, PC Constable Canela, and Pat Nicandro
Garcia, and a civilian by the name of Fred Barcelona. 18
As heretofore stated, the accused is guilty only of the crime of Homicide in the killing of PC
Constable Canela and Pat. Gelera. The Solicitor General recommends that the accused
should be sentenced to suffer imprisonment of from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8
months, with the accessory penalties, for each homicide committed by him. The penalty
recommended is within the range provided by law.

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the accused Rudy Tiongson should be sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each
homicide committed by him, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby,
AFFIRMED. The indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victims is hereby increased to
P30,000.00 in each case.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De
la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1 People vs. Gonzales, L-34674, Aug. 6, 1979, 92 SCRA 527 and other cases cited therein.
2 Art. 14, No. 16.
3 TSN. of Dec. 20, 1971. p. 11.
4 Id, p. 4.
5 Id, p. 13.
6 TSN. of Dec. 20, 1972, p. 2.
7 Id, p. 4.
8 1 Phil. 741 (1903).
9 4 Phil. 141 (1905).
10 4 Phil. 175 (1905).
11 49 Phil. 104.
12 TSN of Jan. 4, 1972, p. 3.
13 People vs. Boyles, 120 Phil. 92.
14 TSN of Dec. 20, 1971, p. 11,
15 People vs. Verzo, 129 Phil. 628.
16 U. S. vs. Salgado, 11 Phil. 56.
17 TSN of Jan. 4, 1972, p. 11.
18 TSN of Dec. 20, 1971, p. 10; TSN of Jan. 4, 1972, p. 4.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68699 September 22, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
HERMOGENES MAGDUEO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Donato T. Faylona for accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Before us for automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City finding accused-appellant Hermogenes Magdueo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and
aggravated by price or reward and by the crime being committed in contempt of/or with insult
to public authority. The court sentenced Magdueno to suffer the penalty of DEATH with all the
accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs; and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim, Fernando M. Dilig in the sum of P130,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as
moral damages.
The amended information charged Hermogenes Magdueno, Apolinario Sison, Teodorico
Ramirez, Alejandro Guevarra, Alfredo Guevarra, and Edgardo Casabay with having committed
the crime of murder as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of October, 1980, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, in the City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines and in Aborlan, Province of Palawan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession, custody and control a firearm, to wit: one (1) 9MM
automatic pistol, without having secured the necessary license and/or permit to possess the
same from the proper authorities; that at the aforementioned time and place while the said
accused were in possession of the afore-described firearm, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, with
intent to kill and while armed with said firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one FERNANDO M. DILIG, City Fiscal of Puerto
Princesa City, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of his death, (sic) to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs in the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
(P250,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, evident
premeditation that the crime was committed in consideration of a price, reward or promise;
and that the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities.
The facts established by the prosecution and accepted by the lower court as basis for the
decision are summarized as follows:
On October 15, 1980, a few minutes past 8:00 o'clock in the morning, as soon as the late
Fiscal Fernando M. Dilig had placed himself at the driver's seat inside his jeep parked near his
house at the corner Roxas and D. Mendoza Streets, Puerto Princesa City, all of a sudden, two
successive gunshots burst into the air, as the gunman coming from his left side aimed and
poured said shots into his body, inflicting two fatal wounds (Exhibit N) that instantaneously
caused his death, The autopsy report of Dr. Rufino P. Ynzon, Puerto Princesa City Health
Officer, described the wounds as follows:
1. Wound, gunshot, (entrance), 0.7 cm. in diameter, surrounded by contusion collar, 0.3 cm. in
width almost evenly distributed around the gunshot wound, located at the lateral aspect, neck,
left, lower portion, directed medially, slightly anteriorly, and upwards penetrating the
subcutaneous tissues and muscles, involving the left lateral portion of the esophagus, then the
right lateral portion of the thyroid bone, the right common Carotid Artery, the right jugular vein,
and piercing the sterno-cleido Mastoid Muscle, then making a wound (exit), 1.3 cm. located at
the lateral aspect, neck, right, about 1 1/2 inches below the angle of the mandible.

2. Wound, gunshot, (entrance), 0.7 cm. in diameter, surrounded by Contusion Collar, 0.3 cm.
in width almost evenly distributed around the gunshot wound, located at the lumbar region, left
about 2 inches posteriorly from the Mid-axillary line directed medially, slight anteriorly and
slightly upwards penetrating the sub-cutaneous tissues and muscles, then to the abdominal
cavity and involving the upper portion of the descending colon, and the two loops of small
intestines, then piercing the right abdominal muscles, making a wound, (exit), 1.5 cm. located
at the lumbar region, right, about 1 1/2 inches anterior to the mid-axillary line, right.
Three witnesses positively identified the assailant as accused Hermogenes Magdueo: (1)
Elena Adion Lim, while sitted (sic) at the gate of her fence, about 20 to 30 meters away from
the house of Fiscal Dilig, saw the gunman coming from where she heard two successive shots
when he passed by her house, bringing a short gun in his right hand and a clutch bag while
hurriedly proceeding towards Liwanag Street. On October 30, 1980, she identified accused
Magdueno as the man she saw that early morning of October 15, 1980; (2) Ernesto Mari Y
Gonzales, a security guard of the Malaria Eradication Service, this City, while on board a
tricycle, passing in front of the house of Fiscal Dilig, on his way home, likewise heard the two
gunshots coming from the direction of Fiscal Dilig's house, prompting him to order the driver to
stop. He described the gunman as wearing a white polo shirt, blue pants and a hat, still
holding the gun pointed at Fiscal Dilig. When the gunman turned to his left side, Mari saw a
scar on his left temple below his left eyebrow. The man was still holding the gun in his right
hand while walking in a limping manner towards Mendoza Street. On the witness chamber, he
positively identified accused Hermogenes Magdueno as the gunman; (3) Cynthia Canto a taxi
dancer, residing at Jose Abad Santos, this City, while in front of the store of Aling Charing near
the house of Fiscal Dilig, waiting for a tricycle, saw the gunman standing by for a quite time,
then went nearer Fiscal Dilig who was then sitted (sic) on the driver's seat of his jeep and fired
two successive shots to the latter, exiting towards Mendoza Street. She could not be mistaken
that accused Hermogenes Magdueno was the gunman and when she came face to face with
him at the invitation of the police in Plaridel, Aborlan, Palawan, she readily Identified
Magdueo as the killer.
Magdueo also executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he admitted that he killed Fiscal
Dilig for a price or reward and implicated Leonardo Senas and Mauricio de Leon to the
commission of the crime. However, both Senas and de Leon were later dropped from the
amended information for lack of a prima facie case against them.
All the other accused were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
Gloria S. Dilig, the widow of the victim was presented as witness to prove the civil aspects of
the case. She testified on the actual damages the family incurred and the moral damages she
suffered as a result of the death of Fiscal Dilig.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding:
1) Accused Hermogenes Magdueno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and aggravated by price or reward and that
the crime was committed in contempt of/or with insult of public authority, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH, with all the accessory penalties
provided for by law, and to pay the costs. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
late Fernando M. Dilig in the sum of P130,000.00, as actual damages and P20,000.00, as
moral damages.

2) Accused Alejandro Guevarra, Teodorico Ramirez, Jr., Edgardo Caabay, Apolinario Sison
and Alfredo Guevarra, not guilty of the crime of murder and hereby acquits them of the charge
against them. The bailbond posted for the provisional liberty of accused Alejandro Guevarra,
Teodorico Ramirez, Jr., Edgardo Caabay and Alfredo Guevarra is hereby ordered cancelled
and the immediate release of accused Apolinario Sison is likewise ordered unless held for any
other cause.
The appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the lower court:
I THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR MURDER.
II THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED'S EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION.
We are convinced from the records that the appellant was the assailant of the late Fiscal
Fernando Dilig. The lower court did not err as alleged.
The appellant was a stranger in the town and was not known by the three eyewitnesses
before the incident. However, he was readily and positively Identified by the three
eyewitnesses upon confrontation. They could not have mistaken the appellant's Identity
because they had a clear view of him at the time and the incident happened in broad daylight.
Any doubt of his Identity is erased by the testimony of Ernesto Mari Gonzales, one of the
eyewitnesses, to the effect that the man he saw pointing a gun to the late Fiscal Dilig had a
scar on his left temple below his left eyebrow. The appellant, as observed by the lower court,
has a scar below his left eye and above the left eye at the eyebrow in the shape of a letter "J"
and at the end of the left eye somewhat shaped like the letter "V", perpendicular to the
eyebrow.
The defense failed to show any motive on the part of these eyewitnesses to falsely accuse the
appellant as having committed the crime. The appellant's accusation that Cynthia Canto, one
of the eyewitnesses testified against him "to claim a reward" is not supported by any evidence
on record.
In the light of the positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, his
defense of alibi necessarily falls. His assertion that on the day of the incident, he was at the
house of Leonardo Senas in Plaridel, Aborlan, Palawan deserves no credit. The appellant has
not shown that it was impossible for him to have been at the place of the incident at the time
the crime was committed. Moreover, as the lower court observed a bus ride from Aborlan,
Palawan, would take only a little more than two hours to the city.
Treachery in the commission of the crime is clearly established by the record.
The appellant fired two successive shots at the defenseless Fiscal Dilig while the latter was
still seated in his jeep, hitting him at the neck and lumbar region. According to Dr. Rufino P.
Ynzon, who performed the autopsy, on the victim; both wounds were fatal and that "death will
definitely occur." Immediately after the shooting, the appellant fled still holding his firearm.
The manner of the execution was such that the appellant deliberately and consciously
adopted means and ways of committing the crime and insured its execution without risk to
himself arising from any defense Fiscal Dilig might make. The two conditions necessary for
treachery to exist are present. (People v. Macariola, 120 SCRA 92; People v. Rhoda, 122
SCRA 909; People v. Mahusay, 138 SCRA 452; and People v. Radomes, 141 SCRA 548).
The fact that the appellant called out, "Fiscal" before shooting the victim does not negate the
presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. Since the appellant was a hired killer,
he wanted to insure that he was shooting the correct person. When Dilig turned his face to

find out who was calling him, the appellant fired immediately rendering no opportunity for Dilig
to defend himself.
The attendant circumstance of treachery qualifies the crime to murder. The first assigned error
is without merit.
The second assignment of error questions the trial court's finding that the extra-judicial
confession was admissible.
The lower court quoted Section 20, Article IV of the Bill of Rights and took pains to explain
why there was compliance with its mandate. The court commented on the. imbalance present
during custodial interrogations, the strange and unfamiliar surroundings where seasoned and
well-trained investigators do their work, and then rejected the appellant's allegations that it
was extracted through violence and torture. The trial court stated:
But a cursory evaluation of the evidence shows that accused Magdueno was properly
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he
might make could be used against him He was allowed to communicate with, and was even
given, a lawyer in the person of Atty. Clarito A. Demaala, Jr. of the CLAO in this City. As
certified to by Atty. Demaala, Jr., he assisted and was present when the accused was placed
under custodial investigation. Even before it started, Atty. Demaala interviewed the accused
and informed him of his constitutional rights. NBI Officer-in- Charge Celso A. Castillo, affirmed
this particular fact. He was allowed to converse with his counsel in his cell and the statement
thus obtained from him, signed and subscribed by him as true, whether inculpatory or
exculpatory, in whole and in part, shall be, as it is hereby, considered admissible in evidence.
(Morales, et al: v. Ponce Enrile, et al. L-61016; Moncupa, Jr. v. Ponce Enrile, et al. L-61107,
April 26, 1983.) It is presumed voluntary and no contrary evidence was shown. (People v.
Dorado, L-23464, 36 SCRA 452). There is spontaneity and voluntariness in his extra-judicial
confession which contains details that cannot be furnished by the investigators on how the
killing was planned, the reward to be received and the scenario of the killing (People v.
Opiniano, 22 SCRA 177). Furthermore, it was corroborated by other evidence which recites
the true sequence of events. (People v. Pontanosal, 20 SCRA 249).
With the admission of, and conformably to what the accused Hermogenes Magdueno alleged
in, his extra-judicial confession, the court finds that accused Magdueno was hired by a
'mysterious mastermind' with whose representative he agreed to kill Fiscal Dilig for a fee of
P80,000.00, of which he will receive a clean bill of P 30,000.00. Sometime during the last
week of September, 1980, at his residence in Divisoria, Metro Manila, he agreed to the
proposition. The representative of the mastermind,' Leonardo Senas, gave him the advance
payment of P5,000.00, with the balance of P25,000.00 to be paid after he accomplished the
mission. As to the gun he used, it was a 9mm. automatic revolver. This confirms the finding of
the NBI. ...
The records show that the CLAO lawyer, Atty. Clarito Demaala, entered his appearance as
counsel for the accused during the interrogation and was present from the start of the
investigation until it was finished.
The evidence showing that the appellant was a contract or hired killer especially contacted in
Manila to do a job in Puerto Princesa is strengthened by testimony.
Magdueo himself testified that he was formerly an inmate of Muntinglupa who was later
transferred to Sta. Lucia Sub-Colony and released in 1973. He stated that after his release, he
lived with relatives in Divisoria and worked with an aunt as sidewalk vendor. He explained his
presence in Palawan on the day of the killing by claiming that sometime in 1979 Leonardo

Senas accidentally passed by their place in Tabora and suggested that the appellant bring
assorted merchandize to Aborlan, Palawan where Senas resides. He, therefore, left for
Palawan on board the M/V Leon on September 28, 1980 (or shortly before the killing) and
visited Mauricio de Leon at Quito, Puerto Princesa, saw head-nurse Mrs. Fernandez at Sta.
Lucia, spent a night with a Mr. Obid at the Inagawan Sub-Colony and proceeded to Aborlan,
Palawan. He claims that at the time of the shooting, he was in the house of Senas in Aborlan
and learned only from the radio about the killing of Fiscal Dilig.
One of the prosecution witnesses, Andres Factors, testified that he was formerly an inmate in
Muntinglupa since October 26, 1955 and that while serving a sentence for triple death penalty,
he met Magdueno, a leader of the Sputnik Gang, also on death row. Magdueo was
nicknamed "Mande" and served as an attendant in the prison hospital Factors stated that
Magdueo was known as a TIRADOR or killer while in prison He further testified that while he
was in Sta. Lucia Sub-Colony in 1980, he saw Magdueo on October 12 or 13 at the gate of
Palawan Apitong. The reason given by the appellant for his being there was that he was in the
business of bangus fry.
There is plenty of other testimony about the participation of the appellant and the other
accused and the defenses they presented. The trial court summarized in its decision the
testimonies of sixteen (16) prosecution witnesses and twenty-one (21) witnesses for the
defense.
We have carefully examined the records and considering the testimony of the three
eyewitnesses to the shooting, their positive and categorical Identification of the appellant as
the assailant, the corroborative evidence on the circumstances of the killing, and the more
than coincidental presence of Magdueo in Palawan when he should have been in Manila, we
see no error in the lower court's finding that the appellant committed the crime of murder
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and aggravated by price and reward.
Magdueo, in effect, also admitted that he was a recidivist at the time of his trial. However,
recidivism was not alleged in the information and makes no difference in the determination of
the penalty in this case.
However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime with insult to public authority
does not seem to be borne by the records. For this aggravating circumstance to be
considered it must not only be shown that the crime was not committed in the presence of the
public authority but also that the crime was not committed against the public authority himself.
(U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150; People v. Rizal, 103 SCRA 282). In the instant case Fiscal
Dilig, the public authority involved in the crime, was the victim. Hence, the lower court, erred in
including commission of the crime with insult to public authority as an aggravating
circumstance.
Considering the presence of an aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating
circumstance attending the offense, the lower court imposed the proper penalty on the
appellant. The crime in this case is a particularly heinous one. The appellant is shown by the
records as a heartless contract killer. Upon being paid for a job, he had no compunctions
about traveling all the way to Palawan from Manila, stalking and liquidating an unwary victim
whose only fault was to perform his duties faithfully.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Amadeo D. Seno for accused-appellant.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990

FELICIANO, J.:
Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran
City, convicting him of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal
Case No. 4007 and of murder in Criminal Case No. 4012 and imposing upon him the penalty
of death in both cases.
On 18 December 1984, appellant was charged with violation of Section 1, paragraph (2), of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December 1984, in the City of Tagbilaran Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while acting under
the influence of drugs and without any license or permit from the proper authorities, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have ill his possession, custody and control an
unlicensed firearm, a SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number
359323 with Five (5) spent shells and Five (5) live ammunitions and without any justifiable
cause and with intent to kill, used the said firearm and ammunitions to shoot one Francis
Ernest Escano III hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following gunshot wounds or injuries,
to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS Head & Chest (through and through);
Head Entrance 1.4 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-Temporal Area; Port 1.3 x 0.3 cm.; Right
Cheek. 3.5 cm. above the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance 0.3 x 1 cm. Right Infrascapular Area at the level of the 7th Intercostal
Rib (Back); Exist 0.3 cm. dia; above the right nipple;
Y-shape laceration, check at the right angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of
the Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2 of the Presidential Decree
No. 1866. 1
On 11 January 1985, an amended information 2 for murder was also filed against appellant
reading as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December, 1984 in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
justifiable cause and with intent to kill, evident pre-meditation treachery, while acting under the
influence of drugs, with cruelty and deliberately augmenting the suffering of the victim, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot one Francis Ernest
Escano with the use of an unlicensed SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with
Serial Number 359323 hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following gunshot wounds or
injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS Head and Chest (Through & Through);
Head Entrance 14 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-temporal Area; Port l.3 x 0.3 cm., Right Cheek,
3.5 cm., above the right external meatus;

Chest Entrance 0.3 x 1 cm. right Infrascapular Area at the level of the 7th Inter-Costal
Rib (back); exit 0.3 cm. dia; above the right nipple
Y-shape laceration, cheek at the angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8.
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the deceased namely: Judge & Mrs. Francisco Rey H. Escano, in the amount to
be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation
to Section 17 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, with the qualifying aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation, treachery and acting under the influence of dangerous drugs and
cruelty.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. The two (2) criminal cases were
consolidated upon motion of the prosecution and tried jointly. On 31 July 1986, the trial court
rendered a decision 3 convicting appellant under both informations. The dispositive portion of
the decision read as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in Criminal
Case No. 4007 finding the accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions qualified with Murder under Section 1,
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and hereby sentences said Renato Tacan y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Further, decision is also rendered in Criminal Case
No. 4012 finding the same accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Batas Pambansa Blg.
179 and P.D. 1866. Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
(treachery used to qualify the crime to murder) and the special aggravating circumstances of
acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and with the use of an unlicensed firearm
and with insult to a person in authority and there being no mitigating circumstance to offset
them, and sentences the said Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The
accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francis Ernest Escano in
the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00); to pay actual compensatory
damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TEN
PESOS (P108,310.00); to pay moral damages to Judge Francisco Escano, Jr., the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and to Mrs. Lydia Escano the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for the mental anguish and suffering
each experienced because of the death of Francis Ernest. All such amount shall earn legal
interest from the time this decision shall become final and executory until fully satisfied. The
accused shall also pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Immediately after promulgation of the decision, appellant signified his intention to appeal to
this Court, although the same was subject to automatic review by this Court.
In his brief, appellant assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I. The lower court erred in believing the prosecution's version of the case instead of according
full faith and credence to the defendant's version.
II. The trial court erred in not holding that Renato Tac-an was justified in shooting the
deceased.
III. The trial court erred in not holding that in (sic) the least the defendant acted in incomplete
self-defense in shooting the deceased.

IV. The trial court erred in not holding that P.D. 1866 is inapplicable to the defendant inasmuch
as said decree was enforceable only during the existence of the Martial Law Regime.
V. The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant was placed twice in jeopardy for
having been prosecuted for violation of P.D. 1866 despite his being prosecuted for murder in
an information which alleges that the accused used an unlicensed firearm in killing the
deceased.
VI. The trial court erred in not adjudging the defendant innocent of murder.
From the record, the facts may be collated and summarized as follows:
Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months of age, and the
deceased Francis Ernest Escano III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates in the third year
of high school of the Divine Word College in Tagbilaran City. They were close friends, being
not only classmates but also members of the same gang, the Bronx gang. Renato had been to
the house where Francis and his parents lived, on one or two occasions. On those occasions,
Francis' mother noticed that Renato had a handgun with him. Francis was then advised by his
mother to distance himself from Renato. 4
Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship between Renato and Francis turned
sour. Sometime in September 1984, Renato and Francis quarrelled with each other, on which
occasion Francis bodily lifted Arnold Romelde from the ground. Arnold was friend and
companion to Renato. The quarrel resulted in Renato and Francis being brought to the high
school principal's office. The strained relationship between the two (2) erstwhile friends was
aggravated in late November 1984 when Francis teamed that Renato, together with other
members of the Bronx gang, was looking for him, apparently with the intention of beating him
up. Further deterioration of their relationship occurred sometime in the first week of December
1984, when graffiti appeared on the wall of the third year high school classroom and on the
armrest of a chair in that classroom, deprecating the Bronx gang and describing Renato as
"bayot" (homosexual) 5 Renato attributed the graffiti to Francis.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 December 1984, Renato entered Room 15 of the
high school building to attend his English III class. Renato placed his scrapbook prepared for
their Mathematics class on his chair, and approached the teacher, Mrs. Liliosa Baluma, to
raise a question. Upon returning to his chair, he found Francis sitting there, on the scrapbook.
Renato was angered by what he saw and promptly kicked the chair on which Francis was
seated. Francis, however, explained that he had not intentionally sat down on Renato's
scrapbook. A fistfight would have ensued but some classmates and two (2) teachers, Mrs.
Baluma and Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, intervened and prevented them from assaulting each
other. After the two (2) had quieted down and apparently shaken hands at the instance of Mrs.
Baluma, the latter resumed her English III class. Francis sat on the last row to the extreme
right of the teacher while Renato was seated on the same last row at the extreme left of the
teacher. While the English III class was still going on, Renato slipped out of the classroom and
went home to get a gun. He was back at the classroom approximately fifteen (15) minutes
later. 6
The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas scheduled for 3:00 p.m. had just started in
Room 15 when Renato suddenly burst into the room, shut the door and with both hands
raised, holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?" Upon sighting Francis seated behind
and to the light of student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired at Francis, hitting a notebook, a geometry
book and the armrest of Ruel's chair. Francis and Ruel jumped up and with several of their
classmates rushed forward towards the teacher's platform to seek protection from their

teacher. Renato fired a second time, this time hitting the blackboard in front of the class.
Francis and the other students rushed back towards the rear of the room. Renato walked
towards the center of the classroom and fired a third time at Francis, hitting the concrete wall
of the classroom. Francis and a number of his classmates rushed towards the door, the only
door to and from Room 15. Renato proceeded to the teacher, s platform nearest the door and
for the fourth time fired at Francis as the latter was rushing towards the door. This time,
Francis was hit on the head and he fell on the back of Ruel and both fell to the floor. Ruel was
pulled out of the room by a friend; Francis remained sprawled on the floor bleeding profusely. 7
Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A teacher, Mr.
Pablo Baluma, apparently unaware that it was Renato who had gunned down Francis,
approached Renato and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive inside the room.
Renato thereupon re-entered Room 15, closed the door behind him, saying: "So, he is still
alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor,
Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back
below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the right nipple. 8
Renato then left with two (2) remaining students and locked Francis alone inside Room 15.
Renato proceeded to the ground floor and entered the faculty room. There, he found some
teachers and students and ordered them to lock the door and close the windows, in effect
holding them as hostages. He also reloaded his gun with five (5) bullets. After some time, a
team of Philippine Constabulary troopers led by Capt. Larino Lazo arrived and surrounded the
faculty room. With a hand-held public address device, Capt. Lazo called upon Renato to
surrender himself Renato did not respond to this call. Renato's brother approached Capt. Lazo
and volunteered to persuade his brother to give up. Renato's father who, by this time had also
arrived, pleaded with Renato to surrender himself Renato then turned over his gun to his
brother through an opening in the balustrade of the faculty room. Capt. Lazo took the gun from
Renato's brother, went to the door of the faculty room, entered and placed Renato under
arrest. 9
Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room 15, some teachers and students came to rescue
Francis but could not open the door which Renato had locked behind him. One of the students
entered the room by climbing up the second floor on the outside and through the window and
opened the door from the inside. The teachers and students brought Francis down to the
ground floor from whence the PC soldiers rushed him to the Celestino Gallares Memorial
Hospital. 10 Francis died before reaching the hospital.
Capt. Lazo brought Renato to the PC Headquarters at Camp Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City. The
officer deposited the revolver recovered from Renato which was an Airweight Smith and
Wesson .38 caliber revolver, with Serial No. 359323, as well as the five (5) live bullets
removed from the said revolver, and the five (5) empty cartridges which Renato had turned
over to him. Ballistic examination conducted by Supervising Ballistician, Artemio Panganiban,
National Bureau of Investigation, Cebu, showed that the empty cartridge cases had been fired
from the revolver recovered from Renato. 11
Appellant at the outset assails the trial court for having believed the prosecution's version of
the facts instead of the version offered by the appellant. The trial court took into account, inter
alia, the positive and direct testimony of:
1. Mrs. Liliosa Baluma who testified as to, among other things, the events which took place
inside her English III classroom immediately before the shooting;

2. Ruel Ungab a fifteen (15) year old classmate of Renato and Francis, who had fallen on
the floor with Francis when the latter was finally hit by Renato;
3. Damaso Pasilbas the Mathematics teacher who was holding his class when Renato had
burst into Room 15 and started firing at Francis; and
4. Napoleon Jumauan another sixteen (16) year old, classmate of Renato and Francis who
was inside the classroom when Renato had started firing at Francis and who was only about a
foot away from the head of Francis when Renato, having re-entered Room 15, had fired at
Francis as the latter was sprawled on the floor of the classroom.
After careful examination of the record, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion of
the trial court that Renato had indeed shot and killed Francis under the circumstances and in
the manner described by these witnesses.
1. The claim of self-defense.
Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense, or at least in incomplete self-defense,
when he shot Francis. For a claim of self-defense to be sustained, the claimant must show by
clear and convincing evidence that the following requisites existed:
a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel the aggression; and
c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. 12
Testifying in his own behalf, Renato said that a few minutes before the end of Mrs. Baluma's
English III class, Francis had approached him:
(Atty. Seno, Defense Counsel)
Q: How did it happened (sic) that you had a conversation with Francis?
(Renato)
A: While the class was going on, Mrs. Baluma was writing on the blackboard.
Q: Then what happened?
A: While our teacher was writing on the blackboard Francis suddenly got near me.
Q: And what happened when Francis approached you?
A: He said, 'So you are brave now you had a (sic) guts to fight against me.'
Q: And what else did he say?
A: He said, 'Go home, get your firearm because I will go home to get a gun.'
Q: Was that all that he told you?
A: He further said, 'You go home get your firearm, if you won't go home and get a gun, I will
go to your place and kill you including your parents, brothers and sisters.'
Q: And after that where did Francis go?
A: Before the bell rang he went ahead. 13
(Emphasis supplied)
We note at the outset that there was no evidence before the Court, except Renato's own
testimony, that Francis had uttered the above statements attributed to him by Renato.
Although there had been about twenty-five (25) other students, and the teacher, in the
classroom at the time, no corroborating testimony was offered by the defense. In the second
place, assuming (arguendo merely) that Francis had indeed made those statements, such
utterances cannot be regarded as the unlawful aggression which is the first and most
fundamental requirement of self-defense. Allegedly uttered in a high school classroom by an
obviously unarmed Francis, such statements could not reasonably inspire the "well grounded
and reasonable belief" claimed by Renato that "he was in imminent danger of death or bodily
harm." 14 Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized

or at the very least is clearly imminent: it cannot consist in oral threats or a merely threatening
stance or posture. 15 Further as pointed out by the Solicitor General, Francis was obviously
without a firearm or other weapon when Renato returned and burst into Room 15 demanding
to know where Francis was and forthwith firing at him repeatedly, without the slightest regard
for the safety of his other classmates and of the teacher. There being no unlawful aggression,
there simply could not be self-defense whether complete or incomplete, 16 and there is
accordingly no need to refer to the other requirements of lawful self-defense.
2. The claim that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable.
As pointed out at the outset, appellant was charged with unlawful possession of an unlicensed
firearm, a Smith and Wesson Airweight.38 caliber revolver with five (5) spent bullets and five
(5) live ones and with having used such firearm and ammunition to shoot to death Francis
Ernest Escano III, in violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 provides, in relevant part, that:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death
shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant urges that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable to him "considering that the reason for its
[P.D. No. 1866] issuance no longer exists." He argues that P.D. No. 1866 was enforceable
only during the existence of martial law, and that when martial law was "lifted in 1979," the
reason for the "existence" of P.D. No. 1866 faded away, with the result that the "original law on
firearms, that is, Section 2692 of the [Revised] Administrative Code, together with its premartial law amendments, came into effect again thereby replacing P.D. No. 1866." 17
There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which suggests
that it was intended to remain in effect only for the duration of the martial law imposed upon
the country by former President Marcos. Neither does the statute contain any provision that so
prescribes its lapsing into non-enforceability upon the termination of the state or period of
martial law. On the contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its own terms purported to "consolidate, codify
and integrate" all prior laws and decrees penalizing illegal possession and manufacture of
firearms, ammunition and explosives in order "to harmonize their provisions as well as to
update and revise certain provisions and prior statutes "in order to more effectively deter
violators of the law on firearms, ammunitions and explosives." 18 Appellant's contention is thus
without basis in fact.
3. The claim of double jeopardy.
It is also contended by appellant that because he had already been charged with illegal
possession of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007, aggravated by the use of
such unlicensed firearm to commit a homicide or murder, he was unconstitutionally placed in
jeopardy of punishment for the second time when he was charged in Criminal Case No. 4012
with murder "with the use of an unlicensed [firearm]," in violation of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179.
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a
second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information

charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there
is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed
firearm penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
4012 was that of murder punished under the Revised Penal Code. It would appear selfevident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite different one from the other, such
that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as
having placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.
We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 4007 after charging appellant with unlawful
possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, went on to state that said firearm and
ammunition had been used to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escao III. We note also that the
amended information in Criminal Case No. 4012 after charging appellant with the unlawful
killing of Francis Ernest Escao III, stated that the killing had been done with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. We believe these additional allegations in the two (2) informations did not
have the effect of charging appellant with having committed the same offense more than once.
However, in sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder, the trial
court did take into account as a "special aggravating circumstance" the fact that the killing of
Francis had been done "with the use of an unlicensed firearm." In so doing, we believe and so
hold, the trial court committed error. There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed
firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information charging
homicide or murder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used
to increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death (or reclusion
perpetua under the 1987 Constitution). The essential point is that the unlicensed character or
condition of the instrument used in destroying human life or committing some other crime, is
not included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code. 19
In contrast, under an information for unlawful possession (or manufacture, dealing in,
acquisition or disposition) of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. No. 1866 authorizes the increase of
the imposable penalty for unlawful possession or manufacture, etc. of the unlicensed firearm
where such firearm was used to destroy human life. Although the circumstance that human life
was destroyed with the use of the unlicensed firearm is not an aggravating circumstance
under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be taken into account to increase the
penalty to death (reclusion perpetua, under the 1987 Constitution) because of the explicit
provisions of P.D. No. 1866. As noted earlier, the unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm
or ammunition is an offense punished under a special law and not under the Revised Penal
Code.
4. The claim that there was no treachery.
Appellant contends that there was no treachery present because before any shot was fired,
Renato had shouted "where is Francis?" Appellant in effect suggests his opening statement
was a warning to Francis and that the first three (3) shots he had fired at Francis were merely
warning shots. Moreover, building upon his own testimony about the alleged threat that
Francis had uttered before he (Renato) left his English III class to go home and get a gun,
appellant argues that Francis must have anticipated his return and thus had sufficient time to
prepare for the coming of the appellant. 20 Appellant's contention, while ingenious, must be
rejected. The trial court made a finding of treachery taking explicit account of the following
factors:

1. Room 15 of the Divine Word College High School Department Tagbilaran City, is situated in
the second floor of the building. It is a corner room and it has only one (1) door which is the
only means of entry and exit;
2. At the time of the attack, the deceased was seated on his chair inside his classroom and
was writing on the armrest of his chair and also talking to Ruel Ungab and while their teacher,
Mr. Damaso Pasilbas was checking the attendance. The deceased was not aware of any
impending assault neither did he have any means to defend himself;
3. The accused used an airweight Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver in shooting to death
the defenseless and helpless Francis Ernest Escao;
4. The attack was so sudden and so unexpected. the accused consciously conceived that
mode of attack;
5. The accused fired at Francis again and again and did not give him a chance to defend
himself. After the deceased was hit on the head and fell to the floor while he was already
sprawled and completely defenseless the accused fired at him again and the deceased was
hit on the chest;
6. The deceased was not armed. He was totally defenseless. He was absolutely not aware of
any coming attack. 21
The Court also pointed out that Renato must have known that Francis while inside Room 15
had no means of escape there being only one (1) door and Room 15 being on the second
floor of the building. Renato in effect blocked the only exit open to Francis as he stood on the
teacher's platform closest to the door and fired as Francis and Ruel sought to dash through
the door. Renato's question "where is Francis?" cannot reasonably be regarded as an effort to
warn Francis for he shot at Francis the instant he sighted the latter, seated and talking to Ruel
Ungab. That Renato fired three (3) shots before hitting Francis with the fourth shot, can only
be ascribed to the indifferent markmanship of Renato and to the fact that Francis and the
other students were scurrying from one part of the room to the other in an effort to evade the
shots fired by Renato. The cumulative effect of the circumstances underscored by the trial
court was that the attack upon Francis had been carried out in a manner which disabled
Francis from defending himself or retaliating against Renato. Finally, the circumstance that
Renato, having been informed that Francis was still alive, re-entered Room 15 and fired again
at Francis who lay on the floor and bathed with his own blood, manifested Renato's conscious
choice of means of execution which directly and especially ensured the death of his victim
without risk to himself. 22 We are compelled to agree with the trial court that treachery was
here present and that, therefore, the killing of Francis Ernest Escao III was murder.
5. The claim that there was no evident premeditation.
The trial court also found the presence of evident premeditation and appreciated the same as
a generic aggravating circumstance. Here, it is the urging of the appellant that the requisites of
evident premeditation had not been sufficiently shown. In order that evident premeditation may
be taken into account, there must be proof of (a) the time when the offender formed his intent
to commit the crime; (b) an action manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his
determination to commit the crime; and (c) of the passage of a sufficient interval of time
between the determination of the offender to commit the crime and the actual execution
thereof, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 23 The defense pointed out
that barely fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed from the time Renato left his English III class and
the time he returned with a gun. While there was testimony to the fact that before that fatal
day of 14 December 1984, anger and resentment had welled up between Francis and Renato,

there was no evidence adequately showing when Renato had formed the intention and
determination to take the life of Francis. Accordingly, we must discard evident premeditation
as an aggravating circumstance.
6. The claim that the killing was not done under the influence of a dangerous drug.
Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 which was promulgated on 2 March 1982 provides as follows:
SEC. 17. The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, when a crime is
committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous drugs, such state shall be
considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of a crime and the
application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court found that Francis was killed by Renato while the later was under the influence
of a dangerous drug, specifically marijuana, and took that into account as a "special
aggravating circumstance". No medical evidence had been submitted by the prosecution to
show that Renato had smoked marijuana before gunning down Francis. Fourteen (14) days
had elapsed after December 14, 1984 before Renato was medically examined for possible
traces of marijuana; the results of the examination were negative. Defense witness Dr.
Rogelio Ascona testified that in order to have a medically valid basis for determining the
presence of marijuana in the human system, the patient must be examined within twenty-four
(24) hours from the time he is supposed to have smoked marijuana. 24 The prosecution had
presented Orlando Balaba, a student at the Divine Word College, High School Department,
who testified that he found Renato and one Jaime Racho inside the men's room of the High
School Department sucking smoke from a hand-rolled thing that look like a cigarette, that he
had asked Renato what that was and that Renato had replied damo (marijuana). 25 While the
testimony of Orlando Balaba was corroborated by two (2) other prosecution witnesses, we
believe that Orlando Balaba's testimony was incompetent to show that what Renato and
Jaime Racho were smoking inside the men's room was indeed marijuana. It was pointed out
by apellant that Orlando Balaba had never smoked nor smelled marijuana.
In the absence of medical evidence, the Court took into account certain detailed factors as
circumstantial evidence supporting the testimony of Orlando Balaba. These circumstances
were:
The circumstance of place where the killing was committed, the circumstance of the manner
of the attack, the circumstance of holding hostage some teachers and students inside the
faculty room, the circumstance of terrifying an entire school, the circumstance that sitting on a
scrapbook is too insignificant as to arouse passion strong enough to motivate a killing, are
circumstantial evidences that gave the court no room for doubt that prosecution witnesses
Orlando Balaba, Benjamin Amper and Allan de la Serna truthfully told the court that they saw
the accused smoking marijuana inside the comfort room at 1:45 in the afternoon of December
14, 1984. ... . 26
The above circumstances pointed to by the trial court may be indicative of passionate anger
on the part of Renato; we do not believe that they necessarily show that Renato had smoked
marijuana before entering his English III class. In the absence of competent medical or other
direct evidence of ingestion of a dangerous drug, courts may be wary and critical of indirect
evidence, considering the severe consequences for the accused of a finding that he had acted
while under the influence of a prohibited drug. The Court considers that the evidence
presented on this point was simply inadequate to support the ruling of the trial court that
Renato had shot and killed Francis while under the influence of a prohibited drug.
7. The claim that appellant had voluntarily surrendered.

Appellant contends that he had voluntarily surrendered and that the trial court should have
considered that mitigating circumstance in his favor. The trial court did not, and we consider
that it correctly refused to do so. Firstly, Renato surrendered his gun, not himself, 27 by
handing over the weapon through the balustrade of the faculty room. Secondly, he
surrendered the gun to his brother, who was not in any case a person in authority nor an
agent of a person in authority. 28 Thirdly, Renato did not surrender himself he was arrested by
Capt. Lazo. The fact that he did not resist arrest, did not constitute voluntary surrender. 29
Finally, if it be assumed that Renato had surrendered himself, such surrender cannot be
regarded as voluntary and spontaneous. Renato was holed up in the faculty room, in effect
holding some teachers and students as hostages. The faculty room was surrounded by
Philippine Constabulary soldiers and there was no escape open to him. He was not entitled to
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
8. Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities.
The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in contempt of or with
insult to the public authorities:
Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or private school is considered a
person in authority. The fact that Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in mathematics, was
already checking the attendance did not deter the accused from pursuing his evil act, The
accused ignored his teacher's presence and pleas. Not yet satisfied with the crime and terror
he had done to Francis and the entire school, the accused entered the faculty room and held
hostage the teachers and students who were inside that room. To the court, this act of the
accused was an insult to his teachers and to the school, an act of callus disregard of other's
feelings and safety and completely reprehensible. 30
We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978
and Presidential Decree No. 299, provides as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who shall be deemed as
such. In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any
person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court
or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A
barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of
life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader and any
person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in
authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and
persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges
and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the
occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by P.D.
No. 299, September 19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor
of a public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher
or professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon
a person in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the

agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of
Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of
which any person "directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority."
Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for
by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an
accused, we do not believe that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school
may be regarded as a "public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, 31 the provision the trial court applied in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 31 July 1986 is hereby MODIFIED in the
following manner and to the following extent only:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4007, appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. In Criminal Case No. 4012 (a) the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and of having acted with contempt of or insult to the public authorities shall be DELETED and
not taken into account; and (b) the special aggravating circumstances of acting while under
the influence of dangerous drugs and with the use of an unlicensed firearm shall similarly be
DELETED and not taken into account. There being no generic aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances present, the appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua shall be served successively in accordance with
the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. As so modified, the decision of the trial
court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 11-12.
2 Rollo, pp. 13-14.
3 Ibid, pp. 30-93.
4 TSN, 12 November 1985, pp. 179-180.
5 TSN, 28 April 1986, pp. 11-16.
6 TSN, 1 April 1985, pp. 8-16, 30: TSN, 2 April 1985, pp. 5-11.
7 TSN, 2 April 1985, pp. 11, 12,19-39; TSN, 25 April 1986, pp. 39-48.
8 TSN, 10 September 1985, pp. 144-147; TSN, 11 November 1985, pp. 106-107.
9 TSN, 1 April 1985, pp. 22-26.
10 TSN, 10 September 1985, pp. 152-154.
11 See Ballistic Report. Exhibit "I" for the Prosecution.
12 Article 11 (1), Revised Penal Code.
13 Appellant's Brief, pp. 23-24; Rollo, pp. 134-135.
14 Appellant's Brief, pp. 35-36; Rollo, pp. 146-147.
15 People v. Lachica, 132 SCRA 230 (1984).
16 People v. Nulla, 153 SCRA 471 (1987).
17 Appellants Brief, p. 42; Rollo, p. 153.
18 Third, Fourth and Fifth Whereas Clauses. P.D. No. 1866.
19 And even if it were, the provisions of Article 62, paragraph 1 of the same Code would
become applicable to prevent its being appreciated for the purpose of increasing the
imposable penalty:

Article 62. Effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual
delinquency. ... ...
(1) Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by
law or which are included bythe law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor
shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. (Emphasis supplied.)
20 Appellant's Brief, pp. 46-47; Rollo, pp. 157-158.
21 Rollo, pp. 82-83.
22 People v. Tingson, 47 SCRA 243 (1972).
23 People v. Estillore, 141 SCRA 456 (1986).
24 TSN, 1 April 1986, pp. 166-169.
25 TSN, 11 November 1985, pp. 172-175.
26 Rollo, p. 206.
27 People v. Palo, G.R. No. L-9593, 31 July 1957.
28 Article 13, paragraph 7, Revised Penal Code.
29 People v. Siojo, 61 Phil. 307 (1935); People v. Yuman, 61 Phil. 786 (1935); People v. Velez,
58 SCRA 21 (1974); and People v. Conwi, 71 Phil. 595 (1976).
30 Decision, RTC, p. 45; Rollo, p. 207.
31 Reyes, L.B., Revised Penal Code, p. 133 (1981 ed.).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24002 January 21, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO DIAZ and GERARDO DIAZ, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro and Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya for plaintiff-appellee.
Jovito R. Salonga for defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
This is an appeal of defendants Francisco Diaz and Gerardo Diaz from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Samar convicting them of murder.
Gerardo was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, while Francisco was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal. Both appellants were ordered to pay solidarily to the heirs of
Quintin Tadia an indemnity in the sum of six thousand pesos (P6,000) and to pay the costs
proportionately. (Criminal Case No. 202-CC).
There should be no difficulty in resolving the appeal. The case is classic in its simplicity. The
prosecution's evidence consists of eyewitness testimony or direct evidence, not deceptive
circumstantial evidence. Appellant Francisco Diaz admits that he killed Tadia. He justifies the
killing on the ground of self-defense. His younger brother Gerardo denies any participation in
the killing. He has set up the easily contrivable defense of alibi.
So, the main issue is whether credence can be accorded to Francisco Diaz's plea of selfdefense and Gerardo's alibi.
The alternative issues are whether the brothers conspired to kill the victim and whether
treachery and evident premeditation should qualify the killing as murder. The trial court did not
pass upon those ancillary issues.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of
September 4, 1963 Remegia Carasos, a fourteen-year old girl, and her first cousin, Anita
Pacaira (Pakaira), eleven years old, were gathering camotes in a farm located at a place
fittingly called Sitio Camotian, Barrio Perito, municipality of Sta. Margarita, Western Samar.
In that peaceful, rustic scene, there suddenly appeared Francisco Diaz (Ansing or Francing), a
twenty-four year old unmarried farmer of that place, whom Remegia and Anita had known for
many years. Without any preliminaries, he embraced Remegia from behind and against her
will and held her breast. He knelt behind her while she was gathering camotes. She shouted
for help, saying: "Anita (Aning), help me because I am being embraced". Reacting to
Remegia's cry for help, Anita, with a bolo, struck Francisco on the head and hands. Francisco
released Remegia and fled. He suffered some injuries in consequence of those blows. The
injuries were treated at the puericulture center by the sanitary inspector (Exh. D and D-1).
The two girls left the camote farm and hastened to the house of Quintin Tadia (Tadya), their
grandfather, in Sitio Ilawod. They informed him that Francisco Diaz had embraced and abused

Remegia. Remegia had been brought up by her grandfather. She was then staying with him.
Anita was living with her parents in a house about six brazas from Tadia's house.
Tadia immediately reported the incident to the barrio lieutenant. He gave Tadia a note for the
municipal authorities so that the proper complaint could be filed against Francisco Diaz.
At around seven o'clock in the morning of the following day, September 5th, Tadia,
accompanied by his teenage granddaughters, Remegia and Anita, was on his way to the
poblacion of Sta. Margarita to file complaint. He was unarmed. He was carrying on his back a
catopis, an oblong basket about four by two "palms' length" containing provisions of boiled
camotes. He was walking ahead, followed by Remegia and Anita one braza behind him.
While they were ascending the hill or cliff ( pangpang in Waray dialect) in Sitio Ilawod,
Francisco Diaz and his younger brother Gerardo (Adong), twenty-one years old, appeared on
the crest of the hill. Both were wearing denim pants and white shirts. Gerardo was armed with
a locally made shotgun called bardog (Exh. C), about fifty inches long. He immediately fired
sidewise at Tadia while about four meters from the latter, hitting him in the neck. The shot
felled Tadia. He rolled down the lower part of the cliff near the Alao Creek and lay there flat on
his back with his catopis.
Then, the brothers jumped to the lower part of the cliff. Gerardo told his brother: "Go ahead,
Francisco, stab that fellow". Francisco placed his foot on the prostrate body of Quintin Tadia,
bent over him and repeatedly stabbed him in different parts of his body. Francisco was armed
with a bolo commonly called utak which is used in gathering firewood.
After witnessing the assault, Remegia Carasos ran in the direction of her house. Anita Pacairo
hid herself among the bushes or tall grasses "sitting, crouching and peeping" and "seeing all
that was happening" (78 tsn.). Tadia died on the spot where he fell. Gerardo placed his
bardog on a moss-covered stone called palanas about three brazas from Tadia's body.
Remegia informed her father and the inhabitants of the barrio about the ambuscade and the
killing of her grandfather. Gerardo Diaz went home while Francisco surrendered to the
authorities.
Doctor Tecla Tagle Valley, the town's municipal health officer, performed an autopsy on the
body of the deceased Quintin Tadia. Her medical findings indicate that the following injuries
caused the death of the sixty-two year old victim:
1. Internal hemorrhage due to penetrating wounds on the chest about two and one-half inches
long and five inches in depth, penetrating the lower lobe of the right lung, superior vena cava
and the right ventricle of the heart.
2. Punctured wound, one inch long and one inch in depth, left mandibular region.
3. Stab wound, one inch long and one half inch in depth below left ear.
4. Penetrating wound, four inches in depth, about one centimeter in circumference, occipital
region.
5. Penetrating wound, four inches and one half in depth, about one centimeter in
circumference at the nape.
6. Stab wound, one-half inch in depth and three inches long, left shoulder.
7. Punctured wound, left leg, about two inches long, penetrating thru the side portion. (Exh. A).
Doctor Valley found two pellets ( perdigones or birdshot) in the two gunshot wounds. The
pellet found in the nape is Exhibit B.
On September 6, 1963 Gerardo Diaz was arrested in Barrio Perito by Policemen Venancio
Melka and Simplicio Calibo. He did not resist arrest. He was in good physical condition. On
September 9, 1963, or four days after the killing, Remegia and Anita executed before the

municipal judge sworn statements wherein they recounted the antecedents and details of the
killing (pages 3 to 8 of the Record). On that same date the chief of police filed in the municipal
court a complaint for murder against the Diaz brothers.
They waived the preliminary investigation. The case was remanded to the Court of First
Instance at Calbayog City where, on November 6, 1963, the fiscal filed against them an
information for murder.
As already noted, appellant Francisco Diaz, while assuming sole responsibility for the killing,
set up the exculpatory plea of self-defense. His version was that he and Tadia were neighbors.
Because he did not accede to Tadia' request for a pig, Tadia allegedly followed him to his
abaca plantation near the Alao River. When Francisco again refused to grant Tadia's request
for the pig, the latter allegedly hacked Francisco with his bolo, wounding him the hand
between the middle and index fingers and in the left side of his head. Francisco retreated, but
when he was cornered, "he pulled the trigger of" his shotgun, causing Tadia "to release his
bolo". Francisco then picked up Tadia's bolo (note that Francisco himself had his own bolo).
He threw away his gun and repeatedly stabbed Tadia. After the stabbing he surrendered to the
authorities.
The inveracity of Francisco's version is quite apparent. The wounds, which according to
Francisco were inflicted on him by Tadia, were the injuries which were inflicted on him on the
preceding day by Anita Pacairo (Exh. D-1). The improbable facets of his story induce disbelief.
A trivial cause may possibly provoke a man to assault another person. But it was unlikely in
this case that Tadia, a sexagenarian grandfather, would have gone to the extent of assaulting
the twenty-four year old Francisco Diaz who was armed with a gun and a bolo, just because
the latter refused to give him a pig.
The prosecution eyewitnesses, Remegia Carasos and Anita Pacaira, positively identified
Gerardo Diaz as the gun wielder who with his brother, Francisco, ambushed Tadia on the cliff.
Such an unmistakable identification can be negated by the alibi interposed by Gerardo Diaz.
He claimed that on September 5, 1963 he was in his house "having a headache and his
bones were aching" (p. 7, Appellant's Brief). He said that he was treated by Honorio Albite. His
mother said that Gerardo was treated by Liloy Diaz. Gerardo said that he was already sick on
September 2, 1963. His mother, who does not know the months of the year, said that he got
sick on September 4th. These discrepancies weaken Gerardo's alibi. Modesto Diaz, the father
of Gerardo, tried to corroborate his alibi. Modesto, "hopelessly illiterate" person, did not know
the month and year when Gerardo was sick.
Gerardo's supposed indisposition could not have prevented him from going to the cliff with
Francisco and waylaying the unsuspecting and unfortunate Tadia. To establish an alibi, the
accused must show that he was at another place for such a period of time that it was
impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its
commission (People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973; People vs. Lumantas, L28355, July 17, 1969, 28 SCRA 764, 768).<re||an1w> The alibi of Gerardo Diaz cannot be
sustained. His counsel de oficio agrees "that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and is
generally received with caution". In this case, it was evidently a manufactured alibi.
The trial court carefully observed the demeanor of Remegia Carasos and Anita Pacaira while
testifying. It found them to be "candid and trustworthy" eyewitnesses. The killing was
perpetrated in broad daylight. Remegia was even able to recollect the garments worn by the
Diaz brothers.

As appropriately observed by the trial court, the brothers conspired to kill Tadia to prevent him
from filing a charge of abusos deshonestos. Moreover, Francisco Diaz might have felt
aggrieved because Anita Pacaira had hit him with a bolo and wounded him in the head and
hand (Exh. D-1).
The alternative contention of appellant Gerardo Diaz is that he did not conspire with his
brother Francisco in assaulting Tadia and that he should be held liable only for lesiones for
shooting the victim. That contention is belied by the record.
Doctor Valley found that two gunshots wounds were inflicted. One was a penetrating wound in
the occipital region and another was a penetrating wound in the nape (Nos. 4 and 5, Exh. A).
She testified that, because those wounds were not treated, they contributed to the victim's
death. Gerardo was the one who inflicted those wounds. He used a deadly weapon. He fired
at the vital parts of the victim's body. He desisted from firing further because the victim had
fallen on the river bank below the cliff as a result of the first shot and was beyond the range of
his gun, which was intended for hunting birds.
The conspiracy between the brothers to kill Tadia may be inferred from the antecedents and
circumstances surrounding the killing. The lascivious or vexatious act committed by Francisco
Diaz on Remegia Carasos was reported to the barrio lieutenant. He advised Tadia to go to
town and lodge a complaint with the proper authorities. That fact must have been known to
Francisco Diaz. He wanted to forestall that eventuality. To accomplish that objective, he
decided to liquidate Tadia. It was natural or probable that he should seek the collaboration of
his younger brother Gerardo.
The two brothers appeared together on the cliff on that fateful morning of September 5, 1963
to ambush Tadia. Gerardo was armed with a deadly weapon that could be employed at a
distance without exposing himself to any immediate retaliatory act of the victim. He
commenced the assault by firing at Tadia. Then, when Tadia fell down the cliff, Gerardo
maliciously induced or instructed Francisco to continue the assault by stabbing the fallen
Tadia. Francisco obeyed that injunction by inflicting five stab wounds on the defenseless
victim. These circumstances reveal that the brothers acted in concert, impelled by their
common design to kill Tadia. Their liability for the killing is collective, not individual or separate.
The appellants' defenses are untenable in their transparent flimsiness and fabricated
character. It results that the strong, clear and convincing evidence of the prosecution on the
felonious killing perpetrated by the appellants may be regarded as conclusive. Their guilt has
been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The crime committed by the appellants is murder qualified by treachery as alleged in the
information. There was treachery (alevosia) because the brothers made a deliberate surprise
or unexpected assault on Tadia. They literally ambushed him. They waited for him on the cliff,
a high ground which rendered it difficult for him to flee or maneuver in his defense. Tadia was
shot sidewise while he was ascending the hill or cliff burdened by his catopis or food basket.
That was another circumstance which handicapped him in resisting the assault. The initial
attack was successful. Tadia fell and rolled down the cliff and landed near the creek below. In
that helpless state, he was ruthlessly stabbed by Francisco Diaz.
The appellants resorted to means of execution which directly and specially insured the killing
without any risk to themselves arising from any defense which the victim could have made.
Actually, he was not able to make any defense, unarmed and attacked unaware as he was.
The treacherous mode of attack is incontrovertible (Par. 16, Art. 14 and Art. 248, Revised
Penal Code).

The attack was also attended with abuse of superiority. Two armed young men unexpectedly
assaulted an unarmed sexagenarian. However, abuse of superior strength is merged with
treachery.
The circumstance of old age cannot be considered aggravating. There was no evidence that
the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. That circumstance
may be absorbed in treachery (People vs. Gervacio, L-21565, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 960;
People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35, 44).
The trial court did not make any finding as to the degree of instruction of the offenders. Hence,
on appeal, that alternative circumstance cannot be considered in fixing the penalty on the
appellants (People vs. Casillar, L-28132, November 25, 1969, 30 SCRA 352, 358).
As to Francisco Diaz, evident premeditation should be appreciated. It should be recalled that
the embracing incident was reported by Tadia to the barrio lieutenant after two o'clock in the
afternoon of September 4, 1963. That functionary advised Tadia to file a complaint with the
authorities in the town of Sta. Margarita. It may reasonably be assumed that Francisco Diaz
became aware that same afternoon that Tadia, who was his neighbor, was going to the
poblacion to lodge a complaint against him. That would explain why early in the morning of the
next day, September 5th, at about seven o'clock, he and his brother were already in the hill or
cliff waiting for Tadia who was on his way to town. The trial court said:
Francisco having been boloed on the head, he and his younger brother must have decided to,
and thus conspired, to retaliate. For this purpose they armed themselves. Second, having
come to know that the deceased was going to the poblacion, in company with Remegia
Carasos and Anita Pacaira to file the corresponding complaint against Francisco Diaz for
abusing Remegia Carasos, both accused must have decided and, so deciding must have
confabulated, to waylay the deceased so as to prevent him from pursuing his plan.
Thus, there was a sufficient interval of time, more than one-half day, within which appellant
Francisco Diaz had full opportunity for meditation and reflection and to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will (vencer las determinaciones de la voluntad) had he desired
to hearken to its warnings (U.S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530, 547).
However, with respect to Gerardo Diaz, premeditacion conocida should not be appreciated.
Obviously, he participated in the assault in order to help his elder brother who exercised some
moral ascendancy over him and who was the one directly affected by the embracing incident
which preceded the killing (People vs. Talok, 65 Phil. 696, 707; Art. 62, Revised Penal Code).
Premeditation, which was alleged in the information as a qualifying circumstance, should be
considered only as generic aggravating circumstance with respect to Francisco Diaz since
treachery has already been used to qualify the killing as murder (See People vs. Ubia, 97
Phil. 515, 535). In his case, it is offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to
the authorities.
The penalty for murder, which is reclusion temporal maximum to death, should be imposed in
its medium period on Francisco Diaz. He should be sentenced to reclusion perpetua (Arts.
64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
With respect to Gerardo Diaz, as no generic aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be
considered in his case, he was properly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua
(Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
The indemnity which the appellants should pay to the heirs of Quintin Tadia should be raised
to twelve thousand pesos (P12,000).

The ironical twist in this case is that an old man paid with life for his attempt to abide by the
law, that is, to vindicate his granddaughter's honor through lawful means. He lost his life
because the appellants chose to take the law into their own hands. For such flagitious
lawlessness, full and condign retributory punishment should be meted.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court should be modified. Francisco Diaz is sentenced to
reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties. The appellants are ordered to pay solidarily to
the heirs of Quintin Tadia the sum of P12,000 as indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code). In
other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellants.
The benefits of article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, regarding preventive imprisonment, may
be extended to the appellants if the conditions laid down in Republic Act No. 6127 are
satisfied. So ordered.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 135051-52
December 14, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLARITO ARIZOBAL (at large), ERLY LIGNES and TWO (2) JOHN DOES, accusedappellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Man in his inordinate pursuit of lucre oft equates human life with mere chattels and plunges
himself into the bottomless pit of his own folly. He is thus driven to plunder and kill, crimes
which are most reprehensible and ignominious as the criminal apparently leans towards
material gains than to the inestimable value of human life. Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes
come to us to assert and prove, if they must, that they are not cast of that mold.
The factual backdrop: On 12 August 1994 two (2) separate Informations were filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Cataingnan, Masbate, charging Clarito Arizobal, Erly Lignes, Rogelio
Gemino and two (2) John Does with Robbery in Band with Homicide for robbing and slaying
Laurencio Gimenez1 , Original Records.1 and his son Jimmy Gimenez.2
After arraignment, the two (2) cases were tried jointly. However, on 14 May 1997, upon motion
of accused Rogelio Gimeno, without objection from the prosecution, the two (2) Informations
were dismissed as against him for lack of evidence. But the same cases remained as against
accused Erly Lignes and Clarito Arizobal. Only accused Lignes appeared at the trial until its
termination as Arizobal escaped from detention and had to be tried in absentia.3 The two (2)
John Does were never apprehended as they were not sufficiently identified.
The prosecution presented, among others, Clementina Gimenez, wife of victim Laurencio
Gimenez. She testified that on 24 March 1994 she together with her husband Laurencio
Gimenez and a grandchild were sound asleep in their house in Tuybo, Cataingan, Masbate. At
around 9:30 in the evening, Laurencio roused her from sleep and told her to open the door
because there were persons outside the house. Since it was pitch-dark she lit a kerosene
lamp and stood up to open the door. She was suddenly confronted by three (3) armed men
pointing their guns at her. She recognized two (2) of them as Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes
but failed to recognize the third person who was wearing a maskara. She readily identified
Clarito because she used to pass by his house in San Rafael while Erly was also a familiar
face as he was a regular habitue of the flea market.
According to Clementina, Clarito asked her husband, "Tay, where is your gun." But she
promptly interjected, "We have no gun, not even a bolo. If you want, you can look around for
it."4 While the man in maskara stood guard at the door, Clarito and Lignes barged into the
master's bedroom and forcibly opened the aparador. The terrified couple could not raise a
finger in protest but had to leave their fate to the whims of their assailants. The intruders
ransacked their cabinet and scattered everything on the floor until they found P8,000.00
among sheets of paper. Before leaving with their loot they ordered Laurencio to go with them

to Jimmy's house because "we have something to talk about." 5 Against his will, Laurencio
went with them. Clementina recalled that shortly after the group left she heard a volley of
shots. Her grandchild, as if sensing what befell her grandfather, could only mutter in fear,
"Lolo is already dead!"
Erlinda Gimenez, wife of Jimmy Gimenez, narrated that on 24 March 1994, after she and her
son had taken supper, her husband Jimmy with one Francisco Gimenez arrived. Jimmy
informed Erlinda that they had already bought a carabao. After he handed her the certificate of
large cattle, and while he was in the process of skinning a chicken for their supper, three (3)
men suddenly appeared and ordered them to lie face down. One of them pushed her to the
ground while the others tied Francisco and Jimmy as they whipped the latter with an armalite
rifle. She noticed one of them wearing a mask, another a hat, and still another, a bonnet. 6
Realizing the utter helplessness of their victims, the robbers took the liberty of consuming the
food and cigarettes Erlinda was selling in her sari-sari store. Finding no softdrinks to complete
their snack, two (2) of the intruders ordered Erlinda to buy coke for them at the neighboring
store. But they warned her not to make any noise, much less alert the vendor. When they
returned to the house of Jimmy, the robbers proceeded to ransack the household in search for
valuables. They took around P1,000.00 from her sari-sari store and told them to produce
P100,000.00 in exchange for Jimmy's life. Since the couple could not produce such a big
amount in so short a time, Erlinda offered to give their certificate of large cattle. The culprits
however would not fall for the ruse and threw the document back to her. Three (3) masked
men then dragged Jimmy outside the house and together with Laurencio brought them some
fifty (50) meters away while leaving behind Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes to guard Francisco
and Erlinda's son. Moments later she heard a burst of gunfire which reverberated through the
stillness of the night.
When the masked men returned to Jimmy's house, one of them informed Erlinda that her
husband and father-in-law had been killed for trying to escape. Upon hearing this, Erlinda, as
if the heavens had fallen on her, slowly lost consciousness.
The post-mortem examination report prepared by Dr. Allen Ching showed that Jimmy
Gimenez sustained injuries: (a) a gunshot wound located at the victim's zygomatic area (right
side near the ear) which may have caused brain hemorrhage; (b) a non-serious gunshot
wound at the upper back right side (armpit area); (c) a wound located at the middle side of the
trunk - considered as exit of wound No. 2; (d) gunshot wound at the right forearm; and, (e) a
wound considered as a complication of the trajectory point of wound No. 4 that caused the
fracturing of a bone and exited as lacerated bone at the posterior. 7
The medico-legal examination conducted on Laurencio Gimenez also showed: (a) a chest
wound penetrating the pericardium; (b) gunshot wound at the right thigh exiting at the lumbar
area, back; (c) gunshot wound at the left thigh below the knee; and, (d) cause of death was
respiratory arrest secondary to gunshot wounds.8
Erly Lignes who testified in his defense explained that on 24 March 1994 at around 9:30 in the
evening he was at the house of a neighbor, one Noli Hermosa, attending a house blessing in
San Pedro, Cataingan, Masbate. He helped as cook and food server. The occasion was
attended by around twenty (20) well-wishers who feasted on fried chicken and tuba. In fact,
two (2) of his friends, Andres Lapay and Alberto Senelong, were among the group of drinkers.
The celebration finally ended at 1:00 o'clock in the morning. Early that morning he went home,
which was only about a hundred meters away.9

Erly Lignes also presented Andres Lapay who confirmed his defense of alibi. Andres
recounted that at 9:30 in the evening of 24 March 1994 he was at the house of Noli Hermosa
for the latter's house blessing. There he saw Erly in the kitchen preparing food and drinks for
the visitors. He also attended to Andres' group whenever they needed additional food and
tuba. According to witness Andres, he was certain that from the time of his arrival at 7:00
o'clock in the evening to 11:00 o'clock Erly never went out of the house of Hermosa. When
asked whether he knew where Tuybo was, Andres answered in the affirmative. He also
clarified that it would take a person about one and a-half (1-) hours by foot and about one
hour (1) by horseback to travel from San Pedro to Tuybo.
On 30 March 1994 Erly Lignes was arrested in the house of Noli Hermosa and then detained
at the Cataingan Municipal Jail. Erlinda Gimenez, accompanied by three (3) policemen, later
went to the municipal jail and pointed to Clarito Arizobal as one of the suspects in the robbing
and killing of Laurencio and Jimmy Gimenez. Erly insisted that he was not implicated by
Erlinda as a suspect in the crime.
But the trial court gave full credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and
rejected the alibi of accused-appellant Erly Lignes. On 7 July 1998 the court found both
accused Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes guilty of robbery with homicide, sentenced them to
suffer the supreme penalty of Death and to indemnify the legal heirs of Laurencio Gimenez
P50,000.00 for his death and P20,000.00 for moral damages, and the legal heirs of Jimmy
Gimenez P50,000.00 also for his death and P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus P30,000.00
for exemplary damages.10 Their cases are now before us on automatic review in view of the
penalty imposed.
As the lower court explained x x x x There is direct relation and intimate connection between the robbery and the killing.
The accused were positively identified as perpetrators of the crime by witnesses Clementina
Gimenez and Erlinda Gimenez who have no motive to falsely testify x x x x Inasmuch as no
improper motive have (sic) been ascribed to prosecution witnesses and no shadow of
evidence appears on record to blacken their credibility, their testimony is worthy of full faith
and credit x x x x11
Going to the denial and alibi interposed by accused Erly Lignes that he was at San Pedro,
Cataingnan, Masbate, helping as cook and food server of his neighbor Noli Hermosa during a
house blessing at the time of the robbing and killing and his belief that he was not identified
(Exh. "2") by witnesses (especially Erlinda Gimenez), and that he did not know Clarito
Arizobal, the same cannot be given any credence in the face of the testimony of Clementina
Gimenez and Erlinda Gimenez positively identifying him (Erly Lignes) and his co-accused
Clarito Arizobal as the culprits x x x x The place of the crime is only about six kilometers and
more or less one and a half hour travel by foot from the place where the accused Erly Lignes
was at the time of the commission of the crime.
The robbery with killing was aggravated: 1) By a band because the malefactors were more
than three armed robbers acting together; 2) With treachery because the robbers tied the
hand of the victims before killing them; 3) By nighttime (nocturnity) because the accused took
advantage of the night; and, 4) By dwelling because the robbery is (sic) committed with
violence against or intimidation of persons x x x and the commission of the crime begun in the
dwelling x x x x12
Accused-appellant Erly Lignes attempted to discredit the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses by underscoring their alleged inconsistent, conflicting and incredible statements. He

pointed out that: (a) Clementina testified on direct examination that she saw Erly Lignes in the
flea market four (4) times, but on cross-examination she averred that she saw the accused at
the flea market in only three (3) occasions; (b) she stated that three (3) persons entered their
house and recognized Arizobal and Lignes because they lighted a kerosene lamp and that
she did not recognize the third person because he was wearing a mask thus implying that
Arizobal and Lignes were not wearing masks, in utter disregard of the risk of being identified;
(c) she failed to witness the actual killing when she stated in her testimony that she came to
know of it only the following morning after she was informed by a neighbor thus implying that
accused-appellant Erly Lignes was not positively identified as the killer of the two (2) victims;
and, (d) Erlinda Gimenez stated that three (3) robbers were not wearing masks while two (2)
were wearing masks but later contradicted herself when she stated that three (3) of the
masked robbers executed her husband and father-in-law. 13
In essence, the issues raised are factual and involve the credibility of the witnesses. It is
doctrinally settled that in the absence of any showing that the trial court's calibration of factual
issues, particularly on the matter of credibility, is flawed this Court is bound by its assessment.
The rationale is the presumption that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial.14 We find no plausible reason to deviate therefrom.
Admittedly, the prosecution witnesses did not give a consistent account of the whole gutwrenching episode, particularly on the matter of the number of times Clementina allegedly
saw the accused-appellant at the flea market; the exact number of masked robbers and other
minor details. These lapses however are not so serious as to warrant the reversal of the
verdict of conviction of accused-appellant and his co-accused who, as the record shows, were
categorically identified as two (2) of the perpetrators of the crime.
Accused-appellant Erly Lignes asserts that the failure of Clementina Gimenez to actually
witness the killing of her son and her husband is adequate proof that she failed to identify him
as the killer. We do not agree. Accused-appellant seems to have overlooked the significance
of conspiracy, as a rule for collective criminal liability, where it is not necessary to show that all
the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim; what is important is that all participants
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a
common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim. 15 The fact that accusedappellant conspired in the commission of the crime charged was sufficiently and convincingly
shown by his active participation in ransacking the belongings of the two (2) Gimenez families,
tying and holding Francisco and Erlinda's son immobile while the others led the two (2)
hapless victims to the threshold of their obliteration.
Alibi, as it has been repeatedly held, is one of the weakest defenses as it is easy to concoct
although difficult to prove. In the face of positive identification by credible prosecution
witnesses, accused-appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily crumble. For alibi to be
believed, credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the
scene of the crime is indispensable.16
The trial court is correct in appreciating dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. Generally,
dwelling is considered inherent in the crimes which can only be committed in the abode of the
victim, such as trespass to dwelling and robbery in an inhabited place. However, in robbery
with homicide the authors thereof can commit the heinous crime without transgressing the
sanctity of the victim's domicile.17 In the case at bar, the robbers demonstrated an impudent
disregard of the inviolability of the victims' abode when they forced their way in, looted their

houses, intimidated and coerced their inhabitants into submission, disabled Laurencio and
Jimmy by tying their hands before dragging them out of the house to be killed.
But treachery was incorrectly considered by the trial court. The accused stand charged with,
tried and convicted of robbery with homicide. This special complex crime is primarily classified
in this jurisdiction as a crime against property, and not against persons, homicide being merely
an incident of robbery with the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminals. As
such, treachery cannot be validly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of
The Revised Penal Code.18 This is completely a reversal of the previous jurisprudence on the
matter decided in a litany of cases before People v. Bariquit.19
While it appears that at least five (5) malefactors took part in the commission of the crime, the
evidence on record does not disclose that "more than three" persons were armed, and
robbery in "band" means "more than three armed malefactors united in the commission of
robbery." Nowhere in the records can we gather that more than three (3) of the robbers were
armed. Hence, "band" cannnot be aggravating where no proof is adduced that at least four (4)
of the five (5) perpetrators involved in this case were armed. In this regard, we are quoting
pertinent portions of Clementina Gimenez's testimony Q: While you were in your house do you still remember of any unusual incident that
happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that incident about?
A: Armed persons entered our house.
Q: How many?
A: Three (3).
Q: You said that these 3 persons were armed, will you tell this Honorable Court the kind of
weapon or arms they were bringing with them at that time?
A: One person carrying a long firearm.
Q: How about the other two?
A: One person standing at the door carrying a long firearm and the two went upstairs.
Q: Were they carrying weapons?
A: They have (sic) both of them were carrying short firearms. 20
On cross examination she further clarified Q: Where were you when you saw that the two accused Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes got
the money?
A: At the sala.
Q: When they ransacked your aparador you did not object?
A: They let us sit and warned us not to move.
Q: But you have not seen them armed with any firearm, is that correct?
A: They have.
Q: Who were armed with firearms?
A: Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes.
Q: What kind of firearm?
A: Short arm.
Q: And where was the third person who was wearing mask at the time these two accused Erly
Lignes and Clarito Arizobal ransacked your aparador and got the money?
A: At the door of our house.
Q: What was he doing?

A: On guard.
Q: Was he armed?
A: Bringing a long gun, masked.21
For her part, Erlinda Gimenez testified Q: Did you see who killed your husband?
A: My husband was brought towards a distance about 50 meters because it could be seen
from where I was and then I heard a burst of firearm thereafter the one who brought him told
me that he ran so that they have (sic) to kill him.
Q: Who told you?
A: The one wearing mask.
Q: Where were accused Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes at that time?
A: The two (2) took guard on Boboy Gimenez (referring to Francisco) and my son.
Q: Were they armed?
A: Yes sir, short gun, sir.
Q: When your husband was brought by three of these five (5) persons, your son and
Francisco Gimenez were left behind?
A: Yes sir, because they were tied.22
We likewise hold that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime did not attend the commission
of the crime. The fact that the offense was committed at 9:30 in the evening does not suffice to
sustain nocturnidad for, by itself, nighttime is not an aggavating circumstance. 23 To be properly
so considered, it must be shown that nocturnidad was deliberately and intentionally sought by
accused-appellants to help them realize their evil intentions. 24 Nowhere can we infer from the
records that the malefactors sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the accomplishment of
their devious design. On the contrary, the locus criminis was well lighted and nighttime was
merely an incidental element to the whole drama.
First. The houses of the victims were adequately lighted by kerosene lamps when the robbers
entered and went about their looting spree. In People v. Pallarco25 this Court clarified this
modifying circumstance thus Nor can the aggravating circumstance of nighttime be appreciated, for the prosecution failed
to demonstrate (a) that the malefactor particularly sought or took advantage of the darkness to
commit the offense, or (b) that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime. In any event,
the prosecution presented no evidence to establish the fact that nocturnidad attended the
killing. Nighttime cannot be considered if it is shown that the place was adequately lighted. In
this case, it was established that the place was sufficiently illuminated by a kerosene lamp.
Second. The robbers, particularly referring to accused-appellant and his co-accused, lingered
in the locus criminis and even conversed with their intended victims for an appreciable period
of time inside the well-lit houses. As Erlinda Gimenez testified, the place where the victims
were gunned down was adequately illuminated by the moonlight, although for undisclosed
reasons she did not see the actual shooting.26
All these taken together belie the assumption that the culprits took advantage of the intrinsic
impunity afforded by the cover of darkness and made the same as an ally to accomplish their
nefarious plan. Nocturnity lures those who crave for blood to yield to their baser impulses with
the false courage borne out of the belief that their identity would not be brought in the open.
We do not discern any such intention in this case.
We also note with approval the view of the trial court that the offenders did not commit two (2)
separate counts of robbery with homicide but only a delito continuado, as the ransacking of

the two (2) houses and the killing of the victims were not entirely disconnected and distinct
acts of depredation. They arose from a single criminal impulse and intent, "there being unity of
purpose and of right violated."27
As to actual damages, it was proved that the robbers took the amount of P8,000.00 from the
family of the deceased Laurencio Gimenez and P1,000.00 from that of Jimmy Gimenez. Their
legal heirs must therefore be indemnified for these losses. However, the award of the trial
court of P20,00.00 for moral damages and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages must be
modified to P50,000.00 and P20,000.00 for moral damages and exemplary damages,
respectively for the legal heirs of each victim.
The trial court correctly found accused-appellant and his co-accused Clarito Arizobal guilty of
the crime of robbery with homicide as defined in Art. 294, par. (1), of The Revised Penal
Code. The prosecution has established beyond any scintilla of doubt through the prosecution
witnesses that Erly Lignes in conspiracy with Clarito Arizobal and three (3) other unidentified
persons used violence and intimidation against the members of the two (2) Gimenez families
in carrying out the robbery and on the occasion thereof killed Laurencio and Jimmy
Gimenez.1wphi1
The special complex crime of robbery with homicide carries with it the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. In conformity with Art. 63, par. (1), of The Revised Penal Code, when the
crime is attended by an aggravating circumstance with no circumstance mitigating it, the
higher penalty shall be imposed.
Four (4) members of the Court are steadfast in their adherence to the view that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. However, they bow to the majority
opinion that the aforesaid law is constitutional and, therefore, the penalty prescribed
thereunder has to be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cataingan, Masbate, finding
accused-appellant ERLY LIGNES and accused CLARITO ARIZOBAL GUILTY of Robbery with
Homicide and imposing upon both of them the penalty of DEATH, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant ERLY LIGNES and his co-accused CLARITO
ARIZOBAL (who is still at large) are ordered in addition: (a) to pay jointly and solidarily the
legal heirs of Laurencio Gimenez and Jimmy Gimenez P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, another
P50,000.00 for moral damages, and P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, for each set of heirs;
and, (b) to pay jointly and solidarily the legal heirs of Laurencio Gimenez P8,000.00 and those
of Jimmy Gimenez P1,000.00 representing their respective actual damages.
In accordance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659 amending Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, upon
the finality of this Decision, let the records of the case be forwarded to His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, for the possible exercise of his pardoning power. Costs against
both accused.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
See Information in Crim. Case No.842, p.
2
See Information in Crim. Case No. 841, p. 1, id.
3
Id., p. 83.
4
TSN, 25 October 1995, p. 20.

Id., p. 23.
TSN, 4 March 1997, p. 5.
7
TSN, 25 October 1995, p. 4.
8
Id., pp. 10-11.
9
TSN, 18 March 1998, pp. 3-23.
10
Decision penned by Judge Henry B. Basilla, RTC-Br. 49, Cataingan, Masbate.
11
Rollo, p. 16.
12
Id., p. 19.
13
Id., pp. 59-63.
14
People v. Nang, G.R. No. 107799, 15 April 1998, 289 SCRA 16.
15
People v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 101312, 28 January 1997, 267 SCRA 26.
16
People v. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 98402-04, 16 November 1995, 250 SCRA 14.
17
People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 88043, 9 December 1996, 265 SCRA 429; People v,
Faliciano,G.R. No. 15 May 1996, 256 SCRA 706.
18
People v. Bariquit, G.R. No. 122733, 2 October 2000.
19
See Note 18.
20
TSN, 25 October 1995, p. 16.
21
TSN, 10 September 1996, p. 32.
22
TSN, 4 March 1997, p. 11.
23
People v. Bello, G.R. No. 109148, 4 December 1998, 299 SCRA 654.
24
People v. Caisip, G.R. No. 119757, 21 May 1998, 290 SCRA 451.
25
G.R. No. 119971, 26 March 1998, 288 SCRA 151.
26
TSN, 4 March 1997, p. 17.
27
Rollo, p. 21.
6

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40330 November 20, 1978
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant.
Eraulio D. Yaranon for appellant.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor
Rosalio A. de Leon for appellee.
MUOZ PALMA, J:
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a complaint
filed by 13-year old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape
alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, armed with a sharp
instrument and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersignedcomplaint, against her will, and in her
own room situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it was committed in
the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having givenprovocation for it, is present. (p.
1, CFI record)
The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial rendered its decision
on May 30, 1966, finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer "not more than
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal and not less than SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the costs." 1
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed a notice of
appeal; forthwith the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division rendered a decision
the dispositive portion of which follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused Amado Daniel has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he should accordingly suffer the penalty for the crime
herein charged.

We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the judgment appealed from is
not in accordance with law.
Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, amended Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, providing that
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296, as
amended)
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as herein provided, in
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; ...
WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court for appropriate further
proceedings pursuant to law. 2
By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was certified to this Court
and in a Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed. 3
Preliminary question
The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which strikes at the very root
of a long standing practice and procedure evoked for the last forty years or so since the
creation of the Court of Appeals. 4
Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case where the offense
is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death certified to it by the Court of Appeals with
findings of facts and of the guilt of the accused, but without imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua or death on the appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12, paragraph 2, of the
Rules of Court? 5
Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, expresses the view that for this
Court to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal, the decision before Us must have imposed on
the appellant the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warranted.
The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe otherwise and hold the
view that the dispositive portion of the decision as written and rendered is in accordance with
the Constitution and the law, and vests jurisdiction on the Court to act on the appeal.
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a case was certified to this Court by
the Court of Appeals without findings of facts and simply on the ground that it was "on the
opinion that the penalty that should be imposed ill this case is reclusion perpetua, as
recommended by the Solicitor-General, and not reclusion temporal, as imposed by tile lower
court." The question arose as to the proper procedure to be followed by the appellate court in
certifying cases to this Court under Section 145-K of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:
Whenever in any criminal cases submitted to a division the said division should be of the
opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said Court shall
refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme
Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different, and We may say,
strong reactions from the Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity we shall not dwell

on them. Simply stated, it is was ruled that the Court of Appeals was duty bound to make its
findings of facts to support its opinion that the penalty to the imposed upon the appellant was
either life imprisonment or death so as to bring the case within the jurisdiction of this Court.
From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran, We
quoted the following pertinent portions:
The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals, as provided
in the above-quoted provisions of the law, must of necessity defend upon the correctness of
that opi nion There is nothing in the law precluding this Court from exercising ing its authority
to pass upon such question which concerns its own jurisdiction. And in order that this Court
may exercise its power of review the Court of appeals is bound to make in its order f
certification such findings of facts as are necessary to support its conclusion that either life
imprisonment or death is the penalty to be imposed. This is indeed covered by Rule 52,
section 3, which provides th where a court to which an appeal has been taken has no
appellate jurisdiction over lic case and it certifies the same to the proper court, it must do so
"with a specific and clear statement of grounds therefor." the requirement of with and specific
grounds is precisely a device to prevent erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction from a lower
to a superior court.
Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" appearing in the
provision above quoted, are sufficient indication that the Court of Appeals, at the time of
certifying the case to this Court, had already examined the evidence and was ready to render
judgment on the merits, but having found from the facts established by proof that the penalty
to be imposed is either death or life imprisonment, instead of entering judgment thereon , it
certifies the case to the Supreme Court for final determination. Since the Certification is the
only ground for determining our jurisdiction, it must contain not only conclusions of law but
also findings of fact, the latter being more important than the former for they supply the real
basis for determining jurisdiction ...
The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a Court of First
Instance wherein either life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, for in such cases, if we
assume jurisdiction even where the judgment appears to be erroneous on its face, it is
because the Court of First Instance has already exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering
judgment on the merits containing both findings of fact and conclusions of law, and under such
circumstance it is more practical for the administration of the law that this Court should
exercise its appellate jurisdiction by examining the evidence and correcting all errors both of
fact and of law that might have been committed by the trial court. But here, the Court of
Appeals is refraining from rendering judgment on the merits and is refusing to complete the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction because it believes that such jurisdiction belongs to the
Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to transfer the case to this Court. lt is in that transfer that
we believe we may intervene in order to prevent an erroneous transfer,
xxx xxx xxx
Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to make effective the
appellate jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeals and this Court, as defined by law. According
to the law of jurisdiction (section 138, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259), offenses, for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment, including offenses arising from the same occurrence or committed on the same
occasion, come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the remaining
offenses fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals ...

We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of Appeals, in
certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to support its conclusion that
the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or death. While this Court will not review
the findings of fact, it will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived
therefrom. And if this Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it
finds them to be wrong, the case will be returned to the Court of Appeals. (pp. 613-616, supra,
emphasis supplied)
In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there was substantial
compliance with the law as the order of certification made reference to the opinion and
recommendation of the Solicitor General whose brief contained sufficient findings of fact to
warrant the conclusion that life imprisonment should be imposed upon the appellant. Justices
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Briones concurred in the Resolution.
Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle that the Court of
Appeals is bound to make its findings of fact and study the evidence so as to determine
whether the appellant is guilty or not, but dissented from that portion of the Resolution which
accepted the case as he was of the opinion that the case should have been remanded to the
Court of Appeals. 7
Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the majority insofar as it
held that it was necessary for the Court of Appeals or a division thereof to state the reasons
for its opinion that death penalty or life imprisonment should be imposed. He particularly
dissented from statements that if this Court found the conclusions of the Court of Appeals to
be wrong, the case should be returned to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
According to Justice Tuason when a case is certified to this Court it is placed, by force of the
Court of Appeals' opinion, within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the latter to decide
the appeal on the merits; findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are neither essential nor
necessary. Justice Tuason was joined in his dissent by Justice Cesar Bengzon who later
became Chief Justice of this Court and Justice Sabino Padilla. 8
B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that ruled in Ramos that
is, for the Court of Appeals not only to make its findings of fact and finding of guilt, but also to
impose the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warrant in order that We
may exercise Our appellate jurisdiction.
We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit of the law which
confers on the Supreme Court the exclusive prerogative to review on appeal and impose the
corresponding penalty in criminal cases where the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death.
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction,
in "(A)ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment." 9 This
jurisdiction is constitutional: the Supreme Court ma not be deprived thereof by, Congress then,
now the National Assembly. 10
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the foregoing appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive.
Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction - the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death.
The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second paragraph of Sec.
12, Rule 124, Rules of Court 11 more particularly to the use of the phrases "should be
imposed" and "shall refrain from entering judgment", viz:

xxx xxx xxx

Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division should be of the
opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said court shall
refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme
Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal. (Emphasis
supplied)
As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate court with the duty of imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death. All that the Rule requires is that should the Court of
Appeals be of the opinion that death or life imprisonment should be imposed, it "shall refrain
from entering judgment thereon ...
The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the Court of Appeals shall
refrain from rendering judgment if and when it is of the opinion that reclusion perpetua or
death is the proper penalty for the crime committed. This can be the only logical interpretation
considering that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to impose the penalties concerned.
The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated with an "entry of judgment" as the latter
is understood in Rule 36 in relation to Section 8, Rule 121 and Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of
Court. "Entry of judgment" presupposes a final judgment final in the sense that no appeal
was taken from the decision of the trial or appellate court within the reglementary period. A
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an
appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant
has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. 12 It is only then that there is a judgment
which is to be entered or recorded in the book of entries of judgments. 13
It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second paragraph, Rule 124
enjoins the Court of Appeals from entering judgment" when there is no judgment to be entered
.
But then the argument is advanced what is there to be reviewed by the Supreme Court
when the decision being certified contains no penalty or sentence, as distinguished from
appeals from the Court of First Instance where there is a complete judgment to be passed
upon. The answer is simple. Section 12 itself states that the case is for final determination by
the Supreme Court as if the case had been brought before it on appeal. Hence, based on the
findings of facts of the appellate court which as a rule are conclusive and binding on Us, this
Court "will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom" (People v.
Ramos, supra) and impose the correct penalty for the offense committed.
We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase shall refrain from rendering
judgment " there would be no cause for any ambiguity. We can only assume that the intent of
the Rule was so clear to the Court when it drafted the Revised Rules of Court that it did not
envision a possible contrary or adverse interpretation or ambiguity in its implementation under
the phraseology used. It is incumbent upon Us to construe the Rule in the spirit and intent it
was conceived and in harmony with pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
On the merits of the appeal
1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution consists solely of the
testimony of the offended party. Here We have the declaration of the victim, who at the time of
the incident was a little less than 13 years of age, on the basis of which the trial court found
the charge of rape duly established. The happenings are briefly summarized in the People's
brief as follows:

The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born on November 20, 1952 (p.
3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a native of Balangabang Tublay, Mountain Province (pp. 3, 12, Id.)
At the time of the incident in question on September 20, 1965, complainant was temporarily
boarding at a house located at Pinsao Guisad Baguio City, as she was then a first year high
school student at the Baguio Eastern High School (pp. 3, 12, 20, Id.; p. 36, Estigoy).
On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had just arrived in the
City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus (p. 3, Manipon). Because it was then raining and the bus
was parked several meters away from the bus station, she waited inside the bus (pp. 3, 22,
Id.). After about three minutes of waiting, the accused came and started molesting her by
inquiring her name and getting hold of her bag (pp. 4, 22-24, Id.). But she did not allow him to
hold her bag (p. 24, Id.). She called the attention of the bus driver and the conductor about the
actuation of the accused, but it seemed that the former were also afraid of him (pp. 24-25, Id.).
Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100 meters away
(pp. 4, 25, Id.). The accused closely followed her (p. 4, Id.). When the jeep started to go, the
accused also rode and sat beside her (p. 5, Id.).
When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had to negotiate a
distance of ten meters (p. 5, Id.). The accused also alighted and again he tried to carry her
bag (p. 5, Id.). Although he was not allowed to carry her bag, her was adamant in following her
(p. 5, Id.).
Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it when the
accused dashed in and closed the door behind him (pp. 31-32, Id.). When she entered her
room, the accused went in (p. 7, Id.). He pulled a dagger eight inches long and threatened
her: "If you will talk, 1 will kill you". (p. 7, Id.). Margarita was stunned into silence because of
her fear (p. i Id.). Thereupon, the accused held her hair with his left hand and forced her Lo lie
down in bed (p. 7, Id.) He also placed his left hand with a handkerchief in Margarita's mouth,
at the same time holding the dagger and her neck with his right hand (pp. 7-8, Id.). She was
forcibly made to the down and, at this moment, the accused removed the buttons of his pants
(p. 8, Id.). He then put down the dagger on tile bed (p. 8, Id.). Her attempts to extricate herself
from the accused was to no avail assile was only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall and weighed about 95
to 100 pounds (p. 35, Id.) while the accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall and weighed about 126
pounds (pp. 8, 59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8. 36, Id.), used his thigh to separate the
legs of Margarita (p. 38, Id.). tried, but failed. to remove her panty (p. 36, Id.). He nonetheless
guided his penis and inserted it inside the vagina of the complainant after prying open the part
of her panty covering her private parts (pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of the offended party (p. 9, Id.). Margarita lost consciousness. When she
recovered, he was already gone (p. 9, Id.).
The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him the terrible misfortune
which befell her (pp. 9-10, Id.). She was immediately brought to the Baguio General Hospital
where she was examined (p. 10, Id.). Then they proceeded to the Police Department. The
Chief of Police accompanied them to the Health Center where she was again examined by Dr.
Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter submitted his medical report (Exh. C; p. 3, rec.; pp. 11, 14-16,
Id.). Margarita and her father gave their respective statements before the police authorities
(Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.). She signed her criminal complaint prepared by the Fiscal's
Office of Baguio (Exh. A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp. 2-4, Brief at p. 83, rollo

The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called to the witness stand and he
testified on the physical examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng on
September 23, 1965 and his findings as contained in the report were as follows:
1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00 and 11:00 o'clock
positions in the face of a clock.
2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.
3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.
4. Vaginal wall tight and vaginal folds are prominent.
5. Vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa and for gram negative intra or extra-cellular
diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI record)
Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that the condition of the
hymen revealed that Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident complained of, and that
the number of lacerations and contusions at the base of the hymen indicated the degree of
force exerted to effect the sexual act. 14
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted with each other
since 1963, and there were occasions when they rode together in a bus; that the incident of
September 20, 1965 inside the room of Margarita was with the latter's consent, and in fact it
was the second time he had carnal knowledge with her, the first time having occurred inside a
shack; that he promised Margarita that he would marry her, but to his surprise, she filed the
instant complaint against him. 15
2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for discarding the findings of
facts of the trial court which were sustained by the Court of Appeals after the latter had
examined the evidence as a result of which it certified the case to this Court.
Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible motive
could a thirteen-year old girl barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that could only
bring down on her and her family shame and humiliation and make her an object of gossip
and curiosity among her classmates and the people of her hometown. It cannot be denied that
a public trial involving a crime of this nature subjects the victim to what can be a harrowing
experience of submitting to a physical examination of her body, an investigation by police
authorities, appearance in court for the hearing where she has to unravel lewd and hideous
details of a painful event which she would prefer to forget and leave it unknown to others. If
Margarita did forego all these and preferred to face the cruel realities of the situation it was
due to her simple and natural instincts of speaking out the truth.
The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married the girl
although he promised to marry her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965, Margarita was
only twelve years and ten months old and was not of marriageable age, hence, marriage was
a legal impossibility. And as regards appellant's testimony that the complaint was instigated by
the Chief of Police of Tublay who was Margarita's uncle, the trial court did not give credit to
such a declaration.
Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the opportunity to ask
for help or attract the attention of other people before she reached her boarding house, she
failed to do so. According to counsel there were people at the Dangwa station, in the busy
streets, in the market place, in the jeepney parking place where the girl took a jeep to proceed
to the boarding house, and in the neighboring houses the closest of which was about 5 meters
away, but no attempt was ever made by complainant to seek help so as to prevent appellant
from molesting her. 16

Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time from the
moment she saw the appellate inside the bus that the latter had intentions of abusing or
raping her. All that the appellant did inside the bus was to hold her bag and she caged the
attention of the driver and the conductor to the impertinence of appellant but the two did not
do anything about it. 17 And when Margarita walked from the bus to the jeepney station,
although she saw appellant walking behind her she did not suspect that he was following her.
To a question propounded by His Honor whether she suspected that appellant was following
her, Margarita answered: "No sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along Margarita could not call the
attention of the people in the street or shout for help inasmuch as at that particular moment
the appellant was not doing anything against her. And when Margarita reached the boarding
house there were no persons around 19 and in fact she went straight to her room and it was at
that particular moment when appellant barged into the room before she could close the door.
In short, the Poor girl was simply taken by surprise by the forced entrance of appellant who
immediately took out an 8-inch long dagger and said "If you will talk I will kill you."
Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that some may manifest an
aggressive or violent attitude of confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while others, like
12-year old Margarita, may assume a silent. fearful attitude.
Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the acts of the
accused at the time the latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by the medical
findings that there were no signs of extra-genital injuries on the girl's body, and no blood stains
on her dress and underwear.
The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of Margarita's
straightforward and positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old farmer in the prime
of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs and five feet 21 and six inches tall, 20 overpowered her and
succeeded in accomplishing the sexual act despite her resistance. Margarita was less than 13
years of age, was 4' 8 " in height, and weighed around 95 lbs. 21
In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long as it
brings about the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible, is
beside the point. 22
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to consummate
his evil purpose. In U.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation. A 12 year old girl was
sexually abused in the woods by a man of superior physical strength. In holding the accused
Villarosa guilty of rape the Court held:
It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the existence of the
crime of rape it is not necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so great or of
such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force used by the guilty
party be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in view. (4 Phil. 434, 437 citing
Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The Villarosa doctrine has been followed in
numerous cases involving the crime of rape and one of the latest is People v. Equec, 1977,
per Justice Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA 665.)
And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or violence
necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength of the
parties and their relation to each other. 23
Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits
herself against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case of
Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a dagger and with it threatened to kill the girl if

she would talk or scream for help. Her fear naturally weakened whatever resistance Margarita
could muster at the time and as a result appellant was able to consummate his coitus on the
victim. 24
One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the
time of the trial in 1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant voluntarily
submitted to a lie detector test with the National Bureau of Investigation and the report of the
lie detector examiner is in appellant's favor, that is, the latter was telling the truth on the
questions propounded to him one of which was whether he forced Margarita Paleng into
having sexual intercourse with him and the reply was "No". 25
On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and We
quote from his decision the following:
As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and credit on it. It is
well known that the same is not conclusive. Its efficacy depends upon the time, place and
circumstances when taken and the nature of the subject. If subject is hard and the
circumstances, as in this instant, were not conducive to affect the subject emotionally, the test
will fail. The subject had nothing more to fear because the trial was over. He was not
confronted by the victim or other persons whom he had a reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction
to the questions propounded was normal and unaffected and the apparatus could not detect it.
(pp. 172-173, CFI record)
To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon
with the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended
party. Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room
constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article 14(3),
Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place where
he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the
sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended. However, for lack of the necessary number of votes, the
penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for the
crime of rape as charged, and We sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and order him to indemnify Margarita Paleng by way of moral damages in the amount of
Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and pay the costs.
Decision Modified.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, J., concurs.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur in the result on the merits.
Castro, C.J., Makasiar, Fernando and Fernandez, JJ., took no part.
Guerrero, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The phrase shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" found in section 12 of Rule 124 and
in section 34 of the Judiciary Law means that the Court of Appeals should not decide the
case. The Court of Appeals has been certifying to this Court criminal cases, wherein the

imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua without rendering any judgment but merely
expressing its opinion that the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous and that the
imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua. Invariably, this Court accepted those cases
and decided the same. This Court's jurisdiction in criminal cases, as defined in the
Constitution, cannot be diminished but it can be enlarged.
Appealed criminal cases may be divided into three classes: (1) those wherein the lower court
imposed the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua and which are within this Court's exclusive
appellate jurisdiction; (2) criminal cases wherein the trial court imposed reclusion temporal or
a lesser penalty and which fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and (3)
criminal cases wherein the trial court imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal or a lesser
penalty but a Division of the Court of Appeals, while in the process of deciding the case,
comes to the conclusion that the imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua. That third
class of criminal cases should be elevated to this Court "for final determination".
Reclusion perpetua was properly imposed in this case upon the appellant who is a
pedophiliac.
CASTRO, C.J., dissenting:
1
The preliminary issue at bar is: What is the correct course of action that the Court of Appeals
should take when, in a criminal case properly appealed to it, that court determines that the
penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed instead of the
lesser penalty imposed by the court a quo? Should it refrain from rendering judgment and
forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court? Or should it render judgment imposing what it
considers as the proper penalty (either life imprisonment or death) but refrain from entering
judgment and thereafter certify the case to the Supreme Court?
At the center of scrutiny is the pertinent provision of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, and the Identical statement in the second paragraph of section 12 of Rule 124 of
the Rules of Court, both of which read:
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division [of the Court of Appeals] the said
division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be
imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify
the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before
it on appeal.
Justices Claudio Teehankee, Cecilia Munoz Palma and Ramon C. Aquino interpret the phrase
"entering judgment" in the inhibitory clause "shall refrain from entering judgment" to mean
"rendering judgment" or "pronouncing judgment," arguing that [t]his can be the only logical
interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction" to impose the
penalties of death and life imprisonment. They thus opt to maintain the present practice 1 of
requiring no more than a forwarding certification (embodying findings of fact supporting the
opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed) by the Court of
Appeals for the purpose of placing such case within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
For the reasons hereunder stated, we consider their interpretation unwarranted and therefore
reject the conclusion that it leads to.
2.
Section 34 of the amended Judiciary Act and the second paragraph of section 12 of Rule 124
of the Rules of Court must be construed in the light of the unequivocal phraseology of
paragraph (d), subsection (2), section 5 of Article X of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferiors courts in
xxx xxx xxx
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, life imprisonment;
Varying the language of this provision only to the extent necessary to carry out its intention,
the first subdivision of the third paragraph of section 17 of the Judiciary Act made exclusive
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the following words:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on appeal as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts as herein provided in (1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment: ...
The constitutional mandate, given due statutory acknowledgment, sets forth the pertinent
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We accord capital significance to the phrases
"final judgments and decrees of inferior courts and "the penalty imposed." These phrases are
crystal-clear. Read together with the remainder of the provision, they state in precise and
unmistakable terms the sole intended inescapable meaning that the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of inferior courts in criminal cases in which the
penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. No hermeneutic expertise or exercise can
validly fashion some other meaning or intention.
3.
The constitutionally determined nature of the criminal cases falling within the periphery of the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court fixes our perspective, defines and delimits our
judicial prerogative in the interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act, and dictates the
manner in which the law in question should be read and made operative.
This being so, the clause enjoining the Court of Appeals to "refrain from entering judgment"
whenever it "should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be
imposed" cannot validly be interpreted as a bar to that appellate court's "rendering judgment."
If the meaning given to the law by the minority should prevail and the case is forwarded, as
this case before us was, to the Supreme Court on a bare certification by the Court of Appeals,
then we have the unacceptable happenstance of an ordinary legislative act upstaging the
fundamental law, since, plainly, the Supreme Court will be constrained to exercise its power to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal" in criminal cases where NO "final
judgment" in which "the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment" has been rendered or
pronounced.
The minority view would thus result not only in an unconstitutional imposition on the Supreme
Court of assumption of jurisdiction over a case that is beyond its original appellate
competence but would also compel abandonment by the Court of Appeals of appellate
jurisdiction legally and duly vested in and acquired by it.
4.
Because sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act does not and cannot have primacy or ascendancy over
the Constitution, we assert that the Court of appeals is legally empowered to impose the
penalties of death and life imprisonment. Four basic and compelling considerations underlie
our view.

First: There is no law no law at all that states such prohibition in categorical terms. The
minority view rests solely on the strained interpretation foisted on the very law under
consideration and this interpretation, as we have said, is entirely unwarranted.
Second: In the case at hand, the Court of appeals duly and legally assumed appellate
jurisdiction over the accused Amado Daniel's appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio sentencing him to suffer a penalty less than life imprisonment. This cannot
be debated since section 29 of the Judiciary Act specifically places such appeal within the
Court of Appeals' jurisdictional ambit with the statement that
The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases, actions, and
proceedings, not enumerated i section seventeen of this Act, properly brought to it.
Thus, absent any constitutional or legal constraints, the Court of Appeals should have
rendered the proper judgment in the case. For, verily, judicial jurisdiction is "the power with
which judges are invested for administering Justice that is, for trying civil or criminal cases,
or both, and deciding them and rendering judgment, ..., 2 (emphasis supplied)
Third: Harking back to the Constitution, the Court of Appeals, by unmistakable constitutional
categorization, is an "inferior court." And it is its judgments as such inferior court which, so the
Constitution plainly states, are the subject of the Supreme Court's plenary power of review,
revision, reversal, modification or affirmance.
Fourth: Absurdity and incongruity should not be read into the law so as to support the view
that a panel of three Justices of the Court of Appeals is denied the power to impose the
penalties of life imprisonment and death at the same time that such power is recognized in a
single judge of a lower court of admittedly lesser category,
5.
The resulting conclusion that the Court of Appeals must impose the proper penalty does not
justify the apprehension that the Supreme Court will be hampered in the exercise of its
jurisdiction because the findings of fact made by the inferior appellate court "will have to be
respected." This stated procedural practice has never been honored in the absolute. The
ultimate function of the Supreme Court is to render justice. And we need not elaborate on or
belabor the numerous occasions when, to attain this objective, the Court shunted aside
technicalities to bare wide open the controversy and inquire into each and every aspect, be it
legal or factual or a mixture of both.
And this is one perfect instance where the avowed ends of justice must override practice and
procedure, for, no less than human life is at stake. And this would not be a novelty. When a
trial court's judgment imposing the death penalty is elevated to this Court en consulta, we strip
the case into minutiae: fact by fact, detail by detail, facet by facet. We see no reason why,
when a decision imposing the penalty of death or life imprisonment is rendered by the Court of
Appeals, the same manner of meticulous inquiry should not be resorted to by the Supreme
Court. A sentence imposing death or life imprisonment is of the self-same gravity, whichever is
the sentencing tribunal. 3
6.
It is rather obvious that the phrase "entering judgment" is completely disparate from the term
"rendering judgment." There is no need to perambulate and meander the provisions of
sections 1 and 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of court need merely be read to perceive the
strikingly sharp antithesis between the two phrases. These sections read:

Section 1. Rendition of judgments. All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in
writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it [sic] is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
Section 2. Entry of judgments and orders. If no appeal or motion for new trial is filed within
the time provided in these rules, the judgment or order shall be entered by the clerk. The
recording of the judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments shall constitute its entry.
The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or order and shall be signed by
the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or order has become final and executory.
The word "enter" (which undeniably is the root of "entering") with reference to judgments has
acquired a definite meaning in our procedure. There simply exists no ambiguity to warrant
embroiled interpretation. We need not hammer out meaning from the word "entered." It is
there. Section 2, Rule 36 chisels out the legal import of the word. 4 To repeat and stress the
Rule, "[t]he recording of the judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments shall
constitute its entry. Upon the other hand, the rendition of judgment is the judicial act of the
writing by the judge of the decision and the filing thereof with the clerk of court. 5
Such being the precise acceptations of the terms "entering judgment" and "rendering
judgment," we see no cogent reason why our indisputably learned lawmakers should have
written in the former when they meant the latter. If, as the minority would have it, the intention
was just that, why then has not section 34 of the Judiciary Act been accordingly amended,
considering that the said Act has been amended no less than ninety (90) times 6 since its
enactment thirty years ago in 1948?
The conclusion is thus ineluctable that section 34 of the Judiciary Act means exactly what it
says. (And its intendment cannot and should not be altered through tile expedient of palpably
tortuous and torturous statutory interpretation.) This rightly projects the limited character of the
said section a procedural device designed to effect and make effective the jurisdictions of
both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Read as written, this section neither
imposes nor curtails constitutionally and legally established jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals
can and must render a decision and impose the proper penalty of death or life imprisonment,
and, to effect the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, refrain from entering its judgment, and
forthwith certify tile case to the Supreme Court.
7.
Aside from according the respect that is due to the Constitution and setting aright the import of
section 34 of tile Judiciary Act, our reading of the law will obviate unnecessary, pointless and
time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
We advert to that portion of the Ramos 7decision, cited with approval by Justice Muoz Palma,
which states:
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of Appeals, in
certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to support its conclusion that
the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or death. While this Court will not review
the findings of fact, it will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived thereof
And if this Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds then
to be wrong the case will be returned to the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)
We particularly and especially object to the return of the ease to the Court of Appeals if the
Supreme Court "finds" the legal conclusions in the certification "to be wrong." This incident will
never come to pass if section 34 is correctly construed that is, as we construe it for, the
Supreme Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and can, without

bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do
justice in the case.
8.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court directs that, henceforth, should the Court of Appeals be of the
opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed
in any criminal case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than
reclusion perpetua the said Court, with a comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and
discussion of the law involved, render judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty
of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering
judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to this Court for
review.
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 People vs. Ramos, 79 Phil. 612.
2 The Tenth Division was composed at the time of Justices Ramon C. Fernandez, Ricardo C.
Puno, and Sixto A. Domondon, with Justice Puno as the ponente, pp. 107-108, of rollo.
3 p. 127, Ibid.
4 The Court of Appeals was organized under Commonwealth Act No. 3. Abolished in 1945
under Executive Order No. 37 issued by the President of the Philippines, the appellate court
was recreated under R.A. No. 52 upon the inauguration of the Philippine Republic See Moran
on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed Vol. 1, p. 14.
5 Formerly, 145-K, Revised Administrative Code, later adopted in Section 34, RA 296,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948.
6 79 Phil. 612
7 pp. 617-619, Ibid.
8 ibid., pp. 620-629.
9 Art. VIII, Sec. 2(4), 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Sec. 5, subsec. 2(d), 1973 Constitution.
10 Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Sec. 1, 1973 Constitution.
11 formerly 145-K Revised Administrative Code and Sec. 34, Judiciary Act of 1948.
12 Section 7, Rule 120, Rules of Court.
13 Section 2, Rule 36, Ibid.
14 tsn, Nov. 26, 1965, pp. 14-16.
15 tsn, December 23, 1965, pp. 43-57.
16 pp. 18-19, Appellant's brief.
17 tsn December 9, 1965, pp. 24-25.
18 pp. 25-27, Ibid.
19 pp. 30-31, Ibid.
20 tsn. December 23, 1965, p. 59.
21 tsn. December 9, 1965, p. 35.
22 Decision of Supreme Court of Spain, May 14, 1878, 5 Viada, 5th ed., page 224, pt. 8, cited
in People v. Momo, 1931, 56 Phil. 86, 87.
23 57 SCRA 320,328.
24 See People v. Garcines, 1974, 57 SCRA 653.
25 See pp. 165-166, CFI record.
Castro, J.

1 People vs. Ramos, 79 Phil. 612.

2 Conchada vs. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil. 95, quoting Escriche Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurispruden (4 Vol. 3, p. 743, ed. 1875.
3 See U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532: "The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a
case in which capital punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is one
having for its object ... the protection of the accused. Having received the highest penalty
which the law imposes, he is entitled under that law to have the sentence and all the facts and
circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the highest tribunal of the land to the
end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively determination ed."
4 Dirige vs. Biranya, 17 SCRA 840.
5 People vs. Soria, 22 SCRA 948; Ago vs. CA, 6 SCRA 530; 49 C. J. S. p. 222.
6 The Judiciary Act of 1948 RA 296) was amended by Republic Acts Nos. 431, 643, 644, 843,
859, 1186, 1404, 1605, 1914, 1963, 1969, 2613, 2682, 2696, 2718, 2875, 3067, 3084, 3086,
3087, 3090, 3114, 3327, 3599, 3632, 3749, 3828, 4057, 4134, 4235, 4322, 4533, 4644, 4728,
4769, 4798, 4814, 4821, 4833, 4838, 4892, 5052, 5064, 5067, 5075, 5084, 5103, 5107, 5116,
5126, 5129, 5135, 5140, 5147, 5204,
5277, 5296, 5341, 5382, 5389, 5433, 5440, 5468, 5479, 5675, 6031, 6092, 6157, 6159, 6263,
6264, 6439, 6445, and 6546, and by Presidential Decrees Nos. 204, 289, 363, 411, 411-A,
506, 516, 537, 722, 723, 827, 974, 1130, 1439, 1482, and 1600.
7 79 Phil. 612, at p. 616.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51304-05 June 28, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN MANDOLADO and JULIAN ORTILLANO, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Basilio V. Lanoria for defendants-appellants.
GUERRERO, J.:
The judgment of conviction rendered by the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I I,
Cotabato City dated June 28, 1979 sentencing the accused Martin Mandolado to the supreme
penalty of death in each case and the accused Julian Ortillano to imprisonment of six (6)

years of prision correccional as minimum to seventeen (17) years of prision mayor as

maximum, being merely an accessory, is before Us for mandatory review.
Under two (2) separate criminal informations dated January 5, 1978 filed by First Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Ismael G. Bagundang, the two accused- appellants, Martin Mandolado and
Julian Ortillano, draftees assigned with the Alpha Company, 3rd Infantry Battalion, Second
Infantry Division, Philippine Army with station at Pikit, North Cotabato, together with Anacleto
Simon and Conrado Erinada, trainees attached to the Headquarters & Headquarters
Company, 3rd Infantry Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at the Army
Detachment along Simuay Junction, Simuay, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, were accused of
murder for the death of the victims Herminigildo Tenorio and his driver Nolasco Mendoza with
the use of their firearms in the afternoon of October 3. 1977 at Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao,
qualified with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength.

Criminal Case No. 561 for the killing of Nolasco Mendoza, with the aggravating circumstances
of (1) 'advantage was taken of his being a draftee in the Philippine Army,' and (2) 'abuse of
confidence or obvious ungratefulness' without the presence of any mitigating circumstances
and is meted the following penalty, to wit;

Specifically, in Criminal Case No. 561, the information charged the accused as follows:
That on or about October 3, 1977 in the afternoon, in the Municipality of Sultan Kudarat,
Province of Maguindanao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and helping one another
with treachery, evident premeditation and the use of superior strength all armed with high
powered weapons did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with the use of
their guns shoot Mr. Nolasco Mendoza hitting the latter on the different parts of his body
causing his instantaneous death.

He is to pay the heirs of said deceased the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of said victim,
and the amount of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.

Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and
the use of superior strength.
Similarly, in Criminal Case No. 562, the information reads:
That on or about October 3, 1977, in the afternoon, in the Municipality of Sultan Kudarat,
Province of Maguindanao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and helping one another
with treachery, evident premeditation and the use of superior strength all armed with highpowered weapons did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with the use of
their guns shoot Mr. Herminigildo Fajardo Tenorio hitting the latter on the different parts of his
body causing his instantaneous death.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and
the use of superior strength.
The charges having been allegedly committed at the same place and occasion and involving
all the four (4) accused in each instance were jointly tried per order of the trial court dated
February 28, 1978 and after completion thereof, the two herein accused-appellants were
found guilty while the remaining two accused, Anacleto Simon and Conrado Erinada were
acquitted. We quote hereunder the dispositive portion of the decision now under review, to wit:
WHEREFORE, Martin Mandolado is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder in Criminal Case No. 562 for the killing of Herminigildo Fajardo Tenorio, and also in

In Criminal Case No. 562, for the killing of Herminigildo Tenorio, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of the crime in its maximum degree which is death.
He shall pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P12,000.00 for the death of this victim,
and the amount of P20,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 561 for the killing of the driver, Nolasco Mendoza, he is similarly
sentenced to death.

In both Criminal Cases Nos. 561 and 562, on the grounds of reasonable doubt, Anacleto
Simon and Conrado Erinada are both found not guilty. This case against them (Anacleto
Simon and Conrado Erinada) is hereby dismissed.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 561 and 562, Julian Ortillano was found guilty as an accessory. He
fired his M-16 armalite whenever Martin Mandolado fired his machine gun and this could be
for no other purpose than to conceal or destroy the body of the crime in making it appear the
victims were fighting them or running away or that somebody else like the MNLF, rebels, NPA
or bandits committed the crime. Furthermore, in his own admission, the purpose of their
attempt to leave Mindanao for Bulacan after this incident was to hide and wait for the time
when Martin Mandolado could succeed in settling this case which is evidence that he assisted
in the escape of the principal of the crime.
He is hereby sentenced in each of both cases to serve an imprisonment term of six (6) years
of Prision Correccional as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years of Prision Mayor as
the maximum penalty.
Martin Mandolado and Julian Ortillano are to pay jointly and solidarily the cost of this litigation.
SO ORDERED.
Given in the City of Cotabato, Philippines, the 28th day of June, 1979.
(SGD.) ALEJANDRO R. LEOPANDO
District Judge
The facts are as stated in the People's Brief as follows:
In the morning of October 3, 1977, Julian Ortillano, Martin Mandolado, Conrado Erinada and
Anacleto Simon, trainees/draftees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and assigned to the
3rd Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army, were passengers of a bus bound for Midsayap,

North Cotabato (p. 8, t.s.n., Feb. 21, 1979). They alighted at the bus terminal in Midsayap.
Being all in uniform, armed and belonging to the same military outfit, they got acquainted and
decided to drink ESQ rum, at the said bus terminal (pp. 10-11, Supra).

changed his wet uniform (p. 104, Supra). After about an hour, they rode in a "Hino" passenger
bus bound for Midsayap. On board said bus was a certain Mr. Leopoldo Jalandoni who was
seated in front of the appellants.

While drinking, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon decided to join appellants in going to
Pikit, North Cotabato, home base of appellants (p. 59, Id.). After drinking for about an hour,
appellant Mandolado got drunk and went inside the public market. Subsequently, he returned,
grabbed his .30 caliber machine gun and started firing. His companions tried to dissuade him
but he nonetheless continued firing his gun (pp. 11-12, Supra).

Upon reaching a BPH building near Nuling, Sultan Kudarat, the passengers of said bus were
ordered to alight at the military check point but appellant Mandolado did not alight (pp. 10-13,
t.s.n., Oct. 5, 1975). As the bus was not proceeding to Pikit, North Cotabato and upon advice
of Mr. Jalandoni, appellants alighted at the Midsayap crossing and waited for a bus bound for
Pikit (pp. 19-20, Supra).

Sensing trouble, Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon ran away, hailed and boarded a
passing Ford Fiera with some passengers on board. Appellants followed and boarded also the
vehicle (pp, 13-15, Supra). The soldiers forced the driver of the Ford Fiera to bring them to the
Midsayap crossing (p. 58, t.s.n., July 24,1978).

Appellants were able to ride on a sand and gravel truck which took them to Pikit, North
Cotabato, arriving thereat at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At their camp, appellants
returned their firearms, but did not report the incident. In the evening, appellants attended a
party at the Pikit Elementary School (pp. 32-35, t.s.n., April 16, 1979). The following day,
appellants proceeded to Davao City but stopped at Kavocan where they stayed overnight.
Arriving at Davao City, the following morning, appellants went to see a movie and afterwards
proceeded to the Office of Doa Ana, a shipping firm (p. 40, Supra), where they saw a certain
Sgt. Villanueva who was then leaving for Luzon. Sgt. Villanueva informed the appellants that
they were suspects in the Tenorio and Mendoza killings. Immediately thereafter, appellant
Mandolado purchased two passenger tickets for Manila. The other ticket was for appellant
Ortillano (pp. 120-123, Supra). However, before appellants could board the ship bound for
Manila, they were apprehended by a team led by Lt. Licas (p. 45, Supra). Appellants were
brought to Pikit, North Cotabato where they were investigated by Lts. Licas and Maburang
about the aforesaid killings. The following day, appellants were brought to the headquarters of
the 2nd MP Battalion at P.C. Hill, Cotabato City where they were again investigated. In said
investigation, after appellants were duly apprised of their constitutional rights, they executed
and signed their respective sworn statements (Exhs. "O" and "R"). Appellant Mandolado
admitted the killing of Tenorio and Mendoza (Exh. "Q"); whereas appellant Ortillano admitted
his presence at said killings and of his having fired his armalite downwards after appellant
Mandolado fired upon the killed the afore-named victims (Exh. "R ").

On their way, appellant Mandolado got his knife and tried to attack the driver (pp. 61-62,
Supra). After appellants alighted at said crossing, the Ford Fiera sped away. Appellant
Mandolado fired his .30 caliber machine gun at the speeding vehicle (p. 51, t.s.n., Jan. 17,
1979) hitting the right side of the back of the driver's sister who was then on board said vehicle
(p. 64, t.s.n., July 24, 1978).
While waiting for a ride at the Midsayap crossing a privately owned jeep, driven by
Herminigildo Tenorio, passed by. On board said jeep which was bound for Cotabato City were
Nolasco Mendoza and two (2) others, but the latter two alighted at said crossing. Conrado
Erinada and Anacleto Simon boarded the jeep. Thereafter, appellants ran after the jeep, shout
at Herminigildo Tenorio the driver thereof, to stop the vehicle and subsequently, both
appellants Mandolado and Ortillano boarded the jeep (p. 34, Supra). On the way, both
appellants kept firing their guns (pp. 54-55, t.s.n., Jan. 17, 1979) prompting Herminigildo
Tenorio to remark, "Kung hindi kayo tatahimik, ibabangga ko itong jeep" (Sworn Statement,
Exh. Q., Mandolado) which literally means, "if you will not stop firing your guns, I will ram this
jeep into something. "
Upon learning that the jeep was bound for Cotabato City and not Pikit, North Cotabato,
appellant Mandolado got angry, "cocked" his gun and ordered the driver to stop (pp. 36-38,
Supra). While the jeep was coming to a full stop, Conrado Simon and Anacleto Erinada
immediately jumped off the jeep and ran towards their detachment camp located some two
hundred fifty meters away. Appellants also got off the jeep. Thereupon, appellant Mandolado
fired his .30 caliber machine gun at and hit the occupants of the jeep (Sworn Statement, Exh.
Q, Mandolado). Appellant Ortillano likewise, fired his armalite, not at the occupants of said
jeep but downwards hitting the ground. These bursts of gunfire were heard by both Conrado
Erinada and Anacleto Simon who were then already about fifty meters away from the jeep
while running towards their detachment camp (pp. 38 and 42, t.s.n., Feb. 21, 1979). Although
it was then raining torrentially, Anacleto Simon recognized the bursts of gunfire as those of a
machine gun (p. 43, Supra).
Appellants ran away from the scene and boarded another vehicle, alighting at Pinaring
crossing. Appellant Mandolado proceeded to a house where he left his belongings and

Silverio Balderosa, on October 3, 1977, at about 12:30 p.m., was on board a "Pinoy" jeep. On
his way home to Midsayap, he passed a jeep parked along the highway towards the direction
of Cotabato City and about 250 meters away from the BPH building. The parked jeep was
surrounded by several persons. Alighting from the "pinoy" jeep, he went near the parked jeep
to see what happened. He saw the lifeless bodies of two persons, one sprawled along the
highway whom he recognized as Nolasco Mendoza and the other whom he recognized as Mr.
Tenorio slumped on the wheel of the parked jeep (pp. 13-15, t.s.n., July 24, 1978).
The postmortem examination conducted by Dr. Taeb Zailon, Municipal Health Officer of Sultan
Kudarat, Maguindanao, upon the bodies of Tenorio and Mendoza on October 3, 1977, were
reduced into writing and reads as follows:
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION REPORT
Post-mortem examination was performed at the Rural Health Center, Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao on October 3, 1977 at around 3:30 p.m. in the presence of police officers of

Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao and personnel of the Health Center and other persons in the
vicinity.
PERTINENT PERSONAL DATA:
Name: HERMINIGILDO TENORIO
Sex: Male
Age: 55 yrs. old
Height: 5'5'
Weight: 145 lbs.
C.S.: Married
Residence: Midsayap, N. Cotabato
Place of Death: Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION FINDINGS
1. Avulsed cranial content at the level of forehead including eyeballs;
2. Wound-circular lacerate 3 inches in diameter T-T at lateral side of right deltoie region;
3. Wound-1 in. circular wound at the right forearm T-T 4 inches below the elbow;
4. Comminuted fracture at right leg just below the knee cap;
5. Comminuted fracture at right leg just above ankle;
6. Wound-1 in. circular non-penetrating at lateral side left arm;
7. Wound-1/2in.circularnon-penetrating at left region.
PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH
Hemorrhage severe secondary to multiple gunshot wounds.
Respectfully submitted:
(SGD.) TAEB ZAILON, M.D.
Municipal Health Officer
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao (Exh. "N")
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION REPORT
Post-mortem examination report was performed at the Rural Health Center, Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao on October 3, 1977 at 3:30 p.m. in the presence of police officers, personnel of
the health center and other civilians.
PERTINENT PERSONAL DATA:
Name: NOLASCO MENDOZA
Sex: Male
Age: 45 years old
Height: 5'4"
Weight: 135 lbs.
C.S.: Married
Residence: Midsayap, North Cotabato
Place of Death: Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION FINDINGS
1. Wound -Circular, one inch wide, one inch above right eyebrow;
2. Wound-Circular, 1/2 inch wide, lateral part of left side of neck:
3. Wound-Circular, 3/4 inch wide, upper aspect of right deltoid muscle;
4. Wound-Circular, 1 1/2 inch wide, lateral aspect of right deltoid muscle; and
5. Wound-Circular, 1 1/2 inch wide, lateral aspect of right breast 3 inches below arm pit.
PROBABLE CAUSE OF DEATH

Wounds, gunshot, multiple shock, secondary hemorrhage, external-internal, extensive

Respectfully submitted:
(SGD.) TAEB A. ZAILON, M.D.
Municipal Health Officer
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao (Exh. "P")
Acting upon the letter request of the commanding officer, Lt. Rodolfo Villanueva, a ballistic test
was conducted by Sgt. Leon Platoon of the P.C. Crime Laboratory at Cotabato City, on the
firearms issued to appellant Mandolado, Anacleto Simon and Conrado Erinada. In said test,
bullets were fired from said guns and the empty shells, called test specimen (T05-1 to T-05-3),
together with the empty shells recovered from the scene of the crime called specimen
evidence, and the 10 links of cal. 30 machine gun, were forwarded to Camp Crame for
Ballistic Examination (pp. 20-24, t.s.n., October 6, 1978). Sgt. Platoon marked the 8 shells of .
30 caliber recovered from the scene of the crime as HT-1 to HT-8 and the armalite shells as
CM-9 to CM-13.
In the ballistic examination conducted by Reynaldo Pasatiempo of the Camp Crame Criminal
Laboratory, it was found that the caliber .30 shells recovered from the scene of the crime (Exh.
"HT-1" to "HT-8 ") reveal Identical impressions as the test specimens of five empty shells ("T05-1 to "T-05-3 ") fired from appellant Mandolado's machine gun. Whereas the armalite shells
recovered from the scene of the crime reveal non-identical impressions with the shells fired
from the armalites of Conrado Simon and Anacleto Erinada. He then concluded that the .30
caliber shells recovered from the scene of the crime were fired from the same machine gun
issued to appellant Mandolado (pp. 60-62, t.s.n., October 6, 1978).
Appellants submit only one assigned error and that is, that the trial court erred in convicting
appellants Martin Mandolado and Julian Ortillano beyond reasonable doubt as principal and
accessory, respectively, of the crimes charged on the strength of the prosecution's evidence
totally disregarding the evidence of the defense. Appellants contend that their guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the circumstantial evidence of the prosecution
merely proved the fact of the deaths of Tenorio and Mendoza and not as to the actual
perpetrators of the crime; that the evidence of the prosecution being weak on its own, the only
link of the appellant Mandolado to the killings is his extra-judicial sworn confession, Exhibit
"Q", which he stoutly repudiates for being unlawfully taken under force and duress and in the
failure of the investigator to apprise him of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be
assisted by counsel.
It is contended by the defense that although the ballistic expert and the firearm examiner
testified that they conducted ballistic and firearm examinations, respectively and that their
finding was that the caliber .30 empty shells were fired from the machine gun issued to Martin
Mandolado, the prosecution failed to prove that the "evidence specimen" (Exh. "HT-1" " to
Exh. "HT-8") were the empty shells recovered from the scene of the crime, the prosecution not
having presented any witness who recovered these empty shells. It was not shown that these
empty shells were recovered from the scene of the crime nor that the slugs of these empty
shells caused the gunshot wounds which resulted in the death of the victims, Hence, the only
link of appellant Martin Mandolado with the empty caliber .30 shells was the fact that these
shells were fired from his machine gun, yet the records disclose that Mandolado accidentally

fired his machine gun at the Mintranco Terminal in Midsayap, North Cotabato, which is not the
scene of the crime, when he threatened the person who tried to steal his bag.
Appellant Mandolado's claim that he was not previously apprised of his constitutional rights
before he executed his extra-judicial confession, Exh. "Q ", deserves scant consideration. His
claim is clearly belied by the opening statements appearing in his sworn statement, which
reads, thus:
Preliminaries: Dft Martin Mandolado please be informed that you are now under investigation
by this unit in connection with the Shooting incident that happened at National Highway
particularly near the vicinity of the BPH Office at Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao on or about
031300H October 1977. Before I ask you any questions, you must understand your legal
rights to wit: You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say maybe used for or against
you as evidence. You have the right to the services of a lawyer of your own choice. If you
cannot afford a lawyer and you want one, a lawyer will be appointed for you before I ask you
any questions.
Question: Are these all clearly understood by you?
Answer: Yes, sir.
2. Q Do you wish now to proceed with this investigation ever. in the absence of a lawyer of
your own choice?
A Yes sir.
3. Q Are you willing to give your statement without being forced, coerced, intimidated or
promised of any reward whatsoever?
A Yes sir.
4. Q Now that you are about to testify under oath, do you swear to tell the truth?
A Yes sir.
WAIVER
I have been advised of my legal right to remain silent; that anything I say maybe used as
evidence against me, and that I have the right to a lawyer to be present with me while I am
being questioned.
I understand these rights and I am willing to make a statement and answer to questions. I do
not want the assistance of a counsel and I understand and know what I am doing. No
promises or threats have been made to me and no force or pressure of any kind have been
used against me.
(SGD.) MARTIN A. MANDOLADO
Dft 07A-2853 PA
(Affiant)
And with respect to the accused-appellant Julian Ortillano, the same preliminary questions
were made to him before his investigation and he answered similarly as his co-accused
Mandolado which is shown in Exhibit "R" and said Ortillano likewise executed the same waiver
as that of his co- accused, which is marked Exhibit "R-A".
The contention of both appellants that they signed their sworn statements (Exhibits Q and R)
because they were maltreated and forced, cannot be believed, not only for failure on their part
to present any evidence of compulsion, duress or violence but also because they even failed

to Identify their investigators who allegedly inflicted maltreatment to them, much less
complained to the officials who administered the oaths to their sworn statements of such
maltreatment, if any. Moreover, the sworn statements themselves contain significant and
important details which the affiants alone could have furnished, thereby clearly revealing the
voluntariness of said statements and rendering the same admissible as evidence. (People vs.
Rosales, 108 SCRA 339; People vs. Regular, 108 SCRA 23, 39; People vs. Tintero, 111 SCRA
714; People vs. Estero, 91 SCRA 93,99).
The conviction of appellant Mandolado for double murder appears to be based not only on his
extra-judicial confession (Exhibit Q) but also upon the following circumstances which proved
that he did shot and kill the victims, Tenorio and Mendoza, beyond peradventure of doubt. And
these are listed in the People's Brief, to wit: "(1) he repeatedly fired his .30 caliber machine
gun while intoxicated at the bus terminal in Midsayap (pp. 11-12, t.s.n., February 21, 1979); (2)
that he fired at the Ford Fierra which took them in the Midsayap junction (p. 51, Supra) hitting
one of its passengers (p. 64, t.s.n., July 24, 1978); (3) that Anacleto Simon while running away
from the jeep driven by the deceased, heard a burst of machine gun fire coming from the
direction of the jeep (p. 42, t.s.n., February 21, 1979); (4) the result of the Ballistic examination
showing that the shells recovered from the scene of the crime were fired from the gun issued
to appellant Mandolado (pp. 60-62, t.s.n., October 16, 1978); (5) the attempted flight of both
appellants from justice (pp. 120-123, t.s.n., April 16, 1979) and which act clearly indicates guilt
for the 'wicked teeth where no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as the lion, and
lastly (6) appellant's own admission before the lower court that he killed Tenorio and Mendoza
although he claims the same to be accidental (pp. 7-8, t.s.n., October 6, 1978)."
The killing of the two victims in the case at bar is correctly qualified as murder, there being
present the qualifying circumstance of treachery which is alleged in the informations. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. (Art. 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code). The prosecution evidence is quite clear
and explicit that when appellants alighted from the jeep, the accused Mandolado immediately
fired his .30 caliber machine gun at the occupants of the jeep, the victims Nolasco Mendoza
and Herminigildo Tenorio, and both of them died instantaneously on the spot, and from this
sudden means or manner of attack, it can reasonably be concluded that it tended directly to
insure its execution without risk to the appellant-assailant and also deprive the victims of any
chance or opportunity to defend themselves. We also rule that the particular means or manner
employed by the appellant-assailant was consciously or deliberately sought and not a mere
accidental circumstance resorted to on the spur of the moment on the basis of the evidence
that the appellant had previously and repeatedly fired his .30 caliber machine gun at the bus
terminal in Midsayap and had also fired the machine gun at the Ford Fiera which took them to
Midsayap junction and that appellants waited for sometime riding on board the jeep driven by
Tenorio before they ordered the jeep to stop, alight therefrom and then shoot the occupants
therein.
While the informations allege as aggravating circumstances that of evident premeditation and
the use of superior strength, aside from treachery, We cannot agree with the finding of the trial

court that the aggravating circumstances of (1) advantage was taken of his being a Draftee in
the Philippine Army, and (2) abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness were present in
the commission of the crime.
While it may be true that a soldier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines is deemed as one
who holds public position (U.S. vs. Gimenea, 24 Phil. 464, where a constabulary soldier was
held to be a public officer), there is no persuasive showing that herein appellants being
draftees of the Army, in full military uniform and carrying their high-powered firearms,
facilitated the commission of the crimes they were charged. It may be conceded that as
draftees, the accused could easily hitch hike with private vehicles, as in the case of the
deceased Tenorio's owner-type jeep, but there is no evidence that when they stopped the jeep
the accused already intended to shoot the occupants of the vehicle. As it was held in People
Pantoja, 25 SCRA 468, 471 which We reiterate that "There is nothing to show that the
appellant took advantage of his being a sergeant in the Philippine Army in order to commit the
crimes. The mere fact that he was in fatigue uniform and had an army rifle at the time is not
sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission of the crimes ... "
There is also merit in appellants' contention that there could be no abuse of confidence as the
evidence on record showed the lack of confidence by the victims to the appellants, that this
confidence was abused, and that the abuse of the confidence facilitated the commission of the
crimes. In order that abuse of confidence be deemed as aggravating, it is necessary that
"there exists a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and one against whom
the crime was committed and the accused made use of such a relationship to commit the
crime." (People vs. Comendador, 100 SCRA 155, 172). It is also essential that the confidence
between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give that accused some
advantage or make it easier for him to commit the crime; that such confidence was a means of
facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's
belief that the former would not abuse said confidence (People vs. Hanasan, 29 SCRA 534).
In the instant case, there is absolutely no showing of any personal or immediate relationship
upon which confidence might rest between the victims and the assailants who had just met
each other then. Consequently, no confidence and abuse thereof could have facilitated the
crimes.
Similarly, there could have been no obvious ungratefulness in the commission of the crime for
the simple reason that the requisite trust of the victims upon the accused prior to the criminal
act and the breach thereof as contemplated under Article 14, par. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code are manifestly lacking or non-existent. In all likelihood, the accused Army men in their
uniforms and holding their high-powered firearms cowed the victims into boarding their jeep
for a ride at machine gun point which certainly is no source of gratefulness or appreciation.
The finding of the trial court that: "There is no doubt about Martin Mandolado's state of
intoxication. He was so drunk that even his three (3) companions armed with M-16 armalite
feared him. The same thing was true with the MPs," should credit said accused with the
mitigating circumstance of drunkenness but which the trial court decision failed to appreciate
in his favor. Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed upon the accused-appellant Mandolado
shall be reduced in the computation thereof.

With respect to the accused-appellant Julian Ortillano who was found guilty as an accessory
in Criminal Cases No. 561 and No. 562 for having fired his M-16 armalite whenever Martin
Mandolado fired his machine gun and, according to the court, this could be for no other
purpose than to conceal or destroy the body of the crime and making it appear that the victims
were fighting them or running away or that somebody else like the MNLF, rebels, NPA or
bandits committed the crime, and for assisting in the escape of the principal Martin
Mandolado) of the crime and sentenced in each of both cases to serve imprisonment for a
term of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to seventeen (17) years of prision
mayor as maximum, We find and hold that the accused-appellant Julian Ortillano should be
convicted, not as an accessory, but as an accomplice.
An accomplice cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts,
provided he has no direct participation in its execution or does not force or induce others to
commit it, or his cooperation is not indispensable to its accomplishment (Art. 18, Revised
Penal Code).
To hold him liable, upon the other hand, as an accomplice, it must be shown that he had
knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by previous
or simultaneous acts which contributes to the commission of the offense as aid thereto
whether physical or moral (People vs. Silvestre, et al., 56 Phil, 353, 356). As aptly stated in
People vs. Tamayo (44 Phil. 38, 49): 'It is an essential condition to the existence of complicity,
not only that there should be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is further necessary that the latter, with
knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of supplying material or
moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. (People vs. Custodia, 47 SCRA
289,303 [19721).
In the case at bar, Ortillano, by his acts, showed knowledge of the criminal design of
Mandolado. He was present when Mandolado tried to attack the driver of the Ford Fierra with
a knife and fired at the vehicle hitting a female passenger (p. 4, Decision). When Mandolado
got angry and "cocked" his gun and ordered Tenorio to stop the jeep, their two other
companions, Simon and Erinada, immediately jumped off the jeep and ran away, but Ortillano
stayed. In a display of unity with Mandolado, Ortillano fired his armalite while they were riding
in the jeep of the victim (p. 5, Decision). And Ortillano's act of firing his gun towards the ground
manifested his concurrence with the criminal intent. In other words, Ortillano's simultaneous
acts supplied, if not material, moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way.
Ortillano's presence served to encourage Mandolado, the principal, or to increase the odds
against the victims (U.S. vs. Guevara, 2 Phil. 528 [1903]; People vs. Silvestre and Atienza, 56
Phil. 353 [1931]).
In convicting the accused Ortillano as an accomplice, We, however, appreciate the mitigating
circumstance of drunkenness in his favor, the same as We did to his co-accused Martin
Mandolado, the principal defendant.
In resume, the crime committed by the accused-appellant Martin Mandolado is murder,
qualified by treachery. There being no aggravating circumstance but having found and

appreciated drunkenness which is not habitual as a mitigating circumstance, the penalty

prescribed under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death shall be imposed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the accused shall be sentenced to imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (;)
day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum in each case.

In Criminal Case No. 562 for the killing of Herminigildo Tenorio, We sentence both accused to
pay the heirs of the victim P12,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 for moral
damages. The liability of the accused shall also be in solidum.
Costs against the appellants. Judgment modified.
SO ORDERED.

As to the accused-appellant Julian Ortillano, convicted as an accomplice to the crime of

murder, and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness which is not
habitual, the penalty to be imposed upon him shall be one degree lower than that imposed for
murder (Article 52, Revised Penal Code), which will be in the minimum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused Ortillano shall be sentenced to imprisonment of
four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as maximum in each case.

Fernando (C.J.), Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro, MelencioHerrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.

With respect to damages, for the death of Herminigildo Tenorio, the award of P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P 20,000.00 for moral damages is hereby affirmed.
For the death of Nolasco Mendoza, We reduce the award of P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages to P12,000.00 We also reduce the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages to
P20,000.00.
The liability of the appellants for the above damages which shall be paid to the heirs of the
victims shall be in solidum (Article 110, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the trial court is hereby
MODIFIED. The accused-appellant Martin Mandolado is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 561 for the killing of Nolasco
Mendoza and in Criminal Case No. 562, for the killing of Herminigildo Tenorio. There being no
aggravating circumstance but having found and appreciated drunkenness which is not
habitual as a mitigating circumstance, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum in each of the
two cases.
The accused-appellant Julian Ortillano is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
accomplice in the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 561 for the killing of Nolasco Mendoza
and in Criminal Case No. 562 for the killing of Herminigildo Tenorio. Similarly, there being no
aggravating circumstance but having found and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
drunkenness which is not habitual in his favor, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum in each case.
In Criminal Case No. 561 for the killing of Nolasco Mendoza, We sentence both accused to
pay the heirs of the victim P12,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages. The liability of the accused shall be in solidum.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30449 October 31, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

ANTONIO GARCIA Y CABARSE alias "TONY MANOK" and REYNALDO ARVISO V

REBELLEZA alias "RENE BISUGO," defendants-appellants.
Wenceslao B. Trinidad for appellants.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor
Adolfo J. Diaz for appellee.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of April 17, 1969 by the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig,
Rizal, which found the accused guilty of murder and sentenced them to the death penalty.
The legal verdict hinges on the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Mrs.
Corazon Dioquino Paterno, sister of the deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. She testified that at
the time of the incident, she resided at Ventanilla Street, Pasay City. She lived at Pasay City
for about five months before moving to another dwelling at Timog Avenue, Quezon City. While
residing at Pasay City, she conceived a child and during this period, it was not unusual for her,
accompanied by her husband, to step out of the house in the wee hours of the morning. They
set out on these irregular walks about five times.
During her residence at Pasay City, her brother Apolonio visited her family for about twenty
times. Sometimes her brother would stay instead at their parents' house at Muntinlupa, Rizal.
He usually spent his weekends in his residence at Bo. Balubad, Porac, Pampanga. Apolonio
and her husband were very close to each other; whenever Apolonio paid them a visit, he
usually slept in the house and sought their help on various problems.
Before the incident which gave rise to this case, Corazon's husband informed her that he saw
Apolonio engaged in a drinking spree with his gang in front of an establishment known as Bill's
Place at M. de la Cruz Street. Pasay City. In her sworn statement before the Pasay City Police
executed on November 3, 1968, Corazon surmised that her husband must have been painting
the town red ("nag good time") in that same place. Upon learning this information from her
husband, Corazon obtained permission to leave the house at 3:00 a.m. so she could fetch her
brother. At that time, she had not been aware that Apolonio was in Pasay City; she had been
of the belief that he was with his family in Pampanga. She went to fetch him because she
wanted him to escape the untoward influence of his gang. In explaining the rationale for her
noctural mission, she employed in her sworn statement the following language: "Dahil itong si
Junior ay meron na kaming nabalitaan na naaakay ng barkada niya sa paggawa ng hindi
mabuti."
On her way, as she rounded the corner of P.C. Santos Street, Corazon saw her brother fleeing
a group of about seven persons, including the two accused, Antonio Garcia and Reynaldo
Arviso. She recognized the two accused because they were former gangmates of her brother;
in fact, she knew them before the incident by their aliases of "Tony Manok" and "Rene Bisugo,
" respectively.
Corazon saw that the chase was led by the two accused, with Antonio carrying a long sharp
instrument. Later, in the course of giving her sworn statement before the Pasay City Police
on , November 3, 1968, Corazon positively Identified Antonio and Reynaldo, who were then at
the office of the General Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, Pasay City Police
Department. She also stated that if she saw the other members of the group again, perhaps
she could likewise Identify them. At the trial, Corazon likewise pointed out the two accused.
During the incident, she exerted efforts to Identify the other group members, taking care to
conceal herself as she did so. She heard a gunshot which caused her to seek cover.

When she ventured to look from where she was hiding, about 20 meters away, she saw the
group catch up with her brother and maltreat him. Some beat him with pieces of wood, others
boxed him. Immediately afterwards, the group scampered away in different directions. Antonio
was left behind. He was sitting astride the prostrate figure of Apolonio, stabbing the latter in
the back with his long knife. Corazon was not able to observe where Antonio later fled, for she
could hardly bear to witness the scene.
When Corazon mustered the courage to approach her brother, she saw that he was bathed in
a pool of his own blood. The incident threw her in a state of nervous confusion, and she
resolved to report the incident to her younger sister, who lived at Lakandula Street, Pasay City.
Her sister in turn decided to break the news to their father at Muntinlupa.
Subsequently, Corazon learned that the police authorities were searching for her brother's
gangmates for having killed him. She also learned that the suspects were in hiding. On the
same day October 19, 1968 accompanied by her family, she went at 2:00 p.m. to the
Police Department to inquire about her brother's corpse. They were directed to the Funeraria
Popular, where an autopsy was held. Sometime later, on November 1, 1968, she transferred
residence to Quezon City.
Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr. testified that he conducted a post-mortem examination on the cadaver
of the decedent Apolonio, and that he prepared the corresponding Necropsy Report. Dr.
Cueva found that the deceased suffered 22 stab wounds in the different portions of his hips; in
the front portion of the chest and neck; in the back portion of the torso; and in the right hand.
He testified that the wounds sustained by the deceased brought about a massive hemorrhage
which caused death. He also testified that it is possible that the instrument marked as Exhibit
"B" could have been used in inflicting the multiple stab wounds sustained by the deceased,
except the stab wounds on the neck.
Both the accused took refuge in the defense of alibi. Antonio Garcia claimed that at that time
of the incident starting with the chase and ending with the victim's death in the morning
of October 19, 1968, he was at a place called Pacita's Canteen which adjoins Bill's Place at
M, de la Cruz Street. Reynaldo Arviso claimed that in the evening of the preceding night
(October 18, 1968) he went on a drinking spree with his friends at Pacita's Canteen. He went
home at 10:30 p.m. and slept up to 7:00 a.m. of October 19, 1968. From 7:00 a.m. of that day,
he performed his duties as a bus conductor by calling for passengers near Pacita's Canteen.
The trial court pinpointed the issue as revolving around the Identity of the persons who
participated in the killing of the deceased. it banked on the testimony of the witness, Corazon
Dioquino, who positively Identified the accused as participants in the attack. Noting that "the
defense did not even attempt to present any evil motive on the part of the witness," the court
concluded that "the two accused took part in the perpetuation of the crime charged." It gave
short shrift to the defense of alibi presented by the two accused, noting that, by their own
admission, the two accused were residents of the vicinity of the crime.
In respect of the circumstances attending the crime it said:
But considering the aggravating circumstances of nighttime; superior strength; and treachery,
which three aggravating circumstances had been sufficiently established by the prosecution,
the same cannot be offset by said voluntary surrender to a person in authority of his agent,
plus the uncontested fact that deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. suffered no less than 22 stab
wounds, convincing evidence of the apparent criminal perversity of the accused, the court,
therefore, has no alternative but to impose the supreme penalty.
And rendered judgment as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused, Antonio Garcia v Cabarse and
Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder under
Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged under Article 248, of the Revised Penal
Code, as charged in the information, and considering the aggravating circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime, each one of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH.
The two accused are further ordered to indemnify, the heirs of the deceased, Apolonio
Dioquino, Jr. in the amount of TWELVE 'THOUSAND (P12,000,00) PESOS, jointly and
severally and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
In their Brief, the accused contended that the lower court erred: in not considering nighttime
and superior strength as absorbed in treachery: in finding nighttime as an aggravating
circumstance despite absolute absence of evidence that nighttime was purposely sought to
insure the execution of the crime; in finding superior strength as an aggravating circumstance
despite absence of evidence to sustain such a finding; in finding treachery as an aggravating
circumstance despite absence of evidence to that effect; in not stating the qualifying
circumstance of the alleged crime; in holding that the accused Reynaldo Arviso stabbed and
hit the victim when there is no evidence as to the participation of the said accused Arviso in
the execution of the alleged crime; and in failing to consider the material inconsistencies,
prejudice and other circumstances in the uncorroborated testimony of the only eyewitness,
rendering said testimony not worthy of belief.
The assignment of errors by the accused is anchored on their attempt to discredit the lone
eyewitness for the prosecution, a function which, if successfully undertaken, would totally
obliterate the nexus between the accused and the crime. The defense vigorously maintained
that the testimony of the only eyewitness is a fabrication, and that she was in fact absent from
the scene which she described in both her sworn statement and in her testimony at the trial.
The defense asserted that Corazon Dioquino's testimony was riddled by material
inconsistencies. The defense sought to capitalize on the discrepancy of a sketch made by
Corazon and the sketch made by Pasay City Electrical Engineer Jaime Arriola. Corazon's
sketch shows Juan Sumulong Elementary School to be right in front of P.C. Santos Street;
while Arriola's sketch shows that the school is about 135 meters from the corner of the street.
The defense contended that the discrepancy was a deliberate falsehood on the part of the
witness,
Corazon testified that she was near the corner of P.C. Santos Street when she saw her
brother under chase in front of the school, and that she met the group in front of the school in
a matter of five seconds, more or less. The defense assailed her testimony on this point as
incredible on the ground that the distance between the point where she saw her brother being
chased, up to the point where she met them, is 135 meters, and no human being can cover
that distance in five seconds. Moreover, Corazon testified that she was 20 meters away from
the place where the accused caught up with her brother. Again, the defense criticized her
testimony in this respect by pointing out that the true distance is 175 meters.
The defense insisted that Corazon's sketch of the locale of the crime (Exhibit "1") constitutes
"the high point of falsity of her testimony." The defense sought to substantiate this claim by
arguing that from her sketch, it appears that she never crossed paths with her brother or his
pursuers. The witness testified that she saw her brother at the point which is four to five
meters from the corner of P.C. Santos Street. Yet she also testified that she saw the incident
from 20 meters. The witness claimed she hid after hearing the shot at a point which is 170

meters from the scene of the crime. The defense argued that she could not have covered the
distance in such a short time, and that this belies her claim that she was only 20 meters from
the scene of the crime. The defense pointed out that Arriola's sketch (Exhibit "2") shows that
the school is 135 meters from the scene of the crime, and the point where the witness claimed
she viewed the crime is 170 meters from the scene of the crime thus giving the lie to her claim
that she was 20 meters away.
The alleged inconsistencies in Corazon's testimony which the defense makes much of
are not irreconcilable with the physical facts, At the outset, it should not be overlooked that
Corazon was testifying as an eyewitness to the traumatic incident by which her brother met a
violent death at the hands of a mob. Naturally, Corazon can not be expected to deliver a
testimony which passes microscopic scrutiny and scrupulous armchair analysis of the facts,
conducted under circumstances far removed from the turbulence and emotional color of the
event as it actually transpired. Al contrario, if Corazon's testimony were meticulously accurate
with respect to distance covered and the time taken to negotiate it, an impartial observer
would wonder whether such exactitude were not the product of previous rehearsal, if not of
fabrication. In times of stress, the human mind is frequently overpowered by the ebb and flow
of emotions in turmoil; and it is only judicious to take into consideration the natural
manifestations of human conduct, when the physical senses are subdued by the
psychological state of the individual.
Corazon was a resident of Pasay City for only about five months. She testified that she is not
familiar with the streets along M. de la Cruz Street. Moreover, Corazon did not categorically
testify that she covered the distance of 135 meters in five seconds. Mole accurately, she
testified that she walked for a period of from five to ten seconds, more or less. Put in this way,
the period was sufficient to allow her to negotiate the distance. Moreover, Corazon did not stay
rooted to one spot while the incident was taking place, but surreptitiously edged her way up to
Magtibay Street, which is closer to the place of the killing.
The defense also claims that the delay which Corazon allowed to transpire, before reporting
the crime to the authorities and giving her sworn statement (on November 3, 1968), is
indicative of fabrication. The killing took place before dawn of October 19, 1968, In the
afternoon of the same day, Corazon and her family went to the Police Department to inquire
about the remains of her brother. Corazon already knew that the police were taking steps to
round up the killers. She incurred no fault in waiting until the culprits were arrested before
confronting them and giving her statement. It would have been the better part of legal
procedure if she had given her statement earlier; but since she was only a 22-year old
housekeeper at that tune, she can not be held to a higher standard of discretion.
The defense further contends that the failure to present Corazon's husband in court indicates
that Corazon was not actually at the scene of the crime at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It the
defense felt that the husband had a contribution to make in the cause of truth, there was
nothing which prevented them from compelling his process by summons. This they failed to
do; and their omission should not be taken to reflect adversely on the prosecution, who
evidently believed that the husband's testimony was unnecessary,
Finally, the defense claims that it was unnatural for Corazon, after viewing her brother's body,
to proceed to her sister's house one kilometer away, instead of returning to her own house,
which was just a block or so away. It is not unnatural for a witness to a gruesome event, to
choose to confer with a person bound to her by ties of consanguinity, even if such a

conference necessitates that she traverse a longer distance. The exercise of judgment, on the
spot, should not be gauged by reason applied in hindsight with a metrical yard stick.
The next major burden which the defense undertook to assume was to contend that the
accused Reynaldo Arviso is innocent because there is no evidence as to his participation in
the execution of the crime. It is claimed that there is absolute absence of evidence to show
that Reynaldo was a direct participant and that the only evidence against him is that he was
seen pursuing the victim. However, the finding of Reynaldo's guilt stems, not from his direct
participation in the criminal execution, but from his participation in the conspiracy to kill the
deceased. His participation in the conspiracy is supported by Corazon's testimony that he and
Antonio were the leaders of the pack following closely at the heels of the victim.
It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves,
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design. A concerted assault upon the victim by the
defendants may indicate conspiracy. (PP v. Monroy & Idica, L-11177, Oct. 30, 1958, 104 Phil.
759). Conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the defendants had
the same criminal purpose and were united in its execution. (PP v. Datu Dima Binahasing, L4837, April 28, 1956, 98 Phil. 902). Those who are members of the band of malefactors by
which a murder is committed and are present at the time and place of the commission of the
crime, thus contributing by their presence to augment the power of the band and to aid in the
successful realization of the crime, are guilty as principals even if they took no part in the
material act of killing the deceased. (US v. Abelinde, No. 945, Dec. 10, 1902, 1 Phil. 568;
People v. Carunungan, L-13283, Sept. 30, 1960, 109 Phil. 534). To establish conspiracy, it is
not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient
that the malefactors have acted in concert, pursuant to the same objective. (PP vs. San Luis,
L-2365, May 29, 1950, 86 Phil. 485).
Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may and
generally must be proven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which
vary according to the purpose to be accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons
aimed by their acts towards accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part.
so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy
maybe inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert is proven (PP v. Colman L6652-54, Feb. 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 6). A conspiracy may be entered into after the
commencement of overt acts leading to the consummation of the crime. (PP v. Barredo, L2728, Dec. 29, 1950, 87 Phil. 800). Conspiracy implies concert of design and not participation
in every detail of execution (PP v. Carbonel, L-24177, March 15, 1926, 48 Phil. 868; PP v.
Danan, L-1766, March 31, 1949, 83 Phil. 252).
When a group of seven men, more or less, give chase to a single unarmed individual running
for his life, and they overtake him and inflict wounds on his body by means of shooting,
stabbing, and hitting with pieces of wood, there is conspiracy to kill; and it does not detract
from their status as conspirators that there is no evidence of previous agreement, it being
sufficient that their wills have concurred and they labored to achieve the same end.
The defense submits that the failure of the lower court to specify the qualifying circumstance
in the crime of murder is violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We find no such
infirmity. Since the principle concerned is "readily understood from the facts, the conclusion
and the penalty posed., an express specification of the statute or exposition of the law is not
necessary." (People vs. Silo, L-7916, May 25, 1956, 99 Phil. 216). In the absence of a

specification by the trial court, the defense surmised that the qualifying circumstance in this
case is evident premeditation: but the defense argued that evident premeditation was not
shown. We agree. Under normal conditions, conspiracy generally presupposes premeditation.
But in the case of implied conspiracy, evident premeditation may not be appreciated, in the
absence of proof as to how and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time
elapsed before it was carried out, so that it can not be determined if the accused had
"sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept
the consequences." There should be a showing that the accused had the opportunity for
reflection and persisted in executing his criminal design. (PP v. Custodia, L-7442, October
24,1955, 97 Phil. 698; PP v. Mendoza and Sinu-ag, L-4146 and L-4147, March 28, 1952, 91
Phil. 58; PP v. Yturiaga, L-2816, May 31, 1950, 86 Phil. 534; PP v. Lozada, No. 46998, Nov.
16, 1940, 70 Phil. 525; PP v. Upao Moro, L-6771, May 28, 1957, Phil. 101 Phil. 1226; PP v.
Sakam, No. 41566, Dec. 7, 1934, 61 Phil. 27: PP v. Peralta, L-19069, Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA
759; PP v. Pareja, L-21937, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693).
Even in the absence of evident premeditation, the crime of murder in this case might still be
qualified by treachery, which is alleged in the information. But the defense argued that
treachery was not present. We are so convinced. It is an elementary axiom that treachery can
in no way be presumed but must be fully proven. (US v. Asilo, No. 1957, Jan. 30, 1905, 4 Phil,
175; US v. Arciga, No. 1129, April 6, 1903, 2 Phil. 110; PP v. Durante, No. 31101, Aug. 23,
1929, 53 Phil. 363; PP v. Pelago, L-24884, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1027), Where the manner
of the attack was not proven, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the
crime should be considered homicide only. (Carpio, 83 Phil. 509; Amansec, So Phil, 424).
In People vs. Metran (L-4205, July 27, 1951, 89 Phil. 543). the aggravating circumstances of
aid of armed men, abuse of superiority, and nocturnity, were considered as constituting
treachery, which qualified the crime as murder, since there was no direct evidence as to the
manner of the attack. However, in this case we believe that the correct qualifying
circumstance is not treachery, but abuse of superiority. Here we are confronted with a helpless
victim killed by assailants superior to him in arms and in numbers. But the attack was not
sudden nor unexpected, and the element of surprise was lacking. The victim could have made
a defense; hence, the assault involved some risk to the assailants. There being no showing
when the intent to kill was formed, it can not be said that treachery has been proven. We
believe the correct rule is found in People vs. Proceso Bustos (No. 17763, July 23, 1923, 45
Phil. 9), where alevosia was not appreciated because it was deemed included in abuse of
superiority.
We find that abuse of superiority attended the offense, following a long line of cases which
made this finding on parallel facts Our jurisprudence is exemplified by the holding that where
four persons attacked an unarmed victim but there was no proof as to how the attack
commenced and treachery was not proven, the fact that there were four assailants would
constitute abuse of superiority. (People vs. Lasada, No. 6742, Jan. 26, 1912, 21 Phil. 287; US
v. Banagale, No. 7870, Jan. 10, 1913, 24 Phil. 69). However, the information does not allege
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superiority; hence, this circumstance can only be
Created as generic aggravating. (People v. Acusar, L-1798, Dee. 29, 1948, 82 Phil. 490;
People v. Beje, L-8245, July 19, 1956, 99 Phil. 1052; People v. Bautista, L-23303, May 20,
1969, 28 SCRA 184).
The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It may therefore be said that it was
committed at night, which covers the period from sunset to sunrise, according to the New Civil

Code, Article 13. Is this basis for finding that nocturnity is aggravating? The Revised Penal
Code, Article 14, provides that it is an aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed
in the nighttime, whenever nocturnity may facilitate the commission of the offense. There are
two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test, under which
nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the
subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the
offender. These two tests should be applied in the alternative.
In this case, the subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the accused
purposely sought the cover of night time. Next, we proceed and apply the objective test, to
determine whether nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A group of men were engaged
in a drinking spree, in the course of which one of them fled, chased by seven others. The
criminal assault on the victim at 3:00 a.m. was invited by nocturnal cover, which handicapped
the view of eyewitnesses and encouraged impunity by persuading the malefactors that it
would be difficult to determine their Identity because of the darkness and the relative scarcity
of people in the streets. There circumstances combine to pass the objective test, and e find
that nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitated the commission of the offense. Nocturnity
enticed those with the lust to kill to follow their impulses with the false courage born out of the
belief that they could not be readily Identified.
The information alleges that the crime of murder was attended by the two qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Neither of these qualifying
circumstances was proved; hence, the killing can not be qualified into murder, and constitutes
instead the crime of homicide, which is punished by reclusion temporal. It is not controverted
that the accused voluntarily surrendered to the authorities; they are therefore entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. This lone mitigating circumstance offset by the
two generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of superiority and nocturnity, produces the
result that in the crime of homicide, one aggravating circumstance remains.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby modified in that the two accused,
Antonio Garcia y Cabarse and Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza, are sentenced to undergo an
indeterminate imprisonment of 10 years as minimum to 18 years as maximum, but in all other
respects affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro and -Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175881
August 28, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO RODAS1 and JOSE RODAS, SR.,2 Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00289
which affirmed in toto the decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, Branch XI, convicting accused-appellants Armando Rodas and Jose
Rodas, Sr. of the crime of Murder.
For the death of one Titing Asenda, accused-appellant Jose Rodas, Sr., together with his sons
Charlito, Armando, and Jose Jr., all surnamed Rodas, were charged with murder in an
information which reads:
That, in the evening, on or about the 9th day of August, 1996, in the municipality of Siayan,
Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a hunting knife, firearm, chako and bolo, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
beat, stab and hack one TITING ASENDA, thereby inflicting upon him multiple wounds on the
vital parts of his body which caused his death shortly thereafter; that as a result of the
commission of the said crime the heirs of the herein victim suffered the following damages,
viz:
a) Indemnity for victims death . . .

P50,000.00

b) Loss of earning capacity . . . . . . .

P30,000.00
P80,000.00

CONTRARY TO LAW (Viol. of Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), with the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and abuse of superior strength. 5
When arraigned on 22 November 1996, the four accused, assisted by counsel de oficio,
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.6
By agreement of the parties, pre-trial conference was terminated on 6 December 1996. 7
Thereafter, trial on the merits commenced.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Alberto Asonda, Danilo Asenda, Ernie
Anggot, Blessie Antiquina and PO1 Pablo Yosores.
Before the prosecution could rest its case, accused Charlito Rodas 8 and Jose Rodas, Jr. 9
withdrew their previous pleas of "NOT GUILTY" and entered their respective pleas of
"GUILTY" for the lesser crime of Homicide. Both were sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years and were each ordered to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,500.00 as damages. 10
The prosecution formally offered Exhibits "A" to "H," inclusive, with sub-markings. 11

From the evidence adduced, the prosecutions version of the killing is as follows:
On 9 August 1996, Titing Asenda, a resident of Boyos, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, was
at Milaub, Denoyan, Zamboanga del Norte, to help his brother, Danilo Asenda, in the
harvesting of the latters corn.
On the same day, at around 8:00 in the evening, a benefit dance at Milaub, which was
sponsored by Boboy Raquilme,12 was being held. Among those roaming in the vicinity of the
dance hall were Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot. They stopped and hung out near the fence
to watch the affair. Titing Asenda was standing near them. They saw Charlito Rodas, Armando
Rodas, Jose Rodas, Jr., and Jose Rodas, Sr. surround Titing Asenda. Suddenly, without a
word, Charlito Rodas, armed with a hunting knife, stabbed Titing at the back. Armando Rodas
then clubbed Titing with a chako hitting him at the left side of the nape causing him to fall.
Thereafter, Jose Rodas, Sr. handed to Jose Rodas, Jr. a bolo which the latter used in hacking
Titing, hitting him on the left elbow. Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot tried to help Titing but
Armando Rodas prevented them by pointing a gun at them and firing it towards the sky.
After the assailants left, Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot approached Titing Asenda who was
already dead. They informed Danilo Asenda that his brother was killed. The police arrived the
following day after being informed of the incident.
On the part of the defense, accused-appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr., and
Vilma Rodas, the formers wife, took the witness stand. The defense rested its case without
marking and offering any documentary evidence.
Defense evidence showed that only Charlito Rodas and Jose Rodas, Jr. killed Titing Asenda.
Appellant Jose Rodas, Sr. denied any participation in the killing of Titing Asenda claiming he
was not present in the benefit dance and that he was in his home with his wife and infant
granddaughter when the killing happened. He revealed that on the night of the killing, his son,
Charlito Rodas, who was carrying a hunting knife, arrived and told him he killed somebody. He
then brought his son to the municipal building of Siayan to surrender him to the police
authorities.
Appellant Armando Rodas likewise denied he was one of those who killed Titing Asenda. He
claimed that at the time of the killing, he was in his house sleeping with his children. He
denied using a chako and firing a gun. He insisted it was his brothers, Charlito and Jose Jr.,
who killed Titing Asenda because they pleaded guilty.
To bolster the testimony of the appellants, Vilma Rodas testified that she was at the benefit
dance when the killing happened. Armando and Jose Sr., she claimed, did not participate in
the killing. She said Charlito stabbed Titing while Jose Jr. merely punched the victim.
On 9 July 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision finding accused-appellants Armando
Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr. guilty of the crime of Murder. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jose Rodas, Sr. and Armando Rodas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, as amended under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 and hereby sentenced them to
RECLUSION PERPETUA each and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Titing Asenda,
P12,500.00 each or a total of P25,000.00.
COST de oficio.13
In finding accused-appellants guilty, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of
eyewitnesses Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot. It found accused-appellants and the other
two accused conspired in the killing of the victim and that treachery attended the same. It

gave no weight to accused-appellants defense of alibi and denial arguing that they were
positively identified as the perpetrators and that they failed to adduce evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to be present at the crime scene when the killing happened. It
added that their unsubstantiated denial will not be given greater evidentiary value over the
testimonies of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
With a Notice of Appeal14 filed by accused-appellants, the trial court forwarded the entire
records of the case to this Court.15 However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo, 16 the
case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
In its decision dated 28 July 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. 17
With the Court of Appeals affirmance of their convictions, accused-appellants are now before
this Court via a notice of appeal. With the appeal being timely filed, the records of the case
were elevated to this Court.
In our Resolution18 dated 19 February 2007, the parties were required to file their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice. Accused-appellants
manifested that since they had already filed the Appellants Brief, as well as Reply and
Supplemental Reply Brief, they are dispensing with the filing of the Supplemental Brief
because the latter will merely contain a reiteration of the arguments substantially discussed in
the former.19 On the part of the Office of the Solicitor General, it manifested that considering
that the guilt of the appellants had already been discussed in the Appellees Brief, it was
waiving its right to file a Supplemental Brief.20
Accused-Appellants assign as errors the following:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE ALSO
PRESENT AT THE DANCE AND PARTICIPATED IN ATTACKING THE VICTIM.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY, THEY ARE ONLY LIABLE
FOR THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
On the first assigned error, appellants contend that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot should not be believed because they did not see the start of
the assault on Titing, and all they saw was him injured and lying down on the floor. They insist
that Asonda and Anggot could not have seen the killing because only a Petromax lighted the
place.
After a careful and meticulous review of the records of the case, we find no reason to reverse
the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We affirm appellants
conviction.
We find the evidence of the prosecution to be more credible than that adduced by appellants.
When it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to
observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a
better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence. 21
It is to be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC. In this regard, it is
settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said
findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. 22 We find no compelling reason
to deviate from their findings.

The Court finds that Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot witnessed the killing of Titing Asenda by
Charlito Rodas, Armando Rodas, Jose Rodas, Jr. and Jose Rodas, Sr. When Titing was killed,
Asonda and Anggot were near him. Contrary to the claim of the defense that the place where
the killing occurred was not lighted enough for the assailants to be identified, the place was
sufficiently lighted by a Petromax as testified to by Vilma Rodas.23
Appellants make a big issue about the absence of a medical examination. Should they be
exonerated because of this? The answer is no.
A medical examination or a medical certificate is not indispensable in the case at bar. Its
absence will not prove that appellants did not commit the cime charged. They can still be
convicted by mere testimonial evidence, if the same is convincing. In the case at bar, the
testimonies of the two eyewitnesses, which the Court found to be credible, are sufficient to
prove the crime and its perpetrators.
Appellants defense of denial and alibi must likewise fail. Mere denial, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
value than the positive testimony of a victim.24 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a negative
and self-serving assertion.25
Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were not
shown to have any ill motive to testify against appellants. Absence of improper motive makes
the testimony worthy of full faith and credence.26 In this case, appellants, who were positively
identified, testified that Asonda and Anggot had no ill motive to testify against them. 27
Moreover, ill motive has no bearing when accused were positively identified by credible
eyewitnesses. Motive gains importance only when the identity of the culprit is doubtful. 28
Appellants also interposed the defense of alibi. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more
settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected. 29 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is
imperative that the accused establish two elements: (1) he was not at the locus criminis at the
time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene at the time of its commission.30 Appellants failed to do so.
In the case at bar, both appellants claimed that on the night Titing Asenda was killed, they
were one kilometer away. Thus, it was not possible for them to have been at the scene of the
crime when the crime was committed. The defense witnesses, however, gave conflicting
testimonies. Appellant Armando said his residence was more or less one kilometer away from
the crime scene31 but Jose Sr. said it was only 50 meters away.32 Jose Sr.33 said the house of
Charlito was only 50 meters away from the crime scene but Armando said it was one
kilometer away.34 Armando said his wife was in Dipolog City when the killing happened, 35 but
his wife said she witnessed the killing.36 Armando said he and all the other accused lived in
separate houses,37 but his wife revealed that Charlito lives with Jose Sr. 38 Vilma Rodas said
after the killing, she immediately went home and told Armando that his brothers killed
somebody39 but her husband said he only learned of it the next morning. 40 What is more
incredible is the fact that despite the testimony of Vilma Rodas that she informed Armando of
the killing, the latter never testified to this effect. All these negate appellants claim that they
were not at the crime scene when the killing took place.
The information alleged that appellants, together with Charlito and Jose Jr., conspired in killing
Titing Asenda. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two
or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is hornbook doctrine that
conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence, the same quantum of

evidence as the crime itself.41 Indeed, proof of previous agreement among the malefactors to
commit the crime is not essential to prove conspiracy. It is not necessary to show that all the
conspirators actually hit and killed the victim; what is primordial is that all the participants
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common
purpose or design to bring about the victims death. 42 Once conspiracy is established, all the
conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of their degree of participation. In the
contemplation of the law, the act of one becomes the act of all, and it matters not who among
the accused inflicted the fatal blow on the victim. 43
In this case, conspiracy was convincingly proven beyond reasonable doubt. All the accused
had the same purpose and acted in unison when they assaulted the victim. Surrounding the
victim, Charlito stabbed Titing Asenda at the back with a hunting knife. Armando next clubbed
the victim with a chako, hitting him on the left side of the nape, causing him to fall to the
ground. Jose Sr. then handed a bolo to Jose Jr. who used it in hacking the victim.
On the second assigned error, appellants argue that assuming arguendo they are guilty, they
are liable only for the crime of homicide, not murder. They contend that treachery was absent
since they, together with Charlito and Jose Jr., met the victim casually in the dance hall.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the
latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. 44 In People v.
Villonez,45 we ruled that treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was
forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
In the case under review, the victim was completely unaware that he was going to be
attacked.46 He was not forewarned of any danger to himself as there was no altercation or
disagreement between the accused and the victim. If treachery may be appreciated even
when the victim was forewarned, more so should it be appreciated when the victim was not,
as in the case at bar. The suddenness of the attack, the number of the accused and their use
of weapons against the unarmed victim prevent the possibility of any defense or retaliation by
the victim. The fact that the victim was already sprawled on the ground and still Jose Jr.
hacked him with a bolo clearly constitutes treachery.
The information also alleged that evident premeditation, nocturnity and abuse of superior
strength attended the killing.
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be established: (1)
the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating
that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and
execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 47 Like any other
circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be established by
clear and positive proof; that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 48 The essence of
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment.49 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show the presence of
any of these elements.
The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity cannot be considered against appellants. This
circumstance is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime,
or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity.

The essence of this aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely
the chronological onset of, nighttime. Although the offense was committed at night, nocturnity
does not become a modifying factor when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no
longer insure the offenders immunity from identification or capture. 50 In the instant case, the
prosecution failed to show that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime, or was
especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The crime
scene was sufficiently lighted by a Petromax which led to the identification of all the accused.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength attended the killing. There was
glaring disparity of strength between the victim and the four accused. The victim was unarmed
while the accused were armed with a hunting knife, chako and bolo. It is evident that the
accused took advantage of their combined strength to consummate the offense. This
aggravating circumstance, though, cannot be separately appreciated because it is absorbed in
treachery. In People v. Parreno,51 we decreed:
As regards the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, what should be
considered is not that there were three, four, or more assailants as against one victim, but
whether the aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate
the offense. While it is true that superiority in number does not per se mean superiority in
strength, the appellants in this case did not only enjoy superiority in number, but were armed
with a weapon, while the victim had no means with which to defend himself. Thus, there was
obvious physical disparity between the protagonists and abuse of superior strength on the part
of the appellants. Abuse of superior strength attended the killing when the offenders took
advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. However, the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated separately, it being
necessarily absorbed in treachery.
As a final attempt to lower their conviction to Homicide, appellants, citing People v. Alba,52
argue that although treachery was alleged in the Information and proven according to the trial
court, the same was not specified as a qualifying circumstance. Such argument fails.
In People v. Aquino,53 we have held that even after the recent amendments to the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words
such as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an offense. We explained:
Section 8 of Rule 110 requires that the Information shall "state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances." Section 8 merely requires the Information to
specify the circumstances. Section 8 does not require the use of the words "qualifying" or
"qualified by" to refer to the circumstances which raise the category of an offense. It is not the
use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" that raises a crime to a higher category, but the
specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the
crime to a higher category.1avvphi1
In the instant case, the attendant circumstances of minority and relationship were specifically
alleged in the Information precisely to qualify the offense of simple rape to qualified rape. The
absence of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" cannot prevent the rape from qualifying as a
heinous crime provided these two circumstances are specifically alleged in the Information
and proved beyond reasonable doubt.
We therefore reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that the Information
allege, specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law to qualify the
offense. These circumstances need not be preceded by the words "aggravating/qualifying,"

"qualifying," or "qualified by" to be considered as qualifying circumstances. It is sufficient that

these circumstances be specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges
against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during the
trial. When the prosecution specifically alleges in the Information the circumstances
mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and succeeds in proving them beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to impose the higher penalty mandated by law.
This includes the death penalty in proper cases.
xxxx
To guide the bench and the bar, this Resolution clarifies and resolves the issue of how to
allege or specify qualifying or aggravating circumstances in the Information. The words
"aggravating/qualifying," "qualifying," "qualified by," "aggravating," or "aggravated by" need not
be expressly stated as long as the particular
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
attendant circumstances are specified in the
Associate Justice
54
Information.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 55
murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the felony, appellants should be sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
We now go to the award of damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following
damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual
or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.56
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
than the commission of the crime.57 We affirm the award of civil indemnity given by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals. Under prevailing jurisprudence, 58 the award of P50,000.00 to
the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity is in order. Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals awarded P25,000.00 as civil indemnity because the two accused who pleaded guilty
to the lower offense of homicide were ordered to pay P25,000.00 or half of the P50,000.00
civil indemnity. Considering that half of the P50,000.00 was already paid, appellants should
therefore pay only the difference.
As to actual damages, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto because said damages
were not duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty. 59 However, the award of P25,000.00
in temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and
funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.60 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim
suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. 61
Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need
of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. 62 The award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages is in order.
The heirs of the victim are likewise entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established. 63
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00289 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellants Armando Rodas and Jose
Rodas, Sr. are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime, they are

hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellants are ORDERED
to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Titing Asenda the amount of P25,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
Chairperson
RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E RT I F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Middle name is Martinez.
2
Middle name is Marinduque.
3
Rollo, pp. 141-152; penned by Associate Justice Sixto Marella, Jr. with Associate Justices
Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr., concurring.
4
Records, pp. 85-104.
5
Records, p. 13.
6
Id. at 20.
7
Id. at 22.
8
Entered plea of guilty to the lesser crime of Homicide on 17 October 1997.
9
Entered plea of guilty to the lesser crime of Homicide on 29 May 1998.
10
Records, pp. 39-40 and 55-56.
11
Id. at 60-66.
12
Sometimes spelled as "Requilme."
13
Records, pp. 103-104.
14
Id. at 105.
15
Id. at 106.
16
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

17

Rollo, p. 151.
Id. at 18.
19
Id. at 19-20.
20
Id. at 21-22.
21
People v. Escultor, G.R. Nos. 149366-67, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 651, 661.
22
People v. Aguila, G.R. No. 171017, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 642, 661; Rebucan v.
People, G.R. No. 164545, 20 November 2006, 507 SCRA 332, 347.
23
TSN, 30 April 1999, p. 9.
24
People v. Esperas, 461 Phil. 700, 713 (2003).
25
People v. Agsaoay, Jr., G.R. Nos. 132125-26, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 450, 466.
26
People v. Brecinio, G.R. No. 138534, 17 March 2004, 425 SCRA 616, 625.
27
TSN, 7 August 1998, pp. 6-7, 11 December 1998, pp. 11-12.
28
People v. Orpilla, 425 Phil. 419, 428 (2002); People v. Sicad, 439 Phil. 610, 626 (2002).
29
People v. Sanchez, 426 Phil. 19, 31 (2002).
30
People v. Flora, 389 Phil. 601, 611 (2000).
31
TSN, 11 December 1998, p. 4.
32
TSN, 7 August 1998, p. 9.
33
Id.
34
TSN, 11 December 1998, p. 8.
35
Id. at 11.
36
TSN, 30 April 1999, p. 3.
37
TSN, 11 December 1998, p. 4.
38
TSN, 30 April 1999, p. 6.
39
Id. at 4.
40
TSN, 11 December 1998, p. 8.
41
People v. Montenegro, G.R. No. 157933, 10 August 2004, 436 SCRA 33, 41.
42
People v. Amazan, G.R. Nos. 136251, 138606 & 138607, 16 January 2001, 349 SCRA 218,
234.
43
People v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 620, 642.
44
People v. Botona, G.R. No. 161291, 27 September 2004, 439 SCRA 294, 301.
45
359 Phil. 95, 112 (1998).
46
TSN, 31 January 1997, p. 8.
47
People v. Tan, 411 Phil. 813, 836-837 (2001).
48
People v. Manes, 362 Phil. 569, 579 (1999).
49
People v. Rivera, 458 Phil. 856, 879 (2003).
50
People v. Cario, G.R. No. 131117, 15 June 2004, 432 SCRA 57, 84.
51
G.R. No. 144343, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 591, 608.
52
425 Phil. 666, 677-678 (2002).
53
435 Phil. 417 (2002).
54
Id. at 426-427.
55
An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, other Special Laws, and for other Purposes. Took
effect on 31 December 1993.
56
People v. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051, 27 September 2006, 503 SCRA 715, 740.
57
People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, 31 August 2006, 500 SCRA 727, 742.
18

58

People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 173309, 23 January 2007; People v. Cabinan, G.R. No.
176158, 27 March 2007; People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 176158, 27 March 2007.
59
People v. Tubongbanua, supra note 57.
60
People v. Dacillo, G.R. No. 149368, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 528, 538.
61
People v. Surongon, G.R. No. 173478, 12 July 2007.
62
People v. Bajar, 460 Phil. 683, 700 (2003).
63
People v. Beltran, Jr., supra note 56.

with a rifle, springfield Cal. 30, Victoriano Eugenio with a paltik Cal. 12 ga., Estanislao
Gregorio with a scythe, and Lorenzo Alviar with a paltik Cal. 22, confederating, conspiring,
helping and aiding one another, by means of force, violence, threats and intimidation upon the
persons of Donata Rebolledo, Victoriano de la Cruz and Susana Sabado, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain, take, steal and carry away with them the
following.
PROPERTY OF DONATA REBOLLEDO:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30116 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
FAUSTO DAMASO, VICTORIANO EUGENIO,
alias TURING, ESTANISLAO GREGORIO alias
ISLAO, LORENZO ALVIAR alias ORING AND
BONIFACIO ESPEJO alias MARCIA, defendants,
FAUSTO DAMASO, LORENZO ALVIAR,
BONIFACIO ESPEJO AND VICTORIANO
EUGENIO, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-30117 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee,
vs.
LORENZO ALVIAR alias ORING, defendantappellant.
Carlos, Valdez, Ibarra & Caunan Law Offices for
appellants.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant
Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor
Concepcion T. Agapinan for appellees.

Cash money in the amount of

One jacket valued at

15.00

Ten bottles of liquor Bicolana;

Six bottles of Cana Rum;
One dozen Ligo Sardines;
One dozen Eatwell Sardines;
Six packages of Golden Star cigarettes;
three packages of cigarettes (Inyog);
and four packages of cigarettes
(La Ventaja) with a total value of.

P21.02

Total.

P36.02

Grand Total
PER CURIAM:
The penalty of death imposed on Fausto Damaso,
Victoriano Eugenio Lorenzo Alviar and Bonifacio Espejo by the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac in its Criminal Case No. 2253 for "robbery with double homicide" is now before this
Court on automatic review together with a related case No. 2293 "for illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition" involving only the accused, Lorenzo Alviar.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 2253 charged the accused therein of "robbery with
double homicide" alleged to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of November, 1959, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Victoria,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, four of whom are armed with a scythe and firearms, namely: Fausto Damaso

P176.92

P25.00

One necklace valued at

50.00

One earring valued at

25.00

One ring valued at

15.00

One hat valued at.

5.00

Three scythes valued at

. 3.60

A document valued at

2.30

Total.

P125.90

PROPERTY OF VICTORIANO DE LA CRUZ

Cash money in the amount of

P15.00

PROPERTY OF SUSANA SABADO:

to the damage and prejudice of the said owners in the respective amounts of P125.90, P15.00
and P36,02, Philippine currency; that the said accused, on the occasion of the commission of
the crime above-mentioned, held and brought Catalina Sabado and Susana Sabado,
daughters of the said Donata Rebolledo, to a sugarcane field which is a secluded and
uninhabited place, at Barrio Bangar, Victoria, Tarlac, and once there and after tying together
the respective forearms of the said Catatina Sabado and Susana Sabado, in pursuance of
their concerted conspiracy, by means of force and grave abuse of superior strength, the said
accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, stab the said Catalina Sabado
and Susana Sabado on different parts of their body and cut their necks with a sharp pointed
instrument (scythe), as a result of which the latter died instantly.
That in the commission of the crime above mentioned, there concurred the aggravating
circumstances of (1) abuse of superior strength, (2) nighttime, (3) uninhabited place, (4) by a
band, (5) treachery, and (6) disregard of sex. (pp. 116-117, rollo)
In Criminal Case No. 2293 Lorenzo Alviar was also charged of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition, viz.
That on or about November 24, 1959, in the Municipality of Victoria, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused,
without authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
posssession and under his control a firearm, to wit; a paltik revolver caliber 22 with eight (8)
rounds of ammunition, without first obtaining the corresponding license or permit to keep and
possess the same. (pp. 117-118, Ibid.)
The two cases were jointly heard by the trial court. In a joint decision rendered on December
10, 1968, by then Presiding Judge, Hon. Arturo B. Santos, all the accused were found guilty
as charged. In Criminal Case No. 2253 (robbery with double homicide) the accused Fausto
Damaso, Lorenzo Alviar, Bonifacio Espejo and Victoriano Eugenio were each sentenced to
suffer the "penalty of death, to indemnify the legal heirs of the victims, Catalina Sabado and

Susana Sabado, jointly and severally in the amount of P12,000.00 for each of the victims, plus
the sum of P15,00 which was the money taken by the accused, and to pay the costs, share
and share alike." One of the accused, Estanislao Gregorio, was no longer included in the
sentence because he died on April 6, 1967 while the cases were still undergoing trial.
In Criminal Case No. 2293, accused Lorenzo Alviar was sentenced "to three years
imprisonment and to pay the costs," 1
The evidence of the prosecution as found by the trial court establish the following incidents: 2
Donata Rebolledo and her son-in-law, Victoriano de la Cruz were residents of Barrio Bangar,
municipality of Victoria, province of Tarlac. At about 9 o'clock in the evening of November 21,
1959, Donata and Victoriano heard the barkings of dogs outside their house. Shortly, two men
armed with guns, entered, pointed their weapons at them, tied up the hands of Victoriano,
covered him with a blanket and asked Donata for the wereabouts of her daughter Catalina
Sabado. Stricken by fear, Donata kept silent and blocked the door leading to her daughter's
room but was promptly pushed aside. Donata was then ordered to open an "aparador" from
which the two men took valuables like jewelry, clothing, documents, and cutting instruments.
All the while, Donata and Victoriano could hear the movements and voices of some three to
four other persons beneath the house. The two men brought Catalina Sabado down from the
house and then asked where they could find Susana Sabado, Donata's other daughter who
was then in her store located about five meters away in the same house. Thereafter, Donata
heard the men opening the door to Susana's store. After several minutes, feeling that the
intruders had left, Donata untied the hands of Victoriano and asked him to go to the store to
see if her daughters were there. When the two women could not be found, Donata sent
Victoriano to the barrio lieutenant to report the incident. Accordingly, Victoriano went to the
barrio lieutenant and the two later went to town to inform the police of the occurrence.
On the same night, Chief of Police Pedro Valdez with the aid of several policemen and a
handful of civilians went out in search for the Sabado sisters. It was only the following morning
when the two women were found already dead with wounds in several parts of their bodies.
They were found in a sugar plantation belonging to one Ignacio Fabros, located about one
hundred meters from Donata Rebolledo's house.
Dr. Carlos Briones, Municipal Health Officer of Victoria performed the autopsy on the two
bodies and reported that the deaths were caused by profuse hemorrhage due to a fatal, big,
wide, gaping and deep lacerated wound just above the Adam's apple. He also testified in court
that the death weapon must have been a sharp instrument with a pointed tip, like a scythe.
A few days after the incident, Donata Rebolledo singled out the accused Fausto Damaso from
a police line-up as one of the men who went up to her house on that evening. She and
Victoriano had recognized Damaso because of the light coming from a kerosene lamp placed
on a small table near the "aparador." Damaso, however, initially denied ever having been to
Donata's house that night. Later, the PC rounded up four other suspects in the persons of coaccused Gregorio, Eugenio Alviar and Espejo.
As further evidence, the prosecution presented separate extrajudicial statements, sworn to
before Municipal Judge Conrado de Gracia of Paniqui, Tarlac, wherein au the five accused
admitted having participated in the crime.
In his sworm statement marked as Exhibit "J", Fausto Damaso stated that he was with his coaccused Gregorio, Eugenio, Alviar and Espejo on the night the Sabado sisters were killed; that
he never went into the house of Donata Rebolledo as Eugenio and Gregorio were the ones
who did; that it was Gregorio and Eugenio who actually did the killing while he, Alviar and

Espejo merely stood by; that the victims were stabbed and their throats cut with a reaping
knife (pangapas or lait); that the killing was motivated by the failure of the older woman
(Catalina) to pay for a carabao bought from Gregorio; and that on that evening, Gregorio,
Eugenio, Alviar and Espejo were carrying caliber .45 pistols while he was unarmed.
In a subsequent statement marked as Exhibit "P", Damaso reiterated his claim that it was
Gregorio who actually stabbed and cut the throats of the victims in the presence of all the
accused; that Catalina was killed ahead of Susana; that Gregorio killed Susana as she was
being held by Eugenio; and that while still in the house, they were able to get P15 from
Susana's store. Contrary to what he confessed in his previous sworn statements, he admitted
that it was he and Eugenio who went up to Donata Rebolledo's house and not Eugenio and
Gregorio. He also changed his theory as to the motive for the killings, declaring this time that
the two women were killed because the latter had already recognized them. He further stated
that on that night, he was armed with a caliber .22 (paltik) revolver, Eugenio with a 12-gauge
paltik, Gregorio with two reaping knives (lait), Lorenzo with a long firearm and Espejo with two
stones.
In this sworn statement, Exhibit "O", Victoriano Eugenio likewise admitted that he was a party
to the commission of the offense: that it was Gregorio who conceived of the plot to commit the
crime; that it was also Gregorio who killed the two women with a reaping knife; that after
Catalina was killed he held Susana by the arms as Gregorio stabbed her and cut her throat;
that Alviar, Damaso and Lorenzo were also with them that night; that he did not know what
motivated Gregorio to kill the victims; that he had no previous agreement with his co-accused
to kill the two women; that he and Damaso were the ones who entered Donata's house, took
P15 from the "aparador," brought down Catalina and also got Susana from another portion of
the house; that he was then armed with a 12- gauge paltik, Damaso with a caliber.22 paltik
revolver, Alviar with a Springfield caliber .30 rifle, Gregorio with a reaping knife and Espejo
with two stones; and that he was with the group that night because at about 7 o'clock in the
evening, Gregorio dropped by his house and invited him to Barrio Bangar where the crime
was committed.
In his separate statement (Exhibit "Q"), Estanislao Gregorio narrated that in the afternoon of
November 21, 1959, his four co-accused came and informed him of a plan to rob the Sabado
sisters, to which plan he agreed; that Damaso and Eugenio went up Donata Rebolledo's
house, got P15 in cash and brought out Catalina and Susana by force; that he stabbed and
cut the throats of the victims with all his co-accused present; that Eugenio held Catalina while
Damaso held Susana as he killed them both with a reaping knife; that the two women were
killed because they had recognized Eugenio and Damaso and might testify against them in
court; that during the commission of the crime, his only weapon was a reaping knife while
Alviar was carrying a caliber .22 paltik revolver, Damaso, a Springfield caliber .30 rifle,
Eugenio a 12-gauge single shot paltik and Espejo was unarmed.
Exhibit "N" is Bonifacio Espejo's sworn statement. Here he declared that he happened to be
with the group because Damaso and Eugenio invited him to Barrio Bangar and they dropped
by the houses of Alviar and Gregorio before actually proceeding to the barrio; that they had a
previous agreement to commit the crime; that they planned the same in a lot owned by a
certain Don Juan Garcia in Barrio Bangar; that it was Damaso and Eugenio who entered
Donata Rebolledo's house while he, Alviar and Gregorio were left downstairs to keep watch;
that they were able to get P15 from the house; that it was Gregorio who actually killed the two
women; and that Damaso and Eugenio were armed with a 12-gauge paltik and another long

arm the caliber of which he did not know; that Alviar had a caliber .22 paltik revolver, Gregorio
a knife and he had two big stones.
Substantially similar were the admissions of Lorenzo Alviar in his sworn statement (Exhibit
"R"). He likewise declared that he and his co-accused took P15 from the house of the victims;
that it was Gregorio who stabbed and cut the throats of the victims with a reaping knife; that
the killing was done in a sugarcane plantation between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock in the evening
of November 21, 1959; that Catalina was killed before Susana; that he was armed with a
caliber .22 paltik revolver, Eugenio with a single shot, 12-gauge paltik, Damaso with a
Springfield caliber .30 rifle and Espejo with two stones. He claimed, however, that he was only
forced and intimidated by his co-accused to join the group.
At the trial, the five accused set up the defense of alibi and repudiated their respective sworn
statements alleging that these were obtained from them through duress, force and
intimidation. Instances of the use of third degree methods like boxing, pouring of "7-up" into
the nostrils, stripping of clothes, pricking of the penis, kicking and slapping of the ears were
narrated by the accused on the witness stand, all of which were not believed by the trial court.
The accused-appellants are here represented by a counsel de oficio, Atty. Clemente A.
Madarang, Jr., who filed an exhaustive brief for the accused.
Taken as a whole, the assigned errors boil down to the question of credibility and sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain the conviction of appellants for the special complex crime of robbery
with double homicide. It is argued that (a) there is no evidence of the alleged robbery; (b) that
the homicide was not committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery; and (c) that the
crime was not attended by the aggravating circumstances of armed band, treachery and
uninhabited place.
There is no merit to appellants' submittal.
1. That robbery was committed is evident from the declaration of prosecution witness Donata
Rebolledo who testified that the two men who barged into her house, one of whom she
recognized as Fausto Damaso, ordered her to open her "aparador" and then they took
therefrom the following items with their respective values a jacket-P25; a necklace P50;
earrings P25; a ring-P15; a hat-P5; scythes-P3.60; and documents worth P2.30. 3 Moreover
the appellants admitted in their separate statements that they were able to get P15 from
Donata's house. On this point, We agree with the Solicitor General that it matters not from
what part of the house the accused got the P15. What is important is that the culprits carried
away personal property belonging to another by the use of force, intimidation or violence. 4
2. Counsel points out that because there was a motive, at least on the part of Gregorio, for the
killing of the Sabado sisters, the double homicide could not have been "committed by reason
or on occasion of the robbery" as the law contemplates. He calls Our attention to the sworn
statement wherein Fausto Damaso declared that Gregorio killed Catalina and Susana
because Catalina bought a carabao from him and did not pay for it. Harping further on this
motive theory, counsel mentions such circumstances as why the accused specifically asked
for Catalina and Susana upon entering Donata Rebolledo's house and why Donata and
Victoriano were not killed together with the sisters if the purpose was to remove all opposition
to the robbery or to eliminate witnesses thereto.
As to Damaso's declaration, it should be noted that Damaso himself, in his subsequent sworn
statement, changed his motive theory and stated that the victims were killed in order to
eliminate witnesses to the crime. This was corroborated by Gregorio in the latter's own written
confession. Even assuming, however, that such a motive for vengeance existed on the part of

Gregorio, it does not necessarily exclude the fact that he and co-accused also intended, when
they went to Donata's house that night, to rob the family. In a complex crime of robbery with
homicide, while an intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life, the fact
that the intent of the culprit was tempered with a desire also to avenge grievances against the
person killed does not prevent the punishment of the accused for the complex crime. 5
3. Counsel for appellants also argues that the trial court erred in its appreciation of the
aggravating circumstances of armed band, treachery and uninhabited place.
The aggravating circumstance of band exists whenever more than three armed malefactors
act together in the commission of an offense. 6 Counsel concedes that at least three of the
accused-appellants, namely Eugenio, Alviar, and Gregorio, ,were armed during the
commission of the crime. He doubts, however, whether accused Damaso carried any weapon
and whether the "two stones" carried by accused Espejo fall under the category of "arms." But
even granting that Espejo's stones do not constitute arms, the prosecution presented the
following evidence to show that Damaso was also armed and, as such, there were more than
three of the accused who were armed: (1) that extrajudicial confession of Damaso himself
(Exhibit "P") that he was carrying a caliber .22 paltik revolver; (2) the sworn statement of
accused Eugenio (Exhibit "O") that Damaso had a caliber .22 paltik revolver; (3) the separate
written confessions of Alviar, Gregorio and Espejo (Exhibits R, Q, and "N") that Damaso had a
caliber .30 Springfield rifle; and (4) the testimonies of Donata Rebolledo and Victoriano de la
Cruz that both men who entered their house (one of whom they later Identified as Damaso)
were carrying firearms. It is clear from the above, that Damaso was armed during the night of
the commission of the crime, and it is immaterial what kind of firearm he carried, the only
important thing being that he was armed. In this case, the presence of an armed band is to be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14(6) of the Revised Penal
Code inasmuch as the crime committed was that provided for and penalized in Article 294,
paragraph 1 and not under Article 295, Revised Penal Code (see People v. Apduhan, Jr., per
Justice, now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, 24 SCRA 798)
Treachery is present if the victim is killed while bound in such a manner as to be deprived of
the opportunity to repel the attack or escape with any possibility of success. 7 The fact that the
bodies of Catalina and Susana were found dead with their arms tied behind their backs as
well as the admission of Gregorio in his confession (Exhibit "Q") that he killed the sisters while
their arms were held by Eugenio and Damaso lead Us to conclude that the killing of the two
women was done under treacherous circumstances.
Anent the circumstances of uninhabited place, counsel disclaims its existence by pointing to
the proximity of the sugarcane field where the victims were killed to the national highway as
well as to certain houses in the barrio. The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by
the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place of
commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help. 8 Considering
that the killing was done during nighttime and the sugarcane in the field was tall enough to
obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the
victims to receive any assistance. That the accused deliberately sought the solitude of the
place is clearly shown by the fact that they brought the victims to the sugarcane field although
they could have disposed of them right in the house of Donata Rebolledo where they were
found. Thus, in People v. Saguing, the Court considered the crime as having been committed
in an uninhabited place because the killing was done in a secluded place at the foot of a hill,
forested, and uninhabited. 9

The trial court considered separately the three circumstances of armed band, treachery and
uninhabited place where under other situations one may be considered absorbed or inherent
in the other. There is ample justification for this. The elements of each circumstance subsist
independently and can be distinctly perceived thereby revealing a greater degree of perversity
on the part of the accused.
4. In the third assignment of error, defense counsel assails the sufficiency of the evidence for
the prosecution. He urges that the extrajudicial confessions, having been repudiated during
the trial, are insufficient to sustain the trial court's judgment of conviction, specially so since no
direct evidence was introduced of any conspiracy or of the involvement of appellants in the
crime in question.
Regarding this matter, the following are strongly persuasive. First, the appellants' separate
extrajudicial confessions were subscribed and sworn to before Municipal Judge Conrado de
Gracia of Paniqui, Tarlac. On the witness stand, Judge de Gracia testified as to the
authenticity and due execution of the statements. He declared that before the statements
were sworn to before him, he had the appellants' PC escorts excluded from the room. He then
took pains in translating and explaining to the appellants the contents of their written
statements and got their assurance that such statements were freely and voluntarily made. 10
If it were true that appellants were forced or intimidated into making the confessions, they
could have easily manifested before the judge that they did not voluntarily give the same.
Certainly, they could have then been afforded the necessary protection from any untoward
incident that could happen. Their failure there and then to air any injustice or misdeed
committed upon them belies their stories of maltreatment. Too, there is no credible proof of the
alleged maltreatment that they suffered in the hands of the police or other authorities as a
result of which they executed the confessions. Considering that repudiation of confessions
comes very easily, the same must be taken with a grain of salt. it occurs all too often that guilty
persons, after confession to crime, experience a change of heart and repudiate their
confessions in the hope of escaping liability.
Secondly, there was the reenactment of the robbery and the killings. The movements
reconstructed by the appellants conform substantially with the details set forth in their
individual sworn statements. The reenactment was done in the presence of people, including
a photographer who had no connection with the police or the prosecution.
Fiscal Magin Taedo who was present during the reenactment testified that the entire
proceeding was spontaneous and free from coercion. On several occasions, appellants, even
corrected themselves in certain details. Nobody directed the whole show except the
appellants themselves. 11
Fiscal Taedo's testimony was corroborated by photographer Manuel Gamalinda who also
declared that there was no dictation, violence, force or intimidation employed upon the
appellants during the reenactment. 12 Gamalinda also testified as to the authenticity of the
pictures he took during the reenactment, which the prosecution also submitted as evidence. 13
Again, concerning the confessions, other circumstances are equally significant. Some of the
statements made, specifically the one of accused Alviar, were exculpatory in nature and would
not have been included had the confessant been coerced into making his confession. Others
cite plausible facts and details which only actual participants in the crime could have known.
Also, partial corroboration of appellants' statements are found in the testimonies of Donata
Rebolledo and Victoriano de la Cruz, more particularly, as to the robbery. As such, the

confessions, coupled by evidence of the corpus delicti the human remains of Catalina and
Susana Sabado, are sufficient bases for the trial court's declaration of guilt.
5. With regards to the defense of alibi, We find no justifiable reason for discarding the findings
of the trial court on this matter. In People v. Berdida, et al., this Court held that the defense of
alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on credibility, which depends much on the credibility of the
witnesses who seek to establish it. In this respect the relative weight which the trial judge
assigns to the testimony of the witnesses must, unless patently and clearly inconsistent with
the evidence on record, be accepted. The defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive
Identification by prosecution witnesses, pointing to the accused as participants in the crime.
(17 SCRA 520, citing People v. Tansiangco,
L-19448, February 28,1964; People v. Rivera, L-14077, March 31, 1964)
6. As to conspiracy, the trial court's inference as to the existence of the same is well-founded
and is amply discussed in its decision. Said His Honor:
From the simultaneous and cooperative acts of the accused, the Court finds and so holds that
there was conspiracy among them. For conspiracy to exist, direct proof is not essential The
same may be inferred from the acts of the conspirators in the commission of the offense. It is
not essential that each conspirator takes part in every act or that he should know the exact
part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Conspiracy merely
implies concert of design and does not require participation in every detail of execution.
Neither is it necessary to show any previous plan or that the parties should actually come
together and agree in express terms in pursuing a common design. It is sufficient if it is proved
that the acts of the conspirators were in fact connected and cooperative in accomplishing the
unlawful object, thereby indicating a closeness of personal association and concurrence of
sentiments.
In the case of the accused herein, they got together and planned the criminal act shortly
before its execution; they proceeded together to the house of the victims and, while Damaso
and Eugenio went upstairs, the other accused stayed under the house as lookout; once inside
the house, the two asked and demanded for the victims, forcibly dragged them downstairs,
handed them to those waiting under the house and, together as a group, they brought the
victims to the sugarcane field and mercilessly stabbed them to death. Clearly, there was a
concert of acts among the accused aimed at one common design, and each act was
connected to and cooperative with the others.
The basic rule is that when conspiracy is established, like in the present case, the act of one
conspirator is imputable to the others and the criminal liability of each participant is the same
as those of the others.
7. On the matter of accused Lorenzo Alviar's conviction for illegal possession of firearms in
Criminal Case No. 2293, two errors are assigned. First, that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case because the same having been previously filed before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Victoria, Tarlac, which also acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the
latter court acquired jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
This is untenable. That the Justice of the Peace Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of First Instance in this case is not questioned. It, however, appears from the order of
the justice of the Peace Court forwarding the records of the case to the Court of First Instance
14
that the case was brought before the former court merely for purposes of a preliminary
investigation. Where a Justice of the Peace acquires jurisdiction for the purpose of preliminary

investigation and not for trial on the merits, such court does not necessarily acquire exclusive
jurisdiction to try the case on the merits. 15
In the second assigned error, counsel attacks the flimsiness of the evidence for the
prosecution. He questions the sufficiency of a document (Exhibit "B"), purportedly a receipt
issued to Alviar upon the confiscation from him of the alleged firearm. It is argued that from the
manner the receipt is worded as well as from the fact that it is thumb marked by Alviar and not
signed by the person confiscating, it appears to be a confession rather than a receipt.
The controversial receipt, however, is not the only evidence presented by the prosecution.
Sgt. Melencio Fiesta of the Philippine Constabulary also declared on the witness stand that
Alviar verbally confessed to him his (Alviar's) possession of a caliber .22 paltik revolver. 16 He
further stated that he properly translated from English to Ilocano the contents of the receipt
before Alviar affixed his thumbmark on the same. 17 Whether Exhibit " B " is taken as a receipt
or as a confession, it has its own weight as an evidence against appellant Alviar.
Still on the illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution also presented as evidence Exhibit
"C" properly sworn to before Judge Conrado de Gracia, wherein Alviar confessed that he did
own and possess a caliber .22 paltik which he carried on the night the robbery and killings
were committed. The voluntariness of this confession has not been disproved.
8. In conclusion, the crime committed by appellants in Criminal Case No. 2253 is robbery with
homicide defined in Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties - Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed.
xxx xxx xxx
The penalty is to be imposed in its maximum period by reason of the presence of three
aggravating circumstances found by the trial court, to wit: that the robbery was committed by a
band, 18 with treachery, 19 and in an uninhabited place. 20 There is likewise the additional
aggravating circumstance that the robbery was committed in the dwelling of the victim. Donata
Rebolledo which although not alleged in the Information is however established by the
evidence.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We hereby affirm in toto the decision of
the trial court in the two cases.
Without pronouncement as to costs at this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Castro, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Fernando, Aquino, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1 see pp. 130-131, rollo.
2 G.R. see pp. 11 8-121, Ibid.
3 tsn., October 11, 1962, p. 5.
4 Art. 293, Revised Penal Code.
5 US v. Vilorente and Bislig, 30 Phil. 59.
6 Art. 14, par. 6, Revised Penal Code.

7 People v. Madrid, 88 PhiL 1; People v. Bakang, et al., 26 SCRA 840; People v. Mongado, et
al., 28 SCRA 642; People v. Lunar, 45 SCRA 119.
8 People v. Bangug, et al., 52 PhiL 87.
9 30 SCRA 834.
10 tsn., July 29, 1963, pp. 69-83.
11 tsn., November 15, 1963, p. 72.
12 tsn., April 4, 1963.
13 tsn., April 4, 1963, pp. 245-246 and 262.
14 p. 20, rollo, Criminal Case No. 2293.
15 Nearia, et al., v. Veluz, 91 PhiL 473.
16 tsn., October 4, 1963, p. 33.
17 tsn., October 4, 1963, p. 21.
18 Article 14, par. 6, Revised Penal Code.
19 ibid., par. 16, Ibid.
20 ibid. par. 6, Ibid.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2390
April 24, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO BALDERA, MIGUEL BLAY, JOSE DE LA CRUZ, and FOUR OTHERS, defendants.
PEDRO BALDERA, appellant.
August Francisco for appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and
Solicitor Florencio Villamor for appellee.
REYES, J.:
We are called upon to review the sentence of death passed upon the appellant Pedro Baldera,
who was found guilty of robbery in band with homicide and serious and less serious physical
injuries by the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
The evidence shows that at about 4 a.m. on December 23, 1947, a Casa Manila bus loaded
with passenger left Batangas, Batangas, bound for Manila. On the highway in barrio
Calansayan, municipality of San Jose, same province, it was held up by a group of five or six
armed men. One of these, later identified as herein appellant Pedro Baldera, who was then
armed with a .45 caliber pistol, fired a shot, and this was followed by a hail of bullets coming
from different directions. As a result, several passengers, among them Jose Cabrera, Jose
Pastor and Francisco Mendoza, were wounded. After the firing had ceased, appellant got on
the bus and, threatening the passengers with his gun, took P90 from Jose Pastor and P34
from Ponciana Villena. Another passenger named Francisco Mendoza was also relieved of his
P3. Appellant then alighted and ordered the bus to proceed, whereupon the driver headed for
the municipal building of San Jose and there reported the incident to the authorities. The
wounded were taken to the hospital, where Jose Cabrera died from his wounds on the
following day. Jose Pastor, who was wounded in the left leg, was cured in two months, while
Francisco Mendoza's gunshot wound in the right shoulder healed in 15 days.
For the above crime four persons were prosecuted and tried under an information charging
"robo en cuadrilla con homicidio y lesiones graves y lesiones menos graves." The case was
dismissed as to two of the accused due to insufficiency of evidence. But the other two, Pedro
Baldera and Miguel Blay, were, after trial, found guilty as charged and sentenced, the first to

capital punishment, and the second to life imprisonment, both to pay the corresponding
indemnity and proportionate costs.
Only the case against Pedro Baldera is now before us.
There is no dispute as to the perpetration of the crime. The only question is as to the
identification of this appellant as one of the authors thereof. On this point the evidence for the
prosecution shows that shortly after the commission of this crime, appellant was arrested in
the municipality of Batangas in connection with the theft of a radio, and as his features tallied
with the personal description of one of the highway men given to the chief of police by some of
the passengers of the held-up bus, he was also investigated in connection with the hold-up,
and he then made a confession, which was reduced to writing and later subscribed by him
before the justice of the peace, admitting his participation in the crime as the one who, armed
with a pistol, boarded the bus and though intimidation relieved Ponciana Villena of her money.
At the trial, Ponciana also identified appellant as the one who relieved her of her money at
gunpoint, saying that she had a good look at his face for she was watching him closely for fear
that he might fire at her. She also declared that when she was sent for by the chief of police to
identify appellant, the latter approached her as she came into the office of said officer and
asked her forgiveness. Two other passengers of the bus declared at the trial that appellant
resembles the one who stopped the bus and robbed its passengers.
Testifying in his own defense, appellant denies participation in the crime charged, declaring
that he passed the night in question in a house of prostitution in Batangas, where he was
employed by the prostitutes for drawing water. But this alibi is without corroboration and can
not stand up against the clear and positive testimony of Ponciano Villena, who has not shown
to have any motive for falsely testifying against him.
Counsel de oficio impugns the admissibility of appellant's confession on the ground that the
same was made on a promise to render him protection from his co-accused and also to utilize
him as a government witness. But appellant himself denied that such a promise was ever
made and the record shows that, when the confession was offered in evidence, it was
objected to the sole ground that "it was taken through force and intimidation," which, however,
was not proved. Moreover, this court has already held that "where one of several
codefendants turns state's evidence on a promise of immunity ... but later retracts and fails to
keep his part of the agreement, his confession made under such promise may then be used
against him." (People vs. Panaligan and Andulan, 43 Phil., 131.) In any event, even without
the said confession, we find that appellant's participation in the crime herein charged has been
clearly and satisfactorily proved.
Counsel also contends that the lower court erred in holding that the crime committed is
robbery in band, alleging that there was no sufficient proof that the perpetrators thereof
numbered more than three armed men. The fact, however, that there were more than three
armed men in the group that held up the bus appears in appellant's own confession and is
also established by the uncontradicted testimony of one of the government witnesses. And the
point is really not material because in the crime of robbery with homicide it is not essential that
the robbery be in band, although that circumstance may be taken into account as an
aggravation in the imposition of the penalty. And even if it be not be taken into account as
such in this case, there would still remain the other aggravating circumstance that the robbery
was perpetrated by attacking a vehicle (art. 295, R. P. C.), which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance.

The lower court did, however, err in appreciating against the accused the circumstance of
recidivism by reason of his previous conviction for theft, it appearing that crime was committed
on or about December 30, 1947 (Exhibit E) while the offense now charged took place seven
days before that date.
In conclusion, we find appellant guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious and
less serious physical injuries with two aggravating circumstances. But there being no sufficient
vote to impose the extreme penalty, appellant can be sentenced to life imprisonment only.
Wherefore, reducing appellant's sentence to life imprisonment but increasing the indemnity to
be paid by him to the heirs of the deceased Jose Cabrera to P6,000, the judgement below as
so modified is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuazon, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39913
December 19, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO MELENDREZ Y NIETO, ET AL., defendants.
RICARDO MELENDREZ Y NIETO, appellant.
Consorio Gallego for appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
AVANCEA, C.J.:
The text of the information filed against Ricardo Melendrez y Nieto and Elias Martinez in this
case, reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June, 1933, in the municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal,
Philippine Islands, within two and one-half (2 ) miles from the limits of the City of Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused conspiring together and helping each
other willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly broke open the door of the store located at
No. 85 Cementina, Pasay, an inhabited house belonging to and occupied by Tin Bun Boc, and
once inside the said store, with intent of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof,
took, stole and carried away therefrom the following personal properties of the said Tin Buc
Boc:
Money amounting to
P30.26
One(1) Elgin watch, gold plated and a gold filled chain, valued at
25.00
One(1) Chinese ring, signet solid gold, valued at
13.50
One(1) buntal hat, valued at
4.50
Nine (9) small packages of "Camel" cigarettes
1.35
Nine (9) small packages of "Chesterfield" cigarettes
1.26
Three (3) cans of Milkmaid, valued at
.81

Total
76.68
to the damage and prejudice of the said Tin Buc Boc in the total sum of seventy-six pesos and
sixty-eight centavos (P76.68), Philippine currency.
That the accused Ricardo Melendrez y Nieto is a habitual delinquent, he having been
previously convicted by final judgment of competent courts twice of the crime of theft and once
of the crime of estafa and having been last convicted of the crime of estafa on September 3,
1932. On the date of the trial of this case, Elias Martinez had not been yet apprehended, for
which reason only the other defendant Ricardo Melendrez y Nieto, who pleaded guilty to the
charge, was arraigned. Whereupon, the court found him guilty of the crime charged in the
information and sentenced him to eight years and one day of prision mayor, and to serve an
additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for being a habitual delinquent.
From this judgment Ricardo Melendrez y Nieto appealed.
In this instance, counsel for the appellant contends that lack of instruction on the part of the
appellant should be considered as a mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime.
However, aside from the fact that this court has repeatedly held in its various decisions that
lack of instruction cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance in crimes of robbery, the
records of the case do not afford any basis on which to judge the degree of instruction of the
appellant inasmuch as no evidence was taken relative thereto, he having pleaded guilty.
However, the fact that the appellant pleaded guilty upon arraignment is a mitigating
circumstance which should be considered in his favor. On the other hand, the fiscal contends
that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account against the
appellant. This claim of the fiscal is in accordance with the judgment rendered by this court in
banc in the case of People vs. Aguinaldo (47 Phil., 728) while the old Penal Code was in force.
But the enforcement of the Revised Penal Code has resulted in a difference of opinion
regarding this point on the part of the members of this court. For this reason, after reviewing
all the decisions affecting the matter, rendered by this court both in banc and in division, it is
now held that the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in
imposing the principal penalty in its corresponding degree, notwithstanding the fact that the
defendant is also sentenced to suffer an additional penalty as a habitual delinquent. The facts
alleged in the information constitute the crime of robbery committed without the use of arms in
an inhabited house, the value of the articles taken being less than P250. In accordance with
article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed for said crime is prision
correccional in its medium degree. Inasmuch as there is a concurrence therein of one
mitigating and one aggravating circumstance, this penalty should be imposed in its medium
degree.
Wherefore, it being understood that the principal penalty imposed upon the appellant is two
years, eleven months and eleven days, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, in all
other respects with costs. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I can not give my assent to the proposition that in the imposition of the penalty prescribed by
law for the crime committed by the appellant, the aggravating circumstance of recidivism
should be taken into consideration. The appellant is a habitual delinquent, and under our law

and upon the facts of this particular case, recidivism is an inherent element of habitual
delinquency. Article 14, paragraph 9, of the Revised Penal Code, defines a recidivist as
follows: A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code. And
article 62, paragraph 5 (c), of the same Code, defines a habitual delinquent as follows: For the
purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be habitual delinquent, if within a period
of ten years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa,
or falsification, he is found guilty of any said crimes a third time or oftener.
It seems clear from the provisions of law above quoted that if, within a period of ten years from
the date of his release or last conviction of the crime of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification, a
person be found guilty of the same crime for the second time, he would be a recidivist; and if
he be found guilty for the third time or oftener, he would be deemed a habitual delinquent. The
law determines the effect to be given to a second conviction, and it also determines the effect
to be given to a second conviction, and it also determines the effect of a third, fourth, and fifth
conviction. In imposing the penalty prescribed for the third, fourth or fifth conviction of any of
the crimes mentioned, it seems to me beyond the purpose of the law to take again into
consideration the legal effect of the previous, second conviction.
Except as above stated, I agree with the decision of the court.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. L-No. 5292
August 28, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff. Ramon Diokno for defendant.
TORRES, J.:
Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a
Spaniard, was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro Province,
he suddenly received a wound on the head delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris.
Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who was standing behind the counter, upon hearing
the noise and the cry of the wounded man, ran to his assistance and found him lying on the
ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named
Choa, who was passing along the street, and just as the latter was putting down his load in
front of the door of a store and was about to enter, attacked him with the same weapon,
inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the ground. The
Moro, who came from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon
wrapped up in banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both
wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital, where the former
died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound inflicted on the Spaniard
Juan Igual.
In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court
charging Manalinde with the crime of murder, and proceedings having been instituted, the trial
judge, in view of the evidence adduced, rendered judgment on the 5th of February of said

year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been submitted to this court for review.
From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond doubt that the crime of
murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, was committed on the person
of the Chinaman Choa, in that the deceased was unexpectedly and suddenly attacked,
receiving a deep cut on the left shoulder at the moment when he had just put down the load
that he was carrying and was about to start for the door of the store in front of which he
stopped for the purpose of entering therein. As a result of the tremendous wound inflicted
upon him by the heavy and unexpected blow, he was unable, not only to defend himself, apart
from the fact that he was unarmed, but even to flee from the danger, and falling to the ground,
died in an hour's time. It is unquestionable that by the means and form employed in the attack
the violent death of the said Chinaman was consummated with deceit and treachery
(alevosia), one of the five qualifying circumstances enumerated in the aforesaid article as
calling for the greatest punishment.
When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the
crime herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one hundred days before and that
he had come from his home in Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had
directed him to go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the said
Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto
further stating that if he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty
woman on his return, but that in case he was captured he was to say that he performed the
killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In order to carry out his intention to
kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in
banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home, upon reaching the town,
attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in front of a store and, wounding him,
immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was close by, just as the latter was placing a tin
that he was carrying on the ground and he was about to enter a store near by, cutting him on
the left shoulder and fleeing at once; he further stated that he had no quarrel with the
assaulted persons.
From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and selfconvicted author of the crime in question has been unquestionably established, nor can his
allegation that he acted by order of Datto Mupuck and that therefore he was not responsible
exculpate him, because it was not a matter of proper obedience. The excuse that he went
juramentado by order of the said datto and on that account killed only two persons, whereas if
he had taken the oath of his own volition he would have killed many more, because it is the
barbarous and savage custom of a juramentado to kill anyone without any motive or reason
whatever, can not under any consideration be accepted or considered under the laws of
civilized nations; such exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as
the very people who up to the present time have been practicing such acts are well aware that
the established authorities in this country can never allow them to go unpunished, and as has
happened a number of times in towns where juramentados are in the habit of appearing, the
punishment of the author has followed every crime so committed.
In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances 3 and 7
of article 10 of the Penal Code should be taken into consideration in that promise of reward
and premeditation are present, which in the present case are held to be generic, since the
crime has already been qualified as committed with the treachery, because the accused

confessed that he voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto Mupuck to go juramentado
and kill some one in the town of Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped punishment he
would be rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon complying with the order the accused
undoubtedly acted of his own volition and with the knowledge that he would inflict irreparable
injury on some of his fellow-beings, depriving them of life without any reason whatever, well
knowing that he was about to commit a most serious deed which the laws in force in this
country and the constituted authorities could by no means permit. Datto Mupuck, who ordered
and induced him to commit the crimes, as well as the accused knew perfectly well that he
might be caught and punished in the act of committing them.
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the
order and undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and
carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the consequences of the acts which,
under orders received from the said datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end provided
himself with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and
a night for the sole purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not
know, and with whom he had never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a
certain extent, might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the arrangement between the
instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does
not bar the consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the
circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material and
moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not affect
nor alter the nature of the crime. The person having been deprived of his life by deeds
executed with deliberate intent, the crime is considered a premeditated one as the firm and
persistent intention of the accused from the moment, before said death, when he received the
order until the crime was committed in manifestly evident. Even though in a crime committed
upon offer of money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not
being inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two,
premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer of
money, reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the former, the
one being independent of the other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the
crime was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent
conduct showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he
intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not
conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it.
The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings instituted by the United
States vs. Caranto et al., wherein the decision on page 256 of Volume IV of the Philippine
Reports was rendered, as may be seen from the mere perusal of the statement of facts. It is
also different from the case where a criminal who has made up his mind to kill a certain
individual kills a person other than the object of his criminal intent. On going to Cotabato the
Moro Manalinde intended to and did kill the first two persons he encountered, and the fact that
the victim was not predetermined does not alter the nature, conditions, or circumstances of
the crime, for the reason that to cause the violent death of a human being without any
reasonable motive is always punishable with a more or less grave penalty according to the
nature of the concurrent circumstances.
For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is present to
neutralize the effects of the aggravating ones, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed

from should be affirmed with costs provided however, that the penalty imposed on the culprit
shall be executed in accordance with the provisions of Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577, and that in
the event of a pardon being granted he shall likewise be sentenced to suffer the accessory
penalties imposed by article 53 of the Penal Code. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 94308 June 16, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN E. ILAOA and ROGELIO E. ILAOA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff- appellee.
Buen Zamar for accused- appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Pfc. Reynaldo P. Angeles was dispatched in the early morning of 5 November 1987 to Tinio
St., Sta. Maria Phase I, Balibago, Angeles City, where the decapitated body of a man, later
identified through his voters identification card as Nestor de Loyola, was found in a grassy
portion thereof. Apart from the decapitation, the deceased bore forty-three (43) stab wounds in
the chest as well as slight burns all over the body. The head was found some two (2) feet
away from the corpse.
Five persons, Ruben E. Ilaoa, Rogelio E. Ilaoa, Rodel E. Ilaoa, Julius Eliginio and Edwin
Tapang, were charged for the gruesome murder of Nestor de Loyola. However, only the
brothers Ruben and Rogelio stood trial since the other accused escaped and were never
apprehended.

On 15 June 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City found Ruben and Rogelio guilty of
murder with the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength
and cruelty, and imposed upon them the penalty of "life imprisonment." 1 The conviction was
based on the following circumstantial evidence:
One. The deceased Nestor de Loyola was seen at about eleven oclock in the evening of 4
November 1987, in a drinking session with his compadre Ruben Ilaoa together with Julius
Eliginio, Edwin Tapang and a certain "Nang Kwang" outside Rubens apartment. 2
Two. The drunken voices of Ruben and Nestor engaged in an apparent argument were later
on heard. 3 Nestor was then seen being kicked and mauled by Ruben and his brother Rodel,
Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang. 4 Nestor was crying all the while, "Pare, aray, aray!"
Afterwards, Nestor, who appeared drunk, was seen being "dragged" 5 into Ruben Ilaoas
apartment. Nestor was heard saying, "Pare, bakit ninyo ako ginaganito, hirap na hirap na
ako!" 6
Three. Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio borrowed Alex Villamils tricycle at about two oclock the
following morning allegedly for the purpose of bringing to the hospital a neighbor who was
about to give birth. Ruben was seen driving the tricycle alone, with a sack which looked as
though it contained a human body, placed in the sidecar. The tricycle was returned an hour
later to Alex who noticed bloodstains on the floor. The latter thought that they were those of
the pregnant woman.
Four. Blood was found on Rubens shirt when he was asked to lift it during the investigation by
the police. 7 Moreover, Rubens hair near his right forehead was found partly burned and his
shoes were splattered with blood. 8 Susan Ocampo, Rubens live-in partner, was likewise seen
in the early morning of 5 November 1987 sweeping what appeared to be blood at the entrance
of their apartment. 9
In this appeal, brothers Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa argue for their acquittal. They contend that
the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court for their conviction failed to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, they assail the finding of evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty as totally unwarranted.
We affirm Ruben Ilaoas guilt having been satisfactorily established by the evidence on hand,
albeit circumstantial. However, we reverse the conviction of Rogelio as we find it patently
baseless.
In finding Rogelio guilty of murder, the court a quo relied solely on the testimony that he
helped his brother Ruben drag Nestor de Loyola inside Rubens apartment where the
deceased was last seen alive. Apart from such testimony, however, there is nothing else to link
Rogelio to the killing.
To warrant a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur:
(a) there must be more than one circumstance; (b) the circumstances from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and, (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 10 In the case at bench, it does not
require much analysis to conclude that the circumstance relied upon to establish Rogelio
Ilaoas guilt, i.e., the alleged dragging of the deceased to his brothers apartment, is totally
inadequate for a conviction, having miserably failed to meet the criteria. This is especially so
where the veracity of such circumstance is even open to question. While Antonio Ramos and
Abdulia Logan testified that Rogelio Ilaoa helped his brother drag the deceased to his
apartment, Eustancia Bie who claimed to have witnessed the same incident positively testified
that it was Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio who did so. 11 Rogelio Ilaoa was not mentioned. Not

having been adequately established, in addition to being uncorroborated, such circumstance

alone cannot be the basis of Rogelios conviction.
Rubens case, however, is a totally different matter. Unlike that of his brother, Ruben Ilaoas
fate was most definitely assured by the unbroken chain of circumstances which culminated in
the discovery of Nestor de Loyolas decapitated body in the early morning of 5 November
1987.
As found by the trial court, in the late evening of 4 November 1987, appellant Ruben Ilaoa was
engaged in a drinking session with the deceased Nestor de Loyola together with several
others. Ruben was heard arguing with Nestor. A few moments later, Ruben mauled and kicked
the deceased with the help of their drinking companions just outside Rubens apartment. As
the deceased cried "Aray! Aray!" and "Pare, bakit nyo ako ginaganito? Hirap na hirap na ako!"
appellant dragged the deceased with the help of Julius Eliginio to the apartment from where a
mans cries were continued to be heard later. To further seal the case against him, Ruben
borrowed Alex Villamils tricycle at two oclock in the morning of 5 November 1987 on the
pretext that a neighbor was about to give birth and had to be rushed to the hospital. However,
he was seen driving the tricycle alone with a sack placed in the sidecar. The sack looked as if
it contained a human body. 12 Then, an hour later, or at three oclock in the morning, the
tricycle was returned with bloodstains on the floor.
For his defense, appellant Ruben Ilaoa does not dispute the testimony of an eyewitness that
he was driving the tricycle at past two oclock in the morning with the sack in the sidecar.
However, he claims that the sack contained buntot ng pusa, a local term for marijuana, not a
human body, which he delivered to a designated place in Fields Avenue as a favor to his
compadre Nestor de Loyola whom he could not refuse. Moreover, it was the vomit discharged
by his drinking companions that was being swept clean by his girlfriend at the entrance of their
apartment in the early morning of 5 November 1987, not blood as the witnesses asseverated.
We find the version of the prosecution more persuasive than the defense. The fact that
appellant quarreled with the deceased, then mauled and pulled him to the apartment where
the latter was last seen alive, in addition to borrowing a tricycle which was found with
bloodstains when returned, sufficiently point to Ruben as the culprit responsible for the crime.
The fact that the deceased was his compadre, hence, presumably would have no motive to kill
the latter, is not enough to exculpate appellant. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that
persons have been killed or assaulted for no apparent reason at all, 13 and that friendship or
even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime. 14
If we are to believe appellant Ruben, we will not be able to account for the blood found on the
floor of the tricycle after it was brought back to the owner. Ruben himself could not explain
away such testimony for he belied the excuse that the tricycle was needed to rush a pregnant
woman to the hospital, which was the explanation he gave to Alex Villamil when he borrowed
it. We cannot even consider that the story about the blood on the tricycle was simply
concocted by Alex Villamil to incriminate Ruben because the latter was his friend, as Ruben
himself has admitted. 15 In fact he could think of no reason for Alex Villamil to testify falsely
against him. 16
Despite the foregoing, however, we hold appellant liable only for homicide, not murder, on the
ground that the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, namely, abuse of superior
strength, cruelty and evident premeditation, were not sufficiently proved to be appreciated
against appellant.

Abuse of superior strength cannot be considered because there was no evidence whatsoever
that appellant was physically superior to the deceased and that the former took advantage of
such superior physical strength to overcome the latters resistance to consummate the
offense. 17 The fact that Nestor de Loyolas decapitated body bearing forty-three (43) stab
wounds, twenty-four (24) of which were fatal, 18 was found dumped in the street is not
sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no showing that appellant Ruben Ilaoa, for his
pleasure and satisfaction, caused Nestor de Loyola to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted
on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. 19 Number of wounds alone is not the criterion
for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. 20 Neither can it be inferred
from the mere fact that the victims dead body was dismembered. 21 Evident premeditation
cannot likewise be considered. There is nothing in the records to show that appellant, prior to
the night in question, resolved to kill Nestor de Loyola, nor is there proof to show that such
killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. On the contrary, the
evidence tends to show that the series of circumstances which culminated in the killing
constitutes an unbroken chain of events with no interval of time separating them for
calculation and meditation. Absent any qualifying circumstance, Ruben Ilaoa should only be
held liable for homicide.
The penalty prescribed for homicide in Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the maximum shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is prision mayor, in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
In line with present jurisprudence, the civil indemnity fixed by the court a quo for the death of
Nestor de Loyola is increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the judgment finding accused RUBEN E. ILAOA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt is AFFIRMED but only for homicide, instead of murder. Consequently, he is sentenced
to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of
prision mayor medium, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days
of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. In addition, accused-appellant RUBEN E. ILAOA
is ordered to pay the heirs of Nestor de Loyola P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and, as fixed by
the court a quo, P46,765.00 as actual damages, P10,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation, and P10,000.00 for moral damages.
Accused-appellant ROGELIO E. ILAOA, however, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for
obvious insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Decision penned by Judge Reynaldo B. Daway, Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch
58, Rollo, pp. 81-88.
2 TSN, 17 October 1989, pp. 16-17.
3 TSN, 4 May 1988, p. 31; 17 October 1989, p. 11.
4 TSN, 14 November 1989, pp. 22-23.
5 TSN, 4 May 1988, pp. 34-36; 7 November 1989, pp. 19-21.

6 TSN, 13 April 1988, p. 9; 7 November 1989, p. 22.

7 TSN, 24 October 1989, p. 20.
8 TSN, 13 April 1988, pp. 14-15.
9 TSN, 4 May 1988, p. 42.
10 Sec. 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
11 TSN, 7 November 1989, pp. 19-21.
12 TSN, 4 May 1988, p. 38; Original Records, p. 61.
13 People v. Basadre, No. L-36383, 17 April 1984, 128 SCRA 641, 648; People v. Reyno, No.
L-19071, 30 April 1965, 13 SCRA 647, 651-652.
14 People v. Bicog, G.R. No. 76529, 19 July 1990, 187 SCRA 556, 564.
15 TSN, 5 January 1990, p. 30.
16 Ibid.
17 People v. Montilla, G.R. No. 95048, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 119, 128; People v. Canciller,
G.R. No. 97296, 4 March 1992, 206 SCRA 827, 833; People v. Jimenez, Jr., G.R. No. 84276,
13 February 1992, 206 SCRA 214, 222.
18 TSN, 4 May 1988, pp. 12-13; Original Records, pp. 35-36.
19 People v. Luna, No. L-28812, 31 July 1974, 58 SCRA 198, 209; People v. Llamera, Nos. L21604-5-6, 25 May 1973, 51 SCRA 48, 60.
20 People v. Tonog, Jr., G.R. No. 94533, 4 February 1992, 205 SCRA 772, 782; People v.
Manzano, Nos. L-33643-4, 31 July 1974, 58 SCRA 250, 262.
21 People v. de Pascual, No. L-32512, 31 March 1980, 96 SCRA 722, 738.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 124319 May 13, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GARI BIBAT Y DESCARGAR, defendant-appellant.
PURISIMA, J.:
Appeal interposed by accused Gari Bibat y Descargar from the judgment rendered by Branch
IV of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, finding him guilty of the crime of Murder in Criminal
Case No. 93-123648.
Filed on July 23, 1993 by Assistant Prosecutor Alfeo T. Siccuon, the Information indicting
accused for Murder, alleges:
That on or about October 14, 1992, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully

and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault
and use personal violence upon the person of one LLOYD DEL ROSARIO Y CABRERA, by
then and there stabbing him with bladed weapon hitting him on the chest and abdomen,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal stab wounds, which are necessarily fatal and which
where the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law.
With the accused entering a negative plea upon arraignment thereunder, with assistance of
the counsel de oficio, Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreborre, Jr., trial ensued with the prosecution
presenting Nona Avila Cinco, PO3 Julian Bustamante, Florencio Castro and Rogelio Robles,
as its witnesses.
Aside from accused, Marte Soriano, Lino Asuncion III, and Rogelio Robles (who was recalled
to the stand by the defense), testified for the defense.
As synthesized by the trial court of origin:
From the record and evidence presented, it appears that the accused Gari Bibat stabbed to
death one Lloyd del Rosario on October 12, 1992 at around 1:30 p.m. along G. Tuazon cor.
Ma. Cristina Sts., Sampaloc, Manila. The victim was on his way to school waiting for a ride
when he was stabbed. Thereafter the suspect fled while the victim was brought to the United
Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The incident was witnessed by Nona Avila Cinco, a laundry woman, who testified that on
October 14, 1992, while she was at Funeraria Gloria waiting for her bettor, she saw a person
about one meter away talking to the accused. Said person told the accused "O pare, anduon
na. Puntahan mo na. Siguruhin mo lang na itumba mo na." to which the accused answered:
"Oo ba. Ganito ba, ganito ba?" (as the witness was speaking, she was demonstrating with her
arms.) 1
After hearing the accused, she (witness) left towards Honrades Street to see another bettor.
She first went inside a house and after a while, she went outside where she saw the accused
along Honrades Street, entering an alley. She walked along with the accused. She and the
accused were even able to look at each other.
While the victim was going out of a gate, the accused hurried towards the victim and took a
pointed object from a notebook, then stabbed the victim in the left chest twice.
She was only about 4 to 5 meters away from the scene of the crime.
Thereafter, the accused fled, the victim shouted for help. Upon hearing the shouts of the
victim, the accused returned and stabbed the victim again in the middle part of the chest. She
(witness) then left the scene of the crime after the accused ran away.
She reported the matter to the authorities only on July 20, 1993 because she was afraid. 2
xxx xxx xxx
Florencio Castro testified among others that he saw the accused together with four others
inside the Gloria Memorial Homes along G. Tuason St. on October 14, 1992. One of them
used the phone inside said place to call somebody. The rest stayed beside the one calling. He
saw one of them open a notebook where a stainless knife was inserted. He heard the one
using the phone, asking "kung nasaan." Thereafter, the group went out and left towards the
direction of Balic-Balic.
Rogelio Robles, testified among others that the accused Gari Bibat had been going to his
place at 424 Berdad St., Sampaloc, Manila, for a long time already because their Samahang
Ilocano (SI) president, Tonton Montero, is his (witness) neighbor. Before the incident occurred,
Tonton Montero told him (witness) about a rumble in school whereby somebody died. The

group of the accused was planning to take revenge against the victim, Lloyd del Rosario (see
TSN, pp. 7-8, 6/30/94), thus:
PROS. EUGENIO:
Q Now, do you know personally what this group of Gari Bibat and his companions plan to do
regarding that trouble related to you by your neighbor, Tonton Montero?
A What I know, the person against whom they will take revenge is living from a far place. I did
not know that he is from our place.
Q Did they ever mention, during that meeting the name of the person whom they will take
revenge?
A In the beginning, no, sir, but later they told me.
Q What was the name, if they did mention to you the name?
A The one who was killed, Lloyd, sir.
Q The same Lloyd del Rosario, the victim in this case?
A Yes, sir. Lloyd del Rosario.
He further testified that he (witness) only knows Lloyd del Rosario by the face because the
latter is from his place. He only knew what had happened to Lloyd after that fateful incident
because 6 or 7 of the members of the group arrived, all with a "tusok" and they even kept two
(2) guns in his (witness) house. Gari Bibat was one of the 6 or 7 people he saw on that day,
with a "tres-cantos" or "veinte nueve" tucked in his (Bibat's) waistline. (see pp. 11-12, TSN,
6/30/94). He further narrated that he actually saw the killing of the victim, (see pp. 22-24, ibid),
that even before the day Lloyd died, they (accused and companions) already hid some guns
and "tusok" in his house. (see pp. 20, TSN, Ibid.)
xxx xxx xxx
Accused Gari Bibat testified among others that on October 14, 1992, he was staying in his
house at 629 Reten St., Sampaloc, Manila; at that time it was his mother's birthday; that he
was reviewing his lessons from 7:00 o'clock to 10:00 o'clock in the morning in preparation for
his final oral exams on October 14, 1992; that Marte Soriano, a friend of his and a neighbor
were in his house; that after lunch, they (he and Marte Soriano) left for school at 12:35 noon;
that they did not pass by Funeraria Gloria; that he and his friend were able to reach the
school; that he had a review of with his classmates up to 1:45 o'clock in the afternoon,
afterwhich they proceeded to their room for the final exams; that their examination lasted from
7:30 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon; that he passed the subject with a grade of 2.25; that he
does not know Nona Cinco but only later in the precinct; that he saw Rogelio Robles who was
also detained at the Manila City Jail; that when he asked why Rogelio Robles testified against
him, Robles told him that it was merely concocted because the complainant is Robles'
neighbor whom he cannot refuse; that he does not know Tonton Montero; that he did frequent
Verdad St., near Rogelio Robles' house, neither did he go there on October 14, 1992 between
1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon; that he is not a member of Samahang Ilocano fraternity
but the United Ilocandia fraternity, a school fraternity; that he could not remember of his
fraternity being involved in any school rumble as the same is a very peaceful group which
promotes brotherhood; that they did not have a quarrel with the victim who is already dead
because the latter is not studying at Arellano University; that with respect to the death of Lloyd
del Rosario, the same is an added charge (ipinatong) to him and that he was just implicated
therein; that he knows nothing about it.
On cross examination, he testified that he neither saw the two prosecution witnesses before
nor did he know of any grudge which said witnesses have against him; and that he does not

know of any reason why they would testify against him and identify him as one of the killers of
Lloyd del Rosario.
Marte Soriano, testified among others that he was at the house of Gari Bibat at Reten St.,
Sampaloc, Manila, attending the birthday (party) of Gari's mother on October 14, 1992; that
Gari Bibat was reviewing his studies at that time in preparation for an oral examination. After
taking lunch, he, together with Gari, went to school (Arellano University) at around 12:00
noon. There, he reviewed his lessons in preparation for his exams while Gari Bibat had a
group study with his classmates until 2:00 P.M. when Gari went inside the classroom. He knew
that Gari Bibat had an exam that day at 2:00 P.M. because he (witness) is also studying at
Arellano University. The next time he saw the accused was two (2) days after October 14,
1992.
Lino Asuncion III, testified among others: that he is a classmate of Gari Bibat at Arellano
University; that their common subject on MWF is Math 2, English 2, Computer 2; that they had
a last/final oral examination in Computer 2 on October 14, 1992; that he saw Gari Bibat in
school on that day at about 1:00 P.M.; that he and Gari Bibat took the said last final oral exam;
that they both left the room at the same time at 4:30 P.M.
Rogelio Robles (was recalled to the stand to testify contrary to what he had previously
stated in court). He testified inter alia that he did not really see what transpired on October 14,
1992 at 1:30 o'clock in 6the (sic) afternoon; that he only assisted the parents of the victim
because they come from the same place; that the father of the victim handed to him the
handwritten statement which he (witness) based his previous testimony; that he did not
actually see the killing.
On December 27, 1995, the court a quo handed down its decision in question; disposing,
thus:
Wherefore, with all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused GARI BIBAT Y Descargar, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P49,786.14
as actual damages; and to pay P50,000.00 as and for moral damages, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant places reliance on the assignment of errors, that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES NONA AVILA CINCO AND ROGELIO
ROBLES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE VERSION OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT THAT HE WAS NOT AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME WHEN THE SAME
HAPPENED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
FIRST ISSUE:
CREDIBILITY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES
The Court discerns no basis for disturbing the finding and conclusion arrived at below on the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

In the matter of credibility of witnesses, we reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that
the factual findings of the trial court case should be respected. The judge a quo was in a better
position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them when
they testified and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. It is doctrinally settled
that the evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal
with the highest respect, because it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand
and detect if they were telling the truth. This assessment is binding upon the appellate court in
the absence of a clear showing that it was reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance or value that if considered might affect the result of the
case. 3
As well explained by the Solicitor General, "Persons do not necessarily react uniformly to a
given situation, for what is natural to one may be strange to another. 4 Verily, there is no
standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange and
startling experience. 5
It was thus natural for Nona Cinco to just have stayed at the sidelines. She is a woman who
could not have prevented the armed appellant from stabbing the victim, anyway. The
suddenness of the happening and Nona Cinco's fear for her own life must have prevented her
from shouting for help. 6
Delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of the crime, if sufficiently reasoned out, does
not impair the credibility of a witness and his testimony nor destroy its probative value. It has
become judicial notice that fear of reprisal is a valid cause for the momentary silence of the
prosecution witness. 7
In the case at bench, witness Nona Avila Cinco gave an eyewitness account of the killing
complained of in a categorical and straightforward manner.
Appellant belittles the fact that Nona Cinco remembers the stabbing incident to the minutest
details. According to him, "this is alright if the crime just happened, or after the happening of
the crime, the witness FORTHWITH reported the matter to the proper authorities.
Unfortunately, the witness reported the said incident after NINE (9) LONG MONTHS."
It does not appear that it was impossible for Nona Cinco to have a detailed recollection of the
stabbing sued upon. Even before the incident, she already saw the accused with some
companions inside Funeraria Gloria and overheard the plan to kill someone. At that time, she
was only about one (1) meter from the accused and his companions. And when she
proceeded to Honrades Street, she and the accused walked along with and even looked at
each other.
At the time when the stabbing in question was taking place, Nona Cinco was only four to five
meters away. The possibility of her recalling even the minutest details cannot therefore be
ruled out.
Appellant faults Nona Cinco for reporting the stabbing incident to the police authorities only
after nine (9) months, and for her apparent indifference during the incident, doing nothing even
while witnessing a cruel and gruesome crime.
Appellant also theorizes that Nona Cinco was lying when she testified that she was taking
bets for a PBA game on October 14, 1992, a Wednesday. Claiming that PBA games are held
only on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays; appellant concludes that "She lies on a simple
or minor thing, all the more, she can lie on a bigger scale."
On the other hand, the Solicitor General pointed out that: "There are 100 combinations which
bettors can try their luck on the so-called PBA game "ending" and, therefore, 100

corresponding bets should be collected for maximum profit. It was not farfetched, therefore,
for Nona Cinco to collect bets a day or two before the actual PBA games which would decide
the winning bet."
Besides, the lie alluded pertains to an insignificant matter which does not affect the material
details of the stabbing incident, and the unequivocal eyewitness account of the killing of the
victim, Lloyd del Rosario. "The maxim or rule 'falsus in unos, falsus in omnibus' does not lay
down a categorical test of credibility. It is not a positive rule of law of universal application. It
should not be applied to portions of the testimony corroborated by other evidence particularly
where the false portions could be innocent mistakes. Moreover, the rule is not mandatory but
merely sanctions a disregard of the testimony of the witness if the circumstances so warrant.
To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness on this ground, his testimony must have
been false as to a material point, and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate
intention to falsify a material point." 8
SECOND ISSUE:
THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
The accused relies on the defense of alibi, an inherently weak defense. 9 In a long line of
cases, this court has held that "alibi is generally considered a weak defense because of the
facility with which it can be fabricated. Thus, courts have always looked upon it with suspicion.
Well-settled is the rule that for alibi to prevail, it must be established by positive, clear and
satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that he was somewhere else." 10
Appellant failed to convince the court that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at G. Tuazon cor. Ma. Cristina Sts. He claimed that during the stabbing
incident at around 1:30 p.m., he was reviewing for an oral examination in his subject of
Computer 2 at the Arellano University. But as the trial court noted, the situs of the crime was
not far from Arellano University such that "granting arguendo that the accused was initially at
the Arellano University, he could have easily sneaked back to the scene of the crime
considering that the two places are just near each other." 11
To buttress his theory that he was actually reviewing for his final oral examination in Computer
2 at the very time the crime occurred, he alleged that he received a grade of 2.25 in said
subject. But aside from his testimony and that of Lino Asuncion, no other evidence was
presented to substantiate this submission. Appellant should have, at least, exhibited his class
card or grading sheet to show that he did really take an examination in that subject.
Furthermore, positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing
of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial
which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. 12
In the instant case, prosecution witness Nona Cinco positively identified appellant as the
culprit. Another prosecution witness, Rogelio Robles, testified to the actual killing of the victim
by appellant. Although the latter recanted, the lower court correctly held that "the later
retraction made by Rogelio Robles does not by itself render his previous testimony false or
perjured because the same testimony appears to be credible and worthy of belief." 13 Then too,
affidavits of recantation are considered as exceedingly unreliable because they can be easily
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually for monetary consideration and most likely
to be repudiated afterwards. 14
THIRD ISSUE:

THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE

OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously appreciated evident premeditation against
him. Assuming for the sake of argument that he is the felon, the crime he committed is not
MURDER but HOMICIDE, 15 he maintains.
Appellant correctly states the rule that the circumstance which would qualify the killing to
murder must be proved as convincingly as the crime
itself. 16
Here, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the attendance of evident premeditation to
qualify the killing complained of to murder is borne out by the evidence.
There is evident premeditation when the following requisites are met:
1. The time when the offender determined (conceived) to commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and
3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. 17
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. 18
The appellant, in his brief, implies that the first requisite of evident premeditation was not
sufficiently proven, contending, that:
. . . the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was appreciated by the trial court
based solely on the testimony of witness Rogelio Robles. The said witness testified that
accused-appellant and several others often met in his (Rogelio Robles) house. In one of their
meetings, accused-appellant and his companions hid some guns and "tusok" in the said
witness' house. Other than these testimonies, the trial court proffered no other rationale to
justify the application of evident premeditation. 19
At first glance, it may seem that the first requisite of evident premeditation, [i.e. the time when
the offender determined (conceived) to commit the crime], was appreciated by the lower court
solely on the basis of the testimony of Rogelio Robles.
Appellant theorizes that the testimony of Robles is not believable; ratiocinating, thus:
. . . such testimonies which were retracted by Rogelio Robles cannot by any yardstick be
considered credible in itself. It simply defy human experience. For evidence to be believed, it
is basic that it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
CREDIBLE IN ITSELF. (Emphasis supplied; Layug v Sandiganbayan and People of the Phil.,
supra; Tuason v. C.A., supra; Lee Eng Hong v. C.A., 241 SCRA 392) If it were true that
accused-appellant and several others planned the subject killing, they would not be crazy
enough to have openly discussed the same in the presence of another person (TSN, June 30,
1994, p. 9). They would be very discreet about it because even the most unlearned or
unschooled person would know that killing is against the law of man and of God. If indeed
they have planned it, they did it in complete secrecy. More, there is no explanation why of all
places, accused-appellant and his group met at Rogelio Robles' house. The latter is only the
neighbor of the alleged president of the former's organization. Worse, accused-appellant and
his group hid some guns (Ibid., p. 11) and "tusoks" (Ibid., p. 22), in Rogelio Robles' house.
Any person who is in his right frame of mind would not allow anybody to use his house as an
"armory" so to speak or for any illegal purposes.

Appellant faults Rogelio Robles for his utter lack of concern knowing fully well that the
appellant and his companions were planning to kill someone and even allowed them to hide
guns and "tusok" in his house. But the reason for the apparent indifference of Robles could be
gleaned from the following revelation:
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Q And when they left your house and took the "tusok" and left the guns, you know very well
from Tonton Montero that they are going to kill somebody, am I right?
A In school. I did not know that the one they will kill is from my place.
Q Now, my question you know that they are going to kill somebody, what did you do, if any
as a concerned citizen?
A What if they turn their ire on me.
COURT:
Aside from that English translation, you put on record the Tagalog answer of the witness: "a
Eh, kung ako naman ang pagbalingan"
ATTY. CALIMAG
Q Now, Mr. Witness, why it took you so long to come out and testify, if you really know the
truth about this matter?
A Because the parents of the victim were still mad or angry, what would happen to me if I tell
them early, what if they said that I am a part of it.
Q Why, what do you think about yourself, are you not a part of it, Mr. Witness? Because you
failed to report this matter immediately to the police officer?
A I kept it to myself for fear that my brother and sisters might be involved, what will happen to
me.
Fully aware that the appellant and his companions were armed with guns and "tusok", it was
but natural for nobles to just observe the protagonists and not get involved. Fear for his own
life and that of his family may have overcome whatever humanitarian inclination he had as a
concerned citizen.
Besides, even without the testimony of Rogelio Robles, the presence of the first requisite of
evident premeditation appears to have been thoroughly and sufficiently established. The
determination or conception of the plan to kill the victim could be deduced from the outward
circumstances that happened on the fateful day of October 14, 1992. Records show that at
11:30 in the morning of October 14, 1992, prosecution witness Nona Cinco saw the accused
with some companions at Funeraria Gloria. She personally heard the plan to kill someone.
Another prosecution witness, Florencio Castro, who works at the Funeraria Gloria also saw
the group of Gari Bibat in the said place. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, Nona Cinco saw the
appellant for the second time. She saw the appellant hurry towards the victim, take a pointed
thing from a notebook and with the use of such weapon, stab the victim on the chest. These
overt acts clearly evinced that the appellant clung to his resolution to kill the victim.
From the time Nona Cinco heard the plan to kill someone at 11:30 up to the killing incident at
1:30 in the afternoon of the same day, there was a sufficient lapse of time for appellant to
reflect on the consequences of his dastardly act.
As held in the case of People v. Dumdum 20 "the killing of the deceased was aggravated by
evident premeditation, because the accused conceived of the assault at least one hour before
its perpetration." In the case under examination, two hours had elapsed from the time
appellant clung to his determination to kill the victim up to the actual perpetration of the crime.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against accusedappellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 TSN, September 30, 1993, pp. 8-9, cited in Decision, p. 2.
2 Ibid., p. 18, cited in Ibid.
3 People v. Morales, 241 SCRA 267, 273, February 13, 1995; citing People v. Jacalan, 230
SCRA 1, February 10, 1994, People v. Abo, 230 SCRA 612, March 2, 1994, and People v.
Revillame, 230 SCRA 650, March 3, 1994.
4 People v. Cabrera, 241 SCRA 28 [1995].
5 People v. Paricia, 243 SCRA 557 [1995].
6 Appellee's Brief, pp. 16-17.
7 People v. Villanueva, 4 March 1995.
8 People v. Pacapac, 7 September 1995, 248 SCRA 77, 89.
9 People v. Bocatcat, Sr., 188 SCRA 175.
10 People v. Magana, G.R. No. 105673, p. 14 July 26, 1996; citing People v. Cortes, 226
SCRA 91, September 3, 1991; People v. Marquez, 153 SCRA 700, September 14, 1987; and
People v. Nescio, 239 SCRA 493, December 28, 1994.
11 Decision, p. 6.
12 People v. Amonia, 248 SCRA 486, 493, September 21, 1995.
13 Decision, p. 6.
14 People v. Celedonia de Leon, et al., G.R. No. 110558, July 3, 1995.
15 Appellant's Brief, p. 10.
16 People v. Machete, 231 SCRA 272, cited in Ibid.
17 People v. Leano, C.A. 36 O.G. 1120; People v. Diva, et al., G. R. No. L-22946, April 29,
1968; People v. Lagarto, 196 SCRA 611 [1991].
18 People v. Durante, 53 Phil 363, cited in LUIS B. REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE:
CRIMINAL LAW, BOOK ONE, Twelfth Edition (1981), p. 378, Emphasis in the original text.
19 Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-11.
20 92 SCRA 198 [1978].

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95756 May 14, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

CRISOLOGO EMPACIS, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Antonio A. Almirante, Jr. for accused-appellant.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 1 five men, namely: Crisologo Empacis, Romualdo
Langomez, Zacarias Solis, Carlito Antiga, and Bebe Antiga, were indicated for the crime of
robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1), in relation to Article 296, of the Revised Penal
Code. 2 The indictment reads as follows:
That on the 16th day of September, 1986 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in
Barangay Kanguha, Municipality of dumanjug, Province of Debu . . . (said) accused, all armed
with carbines and bladed weapons, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with evident premeditation and intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon FIDEL SAROMINES by stabbing him on different parts of his body
and as a result of which FIDEL SAROMINES died; that on the occassion of the said killing, in
pursuance of their conspiracy, . . . (the) accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and by means of violence, with intent to gain and against the will of FIDEL
SAROMINES, TAKE, STEAL AND CARRY AWAY the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND
(P12,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, belonging to the latter.
That the crime was committed by a band, all the accused being armed with carbines and
bladed weapons (Article 296, RPC).
IN VIOLATION of and contrary to ARTICLE 294 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
All the accused, except Romualdo Langomez, were thereafter taken into custody. Langomez
disappeared, and was never apprehended and brought to trial. 3 In due course, the other
accused were arrainged and tried.
Sometime in December, 1987, during the trial, Carlito Antiga died from a gunshot wound. 4
The trial eventuated in a verdict of conviction against Crisologo Empacis, and of acquittal as
regards Zacarias Solis and Bebe Antiga. The Trial Court's judgment, dated October 24, 1989,
made the following final disposition: 5
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Crisologo Empacis guilty of robbery with homicide
as defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and considering
the attendance of the four generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, craft or
fraud and superior strength, not offset by any mitigating or extenuating circumstance, hereby
sentences the said accused Crisologo Empacis to the supreme penalty of death. In view of
the fact, however, that the death penalty has been abolished by Section 19(1), Article III of the
1987 Constitution, 6 the accused Crisologo Empacis is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the heirs of Fidel
Saromines the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) by way of death
indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in view of the principal
penalty. He shall also pay the costs of these proceedings.
The accused Crisologo Empacis is hereby immediately ordered arrested and held in the
custody of the law pending appeal or review of this decision, should the accused wish to
appeal from or take up on review this decision.
The other two accused Zacarias or Caring Solis and Bebe Antiga are hereby acquitted of the
charges against them, their guilt not having been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Let a bench warrant issue against the fifth accused in this case, Romualdo a.k.a. Maldo
Langomez so that he can be brought to court to be dealt with accordingly.
The Trial Court accorded superior credit to the evidence of the prosecution in so far as it
established Empacis' direct participation in the felony charged, to wit: the testimony of the
widow of victim, Camila Saromines; of their son, Peter Saromines; and of a neighbor, Balbino
Bulak, which the Court found to be corroborated inter alia by the Post Mortem Report dated
September 17, 1986 of the Rural Health Physician at Dumanjug, Cebu (Dr. Octavio Ortiz), and
even by the testimony of accused Crisologo Empacis himself. 7
Following is the story narrated to the Trail Court by the Government witnesses.
At about 9 o'clock on the night of September 16, 1986, as Fidel Saromines and his wife,
Camila, were about to close to their small store, located in their house at Kanguha, Dumanjug,
Cebu, two men came and asked to buy some sardines and rice. They were Romualdo (or
Maldo) Langomez and Crisologo Empacis. Camila served them and they proceeded to make
a meal of the rice and sardines.
After they finished eating, Romualdo told Fidel to sell him cigarettes. As Fidel was handing
over the cigarettes, Romualdo announced a "hold-up" and commanded Fidel to give up his
money. As it happened, Fidel then had P12,000.00 in his house, wrapped in cellophane. This
he started to give to Romualdo but as the latter was taking hold of the packet, Fidel suddenly
decided to fight to keep his money. A struggle followed in the course of which Romualdo
stabbed Fidel about three times. Crisologo joined in and with his own knife also stabbed Fidel.
At this time, gunshots were heard outside of the house; and a neighbor of the Saromineses,
Balbino Bulak, recognized one of those doing the shooting as certain Carlito Antiga. 8 A voice
was heard from below saying, "Stab him!" 9 to which Langomez replied, "I already stabbed
(him)." 10
From his little sister's room, Fidel's thirteen-year odl son, Peter, saw his father fighting for his
life with Romualdo and Crisologo Empacis. Heeding his father's cry, "Peter, help me!"
(Suportahe ko, Peter!), Peter took hold of a "pinuti" (a long bolo), and rushed to his father's
defense. He struck out at Crisologo and inflicted two wounds on him, one at the right shoulder,
and the other, in the neck. Romualdo and Crisologo jumped out of the house and fled, with the
sound of Peter's defiant shout trailing them, "Come back, if you are brave!"
Peter then turned to his wounded father, but found him already dead from his injuries. The
post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Octavio Ortiz, Rural Health Physician, disclosed
four (4) stab wounds on the deceased, all in the upper back. Two of these, which penetraded
the lungs and heart, were
fatal. 11
Crisologo Empacis repaired to the clinic of Dr. Eustaquio Deiparine at the poblacion of
Sibonga, Cebu, for treatment of the wounds inflicted on him by Peter, arriving there between
10 and 11 o'clock that same night. The doctor found Crisologo's wounds described by him
as a "(hacking) wound on the right side of the neck and the right shoulder" "so serious" as
to require further treatment, even after they had been sutured. Dr. Deiparine asked Crisologo
how he had come by these wounds. Crisologo said that at around 6 to 7 o'clock that evening,
near the Papan Market, he was assaulted without warning by a young man, who injured him
with a bolo.
Police officers came to Dr. Deiparine's clinic the following morning, looking for a man might
have been treated for wounds from a bladed weapon. They were directed to the public market
where they came upon Crisologo, taking breakfast. They arrested him and brought him to the

Dumanjug INP Station. There, Crisologo was interrogated by the Station Commander, P/Pfc.
Rogelio Abrea, and gave a sworn statement.
Crisologo was later brought to Municipal Judge Gerardo Gestopa, before whom he took oath
on his affidavit. Before admnistering the oath, the Judge had a law graduate, one Victor
Esguerra, called to assist Crisologo and verify if he had voluntarily executed his sworn
statement.
The three (3) accused all took the witness stand in their defense, 12 and gave stories different
from that of the prosecution witnesses.
Empacis confirmed the facts established by the prosecution witnesses, up to a point. He
admitted that he and Romualdo Langomez had indeed gone to the store of Fidel Saromines
on the night in question, and had there partaken of a meal of sardines and rice. He also
acknowledged that after taking their supper, Romualdo Langomez had gone upstairs to buy
some cigarettes from Fidel, and it was there the moments later, he saw Romualdo and Fidel
grappling with each other. He denies having joined Romualdo in attacking Fidel. He claims
that when he saw Romualdo pull out a knife, he tried to stop Romualdo from using the knife
on his adversary; that nonetheless, Romualdo succeeded in stabbing Fidel twice; that a teenage boy came with a bolo and lashed out at Romualdo but the latter was not hit because he
pulled him to one side, and instead it was he (Empacis) who was struck at the right side of the
neck; that he then ran away towards his barrio and from there he was brought by his
neighbors to the clinic of Dr. Deiparine; that he was arrested by the police the following
morning; that while being investigated at the municipal hall of Dumanjug, he told the
investigator he wished to avail of the assistance of counsel but his request went unheeded;
and that while being interrogated, some policemen were inflicting pain on him by squeezing
his injured back in order to force him to admit his participation in the robbery-homicide at
Kanguha, Dumanjug. 13
The other two accused, Zacarias Solis and Bebe Antiga, denied any participation whatever in
the crime. They were both absolved by the Trial Court, which agreed with them that the
prosecution had indeed failed to clearly and positively and their complicity in the offense. 14
The Court a quo rejected (quite correctly, it may be said) the sworn statement purpotedly
execute by Empacis on September 17, 1986, offered by the prosecution, condemning it was
"null and void, . . . offensive to Art. III, Section 20, of the New Constitution and the teachings of
the Supreme Court
. . . ." 15 It ruled however that the other proofs of the prosecution overwhelmingly demonstrated
Crisologo Empacis' guilt of the crime charged, and accordingly entered a judgment of
conviction against him. It ruled that Empacis had committed the offense in conspiracy with
Romualdo Langomez (who was then and to this day remains at large); that both of them knew
Fidel to be in possession of a sizable amount of money at the time, and their concerted acts
proved their agreement to rob Fidel and if necessary, kill him. It also ruled that the crime was
attended by several aggravating circumstances, i. e., having been perpetrated (a) "in the
dwelling of the offended party . . . (the latter not having) given provocation," 16 (b) "in the
nighttime;" 17 (c) with employment of "craft of fraud;" 18 and (d) with advantage being taken of
superior strength. 19
From this judgment Empacis has appealed to this Court. His basic thesis is that the evidence
of the prosecution does not actually prove his guilt of the felony of which he is accused
beyond reasonable doubt.

A painstaking review of the record fails to reveal to this Court any error on the part of the Trial
Court of sufficient gravity to justify reversal or modification of its verdict. This Court is unable to
perceive any reason to doubt the veracity of the testimony of the victim's widow and son
respecting the identity of Romualdo Langomez and Crisologo Empacis as the persons who
attacked and killed Fidel Saromines in their effort to make off with the latter's money
amounting to P12,000.00, and the acts individually done by Romualdo and Crisologo in
pursuance of their common nefarious objective. Indeed, the narrative of the widow and son is,
as already pointed out, confirmed for the most part by the testimony of Crisologo Empacis
himself. The latter's attempt to exculpate himself, by portraying himself as a frustrated
protector of Fidel Saromines, cannot be taken at face value, as against the more credible
declarations of the victims widow and son, specially considering that Crisologo's credit as a
witness has been gravely enfeebled by his having obviously lied to the physician treating him,
as regards the cause of his
injuries. 20
The Court has been cited to no plausible cause for Fidel's widow and son to testify falsely
against Crisologo if it be true, as the latter insinuates, that either they had not seen the actual
killing or, having witnessed it, had seen Crisologo actually try to stop Romualdo from stabbing
Fidel. No reason exists, therefore, to disbelieve them. 21 The fact that the victim's son, Peter,
had to correct his statement on direct examination that Romualdo Langomez stabbed his
father five (5) times, declaring, on cross-examination, that in truth Romualdo stabbed his
father only about three times while Crisologo Empacis stabbed the victim once which the
appellant seeks to make capital is not sufficient warrant to reject and discard Peter's
evidence. The discrepacy is at best a minor one, not all destructive of Peter's credibility as an
unrehearsed witness. This Court agrees that the Trial Court has correctly assessed the credit
that should be accorded to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses.
This Court also agrees that conspiracy is adequately proven by the evidence. Langomez and
Crisologo Empacis came to Fidel's store late at night, acting as bona fide customers.
Immediately after finishing their supper, they demanded the delivery to them of Fidel's money,
of which they evidently had prior knowledge, Crisologo lending silent support to his
companion's order for Fidel to turn over the money to them; they helped each other wrest the
money away from Fidel and subdue him by deadly knife thrusts; Romualdo stabbing Fidel
thrice, Crisologo, once; they had obviously arranged for shots to be fired from outside Fidel's
store as a means of frightening Fidel to submit to their command; and they fled from the
scene, together. They acted in concert, helping and cooperating with one another (and others)
by simultaneous acts, evidently in pursuit of a common objective. 22
The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud 23 was properly appreciated against Empacis.
He and Romualdo pretended to be bona fide customers of the victim's store and on his pretext
gained entry into the latter's store and later, into another part of his dwelling. This Court has
held stratagems and ruses of this sort to constitute the aggravating circumstance of fraud or
craft, e.g: where the accused
a) pretended to be constabulary soldiers and by that ploy gained entry into the residence of
their prey whom they thereafter robbed and killed; 24
b) pretended to be needful of medical treatment, and through this artifice, entered the house
of the victim whom they thereupon robbed and killed; 25
c) pretended to be wayfarers who had lost their way and by this means gained entry into a
house, in which they then perpetrated the crime of robbery with homicide; 26

d) pretended to be customer wanting to buy a bottle of wine; 27

e) pretended to be co-passengers of the victim in a public utility vehicle; 28
f) posed as customers wishing to buy cigarettes; and as being thristy, asking for drink of water.
29

The Court also agrees that nighttime was properly appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance against the accused. To be sure, nighttime is not per se aggravating. 30 It must
be shown that nocturnity was deliberately and purposely sought to facilitate, or that it actually
facilitated, the commission of the crime. 31 In the case at bar, the lateness of the hour no doubt
precluded the presence of other customers who could have deterred the felons, or come to
the aid of the victim. All things considered, there is adequate showing that nocturnity was
deliberately sought by the robbers and did in reality facilitate the perpetration of the felony.
For the aggravating circumstance of superior strength to be deemed present in a case, it does
not suffice to prove superiority in number on the part of the malefactors; 32 it must appear that
they purposely employed excessive force, force out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the person attacked. 33 In this case, the evidence shows that Empacis helped his
co-accused by also stabbing the victim; he and his companion took advantage of their
combined strength and their bladed weapons to overcome their unarmed victim and assure
the success of their felonious design to make off with his money.
That the crime was "committed in the dwelling of the offended party, . . . the latter . . . not
(having) given provacation," was also correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. 34
This Court thus sees no cause to deviate from the established axiom that the factual findings
of the Trial Court are accorded the highest respect on appeal, if not indeed regarded as
conclusive, absent any persuasive showing that material facts have been overlooked or
ignored which might otherwise dictate a different verdict. 35
The Court a quo sentenced a Crisologo Empacis to pay the heirs of Fidel Saromines in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) "by way of death indemnity." Pursuant to
prevailing case law, 36 this indemnity must be increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
On the other hand, despite the evidence given by Fidel Saromines' widow establishing the
forcible taking from her husband of the amount of P12,000.00 by Crisologo and Romualdo, 37
the Trial Court somehow omitted to require the return of said stolen money, as required by law.
38

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the indemnity for death payable to the heirs of
Saromines is increased to P50.000.00 and restitution of the amount of P12,000.00 shall be
made by the accused, jointly and severally, the Decision of the Trial Court subject of this
appeal is hereby AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Branch 14.
2 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-9567.
3 Rollo, p. 22.
4 Original record, p. 262.
5 Rollo, pp. 31-32.

6 Emphasis supplied. The italicized clause is incorrect. The cited constitutional provision did
not "abolish" the death penalty. It simply declared that it shall NOT be imposed "unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it."
7 Rollo, pp. 22-27.
8 Carlito died during the trial. SEE p. 2, supra, and footnote 8 infra.
9 TSN, Aug. 10, 1987, p. 18.
10 Id., p. 19.
11 Id., pp. 22-24; Original Record, p. 6.
12 As aforestated, the fourth, Carlito Antigue, died a violent death during the trial: and the fifth
suspect, Romualdo Langomez, has remained, and the this day remains, at large.
13 Rollo, pp. 24-25.
14 Id., p. 26.
15 The Trial Court cited People v. Pascual, 109 SCRA 197; Morales v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538;
People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465; People v. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100; People v. Opida, 142 SCRA
295.
16 Par. 3, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code.
17 Par. 6, id.
18 Par. 14, id.
19 Par. 15, id.
20 SEE footnote 9 and related text, supra.
21 SEE Peo. v. Dimaano, June 15, 1992, citing Peo v. Gonzales, 182 SCRA 393 (1990).
22 SEE Peo v. Benitez, 202 SCRA 478; Peo v. Penones, 200 SCRA 624; Peo. v. Palino 183
SCRA 680; Peo. v. Alitao, 194 SCRA 120.
23 Par. 14, ART, 14, RPC.
24 Peo. v. Saquing, 30 SCRA 961 (SEE Aquino, the Revised Penal Code, 1988 ed., Vol. I, p.
374.
25 Peo. v. Casalme, 101 Phil. 1249.
26 Peo. v. Saulog, 74 Phil. 527.
27 Peo. v. Bundal, 3 Phil. 89.
28 Peo. v. Vallente, 144 SCRA 495.
29 Peo. v. Napili, 85 Phil. 521.
30 Peo. v. Serante, 152 SCRA 570.
31 Peo. v. Palon, 127 SCRA 529, 539 (1984), citing Peo. v. Garcia, 94 SCRA 14.
32 Peo. v. Maloloy-on, 189 SCRA 250 [1988].
33 Peo v. Carpio, 191 SCRA 108 [1990] citing Peo v. Cabato, 160 SCRA 101.
34 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1976 ed., Vol. 1, p. 289. citing Valdez, 64 Phil. 860;
Pinca, 114 Phil. 498.
35 SEE, e.g., Peo. v. Bravo, 180 SCRA 694, 699-700 (1989); Peo. v. Alitao, 194 SCRA 120,
126-127 (1991) Peo. v. Manantan, 196 SCRA 128, 131 (1991); Peo. v. Tugbo, 196 SCRA 133,
137 (1991).
36 SEE, e.g., Peo. v. Soriano, 196 SCRA 123; Peo. v. Sison, 189 SCRA 643; Peo. v. Sazon,
189 SCRA 700; Peo. v. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459.
37 TSN, May 29, 1987, pp. 9-12, 17.
38 Art. 104, Revised Penal Code; SEE Aquino, Revised Penal Code [Anno.]. 1987 ed., p. 842.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 94534 July 20, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO BIGCAS y AMUNCIO and QUILIANO BUTRON y PEROCHO, accusedappellants.
REGALADO, J.:
Finding accused-appellants Rodrigo Bigcas and Quiliano Butron guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of killing one Ambrocio Palapar, the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch IV in
Tagbilaran City 1 imposed on them the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" and
to solidarily pay the heirs of the victim "legal indemnity" of P30,000.00, actual damages in the
amount of P11,150.00, loss of earnings of P20,000.00 and the costs. 2
In an information dated October 13, 1988, appellants Butron and Bigcas were charged with
murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of July, 1988 at barangay Poblacion, municipality of Pilar,
province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping with (sic) each other,
with intent to kill, abuse of superior strength, and with treachery, by suddenly attacking the
victim without giving him the opportunity to defend himself and without justifiable cause, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Ambrocio
Palapar y Macarayan with the use of a sharp-pointed bolo and a piece of wood thereby
inflicting upon the vital parts of the body of the victim mortal wounds or injuries which resulted
directly to the immediate death of the victim Ambrocio Palapar y Macarayan, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought for (sic) or taken advantage of
by the accused to facilitate the commission of the crime. 3
Appellants pleaded not guilty when arraigned and, thereafter, trial on the merits ensued
wherein, predictably, the prosecution and the defense presented different versions of the
circumstances which gave rise to the alleged killing.
The version of the prosecution revolved basically around the testimonies of the two
eyewitnesses, Rosito Doydoy and Jesus Calape, with corroborative and supplementary
testimonies on other aspects furnished by Pfc. Ponciano Butron of the Integrated National
Police Station at Pilar, Bohol and Dr. Lourdes Atop-Tan, municipal health officer of the same
town.
Rosito Doydoy testified that after attending the last prayers for his uncle which ended at 8:30
in the evening of July 25, 1988, he went home with his son, Rodel, to his house some two
kilometers away. On the way and at a distance of about twelve meters, Doydoy saw three
persons involved in a commotion. It was not so dark then as the moon was shining brightly.
From behind tall cogon grass, he saw appellant Butron strike Ambrocio Palapar two times with
a piece of wood on the latter's back. In his attempt to flee from his aggressor, Palapar passed
beside witness Doydoy who was then trying to hide himself and his son behind the bushes.

Palapar was chased by appellant Bigcas who, upon catching up with the former stabbed him
twice with a bolo at the back. The chase continued until Bigcas was able to stab the victim
again at the back of the latter's right knee. The victim fell on the ground, after which he
uttered, "Long, stop because I will die of these wounds." Butron shouted at him saying, "I will
kill you, Boyax." He then approached Palapar and hit him twice with a piece of wood on the
right jaw. Bigcas, on his part, stabbed the supine victim several times. Thereafter, both
appellants left the victim, with Butron telling Bigcas. "You own the killing and these two bolos
and I will be with you anywhere." 4
Jesus Calape, testified on essentially the same facts. He declared that he left his house at
9:00 o'clock that same night to go to the house of his "kumpadre Imo," whose real name is
Maximo Tiro, to borrow the latter's carabao as he wanted to haul posts for his house. He
purposely went there that night because Tiro is usually out of his house during daytime. While
on his way, he saw the victim Palapar being attacked by the two appellants. Butron hit Palapar
twice with a piece of wood at his back. Bigcas told the victim to fight but the latter refused.
Palapar pleaded for his life but appellant Bigcas instead stabbed him twice, also at the back.
Due to his fear after seeing Bigcas stab the victim, Calape ran home and told his wife what he
witnessed. The next morning, he heard that the victim died. 5
The defense, as expected, presented a version based principally on the testimonies of the two
appellants, Butron and Bigcas, which are hereunder summarized.
It is claimed that on July 28, 1988, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, Rodrigo Bigcas was at the
store of a certain Efren Butron at Buyong, Pilar. At about 6:30 P.M., Quiliano Butron arrived at
the same store. A few minutes later, Ambrocio Palapar, who was apparently already
intoxicated, arrived and drank 'tuba' with the group of Bigcas and Butron. Palapar requested
for more drinks but Quiliano Butron refused as he had no more money. Palapar got angry and
called Butron stingy. He challenged Butron to fight but the latter remonstrated with him.
Palapar then placed his hand on Butron's shoulders and told him not to worry. He thereafter
held the waist of Butron, grabbed the knife that was hanging from the latter's waist and
challenged everybody to fight. Someone reported the incident to the police and, later on, Pfc.
Ponciano Butron responded together with another policeman. Pfc. Butron took the knife from
Palapar and ordered the latter to go home, but he required Bigcas and Butron to stay a while
and let Palapar leave ahead. Around fifteen minutes after Palapar had left, Bigcas and Butron
left together with some other persons. Butron walked ahead as he was bringing something for
his family. 6
Later, on their way, Bigcas and a certain Anasco met appellant Butron running and already
wounded. Out of fear, Anasco ran away. Bigcas brought Butron to surrender to the police at
the municipal building of Pilar, Bohol. Butron reported to the police that he was waylaid by
Palapar on his way home. Bigcas later accompanied Butron to the Simeon Toribio Hospital in
Carmen, Bohol where Butron was confined. 7 Butron complemented the foregoing testimony
by narrating that, on his way home, he saw Palapar standing in the middle of the road. He
greeted Palapar by his nickname "Boyax" but received no answer. As he was passing by
Palapar, the latter suddenly stabbed him with a bolo, hitting his stomach. He backtracked but
the victim followed him and gave him three stab thrusts which he parried. He was able to take
hold of the victim's hand holding the bolo and wrestled the same from him. Butron then
repeatedly stabbed Palapar until the latter fell. When he went to the police, he also
surrendered the bolo used in the alleged killing. Butron was brought by Bigcas and the police
to the hospital where he was treated and confined for four days. 8

After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment. Not satisfied therewith, Butron and
Bigcas interposed the present appeal wherein they filed separate briefs through their
respective counsel.
Appellant Butron, for his part, argues that the court a quo erred (1) in failing to duly consider
the material evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense; (2) in disregarding the
evidence of self-defense which evidence constituted his defense; and (3) in finding him guilty
of the crime of murder. 9
Appellant Bigcas, on the other hand, contends that the trial court erred (1) in failing to give full
credence to the declaration of appellant Quiliano Butron, against his penal interest, that he
alone killed the victim, Ambrocio Palapar; (2) in convicting appellant Rodrigo Bigcas of murder
despite the failure of the prosecution to establish the presence of any of the qualifying
circumstances; and (3) in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. 10
The separate assignments of errors raised by both appellants are congruent in material
points, hence the same shall be jointly discussed in conjunction with each other.
A careful evaluation of the records of the case shows that appellants were correctly found
guilty by the court below for the death of Ambrosio Palapar and we see no reason for
departing from the factual findings of the trial court which resulted in its verdict of guilt.
We have perforce to state once again that this Court, in a long line of cases, has consistently
held that the findings of fact of a trial judge who has seen the witness testify and who has
observed his demeanor and conduct while on the witness stand are not disturbed on appeal,
unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if considered, may
affect the outcome of the case. 11 We do not perceive any of such exceptive instances of
oversight in the findings of fact of the lower court in this case.
As found by said court and reflected by the transcripts of their testimonies, the witnesses for
the prosecution not only testified in a straightforward manner but the substance of their
testimonies inspire credence and are confirmed by the physical evidence. If there be some
inconsistencies in their declarations, the same refer only to minor matters which do not at all
affect their credibility. As we ruled in People vs. Mangalino, 12 minor inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the witnesses are but natural and even enhance their credibility, as these
discrepancies indicate that the responses given were honest and unrehearsed. This is
especially true in the case at bar where said witnesses had no motive whatsoever to
prevaricate and enmesh appellants in a fabricated charge.
Appellant Butron interposed self-defense in order to disclaim criminal liability. He, however,
disregarded the rule that self-defense must he established by clear and convincing evidence.
13
Where an accused claims self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. 14 This is
both a logical and inevitable consequence dictated by the fact that, having admitted the killing,
he has to justify the taking of the victim's life by the requisites and standards of the law for
such absolution.
It is elementary that for self-defense to prosper the accused must prove that there was
unlawful aggression by the victim, that he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel
such aggression, and that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. 15 Just as
fundamental is the overriding necessity to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
absent which there is no call to expound upon any consideration of self-defense in a case
where a life has been taken.

Now, even granting arguendo some degree of truth to appellant Butron's allegations that he
was not armed when he left the store and that it was the victim who had the opportunity to
secure a weapon, 16 the same does not necessarily relieve him of liability. Appellant Butron
himself admitted that he was able to wrench the alleged weapon away from Palapar.
Thereafter, the victim fled, signifying thereby his intention not to fight and, from that moment,
any supposed unlawful aggression had already ceased. But, instead of letting the victim go,
as the prosecution witnesses testified and this is not seriously contested by the defense,
appellants pursued Palapar, immobilized him and stabbed him to death.
The theory of self-defense is based on the necessity on the part of the person attacked to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. When said danger or risk ceased to exist, appellants
had no justification in law or in fact to attack the erstwhile aggressor. Thus, as early as the
case of People vs. Alviar, 17 we held that when the accused, who had been attacked by the
deceased, succeeded in snatching the bolo away from the latter, and the deceased already
manifested a refusal to fight, the accused was definitely not justified in killing him. As more
recently reiterated, the claim of self-defense is not credible where the accused narrated that
he had succeeded in disarming the victim of the piece of wood (allegedly, a bolo in the case at
bar) which the latter was carrying, hence the act of the accused in thereafter stabbing the
victim with frequency, frenzy and force can no longer be considered as reasonably necessary.
18

Moreover, the results of the autopsy conducted by Dr. Lourdes Atop-Tan on the victim showed
that the latter sustained more or less thirteen wounds, as follows:
1. Stab wound on the anterior chest wall, 2 inches below the right nipple, 2 inches diameter, 4
inches deep, sharp edge posteriorly, round edge anteriorly penetrating the anterior chest wall,
penetrating the heart.
2. Stab wound on the anterior chest wall 3 inches above the right nipple, 2 inches diameter, 3
1/2 inches deep, sharp edge posteriorly, round edge anteriorly penetrating the anterior chest
wall, penetrating the heart.
3. Stab wound on the anterior abdomen at the epigastric region 2 inches diameter, 3 inches
deep, posterior edge sharp, anterior edge round penetrating the anterior abdomen, perforating
the stomach.
4. Stab wound on the right lumbar region, 2 inches diameter, 3 inches deep, anterior edge
round, posterior edge sharp, penetrating the right kidney.
5. Stab wound on the anterior abdominal region 1 inch below the umbilicus 2 inches
diameter, 1/2 inch deep, anterior edge round, posterior edge sharp, non-penetrating.
6. Stab wound on then right forearm 4 inches diameter, 1/2 inch deep.
7. Stab wound on the right arm 4 inches diameter, 1/2 inch deep.
8. Lacerated wound on the left arm, 4 inches diameter, 1 inch deep.
9. Lacerated wound on the left forearm 4 inches diameter, posteriorly.
10. Stab wound on the left palm, 2 inches diameter, 1 inch deep, round edge anteriorly, sharp
edge posteriorly.
11. Stab wound on the left lumbar region, 3 inches diameter, 1 inch anterior edge round,
posterior edge sharp and non-penetrating.
12. Stab wound on the posterior chest wall 3 inches diameter, 1/2 inch deep, 2 inches below
the left scapula.
13. Stab wound on the right foot, 2 inches diameter, 1/2 inch deep.
14. Hematoma and fracture of bone on the neck posterior 3 inches diameter reddish bluish. 19

Appellant Butron claims that he himself was wounded while he was wresting the knife away
from the victim. His own doctor, however, testified that his wounds in the stomach and on his
neck were merely superficial and admit of the possibility of having been self-inflicted. 20 As the
trial court observed, it is incredible that the victim who was supposedly wielding a bolo could
only inflict two small skin-deep wounds on the allegedly defenseless Butron.
The foregoing incontrovertible physical evidence, and a comparison of the wounds sustained
by appellant Butron and those inflicted, on the victim, clearly and undoubtedly belie appellant's
pretension of self-defense. For, to be consistent with existing jurisprudence, the nature and
number of wounds inflicted by an assailant are constantly and unremittingly considered
important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense. 21 It is an affront on credulity to yield
acceptance to appellant's incredible theory that he had to inflict such number of lethal wounds
while acting in legitimate self-defense against an ironically defenseless person.
Appellants further contend that the act of eyewitnesses Doydoy and Calape of immediately
going home after having seen such a horrible crime is contrary to the natural and logical
course of things. We do not agree. In People vs. Caringal, 22 we stressed that the natural
reluctance of any, if not most, witnesses to volunteer information to the police authorities in a
criminal investigation is a matter of judicial notice. Such reticence is not uncommon, especially
when the same arises out of fear or apprehensions of reprisal from the perpetrators of the
crime being investigated. Also, the fact that a witness may have given his account of the
incident only at the trial below and not sooner neither necessarily impairs his credibility nor
discredits his testimony. Witness Doydoy's hesitancy, to inform his wife of the incident was
further justifiedly explained by the fact that his wife and appellant Bigcas' wife are sisters.
The trial court's holding that treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance
against appellants is correct, since there is no evidence that in the commission of the crime
they deliberately adopted means, methods or forms considered in law as treacherous. Its
acceptance of nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance, however, is erroneous. Even the
prosecution witnesses testified that, during the incident, the moon was shining brightly. The
light was bright enough to see what was going on and to recognize the assailants. Moreover,
nocturnity neither facilitated the commission of the crime nor was it purposely sought by
appellants in order to afford impunity. It, therefore, does not qualify as an aggravating
circumstance under either the subjective or objective tests laid down by this Court for it to be
considered as such. 23
We are likewise not convinced that the crime was committed by appellants with abuse or by
taking advantage of superior strength. Regrettably, we can neither determine nor deduce from
the prosecution's sketchy evidence thereon what transpired before the "commotion" involving
the victims and appellants. The two eyewitnesses, Doydoy and Calape testified only on the
fight when it was already in progress but not as to the actuations of the parties proximately
and immediately before the altercation. On the other hand, following the version of the
defense which was partly confirmed by Pfc. Ponciano Butron, the victim was ordered by said
policeman to leave the store of Efren Butron ahead of the others, with appellants directed to
stay behind for about fifteen minutes, so that the parties would not encounter each other again
shortly after the incident at said store.
It cannot, therefore, be said that when the fight took place more than fifteen minutes later,
because the victim instead of going straight home obviously waited for appellants to catch up
with him, appellants could have anticipated such an unexpected contingency and had
accordingly conceived of taking advantage of their combined strength and weapons.

For this qualifying circumstance to be considered, it is not sufficient that there be superiority in
number or strength; it is necessary that the accused must have cooperated and intended to
use or secure advantage from such superior strength. 24 As we also emphasized in People vs.
Cabiling, 25 abuse of superior strength may be considered not only when there is an inequality
of force between the victim and the aggressor but there must be a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. We
find that the prosecution has fallen short of proof that appellants bad specifically contrived or
deliberately intended and prepared to take advantage of superior strength in a projected
assault against the victim. This requisite cannot be drawn from mere assumptions or
conjectures, for qualifying circumstances must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself. 26
Appellant Bigcas' disclaimer of liability, on the other hand, is likewise unavailing. There were
two eyewitnesses to the incident who testified that appellants Bigcas and Butron did act in a
concerted manner in bringing about the death of victim Palapar. This indicates the existence of
conspiracy between them, although such concurrence of wills arose and was adopted by
appellants just momentarily before attacking the victim.
Conspiracy already exists the moment two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, 27 unlike the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and taking advantage of superior strength which require at least
some prior deliberation and adoption of a specific mode of commission. To establish
conspiracy, prior agreement between both accused to kill the victim is not essential for the
same may be inferred from their own acts showing a joint purpose or design, which was
illustrated in this case, by the concerted acts of appellants. 28
All told, it is our considered view that appellants have committed only the felony of homicide,
since treachery was not proved and abuse of superior strength cannot be considered against
them. Neither is the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity attendant in this case. On the
contrary, what has been completely overlooked is the fact that appellant Butron and, resolving
the doubt in his favor, appellant Bigcas are, as we hereby find them to be, entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which was established by their testimonies 29
and substantiated by Pfc. Ponciano Butron. 30
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED, with accused-appellants being
hereby DECLARED guilty of homicide, with due extenuation by voluntary surrender, and each
of them is hereby SENTENCED to serve an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal,
maximum. The death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with current
case law. 31 In all other respects, the judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Judge Fernando S. Ruiz, presiding.
2 Rollo, 29.
3 Original Record, 38.
4 TSN, March 13, 1989, 12-16; March 14, 1989, 1-5.
5 TSN, March 15, 1989, 5-10.
6 TSN, November 9, 1989, 2-6; November 10, 1989, 2-6.
7 TSN, November 9, 1989, 6-9.

8 TSN, November 10, 1989, 7-12.

9 Brief for Appellant Quiliano Butron, 1; Rollo, 50.
10 Brief for Appellant Rodrigo Bigcas, 4; Rollo, 106.
11 People vs. Cruz, Sr., 151 SCRA 609 (1987); People vs. Mauyao, G.R. No. 84525, April 6,
1992; People vs. Hatague, et al., G.R. No. 97308, April 7, 1992.
12 182 SCRA 329 (1990).
13 Araneta, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 187 SCRA 123 (1990).
14 People vs. Uribe, 182 SCRA 624 (1990).
15 Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code.
16 Brief for Appellant Butron, 6; Rollo, 55.
17 56 Phil. 98 (1931).
18 People vs. Masangkay, et al., 155 SCRA 113 (1987).
19 Exh. G; Original Record, 3.
20 TSN, February 5, 1990, 1-2.
21 People vs. Cuadra, 85 SCRA 576 (1978); People vs. Legaspi 151 SCRA 670 (1987);
Guevarra vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 187 SCRA 484 (1990).
22 176 SCRA 404 (1989).
23 People vs. Garcia, et al., 94 SCRA 14 (1979); People vs. Coderes, et al., 104 SCRA 255
(1981); People vs. Palon, 127 SCRA 529 (1984).
24 People vs. Pajarillo, et al., 94 SCRA 828 (1979); People vs. Casey, et al., 103 SCRA 21
(1981); People vs. Basas, 111 SCRA 288 (1982); People vs. Karunsiang Guiapar, et al., 129
SCRA 539 (1984).
25 74 SCRA 285 (1976).
26 People vs. Tiongson, 130 SCRA 614 (1984); People vs. Atienza, 148 SCRA 147 (1987).
27 Art. 8, Revised Penal Code.
28 People vs. Tachado, et al., 170 SCRA 611 (1989); People vs. Arroyo, et al., 201 SCRA 616
(1991); People vs. Moreno, et al., G.R. No. 94755, April 10, 1992.
29 TSN, Nov. 9, 1989, 7; Nov. 10, 1989, 10-11.
30 TSN, Mar. 13, 1989, 2-3.
31 People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700 (1990).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez
and Solicitor Ma. Rosario Quetulio Losa for plaintiff-appellee.
Narciso V. Cruz, Jr. for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:p
This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses disclose that at
around six o'clock in the morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at
Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang, Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora
Sarno, his wife, was left inside the hut. While he was on top of the tree gathering tuba, he was
struck by a volley of shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the coconut tree.
His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south of the hut. She went outside the hut.
From a distance of about twenty-five meters, she saw five men, each armed with a long
firearm, firing at her husband. He was already wounded and was lying on the ground at the
foot of the coconut tree. His assailants were about five meters away from him.
She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who were firing at her
husband. She and her brother Ricardo had known Sangalang since their childhood. She also
recognized Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the
other malefactors.
Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo
pinagbabaril ang aking asawa". The five persons fired at her. She was then about twenty
meters away from them. She retreated to the hut for cover. She heard some more shots. After
the lapse of about five minutes, Laureano Sangalang and his companions left the place. When
Flora returned to the spot where her husband was prostrate, he was already dead.
On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno, twenty-seven years old, a brother of Flora,
was inside his own nipa hut which was about ten meters away from Flora's hut. He was
drinking coffee. His wife and children were eating breakfast. He heard several shots. He came
out of his hut. He saw his brother-in-law being shot by Laureano Sangalang, Eleuterio Cuyom,
Perino Canuel, Irineo Canuel and Conrado Gonzales. He saw Sangalang using a Garand
carbine in shooting his brother-in-law. The latter fell from the top of the coconut tree after he
was shot (10 tsn). His sister Flora was trying to approach her husband but she had to flee to

her hut when Sangalang and his companions fired at her. He wanted to join her but he was
likewise fired upon by the five men. So, he retired and took refuge in his own hut.
Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut. He followed her after she left the hut
and went to see her dead husband, who was lying on the ground, face up, at the base of the
coconut tree. When he noticed that his brother-in-law was already dead, he gathered his
children and brought them to Sitio Biga, which was more or less thirty meters away from his
hut in Sitio Adlas. Ricardo reported the killing to the chief of police who went to the scene of
the crime with some policemen and Constabularymen.
The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained twenty-three
gunshot wounds on the different parts of the body, fourteen of which were entrance-wounds,
and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A and B). He died due to the multiple gunshot wounds (Exh.
C).
On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing, Flora and Ricardo were interrogated by
the Silang police. They executed sworn statements before the Municipal Judge pointing to
Laureano Sangalang, Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom
as the assassins of Ricardo Cortez. Flora said in her statement that she knew those persons
because from time to time they used to pass by her place. They resided at Barrio Capitula,
Dasmarias, which is near Barrio Adlas. On the basis of those statements, the police filed on
June 10 in the Municipal Court a complaint for murder against the five aforenamed persons.
Sangalang was arrested. He posted bail in the sum of P50,000 on June 13. He waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation. The other accused have not been apprehended.
On August 8, 1968 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for murder against Sangalang.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay City Branch, rendered a judgment
convicting Sangalang of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay
the heirs of Ricardo Cortez an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos and to pay his widow
moral damages in the sum of ten thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. TG-162). Sangalang
appealed.
The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he knew Cortez and that he knows his
wife, Flora Sarno. He pleaded an alibi. He declared that in the afternoon of June 8, 1968 he
and Crispulo Mendoza went to the house of Julian Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc,
Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's place at six o'clock. He wanted to borrow money from Gatdula
to defray the matriculation fees of his children.
As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised Sangalang to wait until morning. He would
try to raise the sum of two hundred pesos which Sangalang desired to borrow. Sangalang and
Mendoza agreed. They allegedly slept in Gatdula's house on the night of June 8th. The next
morning, they breakfasted in that house. At about ten o'clock on June 9, Gatdula delivered the
two hundred pesos to Sangalang. He and Mendoza then went to the Central Market in Manila
and then to Quiapo. They returned to Cavite and arrived at seven o'clock in the evening of
June 9 in Barrio Capdula. Gatdula and Mendoza corroborated Sangalang's alibi.
In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns the credibility of the prosecution
eyewitnesses, Mrs. Cortez and the victim's brother-in-law, Ricardo Sarno. The basic issue is
whether their eyewitness-testimony that they saw appellant Sangalang as one of the five
armed persons, who riddled Cortez with fourteen gunshot wounds of entry, is sufficient to
overcome his alibi. In essence, the case projects the ever recurring conflict in criminal
jurisprudence between positive identification and alibi.

The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that although his witnesses, Mendoza and
Gatdula, learned of his arrest, and Mendoza even visited him in the municipal jail, Sangalang
and his witnesses did not interpose the defense of alibi when he was investigated by the
police and when he was summoned at the preliminary investigation.
Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the declarations of Mrs. Cortez and her brother
Ricardo Sarno. Those inconsistencies, which are not glaring, strengthen their credibility and
show that their testimonies were not coached nor rehearsed. The discrepancies may be
attributed to deficiencies in observation and recollection, or misapprehension of the
misleading and confusing questions during cross-examination, or to the defective translation
of the questions and answers but they do not necessarily indicate a wilful attempt to commit
falsehood (People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26,
1973, 54 SCRA 350).
The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly and consistently testified that they
saw Sangalang, a person already well-known to them, among the five armed persons who
shot Ricardo Cortez. That unwavering identification negates appellant's alibi.
The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing. On the other hand, Sangalang did not
show that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno were impelled by a malicious desire to falsely incriminate
him. .
Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the contradictions and deficiencies in the evidence
for the prosecution. He made a spirited defense of the appellant. However, his efforts failed to
cast any reasonable doubt on Sangalang's complicity in the killing.
The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed
and defenseless. He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any immediate
provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack shows that Sangalang and his companions
employed a mode of execution which insured the killing without any risk to them arising from
any defense which the victim could have made. The qualifying circumstance of treachery
(alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was duly established (See art. 14[16],
Revised Penal Code). Hence, the killing can be categorized as murder (See People vs.
Sedenio, 94 Phil. 1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of band(U. S. vs.
Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident premeditation, which was alleged in the information, was not
proven.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Sangalang (Arts. 64[1]
and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no take part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44274 January 22, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUISITO SAN PEDRO, et al., accused, ARTEMIO BANASIHAN, defendant-appellant.
Haydee B. Yorac for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
PER CURIAM:
Automatic review of the death penalty imposed on appellant by the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, for the crime of robbery with homicide, committed, according to the evidence, and as
stated in the appellant's brief, which We quote, as follows:
In the afternoon of June 2, 1970, the lifeless body of a person was found somewhere between
the barrios of Masaya and Paciano Rizal Municipality of Bay, Laguna. The body was brought
to the municipal building of Bay for autopsy. Dr. Fe Manansala-Pantas, in her autopsy report,
Exh. B, noted that the deceased died of profuse hemorrhage due to 23 lacerated and stab
wounds and multiple abrasions found on the different parts of the body of the deceased.
The deceased was identified to be Felimon Rivera, a driver of a passenger jeep belonging to
Pablito delos Reyes, a fruit vendor. Earlier in the day, Rivera was out driving the jeep. But that
was to be the last time for him to drive the jeep for on that same day, he was killed, and his
jeep was no longer found or recovered.
It was not until June 11, 1971, that the police authorities found a concrete lead to the solution
of the case. Rodrigo Esguerra, when apprehended and interviewed by the police, admitted his
participation and named his companions. He gave a written statement, Exh. F. Soon the police
began rounding up the other suspects.
Artemio Banasihan was apprehended sometime in 1972. On March 3 of said year, he was
investigated by Sgt. Juan Tolentino of the Philippine Constabulary. He gave a statement which
was sworn to before the Acting Municipal Judge of Los Baos, Laguna, confessing his
participation in the robbery and killing of Felimon Rivera (Exh. H). In said statement,
Banasihan recounted that four days before June 2, 1970, he and his co-accused met and
planned to get the jeep driven by the deceased. Carrying out their plan, he and Luisito San

Pedro approached Rivera in the afternoon of June 2, 1970 and on the pretext of hiring
Rivera's jeep to haul coconuts, they proceeded to Bo. Puypuy in Bay, Laguna, where they
were joined by Salvador Litan and Rodrigo Esguerra. Esguerra was then carrying a water pipe
wrapped in paper. Upon reaching a river between the barrios of Mainit and Puypuy San Pedro
ordered Rivera to stop. Whereupon, at Esguerra's signal, Litan hit Rivera at the nape with the
water pipe. Rivera jumped out of the jeep but was chased by San Pedro and Litan who
stabbed him at the back several times with a dagger. Esguerra then drove the jeep and the
group proceeded to Makati, Rizal, He then joined Nelson Piso and Antonio Borja. The jeep
was brought to Cavite City where it was sold for P2,000.00. Four days later, Piso went to Los
Baos and gave San Pedro, Litan and Banasihan P50.00 each, with the promise that the
balance would be given later. However, the promised balance was not given them.
As synthesized above, the facts of the instant case are as also found by the trial court, which
appellant, through counsel de oficio, confesses inability to dispute. Admitting thus the
accuracy of the factual finding of the court a quo, appellant raises only questions of law,
particularly in the appreciation of the modifying circumstances proven by the evidence, with a
view to reducing the penalty of death as imposed, to reclusion perpetua as prayed for. This
notwithstanding, We did not relieve ourselves of the duty of reviewing the evidence, for the
purpose of the proceedings before Us is to discover any possible error, specifically in the
appreciation of the evidence, that might have been committed by the trial court that led to an
improper imposition of the supreme penalty. After undertaking the task, We express complete
agreement that no reversible error has been committed by the trial court as to the culpable
participation of the appellant as one of the perpetrators of the capital offense charged.
Specifically, the legal questions raised affecting the degree of culpability of appellant is
whether the aggravating circumstance of craft is absorbed by treachery, and whether the
resulting single aggravating circumstance of treachery should be offset by the mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction, as appellant claims should be appreciated in his favor,
thereby calling for the reduction of the death penalty to that of life imprisonment.
We cannot subscribe to the theory of craft being absorbed by treachery, as nighttime and
abuse of superior strength may be so absorbed, as held in numerous decisions of this Court.'
In the instant case, craft was employed not with a view to making treachery more effective as
nighttime and abuse of superior strength would in the killing of the victim. It was directed
actually towards facilitating the taking of the jeep in the robbery scheme as planned by the
culprits. From the definition of treachery, it is manifest that the element of defense against
bodily injury makes treachery proper for consideration only in crimes against person as so
explicitly provided by the Revised Penal Code (Art. 14[16]).
Aside from the foregoing observation, decisional rulings argue against appellant's submission.
Thus in the case of U.S. vs. Gampona, et al., 36 Phil. 817 (1917) where the crime charged
was murder, qualified by treachery, craft was considered separately to aggravate the killing.
Note that in this cited case, the crime was killing alone, which has a weightier rationale. for,
merging the two aggravating circumstances, than when, as in crime of robbery with homicide,
craft has a very distinct application to the crime of robbery, separate and independent of the
homicide. Yet, it was held that craft and treachery were separate and distinct aggravating
circumstances. The same ruling was announced in People vs. Sakam, et al., 61 Phil. 27
(1934).
In People v. Malig, 83 Phil. 804, (1949) craft which consisted in luring the victim to another
barrio, was considered absorbed by treachery. This may be so because craft enhanced the

effectiveness of the means, method or form adopted in the execution of the crime, one against
persons, "which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make." Even so, the Court was
divided in the inclusion or absorption of craft by treachery. And again, the offense charged was
one solely against persons.
With the presence of two aggravating circumstances, craft and treachery, it would make no
difference even if the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction were appreciated in
appellant's favor which is even doubtful from the fact alone, as was allegedly proven by the
testimony of appellant that he cannot read and write but can only sign his name (P. 9, t. s. n.
Sept. 1, 1975). This, apart from the fact that as held categorically in the case of People vs.
Enot, 6 SCRA 325 (1962) lack of instruction is not applicable to crimes of theft and robbery,
much less to the crime of homicide. The reason is that robbery and killing are, by their nature,
wrongful acts, and are manifestly so to the enlightened, equally as to the ignorant (People vs.
Salip Manla et al., 30 SCRA 389 [1969]).
As recently held by this Court, speaking through Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., the
"criteria in determining lack of instruction is not illiteracy alone, but rather lack of sufficient
intelligence." It is significant that neither to the trial court nor to the appellant's counsel has the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction entered the mind. No attempt was made to prove
it, as direct proof, not mere inference, is required, and must be invoked in the court below
(People vs. Mongado, et al., 28 SCRA 642, [1969]), the reason being that the trial court can
best gauge a person's level of intelligence from his manner of answering questions in court
(People v. Manuel, 29 SCRA 337 [1969]). If the trial court did not consider the mitigating
circumstance invoked for the first time here on appeal, it must be because from appellant's
testimony, and even more so from his given occupation as a merchant (T.S.N., p. 3, Sept. 1,
1975), his alleged lack of intelligence never suggested itself to the trial court or to his lawyer,
as entitling him to the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.
WHEREFORE, there being no error committed by the trial court, its decision imposing the
death penalty, together with the indemnity awarded, has to be, as it is hereby, affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad
Santos, De Castro and Melencio Herrera, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. Although Luisito San Pedro, Artemio Banasihan, Rodrigo Esguerra,
Nelson Piso and Antonio Borja were charged with robbery with homicide in the lower court
(Salvador Litan was not included in the charge), only Banasihan and Piso were arrested and
brought to trial.
Banasihan was convicted of robbery with homicide and was sentenced to death. Piso was
convicted as an accessory. His case is not under automatic review.
Esguerra was later apprehended. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

I think despoblado should also be considered aggravating. The malefactors used the victim's
jeep to bring him to an uninhabited place where he was killed with impunity. Hence, the death
penalty was properly imposed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 120282 April 20, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERT CASTILLO y MONES, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial court judge is not an idle arbiter during a trial. He can propound clarificatory
questions to witnesses in order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of a judge cannot be
assailed on the mere ground that he asked such questions during the trial.
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated December 23, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 88, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-45235 convicting Robert Castillo y Mones
of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. 2
On July 23, 1993, an amended Information 3 was filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ralph S.
Lee, charging appellant with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of May, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill[,] qualified by evident premeditation, use of superior strength and
treachery did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and employ
personal violence upon the person of one ANTONIO DOMETITA, by then and there stabbing
him with a bladed weapon[,] hitting him on his chest thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said ANTONIO DOMETITA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Appellant Castillo, assisted by Counsel Salacnib Baterina, entered a plea
of not guilty. 4 After trial in due course, appellant was convicted. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ROBERTO CASTILLO y MONES is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and [is] hereby sentenced to suffer
[the] penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
Antonio Dometita actual damages in the sum of P60,000.00, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of
indemnity for the death of the victim and moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00. He is
likewise ordered to pay costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
Hence, this appeal. 6
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The Appellee's Brief 7 presents the facts as follows:
On May 25, 1993, around one o'clock in the morning, Eulogio Velasco, floor manager of the
Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, Project 7, Veteran's Village, Quezon City, was sitting outside the
Pubhouse talking with his co-worker, Dorie. Soon, Antonio "Tony" Dometita, one of their
customers, came out of the pubhouse. As he passed by, he informed Eulogio that he was
going home. When Tony Dometita was about an armslength [sic] from Eulogio, however,
appellant Robert Castillo suddenly appeared and, without warning, stabbed Tony with a fan
knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for help, appellant stabbed him once more, hitting him
on the left hand.
Responding to Tony's cry for help, Eulogio placed a chair between Tony and appellant to stop
appellant from further attacking Tony. He also shouted at Tony to run away. Tony ran towards
the other side of EDSA, but appellant pursued him.
Eulogio came to know later that Tony had died. His body was found outside the fence of the
Iglesia ni Cristo Compound, EDSA, Quezon City.
Dr. Bienvenido Munoz, the medico-legal officer who autopsied Tony's cadaver, testified that
the proximate cause of Tony's death was the stab wound on his left chest. Tony also suffered
several incised wounds and abrasions, indicating that he tried to resist the attack. 8
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the defense viewed the facts in this way: 9
On May 25, 1993, the late Antonio Dometita was found dead by the police officers at the alley
on the right side of the Iglesia ni Cristo Church at EDSA in Bago Bantay.
It is the theory of the prosecution that the deceased Antonio Dometita was stabbed by the
accused Robert Castillo y Mones as testified to by Leo Velasco. The corroboration of Leo
Velasco's testimony is that of Melinda Mercado who (tsn Oct. 11, 1993) stated that Leo
Velasco informed her that Dometita was stabbed. Robert Castillo was walking away from the
pubhouse with the bladed weapon. Leo Velasco himself detailed the way Castillo stabbed the
deceased Antonio Dometita.
On the other hand the defense claims that the deceased died in the alley at the right side of
the church. That decedent Dometita was attacked by two malefactors as testified to by
Edilberto Marcelino, a tricycle driver who saw two people ganging up on a third. The same
witness saw the victim falling to the ground. (tsn January 5, 1994, page 8). A report of
Edilberto Marcelino to the Barangay Tanod's Office was made in the blotter of the Barangay
and the extract (xerox of the page) was marked as Exhibit "2"

The Trial Court's Ruling

The court a quo gave full credence to the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, who
positively identified the appellant as the killer. It explained:
From the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and the defense, it can be gleaned
that the accused, to exculpate himself from the liability, clung to the defense of alibi[,] saying
that he was not at the place where the incident took place at the time of the killing. This was
supported by the testimony of his mother and his neighbor and guide Malikdem. This,
however, is contradicted by the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses of the prosecution who
positively identified accused as the person who stabbed the victim. While the testimony of
Mercado is to the effect that she did not actually see the accused hit the victim, she however,
saw him walking away and carrying a bladed weapon at the scene of the crime. Velasco on
the other hand, actually saw him lunged [sic] his fan knife at the victim. These were further
strengthened by the findings of the medico-legal officer that the weapon used in killing the
victim [was] similar to a balisong. 10
The trial court also found that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength, because
"the accused used a deadly weapon in surprising the victim who [was] unarmed." Although
treachery was present, the trial court held that this was absorbed by abuse of superior
strength.
The Issues
The appellant raises the following assignment of errors: 11
I
That the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence presented by the accused that there was
a stabbing/mauling incident at the side street near the Iglesia ni Cristo Church at Edsa-Bago
Bantay, Quezon City (at about the time of the alleged stabbing of victime [sic] Antonio
Dometita according to the prosecution version), the same evidence for the accused being
buttressed and supported by the barangay blotter, marked Exhibit "2."
II
That the trial court failed to appreciate the implications of: the medical finding that the heart
and the lungs of the victim were impaled; that according to the testimony of the prosecution
witness, PO3 Manolito Estacio, the victim was found at the side street near the Iglesia ni
Cristo Church; and that side street distant from the place the witnesses for the prosecution
stated the victim was stabbed. These matters create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused and cast distrust on the testimony of the witness Eulogio Velasco who allegedly
witnessed the stabbing of the victim.
III
That the trial court in many instances showed its prejudice against the accused and in several
instances asked questions that [were] well within the duty of the prosecution to explore and
ask; it never appreciated other matters favorable to the accused, like the frontal infliction of the
mortal wound and the presence [of] "defense wounds" which negate treachery and superiority.
IV
That the trial judge was bias[ed] against the accused hence the judgment of conviction.
In the main, appellant questions the trial judge's (1) assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies and (2) alleged partiality in favor of the prosecution as shown
by his participation in the examination of witnesses.
This Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses

Time and again, this Court has adhered to the rule that the factual findings 12 of the trial court,
as well as its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, 13 are entitled to great weight and are
even conclusive and binding, barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact or circumstance
of weight and substance. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter that
peculiarly falls within the power of the trial court, as it has the opportunity to watch and
observe the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses on the stand. 14 In this case, appellant
failed to provide any substantial argument to warrant a departure from this rule.
The testimony of Prosecution Witness Eulogio Velasco that he saw the appellant stab the
victim is clear and unequivocal. He was sitting outside the pub house when the victim came
out. Dometita, who was then only an arm's length away from him, turned around to say
goodbye when, suddenly, the accused came out of nowhere and stabbed the victim. Velasco
narrated further that the victim asked him for help, so he responded by placing a chair
between the victim and the appellant to block the assault of the accused. 15 Thereafter, he told
Dometita to run away. The accused then chased the victim towards the other side of EDSA. 16
The relevant portions of Velasco's testimony are reproduced hereunder:
Q Immediately thereafter, was there any unusual incident that happened?
A When Dorie went inside the pub house, that was the time Tony went out, sir.
COURT:
Q Who is this Tony?
A Antonio Dimatita alias Tony, Your Honor.
PROS. LEE:
Q When Antonio Dimatita [sic] alias Tony went out, what happened?
A Tony asked permission from me that he will go home, sir.
Q And what happened thereafter?
A When he ha[d] not gone far yet from me, Robert Castillo suddenly attacked him and stabbed
him, sir.
Q What happened to Antonio Dimatita [sic] alias Tony when he was stabbed by accused
Robert Castillo?
A He was taken aback. He was not able to cover up himself and he was hit by the stab made
by Robert Castillo, sir.
Q On what part of the body was he hit?
A On the left side of the chest, sir.
Q And did you see in what summer [sic] accused Robert Castillo stabbed Antonio Dimatita
[sic]?
A Like this, sir. (Witness demonstrating with his right arm above his shoulder with downward
stabbing position.)
Q As you stated, after Tony was hit on the left side of [his] chest, what happened next?
A He was stabbed again and was hit on the arm, sir.
Q What arm? Left or right?
A On the left arm, sir. (Witness is pointing to his left arm in between the 1st and second
finger.)
Q After he was hit on the left arm, what happened next?
A He went near me and asked for help, sir. I placed a bench on the middle to block the way so
that Robert Castillo [would] not be able to reach him and I told Tony to run away, sir.
Q Did Tony run away thereafter?

A Yes, sir.
Q How about accused Robert Castillo, what was he doing the[n]?
A He chased, sir.
Q What happened next?
A I heard Tony was already dead, sir.
The testimony of Velasco that the accused stabbed the victim on the left side of the chest and
then on the left arm was confirmed by the medical findings, 17 particularly the autopsy report of
Dr. Muoz, who testified as follows: 18
COURT
Q Can you tell the Court the relative position of the victim and the assailant when the stab
wound was inflicted?
TRIAL PROS. RALPH S. LEE
Based on the wound, doctor.
WITNESS
A If the victim and the assailant were in a standing position, the assailant and the victim would
be facing each other and the fatal wound was delivered from upward to downward, your
honor.
Witness Velasco further testified that the accused used a bladed weapon which looked like a
fan knife. 19 This was also supported by Dr. Muoz, viz.: 20
Q Dr. Muoz, in your learned medical knowledge, what could have caused this stab wound
marked as Exhibit "D"?
A This was inflicted by a sharp pointed single bladed instrument like kitchen knife or "balisong"
or any similar instrument.
Melinda Mercado, the other prosecution witness, corroborated the story of Velasco. She
testified that when she was inside the pub, she heard Velasco shout that Antonio Dometita
was stabbed. 21 She went out to verify and saw the accused walking away. What she saw was
not the stabbing incident itself, but the accused wrapping a bladed weapon in his shirt. 22 This
confirms the assertion of Velasco that the accused was still holding the bladed instrument as
he chased the victim. 23
Clearly, the straightforward, detailed and consistent narrations of the government witnesses
show that the trial court did not err in giving credence to the account of the prosecution.
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to appreciate the testimony of Defense Witness
Edilberto Marcelino who narrated a "stabbing/mauling incident" on a side street that fateful
night near the Iglesia ni Cristo Church, where the victim's body was found. Said witness
testified that he was driving his tricycle, when he noticed a group ganging up on a man
(pinagtutulungan). 24 He then saw the person fall. 25 He did not notice if the assailants had
weapons, as he was a bit far from them, illumination coming only from the headlight of his
tricycle. He stated that the appellant, with whom he was familiar because he often saw him
selling cigarettes along EDSA, 26 was not one of those he saw ganging up on the person who
fell to the ground. He described one of the malefactors as long-haired and lanky, and the other
one as fair-complexioned with medium build, 27 descriptions which did not fit the accused.
Upon witnessing the incident, Marcelino immediately proceeded to the barangay hall to report
the matter.
The trial court did not accord weight to said testimony. We sustain this holding. Marcelino
admitted that he was about twenty-five meters away from the place of incident 28 and that said
place was not lighted. Furthermore, his tricycle was then moving because he was in a hurry. 29

Thus, we agree with this statement of the trial court: "[C]onsidering that it was dark and the
distance from where the witness saw the incident [was] quite far, it could not have been
possible for him to recognize the victim and his attackers." 30
Appellant also asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate the implications of the medical
finding that the heart and lungs of the victim were impaled. He argues that these wounds
made it impossible for the victim to traverse the distance from the pub house to the Iglesia ni
Cristo Church area, where his body was eventually found. However, the testimony of the
medico-legal expert did not rule out this possibility, as gleaned from the following:
Q And if the stab wound was fatal, how long could have he [sic] lived after the infliction of the
wound?
A It would be very very difficult to give the duration of survival because different individual[s]
would have different types of survival. Others would [live] for five minutes and others would
survive for at least . . . in shorter time.
Q But five minutes doctor would be a long time already. It could be the survival time of a
person who has a strong constitution. Do you agree with me?
A No, sir. In this particular case considering that the involvement here of the heart is the left
ventricle which is a very thick portion of the heart, I don't think he would die in less than five
minutes because the thick portion of the heart serves as sealer once the instrument is pulled
out, the tendency of the thick muscle is to close the injury so there is a much longer time for
survival. 31 (Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue: Partiality of the Trial Judge
Appellant declares that the trial judge was biased against him for propounding questions that
were well within the prerogative of the prosecution to explore and ask. More pointedly,
appellant alleges that the trial judge took over from the prosecution and asked questions in a
leading manner, 32 interrupted the cross-examination to help the witness give answers
favorable to the prosecution, 33 and asked questions which pertained to matters of opinion and
allusions of bad moral character, which would not be objected to by defense counsel, because
they have been ventiliated by the judge himself. 34 To substantiate the alleged bias and
prejudice of the judge, appellant in his brief cited several pages from the transcript of
stenographic notes. 35
The allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It is a judge's prerogative and duty to
ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. 36 On the whole, the Court finds that the
questions propounded by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature. Questions which
merely clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial
prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that allegations of bias on the part of the trial
court should be received with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not
prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge's queries is determined not necessarily by
their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was
prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by the questions propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such questions
and the answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be convicted.
As correctly observed by the solicitor general, "there was no showing that the judge had an
interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar. He is therefore presumed
to have acted regularly and in the manner [that] preserve[s] the ideal of the 'cold neutrality of
an impartial judge' implicit in the guarantee of due process (Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA
18)." 37 That the judge believed the evidence of the prosecution more than that of the defense,

does not indicate that he was biased. He simply accorded greater credibility to the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused. 38
Alibi
Appellant's defense of alibi and denial is unavailing. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was
committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at
the time of the alleged crime. 39 This the appellant miserably failed to do. Appellant contends
that he was then asleep in his house at the time of the incident. This was supported by his
mother who stated that he was asleep from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. the next day 40 and by
Rosemarie Malikdem who said the she visited the accused on the night of May 24, 1993 to
counsel him, which was her task in the Samahang Magkakapit-bahay. 41 Appellant failed to
demonstrate, however, the distance between the crime scene and his house. Indeed, he
testified that his house was "near" the crime scene. In any event, this defense cannot overturn
the clear and positive testimony of the credible eyewitnesses who located appellant at the
locus criminis and identified him as the assailant. 42
Aggravating Circumstances
The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant is guilty of murder for the death of Antonio
Dometita. We likewise agree that the prosecution was unable to prove the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. For this circumstance to be appreciated, there must be
proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements: 1) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime, 2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to
his determination, and 3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to
allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 43 These requisites were never
established by the prosecution.
On the other hand, we disagree with the trial court that the killing was qualified by abuse of
superior strength. "To properly appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, the prosecution must prove that the assailant purposely used excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked." 44 The prosecution did
not demonstrate that there was a marked difference in the stature and build of the victim and
the appellant which would have precluded an appropriate defense from the victim. Not even
the use of a bladed instrument would constitute abuse of superior strength if the victim was
adequately prepared to face an attack, or if he was obviously physically superior to the
assailant.
Nonetheless, we hold that the killing was qualified by treachery. "Treachery is committed when
two conditions concur, namely, that the means, methods, and forms of execution employed
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate[;] and that such
means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
accused without danger to his person." 45 These requisites were evidently present in this case
when the accused appeared from nowhere and swiftly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim
just he was bidding goodbye to his friend, Witness Velasco. Said action rendered it difficult for
the victim to defend himself. The presence of "defense wounds" does not negate treachery
because, as testified to by Velasco, the first stab, fatal as it was, was inflicted on the chest.
The incised wounds in the arms were inflicted when the victim was already rendered
defenseless.
Damages

The trial court awarded indemnity and actual and moral damages to the heirs of the victim. We
sustained the award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000, but we cannot do the same for
the actual and moral damages which must be supported by proof. In this case, the trial court
did not state any evidentiary basis for this award. We have examined the records, but we
failed to find any, either.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, 46 but
the award of actual and moral damage is DELETED for lack of factual basis, Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 13-17.
2 Penned by Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.
3 Rollo, p. 5.
4 Records, p. 18.
5 Rollo, p. 17.
6 The case was deemed submitted for decision on February 6, 1997 upon receipt by this
Court of Appellee's Brief. The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived.
7 This Brief was signed by Assistant Solicitor General Carlos N. Ortega and Solicitor
Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig.
8 Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-5; rollo, pp. 83-85.
9 Appellant's Brief, p. 1. This was signed by Attys. Salacnib Baterina and Ismael Baterina.
10 Decision, p. 3; rollo, p. 15.
11 Appellant's Brief, pp. (50) i-ii.
12 People vs. Sumbillo, G.R. No. 105292, April 18, 1997; People vs. Quinao, G.R. No.
108454, March 13, 1997; People vs. Nuestro, 240 SCRA 221, January 18, 1995.
13 People vs. Ombrog, G.R. No. 104666, February 12, 1997; People vs. Sumbillo, supra;
People vs. Ortega, G.R. No. 116736, July 24, 1997; People vs. de Guzman, 188 SCRA 405,
August 7, 1990.
14 People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709, February 24, 1995; People vs. Cogonon, 262 SCRA
693, October 4, 1996.
15 TSN, September 1, 1993, p. 12.
16 Ibid., p. 51.
17 TSN, September 1, 1993, p. 11.
18 TSN, August 12, 1993, p. 10.
19 TSN, September 1, 1993, p.13.
20 TSN, August 12, 1993, p. 8.
21 TSN, October 11, 1993, p. 8.
22 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
23 TSN, September 1, 1993, p. 14.
24 TSN, January 5, 1995, p. 8.
25 Ibid., p. 16.
26 Id., p. 17.
27 Id., p. 18.
28 TSN, January 5, 1995, p. 27.

29 Ibid., p. 30.
30 Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 16.
31 TSN, August 12, 1993, p. 12.
32 Appellant's Brief, p. 7.
33 Ibid., p. 8.
34 Id., p. 11.
35 Appellant's Brief, pp. 6-13.
36 People vs. Tabarno, 242 SCRA 456, March 20, 1995; Ventura vs. Yatco, 105 Phil. 287,
March 16, 1959; People vs. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196, April 28, 1980.
37 Appellee's Brief, p. 13; rollo, p. 93.
38 People vs. Tabarno, supra.
39 People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17, March 1, 1995; People vs. Hortillano, 177 SCRA 729,
September 19, 1989; People vs. Cabresos, 244 SCRA 362, May 26, 1995.
40 TSN, February 23, 1994, p. 4.
41 TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 6-7.
42 People vs. Sumbillo, supra; People vs. Baydo, G.R. No. 113799, June 17, 1997.
43 People vs. Baydo, supra; People vs. Halili, 245 SCRA 340, June 27, 1995.
44 People vs. Ruelan, 231 SCRA 650, April 19, 1994; People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37,
March 29, 1995.
45 People vs. Maalat, G.R. No. 109814, July 8, 1997, per Romero, J.: People vs. Tuson, G.R.
No. 106345-46, September 16, 1996.
46 As discussed, however, the killing is qualified by treachery, not by abuse of superior
strength.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 140756
April 4, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE, JR. @ Jun Mantika of Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan and
VICTOR ACUYAN y OCHOVILLOS @ Vic Arroyo of Sto. Nio, Poblacion, Bustos,
Bulacan, accused-appellants.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously.
The Supreme Court of Spain so ruled. So does the Court rule in this case, as it had done for
decades.
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision 1 of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court
of Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 443-M-97 convicting accused-appellants Juan Gonzales
Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan of the complex crime of robbery with homicide, meting on each
of them the supreme penalty of death, and ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim, SPO1

Jose C. Manio, Jr., the total amount of P300,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and
to pay to Five Star Bus, Inc., the amount of P6,000.00 by way of actual damages.
The Facts
The antecedent facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star
Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. ABS-793, drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its
destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo Digap, the regular conductor
of the bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers boarded
the bus, including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were wearing maong
pants, rubber shoes, hats and jackets.2 Juan seated himself on the third seat near the aisle, in
the middle row of the passengers' seats, while Victor stood by the door in the mid-portion of
the bus beside Romulo. Another passenger, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles
City, was seated at the rear portion of the bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked on his
waist was his service gun bearing Serial Number 769806. Every now and then, Rodolfo
looked at the side view mirror as well as the rear view and center mirrors installed atop the
driver's seat to monitor any incoming and overtaking vehicles and to observe the passengers
of the bus.
The lights of the bus were on even as some of the passengers slept. When the bus was
travelling along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped
out their handguns and announced a holdup. Petrified, Rodolfo glanced at the center mirror
towards the passengers' seat and saw Juan and Victor armed with handguns. Juan fired his
gun upward to awaken and scare off the passengers. Victor followed suit and fired his gun
upward. Juan and Victor then accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and
valuables. Juan divested Romulo of the fares he had collected from the passengers. The
felons then went to the place Manio, Jr. was seated and demanded that he show them his
identification card and wallet. Manio, Jr. brought out his identification card bearing No. 00898. 3
Juan and Victor took the identification card of the police officer as well as his service gun and
told him: "Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin and papatay sa iyo." The
police officer pleaded for mercy: "Pare maawa ka sa akin. May pamilya ako." However, Victor
and Juan ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and
right side of his body. Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. He fell to the floor of the bus.
Victor and Juan then moved towards the driver Rodolfo, seated themselves beside him and
ordered the latter to maintain the speed of the bus. Rodolfo heard one of the felons saying:
"Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng manok." The other said: "Ayos na
naman tayo pare. Malaki-laki ito." Victor and Juan further told Rodolfo that after they (Victor
and Juan) shall have alighted from the bus, he (Rodolfo) should continue driving the bus and
not report the incident along the way. The robbers assured Rodolfo that if the latter will follow
their instructions, he will not be harmed. Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus
along the overpass in Mexico, Pampanga where they alighted from the bus. The robbery was
over in 25 minutes.
When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo and Romulo forthwith reported
the incident to the police authorities. The cadaver of SPO1 Manio, Jr. was brought to the
funeral parlor where Dr. Alejandro D. Tolentino, the Municipal Health Officer of Mabalacat,
Pampanga, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the police officer. The doctor prepared

and signed an autopsy report detailing the wounds sustained by the police officer and the
cause of his death:
"Body still flaccid (not in rigor mortis) bathed with his own blood. There were 6 entrance
wounds and 6 exit wounds. All the entrance were located on his right side. An entrance (0.5
cm x 0.5 cm.) located infront of the right ear exited at the left side just below the ear lobe.
Another entrance through the mouth exited at the back of the head fracturing the occiput with
an opening of (1.5 cm x 2 cm). Blood CSF and brain tissues came out. Another fatal bullet
entered at the upper right cornea of the sternum, entered the chest cavity pierced the heart
and left lung and exited at the left axillary line. Severe hemorrhage in the chest cavity came
from the heart and left lung. The other 3 bullets entered the right side and exited on the same
side. One entrance at the top of the right shoulder exited at the medial side of the right arm.
The other entered above the right breast and exited at the right lateral abdominal wall
travelling below muscles and subcutaneous tissues without entering the cavities. Lastly
another bullet entered above the right iliac crest travelled superficially and exited above the
right inguinal line.
Cause of Death:
Shock, massive internal and external hemorrhage, complete brain destruction and injury to the
heart and left lung caused by multiple gunshot wounds." 4
Rodolfo and Romulo proceeded to the police station of Plaridel, Bulacan where they reported
the robbery and gave their respective sworn statements. 5 SPO1 Manio, Jr. was survived by his
wife Rosario Manio and their four young children. Rosario spent P20,000.00 for the coffin and
P10,000.00 for the burial lot of the slain police officer. 6 Manio, Jr. was 38 years old when he
died and had a gross salary of P8,085.00 a month. 7
Barely a month thereafter, or on October 25, 1996, at about midnight, SPO3 Romeo Meneses,
the team leader of Alert Team No. 1 of Tarlac Police Station, and PO3 Florante S. Ferrer were
at the police checkpoint along the national highway in Tarlac, Tarlac. At the time, the
Bambang-Concepcion bridge was closed to traffic and the police officers were tasked to divert
traffic to the Sta. Rosa road. Momentarily, a white colored taxi cab without any plate number
on its front fender came to view. Meneses stopped the cab and asked the driver, who turned
out to be the accused Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr., for his identification card. Juan told
Meneses that he was a policeman and handed over to Meneses the identification card of
SPO1 Manio, Jr. and the money which Juan and Victor took from Manio, Jr. during the heist
on September 28, 1996.8 Meneses became suspicious when he noted that the identification
card had already expired on March 16, 1995. He asked Juan if the latter had a new pay slip.
Juan could not produce any. He finally confessed to Meneses that he was not a policeman.
Meneses brought Juan to the police station. When police officers frisked Juan for any deadly
weapon, they found five live bullets of a 9 millimeter firearm in his pocket. The police officers
confiscated the ammunition. In the course of the investigation, Juan admitted to the police
investigators that he and Victor, alias Victor Arroyo, staged the robbery on board Five Star Bus
and are responsible for the death of SPO1 Manio, Jr. in Plaridel, Bulacan. Meneses and
Ferrer executed their joint affiavit of arrest of Juan. 9 Juan was subsequently turned over to the
Plaridel Police Station where Romulo identified him through the latter's picture as one of those
who robbed the passengers of the Five Star Bus with Plate No. ABS-793 and killed SPO1
Manio, Jr. on September 28, 1996. In the course of their investigation, the Plaridel Police
Station Investigators learned that Victor was a native of Laoang, Northern Samar. 10 On April 4,

1997, an Information charging Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan with robbery with
homicide was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. The Information reads:
That on or about the 28th day of September 1996, in the municipality of Plaridel, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with
firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, take, rob and carry away with one (1) necklace and
cash in [the] undetermine[d] amount of one SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner in the said undetermine[d] amount; that simultaneously or on the
occassion (sic) of said robbery, said accused by means of violence and intimidation and in
furtherance of their conspiracy attack, assault and shoot with the service firearm of the said
SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which resulted (sic) the
death of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr.
Contrary to law.11
On the strength of a warrant of arrest, the police officers arrested Victor in Laoang, Northern
Samar and had him incarcerated in the Bulacan Provincial Jail. Assisted by Atty. Ramiro
Osorio, their counsel de parte, Juan and Victor were duly arraigned and entered their plea of
not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case on
August 26, 1998, Juan escaped from the provincial jail. 12 The trial court issued a bench
warrant on September 22, 1998 for the arrest of said accused-appellant. 13 In the meantime,
Victor adduced his evidence.
Victor denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that in 1996, he
worked as a tire man in the vulcanizing shop located in Banga I, Plaridel, Bulacan owned by
Tony Boy Negro. On one occasion, Ilarde Victorino, a customer of Tony Boy Negro, ordered
Victor to sell a tire. Victor sold the tire but did not turn over the proceeds of the sale to Ilarde.
The latter hated Victor for his misdeed. The shop was later demolished and after two months
of employment, Victor returned to Barangay Muwal-Buwal, Laoang, Northern Samar. On
September 26, 1996, at 9:30 p.m., Victor was at the town fiesta in Laoang. Victor and his
friends, Joseph Iringco and Rickey Lorcio were having a drinking spree in the house of
Barangay Captain Ike Baluya. At 11:30 p.m., the three left the house of the barangay captain
and attended the public dance at the town auditorium. Victor and his friends left the auditorium
at 5:30 a.m. of September 27, 1996. Victor likewise testified that he never met Juan until his
arrest and detention at the Bulacan Provincial Jail. One of the inmates in said provincial jail
was Ilarde Victorino. Victor learned that Ilarde implicated him for the robbery of the Five Star
Bus and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr. to hit back at him for his failure to turn over to Ilarde the
proceeds of the sale of the latter's tire.
On January 14, 1999, Juan was rearrested in Daet, Camarines Norte. 14 However, he no longer
adduced any evidence in his behalf.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
On March 11, 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision judgment finding Juan and Victor
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, meted on each of them the penalty of
death and ordered them to pay P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages to the heirs of the
victim and to pay the Five Star Bus Company the amount of P6,000.00 as actual damages.
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused, Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide as penalized under Art. 294 of

the Revised Penal Code as amended and hereby sentences both to suffer the supreme
penalty of Death and to indemnify the heirs of the late SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the amount of
P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages and to pay the Five Star Bus P6,000.00 as actual
damage.
SO ORDERED.15
Assignment of Errors
Juan and Victor assail the Decision of the trial court and contend that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RODOLFO CACATIAN AND ROMULO
DIGAP, DRIVER AND CONDUCTOR OF THE FIVE STAR BUS, RESPECTIVELY, WERE
ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE TWO (2) MEN WHO HELD-UP THEIR BUS AND
KILLED ONE PASSENGER THEREOF AT AROUND 3:00 O'CLOCK IN THE EARLY
MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1996.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO (2) ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. 16
The Court's Verdict
Anent the first assignment of error, Juan and Victor contend that the trial court committed a
reversible error in relying on the testimony of Rodolfo, the bus conductor, for convicting them
of the crime charged. They aver that although their counsel was able to initially cross-examine
Rodolfo, the former failed to continue with and terminate his cross-examination of the said
witness through no fault of his as the witness failed to appear in subsequent proceedings.
They assert that even if the testimonies of Rodolfo and Romulo were to be considered, the
two witnesses were so petrified during the robbery that they were not able to look at the felons
and hence could not positively identify accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
They argue that the police investigators never conducted a police line-up for the identification
of the authors of the crime.
The contentions of Juan and Victor are not meritorious. There is no factual and legal basis for
their claim that they were illegally deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to fully
cross-examine Rodolfo. The Court agrees that the right to cross-examine is a constitutional
right anchored on due process.17 It is a statutory right found in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the accused has the right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. However, the right has always been
understood as requiring not necessarily an actual cross-examination but merely an
opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired. 18 What is proscribed by statutory
norm and jurisprudential precept is the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine. 19 The
right is a personal one and may be waived expressly or impliedly. There is an implied waiver
when the party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness
but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone. 20 If by his
actuations, the accused lost his opportunity to cross-examine wholly or in part the witnesses
against him, his right to cross-examine is impliedly waived. 21 The testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. 22
In this case, the original records show that after several resettings, the initial trial for the
presentation by the prosecution of its evidence-in-chief was set on November 18, 1997 and
December 5, 1997, both at 9:00 a.m.23 Rodolfo testified on direct examination on November

18, 1997. The counsel of Juan and Victor forthwith commenced his cross-examination of the
witness but because of the manifestation of said counsel that he cannot finish his crossexamination, the court ordered the continuation thereof to December 5, 1997. 24 On December
5, 1997, Rodolfo did not appear before the court for the continuation of his cross-examination
but Rosemarie Manio, the widow of the victim did. The prosecution presented her as witness.
Her testimony was terminated. The court ordered the continuation of the trial for the crossexamination of Rodolfo on January 20, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. 25 During the trial on January 20,
1998, Rodolfo was present but accused-appellants' counsel was absent. The court issued an
order declaring that for failure of said counsel to appear before the court for his crossexamination of Rodolfo, Victor and Juan waived their right to continue with the crossexamination of said witness.26 During the trial set for February 3, 1998, the counsel of Juan
and Victor appeared but did not move for a reconsideration of the court's order dated January
20, 1998 and for the recall of Rodolfo Cacatian for further cross-examination. It behooved
counsel for Juan and Victor to file said motion and pray that the trial court order the recall of
Rodolfo on the witness stand. Juan and Victor cannot just fold their arms and supinely wait for
the prosecution or for the trial court to initiate the recall of said witness. Indeed, the Court held
in Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, et al:
xxx
The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party who
wishes to exercise said right. This is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the
intention to utilize it must be expressed. Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a
renunciation thereof. Thus, it should be the counsel for the opposing party who should move
to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses. It is absurd for the plaintiff himself to ask the court to
schedule the cross-examination of his own witnesses because it is not his obligation to ensure
that his deponents are cross-examined. Having presented his witnesses, the burden shifts to
his opponent who must now make the appropriate move. Indeed, the rule of placing the
burden of the case on plaintiff's shoulders can be construed to extremes as what happened in
the instant proceedings. 27
The trial was reset to March 31, April 17 and 24, 1998, all at 8:30 a.m. because of the nonavailability of the other witnesses of the prosecution. 28 On March 31, 1998, the prosecution
presented Dr. Alejandro Tolentino, PO2 Rene de la Cruz and Romulo Digap. During the trial
on April 17, 1998, the counsel of Juan and Victor failed to appear. The trial was reset to June
3, 19 and 26, 1998.29 The trial scheduled on June 3, 1998 was cancelled due to the absence
of the counsel of Juan and Victor. The court issued an order appointing Atty. Roberto Ramirez
as counsel for accused-appellants.30
During the trial on August 26, 1998, Atty. Ramirez appeared in behalf of Juan and Victor. The
prosecution rested its case after the presentation of SPO2 Romeo Meneses and formally
offered its documentary evidence. The next trial was set on September 23, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. 31
On November 11, 1998, Juan and Victor commenced the presentation of their evidence with
the testimony of Victor.32 They rested their case on January 27, 1999 without any evidence
adduced by Juan.
Juan and Victor did not even file any motion to reopen the case before the trial court rendered
its decision to allow them to cross-examine Rodolfo. They remained mute after judgment was
rendered against them by the trial court. Neither did they file any petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals for the nullification of the Order of the trial court dated January 20, 1998
declaring that they had waived their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It was only on appeal to

this Court that Juan and Victor averred for the first time that they were deprived of their right to
cross-examine Rodolfo. It is now too late in the day for Juan and Victor to do so. The doctrine
of estoppel states that if one maintains silence when in conscience he ought to speak, equity
will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains
silent when he ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent. 33
The contention of accused-appellants Juan and Victor that Rodolfo and Romulo failed to
identify them as the perpetrators of the crime charged is disbelieved by the trial court, thus:
As can be gathered from the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, on September
28, 1996, the accused boarded at around 3:00 a.m. a Five Star Bus driven by Rodolfo
Cacatian, bound to Pangasinan, in Camachile, Balintawak, Quezon City. Twenty (20) minutes
or so later, when the bus reached the vicinity of Nabuag, Plaridel, Bulacan, along the North
Espressway, the accused with guns in hand suddenly stood up and announced a hold-up.
Simultaneously with the announcement of a hold-up, Escote fired his gun upwards. Acuyan,
meanwhile, took the gun of a man seated at the back. Both then went on to take the money
and valuables of the passengers, including the bus conductor's collections in the amount of
P6,000.00. Thereafter, the duo approached the man at the back telling him in the vernacular
"Pasensiya ka na pare, papatayin ka namin. Baril mo rin ang papatay sa iyo." They pointed
their guns at him and fired several shots oblivious of the plea for mercy of their victim. After
the shooting, the latter collapsed on the floor. The two (2) then went back at the front portion
of the bus behind the driver's seat and were overheard by the bus driver, Cacatian, talking
how easy it was to kill a man. The robbery and the killing were over in 25 minutes. Upon
reaching the Mexico overpass of the Expressway in Pampanga, the two (2) got off the bus.
The driver drove the bus to the Mabalacat Police Station and reported the incident. During the
investigation conducted by the police, it was found out that the slain passenger was a
policeman, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. of the Caloocan City Police Department.
The above version came from Rodolfo Cacatian and Romulo Digap, bus driver and conductor,
respectively, of the ill-fated Five Star Bus.34
The Court agrees with the trial court. It may be true that Romulo was frightened when Juan
and Victor suddenly announced a holdup and fired their guns upward, but it does not follow
that he and Rodolfo failed to have a good look at Juan and Victor during the entire time the
robbery was taking place. The Court has held in a catena of cases that it is the most natural
reaction of victims of violence to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime
and to observe the manner in which the crime was committed. 35 Rodolfo and Romulo had a
good look at both Juan and Victor before, during and after they staged the robbery and before
they alighted from the bus. The evidence on record shows that when Juan and Victor boarded
the bus and while the said vehicle was on its way to its destination, Romulo stationed himself
by the door of the bus located in the mid-section of the vehicle. The lights inside the bus were
on. Juan seated himself in the middle row of the passengers' seat near the center aisle while
Victor stood near the door of the bus about a meter or so from Romulo. 36 Romulo, Juan and
Victor were near each other. Moreover, Juan divested Romulo of his collection of the fares
from the passengers.37 Romulo thus had a face-to-face encounter with Juan. After shooting
SPO1 Manio, Jr. at the rear portion of the bus, Juan and Victor passed by where Romulo was
standing and gave their instructions to him. Considering all the facts and circumstances, there
is no iota of doubt that Romulo saw and recognized Juan and Victor before, during and after
the heist.38 Rodolfo looked many times on the rear, side and center view mirrors to observe

the center and rear portions of the bus before and during the robbery. Rodolfo thus saw Juan
and Victor stage the robbery and kill SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity:
xxx
Q
So, the announcement of hold-up was ahead of the firing of the gun?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And before the actual firing of the gun it was even still said bad words before saying
the hold-up?
A
After they fired the gun they uttered bad words, sir.
Q
Mr. Witness before the announcement of the hold-up you do not have any idea that
you will encounter that nature which took place, is that correct?
A
None, sir.
Q
Within the two (2) year[s] period that you are plying the route of Manila to Bolinao that
was your first experience of hold-up?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And the speed of above 70 kilometers per hour your total attention is focus in front of
the road, correct, Mr. witness?
A
Once in a while the driver look at the side mirror and the rear view mirror, sir.
Q
Before the announcement there was no reason for you to look at any at the rear mirror,
correct, Mr. witness?
Court:
Every now and then they usually look at the side mirror and on the rear, that was his
statement.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q
I am asking him if there was no reason for him....
Fiscal:
Before the announcement of hold-up, there was no mention.
Court:
Every now and then.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q
When you said every now and then, how often is it, Mr. witness?
A
I cannot tell how often but I used to look at the mirror once in a while, sir.
Q
How many mirror do you have, Mr. witness?
A
Four (4), sir.
Q
Where are these located?
A
Two (2) on the side mirror, center mirror and rear view mirror, sir.
Q
The two side mirror protruding outside the bus?
A
Yes, sir, they are in the side of the bus, sir.
Q
One of them is located on the left and the other on the right, correct?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
You only look at the side mirror when you are going to over take, Mr. witness?
A
No, sir.
Q
Where is this center mirror located, Mr. witness?
A
In the center, sir.
Q
What is the purpose of that?

A
So that I can see the passengers if they are already settled so that I can start the
engine, sir.
Q
What about the remaining mirror?
A
Rear view mirror, sir.
Q
What is the purpose and where is it located?
A
The rear view is located just above my head just to check the passengers, sir.
Q
So that the center mirror and the rear view mirror has the same purpose?
A
They are different, sir.
Q
How do you differentiate of (sic) one from the other?
A
The center mirror is used to check the center aisle while the rear mirror is for the whole
view of the passengers, sir.
Q
If you are going to look at any of your side mirrors, you will never see any passengers,
correct, Mr. witness?
A
None, sir.
Q
If you will look at your center mirror you will only see the aisle and you will never see
any portion of the body of your passengers?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Seated passengers?
A
It is only focus (sic) on the middle aisle sir.
Q
If you look at your rear mirror, you will only see the top portion of the head of your
passengers, correct?
A
Only the portion of their head because they have different hight (sic), sir.
Q
You will never see any head of your passengers if they were seated from the rear
mirror portion, correct, Mr. witness?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Before the announcement of hold-up, all of your passengers were actually sleeping?
A
Some of my passengers were sleeping, some were not, sir.
Q
But you will agree Mr. witness that when you said every now and then you are using
your mirror? It is only a glance, correct?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And by mere glancing, Mr. witness you were not able to identify any person on the
basis of any of your mirror, correct?
A
If only a glance but when I look at him I can recognize him, sir.
Q
You agree a while ago by every now and then it is by glancing, as a driver, Mr. witness
by your side mirror?
A
Not all glancing, there are times when you want to recognize a person you look at him
intently, sir.
Q
The purposes of your mirror inside your Bus is mainly of the safety of your passengers
on board, Mr. witness?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And as a driver, Mr. witness, you do not used (sic) your mirror to identify the person
particularly when you are crossing (sic) at a speed of 70 kilometers per hour?
A
I do that, sir.
Q
How long Mr. witness can you focus your eyes on any of these mirror before getting
back your eyes into the main road?
A
Seconds only, sir.

Q
When you said seconds, for how long the most Mr. witness that you can do to fix your
eyes on any of your mirrors and the return back of (sic) your eyes into the main road?
A
Two seconds, sir.
Q
At that time Mr. witness, that you were travelling at about 70 kilometers you were
glancing every now and then on any of your mirrors at about two seconds, correct?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And when you heard the announcement of hold-up your natural reaction is to look
either at the center mirror or rear mirror for two seconds, correct?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And you were instructed Mr. witness to even accelerate your speed upon the
announcement of hold-up?
A
No sir, they just told me to continue my driving, sir.
Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular "alalay ka lang, steady ka lang.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q
Steady at what speed?
A
70 to 80, sir.
Q
What is the minimum speed, Mr. witness for Buses along North Expressway?
A
60 kilometers, sir.
Q
Are you sure of that 60 kilometers, minimum? Are you sure of that?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
That is what you know within the two (2) years that you are driving? Along the North
Expressway?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
And while you were at the precise moment, Mr. witness, you were being instructed to
continue driving, you were not looking to anybody except focus yours eyes in front of the
road?
Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular. Nakikiramdam ako.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q
That's what you are doing?
A
During the time they were gathering the money from my passengers, that is the time
when I look at them, sir.
Q
For two seconds, correct?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Which of the four (4) mirrors that you are looking at within two seconds, Mr. witness
you said you are nakikiramdam?
A
The rear view mirror, sir.
Q
The Bus that you were driving is not an air con bus?
A
Ordinary bus, sir.
Q
And at what time your passengers, most of your passengers were already sleep (sic),
Mr. witness?
A
Most of my passengers, sir. Some of my passengers were still sleep (sic), sir.
Q
And the lights inside the Bus are off, correct Mr. witness?

A
The lights were on, sir.
Q
While the passengers were sleep (sic) the light was still on, Mr. witness, at the time of
the trip.?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
Now, Mr. witness when the hold-up was announced and then when you look for two
seconds in the rear mirror you were not able to see any one, you were only sensing what is
happening inside your bus?
A
I saw something, sir.
Q
You saw something in front of your Bus? You can only see inside when you are going
to look at the mirror?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
That is the only thing that you see every now and then, you said you were looking at
the mirror?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
How many times, Mr. witness did you look Mr. witness at the rear mirror during the
entire occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up?
A
There were many times, sir.
Q
The most that you can remember, please inform the Honorable Court? During the
occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up, Mr. witness?
A
I cannot estimate, sir.
Q
How long did the alleged hold-up took place?
A
More or less 25 minutes, sir.39
When Rodolfo gave his sworn statement to the police investigators in Plaridel, Bulacan after
the robbery, he described the felons. When asked by the police investigators if he could
identify the robbers if he see them again, Rodolfo declared that he would be able to identify
them:
8. T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang itsura ng dalawang lalaki na nanghold-up sa
minamaneho mong bus?
S: Halos magkasing taas, 5'4" o 5'5" katam-taman ang pangangatawan, parehong
nakapantalon ng maong naka-suot ng jacket na maong, parehong naka rubber shoes at
pareho ring naka sumbrero.
9. T: Kung sakali bang makikita mo pa ang mga ito ay makikilala mo pa sila?
S: Makikilala ko po sila.40
When asked to identify the robbers during the trial, Rodolfo spontaneously pointed to and
identified Juan and Victor:
Q
Fiscal:
(to the witness)
xxx
Q
Those two man (sic) who stated that it was a hold-up inside the bus and who fired the
gun are they inside the Court room (sic) today?
A
Yes, ma'am.
Q
Point to us?
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a man wearing red T-shirt and when asked his name answered Victor
Acuyan and the man wearing green T-shirt and when asked his name answered Juan
Gonzales.41

For his part, Romulo likewise spontaneously pointed to and identified Juan and Victor as the
culprits when asked by the prosecutor to identify the robbers from among those in the
courtroom:
xxx
Q
You said that you were robbed inside the bus, how does (sic) the robbing took place?
A
They announced a hold up ma'am, afterwards, they confiscated the money of the
passengers including my collections.
Q
You said "they" who announced the hold up, whose (sic) these "they" you are referring
to?
A
Those two (2), ma'am.
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to the two accused.
Public Pros.:
May we request that the accused be identified, Your Honor.
Court:
(to both accused)
What are your names?
A
Juan Escote, Your Honor. Victor Acuyan, Your Honor.
Public Pros.:
May we know from the accused if his name is Juan Escote Gonzales because he just said
Juan Escote. In the Information, it is one Juan Gonzales, Jr., so, we can change, Your Honor. 42
Moreover, when he was accosted by SPO3 Romeo Meneses on October 25, 1997 in Tarlac,
Tarlac, Juan was in possession of the identification card 43 of the slain police officer. Juan failed
to explain to the trial court how and under what circumstances he came into possession of
said identification card. Juan must necessarily be considered the author of the robbery and
the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr. In People v. Mantung,44 we held:
xxx [T]he recovery of part of the loot from Mantung or the time of his arrest gave rise to a legal
presumption of his guilt. As this Court has held, '[I]n the absence of an explanation of how one
has come into possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously
killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of the said
person and of the robbery committed on him.'
While police investigators did not place Juan and Victor in a police line-up for proper
identification by Rodolfo and Romulo, it cannot thereby be concluded that absent such line-up,
their identification by Romulo and Rodolfo as the authors of the robbery with homicide was
unreliable. There is no law or police regulation requiring a police line-up for proper
identification in every case. Even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper and
reliable identification as long as such identification was not suggested or instigated to the
witness by the police.45 In this case, there is no evidence that the police officers had supplied
or even suggested to Rodolfo and Romulo the identities of Juan and Victor as the perpetrators
of the robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr.
The Felony Committed by Juan and Victor
The Court finds that the trial court committed no error in convicting Juan and Victor of robbery
with homicide. Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 7659, reads:
Art. 294. - Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. - Penalties. - Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
To warrant the conviction of Juan and Victor for the said charge, the prosecution was
burdened to prove the confluence of the following essential elements:
xxx (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent
to gain or animus lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the
crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. xxx 46
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. 47 In robbery with homicide, so long as
the intention of the felons was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
In People v. Barut,48 the Court held that:
In the controlling Spanish version of article 294, it is provided that there is robbery with
homicide "cuando con motivo o con ocasin del robo resultare homicidio". "Basta que entre
aquel este exista una relacin meramente ocasional. No se requiere que el homicidio se
cometa como medio de ejecucin del robo, ni que el culpable tenga intencin de matar, el
delito existe segn constanta jurisprudencia, aun cuando no concurra animo homicida.
Incluso si la muerte sobreviniere por mero accidente, siempre que el homicidio se produzca
con motivo con ocasin del robo, siendo indiferente que la muerte sea anterior, coetnea o
posterior a ste" (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 14th Ed. P. 872).
Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the homicide committed on the
occasion of or by reason of the robbery, nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide. All the crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery are merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide. This was the ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain on September 9, 1886, et
sequitur cited by this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, et al.49
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with
homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted
in 2 Hidalgo's Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of
the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is
immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886;
October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced
by reason or on occasion of the robbery, inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without
reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration (Decision of January 12,
1889 see Cuello Calon's Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).
Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion
of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as
principals of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it
appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 50
In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Juan and Victor conspired
and confabulated together in robbing the passengers of the Five Star Bus of their money and
valuables and Romulo of his collections of the fares of the passengers and in killing SPO1
Manio, Jr. with impunity on the occasion of the robbery. Hence, both Juan and Victor are guilty
as principals by direct participation of the felony of robbery with homicide under paragraph 1,

Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death.
The Proper Penalty
The trial court imposed the supreme penalty of death on Juan and Victor for robbery with
homicide, defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable with
reclusion perpetua. Under Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the felons
should be meted the supreme penalty of death when the crime is committed with an
aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime absent any mitigating
circumstance. The trial court did not specify in the decretal portion of its decision the
aggravating circumstances attendant in the commission of the crime mandating the imposition
of the death penalty. However, it is evident from the findings of facts contained in the body of
the decision of the trial court that it imposed the death penalty on Juan and Victor on its
finding that they shot SPO1 Manio, Jr. treacherously on the occasion of or by reason of the
robbery:
xxx
The two (2) accused are incomparable in their ruthlessness and base regard for human life.
After stripping the passengers of their money and valuables, including the firearm of the
victim, they came to decide to execute the latter seemingly because he was a police officer.
They lost no time pouncing him at the rear section of the bus, aimed their firearms at him and,
in a derisive and humiliating tone, told him, before pulling the trigger, that they were rather
sorry but they are going to kill him with his own gun; and thereafter, they simultaneously fired
point blank at the hapless policeman who was practically on his knees begging for his life.
Afterwhich, they calmly positioned themselves at the front boasting for all to hear, that killing a
man is like killing a chicken ("Parang pumapatay ng manok"). Escote, in particular, is a class
by himself in callousness. xxx.51
The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the commission of the
crime. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack
employed by him.52 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and
thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated
even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable
to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.53 In the case at bar, the victim suffered
six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the
right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest.
Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then
shot him even as he pleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He
was shot at close range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family
after a hard day's work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief
for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter inhumanity of man to his
fellowmen.
The issues that now come to fore are (1) whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide; and if in the affirmative, (b) whether treachery may be
appreciated against Juan and Victor. On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. This Court
has ruled over the years54 that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in the felony of

robbery with homicide, a special complex crime (un delito especial complejo) and at the same
time a single and indivisible offense (uno solo indivisible). 55 However, this Court in two cases
has held that robbery with homicide is a crime against property and hence treachery which is
appreciated only to crimes against persons should not be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance.56 It held in another case that treachery is not appreciated in robbery
with rape precisely because robbery with rape is a crime against property. 57 These rulings of
the Court find support in case law that in robbery with homicide or robbery with rape, homicide
or rape are merely incidents of the robbery, with robbery being the main purpose and object of
the criminal.58 Indeed, in People vs. Cando,59 two distinguished members of this Court
advocated a review of the doctrine that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in
robbery with homicide. They opined that treachery is applicable only to crimes against
persons. After all, in People vs. Bariquit,60 this Court in a per curiam decision promulgated in
year 2000 declared that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. However, this
Court held in People vs. Cando that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in
robbery with homicide, citing its prior rulings that in robbery with homicide, treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery. This
Court opted not to apply its ruling earlier that year in People vs. Bariquit.
Legal Luminaries in criminal law and eminent commentators of the Revised Penal Code are
not in full accord either. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino (Retired) says that treachery is
appreciated only in crimes against persons as defined in Title 10, Book Two of the Code. 61
Chief Justice Luis B. Reyes (Retired) also is of the opinion that treachery is applicable only to
crimes against persons.62 However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado (Retired) is of a different
view.63 He says that treachery cannot be considered in robbery but can be appreciated insofar
as the killing is concerned, citing the decisions of this Court in People vs. Balagtas64 for the
purpose of determining the penalty to be meted on the felon when the victim of homicide is
killed with treachery.
It must be recalled that by Royal Order of December 17, 1886 the 1850 Penal Code in force in
Spain, as amended by the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 was applied in the Philippines.
The Penal Code of 1887 in the Philippines was amended by Act 3815, now known as the
Revised Penal Code, which was enacted and published in Spanish. In construing the Old
Penal Code and the Revised Penal Code, this Court had accorded respect and persuasive, if
not conclusive effect to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and
construing the 1850 Penal Code of Spain, as amended by Codigo Penal Reformado de
1870.65
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. The following are aggravating circumstances:
xxx
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The law was taken from Chapter IV, Article 10, paragraph 2 of the 1860 Penal Code and the
Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 of Spain which reads:
Art. 10 ...2. Ejecutar el hecho con alevosia. Hay alevosia cuando el culpable comete
cualquiera de los delitos contra las personas empleando medios, modos o for mas en la

ejecucion que tiendan directa y especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para su persona, que
proceda de la defensa que pudiera hacer el ofendido. xxx
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code is a reproduction of the 1850 Penal Code
of Spain and the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 with a slight difference. In the latter law,
the words "las personas" (the persons) are used, whereas in Article 14, paragraph 6, of the
Revised Penal Code, the words "the person" are used.
Going by the letter of the law, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons as
enumerated in Title Eight, Chapters One and Two, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the Supreme Court of Spain has consistently applied treachery to robbery with
homicide, classified as a crime against property. Citing decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, Cuello Calon, a noted commentator of the Spanish Penal Code says that despite the
strict and express reference of the penal code to treachery being applicable to persons,
treachery also applies to other crimes such as robbery with homicide: 66
Aun cuando el Codigo solo se refiere a los delitos contra las personas, cabe estimarla en los
que no perteneciendo a este titulo se determinan por muerte o lesiones, como, en el robo con
homicidio, y en el homicidio del Jefe del Estado que es un delito contra la seguridad interior
del Estado, y no obstante la referencia estricta del texto legal a los delitos contra las personas
no es la alevosia aplicable a la mayoria de ellos, no lo es en el homicidio, pues como su
concurrencia lo cualifica lo transforma en delito distinto, en asesinato, ni en el homicidio
consentido (art. 409), ni en la ria tumultuaria (art. 408) ni en el infanticidio (art. 410). xxx. 67
Viada also says that treachery is appreciated in crimes against persons (delitos contra
personas) and also in robbery with homicide (robo con homicidio).68
"Contra las personas. - Luego la circunstancia de alevosia solo puede apreciarse en los
delitos provistos desde el art. 417 al 447, y en algun otro, como el de robo con homicidio,
atentario, a la vez que contra la propriedad, contra la persona."
Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said
crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is
not a qualifying circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision
dated September 11, 1878, the word "homicide" is used in its broadest and most generic
sense.69
Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing
the penalty for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However,
aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law
or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall
not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. 70 Under paragraph 2 of the
law, the same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the
crime to such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by
law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor
shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
xxx
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the
crime to such a degree that it must be of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime
specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with
homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime

of robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating

uno de los cuales iba el interfecto, dirigiendolos por otro camino que conducia a un aljibon, y
circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
al llegar a este, valiendose de engao para hacer bajar a dicho interfecto, se lanzaron de
In its Sentencia dated March 14, 1877, the Supreme Court of Spain declared that treachery is
improviso sobre el, tirandolo en tierra, robandole el dinero, la manta y los talegos que llevaba,
a generic aggravating circumstance not only in crimes against persons but also in robbery
y atandole al pie una piedra de mucho peso, le arrojaron con ella a dicho aljibon, dados estos
with homicide. The high court of Spain applied Article 79 of the Spanish Penal Code (Article
hechos, no cabe duda que constituyen el delito complejo del art. 516, num. I, con la
62 of the Revised Penal Code) and ruled that since treachery is not a constitutive element of
circunstancia agravante de alevosia, puesto que los medios, forma y modos empleados en la
the crime of robbery with homicide nor is it inherent in said crime, without which it cannot be
ejecucion del crimen tendieron directa y especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para sus
committed, treachery is an aggravating circumstance to said crime. The high court of Spain
autores, procedente de la defensa del ofendido.72
was not impervious of the fact that robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against
In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when
property. Indeed, it specifically declared that the classification of robbery with homicide as a
the victim of homicide is killed by treachery.
crime against property is irrelevant and inconsequential in the application of treachery. It
On the second issue, we also rule in the affirmative. Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Revised
further declared that it would be futile to argue that in crimes against property such as robbery
Penal Code which was taken from Article 80 of the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870,73
with homicide, treachery would have no application. This is so, the high tribunal ruled,
provides that circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means
because when robbery is coupled with crimes committed against persons, the crime is not
employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons
only an assault (ataca) on the property of the victims but also of the victims themselves
only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation
(ofende):
therein. The circumstances attending the commission of a crime either relate to the persons
xxx que la circunstancia agravante de alevosia ni
participating in the crime or into its manner
Age of the victim
= 38 years old
es constitutiva del delito complejo de robo y
of execution or to the means employed. The
Life expectancy
= 2/3 x (80 age of the victim at the time of death)
homicidio, ni de tal modo inherente que sin ella no
latter has a direct bearing upon the criminal
pueda cometerse, sin que quepa arguir que en los
liability of all the accused who have
= 2/3 x (80-38)
delitos contra la propiedad no debe aquella tener
knowledge thereof at the time of the
= 2/3 x 42
aplicacion, porque cuando estos son complejos de
commission of the crime or of their
los que se cometen contra las personas, no solo
cooperation thereon.74 Accordingly, the
= 28 years
se ataca a la propiedad, sino que se ofende a
Spanish Supreme Court held in its
Gross Annual Income = gross monthly income x 12 months
estas. xxx71
Sentencia dated December 17, 1875 that
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic
where two or more persons perpetrate the
= P8,065.00 x 12
aggravating circumstance to robbery with
crime of robbery with homicide, the generic
= P96,780.00
homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of
aggravating circumstance of treachery shall
homicide which is a crime against persons and not
be appreciated against all of the felons who
Living Expenses
= 50% of Gross Annual Income
at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime
had knowledge of the manner of the killing of
= P96,780.00 x 0.5
against property. Treachery is applied to the
victims of homicide, with the ratiocination
constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the
that:
= P48,390.00
constituent crime of "robbery" of the special
xxx si por la Ley basta haberse ejecutado un
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
homicidio simple con motivo ocasin del
Lost Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income-Living expenses]
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose
robo para la imposicion de la pena del art.
= 28 x [P96,780.00 P48,390.00]
its classification as a crime against property or as a
516, num. I, no puede sere ni aun discutible
special complex and single and indivisible crime
que, concurriendo la agravante de alevosia,
= 28 x P48,390.00
simply because treachery is appreciated as a
se aumente la criminalidad de los
= P1,354,920.00
generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery
delincuentes; siendo aplicable a todos los
merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal
autores del hecho indivisible, porque no es circunstancia que afecte a la personalidad del
Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance.
delincuente, de las que habla el art. 80 del Codigo penal en su primera parte, sino que
In its Sentencia, dated July 9, 1877, the high tribunal of Spain also ruled that when the victim
consiste en la ejecusion material del hecho y en los medios empleados para llevarle a cabo,
of robbery is killed with treachery, the said circumstance should be appreciated as a generic
cuando de ellos tuvieron conocimiento todos los participantes en el mismo por el concierto
aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide:
previo y con las condiciones establecidad en la segunda parte del citado articulo. 75
xxx que si aparece probado que el procesado y su co-reo convinieron en matar a un conocido
suyo, compaero de viaje, para lo cual desviaron cautelosamente los carros que guiaban, en

Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar
because the same was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedures which reads:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation
of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be
alleged in the Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because if
it is more favorable to the accused.76 Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the
information, treachery cannot aggravate the penalty for the crime.
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony of robbery with
homicide, Juan and Victor should each be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liability of Juan and Victor
The trial court awarded the total amount of P300,000.00 to the heirs of SPO1 Manio, Jr. The
court did not specify whether the said amounts included civil indemnity for the death of the
victim, moral damages and the lost earnings of the victim as a police officer of the PNP. The
Court shall thus modify the awards granted by the trial court.
Since the penalty imposed on Juan and Victor is reclusion perpetua, the heirs of the victim are
entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. The heirs are also entitled to moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, Rosemarie Manio having testified on the factual basis
thereof.77 Considering that treachery aggravated the crime, the heirs are also entitled to
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. This Court held in People vs. Catubig78 that
the retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should not impair the right of the heirs to exemplary damages which had already accrued
when the crime was committed prior to the effectivity of the said rule. Juan and Victor are also
jointly and severally liable to the said heirs in the total amount of P30,000.00 as actual
damages, the prosecution having adduced evidence receipts for said amounts. The heirs are
not entitled to expenses allegedly incurred by them during the wake as such expenses are not
supported by receipts.79 However, in lieu thereof, the heirs are entitled to temperate damages
in the amount of P20,000.00.80 The service firearm of the victim was turned over to the
Evidence Custodian of the Caloocan City Police Station per order of the trial court on October
22, 1997.81 The prosecution failed to adduce documentary evidence to prove the claim of Five
Star Bus, Inc. in the amount of P6,000.00. Hence, the award should be deleted. However, in
lieu of actual damages, the bus company is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of
P3,000.00.82
The heirs are likewise entitled to damages for the lost earnings of the victim. The evidence on
record shows that SPO1 Manio, Jr. was born on August 25, 1958. He was killed on September
28, 1996 at the age of 38. He had a gross monthly salary as a member of the Philippine
National Police of P8,065.00 or a gross annual salary of P96,780.00. Hence, the heirs are
entitled to the amount of P1,354,920.00 by way of lost earnings of the victim computed, thus:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and
Victor Acuyan are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery with
homicide defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no

modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony, hereby metes on each of them the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Said accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of the victim SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P1,349,920.00 for lost
earnings, P30,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award
of P6,000.00 to the Five Star Bus, Inc. is deleted. However, the said corporation is awarded
the amount of P3,000.00 as temperate damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug J., please see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., I join J. Vitug's separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join J. Vitug's separate opinion.
Separate Opinion
VITUG, J.:
Should an attendant aggravating circumstance of treachery, exclusive to crimes against
persons, be appreciated in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide which Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code categorizes as a crime against property? I humbly submit that
it should not be appreciated.
A brief background. At past midnight on 28 September 1996, a Five Star passenger bus with
plate No. ABS-793, bound for Bolinao from Manila, stopped at the Balintawak junction to pick
up some passengers. Six passengers, among them victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote,
boarded the bus. Escote seated himself on the third seat near the aisle while Acuyan took the
mid-portion of the vehicle beside the bus conductor.
Along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, passengers Escote and Acuyan suddenly stood up,
took their positions and declared a holdup. Escote fired his gun upwards, jolting to
consciousness the sleepy and dozing passengers. The duo promptly divested the passengers
of their valuables. The bus conductor, Romulo Digap, was dispossessed of the fares he earlier
collected from the passengers. When the two repaired to the rear end of the bus, they came
upon SPO1 Jose C. Manio, a passenger on his way to Angeles City. The felons demanded
that Manio show them his identification card and wallet. Manio took out his identification card
and his service gun. At this point, the duo told the hapless law officer: "Pasensya ka na pare,
papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin ang papatay sa iyo." Ignoring his pleas for mercy, the robbers
mercilessly and repeatedly shot Manio to death. The two then proceeded to the driver's seat.
Rodolfo Caciatan, the driver, overheard one of the felons boast: "Ganyan lang ang pumatay
ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng manok." The other said: "Ayos na naman tayo pare. Malaki-laki
ito." After warning Caciatan not to report the incident to the authorities, the two alighted at an
overpass in Mexico, Pampanga. The bus driver and the bus conductor reported the incident to
the police authorities in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The lifeless body of SPO1 Manio, Jr.,
was brought to a nearby funeral parlor where Dr. Alejandro D. Tolentino performed an autopsy.
Less than a month later, on 25 October 1996, about midnight, SPO3 Romeo Meneses, the
team leader of Alert Team No. 1 of the Tarlac Police Station, and SPO3 Florante S. Ferrer
were at a checkpoint along the Tarlac national highway. The police officers were diverting the
traffic flow to the Sta. Rosa Road because of the temporary closure of the Bambang-

Concepcion bridge to motorists. Meneses stopped the driver of a white-colored taxicab

without any plate number. The driver turned out to be Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. Escote
introduced himself to be a police officer. When asked to present his identification card, Escote
at once produced the card issued to and in the name of SPO1 Manio. Meneses became
suspicious after noticing that the card had already expired. When asked to produce a new pay
slip, Escote was not able to show any. Amidst intensive probing, Escote finally confessed that
he was not a policeman. Meneses forthwith brought Escote to the police station where five live
bullets of a 9-millimeter firearm were confiscated from him. Escote owned responsibility for the
highway robbery committed aboard the Five Star passenger bus and for the death of SPO1
Manio, Jr. Escote was turned over to the custody of the Plaridel Police Station where the bus
conductor, Romulo Digap, later identified Escote as having been one of the two robbers. A
further investigation on the case led to the arrest of Victor Acuyan in Laoang, Northern Samar.
On 04 April 1997, an Information for robbery with homicide was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan against Juan Gonzales Escote and Victor O. Acuyan. When arraigned,
Escote and Acuyan entered a plea of not guilty. The trial ensued. After the prosecution had
rested its case, Escote escaped from the provincial jail. Only Acuyan was able to adduce
evidence in his defense. Acuyan denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. At the
time of the robbery, he claimed, he was in Laoang, Samar, for the town fiesta and had a
drinking spree with friends, after which they attended a public dance that lasted until dawn of
the next day. He denied having met Juan Escote before. On 14 January 1999, Juan Escote
was re-arrested in Daet, Camarines Norte, but he chose not to adduce any evidence in his
behalf.
The trial court found Juan Escote and Victor Acuyan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide and meted upon each of them the penalty of death. In
imposing the penalty of death upon appellants, the trial court considered treachery as an
aggravating circumstance as to justify its imposition of the maximum penalty of death. The
ponencia, while finding that treachery could not be appreciated for not having been aptly
alleged in the information, expressed in an obiter, however, that had it been otherwise, i.e.,
that had treachery been properly alleged, this circumstance could have aggravated the crime.
It is on the last pronouncement that I beg to differ.
Unlike ordinary complex crimes, robbery with homicide, defined by Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, is a special complex crime against property, explicitly carrying a corresponding
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
In an ordinary complex crime, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code expresses that "the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period." Article 48 means then that in the imposition of the penalty for such an ordinary
complex crime, i.e., where no specific penalty is prescribed for the complex crime itself, the
composite offenses and their respective penalties are individually factored, and it is possible,
indeed warranted, that any aggravating circumstance, generic or qualified, even if it be
peculiar to only one of the constituent crimes, can and should be logically considered in order
to determine which of the composite crimes is the "most serious crime," the penalty for which
shall then "be applied in its maximum period." The rule evidently is not in square with a special
complex crime, like robbery with homicide, where the law effectively treats the offense as an
individual felony in itself and then prescribes a specific penalty therefore. Article 294 is explicit,
and it provides-

"Art. 294. Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:
"(1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson."
There being just an independent prescribed penalty for the offense, any circumstance that can
aggravate that penalty should be germane and generic not to one but to both of the
constituent offenses that comprise the elements of the crime. 1 The suggestion that treachery
could be appreciated "only insofar" as the killing is concerned would unavoidably be to
consider and hold robbery and homicide as being separately penalized and to thus discount
its classification under Article 294 of the Code as a distinct crime itself with a distinct penalty
prescribed therefor. Most importantly, such interpretation would be to treat the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide no differently from ordinary complex crimes defined under
Article 48, where the composite crimes are separately regarded and weighed in the ultimate
imposition of the penalty. If such were intended, the law could have easily so provided, with
the penalty for the higher of the two offenses to be then accordingly imposed on the
malefactor. In prescribing, however, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, where
homicide results by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the law has virtually taken into
account the particularly "nefarious" nature of the crime, where human life is taken, howsoever
committed, to pursue the criminal intent to gain with the use of violence against or intimidation
of any person.
Distinct penalties prescribed by law in special complex crimes is in recognition of the primacy
given to criminal intent over the overt acts that are done to achieve that intent. This conclusion
is made implicit in various provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, practically all of the
justifying circumstances, as well as the exempting circumstances of accident (paragraph 4,
Article 12) and lawful or insuperable cause (paragraph 7, Article 12), are based on the lack of
criminal intent.2 In felonies committed by means of dolo, as opposed to those committed by
means of culpa (including offenses punished under special laws), criminal intent is primordial
and overt acts are considered basically as being mere manifestations of criminal intent.
Paragraph 2, Article 4, of the Revised Penal Code places emphasis on "intent" over effect, as
it assigns criminal liability to one who has committed an "impossible crime," said person
having intended and pursued such intent to commit a felony although, technically, no crime
has actually been committed. Article 134 of the same Code, penalizing the crime of rebellion,
imposes a distinct penalty, the rebel being moved by a single intent which is to overthrow the
existing government, and ignores individual acts committed in the furtherance of such intent.
If a circumstance, peculiar to only one of the composite crimes, could at all be allowed to
aggravate the penalty in robbery with homicide, it should be with respect to the main offense
of robbery, the intent to gain being the moving force that impels the malefactor to commit the
crime. The attendant offense of homicide cannot be further modified, "homicide" this time
being so understood, as it should be, in its generic sense, comprehending even murder or
parricide, when committed "by reason or on the occasion of the robbery." The generic
character of "homicide" in this special complex crime, has been exemplified, for instance, in
People vs. Mangulabnan,3 where the court has held that, "[i]n order to determine the existence
of the crime of robbery with homicide, it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or
on the occasion of the robbery and it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery

inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the

circumstances, causes , modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that
has to be taken into consideration."4
If the term "homicide" were not to be understood in its generic sense, an aggravating
circumstance, such as evident premeditation or treachery, would qualify the killing into murder.
Two separate crimes of robbery and homicide inevitably would result that effectively would
place the two felonies outside the coverage of Article 294. And, as to whether or not those
crimes should be complexed with each other would depend on the attendance of the
requisites enumerated in Article 48 for ordinary complex crimes, i.e., a) that a single act
constitute two or more grave or less grave felonies or, b) that an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other.
It is on the foregoing predicate, I am convinced, that this Court in People vs. Timple5 has
rejected the idea of appreciating treachery as being an aggravating circumstance in the crime
of robbery with homicide, an offense, I might repeat, is by law classified as a crime against
property. I certainly will not view the ruling as having been made in any cavalier fashion and
with little or no effort for an introspective ratiocination. Timple has, in fact, been stressed in
People vs. Arizobal;6 viz:
"But treachery was incorrectly considered by the trial court. The accused stand charged with,
tried and convicted of robbery with homicide. This special complex crime is primarily classified
in this jurisdiction as a crime against property, and not against persons, homicide being merely
an incident of robbery with the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminals. As
such, treachery cannot be validly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of
The Revised Penal Code. (People v. Bariquit, G.R. No. 122733, 2 October 2000, 341 SCRA
600.) This is completely a reversal of the previous jurisprudence on the matter decided in a
litany of cases before People v. Bariquit."7
Footnotes
1
Penned by Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr.
2
Exhibit "A."
3
Exhibit "H."
4
Exhibit "E."
5
Exhibits "A" and "G."
6
Exhibits "C to C-4."
7
Exhibit "B-1."
8
Exhibit "H."
9
Exhibit "I."
10
Exhibit "F."
11
Original Records of Crim. Case No. 443-M-97, p. 2.
12
Ibid., p. 161.
13
Id., p. 163.
14
Id., p. 179.
15
Id., p. 175.
16
Rollo, p. 70.
17
Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, 62 SCRA 258 (1975).
18
Fulgado, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 182 SCRA 81 (1990).
19
People vs. Suplito, 314 SCRA 493 (1999).

20

See note 16, supra.

People vs. Digno, Jr. 250 SCRA 237 (1995).
22
See note 17, supra.
23
Original Records, p. 70.
24
Ibid., p. 86.
25
Id., p. 89.
26
Id., p. 92.
27
See note 18, supra.
28
Original Records , p. 96.
29
Ibid., p.107.
30
Id., p. 113.
31
Id., p. 157.
32
Id., p. 172.
33
31 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, 87, p. 494.
34
Original Records, pp. 192-193.
35
People vs. Ofido, 342 SCRA 155 (2000).
36
TSN, Cacatian, November 18, 1997, pp. 6-7.
37
TSN, Digap, March 31, 1998, p. 22.
38
Ditche vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 327 SCRA 301 (2000).
39
TSN, Cacatian, November 18, 1997, pp. 19-29.
40
Exhibit "A."
41
Ibid., pp. 8-9.
42
TSN, March 31, 1998, pp. 19-20.
43
Exhibit "H."
44
310 SCRA 819 (1999).
45
People v. Lubong, 332 SCRA 672 (2000).
46
People vs. Nang, 289 SCRA 16 (1998).
47
People vs. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627 (1991).
48
89 SCRA 14 (1979).
49
99 PHIL. 992 (1956).
50
People vs. Cando, 344 SCRA 330 (2000).
51
Original Records, pp. 194-195.
52
People vs. Reyes, 287 SCRA 229 (1998).
53
People vs. Bustos, 171 SCRA 243 (1989).
54
e.g. People vs. Semaada, 103 Phil 790 (1958); People vs. Bautista, et al., 107 Phil 1091
(1960); People vs. Tiongson, et al., 6 SCRA 431 (1962); People vs. Pedro, et al., 16 SCRA 57
(1966); People vs. Sigayan, et al, 16 SCRA 839 (1966); People vs. Pujinio, et al., 27 SCRA
1185 (1969); People vs. Saquing, et al., 30 SCRA 834 (1969); People vs. Cornelio, et al., 39
SCRA 435 (1971); People vs. Repato, 91 SCRA 488 (1979); People vs. Pajanustan, 97 SCRA
699 (1980); People vs. Arcamo, et al., 105 SCRA 707 (1981); People vs. Tintero, 111 SCRA
714 (1982); People vs. Gapasin, et al., 145 SCRA 178 (1986); People vs. Badilla, 185 SCRA
554 (1990); People vs. Manansala, 211 SCRA 66 (1992); People vs. Bechayda, 212 SCRA
336 (1992); People vs. Vivas, 232 SCRA 238 (1994); People vs. Pacapac, et al., 248 SCRA
77 (1995); People vs. Mores, et al., 311 SCRA 342 (1999); People vs. Reyes, et al., 309
SCRA 622 (1999); and People vs. Abdul, et al., 310 SCRA 246 (1999).
21

55

Sentencia de 17 de Diciembre de 1875 of the Supreme Court of Spain. In several cases,

this Court held that robbery with homicide is a special complex crime, e.g., People vs.
Jarandilla, 339 SCRA 381(2000); People vs. Quibido, 338 SCRA 607 (2000); People vs.
Aquino, 329 SCRA 247 (2000); People vs. Zuela, et al., 323 SCRA 589 (2000); People vs.
Tao, 331 SCRA 449 (2000). In some cases, this Court has held that robbery with homicide is
a single and indivisible crime, e.g., People vs. Labita, 99 Phil. 1068 (unreported [1956]);
People vs Alfeche, Jr., 211 SCRA 770 (1992).
56
People vs. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 (1994); People vs. San Pedro, 95 SCRA 306 (1980).
57
People vs. Loseo, G.R. No. 5508-09, April 29, 1954 (unpublished). Under Republic Act
8383, rape is a crime against persons.
58
People vs. Navales, 266 SCRA 569 (1997).
59
344 SCRA 330 (2000).
60
341 SCRA 600 (2000).
61
AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1987 ed., Vol. I, p. 386.
62
REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1993 ed., Vol. I, p. 412.
63
REGALADO, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS, 1st ed., p. 95.
64
68 Phil. 675 (1939)..
65
People vs. Mangulaban, 99 Phil. 992 (1956); People vs. Mesias, 65 Phil. 267 (1939);
Marasigan vs. Robles, 55 O.G. 8297; United States vs. Samonte, L-3422, August 3, 1907;
United States vs. Ipil, et al., 27 Phil 530 (1914), concurring opinion: United States vs.
Landasan, 35 Phil 359 (1916).
66
CUELLO CALON DERECHO PENAL, 1960 ed., Vol. I, p. 592.
67
Decisions dated January 19, 1905, April 18, 1908, June 28, 1922 and December 18, 1947.
68
SALVADOR VIADA CODIGO PENAL REFORMADO DE 1870, Concordado y Comentado
5th ed. 1926, Tomo II, p. 252. Articles 417 to 447 refer to crimes against persons under the
Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870. In Article 516, Title XIII, Chapter 1 of the Codigo Penal
Reformado de 1870, robbery with homicide is a crime against property.
69
Cited in United States vs. Landasan, 35 Phil 359 (1916).
70
Article 62, paragraphs 1 and 2 were taken from Article 79 of the Penal Code of Spain, viz:
No producen el efecto de aumentar la pena las circunstancias agravantes que por si mismas
constituyeren un delito especialmente penado por la Ley, o que esta haya expresado al
describirlo y penarlo.
Tampoco lo producen aquellas circunstancias agravantes de tal manera inherentes al delito,
que sin la concurrencia de ellas no pudiera cometerse. xxx.
71
Vide, Note 63, p. 254.
72
Ibid., p. 255.
73
Las circunstancias agravantes o atenuantes que consistieren en la disposicion moral del
delincuente, en sus relaciones particulares con el ofendido, o en otra causa personal, serviran
para agravar o atenuar la responsabilidad solo de aquello autores, complices o encubridores
en quienes concurrieren.
Las que consistieren en la ejecucion material del hecho o en los medios empleados para
realizarlo serviran para agravar o atenuar la responsabilidad unicamente de los que tuvieren
conocimiento de ellas en el momento de la accion o de su cooperacion para el delito. xxx
74
United States vs. Ancheta, 15 Phil 43 (1910).
75
Ibid.
76
People vs. Onabia, 306 SCRA 23 (1999).

77

People vs. Tao, 331 SCRA 449 (2000).

363 SCRA 621 (2000).
79
People vs. Cordero, 263 SCRA 122 (1996).
80
Article 2234, New Civil Code.
81
Original Record, p. 82.
82
See note 79.
Vitug, J.:
1
Parenthetically, almost all of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code are generic, with few exceptions as so exemplified by Mr. Justice Florenz
B. Regalado in his book, "Criminal Law Conspectus," (First Edition, 2000, p. 73) like cruelty
and treachery being exclusive to crimes against persons, person in authority in physical
injuries, unlicensed firearms in robbery in band, and abuse of authority or confidential
relations by guardians or curators in seduction, rape, acts of lasciviousness, white slavery and
corruption of minors. The mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article 13 of the Revised
Penal Code, however, are generic to both crimes against property and persons and their
applicability to even the special complex crime of robbery with homicide would be without
question.
2
Regalado, Ibid., p. 14.
3
99 Phil 992
4
At p. 993; see also People vs. Ombao, (103 SCRA 233) where an accused was held liable
for the crime of robbery with homicide even though it could not be ascertained whether the
shots which killed the victim were fired by the malefactors or by the pursuing constabulary
troopers.
5
237 SCRA 52.
6
348 SCRA 143.
7
At p. 153.
78

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 122976-77. November 16, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REGANDO VILLONEZ y
PASCASIO, RUEL SANTOS y LAPADA, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, ELMER DOE, and ROY
DOE, accused, vs. EDUARDO N. SANTOS @ "EDDIE," REYNALDO N. SANTOS @
"REY," FERNANDO N. SANTOS @ "DEDE," EMERLITO N. SANTOS @ "ELMER," and
RUDY N. SANTOS @ "BUDDA," accused, REGANDO VILLONEZ y PASCASIO,
EMERLITO N. SANTOS, and RUEL SANTOS, accused-appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellants REGANDO VILLONEZ, RUEL SANTOS, and EMERLITO SANTOS pray
for a reversal of their conviction for MURDER decreed in a Joint Decision rendered on 23
November 1995 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 170, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 14943-MN and 15506-MN.
The information in Criminal Case No. 14943-MN charged REGANDO and RUEL with the
crime of murder allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 3rd day of May 1994 in Malabon, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Regando Villonez y Pascasio, Ruel
Santos y Lapada, John Doe, Peter Doe, Elmer Doe and Roy Doe], conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill, with
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and being armed with bladed weapons, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one GERARDO
LONGASA on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical
injuries, which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was assigned to Branch 170 of the RTC of Malabon, Metro Manila.
Upon arraignment, REGANDO and RUEL entered a plea of not guilty,
Meanwhile, accused-appellant EMERLITO, together with Eduardo, Reynaldo, Fernando, and
Rudy, all surnamed Santos, was likewise charged with murder in an information, which was
later docketed as Criminal Case No. 15506-MN. The crime was allegedly committed as
follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1994, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
[Eduardo N. Santos @ Eddie, Reynaldo N. Santos @ Rey, Fernando N. Santos @ Dede,
Emerlito N. Santos @ Elmer, and Rudy N. Santos @ Budda], conspiring, confederating with
Regando P. Villonez and Ruel Santos who were already charged for the same crime under
Criminal Case No. 14943 and without any justifiable cause, with deliberate intent to kill, with
treachery taking advantage of superior strength and being armed with a [sic] bladed weapons,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one GERARDO
LONGASA on the different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical
injuries, which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only EMERLITO was arrested; his co-accused have remained at large.
Evidently, the killing involved in Criminal Case No. 14943-MN was the same as that in
Criminal Case No. 15506-MN. Hence, the second case was transferred from Branch 72 to
Branch 170 of the RTC of Malabon, Metro Manila, and was consolidated and jointly tried with
the first case pursuant to the Order of 22 March 1995.
At his arraignment, EMERLITO entered a plea of not guilty.
The witnesses for the prosecution were Edgar Jimenez and Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a MedicoLegal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation; and the witnesses for the defense were
the accused-appellants, as well as Arthur Aquino and Conrado Gungon.
Edgar Jimenez testified that on 3 May 1994, at around 9:00 p.m., while he was resting inside
his store at Hulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, a certain Tonton informed him that his close friend
GERARDO LONGASA had a fistfight with one Rudy, alias Dede, at Liwayway Street, Baritan,
Malabon. Edgar proceeded to the area to mediate, since LONGASA and Rudy were both his
friends. Edgar passed through Javier II Street in going to Liwayway Street. At Javier II Street,
a group of seven armed men, including accused-appellants, attacked Edgar. RUEL hit Edgar
on his forehead and back with a bottle. Edgar was able to escape from his attackers. While
fleeing, he ran past LONGASA, who seemed drunk. When Edgar called LONGASA, the
attackers were already upon LONGASA.
While he was about eight arms length away from LONGASA, Edgar saw EMERLITO hit
LONGASA with a 2 x 2 inches piece of wood. Simultaneously, REGANDO and RUEL struck
LONGASA with bottles. Rudy Santos and Eddie Santos then stabbed LONGASA seven and
eight times, respectively, even as two other persons named Rey and Budda held LONGASAs
arms. LONGASA fell to the ground. Edgar saw all these because the scene of the incident
was illuminated by a big fluorescent lamp located about three arms length away. Edgar rushed
to LONGASAs house and reported the incident to the latters parents.
Dr. Ronaldo Mendez conducted an autopsy on LONGASAs corpse. His findings are as
follows:
Abrasions: 1.0 x 0.6 cms., forehead, left side; 6.0 x 4.0 cms., zygomatic area, left; 3.6 x 1.1
cms., nasal area, right side; 4.0 x 2.0 cms., maxillary area, left; 2.0 x 0.6 cms., infranasal area,
left side; 0.5 x 0.4 cms., mandibular area, left side; 6.6 x 4.2 cms., left upper quadrant,
abdomen, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., anterior aspect, upper third, arm, left; 2.5 x 1.3 cms., left lumbar
area; 5.0 x 2.5 cms., elbow, left.
Contusions, purplish: 7.4 x 6.2 cms., anterior chest wall, left side; 4.4 x 2.3 cms., anterior
aspect, upper third, arm, right.

Lacerated wounds: 1.1 cms., supraorbital ridge, right; 1.2 cms., posterior aspect, upper third,
forearm, left.
Stab wounds:
1) 3 in number, sizes ranging from 0.5 to 1.6 cms., elliptical clean-cut edges, with one
extremity sharp and the other blunt, located at the anterior chest wall, left side, over an area of
15.0 cms., x 7.0 cms., the farthest is located 10.0 cms., from the anterior median line, while
the nearest is located 3.0 cms., from the anterior median line, directed backwards, upwards,
downwards and medially, involving the soft tissues, perforating the right ventricle and
penetrating the lower lobe of the left lung with an average depth of approximately 7.5 cms.
2) 1.4 cms., elliptical, clean cut edges, with sharp medial extremity and blunt lateral extremity,
located at the posterior chest wall, left side, 7.0 cms., from the posterior median line, directed
forwards, upwards and laterally, involving the soft tissues only with an approximate depth of
3.0 cms.
3) 1.5 cms., elliptical, clean-cut with sharp medial extremity and blunt lateral extremity, located
at the posterior chest wall, left side, 9.0 cms., from the posterior median line, directed
forwards, upwards and medially, involving the soft tissues, from the 6th intercostal space, into
the left thoracic cavity penetrating the upper lobe of the left lung with an approximate depth
5.0 cms.
4) 1.6 cms., elliptical, clean cut edges, with sharp lateral extremity and blunt medial extremity,
located at the anterior chest wall, right side, 3.0 cms., from the posterior median line, directed
forwards, upwards and medially, involving the soft tissue only with an approximate depth of
2.0 cms.
Hemopericardum, 230 cc.
Hemothorax, left, 1095 cc.
Other visceral organs, pale.
Stomach is almost empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
STAB WOUNDS.
Dr. Mendez explained that the abrasions were caused by hard, rough surface, possibly
cement or a piece of wood. The contusions and lacerations were caused by a blunt object,
which could have been a piece of wood, a bottle, a pipe, or any other hard object. The incise
wounds or stab wounds were caused by a sharp-bladed or sharp-edged instrument. Of the six
stab wounds suffered by LONGASA, stab wounds numbered 1 and 3 on LONGASAs chest
caused the latters death.
The testimony of LONGASAs mother was dispensed with after the State and the defense
agreed that Longasas family incurred P8,500 in funeral expenses.
REGANDO interposed alibi and denial. He claimed that on 3 May 1994, between 7:30 and
8:00 p.m., he was having a conversation with Arthur Aquino at the premises of RUELs house.
Someone passed by the house and reported a slaying incident at Javier II Street. Curious,
REGANDO and Aquino went to the scene of the incident and there found LONGASA lying in a
pool of his own blood. REGANDO recognized LONGASA because the latter was a barber at
REGANDOs neighborhood. He believed that the victim was already dead, since the latter did
not seem to be breathing. When policemen arrived, REGANDO moved away from the scene;
he did not want to be asked about the incident, as he knew nothing about it. On 7 May 1994,
he was arrested by Malabon policemen after Edgar Jimenez identified him as one of the
assailants. He opined that Edgar implicated him in the crime because they had an altercation

during a basketball game, which altercation could have erupted into a fistfight had they not
been pacified.
Arthur Aquino, REGANDOs gangmate, corroborated the latters testimony and declared that it
was impossible for REGANDO to have taken part in the killing, since he was with REGANDO
before and after the incident. When they arrived at Javier II, they saw many people, none of
whom were known to him. He asked the people milling around LONGASAs body who the killer
was, but no one could tell him.
RUEL, who was 16 years old at the time the crime in question was committed, also put up the
defense of alibi. According to him, when the incident was taking place he was at his
grandmothers house in Javier II changing clothes, for he had just taken a bath. He heard
screams from outside of the house reporting that a killing had occurred at the corner of Javier
II Street. Out of curiosity, he immediately went to the reported scene of the incident. There he
saw a bloodied body lying on the ground, which he later found to be LONGASAs cadaver.
RUEL was not questioned by the authorities during the investigation. However, on 7 May
1994, while he and co-accused REGANDO were watching television at his grandmothers
house, they were arrested by the police on the basis of Edgars information that they were
among LONGASAs assailants.
EMERLITO also relied on alibi for his defense. He declared that at the time of the incident he
was at Javier II to borrow P500 from his mother. On his way to his mothers place, someone
informed him that his brother Fernando Santos, alias Dede, was involved in a fight at
Liwayway Street. He rushed to the scene of the reported fight. There, he found his brother
being ganged up on by Edgar Jimenez and another person. EMERLITO grabbed Edgar and
boxed him, but the latter retaliated. They exchanged punches until Edgar ran towards a
nearby alley. EMERLITO gave chase but failed to catch Edgar, as the latter jumped into a
river. EMERLITO waited for Edgar to come up for air. After ten to fifteen minutes, EMERLITO
got impatient and went back to Liwayway Street. After seeing no one in the area, he went to
Javier II Street. Along the way he saw people running, and then someone shouted: Mang
Emer, iyong kapatid ninyo nakasaksak namatay (Mang Emer, your brother stabbed and killed
a man). Another person advised him not to proceed to the scene of the incident and to go
home instead. EMERLITO followed the advice. He did not take his brother to the authorities
because not one of his brothers was at home when he got there. Neither did he go to the
police to explain the incident, as he did not know much about it.
Conrado Gungon attempted to bolster EMERLITOs account by claiming that at the time of the
incident, he saw Fernando Santos and a certain Rey chasing LONGASA at Javier II. He
followed the three to a corner near General Luna Street. There he saw Fernando and Rey
stab LONGASA; after which the assailants ran towards General Luna Street. The two
attackers had no other companion. Conrado went home after the incident.
In its Joint Decision, the trial court found Jimenezs testimony to be credible and supportive of
the theory of conspiracy among the accused. It found the following circumstances to be more
than sufficient to prove that the accused-appellants and their co-accused had common design
to kill LONGASA and were united in its execution: (1) their simultaneous acts and concerted
effort in surrounding the victim; (2) all of them carried weapons, which they used against the
victim; (3) they took turns in disabling the victim with blows administered with a piece of wood
and bottles; (4) the victims arms were restrained when the death blows were inflicted; (6) none
of the accused-appellants tried to dissuade their companions from delivering fatal wounds on
the victim; as a matter of fact, they continued attacking the victim until the latter was already

down and gasping for breath; and (7) the number of wounds inflicted on the victim was a mute
testimony of the vengeful fury and brutality of the deadly attack upon him. Conspiracy having
been established, the act of one was the act of all.
The trial court ruled against the presence of treachery, since LONGASA was engaged in a
fight with the accused before the fatal attack and was, therefore, sufficiently warned of the
assault against him. However, it appreciated against the accused the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength because of the superior number of the
accused, most of whom were armed with weapons; while the victim was alone, with his arms
held behind him by two of the assailants.
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi for failure of accused-appellants to prove that they
were so far away from the scene of the crime as to be physically impossible for them to be
there when the crime was committed.
The trial court thus ruled that the crime committed was murder and decreed; thus:
WHEREFORE, all considered, the Court finds all the three (3) accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and sentences each of them as follows:
a) Accused REGANDO VILLONES y PASCASIO and EMERLITO N. SANTOS, there being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
b) Accused RUEL N. SANTOS, appreciating the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
in his favor, being 16 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Likewise, all the accused are hereby ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
GERARDO LONGASA in the amount of P8,500.00 as actual damages, and the additional sum
of P50,000.00, as civil indemnity for the death of the said victim, and the costs of suit.
Accused-appellants REGANDO, RUEL, and EMERLITO seasonably appealed to us.
In their Brief, accused-appellants REGANDO and EMERLITO, represented by the Public
Attorney's Office, contend that the trial court committed the following errors:
I
... IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE OTHERWISE
UNCORROBORATED, INCREDIBLE AND FABRICATED TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESS EDGARDO JIMENEZ.
II
IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT REGANDO VILLONES GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
III
IN FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
In his separate Brief, accused-appellant RUEL imputes upon the trial court the following
errors:
I.
IN NOT HOLDING THAT EDGAR JIMENEZ IS NOT COMPETENT TO TESTIFY ON THE
PARTICIPATION OF RUEL SANTOS CONSIDERING HE WAS NOT AN EYEWITNESS AND
HIS TESTIMONY IS, THEREFORE, HEARSAY.
II
IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED RUEL SANTOS WAS IN CONSPIRACY AMONG THE OTHER
ACCUSED IN THE KILLING OF GERARDO LONGASA.

III.
... IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF EMERLITO SANTOS.
IV.
IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF CONRADO GUNGON.
All accused-appellants attack the credibility of lone eyewitness Edgar Jimenez. REGANDO
and EMERLITO wonder why Edgar took a longer route through Javier II Street to get to
Liwayway Street instead of just crossing the bridge that separated Duhat from Liwayway
Street, which was shorter route. Another thing which they find illogical was Edgars failure to
shout for help and to do anything to save his friend LONGASA. As to Edgars testimony that he
was mauled by the accused, accused-appellants theorize that Edgar could have been a
participant in the rumble, which made him a biased and unreliable witness. Moreover, Edgar
could not have witnessed the crime, as he was then running away from the scene to escape
further injuries. Additionally, no one corroborated Edgars testimony; hence, it is self-serving.
RUEL claims that Edgar Jimenez committed inconsistencies on material points, especially on
who actually stabbed LONGASA and how many times he was so stabbed. Edgar was,
likewise, unable to make up his mind whether he was running away from the crime scene or
staying at a safe distance from the incident. RUEL finds illogical and incredible the story of
Edgar that accused attacked him when he was merely looking for LONGASA, and that while
Edgar was originally the target of the accuseds aggression, they inexplicably vented their ire
on LONGASA and allowed Edgar to witness everything and walk away untouched. RUEL also
stresses that the prosecution did not disprove EMERLITOs testimony that Edgar was in a river
near Liwayway Street while the incident was taking place; hence, he could not have witnessed
the crime. Besides, Edgars testimony was disproved by Gungon, who testified that Reynaldo
and Fernando Santos were the ones who stabbed LONGASA, and that the said assailants
had no other companions.
Accused-appellants insist on the credibility of the testimony of the defense witnesses. They
further claim that they were able to explain their whereabouts during the perpetration of the
offense, and that they had other witnesses to corroborate their respective versions.
Finally, accused-appellants assert that there is no sufficient proof of conspiracy. The short
interval between the attack on Edgar and the attack on LONGASA precluded the existence of
a preconceived plan among the accused to so assault LONGASA. Additionally, if there was
indeed conspiracy among the accused, all should have stabbed LONGASA, not just that some
of them hit the victim with bottles or a piece of wood.
In the Consolidated Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains
that the alleged lapses in Edgar Jimenezs testimony were duly explained and the alleged
inconsistencies were too trivial to impair his straightforward account of the crime. His failure to
help his friend while the latter was under attack was understandable considering that the
aggressors had the strength of number. At any rate, the trial court found Edgar credible. It is
well-settled that a trial courts assessment of a witnesss testimony is entitled to great respect
on appeal.
As to RUELs claim of lack of logic in the version of Edgar, the OSG argues that it is of judicial
knowledge that persons have been assaulted for no apparent reason whatsoever.
The OSG considers Gungons testimony undeserving of consideration. Gungon failed to
explain why he gave his account of the crime only on 1 August 1995 or fifteen months after

the incident in question. His long unexplained silence makes one suspicious of his motives;
hence his testimony is unworthy of belief.
Finally, the OSG agrees with the trial courts rejection of accused-appellants defense of alibi
and with the finding of conspiracy. It argues that there was no showing of physical impossibility
for the accused to be at the crime scene when the crime was committed; besides, they were
positively identified by Edgar Jimenez as among LONGASAs attackers. As to conspiracy, the
same can easily be deduced from the manner of the commission of the offense and from the
concerted acts of the accused to obtain a criminal objective.
As often happens in criminal cases on appeal, we are asked to disregard the testimony of a
prosecution witness for being incredible, and to give full credence to those of the defense and
decree accused-appellants acquittal. Among the discrepant accounts of the same incident, we
choose to believe the one certified by the trial judge to be credible, in this case, the testimony
of Edgar Jimenez. The judge had the distinct advantage of having personally heard the
testimonies of Edgar and the witnesses for the defense, and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial. It is settled that the trial judges findings on the credibility
of witnesses will not generally be disturbed unless said findings are arbitrary, or facts and
circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
by the trial judge which, if considered, would have affected the result of the case.
None of the exceptions have been shown to exist in the instant case.
Indeed, our perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Edgar Jimenez confirms his
trustworthiness. He told a consistent story throughout his two turns at the witness stand. He
corrected misimpressions by the trial judge and examining counsel, and he satisfactorily
explained the apparent lapses in his testimony. He was frank about his dark history as a drug
user who was once the subject of a criminal case in court. It must be noted that a criminal
record does not necessarily make one an incredible witness. Edgars honesty in revealing his
past without hesitation bolsters his credibility.
The inconsistencies between Edgars testimony and sworn statement given to the police were
likewise adequately explained. In any case, a sworn statement or affidavit, being taken ex
parte by a person other than the witness, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestion or for want of suggestions and inquiries. Omissions and
misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent, particularly under circumstances of hurry
and impatience. The infirmity of affidavits as a species of evidence is a matter of judicial
experience. As such, an affidavit taken ex-parte is generally considered to be inferior to
testimonies made in open court.
Furthermore, as the OSG correctly opined, the findings of medico-legal officer Dr. Ronaldo
Mendez served to corroborate Edgars testimony. LONGASAs injuries, recorded in Dr.
Mendezs report, reflected the severe beatings LONGASA suffered at the hands of the
accused as narrated by Edgar.
The bromidic defense of alibi cannot benefit accused-appellants. In the face of the positive
identification of the accused by Edgar, such defense is worth nothing.Besides, accusedappellants were unable to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime
scene at the time the crime was committed. On the contrary, REGANDO and RUEL admitted
that in just a short time they were able to get to the crime scene by walking. For his part,
EMERLITO acknowledged his involvement in a fight which preceded LONGASAs killing, and
he conceded that he was able to return to the crime scene, or near the crime scene, at or

about the time of the commission of the offense. The alibi which is sufficient to acquit an
accused of a criminal charge must be that which shows it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime.
As to the trial courts finding of conspiracy among the accused, we find the same to be
supported by evidence. For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there be an agreement
for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution. The agreement to commit a crime may be gleaned from the mode and manner of
the commission of the offense or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a joint
purpose or design, concerted action, and community of intent. In this case, the accused
simultaneously attacked LONGASA, with two of them holding the victims hands or arms.
Some struck LONGASA with a piece of wood or bottles and two others stabbed him. The
attack continued until LONGASA fell dead. These acts clearly point to a joint purpose to
accomplish the desired end.
However, we do not share the assessment of the trial court that there was no treachery in this
case because the victim had engaged in a fight previous to the killing and was thus
forewarned of an attack against him. Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim
was forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The overwhelming number of
the accused, their use of weapons against the unarmed victim, and the fact that the victims
hands were held behind him preclude the possibility of any defense by the victim.
The other qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which the trial court
appreciated, will no longer be taken against accused-appellants, for it is absorbed in
treachery.
The penalty for the murder is reclusion perpetua to death pursuant to Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance proved in favor of or against EMERLITO and REGANDO, the trial court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As to RUEL, who was only 16 years old when the offense in question was committed, the trial
court correctly appreciated in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law shall be imposed; in this case the penalty shall be reclusion temporal.
Again, there being no proof of any modifying circumstance, said penalty shall be imposed in
its medium period. Since RUEL is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
he shall be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty whose minimum shall be within the
range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal.
The penalty imposed upon him by the trial court, i.e., ten years of prision mayor as minimum
to seventeen years of reclusion temporal as maximum, is therefore correct.
The awards of P50,000 as indemnity for the death of LONGASA and of actual damages of
P8,500 are in conformity with current case law and with the agreement of the parties,
respectively.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM the challenged Joint Decision of 23
November 1995 of Branch 170 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 14943-MN and 15506-MN convicting accused-appellants REGANDO P.
VILLONES, EMERLITO N. SANTOS, and RUEL L. SANTOS of the crime of murder and
sentencing the first two accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the third

accused, to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to

seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and ordering all accused-appellants
to pay the heirs of the victim GERARDO LONGASA P50,000 as death indemnity and P8,500
as actual damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing JJ., concur.
[1] His surname is alternately spelled Villones and Villonez in the various issuances by the
lower court and the transcripts of stenographic notes but Villonez in the Information in Criminal
Case No. 14943-MN (Original Record [OR], Criminal Case No. 14943-MN, 1) and the Joint
Decision (id., 331-341). However, he signed his name as R. Billones in his motion for
reinvestigation (id., 7-8) and notice of appeal (id., 347).
[2] He is referred to as Ruel in all the pleadings; however, in his certificate of live birth (id.,
117), his first name is spelled Rowell.
[3] OR, Criminal Case No. 14943-MN, 331-341, Rollo, 21-31. Per Judge Benjamin T. Antonio.
Henceforth, all references to the original record are to that in Criminal Case No. 14943-MN,
unless otherwise specified.
[4] Id., 1.
[5] OR, 25.
[6] Id., Criminal Case No. 15506, 1.
[7] Or, 7.
[8] Id., 16.
[9] Witnesses for the defense, however, stated that Dede Santos was the alias of Fernando
Santos (TSN, 18 July 1995, 3; TSN, 1 August 1995, 4).
[10] TSN, 8 November 1994, 2-13; TSN, 10 November 1994, 2-5, 9-15.
[11] Id., 5-17.
[12] OR, 70.
[13] TSN, 24 November 1994, 5-12.
[14] Id., 12-13.
[15] TSN, 6 February 1995, 2-15.
[16] TSN, 9 February 1995, 2-7.
[17] TSN, 13 February 1995, 3-15.
[18] TSN, 18 July 1995, 2-10.
[19] TSN, 1 August 1995, 2-5.
[20] Supra note 3.
[21] OR, 346, 347.
[22] Citing People v. Ilaoa, 233 SCRA 231 [1994].
[23] Citing People v. Ompad, 233 SCRA 62 [1994].
[24] Citing People v. Silong, 232 SCRA 487 [1994].
[25] People v. Leoterio, 264 SCRA 608, 617 [1996]; People v. Balamban, 264 SCRA 619, 629
[1996].
[26] See Sec. 20, par. 2, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[27] People v. Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733, 742-743 [1995]; People v. Bayani, 262 SCRA 660,
680 [1996].

[28] People v. Alshaika, 261 SCRA 637, 646 [1996]; People v. De Guzman, 265 SCRA 228,
245 [1996].
[29] People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, 214 [1996]; People v. Balamban, supra note 25, at
631.
[30] People v. Sequio, 264 SCRA 79, 101-102 [1996]; People v. Tabag, 268 SCRA 115, 127
[1997].
[31] People v. Landicho, 258 SCRA 1, 28 [1996]; People vs. Tobias, 267 SCRA 229, 255-256
[1997].
[32] People v. De Leon, 248 SCRA 609, 624 [1995]; People v. Landicho, supra note 31, at 29.
[33] Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.
[34] Art. 61, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.
[35] Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 169246
January 26, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS GUZMAN y BOCBOSILA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Man is subject to innumerable pains and sorrows by the very condition of humanity, and yet,
as if nature had not sown evils enough in life, we are adding grief to grief and aggravating the
common calamity by our cruel treatment of one another. Joseph Addison.
The passage depicts the tragic fate of the deceased victim in the case at bar. His ultimate
dream was to become a pilot so that he would have enough money to shoulder the schooling
and education expenses of his younger siblings. Sadly, however, this dream will never
become a reality as his young life was brutally snuffed out by certain violent individuals. He
was a minor at the time of his death. Now his family is seeking justice for his untimely and
senseless killing.
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00095, dated 28
February 2005,1 affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. Q-99-88737, dated 12 November 2001, 2 finding
accused-appellant Nicolas Guzman y Bocbosila guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay

the heirs of Michael Balber (Michael) the amount of P35,470.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On 29 November 1999, appellant was charged in an Information 3 with Murder allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of November 1999 in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating with two other persons, whose true
names/identities and whereabouts are still unknown, and mutually helping one another with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
MICHAEL ANGELO BALBER Y CASTILLON, a minor, 17 years of age, by then and there
stabbing him on the trunk with the use of a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon him serious
and grave wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of Michael Angelo Balber y Castillon.
When arraigned on 21 January 2000,4 appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge therein.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
In building its case against appellant, the prosecution relied on the testimonies of its
witnesses, namely: Ronald Santiago (Ronald), Edgardo Bauto (Edgardo), Danilo Balber
(Danilo), Police Inspector Alberto Malaza (Inspector Malaza), SPO3 Samuel Quinto (SPO3
Quinto), and Dr. Francisco Supe, Jr. (Dr. Supe). Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
Ronald is a jeepney driver and resident of Barangay Commonwealth, Quezon City. He
testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he stopped by and ate at a
carinderia located at the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth,
Quezon City. After eating, he sat on a bench just beside the carinderia and rested. He noticed
appellant and two other persons having a drinking spree in a nearby grocery store. He also
saw Michael walking towards the direction of the same grocery store. When Michael was
passing in front of the grocery store, appellant and his two companions suddenly approached
and surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the back of Michael while his two
companions stood in front of Michael. Suddenly, they grabbed the shoulders of Michael and
overpowered the latter. One of appellants companions, whom he described as a male with
long hair, drew out a knife and repeatedly stabbed Michael at the stomach. Afterwards, the
appellants other companion, whom he described as a male with flat top hair, took the knife
from the companion with long hair, and also stabbed Michael at the stomach. Later, appellant
went in front of Michael, took the knife from the companion with flat top hair, and likewise
stabbed Michael at the stomach. Appellant also kicked Michael when the latter was already
lying on the ground. He witnessed this stabbing incident at a distance of five arms length. 5
Afraid and confused, he immediately went home. The next day, however, he went to the house
of Michaels family and narrated the incident to Michaels father, Danilo. Subsequently, he was
accompanied by Danilo to the Batasan Hills Police Station 6 where he gave a statement about
the incident.6
Edgardo Bauto (Edgardo) is also a tricycle driver and resident of Brgy. Commonwealth,
Quezon City. He narrated that on 25 November 1999, at around 9:00 in the evening, he was
standing at the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon
City, when he heard a female voice shouting "Sinasaksak!" When he glanced at the direction
of the said shouts, he saw, at a distance of about five arms length, appellant and the latters
two companions taking turns in stabbing Michael. One of the appellants companions, whom
he described as a toothless male with a long hair, was the first one to stab Michael.

Afterwards, the appellants other companion, whom he described as a male with flat top hair,
took the knife from the toothless male with a long hair and stabbed Michael. Subsequently,
appellant also took the knife from his companion with flat top hair and stabbed Michael too. 7
Thereafter, he immediately ran and proceeded to the house of Michaels family and informed
Michaels parents about the incident. Michaels parents rushed to the crime scene and took
Michael to a hospital. The next day, he was accompanied by Danilo and a certain Ramiro
Alfaro to Batasan Hills Police Station 6 where he gave a statement about the incident. 8
Danilo, Michaels father, testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he
was walking on his way home along the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy.
Commonwealth, Quezon City, when he saw Michael lying along Sto. Nino Street. He also saw
appellant and the latters two male companions near Michaels body. When he was about to
approach them, they immediately ran away. He chased and threw stones at them. Appellant
and his two companions proceeded to the formers house and locked the door. He tried to
follow them all the way to the house but appellants relatives blocked his way to the door and
told him to leave. Thereafter, he went back to Michael and took the latter to Fairview Hospital. 9
He was later informed by the doctors that Michael was already dead.
The next day, he went to Batasan Hills Police Station 6 and gave a statement about the
incident. In an effort to settle the instant case, appellants wife and daughter told Danilo that
they would sell a bus which they owned and would turn over to him the proceeds thereof. He
also stated that Michael wanted to become a pilot so that, as the eldest of the children, he
would be the one to shoulder the education of his siblings. 10
Inspector Malaza is a member of the police force assigned at Police Community Precinct No.
1, Batasan Hills, Quezon City. He testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the
evening, he was on his way home on board his owner type jeep. Upon reaching the corner of
Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, he noticed a
commotion nearby. He slowed down his vehicle and saw, at a distance of five to ten meters,
appellant stabbing and kicking Michael. He also noticed that the appellants two companions
were armed with bladed weapons. He alighted from his vehicle and approached appellant and
his two companions. After introducing himself as a police officer, appellant and his two
companions scampered away. He ran after them but caught only appellant. The two other
companions of the appellant successfully escaped. Thereafter, he handcuffed appellant and
brought him to Batasan Hills Police Station 6. He turned him over to a police investigator
therein and executed an affidavit of arrest.11
SPO3 Quinto is a police investigator at the Batasan Hills Police Station 6. He was the one
who investigated the incident. After the incident was reported to his station on 26 November
1999, he immediately went to the crime scene upon the advice of the desk officer. Since
Michael was already brought to Fairview Hospital at that time, he proceeded thereto. Upon
arriving at the Fairview Hospital, he was informed that Michael was already dead. He then
went back to the station and took the statements of the prosecution witnesses. 12
Dr. Supe is a medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
He conducted the post mortem examination on Michaels body. His testimony evolved on the
matters stated in the Medico-Legal Report No. M-3112-99, 13 viz:
"POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity at the
dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae are pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic.

Needle puncture mark is noted on the dorsum of the right hand. There is fungal infection
covering the entire groin and extending to the buttocks.
"HEAD AND NECK:
1.) Abrasion, left superior orbital region, measuring 0.2 x 0.7 cm, 3.7 cm, from the anterior
midline.
2.) Lacerated wound, left lateral orbital region, measuring 0.5 x 0.8 cm, 5 cm from the anterior
midline.
3.) Abrasion, right inferior orbital region, measuring 0.6 x 2 cm, 1 cm from the anterior midline.
"CHEST AND ABDOMEN:
1.) Abrasion, left inferior or mammary region, measuring 0.5 x 8.5 cm. along the anterior
midline.
2.) Stab wound, thru and thru, point of entry, left coastal region, measuring 1 x 4 cm, 8 cm
from the anterior midline, directed posteriorwards and medialwards making a point of exit at
the left inferior mammary region, measuring 0.7 x 2.5 cm, 5 cm from the anterior midline,
superficial.
3.) Stab wound, left subcostal region, measuring 0.7 x 2.3 cm, 14.2 cm from the anterior
midline, 9 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, slightly upwards and medialwards, lacerating the
mesentery, small intestine, left hemidiaphragm.
4.) Lacerated wound, thru and thru, point of entry, left inferior clavicular region, measuring 2 x
7 cm, 4.5 cm from the posterior midline, extending to the right inferior clavicular region and
making a point of exit thereat, measuring 1 x 3 cm, superficial.
5.) Two and a half liters of blood and blood clots were evacuated from the abdominal cavity.
6.) The stomach is 250 ml full of billous fluid.
"Extremity:
1.) Lacerated wound, distal third of the right arm, measuring 0.4 x 1 cm, 2.5 cm lateral to its
anterior midline.
"CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is hemorrhage and shock secondary to multiple stab wounds of the trunk." 14
On the other hand, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant and Antonio
Sulficiencia (Antonio) to disprove the foregoing charges.
Appellant testified that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he was inside his
store located at No. 886 Mactan St. Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City, when he heard
shouts outside. He peeped through the window of his store and saw Danilo and Ronald pulling
out a certain Jesus de Guzman (Jesus) from the latters tricycle. Danilo and Ronald punched
Jesus but the latter retaliated. Thereafter, a rumble ensued. At the height of the brawl, he
shouted Hoy! ano ba yan? Tama na yan! Itigil na ninyo yan! Awatin na ninyo yan." Minutes
later, Michael passed by his store and inquired as to what was happening. He told Michael
"Yung tatay mo at si Santiago (Ronald) pinagtulungan si Rommel." Michael rushed to Danilo
and pacified the latter. Edgardo, one of the participants therein, threw stones at Michael. At
this point, a certain Lemuel Grans Querubin (Lemuel) arrived and tried to join the fracas.
Michael, however, blocked Lemuels way. The two wrestled and both of them fell to the
ground. Moments later, Lemuel stood up. Lemuel was holding a knife and his hands were
bloodied. Michael, on the other hand, was still lying on the ground. Lemuel then chased Danilo
and Ronald but the two were able to escape. Afterwards, Danilo, Ronald and five other
persons returned to the scene. Danilo was carrying a big bolo while the others were armed

with stones and lead pipe. Lemuel and Jesus ran towards the direction of Sto. Nino in order to
escape.15
Appellant went outside his house to observe the situation. Five minutes later, the group of
Danilo, together with two policemen, proceeded to appellants house. The policemen forcibly
entered appellants house and pushed the latter against the wall. They inquired as to the
whereabouts of Lemuel and Jesus, who happened to be appellants bus conductor and driver,
respectively. When they could not find the two, the policemen invited him to the police station.
Appellant told them "Bakit ninyo ako dadalhin? wala naman akong kinalaman diyan." From
then on, the policemen held appellant in custody.16
Antonio was a former bus driver of appellant and a resident of Paranaque City. He narrated
that on 25 November 1999, at about 9:00 in the evening, he parked a bus owned by
appellants cousin named Juanito Palmares (Juanito) just beside the appellants store. He
went to appellants store and conversed with the latter who was inside the same store.
Thereafter, he saw a rumble nearby. He ran and hid inside the parked bus while appellant
stayed inside his store. Later, the participants of the rumble began to stone them. He alighted
from the bus and went inside Juanitos house. He noticed that appellant was still inside the
store. Subsequently, he saw Lemuel running and carrying a knife. He also heard Lemuel
saying "Tapos na ang laban, manahimik na kayo." Thereupon, he saw appellant being
apprehended by policemen in civilian clothes.17
On 12 November 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of murder. 18 It
sustained the "clear, direct and positive" testimony of the prosecution witnesses who all
declared that they saw appellant stab Michael. It found no ill-motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses in testifying against appellant. It also ruled that there was treachery in
the killing of Michael since the latter was unarmed, unsuspecting and very young at the time of
the attack. In ending, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused Nicolas Guzman Y Bocbosila guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. Accordingly, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and further ordered to pay the
heirs of the late Michael Angelo Balber the sum of Thirty-Five Thousand Four hundred
Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), Philippine Currency, as actual damages, excluding the Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) Bagbag Cemetery as there was no evidence to justify the award
of the same; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), as moral damages and the additional civil
indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 26 November 2001. 19 On 28 February 2005, the Court
Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision. 20 The
modification pertains only to the penalty imposed by the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, in Criminal
Case No. Q-99-88737 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects except that the sentence be
RECLUSION PERPETUA only.
On automatic review before us, appellant assigned the following errors of the lower court:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE [DOUBT] OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE PALPABLE
DISCREPANCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE

EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO
PRODUCE SUBSTITUTE OR ADDITIONAL WITNESSES FOR HIS DEFENSE.
IV.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR
THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.21
Anent the first issue, appellant claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should
not be given any weight as the same are filled with discrepancies and inconsistencies.
According to him, Ronald and Edgardo testified that appellant and his two companions used
only one knife in stabbing Michael. Inspector Malaza, however, declared that appellant and his
two companions were armed with separate knives during the stabbing incident. He also avers
that Inspector Malaza gave contradicting versions of how the latter apprehended him after the
incident. Further, Edgardo testified that after the incident, he immediately went to the house of
Michael and informed Danilo of what he witnessed. Danilo, however, declared that while he
was on his way home, he saw Michael lying at the corner of Sto. Nino St. and Mactan St.,
and, that the malefactors were running away.
Appellants contention is bereft of merit.
A witness testifying about the same nerve-wracking incident can hardly be expected to be
correct in every detail and consistent with other witnesses in every respect, considering the
inevitability of differences in perception, recollection, viewpoint, or impressions, as well as in
their physical, mental, emotional, and psychological states at the time of the reception and
recall of such impressions.22 Thus, we have followed the rule in accord with human nature and
experience that honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen, rather
than destroy the credibility of a witness, especially of witnesses to crimes shocking to
conscience and numbing to senses.23
The inconsistencies cited by appellant refer to minor and unimportant details which do not
adversely affect the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Although the testimony of Ronald
and Edgardo as to the number of knives used in the stabbing incident differs with that of
Inspector Malaza, all of them declared under oath during the trial that appellant stabbed
Michael.
Thus, as aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, such inconsistency should not be considered as
a "fatal error," since what is important and decisive is that they had seen appellant stab
Michael and that they testified on the fact during the trial.
Besides, their testimonies on material and relevant points are substantially consistent with
each other. They testified that three persons, among whom was the appellant, had stabbed
Michael. Their descriptions of the faces, physical attributes, and respective positions of
appellant and his two companions during the attack are compatible. They also stated that
appellant was the last person who stabbed Michael.
As regards the alleged inconsistent testimony of Inspector Malaza as to how the latter
apprehended the appellant, it should be borne in mind that the weight of the eyewitness
account should be on the fact that the witness saw the accused commit the crime and was
positive of the latters physical identification.24 Inspector Malaza had seen appellant stab
Michael, and, in fact, apprehended him right after the incident. Hence, the details on the

manner by which Inspector Malaza apprehended the appellant would be immaterial and
irrelevant.
Appellant asserts that the testimony of Danilo runs counter to the testimony of the other
prosecution witnesses. Even if we were to disregard as evidence for the prosecution the
testimony of Danilo, the categorical and credible testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses are sufficient to support the finding of guilt on the part of appellant. It should be
emphasized that the testimony of one eyewitness would be enough to support a conviction
provided it is positive, credible, clear and straightforward. 25
Apropos the second issue, appellant denied any liability and invoked alibi. He argued that he
was inside his store when the stabbing incident occurred, and, that it was Lemuel who
stabbed Michael. He also presented Antonio to corroborate his testimony.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it is physically impossible for him
to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 26 If
appellant was, as he claimed, inside his store at the time of the incident, then it was not
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or in its immediate vicinity. His store is
located just beside Mactan Street,27 and that he witnessed the incident at a distance of merely
five arms length from his store.28 Therefore, his defense of alibi must fail.
Antonio testified that he and appellant, who was inside his store, were having a conversation
when the incident occurred. A perusal of the records, however, shows that appellant did not
mention anything about such conversation. In fact, appellant did not even mention the name
of Antonio in his entire testimony. Given the foregoing, the testimony of Antonio cannot be
considered as credible.
In arguing the third issue, appellant avers that his constitutional rights to produce evidence on
his behalf and to due process were violated when the trial court denied the motion of his
counsel to present substitute witnesses.
In the Pre-Trial Order of the RTC dated 29 February 2000, the defense named only four
witnesses, to wit: Antonio, Lizardo Dedase, Eduardo Bidia, and accused himself. 29 In the same
order, the RTC stated the following:
All parties are informed that witnesses and documents which were not mentioned in this pretrial order shall not be entertained during the trial on the merits. 30
During the trial, only appellant and Antonio were able to testify. When the two other witnesses
in the pre-trial order, namely, Lizardo Dedase and Eduardo Bidia, failed to appear and testify
in court several times, the defense counsel moved to substitute them explaining that they
were hesitant to testify, and, that one of them went home to his province. 31
The RTC was correct in denying the defense counsels motion for substitution of witnesses
since Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that the
matters agreed upon in the pre-trial conference and as stated in the pre-trial order shall bind
the parties, to wit:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting
the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the
parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the
trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice (Italics supplied).
The pre-trial order of the RTC dated 29 February 2000 clearly shows that the defense named
only four witnesses. The parties were also informed therein that witnesses who were not
mentioned in the pre-trial order will not be entertained during the trial on the merits. Thus,

pursuant to the afore-stated provision and its purpose of preventing undue delay in the
disposition of criminal cases and ensuring fair trial, the denial of the defense counsels motion
for substitution of witnesses is justified. Moreover, if appellants motion for substitution of
witnesses is given due course, it will amount to an unreasonable disregard of solemn
agreements submitted to and approved by the court of justice and would make a mockery of
the judicial process.
This is not to say, however, that such provision is absolute. It can be relaxed in the greater
interest of justice. Nevertheless, the exception does not apply in favor of appellant as the RTC
had observed that his motion for substitution of witnesses appears to be a "fishing expedition"
of evidence which is clearly unfair to the case of the prosecution. 32 Moreover, as aptly stated
by the Solicitor General, if the two other witnesses of appellant were indeed afraid or hesitant
to testify, he should have moved the RTC to subpoena the said witnesses to testify in court 33
pursuant to his constitutional right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of his
witnesses.34 Unfortunately, appellant did not avail himself of this remedy.
As to the fourth issue, appellant contends that even if he were held liable for the death of
Michael, there was no treachery which will qualify the killing as murder. According to him,
there is no evidence to show that appellant and his two companions had deliberately and
consciously adopted their mode of attack to ensure its execution without risk to themselves.
The stabbing incident occurred in a place that was properly lighted. There were many people
in the area then walking in different directions. He claims that if he and his two companions
wanted to ensure that no risk would come to them, then they could have chosen another time
and place to attack Michael.
Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the circumstances that renders the victim
unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the
attack.35 It is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder.
Article 14, paragraph (16) of the Revised Penal Code states the concept and essential
elements of treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus:
ART. 14. The following are aggravating circumstances:
xxxx
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
of the crimes against the person, employing
Associate Justice
means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, two essential elements/conditions are required in order
that treachery may be appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner of
execution that would ensure the offenders safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the
offended party, who has, thus no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; (2) deliberate or
conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution. Further, it must always be
alleged in the information and proved in trial in order that it may be validly considered. 36
In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant. 37 Moreover, all
the essential elements/conditions of treachery were established and proven during the trial.
After attending a worship service at the Iglesia ni Kristo church in his barangay, Michael
proceeded home. While Michael was casually walking along the corner of Sto. Nino Street
and Mactan Street, appellant and his two companions, who were drinking nearby, suddenly

approached and surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the back of Michael
while his two companions stood in front of Michael. In an instant, they grabbed the shoulders
of Michael and overpowered the latter. One of the appellants companions, whom the
prosecution witnesses described as a male with long hair, drew out a knife and repeatedly
stabbed Michael on the stomach. Unsatisfied, the appellants other companion, whom the
prosecution witnesses described as a male with flat top hair, took the knife and stabbed
Michael on the stomach. As the finale, appellant went in front of Michael, took the knife and
also stabbed Michael on the stomach. When Michael fell on the ground, appellant kicked him
at the body. Upon noticing that the bloodied Michael was no longer moving, appellant and his
two companions fled the scene.
As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of appellant
and his two companions rendered Michael defenseless, vulnerable and without means of
escape. It appears that Michael was unarmed and alone at the time of the attack. Further, he
was merely seventeen years of age then.38 In such a helpless situation, it was absolutely
impossible for Michael to escape or to defend himself against the assault of appellant and his
two companions. Being young and weak, Michael is certainly no match against adult persons
like appellant and his two companions. Michael was also outnumbered since he had three
assailants, and, was unarmed when he was stabbed to death. Appellant and his two
companions took advantage of their size, number, and weapon in killing Michael. They also
deliberately adopted means and methods in exacting the cruel death of Michael by first
surrounding him, then grabbing his shoulders and overpowering him. Afterwards, each of
them repeatedly stabbed Michael with a knife at the stomach until the latter fell lifeless to the
ground. The stab wounds sustained by Michael proved to be fatal as they severely damaged
the latters large intestine.39
The fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many people were
walking then in different directions does not negate treachery. It should be made clear that the
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without
the slightest provocation on his part.40 This is even more true if the assailant is an adult and
the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected
to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists. 41
As we earlier found, Michael was peacefully
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
walking and not provoking anyone to a fight
Asscociate Justice
when
he was stabbed to death by appellant and his two companions. Further, Michael was a minor
at the time of his death while appellant and his two companions were adult persons.
With regard to the allegation in the Information that the killing of Michael was attended by an
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were
correct in disregarding the same against appellant. The essence of evident premeditation as
an aggravating circumstance is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.42 It implies a deliberate planning of the crime
before executing it. It must also be shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what
time elapsed before it was carried out.43 Further, there must be proof that the accused
meditated and reflected on his intention between the time when the crime was conceived by
him and the time it was actually perpetrated.44 In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show
that appellant and his two companions had previously planned and reflected in killing Michael.

When appellant and his two companions saw Michael on that fateful night, they immediately
pounced on him. The thought of killing Michael came into the minds of appellant and his two
companions only when they saw Michael walking on the road. Indeed, the killing of Michael
was sudden and unplanned.
On another point, we agree with the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code states that murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63 of the same Code provides that if the penalty is composed of two indivisible
penalties, as in the instant case, and there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Since there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the
present case, and, treachery cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance as it was
already taken as a qualifying circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed. As regards the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals, we rule that the sum of
P35,470.00 as actual damages should be reduced to P25,670.00 since the receipts on record
amounts only to P25,670.00.45 It is well-settled that only expenses supported by receipts will
be allowed for actual damages.46 Furthermore, exemplary damages should also be awarded
to the heirs of Michael since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established by
the prosecution.47 If a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying
or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of
the New Civil Code.48 This kind of damage is intended to serve as a deterrent to serious
wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured person or punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. 49lawphil.net
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00095 dated
28 February 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, for which, he is accordingly sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of
Michael P25,670.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for Michaels death; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ATTE STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E RT I F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza with Associate Justices Romeo A.
Brawner and Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-15.
2
Penned by Judge Elsa I. De Guzman; CA rollo, pp. 29-40.
3
CA rollo, p. 13.
4
Records, pp. 14-15.
5
TSN, 3 August 2000, pp. 2-11.
6
Id. at 8-11.
7
TSN, 15 August 2000, pp. 2-4.
8
Id. at 4-6.
9
TSN, 21 November 2000, pp. 2-7.
10
Id. at 8-16.
11
TSN, 4 December 2000, pp. 17-23.
12
TSN, 12 February 2001, pp. 2-5.
13
TSN, 14 February 2001, pp. 2-16.
14
Records, pp. 172-172-A.
15
TSN, 28 May 2001, pp. 2-15.
16
Id. at 15-20.
17
Id. at 2-12.
18
Supra note 2 at 39.
19
Records, p. 161.
20
Supra note 1 at 14.
21
CA rollo, pp. 63-64.
22
People v. Pateo, G.R. No. 156786, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 609, 615.
23
People v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 157669, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 673, 681-682.
24
People v. Alicnas, G.R. No. 142855, 17 March 2004, 425 SCRA 627, 641.
25
People v. Jubail, G.R. No. 143718, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 478, 495.
26
People v. Abes, G.R. No. 138937, 20 January 2004, 420 SCRA 259, 274.
27
TSN, 28 May 2001, p. 7.
28
Id. at 8.
29
Records, pp. 18-19.
30
Id.
31
TSN, 29 September 2001, p. 4.
32
Supra note 29.
33
CA rollo, p. 110.
34
Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
35
People v. Santos, G.R. No. 127492, 16 January 2004, 420 SCRA 37, 49.
36
Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
37
Supra note 3.
38
Records, p. 164 (Exh. C).
39
Supra notes 13 and 14.
40
People v. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 655, 674.
41
Id.
42
People v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 620, 643.
43
People v. Penones, G.R. No. 71153, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 624, 635.

44

People v. Lacao, No. L-32078, 30 September 1974, 60 SCRA 89, 95.

Records, pp. 165-A (Exh. E) and 166 (Exh. F).
46
People v. Medina, G.R. No. 155256, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 610, 623.
47
People v. Manambay, G.R. No. 130684, 5 February 2004, 422 SCRA 73, 90.
48
People v. Simon, G.R. No. 130531, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 330, 356.
49
People v. Orilla, GR. Nos. 148939-40, 13 February 2004, 422 SCRA 620, 643.
45

*Insert

(People v.
Torriefel
45 OG 803)
here.*

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA,
JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA,
defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for plaintiffappellee.
Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota, Paraiso, Garcia and
Dueas for defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose.
Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant Edgardo P. Aquino.
Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-appellant Rogelio S. Canial.
PER CURIAM:
The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows:
The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR. Alias
"BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA
alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y ROMERO and
JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
lewd design, forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant against her will, and did, then and
there take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City,
where each of the four (4) accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a
deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will, to
her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of
the civil code.
That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y
ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the execution of the offense either by forcing,
inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating in its execution by an indispensable
act, did, then and there cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the principal accused in
sequestering the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then
under the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie
Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense.
That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances:
1. Use of a motor vehicle.
2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its
discovery difficult;
3. Abuse of superior strength;
4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added ignominy to the
natural effects of the act; and
5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing
other wrong not necessary for the commission.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the abovequoted amended complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the court reserved
judgment "until such time as the prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its
evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances listed in the complaint." Upon the other
hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on their respective pleas of not guilty. After the
merits, the court below rendered its decision on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Caal, Eduardo Aquino and
Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape
as described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences
each of them to the death penalty to be executed at a date to be set and in the manner
provided for by law; and each to indemnify the complainant in the amount of ten thousand
pesos. On the ground that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against
the accomplices Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y
Envoltario, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case
dismissed against the aforementioned accused.
Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by pointing
to it from the window of the courtroom and pictures of which were submitted and marked as
Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and which Jaime Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to him,
pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires the confiscation and forfeiture
of the proceeds or instruments of the crime, the Court hereby orders its confiscation.
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo
Aquino, and Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio Caal. However, for
practical purposes all of them shall hereafter be referred to as appellants.
The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years
old and single; she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the
secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was
receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her work to perform in radio broadcasts and
television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per month in permanent shows, P300.00 per
month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in
other shows.
So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva,
homeward bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam
car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was
at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She was already near her destination when
a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard (later identified as the four
appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid
a collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she
was already in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda,
Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This
prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda
stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car
continuously. Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the
lady's left arm. The girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her
maid, started to scream. Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who

succeeded in pulling her out of her car. Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped
out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's
grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car,
whose motor was all the while running.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the
three men inside started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two
others held her arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car.
Before she was completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away
in the direction of Broadway Street. The maid was left behind.
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat;
Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Caal was seated beside him. Miss De la
Riva entreated the appellants to release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive
and impolite language that the appellants and threats that the appellants would finish her with
their Thompson and throw acid at her face if she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two
men seated on each side of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one
arm around the complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms on
her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously implored her
captors to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family and that
her mother was alone at home and needed her company because her father was already
dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the
situation was much better than he thought since no one could take revenge against them. By
now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She made the sign of
the cross and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and
then Aquino would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would
exchange knowing glances with Caal and Jose.
The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards
Victoria Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw
Boulevard, thence to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino
took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva.
The latter was told not to shout or else she would be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not
long after, the car came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was
led out of the car to one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was removed. She
saw Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Caal sitting beside her, all of
them smiling meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The
other three expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant
ignored the command. One of the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the
complainant would not be ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said
that it would be more pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to
remove her stocking in order, according to them, to make the proceedings more exciting.
Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned task that the
appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid. They started
pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her dress; another
unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress to prevent it from being pulled down,
but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her brassiere, fell on the floor.

The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front
of her and feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes,
during which the complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around.
Then Pineda picked up her clothes and left the room with his other companions. The
complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to cover herself, but she could not find one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was
sitting on the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends
to release her. Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the
bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and because the complainant
was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her several times on the stomach and
other parts of the body. The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to
force them open. Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left
the room.
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between
him and Miss De la Riva during which he hit, her on different parts of the body. Like Jose,
Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino
called the others into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped her to revive her.
Afterwards, three of the accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the complainant After some
struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the
latter. When the complainant went into a state of shock for the second time, the three other
men went into the room again poured water on the complainant's face and slapped her
several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she would know
what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant
Canal's turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three
appellants before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and succeeded in
forcing his carnal lust on her.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four
appellants was struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside the room, just
behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give in because she
could not, after all, escape what with their presence.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her
clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her
hair, to give the impression that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother
that she was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group found out
that she was a movie actress, she was released without being harmed. She was warned not
to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and
later hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la
Riva again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be
carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it
in that position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by others.
Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva.
They finally decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant
had just come from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but to choose
one which did not come from a well-known company. Jose did as requested, letting several
taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la Riva not

to inform anyone of what had happened to her, appellant Canal accompanied her to the
taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already inside the
cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking
the driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative.
It was 6:30 o'clock or some two hours after the abduction when Miss De la Riva reached
home. Her mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and
reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and
said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." The mother brought
her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath
and a douche. The older woman also instructed her daughter to douche himself two or three
times daily with a strong solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who
was afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for external physical injuries. The doctor
was not, however, told about the sexual assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police
officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence when
the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva
arrived home from her harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben
Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation until she could be ready for it. At that time,
mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do.
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what steps, if
any, should be taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities
had to be informed. Thus, early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the
incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some
members of the family, went to the Quezon City Police Department Headquarters, filed a
complaint and executed a statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave
descriptions of the four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the
complainant submitted herself ito a medico-internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI
Chief Medico-Legal Officer.
During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat.
Pascual was also at the NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the police
headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the
complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified
appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of
Quezon City as one of the four men he abducted and raped her. She executed another
statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a formal identification of Jose and related the role
played by him.
At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I")
before Pat. Marcos G. Vias. In his statement, which was duly sworn. Jose admitted that he
knew about, and was involved in, the June 26 incident. He named the other line appellants as
his companions. Jose stated, among other things, that upon the initiative of Pineda, he and
the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave
chase to the complainant's car; that it was Pineda who blindfolded her and that only Pineda
and Aquino criminally assaulted the complainant.
After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture of
appellant Edgardo Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her
sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the man in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists.

The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified
the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities:
Pineda and Caal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province of
Batangas. On the evening of July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Caal as
among the four persons who abducted and raped her. She picked them out from among
several person in the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening,
Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. B-2)wherein she made the same
identification of the two appellants from among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief of
the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Caal had tattoo marks on his right hip. After the
identification, one of the policemen took appellant Caal downstairs and undressed him, and
he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."
Appellant Caal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their
arrest. In his statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Caal confirmed the information previously given
by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio,
and that they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Caal admitted that all four of
them participated in the commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar as
he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release
her. Pineda executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three companions
wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made plans
to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car and snatched her
and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that the complainant
voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him.
In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and
bruises on different parts of the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries. On the
witness stand the doctor was shown several photographs of the complainant taken in his
presence and under his supervision. With the aid of the photographs and the medical reports,
the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions or bruises on the complainant's
chest, shoulders, arms and fore-arms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He
also declared that when he was examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight
tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sites of the extragenital
physical injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness
on the part of the subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused blows
administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the
subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that they could have been
sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination, the doctor
declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which could have been produced by
sexual intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa.
He explained, however, that spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of
three days from the last intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject might have
douched herself.
The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Caal) took the witness stand.
We quote hereunder the portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the
defense:
Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail Lounge
somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the evening of June

25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day. At the cocktail
lounge they had listened to the music while enjoying some drinks. Between them they had
consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much so that at least Aquino became drunk, according
to his own testimony. They had been joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom they met
only that night. Come time to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his
home in Cubao. The five men piled into the red-bodied, black topped two-door convertible
Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao After
dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to Espaa Extension to bring Aquino to his
home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in Espaa Extension before the Rotonda a small car
whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver was a woman. Pineda gave
chase and coming abreast of the small car he shouted, "Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming
mamatay." The woman continued on her way. Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a lesson,"
sped after her and when she swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car
behind being hurriedly got down, striding to the small car, opened the door and started
dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino confirm the presence of another woman inside the
girl's car, who helped the girl struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle
lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into the red
convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they also admit that
they did nothing to stop him.
Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to scare the
girl who was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and return her to her home.
She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could net do anything as the "boss" was
Pineda. Aquino heard her plead with Jose "do you not have a sister yourself?" but did not bear
the other plea 'do you not have a mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street
where he had forcibly snatched the girl presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing
his mind he said, 'why don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl
taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the performance as
long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were limited to the four of them.
Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted first, but not
before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as she went
up the Hotel. The three followed, and when they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly
caught up. All the three accused testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la
Riva asked the boys to close the windows before she. undressed in front of them. They
themselves also removed their clothing. Two of them removed their pants retaining their briefs,
while Boy Pineda and Caal stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three accused
declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him promise her
that he would pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10
minutes began with the naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This
accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo
Aquino and Rogelio Caal) left the room to wait in the car for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la
Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of payment of the balance. Three minutes
later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the question of how and where to
drop Maggie came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that they
should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come from her
work.

Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia Avenue.
Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He did not have the
P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the balance of her "show" and he was afraid that if he did
not pay, Maggie would have her goons after him. He wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City
where he had relatives and where he could help raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and
to make the company complete they invited Caal to join them. They used another car of
Jaime Jose, different from the one they had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached
himself from his compassions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his relatives.
In the meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had, according to Canal,
gone to live in a house very close to the municipal hall building. They later moved to another
house where the PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them. Aquino was the
last to be apprehended, when having read in the newspapers that he was wanted, he
surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the governor of Batangas.
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's
credulity and reason, and had utterly to counteract the evidence for the prosecution,
particularly the complainant's testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We
quote with approval the able dissertion of the trial judge on this point:
As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition that
nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the complaint agreed
to do for them for fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance to be paid "later." The flaw
in this connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The Court cannot believe that any woman
exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has
not been proven to be) who would consent (and as easily and promptly as defense claims) to
do a performance, not even for all money in the worlds after the rough handling she
experienced from these wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no
fury to match a woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen for
money, and her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the rudeness
and meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of time forget her
indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity about her. The woman in
her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as a weapon of revenge by denying them their
pleasure.
Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something beyond even
the wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused had abducted was in
this kind of trade assuming that the price offered was to her satisfaction, whom woman would
be willing to perform first and be paid later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de
la Riva should have consent to do a striptease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and
the balance to be paid God knows when. Since when are exposition of the flesh paid on the
installment basis? By the very precautious nature of their pitiful calling, women who sell their
attractions are usually very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could demand full
payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she did not even know who
these man were, where they lived, whether they could be trusted with a promise to pay later
(!) whether she could ever find them again? If there is anything that had struck the Court about
the complaint, it is her courage, her intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and
a most stupid one that, could have been persuaded to do what the defense want this Court to
believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.

Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstances during
their interview with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the person who
negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot
escape the very strong suspicion that this story is a last ditch, desperate attempt to save the
day for the accused. It truly underscores the hopelessness of their stand and projects all the
more clearly their guilt.
Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for this?
The Court realizes that in its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's positive
identification of Caal as the man with the tattoo mark on his right buttock, the defense
concocted the sickeningly incident story that the four men removed their underclothing in the
presence of a woman simply "because it was hot." What kind of men were these who were so
devoid of any sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding insult to injury by not only
inducing a woman a strip before them, but for forcing her to perform before a naked
audience? And then they have gall to argue that "nothing" happened. For males of cold and
phlegmatic blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid regions like ours
where quick passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception!
All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the
defense has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of prosecution
which, if unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical
(external and internal) examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the
afternoon of June 29, the pertinent findings of which quoted earlier in this decision, establish
beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore on her body
traces of physical and sexual assault.
The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the following: (1) the
insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left behind in the hotel room
the bruises and the sexual attack could have taken place then. But then, the defense itself
says that these two persons rejoined the three after three or four minutes! It is physically
impossible, in such a short time, for Boy Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her
all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have
inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the accused. The
examining physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much
stretch of the imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose?
Was P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what about all
the shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to?
If she really had not been raped would she have gone thru all of these tribulation?
A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in the
notoriety the case will reap her, her honor and that of her family, than in the redress she
demands (Canastre 82-480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA
55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it could also be argued that the
contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on Maggie during her struggle with Pineda
when the latter pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car. The telltale injuries,
however, discount this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and traumas
were located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause by any
struggle save by those of a woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her honor.
In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated testimony
should not be rated any credence at all as against the concerted declaration of the the

accused. In the first place, it is not correct to say that Maggie's declaration was
uncorroborated she has for corroboration nothing less than the written extra-judicial
statements of Jose and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie stood alone in her statements,
the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which the Court does
not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least
vital element in gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which of the
declarations is the more credible, the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be
biased or polluted. (Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides,
it should be borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a man is at his
worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the only one available to prove directly
its commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in certain cases place a
serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so trial courts of justice are most often
placed in a position of having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in
regards conclusive, logical and probable (Landicho, VIII ACR 530).
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Caal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of
Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof,
but they generously contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality
by the complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a
circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd design. This
line of defense has evidently leg no to stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that
all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the
witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging
her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while inside the
car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing
his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and
knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged among the four; and that all of them
later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony, whose evidentiary weight
has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the
crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that
they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise
been clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the
complainant's vagina disproves the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the
NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina after
three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself within that
period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on the fourth day after the
incident, and the complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy.
Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the
important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but penetration (People vs
Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix were caused
by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen her alleged
fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane woman,
who is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital
organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike back at four
strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act.

Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would
not result in the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of
successive rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the
morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been
raped. All four of them raped me." This utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands
strong probative value, considering that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in
cases of this nature was the most logical person in whom a daughter would confide the truth.
Aquino and Canal would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the reporters
on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her statement to the press is
understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her family on a
matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not
then in a position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason why the
complainant did not immediately inform the authorities of the tragedy that befell her. Another
reason is that she was threatened with disfiguration. And there were, of course, the traumas
found by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have been
self-inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda
alone, when the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in
the hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they
would picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the complainant even allegedly suggesting that she
be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably presume her to have come from a
studio? Equally important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to
the examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of future public ridicule and
diminution of popularity and earnings as a movie actress.
4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of
evidence on the grounds that they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and that
the incriminating details therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are not
convinced that the statements were involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were
concocted by the authorities. The statements were given in the presence of several people
and subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the
aforesaid appellants intimated the use of inordinate methods by the police. They are replete
with details which could hardly be known to the police; and although it is suggested that the
authorities could have secured such details from their various informers, no evidence at all
was presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statements Jose and
Canal admitted having waited together with the two other appellants for Miss De la Riva
at the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in the same statements to exculpate himself:
appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally abused the complainant; while
appellant Canal would make it appear that the complainant willingly allowed him to have
sexual intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared by the authorities, they would
hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is
significant, too, that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or
relatives of the alleged use of force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the
Quezon City Police Department, who examined appellant Canal after the latter made his
statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said appellant's body in spite of the
claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned with a
cigarette lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further, that the police officers who

took down their statements categorically denied on the witness stand that the two appellants
were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them or by anyone other
than the affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-considered
conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the incustody statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution
on record will suffice to secure the conviction of the two.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the
other ground that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201),
Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section
1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to that in the
Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was
interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a
similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902)
to mean proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment.
Implementing the said constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the
Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled ... (b) to be
present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings, that is, from
the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances where an accused is
entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second stage of the
preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18).
The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not
only because it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the
Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be
considered. And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the
absence of unanimity in the voting by the members of the United States Supreme Court in all
the three above-cited cases.
5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in
gross miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge against him and his coappellants is a capital offense and the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances,
which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his
presence during all stages of the trial. The contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is
mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the
information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is
capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant
circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308,
May 29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was
not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence
in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to allow him to prove
mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the
trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The
case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court
ordered a new trial because it found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did

not intend to admit that he committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances"
mentioned in the information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The
transcript of the proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota
prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the statement that .
I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the contents
of aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get, and we have
given said accused time to think. After a while I consulted him for three times and his
decision was still the same.
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been
averse to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I know the circumstances called for the
imposition of the maximum penalty considering the aggravating circumstances," but that he
acceded to his client's wish only after the fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the
court the imposition of life imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation
does not bind the Court. The situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in
U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.
6. Two of the appellants Jose and Caal bewail the enormous publicity that attended the
case from the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears
that the court a quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the
seven (7) original accused were acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief
that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press,
unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial."
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the
crimes imputed to them in the amended information quoted at the beginning of this decision.
There is no doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her
house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to
commit the various and the successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however,
that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had
already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same nature
can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction in other words, they
should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and,
therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.
What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No.
4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape committed.Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes
committed, the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there
is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same
would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the
proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us
to make a definite finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes
was attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having
purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of
superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with
one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the
appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about
ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to
appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca__al, none of these aggravating circumstances has been
offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least affect
the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be three
aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should likewise be made to
suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par.
2, Revised Penal Code.)
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court
applied by analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum
duration of all the penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than
threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon
the appellant, which should not exceed forty years." The said court is of the opinion that since
a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be served, and society
and the victim would be vindicated just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on
each of the appellants.
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken
into account in connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of
the penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty
should be imposed because man has only one life, the trial court ignored the principle
enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court,
in affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused guilty of two murders and one
homicide and imposed upon him two death sentences for the murders and a prison term for
the homicide. In not applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the case of Balaba is
different from the present case, for while in the former case the accused was found to have
committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex. As We
have explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved. There is,

therefore, no substantial difference between the two cases insofar as the basic philosophy
involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the case of Balaba this Court did not
hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the accused by the trial court. In
People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on each of
the six accused three death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder, We
said that "since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one
conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the
felonious acts committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of
the appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated after
the decision of the court a quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at length
the legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an
exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all mortals,
has only one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological attribute of man, it
is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical and futile because
after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death penalties will
naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death
penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple
capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of
sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously;
and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related,
concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature,
gravity and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas service of sentence is
determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties imposed. In the
imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself with the
possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency
subject to varied factors like the successful escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency
or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or
penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved
and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed
simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two moves of
serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that
two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so
permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not
only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical
importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of
his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of
only one death sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable.
Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility
of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the
imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident
grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the

proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency

or leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to
pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to
commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is
that the convict has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only
one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will
have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and
of our finding as regards the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the
presence of aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the
premises.

Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation
asking for reversal of that portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation
of the car used by the appellants in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965
two-door Pontiac sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H33284, File No. 11584171, alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto San
Diego of the Quezon City Police Department. The car is registered in the name of Mrs.
Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car
from the Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage
thereon to secure payment of the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be
payable in 24 monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. The
mortgage was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission and inscribed in the
Chattel Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration
certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan
Motors Corporation assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel mortgage,
to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land Transportation
Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on
July 5, 1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance
of Manila) as a preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the
court issued an order for the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ
of replevin because the car was not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used
by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together with the other appellants in this case, in the
abduction of Miss De la Riva, as a result of which the car was seized by the Quezon City
police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to surrender it to the sheriff
on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal case.
During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the
intervenor filed with the said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was not,
however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present
case ordering the car's confiscation as an instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the
said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the
order of confiscation; but the same was denied on October 31, 1967, on the ground that the
trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this

Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for relief from judgement, but the same was also
denied.
On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to
deliver the car to the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or,
in the alternative, to pay the intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per
annum from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. The
judgment became final and executory. Attempts to execute the judgment against the
properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by the sheriff
unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the present petition for intervention was filed with this Court,
which allowed the intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among
others, that the court a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order
of confiscation is correct.
Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in
the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner
thereof; that the only basis of the court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to
appellant Jose were the latter's statements during the trial of the criminal case to that effect;
that the said statement were not, however, intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of
ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but were made simply in answer to questions
propounded in court for the sole purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who
furnished the car used by the appellants in the commission of the crime; that the chattel
mortgage on the car and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were made several
months before the date of commission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses
the possibility of collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final
judgement in the replevin case can only be executed by delivering the possession of the car to
the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of the Revised Penal
Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of
the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of
this Court that the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in question should be set
aside and that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as
decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil
Case No. 69993.

Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on
the part of the Solicitor General to the effect that Rogelio Caal, one of the herein appellants,
died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case is hereby
dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with onefourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G.
Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime
of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three
(3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four
(4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the
sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay onefourth (1/4) of the costs.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a
quo for its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby

ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in
accordance with the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993
thereof.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-50276 January 27, 1983
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
MICHAEL J. BUTLER, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel B. Tomacruz for accused-appellant.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Third
Judicial District, Branch I, finding the accused Michael J. Butler in Criminal Case No. 2465
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength,
with the attendance of aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of
the deceased, without any mitigating circumstance and sentencing the accused with the
penalty of death, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim with the sum of
P24,000.00.
In an Information dated October 16, 1975, accused-appellant Michael J. Butler was charged
with the crime of murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of August, 1975, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines. and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, with intent to kill and taking
advantage o his superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniosly assault,
attack and hit with a statue of Jesus Christ oue Enriquita Alipo alias 'Gina Barrios' and after
said Enriquita Alipo fell flat on her fare the above-named, accused again taking advantage of
superior strength then and there apply force and pressure on the back of the head of said
Enriquita Alipo thereby forcing and sinking the latter's mouth and nose against the mattress of
the bed, and as a result thereof, the said Enriquita Alipo was not able to breathe and was
choked, thus directly causing the death of said Enriquita Alipo alias 'Gina Barrios'.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, hence the trial was conducted and at
the termination of which, judgment of conviction was rendered.
It appears from the records of the case that on August 7, 1975, at about 10:30 p.m., accusedappellant Michael Butler and the victim, Enriquita Alipo alias Gina Barrios were together at

Colonial Restaurant in Olongapo City. They were seen together by Lilia Paz, and entertainer
and friend of the victim, who claimed to have had a small conversation with the accused, and
by one Rosemarie Juarez, also a friend of the victim. At about 1:00 of the same evening, the
accused and the victim left the said restaurant, 1 after the latter invited Rosemarie Juarez to
come to her house that night.
Emelita Pasco, the housemaid of the victim, testified that, at about 11:30 p.m. or so of August
7, 1975, her mistress (Gina Barrios) came home with the accused-appellant. As soon as she
opened the door for them, the victim and accused-appellant immediately entered the victim's
bedroom. Shortly thereafter, the victim left her bedroom holding an Id card and a piece of
paper, and on the piece of paper, the victim purportedly wrote the following words: MICHAEL
J. BUTLER, 44252-8519 USS HANCOCK. Said words were copied from the ID Card.
Pasco testified that the victim said she was copying the name of the accused because she
knew he would not be going back to her. Then she rushed back to her bedroom after
instructing Pasco to wake her up the following morning. 2 Before retiring, however, the victim's
friend, Rosemarie Juarez, came to the former's house and after having a small conversation,
also left.
The following day, August 8, 1975, at about 4:00 a.m., Pasco rose to wake her mistress as
instructed. She knocked at the door. She found that the victim was lying on her bed, facing
downward, naked up to the waist, with legs spread apart, with a broken figurine beside her
head. Immediately, Pasco called the landlord and they called the authorities. 3
Patrolman Rudyard de los Reyes of the Olongapo Police Department arrived together with
Fiscal Llamado and Corporal Sobrepea at about 6.00 a.m. of August 8, 1975. Pasco
informed Patrolman de los Reyes that the accused Butler slept with the victim the previous
night, and the former gave the latter the piece of paper where the name of the accused was
written.
Sergeant Galindo of the Olongapo Police Department handed over to Jesus Bensales, a
fingerprint technician of the Police Department, a piece of cellophane together with the broken
figurine for latent print examination. The latent print examination report (Exh. E4) showed that
there were three (3) fragmentary latent prints that were lifted from the cellophane wrapping of
the figurine. But only one print was clear and distinguishable. This particular print was found
Identical with the accused's left middle fingerprint on thirteen (13) points. Bensales later
testified that the latent print developed from the piece of cellophane belonged to the accused
Butler. 4
On the same day, officers of the Olongapo Police Department informed the Naval
Investigation Services Resident Agency (NISRA) in Subic Bay that an American Negro by the
name of Michael J. Butler on board the USS Hancock- was a suspect in a murder case. Jerry
Witt and Timothy Watrous both special agents of NISRA went on board USS Hancock. They
informed the legal officer that one of the crew members was a suspect in a murder case. After
being located, the accused was brought to the legal office of the ship. Witt Identified himself,
showed his credentials and informed the accused that he was a suspect in a murder case.
Then Witt informed the accused of his constitutional rights to remain silent and right to
counsel. Then the accused was searched, handcuffed, and was brought to NISRA office.
Arriving at NISRA office at about 11:00 a.m. of the. same day, the investigation and
interrogation were started . by James Cox NISRA investigator, at about 2:55 p.m. According to
Cox's testimony, before he started the interrogation, he identified himself, informed the
accused of his constitutional rights. At the cross-examination, he stated it took him about 1-1/2

hours to finish the investigation. The first 45 minutes was accordingly devoted to interrogation,
and for the next 45 minutes, he called James Beaver who reduced the oral investigation into
writing.
James Cox also testified that after apprising the accused of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and right to counsel he asked the accused if he needed a lawyer and if he understood
his rights (constitutional rights and rights under the military code of justice). The accused
accordingly said he understood his rights and that he did not need a lawyer.
The result of that investigation was thus a document taken from the accused consisting of
three (3) pages, signed and initialed on all pages by him and containing a statement that he
was aware of his constitutional rights, and a narration of the facts that happened on August 7,
1975.
For purposes of clarity the entire text of the waiver of constitutional rights and the extra-judicial
confession containing the narration of facts by the accused appellant (Exhibit H) are
reproduced as follows:
Place- NISRA Subic Bay
I, SA MICHAEL JEROME BUTLER USN 142528519 have been advised by Special Agent(s)
JN COX and JJ CREATURO that I am suspected of MURDER OF GINA BARRIOS ALSO
KNOWN AS ENRIQUETA ALIPO FILIPINA NATIONAL AND THE USE DANGEROUS
DRUGS. I have also been advised:
MJB (1) That I have the right to remain silent and make no statement at all;
MJB (2) That any statement I do make may be used as against me in a trial by Court-Martial;
MJB (3) That I have the right to consult with a lawyer prior to any questioning. This lawyer may
be a civilian lawyer retained by me at my own expense; or, if I wish, Navy/Marine Corps
authority will appoint a Military lawyer to act as my counsel without cost to me;
MJB (4) That I have the right to have such retained civilian lawyer or appointed military lawyer
present during this interview;
MJB (5) That I have the right to terminate this interview at any time for any reason.
MJB I understand my rights as related to me and as set forth above. With that understanding,
I have decided that I do not desire to remain silent, that I do not desire to consult with either a
civilian or military lawyer at this time and I do not desire to have such a lawyer present during
this interview. I make this decision freely and voluntarily and it is made with no threats having
been made or promises extended to me.
(Sgd).
Signature: MICHAEL J. BUTLER
Date and Time: 1502 8 Aug. 1975
1546 hours
Witnessed JN COX SA NIS
JJ CREATURO S/A NIS
Date and Time: 8 August 1975
At this time, I, SA Michael Jerome Butler, 14258519, desire to make the following voluntary
statement. This statement is made with an understanding of my rights as previously related to
me and as set forth above, and it is made with no threats having been made or promises
extended to me. This statement is being typed by YNI James R. BEAVER, USN as I
discussed its contents with Mr. COX and Mr. CREATURO I was born 09-04-57 at Orlando,
Florida. I am a black, male American 6 foot tall and I weigh 155 pounds. I enlisted in the US

Navy on 3 February 1975 for four years. Since 10 June 1975, I have been assigned to the
USS HANCOCK (CV-10).
During the evening hours of 7 August 1975, while on liberty, I went to Bob's Tailor Shop in
Olongapo City, R.P. While I was there I talked to a girl and drank some gin and beer and got
drunk. The girl's mm was Victoria PENA There was another girl in the tailor shop and she was
making eyes at me. I walked outside the tailor shop and she followed me and we spoke to
each other. This was sometime after 9 PM She asked me if I wanted to go home with her and I
said yes.
We caught a tricycle and went to her house. She paid the man one peso. When we got to the
house another girl let us in. After we got to the house the girl that I was with showed me her
health card, but I couldn't read the name on it. I went upstairs and the girl that I was with
showed me the bedroom which was just to the left at the top of the stairs I went in and sat
down on the bed. She came in and asked me for some money. She told me she was going to
screw me. (By this I understood we were going to engage in sexual intercourse). I gave her
approximately 27 pesos. She left the room and said that she was going to get some cigarettes
and would be right back. She came back later and came into the room, walked out of the room
and said something to the girl in the next room. The two of them came into the bedroom where
I was and they were laughing about something. The other girl then left and the two of us were
in the bedroom alone. Both of us got undressed and I laid down on the bed and went to sleep.
I woke up sometime later and she was in bed with me. At this point I rolled the girl over and
made love to her. (By this I mean I engaged in sexual intercourse with her from the rear ). My
intention was to screw her in the vagina. If I screwed her in the rectum, I didn't intend to. After
we finished, I rolled over and went back to sleep again, Roosters started crowing and I woke
up and it was starting to get daylight. The girl was already awake. I thought that it was time for
me to go back to the ship so I told her that I had to leave. I couldn't find my watch and asked
her where it was and she said that the girl in the next room had it. I was sitting on the bed and
I reached down to pull up my sock and I discovered that a five peso note that I had in my sock
was missing. I asked her about it and she said that she had gotten it. We started arguing
about my five pesos and she started saying something to me in the Filipino language and I
told her to speak English. I walked over and looked at her hard and she wanted to know what I
was looking at and I asked her why she took my money. I said 'Ah, fuck it,' and pushed her
down onto the bed. She got off the bed and smacked me and I smacked her back. She started
tussling and acting like she was going to hit me with a karate chop. I thought she was going to
do something dangerous to me so I grabbed her, and we started wrestling on the bed. She
grabbed me by the throat and I picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that was sitting on a
bedside stand and I hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face. I didn't intend to kill the girl
but I was mad and wanted to hurt her. She didn't say anything to me but she was making
some kind of groaning noise. I went in the next room and get my watch, came back in the
bedroom, got dressed and left. I started walking towards the base. I saw the lights of a vehicle
coming so I stepped inside of a building so I wouldn't be caught out after the curfew. As it
turned out it was a Marine in a military truck, I'm not sure if he was with tile Armed Forces
Police or the Shore Patrol. The Marine was white and bald headed and wore a badge. He
gave me a ride to the Armed Forces ]Police Station at the Main Gate, Subic Bay, I then went
from there to my ship. I was dressed in civilian clothing and I had on a pair of burgandy
trousers and a blue and white printed shirt. I left these items of clothing on the top of my bunk
located in the 2nd Division berthing area.

When I was with the girl last night, I was drunk from drinking alcohol. I did not take any
narcotics or dangerous drugs because I do not use them. I never did know the girl's name that
I was with. She was a Filipino, approximately 4'11", black hair (long). She wore glasses
(tinted). When she and I engaged in sexual intercourse I reached a climax while my penis was
in her. Wen I met her she was wearing a two-piece fish net top and skirt, they were both
purple. This is all I can remember about what she looked like. I don't know the exact location
at which she lived except that it was somewhere in Olongapo City, R.P. To my knowledge, the
girl did not take any drugs while I was with her.
I have read the above statement, consisting of three pages and it is true and correct to the
best of my knowledge. No threats or promises have been made to induce me to make this
statement.
(Sgd.)
MICHAEL J. BUTLER
(Name, date, time)
(1634-8 Aug. 75)
James Beaver later testified that he typed the statement of the accused, that the accused
gave his statement in answer to the questions of James Cox and that the accused signed all
the pages of the statement, that he was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel by James Cox that the accused was aware of his constitutional rights and that
he affixed his signature and initials on the document which contained the warning regarding
his rights. 5
In the meantime, Dr. Angeles Roxas, Medico Legal Officer of the Olongapo Police Department
who also came to the scene of the crime on August 8,1975, examined the corpse of the victim
and later issued an autopsy report (Exhibit D) with the following findings:
NAME: - ENRIQUITA ALEPO y Apolinario
alias Enriquita Barrios
DATE & TIME: - 10:30 A.M., August 8, 1975
PLACE: - Funeraria Fernando Morgue
The body is that of a middle-aged woman Identified as Enriquita Alepo y Apolinario about 26
years old, native of Bugasong, Antique and resident of 8 Fontaine Extension. Olongapo City,
found sprawling on her face with her legs widely spread far apart, with no underwear and her
house dress folded from below upwards up to her waistline, thus exposing her private parts.
There was starting rigidity of the extremeties and starting lividity of the face, neck and
abdomen which are the dependent portions of the body. On top of the head are broken pieces
of porce wares.
Close examination of the body showed fine, short, curly hairs numbering five in all, found in
the area of the anal region, with amount of blood in the between the anal folds. There were
also fine pieces of porcelain wares on her teeth and gums, upper and lower, just behind the
upper and lower lips. Further examination failed to show any sign of external physical injuries,
except for a slight abrasion, measuring 3 mm. in diameter, posterior portion, junction of the
anal mucous membrane and the skin.
The body was opened in the usual Y-shaped incision of the chest and abdomen to expose the
different, vital internal organs. The head was likewise opened by means of a saggital incision
of the scalp, then deflecting the anterior and posterior portions, and then making a coronal
incision of the skull to expose the brain substance. The following are the significant findings:

I. HEAD and NECK Fatted to find any fracture of the skull. Brain apparently normal No sign of
intra-cranial hemorrhage
II. CHEST:
1. Heart: apparently nor except that the right side of the heart is fully filled with blood.
2. Lungs. Markedly congested but no sign of edema. No obstruction of the trachea
III. ABDOMEN: all the internal abdominal organs are apparently normal.
NO OTHER SIGNIFICANT FINDING.
Specimens from the anal and vaginal smears were submitted to the OCGHI laboratory for
examinations.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia due to suffocation.
(Sgd.)
Angeles S. Roxas, M.M.
Medico-Legal Officer
Olongapo Police Station 21
Dr. Roxas later testified that anal intercourse was had with the victim after her death as
indicated by the partly opened anus and the presence of spermatozoa in it. He testified that
the anus would have automatically and completely closed had the intercourse occurred, while
the victim was still alive. He also categorically testified that the victim died of asphyxia due to
suffocation when extreme pressure was exerted on her head pushing it downward, thereby
pressing her nose and mouth against the mattress. 6
After trial, judgment was promulgated on December 3, 1976 finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Finding the accused Michael J. Butler guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder by abuse of superior strength and there being proven the aggravating circumstance of
treachery and outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased, not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, the Court hereby sentences him to DEATH;
(b) . Ordering the accused to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Enriquita Alipo alias "Gina
Barrios" the sum of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND (P24,000.00) PESOS; and
(c) Ordering the accused to pay the litigation expenses and the costs of the proceedings.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished His Excellency President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
the Honorable Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, for their information petition and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
On December 17, 1976, a motion for new trial was filed by the accused-appellant. Said motion
assailed the decision of the court a quo on the ground that a serious error of law was
committed prejudicing his substantial rights. The accused-appellant alleged in said motion that
he was a minor at the time the offense was allegedly committed, and having invoked his
minority, he was entitled to the suspension of the sentence pursuant to P.D. 603, Art. 192
before its amendment by P.D. 1179 on August 15, 1977.
The motion for new trial was denied on January 25, 1977. A motion for reconsideration was
subsequently filed which was also denied.
A petition for mandamus was thereafter filed with this Honorable Court praying, among other
things, that an order be issued commanding respondent judge to set aside the judgment dated
December 3, 1976, to declare the proceedings suspended and to commit the accused-

appellant to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare (now Ministry of Social Services
and Development) or any other training institution licensed by the government or any other
responsible person, in accordance with P.D. 603, Art. 192 before its amendment by P.D. 1179
on August 15,1977.
On December 13, 1978, a minute resolution was issued by this Honorable Court dismissing
the petition for mandamus for lack of merit.
On May 26,1981, accused-appellant filed in the present appeal, a manifestation and motion
dated May 19, 1981, praying that the certified certificate of live birth of the accused-appellant
be admitted to form part of the evidence. On June 4, 1981, this Honorable Court resolved to
admit the same to form part of the evidence.
The accused-appellant made six (6) assignments of errors in his brief, and seven (7)
supplemental assignments of errors in his supplemental brief. In essence. however, the issues
can be reduced into the followingI. Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses;
II. Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged extrajudicial
admission of the accused (Exh. H) and appreciating it against him;
III. Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and
scoffing at the corpse of the victim;
IV. Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating treachery and abuse of superior
strength simultaneously and separately;
V. Whether or not the trial court erred in accepting the testimony of Dr. Angeles Roxas, the
Medico-legal Officer, that asphyxiation by suffocation was the cause of death of the victim.
VI. Whether or not the trial court erred in denying the accused the benefits of Section 192 of
P.D. 603 before its amendment by P.D. 1179 on August 15, 1977.
The first issue is whether or not the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses.
Under the said issue, the accused-appellant contends that the court a quo erred in giving full
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
The rule is well-established that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility
of the witnesses are matters that are left mainly to its discretion because it is the trial court
which observed the demeanor and the manner of testimony of the witness and, therefore, the
trial court is in a better position to assess the same than the appellate court. As a matter of
established jurisprudence, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of a witness are not
disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing that it failed to consider certain facts and
circumstances which would change the same. 7
This Court rules that the court a quo did not err in giving credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. There were three (3) persons who Identified the accused as the
person last seen with the victim on the night in question, namely Emelita Pasco, the maid, Lilia
de la Paz, the entertainer-friend of the victim, and Rosemarie Juarez, another friend of the
victim.
The finger print examination showed that one of the three fragmentary latent prints lifted from
the cellophane wrapping of the figurine used in striking the victim was Identical with the
accused's left middle finger print on thirteen (13) points.

As to the contention that the findings of the medico-legal officer were inadequate and
inconclusive, We rule that the accused-appellant failed to present clear and positive evidence
to overcome the scientific and specific finding and conclusion of said officer. The details of
such findings and conclusion will be discussed herein later.
The second issue is whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged
extra-judicial admission of the accused (Exh. H) and appreciating it against him.
Counsel for the accused-appellant questions the regularity of how the arrest of the accused
was made and the regularity of how wanting of the accused-appellant's constitutional rights
were given. Counsel contents that Sec. 20, Art. IV (Bill of Rights) of the New Constitution
which embodies the constitutional rights of the person under custodial investigation against
self-incrimination, and the doctrine laid down in the classic case of Miranda vs. Arizona 8 have
been violated..
Thus, accused-appellant maintains in his brief:
In the Miranda case, the accused was arrested by the and taken to a special interrogation
room where he signed a confession which contained a typed paragraph stating that the
confession was made voluntarily with full knowledge of his legal rights and with the
understanding that any statement he made might be used against him. It will be noted that the
prosecution's EXHIBIT "H" and all the submarkings thereunder was obtained from the
accused-appellant under precisely similar conditions as in the Miranda case. He was taken
from his ship by Naval Intelligence Service special agents and roughly handed from the very
start. Before he could even get his bearings, he was immediately handcuffed and told that he
was a primary suspect in a very serious offense-murder. And then, before giving him any of
the warnings called for under the above-quoted guidelines provided by the M case, was
questioned about the alleged offense which he was being suspected even while awaiting
transportation to the Office of Naval Intelligence. At the Office of Naval Intelligence, the
accused-appellant was placed in a special interrogation room and left alone for a little while.
When he was finally joined again by NIS Investigators, he was merely given the standard
mimeographed warning and told to sign the same without even so much as explaining to him
the contents and significance of the mimeographed form which he was being asked to sign.
The accused-appellant was never informed that whatever statements he may given might be
used against him in a trial before a Philippine Court and was never really given the opportunity
to consult with a lawyer, whether military or civilian. The interrogation of the accused-appellant
then proceeded and lasted all day without giving him the opportunity to rest. And then, in the
preparation of said statement (EXHIBIT "H") a yeoman of the NIS investigator did the typing
and typed only those portions of the interrogation session which the NIS investigator told him
and which turned out to be in criminating to the accused-appellant.1wph1.t The NIS
interrogation could be easily characterized as a police-dominated incommunicado
interrogation. This type of interrogation is precisely the kind which was severely criticized by
the Miranda doctrine. 9
Accused-appellant further argues:
The evidence clearly shows that the Naval Intelligence agent who interrogated the accusedappellant special Agent Cox employed precisely the police interrogation procedures described
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Miranda case i.e. interrogation in privacy of their special
interrogation room questioning in unfamiliar surroundings, employing deceptive stratagems
and for inadequate warning of his rights to counsel and to remain silent etc., thereby breaking
down his will power by failing to allow him some rest or respite. It is in this obviously police-

dominated surrounding that the accused finally succumbed to the oppressive atmosphere of
the dogged and persistent questioning of the Naval Intelligence interrogator and finally gave
the questioned statement (EXHIBIT "H") just to get it over with. 10
We reject accused-appellant's contention and argument. Contrary to what the counsel for the
accused-appellant contends, there is no evidence showing that the accused was roughly
handed from the very start. Neither is there any evidence to prove that he was first handcuffed
and informed that he was a suspect in a murder case before he was warned of his rights.
The manner of arrest as testified to by witness Jerry Witt which was not controverted, was as
follows: 11
Q Will you tell how you make arrest of a serviceman on board a ship?
A We went to the USS HANCOCK to contact the legal officer and told him that one of his crew
members is a suspect in a murder case and we went to talk to him.
Q And what did legal officer do?
A They tried to locate him.
Q Were you with the group who located Michael Butler?
A Yes.
Q Who were with you?
A Watrous, the legal officer ship master whose name I do not know.
Q After you found Michael Butler, where was he brought?
xxx xxx xxx
Q When Michael Butler was brought to the legal office, what happened?
A I identified myself, showed my credentials and said he was a suspect in a murder case, that
it is his right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer. He was informed of the crime and asked
him to put up his arm against the wall we made body search to look for possible weapon. He
had some kind of tools, handcuffed him and took him to our office.
Q Did he refuse?
A He was very submissive.
Q Why did you make him face the wall and search him?
A Normal procedure.
Q And did he ever resist?
A No.
Q How about being handcuffed?
A Not at all.
Q And this manner of searching and handcuffing, was it done in the presence of the legal
officer?
A Yes.
It is clear that there was no mandhandling on the part of the accused. Neither could it be
deduced from the events which transpired on board the sip that there was any moral coercion
exerted to break his will. It should also be noted that as early as this time, the accusedappellant had already been informed of his constitutional rights. On this point, NISRA
investigator James Cox on direct examination said:
Q Prior to your interrogation being an investigator, what are the requisites in your talking to the
suspect?
A By Identifying myself to him, advising him of his rights, of his constitutional rights.
Q And this advise of his rights are reduced to writing?
A Yes.

Q And is this done to Michael Butler?

A Yes.
Q And you said that prior to your interrogating Michael Butler you have warned him of his
constitutional rights and his rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the same
reduced to writing ... I will withdraw.
Q You said that the interrogation on Mr. Butler has been reduced to writing, I have here a
three-page statement of Michael Butler, will you tell what is the relation of this to the statement
you have taken on Michael Butler?
A This is the statement I took from Michael Butler, on AUGUST 8, 1975.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that you warned the accused of his rights under the military code of justice, is this
embodied in the statement?
A Yes.
Q Will you please point to the statement, where is it? (Witness pointing to the first half upper
portion of page one of Exh. "A" motion)
xxx xxx xxx
Q And do you know if the accused understood his rights as warned by you?
A He said he did.
Q Do you have evidence that he understood the warning you gave in connection with his
rights?
A I asked him if he understood, he said yes. I asked him if he needed a lawyer, he said no,
and put his initial in my presence. 12
On cross-examination, witness Jerry Witt declared:
Q You did not stay long in the office of the legal officer after he was brought in?
A No.
Q In short, the only thing that happened in the legal office is that he was searched, had his
body to the wall and handcuffed him?
A He was warned.
Q A But at that time there was no interrogation?
A Right.
Q And he did not say anything
A I do not remember him saying anything.
Q Was the warning given before he was handcuffed?
A That was the very first thing.
Q Do I understand that you gave him the warning in the deck?
A Down in the legal office, I do not want to embarrass him I did it in private.
Q In the presence of Watrous?
A Yes, and the legal officer.
Q How long after you said this warning before you handcuffed him?
A Two or three minutes.
Q And after you handcuffed him you did not reiterate your warning anymore?
A No more, just to come with us. 13
Neither are We convinced of the accused-appellant's assertion petition to the effect that the
"police-dominated' incommunicado interrogation" at NISRA office morally coerced him to sign
the "mimeographed warning" and to give the extra-judicial admission. While it may be true that
a considerable span of time elapsed from the moment the accused was brought to the NISRA

office to the time the interrogation was begun and reduced to writing, there is no competent
evidence presented to support the allegation that the statement made by the accused was a
result of pressure and badgerings. In the absence of such competent evidence, that argument
remains to be a mere speculation which cannot be made to prevail over what the prosecution
witnesses have established and which have not been successfully controverted.
We agree with the court a quo that the Miranda doctrine finds no application in this case. As
the court a quo observes:
The Miranda Doctrine does not apply in this case as the accused had already waived his right
to remain silent and to counsel after he was duly informed of said rights by his investigators.
The Court is not persuaded by the claim of the accused as there is no reliable evidence to
support it except his naked testimony that he was threatened and coerced, which allegation
was contradicted and negatived by the fact that he signed and initialed each and every page
of Exhibit H, showing no signs of tremor as a result of the maltreatment, threats or coercion.
The naked denial of the accused regarding the preparation of Exhibit H cannot overwhelm the
true and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses James Robert Beaver and James
Creatur, James Cox and Jerry Witt as there appears no visible indication for his fellow
Americans to fabricate their declarations and testify falsely against the accused. Besides, it is
a well-settled rule that in weighing conflicting testimonies, greater weight must be generally
given to the positive testimonies of the witnesses, for the prosecution than the denials of the
accused.
The third issue is whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime
of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery
and scoffing at the corpse of the victim.
The prosecution maintains that there is abuse of superior strength as can be deduced from
the fact that the victim was slender, only 4'11" in height while the accused is about 6 feet tall
and 155 lbs that the accused took advantage of this unequal physical condition when he
struck the victim with the figurine which made the victim unconscious, after which he shoved
and pressed the victim's mouth and nose against the bed mattress. 14
On the other hand, it is the defense counsel's contention that the court a quo erred in
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength because like treachery,
nocturnity and evident premeditation, this circumstance has to be deliberately and purposely
utilized to assure the accomplishment of the criminal purpose without risk to the offender
which might arise from the defense that the victim might offer. The defense counsel further
maintains that there is no evidence to support that advantage was taken by the accused of his
superior strength as contrary to what the court a quo said in its decision, there was no
evidence nor testimony on the part of the medico-legal officer to the effect that when the victim
was hit by a figurine, she went into a coma then her head was pushed by a pillow, causing her
nose and mouth to be pressured against the bed mattress. In addition to this, the defense
counsel further maintains that the instrument used by the accused, which was a brittle
porcelain statue of Jesus Christ, could not produce physical injury nor render the victim
unconscious as testified to at cross-examination by the medico-legal officer.
In People vs. Bustos, 15 this Court held that to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that
the accused is physically stronger than the victim or the relative strength of the parties must
be proved. In People vs. Casillar, 16 this Court said that the essence of this circumstance is
that advantage is taken by the offender of this physical strength which is relatively superior to

that of the offended party. The fact that the offender is strong does not of itself prove its
existence. 17
Still, in People vs. Cabiling, a guideline to determine whether or not there is abuse of superior
strength has been laid down. In that case this Court ruled:
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attached. This circumstance
should always be considered whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. To properly
appreciate it, not only is it necessary to evaluate the physical conditions of the protagonists or
opposing forces and the arms or objects employed by both sides, but it is also necessary to
analyze the incidents and episodes constituting the total development of the event. 18
In the light of the above legal precepts and considering the evidence adduced, this Court
holds that there was an abuse of superior strength attending the commission of the crime. It is
not only the notorious advantage of height that the accused had over his hapless victim, he
being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girl was only 4 ft 11 inches tall, but also fits
strength which he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving her head
and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure must have been
very strong and powerful to suffocate her to death and without risk to himself in any manner or
mode whatsoever that she may have taken to defend herself or retaliate since she was
already struck and helpless on the bed, that convinced us to find and rule that the crime
committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
The evidence on record, however, is not sufficient to show clearly and prove distinctly that
treachery attended the commission of the crime since there was no eyewitness account of the
killing. The extra-judicial confession of the accused merely stated, thus: "I thought she was
going to do something dangerous to me so I grabbed her, and we started wrestling on the
bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that was sitting on
the bedside stand and I hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face." Although the figurine was
found broken beside her head, the medical report, however, do not show any injury or fracture
of the skull and no sign of intracranial hemorrhage.
While We reject the presence of treachery, We, however, find and sustain the finding of the
lower court that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the
deceased applies against the accused since it is established that he mocked or outraged at
the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse with her after she was already
dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close and also the presence of
spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer,
and confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report, Exhibit "B1 ", clearly established the
coitus after death. This act of the accused in having anal intercourse with the woman after
killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse.
It is true as maintained by the defense that the aggravating circumstance of outraging at the
corpse of the victim is not alleged in the information and that the lower court found it had been
proved but its contention that the said aggravating circumstance should not have been
appreciated against the accused is without merit. And this is so because the rule is that a
generic aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information may be proven during the trial
over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the, penalty (People vs.
Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil. 597). Aggravating circumstances not alleged in the information

but proven during the trial serve only to aid the court in fixing the limits of the penalty but do
not change the character of the offense. (People vs. Collado 60 Phil. 610, 614; People vs.
Campo, 23 Phil. 368; People vs. Vega, 31 Phil. 450; People vs. Domondon, 64 Phil. 729).
On the claim of the defense that the accused is entitled to the benefits of Section 192 of P.D.
603 before its amendment by P.D. 1179 on August 15, 1977, the records disclose that at the
time of the commission of the crime on August 8, 1975, said accused was seventeen (1 7)
years, eleven (11) months and four (4) days old, he having been born on September 4, 1957
in Orlando, Florida, U.S.A. The records further disclose that during the consideration of the
defense's motion to suppress the extra-judicial confession (Exhibit "H") the accused declared
that he was eighteen (18) years old as evidenced by the certification issued by Vice Consul
Leovigildo Anolin of the Consul General of the Philippines in New York City dated November
14, 1975 (Exhibit "1"-Motion). According to the trial court, notwithstanding the presentation of
Exhibit "1"-Motion, the accused did not make any serious effort to invoke Article 192 of
Presidential Decree 603 and further, since the accused was found guilty of a capital offense,
the suspension of sentence and the commitment of the accused to the custody of any
institution or person recommended by the Department of Social Welfare cannot be carried out.
On December 17, 1976, an Urgent Motion for New Trial was filed by the defense on the
ground that a serious error of law was committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantial
right of the accused and newly discovered evidence which would probably change the
judgment of the court. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit as well as the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and Second Motion for Reconsideration. Thereupon,
the records of the case were ordered immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review pursuant to law.
At the time of the commission of the offense, trial and rendition of judgment, the applicable law
was P.D. 603 otherwise known as Child and Youth Welfare Code. The relevant provisions of
the said law to the instant case are Articles 189 and 192 which provide the following:
Art. 189. Youthful Offender. Defined A youthful offender is one who is over nine years but
under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.
A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability and shall be committed to the care of Ws or her father or mother, or nearest relative or
family friend in the discretion of the court and subject to its supervision. The same shall be
done for a child over nine years and under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission
of the offense, unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against
in accordance -,with Article 192.
The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed modified by the
provisions of tills Chapter.
Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing
and the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender
has committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment
of conviction, the court, upon application of the youthful offender, if it finds that the best
interest of the public as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend an
further proceedings.
The trial court refused to consider and appreciate the minority of the accused because the
proof submitted by the defense was not duly authenticated as required by the Rules of Court
under Section 25 of Rule 132, said proof being merely a certification issued by Consul

Leovigildo Anolin of the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York City, U.S.A. that the
attached document is a xerox copy of the original birth certificate of Michael Jerome Butler
issued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitation Service, State of Florida, U.S.A. shown
by Mr. Butler's mother, Mrs. Ethel Butler. (Exhibit "l ", "1-A")
After the lower court had ordered the records of the case forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review on January 25, 1977, as stated earlier accused-appellant filed on August 25,
1978 a petition for mandamus in G.R. No. L-48786 entitled "Michael J. Butler, minor, assisted
by Lt. Commander Charles T. Riedel, U.S. Navy (guardian ad litem) vs. Hon. Regino T.
Veridiano, et al." praying that respondent judge be ordered and commanded to set aside the
judgment of conviction, to declare the proceedings suspended and order the commitment of
the accused pursuant to Article 193, P.D. 603. The petition was denied by Us for lack of merit
in Our Resolution of December 13, 1978.
Subsequently, however, the required proof was submitted as annexes to the defense'
Manifestation and Motion to Admit (Certified Copy of Certificate of Live Birth) filed May 26,
1981 in the instant proceedings (See Records, pp. 137-141). In Our Resolution of June 4,
1981, We admitted the certified copy of the Certificate of Live Birth of accused-appellant to
form part of the evidence.
We do not agree with the reasoning of the trial court that the accused had not invoked the
privilege granted under Article 192 of P.D. 603 before its amendment because the records
manifestly show the vigorous plea of the accused for it's application not only in the Motion for
New Trial but also in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused (See pp. 237 248,
261-271, Records of Criminal Case No. 2465, People vs. Michael J. Butler, CFI of Zambales,
Branch 1, Olongapo City). We hold and rule that the lower court erred in not applying the
provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603 suspending all further proceedings after the court had
found that the accused had committed the acts charged against him, determined the
imposable penalty including any civil liability chargeable against him. The trial court should not
have pronounced judgment convicting the accused, imposing upon the penalty of death.
We likewise hold that the penalty of death was not justified. Since murder was committed by
the accused, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime is punishable by
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The accused is a minor and he is entitled
to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which reduces the penalty one degree
lower and that is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, or ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. (Article
68, Revised Penal Code) With one aggravating circumstance, that of outraging at the corpse
of the victim, the penalty imposable is the maximum period which is reclusion temporal
medium or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months. Imposing the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty is eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
We find in the records the Order of the Honorable Regino T. Veridiano II, Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Branch I at Olongapo City, committing the accused in
the custody of the Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Philippines dated December 3,
1976, "(p)ending the finality of judgment rendered in the above-entitled case, pursuant to the
provisions of Para. 5, Article 13 of the Revised Base Military Agreement. " (p. 190, original
records).

After the appeal had been submitted for decision pursuant to Our Resolution of November 20,
1980, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed a Verified Motion to Dismiss Case Under
P.D. 603 praying that an order be issued "l) Dismissing the case against accused-appellant;
(2) Ordering the immediate discharge of accused-appellant; (3) Granting accused-appellant
such other relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises, " alleging:
IV
8) During his entire period of continued imprisonment in the BRIG from August 11, 1975 to the
present, accused-appellant has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a useful
member of the community. Documentary proofs of these are as follows:
(a) Official Report of the BRIG Commander, USN Subic Naval Base, attached hereto as
Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof-,
(b) Progress Report filed with this Honorable Court on November 6, 1980, by the Ministry of
Social Services and Development, Olongapo City Branch, found on pp. 113-114, of the Rollo,
and attached hereto as Annex "B" and made an integral part hereof Thus:
Based on the informations we gathered thru interviews and observations, we would like to
recommend to the Hon. Supreme Court, that Michael Butler be given a chance to enjoy his life
fully outside the jail, thus promoting his best interest and welfare.'
(c) Progress Report with annexes, dated February 18, 1981, filed on March 4,1981, by the
Ministry of Social Services and Development, Olongapo City Branch, found on pp. 128-131 of
the Rollo, a xerox copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "C " and made an integral part
hereof Thus:
In view of the fact that Mr. Michael Butler is now fully rehabilitated, it is our recommendation
that he be given an opportunity to have happily and prove himself outside the Brig.'
(d) Diploma awarded by the University of La Verne California, U.S.A., to accused-appellant as
evidence of his having completed a course in Behavioral Science, on January 24, 1981, while
he was a prisoner in the BRIG. A xerox copy of said Diploma and that of the accompanying
group photograph showing a picture of accused-appellant taken on the occasion of the
commencement exercises, are hereto attached as Annexes "D" and "D-1 ", respectively, and
made integral parts hereof. The originals are found on p. 133 of the Rollo. (The original of his
transcript of record is also hereto attached as Annex "E ").
v
(9) Under the foregoing facts and circumstances, and while it is now a legal and physical
impossibility to place accused-appellant under the care and custody of the Ministry of Social
Services and Development which was what should have been done in the beginning under
P.D. 603, it is submitted that accused-appellant's unfortunate situation could still be remedied
and salvaged . . . as justice now demands . . . and that is, by treating accused-appellant's
imprisonment in the BRIG as equivalent to what should have been his full period of
commitment under the care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and Development.
After all, and as said Ministry has reported, it has been regularly visiting accused- appellant at
his cell in the BRIG and, is therefore, in a position to attest to the exceptional behavior of
accused-appellant.
Counsel for the People opposes the Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: 1 That the
dismiss for lack of merit by this Court of the petition for mandamus earlier filed and docketed
as G.R.L-48788 barred the accused from raising or litigating anew the issue of his minority; 2That an offender is not entitled to the benefit of suspension of sentence if at the time of trial he
could no longer qualify as a minor offender for purposes of the rule on suspension of sentence

because of his age, citing the cases of People vs. Capistrano, 92 Phil. 127 and People vs.
Estefa, 86 Phil. 104; and 3-That under Section 192, P.D. 603, as amended, accused-appellant
is not entitled to the benefit of suspension because he was convicted of an offense punishable
by death, considering that the retroactive application to him of Articles 189 and 192, P.D. 603
as amended by P.D. 1179 may not be assailed because said articles are procedural in nature
and there is no vested right in rules of procedure.
We find no merit' to the opposition of the People. Our dismissal of the mandamus petition in
G.R. L-48788 which was for lack of merit due to the insufficient proof of minority of the
accused is no bar to raising the same issue in the instant automatic review of the case after
We had admitted the proper authentication of the accused's birth certificate "to form part of the
evidence." (See Resolution of June 4, 1981, rollo). The second ground is likewise without
merit for the accused was below 21 years at the time of his trial and even at the time judgment
was promulgated to him on December 3, 1976 (he was then 19 years, 3 months and 3 days
old). Neither does the third ground hold water because P.D. 603 was amended on May 15,
1977, which was after the trial and conviction already of the accused. The amendment passed
during the pendency of the appeal and it cannot adversely affect the right, privilege or benefit
accorded to the minor for suspension of the sentence under the original provision of Article
192 of P.D. 603, which reads as follows:
Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing the
evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has
committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment
of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to
the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated
by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall
have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper,
after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the
agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the
Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as the Court
may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
P.D. 1179, Section 2 and made effective August 15, 1977 amended Articles 192 and 193 of
P.D. 603 by adding as its penultimate paragraph the following:
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed
suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted of an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment. (emphasis supplied)
The lower court having erred in not suspending the sentence of conviction against the
accused-appellant who is entitled thereto under the original provisions of Article 192 of P.D.
603, We agree with the defense plea that the "accused-appellant's imprisonment in the BRIG
(be treated) as equivalent to what should have been his full period of commitment under the
care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and Development. After all, and as said
Ministry has reported, it has been regularly visiting accused-appellant at his cell in the BRIG
and is, therefore, in a position to attest to the exceptional behavior of accused-appellant."
We have examined carefully the documentary proofs attached to the appellant's Motion to
Dismiss showing that from August 11, 1975 to the present, accused-appellant has behaved
properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community, and these are

(a) Official Report of the BRIG Commander, USN Subic Naval Base; (b) Progress Report filed
with this Court on November 6, 1980 by the Ministry of Social Services and Development,
Olongapo City Branch; and (c) Progress Report with annexes dated February 18, 1981 filed
on March 4, 1981 by the Ministry of Social Services and Development; and (d) Diploma
awarded by the University of La Verne California, U.S.A. showing completion of a course in
Behavioral Science, on January 24, 1981, while he was a prisoner in the BRIG. The Final
Report prepared and submitted by the Supervising Social Worker of the Ministry of Social
Services and Development Dated September 14, 1981 was subsequently filed with Us and it
states as follows:
FINAL REPORT
In compliance with the request of the Legal Office, U.S. Naval Base, the Ministry of Social
Services and Development, Olongapo City Branch Office respectfully submits this final report
on the progress of the behavior of the above-mentioned youth.
Michael Jerome Butler has been detained at the Naval Station Brig of the U.S. Naval Base for
a period of six years now. Since his detention, he has been visited and was given counselling
by the Social Worker.
While in confinement, he was assigned to the Brig's Library, Coffee Mess and at present at the
Administrative Office. At the Administrative Office, he is responsible in keeping the records on
file, typing various forms and correspondence and forms reproduction. The present Brig
Officer said that Prisoner Butler works well requiring limited supervision as he sets and
pursues goals in an organized manner. He can be relief upon to complete an assigned task in
a timely manner. He also performs all janitorial work required for the above-mentioned spaces.
He gets along very well with the Brig's Staff and other confines and he goes out of his way to
help other confines adjust to confinement and to rehabilitate themselves.
He made use of his time in the Brig constructively and on January 29, 1981, he graduated at
the LA Verne Co with the degree m Behavioral Science. This was made possible thru his selfdetermination, diligence, courage and interest. He also takes an active part in promoting
health and physical fitness to all cofinees as well as staff.
Confines Butler is not only involved in assisting and helping his co- confines but also gives
financial support to a disabled person in the person of Benjamin dela Cruz and to his (Butler)
mother who is in United States.
Mr. Butler has been incharge of the complete operation of the Brig's Library and he kept it well
stocked and completely clean and neat. He also taken the duties of a Coffee Mess and had
accomplished the job expertly.
He was given a task within the compound that only trusted confinee would be given and had
carried them with zest. His personal appearance and uniforms are always in accord with the
Navy standard. With the above findings and Mr. Butler's desire to start life anew, this Final
Report is submitted. /
Prepared and Submitted by:
(SGD.) ELOISA A. GARCIA
Supervising Social Worker
14 Sept. 1981
Noted by:
(SGD.) JUANITA B. LAFORTEZA
City Social Welfare Officer

From these reports, We are fully satisfied that the accused. appellant has behaved properly
and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community. It is of no moment that
the accused had not been specifically committed by the court to the custody or care of the
Department of Social Welfare then, now the Ministry of Social Services and Development, or
to any training institution operated by the government or duly-licensed agencies as directed
under Article 192 of P.D. 603. At any rate, the Commander of the U.S. Naval Base in Subic
Bay to whom the accused was committed in the Order of December 3, 1976 pending the
finality of judgment rendered in the case pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 5, Article 13
of the Revised Base Military Agreement, may be considered a responsible person to whom
the accused may be committed for custody or care under the said Article 192 of P.D. 603.
What is important is the result of such custody and care showing his conduct as well as the
intellectual, physical, moral, social and emotional progress made by the accused as shown in
the favorable recommendation of the Supervising Social Worker of the Ministry of Social
Services and Development who had visited him regularly and given counselling. We hereby
approve the recommendation of the Ministry that "Michael Butler be given a chance to enjoy
his life fully outside the jail, thus promoting Ms best interest and welfare" (Progress Report
dated October 27, 1980); "that Mr. Michael Butler is now fully rehabilitated, it is our
recommendation that he be given an opportunity to live happily and prove himself outside the
Brig" (Progress Reported dated February 18, 1981); "with the above findings and Mr. Butler's
desire to start life anew, this Final Report is submitted." (Final Report dated September 14,
1981).
The dismissal of the case against the accussed Michael Butler is, therefore, meritorious and
justifiable. We hereby order his final discharge therefrom. His final release, however, shall not
obliterate his civil liability for damages in the amount of P24.000.00 to the heirs of the victim
which We hereby affirm. Such release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of
execution for the recovery of civil damages. (Article 198, P.D. 603).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the case against the accused-appellant
Michael J. Butler is hereby DISMISSED and We hereby order his final discharge from
commitment and custody. The civil liability imposed upon him by the lower court shall remain.
Costs de oficio.
Motion To Dismiss granted.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Concepcion Jr., De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Vasquez,
Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Makasiar, J., I join the dissent of Justice Aquino.
Abad Santos, J., I reserve my vote.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J.:, dissenting:
I concur in the finding that Michael J. Butler, an American Negro serving as a seaman in the
U.S. Navy since February 3,1975 (he was born on September 4, 1957), committed murder on
August 8, 1975 when he killed a hostess, Enriquita Alipo 26, a native of Bugasong, Antique, in

her residence at 8 Fontaine Street, Olongapo City, as proven by his extrajudicial confession
(Exh. H) which was corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti (Exh. D).
That confession was admissible in evidence, although it was taken during custodial
interrogation, when Butler was not assisted by counsel, because he voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently waived in writing his constitutional rights to have counsel and to remain silent.
Such waiver is allowed (Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd 684).
Butler's confession shows that the murder was qualified by abuse of superiority. It was not
aggravated by the circumstance of outraging or scoffing at her person or corpse. The trial
court appreciated that aggravating circumstance because of the testimony of Doctor Angeles
Roxas, the medico-legal officer, that Butler had anal intercourse with the victim after her death.
Doctor Roxas based his conclusion on the fact that the victim's anus was partly open and
contained spermatozoa. He said that the anus would have completely closed had the
intercourse occurred while the victim was still alive.
On the other hand, Butler in his confession said:
I rolled the girl over and made love to her. (By this I mean I engaged in sexual intercourse with
her from the rear.) My intention was to screw her in the vagina. If I screwed her in the rectum, I
didn't intend to.
After we finished, I rolled over and went back to sleep again ... When she and I engaged in
sexual intercourse, I reached a climax while by penis was in her. (Exh. H).
The trial court conjectured that "Butler not satisfied with a normal vaginal intercourse
demanded from the deceased (hospitality girl) an anal intercourse. Upon being refused, the
accused infuriated into a demonic frenzy, took hold of a saint figurine, knocked his victim
unconscious, smothered her to death with a pillow and after she was dead, performed anal
coitus with the dead person."
In my opinion the speculations of the medico-legal officer and the trial judge that there was
posthumous sodomy are unwarranted. The prosecution is bound by Butler's confession. He
indicated therein that he had sexual intercourse with the victim from the rear when she was
alive and not after her death. He alleged that the squabble over his five-peso bill, which the
victim took without his consent, was the cause of the fight which he had with the victim.
Consequently, the circumstance of having outraged or scoffed at the victim's corpse cannot be
appreciated in this case.
The confession also proves that Butler did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that
which he committed and that he was intoxicated at the time the killing was perpetrated.
Taking into account the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty imposable
on Butler should be lowered by one degree. He is entitled to an indeterminate sentence.
He should be sentenced to a penalty of five years of prision correccional maximum as
minimum to eleven years of prision mayor as maximum.
The trial court did not suspend the sentence of the accused although he was below eighteen
years of age when he killed the victim because he did not ask for a suspended sentence and
he had committed a capital offense.
On December 17, 1976, or a few days after the trial court promulgated its judgment
sentencing Butler to death, when he was amity 19 years, three months and thirteen days old,
his counsel filed a motion for new trial wherein he asked that he be given a suspended
sentence. The trial court denied the motion. That incident was terminated in the lower court
when it issued an order on May 3, 1977, denying Butler's second motion for reconsideration.

Thereafter, the record of the case should have been elevated to this Court without delay for
automatic review of the death penalty. But, inexplicitly, the record was received in this Court
more than twenty-two months later, or on March 30, 1979.
Before the elevation of the record, Butler on August 25, 1978 filed in this Court a petition for
mandamus wherein he prayed that the trial court be ordered to set aside its judgment of
conviction, to suspend the proceedings and to commit Butler to the custody of the Department
of Social Welfare or any correctional institution pursuant to article 192 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code before it was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179.
This Court in its minute resolution of December 13, 1978 dismissed the petition for lack of
merit (Butler vs. Judge Veridiano II, L-48786).
It is incontrovertible that Butler was seventeen years, eleven months and four days old when
he killed the victim. Had he not contested the validity of his confession (an exercise in futility)
and had he pleaded guilty and asked for a suspended sentence, he could have been entitled
to the benefits of article 192 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (applicable to minors below
twenty-one years of age) before it was amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179 which took
effect on August 15, 1977. The text of article 192 is as follows:
ART. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender If after hearing
the evidence in the proper proceeding the court should find that the youthful offender has
committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment
of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to
the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated
by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall
have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper,
after considering the reports and recommendations of the department of Social Welfare or the
agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed.
The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the
Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as the Court
may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
Presidential Decree No. 1179 reduced the age of you offenders to less than eighteen years
(similar to the original provision of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code) and amended article
192 by requiring that the youthful offender should apply for a suspended sentence and that the
suspension of the sentence should be allowed only when public interest and the interest of the
minor would be served thereby.
The amendment also provided that there should be no suspension of the sentence of (1) one
who once enjoyed the suspension of sentence under article 192, (2) one who is convicted of
an offense punishable by death or life 'imprisonment and (3) one who is convicted for an
offense by military tribunals.
The text of article 192, as amended by Presidential D Nos. 1179 and 1210 (effective on
October 11, 1977) is as follows:
ART. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing
the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful-offender has
committed the acts charged against him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment
of conjuction the court upon application of the youthful offender and if it the best interest of the
public as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend all further

proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social
Services and Development or to any training institution operated by the government or any
other responsible person until he shall reached twenty-one years of age, or for a shorter
period as the court may deem proper, after consider the reports and recommendations of the
Department of Social Services and Development or the government training institution or
responsible person under whose care he has been committed.
Upon receipt of the application of the youthful offender for suspension of his sentence, the
court may require the Department of Social Services and Development to prepare and submit
to the court a social case study report over the offender and his family.
The Youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the
Department of Social Services & Development or government training institution as the court
may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed
suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted of an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the
Military Tribunals.
But he assailed the admissibility of his confession under section 20, Article IV of the
Constitution. He even filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence
tending to prove that the victim was killed by her husband.
On September 24, 1981, Butler filed in this Court a verified motion to dismiss the case on the
ground that he had been illegally deprived of his right to a suspended sentence and to be
committed to a correctional institution, as prescribed in the Child and Youth Welfare Code.
It was alleged that since August 11, 1975 Butler has been confined in the Subic Bay Naval
Station Brig (stockade). He even enrolled in one of the schools of the La Verne College in the
Subic Naval Base and finished the course in Behavioral Science.
I dissent from the ponente's opinion that Butler should have been given a suspended
sentence and that, by reason of his good behavior while confined in the Subic Naval Base
Stockade, he should now be released and discharged.
Butler has taken inconsistent positions. His ambivalence is the cause of his having lost the
right to ask for a suspended sentence. His repudiation of his confession and his plea of not
guilty are inconsistent with his contention that he should have been given a suspended
sentence, a remedy which presupposes that he is guilty.
Because Butler is now twenty-five years old, the question of whether he is entitled to a
suspended sentence has become moot and academic. He is no longer a juvenile offender.
He should be made to serve his sentence of five years of prision correccional as minimum to
eleven years of prision mayor as maximum. The most that can be done for him is to give him
full credit for his confinement in the stockade, a period already exceeding the minimum of his
indeterminate sentence, and to give him a conditional pardon or release him on parole.
This Court has ruled in several cases that where the accused was below eighteen years at the
time he committed a crime but he was over eighteen years at the time of his trial or conviction,
he is not entitled to a suspended sentence (People vs. Casiguran L-45387, November 7,
1979, 94 SCRA 244, 249).
If at the time the case is decided by this Court, the accused is no longer a minor, with more
reason, he is not entitled to a suspended sentence.
Thus, where on May 14, 1963, when the robbery with homicide was committed, Teresita
Nolasco one of the accused, was 15 years and five months old, and the trial court did not

suspend her sentence but convicted her, this Court in its decision dated December 19, 1970,
affirmed the judgment of conviction and imposed on her the proper penalty after giving her the
benefit of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority (People vs. Espejo, L-27708, 36
SCRA 400, 425. See People vs. Parcon, L-39121, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 425;
People vs. Labrinto, L-43528-29, October 10, 1980, 100 SCRA 299; People vs. Capistrano, 92
Phil. 125; People vs. Celespara 82 Phil. 399; People vs. Nunez, 85 Phil. 448).
Footnotes
1 t.s.n., pp. 2, 4-5, 7, July 21, 1976.
2 t.s.n., pp. 207-209, 210-213, 218, July 14, 1976.
3 t.s.n., pp. 215-217, July 14, 1976.
4 t.s.n., pp.90-91, 97-98,100-102,121-122,125, May 5, 1976.
5 t.s.n., pp. 255-258, 260-261, 264, 276, 293, July 29, 1976; t.s.n., pp. 10-11, 12-14,17-22,
May 10, 1976; t.s.n., pp. 37-38,39-42, May 12, 1976.
6 t.s.n., pp. 3-4,8-16,18-21,26-31, May 3, 1976.
7 People vs. Molledo, L-34248, Nov. 21, 1978, 86 SCRA 66.
8 384 U.S. 436.
9 Accused-Appellant's Brief, pp. 15-17.
10 Accused-Appellant's Brief, pp. 21-22.
11 t.s.n., pp. 25-27, Sept. 22, 1976.
12 t.s.n., pp. 7-9, Sept. 22, 1976.
13 t.s.n., pp. 29-31, Sept. 22, 1976.
14 Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief, p. 24.
15 51 Phil. 385.
16 30 SCRA 352.
17 People vs. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798.
18 People vs. Cabiling 74 SCRA 285, pp. 303-304.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36941 June 29, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL SAYLAN alias PAEL, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Federico Y. Alikpala, Jr., for accused-appellant.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental in Criminal Case No. 52-M which imposed the death penalty.

RAFAEL SAYLAN was accused of the crime of rape in the sworn complaint of Eutropia Agno
said to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of January, 1972, at more or less 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at
Sitio Craser, Malinao, Jingo City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent to have sexual intercourse, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally with the use of a dagger, force and intimidate
Eutropia Agno y Arcay, to remove her pantie and to lay down on the ground and with the use
of a dagger, force and intimidation succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Eutropia Agno
y Arcay, a woman of good reputation and against her will. That the commission of the
foregoing offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior
strength, nighttime, uninhabited place, ignominy and reiteracion. (Expediente, p. 27.)
The accused entered a plea of "not guilty" and after trial the court rendered the following
judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
4111, and the commission of the offense having been attended by three aggravating without
any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death, to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), and to pay
the costs. In view of the fact that the offended party is a married woman, aside from the fact
that she has not become pregnant as a result of the commission of the rape, the Court makes
no pronouncement as to acknowledgment and support of offspring. (Id., p. 64.)
The factual version of the prosecution is summarized in the People's brief as follows:
The complaining witness, Eutropia A. Agno, a married woman and a resident of Barrio
Malinao, Gingoog City, was a classroom teacher of the Malinao Elementary School (pp. 2, 3,
tsn., Feb. 22, 1973).
In the afternoon of January 23, 1971, Eutropia went to the public market in Gingoog City to
buy foodstuffs for her family and thereafter, she proceeded to the store of her mother to fetch
her five-year old daughter Nilsonita (p. 4, tsn., Id.). On their way home, Eutropia and Nilsonita
boarded a passenger jeepney and while inside the vehicle she (Eutropia) noticed that the
other passengers were Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the Malinao Elementary School, the
appellant, Rafael Saylan, and a couple whom she did not know (pp, 5, 6, tsn., Id.). The
jeepney went only as far as Malinas citrus farm because the road to Barrio Malinao was not
passable by vehicles (p. 5, tsn., Id.). It was almost 6:30 o'clock in the evening when the
jeepney arrived at the Malinas citrus farm and so all the passengers alighted and had to walk
all the way to Barrio Malinao which was about three and a half kilometers away (p. 5, tsn., Id.).
After walking some distance and upon reaching a junction, the couple separated from the
group and took the road leading to their house while Eutropia's group took the opposite road
(p. 9, tsn., Id.). The appellant, however, joined the group of Eutropia and when they reached
the place where the road was plain, appellant who was then walking side by side with Eutropia
suddenly pulled out a dagger about eight inches long and pointing it at the latter said, "Do not
shout, Nang, I will kill you!" (pp. 11, 12, tsn., Id.). At this juncture, appellant placed his right
arm around the neck of Eutropia with the dagger pointed at her left breast (p. 12, tsn., Id.),
after which he dragged Eutropia at some distance. When they reached the junction of the trail
for men and a trail for carabaos, he ordered everybody to stop and told the children (Nilsonita
and Rudy Gonzales) to stay behind and threatened to kill them if they persisted in following
them (pp. 17, 18, tsn., Id.). Thereafter, appellant again dragged Eutropia by her hand and

brought her towards a creek near a coconut tree which was about five meters away from
where Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales were (pp. 14, 15, 16, tsn., Id.). The appellant then
ordered Eutropia to remove her panty which she refused at first, but appellant threatened to
kill her, so she removed her panty after which appellant ordered her to lie down (pp. 18, 19,
tsn., Id.). Subsequently, appellant placed himself on top of the victim and inserted his penis
into her vagina and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her by moving his buttocks
up and down (pp. 20,21, tsn., Id.).
After the first sexual act, appellant ordered Eutropia to standup which the latter helplessly and
grudgingly followed (p. 23, tsn., Id.). Appellant again inserted his penis into her vagina and
then performed a push and puli movement (pp. 23, 24, 25, tsn., Id.). Not satisfied with the
second intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to lie down again preparatory to a third
intercourse (p. 26, tsn., Id.). Appellant again performed the sexual act with her (pp. 26, 27,
tsn., Id.).
After the third intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to stand up and then he bent her body
downwards with her hands and knees resting on the ground (p. 28, tsn., Id.). When the latter
was already in this position, appellant then placed himself behind her, inserted his penis into
her vagina and executed a push and puli movement in the dog's way of sexual intercourse
(pp. 27, 28, tsn., Id.)
After performing this uncommon way of sexual intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to he
down again which the latter reluctantly obeyed because appellant's dagger was always
pointed at her and thereafter he had carnal knowledge of her for the fifth time (pp. 29, 30, tsn.,
Id.).
After the fifth intercourse, and after satisfying his sexual lust, appellant asked Eutropia if she
will tell her husband what he did to her and the latter answered, "I will not tell" (p. 31, tsn., Id.).
But she only said this so that appellant would let her go home (p. 33, tsn., Id.).
Afterwards, Eutropia and appellant returned to the place where the children were left and
upon arriving thereat, they found Nilsonita (Eutropia's daughter) asleep with Rudy seated
dozing beside her (pp. 32, 33, tsn., Id.). Nilsonita who was sleeping was carried by the
appellant and then they all proceeded to Malinao (pp. 33, 34, tsn., Id.).
After walking some distance, Eutropia saw the house of her friend "Ben" and upon
approaching the said house, she shouted, "Ben, Ben, please give me hot water" (p. 34, tsn.,
Id.). Upon hearing her voice, Ben, who was still awake at the time, opened the door of his
house and allowed Eutropia to come up (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Eutropia immediately went upstairs
and went straight to the room of Ben as she was feeling very bad (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Appellant,
who was then carrying Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales, were also allowed to go upstairs (p. 35,
tsn., Id.). Meanwhile, Eutropia requested Ben to fetch her husband (p. 35, tsn., Id.).
When Eutropia woke up between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock that evening, her husband was
already there (p. 36, tsn., Id.). She then asked him whether the appellant was stin around, and
in reply, he told her that appellant had already left (p. 37, tsn., Id.). Eutropia then told her
husband that she was raped by the appellant (p. 37, tsn., Id.). Upon learning of the dastardly
act committed by the appellant, he advised his wife to submit herself to a medical examination
(p. 37, tsn., Id.).
The following morning, the offended party was brought to the office of the City Health
Department of Gingoog City where she was examined by Dr. Ireneo O. Pascual who after
conducting a thorough physical examination, issued a medical certificate with the following
findings, to wit:

(1) Multiparous.
(2) Presence of viscid whitish secretions at vaginal fornix
(3) Microscopic examination of secretions reveals epithelial cells, but no spermatozoa
Identified.
(pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Feb. 24, 1973; Exh. "A").
Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the Malinao Elementary School and one of the witnesses
for the prosecution, testified that he met Mrs. Eutropia Agno in the afternoon of January 23,
1972 at the public market of Gingoog City buying foodstuffs for her family (pp. 2, 3, tsn., Feb.
26, 1973). On their way back to Barrio Malinao, they boarded a passenger jeepney and while
he was inside the vehicle, he noticed that the other passengers aside from Mrs. Agno, her
daughter, and himself were the appellant and a couple whose names he did not know ( p. 4,
tsn., Id.). The jeepney, however, could only travel up to the Marinas Citrus farm and so they
had to walk all the way to Barrio Malinao (p. 4, tsn., Id.) After was some distance and upon
reaching a trail for carabaos, the appellant suddenly pulled a dagger and placed his arms
around the neck of Mrs. Agno and then dragged her towards the carabao trail (pp. 4, 5, tsn.,
Id.). Meanwhile, he and Nilsonita were left behind and they fell asleep because it took a long
time for the appellant and Mrs. Agno to come back for them (p. 5, tsn., Id.). When Mrs. Agno
and the appellant returned, he was already awake while Nilsonita was still asleep and so
appellant had to carry her in going home to Man (p. 6, tsn., Id.).lwphl@it After was some
distance, Mrs. Agno saw the house of Mang Ben and because she was feeling bad, they all
went to the house of Mang Ben where Mrs. Agno spent the night (p. 7, tsn., Id.). Afterwards,
he and the appellant left the house of Mang Ben and then they proceeded to his house at
Malinao where both of them slept (pp. 7, 21, tsn., Id.). (At pp. 2-8.)
The accused did not deny having had sexual intercourse with Mrs. Agno; in fact he admitted
that he copulated with her for three successive times in the early evening of January 23, 1972,
but he claimed that it was with her consent. Accordingly, he now claims that:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE HAD BEEN
COMMITTED AGAINST THE WILL AND CONSENT OF THE COMPLAINANT.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES HAD
ACCOMPANIED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. (Brief, p. 5.)
The appeal must fail for the reasons stated hereunder.
This is a typical rape case. Only the participants could directly testify on the alleged sexual
abuse and the accused alleges consent on the part of the complainant. The question of
credibility arises and under the circumstances We have to rely heavily on the determination
made by the trial judge who observed the demeanor of the witnesses while before Us is only
the cold transcript of what they said.
We accept the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court that the complainant was in
fact raped by the appellant. There is no fact or circumstance in the record which will justify a
different action.
The claim of the appellant that the sexual intercourse was mutually agreed is utterly
incredible. If it were true that Mrs. Agno consented to have coitus with the appellant, her
conduct thereafter defies understanding because it is contrary to reason and it has not been
shown that Mrs. Agno, a school teacher, was bereft of common sense. For if it was true that
the sexual act was indeed mutually desired and performed why did she complain not only to
her husband but also to the authorities? An affair such as that claimed by the appellant is
carried out in a discreet manier. On the other hand, the version of the complainant has indicia

of credibility. For her version bared her shame to a small community and her exposure was
necessary only because she had to reveal the truth. No, We simply cannot believe the
appellant's version.
We have said above that the findings and conclusions of the trial court are entitled to great
respect. In finding the appellant guilty, this is what the court a quo said in part:
The testimony of the accused is incredible. When he told his love to the offended party for the
first time, they were only two in the latter's house. He had more time with her then. She refuse
him because she is married. He tried for the second time. He was again refused because she
is married. It is unthinkable and highly improbable that on the evening of January 23, 1972,
after only three minutes, the offended party would rush to accept his love and go to the extent
of thanking him for his considering her daughter as his own, unless she was coerced,
threatened, forced and intimidated.
It is highly improbable for a school teacher with several children to exchange her husband
only 40 years old and with a good means of livelihood for one whom she does not know and
whom she has observed as doing nothing except to play basketball. It is subversive of the
traits, character and nature of Filipino women to say that the offended party, a school teacher
and a girl scout accepted the love of a man who is good for nothing and surrendered her
whole body and virtue to him after an accidental courtship of only three minutes. The offended
party is an unsophisticated and conservative woman, fixing her hair the old fashion way. She
does not apply make-up on her face, and her dress is up to her knees. This makes the
pretensions of the accused all the more incredible. (Expediente, p. 59.)
The complaint alleges the following aggravating circumstances: abuse of superior strength,
nocturnity, despoblado, ignominy, and reiteracion.
The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape or is
absorbed in the element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity "there being no evidence
that the accused purposely sought it to facilitate the commission of this rape." (Id, p. 63.)
Despoblado was present according to the trial court because: "The accused dragged the
offended party, at the point of a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from the junction,
but 40 to 50 meters below to better attain his purpose without interference, and to better
secure himself from detection and punishment (U.S. vs. Vitug, 17 Phil. 1). Even the junction
where the two children were left is already 400 meters from the nearest house. While there
maybe occasional passersby, this does not destroy its being an uninhabited place. (People vs.
Bangug, 52 Phil. 87)." (Id, p. 62.) We hold that the trial court for the reasons stated correctly
held that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place.
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the
missionary position, i.e. male supenor female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do"
i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because "The studies of
many experts in the matter have shown that this 'position' is not novel and has repeatedly and
often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation. (Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the
sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.
The trial court also held that "there is no reiteracion because one of the offenses, namely
Robbery in Band, for which the accused has been penal was committed after the commission
of this rape case, and the penalty imposed on the other offense of Frustrated Homicide, is
lighter than the penalty for rape." (Id, P. 63.)
Although not alleged in the complaint, the trial court stated that the offense was aggravated by
disregard of rank because it was a fact knowm to the appellant that Mrs. Agno was a school

teacher. The appellant claims that this circumstance cannot be assigned to him because there
was no deliberate intent to offend or insult the rank of Mrs. Agno. The Solicitor General agrees
with the appellant for the same reason.
The judgment of the trial court is in accordance with the facts and the law but it cannot be
affirmed completely because of the lack of the necessary number of votes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is modified in the sense that the appellant shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death and the indemnity to be paid to the
offended party is increased to P20,000.00. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Plana, Escolin, Relova,
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
FERNANDO SULTAN y LATO appeals from the Decision of the trial court finding him guilty of
the special complex crime of robbery with rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and
ordering him to return to his victim one (1) wrist watch, one (1) ring, one (1) pair of earrings,
and one (1) necklace valued at P1,600.00, P850.00, P500.00, and P2,100.00, respectively,
and cash of P130.00; otherwise, to pay P5,180,00 if restitution be no longer feasible. He was
further ordered to pay P50,000.00 for moral damages. 1
The evidence for the prosecution was based principally on the testimony of complaining
witness Juditha M. Bautista. According to her, on 2 June 1997 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening
she was on her way home from a visit to her cousin Cristina Mansilongan in Novaliches,
Quezon City; when she passed the dark alley in her cousin's compound she was accosted by
someone, later identified as accused-appellant Fernando L. Sultan, who pointed a sharp
instrument at her neck and announcing it was a "hold-up." He grabbed her and brought her to
a house along the alley which turned out to be his. Once inside the house, he made her sit
down. He offered her a drink; she refused it. Then he started divesting her of her watch, ring,
earrings, and necklace the values of which are now reflected in the Decision of the court a
quo, and her cash of P130.00. After taking her valuables, he started kissing her on the lips
and cheeks. As if to discourage him from making further sexual advances, she told him that
she was married with two (2) children but accused-appellant was not dissuaded from pursuing
his intentions. While pointing an ice pick at her he ordered her to undress. She acceded for
fear that he would kill her as she was under constant threat. After she had completely
undressed, accused-appellant ordered her to lie down on the floor. He then kissed her again
from head down. Still she could not resist him because of fear. He went on top of her, held her
two (2) hands on the level of her head, spread her thighs and inserted his penis into her
vagina. The coital encounter lasted for ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes. 2
After satisfying his lust, he ordered her to put on her bra and panty, tied her hands and went
out of the room to smoke. After ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes, he came back, untied her, and
once again with threat and intimidation sexually abused her. Thereafter, he tied her hands to a
protruding piece of wood in the room and held her in his arms. She cried. He told her that he
loved her and that he would answer for what he had done to her. They talked until noon the
following day without sleeping.3

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132470
April 27, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO SULTAN y LATO, accused-appellant.

In her effort to release herself from his clutches she "agreed" to elope with him. Perhaps
convinced that she was going to run away with him, he allowed her to go home at noon to get
her things. She was then staying with her cousin Nita del Rosario, at No. 9 Sta. Eleuteria
Street, Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City. He even accompanied her to the highway to get a
ride home.4
When Juditha arrived home she saw her sister Antonette in the house. She was not actually
residing there but went there only that day. Juditha lost no time in narrating her harrowing
experience to her sister. Immediately Antonette called her brother SPO1 Fernando M. Bautista
who resides in Bulacan.5 SPO1 Bautista arrived at ground 3:00 or 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon
and was told about what happened.6 He then advised Juditha to go back to the house of

accused-appellant for the "planned elopement" so that he and his two (2) companions 7 could
stage an arrest.8

ask him for restitution of her valuables after the alleged threat had ceased, i.e., when there
was already an agreement between them to elope?

On their way to the house of accused-appellant, Juditha rode in a passenger jeep with her
sister Antonette and cousin Nita while her brother and his two (2) companions followed them
on board an XLT Van. Juditha alighted near the house of accused-appellant while her
companions waited for her and accused-appellant along the highway. When she arrived at
accused-appellant's place, he was already waiting for her outside the store nearby. They went
inside his house and came out twenty (20) minutes later. They boarded a passenger bus while
SPO1 Bautista and his companions trailed them. When the bus reached the corner of Forest
Hill Subdivision, Gulod, Novaliches, it slowed down because of the traffic thus making it easier
for SPO1 Bautista and his companions to board the bus. Upon seeing her brother and his
companions, Juditha motioned to them. They immediately approached accused-appellant and
boxed him before they could arrest him. The other passengers of the bus joined in hitting
accused-appellant. This caused a commotion in the bus. Some policemen who were in the
barangay hall across the street saw the disturbance. They boarded the bus to find out what
happened. Then they assisted in facilitating the arrest of accused-appellant and brought him
to the barangay hall. He was later on transferred to the police headquarters for further
interrogation.

These arguments fail to persuade us. The testimony of complainant as to the taking of her
cash and valuables is evidence enough to sustain a conviction for robbery considering that we
find no fault in the pronouncement of the trial court that her testimony is credible. The
persuasive value of the declaration of credibility is bolstered by our own scrutiny of the
testimony of complainant showing her answers to the incisive questions propounded to her to
be firm and straightforward.

At the police station the authorities investigated Juditha who readily identified accusedappellant as her robber and rapist. The police then requested for physical examination to find
signs of sexual abuse. Medico-Legal Inspector Dr. Dennis G. Bellin found no external signs of
violence although there was a deep fresh laceration at 5 o'clock position in Juditha's hymen.
He also discovered other lacerations, deep healed, at 3, 7 and 9 o'clock positions. Dr. Bellin
also observed that Juditha's external vaginal orifice offered moderate resistance to his
examining index finger and virgin-sized vaginal speculum. She was no longer a virgin when
the alleged rape transpired.9
On 5 June 1997 an Information 10 for the special complex crime of robbery with rape was filed
against accused-appellant Fernando Sultan y Lato, docketed as Crim. Case No. Q-97-71353.
But accused-appellant brushed aside the charge and claimed that it was simply a sexual
congress of consenting adults.
Finding the complaining witness' version more credible, the trial court, on 5 June 1998, found
accused-appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. He was
ordered to return to Juditha Bautista one (1) wrist watch valued at P1,600.00, one (1) ring
worth P850.00, one (1) pair of earrings worth P500.00, one (1) necklace worth P2,100.00 and
cash in the amount of P130.00, or the payment of P5,180.00 if return was not possible.
Accused-appellant was further directed to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral damages. 11
In this appeal, accused-appellant submits that there is no convincing proof that he is guilty of
the crime charged.
As to the robbery, he contends that the testimony of complainant that she was robbed of her
personal valuables should not be given weight and credence as (a) no evidence was
presented in court to prove her claim and that (b) if he had really robbed her, why did she not

While there may have been no effort on the part of complainant to retrieve her personal
belongings from accused-appellant even after all threats had ceased, her failure to do so does
not under the circumstances necessarily dispute the commission of robbery. Article 293 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "[a]ny person who, with intent to gain, shall take any
personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of
person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery." When accused-appellant
divested complaining witness of her personal belongings he committed the crime of robbery.
All the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment were present, i.e., (a)
personal property belonging to another, (b) unlawful taking, (c) intent to gain, and (d) violence
or intimidation. It is therefore immaterial that she failed to ask for the return of her personal
things. Moreover, her actuation could only be fairly interpreted to mean that she did not want
accused-appellant to be suspicious of her moves.
As for the charge of rape, accused-appellant maintains that the requisite force or intimidation
was not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt; that there was some form of
consent to the sexual intercourse as complainant did not put up tenacious resistance despite
lack of threat on her life during the alleged rape; and, that complainant on cross-examination
was not certain whether accused-appellant was armed at the commencement of the rape.
We likewise find these contentions of accused-appellant unconvincing. The prosecution for
rape in the instant case is based solely on the testimony of complaining witness. Thus, the
basic issue that must be addressed is her credibility. Doctrinally, the trial court's assessment of
the credibility of witnesses is accorded the highest respect and weight by the appellate courts.
It is normally sustained unless material facts and circumstances have been overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied. 12 There is no such showing in this case.1wphi1
Accused-appellant might not have employed force in committing the rape but he definitely
used intimidation which was sufficient to make complainant submit herself to him against her
will for fear of life and personal safety. Accused-appellant grabbed her and dragged her to his
house. He was armed with an ice pick and threatened to kill her with it if she did not follow his
wishes. She was naturally intimidated and her intimidation started from that moment on, and
subsisted in her mind when the rape was started until its consummation. Intimidation is
subjective so it must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time
of the commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that it produces
fear, as in the present case, fear that if the complainant does not yield to the bestial demands
of accused-appellant something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter. Thus,
it is irrelevant that she was not certain when cross-examined that accused-appellant was
armed with an ice pick when the rape commenced; it was enough that he was holding

something that looked like an ice pick which engendered fear in her. With fear instilled in her
mind, it is understandable that she did not offer any resistance since any attempt to do so
would only be futile. Such failure on her part should not be taken to mean consent so as to
make her a willing participant in the sexual confrontation.
The Information charges accused-appellant with the special complex crime of robbery with
rape. The record shows that the prosecution has established that he committed both robbery
and rape with the intent to take personal property of another preceding the rape. Under Art.
294, par. (1), of the Revised Penal Code, ". . . [a]ny person guilty of robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, . . . when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape . . . ." Complaining witness
Juditha Bautista was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery. In this regard, this Court had
declared in some cases that the additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery
would not increase the penalty. 13 There were also cases; however, where this Court ruled that
the multiplicity of rapes committed could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. 14
Finally, in the recent case of People v. Regala, 15 the Court held that the additional rapes
committed should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance despite a resultant
"anomalous situation" wherein robbery with rape would be on the same level as robbery with
multiple rapes in terms of gravity. 16 The Court realized that there was no law providing for the
additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to be considered as aggravating circumstance.
It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Art. 14 of the
Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code which enumerates the
mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the
remedy lies with the legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that
the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe
the penal law in favor of the offender as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not
clearly made so by the statute. Under this view, the additional rape committed by accusedappellant is not considered an aggravating circumstance. Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "[i]n all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application
thereof . . . . 2. [w]hen there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied," the lower penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed on accused-appellant.
As to the award of damages to the complaining witness, an additional amount of P50,000.00
may be given as damages ex delicto in line with recent jurisprudence. 17
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant FERNANDO
SULTAN Y LATO GUILTY of the special complex crime of robbery with rape and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua, to pay Juditha M. Bautista P50,000.00 for moral damages,
P5,180.00 for actual damages representing the value of the personal properties plus the cash
amount of P130.00 taken from her is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount of
P50,000.00 be added as civil indemnity in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence. Costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Decision penned by Judge Diosdado M. Peralta, RTC-Br. 95, Quezon City.
2
TSN, 15 September 1997, pp. 3-19.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
TSN, 8 September 1997, pp. 3-11.
7
Bong Coronel and policeman Agustin Bautista, Jr.
8
See Note 6.
9
TSN, 15 September 1997, pp. 3-10.
10
Rollo, p. 4.
11
See Note 1.
12
People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 119218, 29 April 1999, citing People v. Banela, G.R. No.
124973, 18 January 1999.
13
People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 119218, 29 April 1999; People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 116918,
19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 259; People v. Lutao, G.R. No. 107798, 16 November 1995, 250
SCRA 45; People v. Precioso, G.R. No. 95890, 12 May 1993, 221 SCRA 748, cited in People
v. Regala, G.R. No. 130508, 5 April 2000.
14
People v. Candelario, G.R. No. 125550, 28 July 1999; People v. Pulusan, G.R. No. 110037,
21 May 1998, 290 SCRA 353; People v. Salvatierra, G.R. No. 111124, 20 June 1996, 257
SCRA 489.
15
G.R. No. 130508, 5 April 2000.
16
Citing People v. Pedroso, No. L-32997, 30 July 1982, 115 SCRA 599; People v. Mabilangan,
No. L-48217, 30 January 1982, 211 SCRA 398.
17
People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 119218, 29 April 1999.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias

WARPAN, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the
person arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder
or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate
offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a
search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of
firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have aggravated the direct assault.
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as Warpan, appeals before us the September 17,
1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which
found him guilty of three out of the four charges lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations,[2] all signed by Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information[3] was
for maintaining a den for the use of regulated drugs. It reads as follows:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then
the owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo,[4] this City, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-in
Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, maintain said house as a den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form.[5]
The second Information[6] charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. We quote it below:

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000]

That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, without any justifiable reason or
purpose other than to use it in the commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control, the following
weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of
live ammunition; two (2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live
[ammunition]; one (1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M79 (single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with
SN-311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and
Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79

grenade launcher paltik, without first having obtained the necessary license and or permit
therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant violation of the aforementioned law.[7]
The third Information,[8] for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14
Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring
and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another and with intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM
B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1
RICARDO J. LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their
M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives,
aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, well
known to the accused as members of the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City Police
Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority, who at the time of the attack were
engaged in the performance of their duties, that is, on the occasion when said officers were
about to serve the Search Warrant legally issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the
person of the accused thus commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly
by overt acts, and if the accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the
above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary desistance but rather
because of the fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek cover during the
firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also by the fact
said police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan
Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and
subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to
make good his escape and has remained at-large.[9]
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs.[10]
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini
were dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a
reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the lower court. The accused were consequently
released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during
which he entered a plea of not guilty.[11] After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered,
the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. WARPAN 1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of
Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended, and SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the
costs;

2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to
Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;
3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866,
as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8)
YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) and pay the costs;
4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an
indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as
minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE
THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and to pay the costs. (emphasis in the original)
Hence, this appeal.[12]
The Facts
Prosecutions Version
In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the
issuance of a search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After
the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted
inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in
connection with the service of the search warrant. The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe
Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea
was assigned as presentor of the warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique
Rivera were designated to conduct the search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter
guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).
After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin
Soledad proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several
police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach
appellants house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting,
[P]olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the
policemen were about ten (10) meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a
rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the
back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).
SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with the first
group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant.

When they were fired upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and
Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence to observe the movements at the
second floor of the house while other policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998,
pp. 50-51).
In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 4546, 57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of
the extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other
members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the
main door and went inside the sala of the ground floor while other policemen surrounded the
house. Two (2) old women were in the sala together with a young girl and three (3) children.
One of the old women took the children to the second floor while the young girl remained
seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).
Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant
firing an M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant
noticed their presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the
jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol
rushed downstairs and asked help from the other members of the raiding team to arrest
appellant. Lacastesantos went to the second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to
fire in the direction of the second floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar
Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the
sofa at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He
removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted
seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle
magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with
twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines
(Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).
After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio and
Obut followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP
Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela
Pea and Rivera then searched appellants room on the ground floor in the presence of Punong
Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh.
J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations
(Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2)
with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty
shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998,
pp. 30-32).

Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga
Police. [O]n the morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go
to appellants house to buy shabu. Locson knew appellant as a seller of shabu (TSN, April 22,
1998, p. 5) and had been to appellants house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio
Hondo and arrived at appellants house at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of shabu from
appellant. The latter got three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed
Locson to go behind the curtain where there was a table. There were six (6) persons already
smoking. There was a lighted kerosene lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table.
They asked Locson to smoke shabu and Locson obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of
shabu he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).
While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire coming from appellants house. They all
stood and entered appellants compound but were instructed to pass [through] the other side.
They met appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told them to escape because the police
are already here. They scampered and ran away because there were already shots. Locson
jumped over the fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the
Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit
(Exh. M) narrating what transpired at appellants house [o]n the afternoon of September 24,
1997.
After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt
for Property Seized (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search. The receipt
was signed by Dela Pea as the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano
and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant but
he refused to acknowledge the properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).
An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of
appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that
appellant had fired a gun before the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder
residue examinations conducted on September 26, 1997 showed that the following firearms
were fired (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver (homemade) with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1),
another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a serial number (Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm
M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an M79 rifle without a serial number
(Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998,
pp. 16-21).
With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector
Susan M. Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office
9, on the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules
with a total weight of 1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the examination of one (1)
crystalline stone weighing 83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. L).

The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive
Section show that appellant had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm
and ammunition or x x x been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence (Exh.
X)[14]
Defenses Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court.[15] Hence, we
quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:
Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave his
occupation as smuggling (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and
bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his
true name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only
his alias. However, he admitted that more people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than
Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-40; 46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the house of
Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandaos house and not in his house
because they ha[d] a sort of a conference as Dandaos daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia.
He noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he
heard shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was
arrested. He said he was arrested xxx [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the
fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my house (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know
who arrested him considering that the one who arrested me does not have nameplate. He
was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested him testified in Court. He was
handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary School. According to
him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the
policemen [were] the one[s] who fire[d] at us (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen
for sure they [would] die [b]ecause the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my house. He
does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) which according to policemen, he used in firing at them.
The gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman
also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that
the M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G; G-1 to G-2), the two
(2) M14 magazines with live ammunition (Exh. G-3; G-4); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers
(Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty (50) aluminum foils each containing shabu (Exhs. J-1 to J-50) placed
inside a pencil case (Exh. J, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh. W) and the
white crystalline stone (Exh. K) all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen just
produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were
brought by the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing
assorted coins, he said: that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as
their evidence (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)
Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He
affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He
could only recognize the husband whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the

place already because they were afraid when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May
4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson
recognized him, in his case he does not know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn,
p.11, id). He did not sell anything to Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu
but he knows for a fact that there are plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in
that place, in that area known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14,
id).
After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one
day and one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was
not able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police
station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes
with [a] match. From the police station, he was brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim
Boulevard where he was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar
(Sikkal) Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he
saw that it was the policeman who shot them[,] only I do not know his name. They were killed
at the back of his house. He said that no charges were filed against the one responsible for
their death (tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).
Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam
whom he calls Hadji Id at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma
Sailabbi. She was together with Babo Dandan, two small children and a helper when soldiers
entered the house. (W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house
(tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short and long firearms. They searched the
house and scattered things and got what they wanted. They entered the room of Walpan
Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag
outside the room, they grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan
Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search
Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and just before the policemen
left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that it was already late in the afternoon[;] before they left
that was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay Captain Hussin
Elhano (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived already late in the
afternoon, almost sundown (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag containing
jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen anything else that was taken from Walpan
Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).
Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 oclock [o]n the
afternoon of September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen
arrived and immediately arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he
was intending to bring to Sabah. He had around P50,000.00 placed inside a waist bag tied
around his waist. The policemen told him to lie down in prone position and a policeman
searched his back. They pulled his waist bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot
three times and was hit on the forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was
taken to the police station where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained

at the City Jail for three months and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29,
May 5, 1998).
Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997,
she was in the house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is
only one house between her parents house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband
Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpans wife. When Melba heard shots, she
went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her husband. The policeman called her
husband. When her husband went down, he was instructed by the policeman to lie down in
prone position. Then the policeman shot her husband. The policeman had two other
companions who also shot her husband while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.27, May 5, 1998).
Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24,
1997, she was sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a
motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom she
called a soldier. He went down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa.
Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her children and when she was about to
enter the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at her and there was a shot. As a
result of firing, three persons died, namely, Sikkal Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali
(tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).
Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o clock [o]n the
afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he
was attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo
already late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were already inside the house. Upon entering
the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police
advised him not to approach Walpan. The search was already over and things were already
taken inside the house. When he went inside the house, he saw the things that they
(policemen) searched, the firearms and the shabu (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see
the Search Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered during the search
which were being listed. They were being counted and placed on a table. Upon seeing the
things that were recovered during the search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. P; P-1) of the
things x x x taken during the search (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three dead bodies
at the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the house. The three persons were
killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id).[16]
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the
said Warrant because it had been issued for more than one specific offense,[17] in violation of
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[18] The court a quo ruled:
It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally null and void because it
was issued for more than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the

Rules of Court which provides that A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense xxx. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995),
the Supreme Court ruled that a search warrant for more than one offense - a scatter shot
warrant - violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is totally null and
void.[19] (emphasis in the original)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot
at the officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established by
the testimonies of several police officers,[20] who were participants in the raid, and confirmed
by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and appellant.[21]
Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his Counter
Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been no exchange
of gunfire during the raid.[22] The trial court concluded that the testimonies of these officers
must prevail over appellants narration that he was not in his house when the raid was
conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:
Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam
and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to
effect said arrest and confiscation of the firearm. Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules
of Court, A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx
(w)hen in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of
an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen entered the house of
accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended to serve
the Search Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was
pursued and arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who were
about to serve the Search Warrant.[23]
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the
M14 rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition)[24] used by appellant
against the police elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines.[25]
The trial court observed that these items were in plain view of the pursuing police officers.
Moreover, it added that these same items were evidence [of] the commission of a crime
and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure[26] since appellant had not applied for a
license to possess firearm and had not been given authority to carry firearm outside his
residence.[27]
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellants claim that the items that were
seized by the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if
the police officers wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during
the previous raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that
they would choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied by the barangay

chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. It then dismissed these
allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak defense.[28]
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned
as follows:
The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and
SPO1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained
a drug den in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or customers bought and used shabu or
methamphetamine hydrochloride by burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke
with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or
regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by
direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including
evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police
officers. The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan that he
did not maintain an extension house or a room where drug users who allegedly buy shabu
from him inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail over the testimonies of Locson, SPO1
Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that he is the owner of the extension house
but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants who rented that extension house. He knew
the name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the
husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpans testimony was not elaborated by
evidence as to when or for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental
paid, or by any other document showing that the extension house was in fact rented. The
defense of denial put up by accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan is a weak defense.
Denial is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given
evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
As between the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements
of the accused, the former deserve more credence.[29]
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner:
x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter
his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering that no
policeman was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance was proved to qualify the
attempted killing to attempted murder.
The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan cannot be held liable [for] the crime of
Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50)
pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as
evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of

Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as it was issued for more than one
offense, and were not found in plain view of the police officers who seized them. Neither could
the accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition except for the (1)
M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live
ammunition and two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live
ammunition respectively considering that the policemen who recovered or seized the other
firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag containing assorted coins
cannot be returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan because according to the
accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted
coins should be turned over to the National Treasury.[30]
The Issues
In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:
I
The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired
first at the police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led
to an exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the police officer.
II
The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular
inspection of the scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located.
III
The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine
hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the police.[31]
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for
ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame-up.
In addition, we shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the
Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower court
a better perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime.[32] We do not agree.

We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[33] We note in particular that the defense had even
requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a
fairly good idea of appellants house.[34] Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed
the proceedings.[35] Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a relevant event
has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge.[36] Here, there is no
reason to disturb the exercise of that discretion.[37]

Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?

Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Q: What did you see inside the house?

Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.[38] Suffice it to

state that the trial courts assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even
finality.[39] After carefully examining the records and finding no material inconsistencies to
support appellants claim, we cannot exempt this case from the general rule.[40] Quite the
contrary, the testimonies of these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon
the approaching police elements, and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1
Amado Mirasol Jr.[41] testified thus:

A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of
Walfran [sic] Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his
house[;] I saw two old woman.

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?

Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?
A: Yes.

A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground
floor. I was concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group
so, I, together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the house.

Q: And its there where you were met by a volley of fire?

Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: Yes.

COURT:

Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?

Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You
said you were fired upon?
A: More or less, five (5) meters.

A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our
presence and immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went
immediately and jumped from the window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the
neighbors house.

xxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

COURT:

Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your
colleague Felipe Gaganting ... I will reform that question.

Reform. That is leading

A: Yes.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
A: Yes.

xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbors house?
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.

A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the
members of the raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.

xxxxxxxxx

FISCAL NUVAL:

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with magazine, one magazine and seven round
[ammunition].

Q: Were you able to go down?

Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were there?

A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine
and I turned it over to the investigator.

A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team
and the investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest
Walfan Ladjaalam.[42]

Q: Where did you turn it over?

What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos,[43]
as follows:

Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?

A: At the crime scene.

A: Yes.
Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
Q: Why?
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside,
do not fire at the second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.

A: I put x x x markings.

Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?

xxxxxxxxx

A: At the sala set.

COURT:

Q: This sala set where is this located?

So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines?

A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.

A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.

Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?

Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?

A: Yes.

A: Empty.

Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?

Q: How about the M14?

A: Yes.

A: Found with [ammunition].

Q: Why can you identify that?

xxxxxxxxx

A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.

Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?

Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?

A: In the corner.

A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.

Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?

A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.

Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?
Q: Can you identify them?
A: It indicates that the gun was fired.
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: Recently?
Q: Where are your initials?
A: On the magazines.

A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before
the incident x x x.

Q: RJL?

COURT:

A: RJL.[44]

Q: There is also black residue?

These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the
weapons seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M14 which he had used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes DelfinDiestro explained in open court:

A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.

Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?
A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of
gun powder nitrates.

A: This one.

Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.

May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.

Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?

COURT:

A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a
person [would be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.

Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?
A: Yes.

Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?

Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?
A: Yes.
A: Yes, Your Honor.[45] (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-3, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with
this?
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there
[were] black and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.

Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements[46] of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the
approaching police officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his
possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the prosecutions
Certification[47] stating that he had not filed any application for license to possess a firearm,
and that he had not been given authority to carry any outside his residence.[48] Further, it
should be pointed out that his possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously

unauthorized because this weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private
individual.[49]
Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up
From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main
defense he raises is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were planted,
and that the entire Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost.
This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy
to fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove.[50] Absent any showing of an improper motive on
the part of the police officers,[51] coupled with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duty, such defense cannot be given much credence.[52] Indeed, after
examining the records of this case, we conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his
claim. On the contrary, his statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his
testimony during the trial.[53] He testified thus:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?

A They were not there.

Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at
Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you
were in your neighbors[] house at that time when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home
in [your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct.[54]
Crime and Punishment
The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct
assault with attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each
of these.

A I could not remember.

Maintenance of a Drug Den
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day
of December 1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name

(Showing)

We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an
offense for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly
established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had
used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time
of the raid. The formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who
testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension
lent credence to the prosecutions story.

A Yes, Sir. This is mine.

Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide

Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote:
that I was resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were
directed towards our house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed persons..
and I was apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x our house; [the] house you are
referring to [in] this paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this [what] you are
referring to [as] your house or the house of your neighbors [from] which you said you heard
gunshots?

The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault[55] with multiple counts
of attempted homicide. It found that [t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the
policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x constituted
such complex crime.[56]

FISCAL NUVAL:
Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?

A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: that [o]n that
afternoon of September 24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo
Muslim, my companions in my house [were] the two old women and my children, is this
correct?

We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision
correccional.[57] Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which
constitutes the most serious crime, should be imposed and applied in its maximum period.[58]
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial
court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD

1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8

years of prision mayor.

The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed
firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should
not have applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law
should have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.

Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the
specific facts of this case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide
-- was committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under
the second paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in
this case, illegal possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the
third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the
applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes
simple illegal possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time.[60]

The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys difficulty in
grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing
views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such
as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .
44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and
caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by
burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.

Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of
illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It
did not explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the
proviso[61] in the second paragraph, it seemed to have construed no other crime as referring
only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating
circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person
may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed
was direct assault with multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant
guilty of illegal possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the
statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission
of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms.
Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes
merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for
illegal possession of firearms.

If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such violation shall be absorbed
as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.[62] In this case, the plain
meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other
interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to
favor the accused.[63] Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of
illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the
crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms
cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or
entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of
their employment.

We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294,
should be applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the
original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took
effect on July 6, 1997.[64] In other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of
PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other
crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained
the specific proviso that no other crime was committed.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson[65] is misplaced. True, this Court
sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also
committed homicide. We explained, however, that the criminal case for homicide [was] not
before us for consideration.
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting
the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused
can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was
committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to
refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third
paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an
M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault.
While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional.
Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such
weapons in committing an even lighter offense,[66] like alarm and scandal[67] or slight
physical injuries,[68] both of which are punishable by arresto menor.[69] This consequence,
however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to
the Courts review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence[70] to the proven facts,
and we have done so in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted
homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6
years of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den, for which he was correctly
sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.

[5] Rollo, p. 10.

[6] Appellant was charged here together with Nur-In Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y
Hajaraini. The charge against the latter two was subsequently dismissed.
[7] Rollo, p. 12.
[8] In this Information, charged were appellant together with one PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula and
Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini. Charges against Sailabbi were later dropped; Hadjula still
remains at large.
[9] Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[10] No copy of the fourth Information was attached to the records. In any event, the trial court
acquitted him of this charge.
[11] Assisted by counsel de parte, Atty. Jose E. Fernandez.
[12] Notice of Appeal was filed on September 25, 1998. This case was deemed submitted for
resolution after the Courts receipt of the Brief for the Appellee on May 19, 2000. The filing of a
reply brief was deemed waived, as none was submitted within the reglementary period.
[13] Signed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, Assistant Solicitor General Carlos N.
Ortega and Associate Solicitor Rico Sebastian D. Liwanag.
[14] Appellees Brief, pp. 9-16; rollo, pp. 247-254.
[15] Appellants Brief, p. 5; rollo, p. 149. This Brief was signed by Atty. Jose E. Fernandez.
[16] Decision, pp. 23-32; rollo, pp. 51-60.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review,
at its sound discretion, of RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.

[17] These are: 1) violation of 16, Article III of RA 6495, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972; 2) violation of PD 1866 penalizing illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

[18] It provides:

[1] Written by Judge Jesus C. Carbon Jr.

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. -- A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

[2] Rollo, pp. 10-15.

[3] The appellant was charged together with his wife Nur-In Ladjaalam and one Ahmad
Sailabbi. Charges against the latter were later dropped.
[4] Also spelled Riohondo.

[19] Decision, pp. 32-33; rollo, pp. 60-61.

[20] These are, inter alia, SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr., SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, PO3
Enrique Rivera and PO3 Renato Dela Pea.

[37] See People v. Moreno, 83 Phil. 286, April 7, 1949.

[38] Appellants first assignment of error is herein taken up as the second issue.

[21] Decision, pp. 42-43; rollo, pp. 70-71. Both appellant and the firearms seized tested
positive for gunpowder nitrates.
[22] The trial court quoted the same thus:
[O]n the afternoon of September 24, 1998, I was at home in my house at Aplaya, Rio Hondo,
Barangay Campo Muslim xxx (and) I was resting and sleeping when I heard the sound of gun
reports, which awakened me. Then I noticed that the shots were directed towards our house,
hence I suspected that we were under attack by armed persons. I tried to escape and jumped
outside, but I was apprehended by the persons who attacked our house, before I learned they
were police officers. (Decision p. 35; rollo, p. 63.)

[39] See People v. Elamparo, GR No. 121572, March 31, 2000; People v. Cupino, et al., GR
No. 125688, March 31, 2000; People v. Estorco, GR No. 111941, April 27, 2000; People v.
Sultan, GR No. 132470, April 27, 2000; People v. Mendoza, GR No. 128890, May 31, 2000;
People v. Geral, GR No. 122283, June 15, 2000; People v. Rios, GR No. 132632, June 19,
2000; People v. Molina, infra.
[40] People v. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637, November 16, 1998.
[41] The witness is a member of the team that went to Ladjaalams house on September 24,
1997. He was tasked to bring the barangay captain to appellants house to serve as a witness
to the search.

[23] Decision, pp. 37-38; rollo, pp. 63-64.

[42] TSN, March 4, 1998, pp. 18-23.
[24] Seen by SPO1 Lacastesantos lying on top of a sofa on the second story of appellants
house when he pursued appellant.
[25] Seen at a corner on the same floor.

[43] Also a member or the raiding team. Lacastesantos, together with SPO1 Mirasol, went
inside the house. When appellant tried to escape, Mirasol pursued him; Lacastesantos
proceeded to the second floor.

[26] Decision, p. 38; rollo, p. 66.

[44] TSN, March 5, 1998, pp. 23-24, 28-29.

[27] Ibid.

[45] TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 10-11, 19-20.

[28] Ibid. p. 51; rollo, p. 79.

[46] In the en banc case of People v. Molina (292 SCRA 742, 777, July 22, 1998), we said:

[29] Ibid., pp. 48-50; pp. 76-78.

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has the burden of proving
the elements thereof: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the
accused, who owned or possessed the firearm, did not have the corresponding license or
permit to possess or carry the same outside his residence. (footnote omitted)

[30] Ibid., pp. 53-54; pp. 81-82.

[31] Appellants Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 145.
[32] Appellants Brief, p. 19; rollo, 163.
[33] As shown by the pertinent portions quoted below. See People v. Baniel, 275 SCRA 472,
July 15, 1997.

See also People v. Castillo, GR No. 131592-93, February 15, 2000; People v. Lazaro, GR No.
112090, October 26, 1999; People v. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637, November 16, 1998.
[47] Signed by Police Senior Inspector Ruperto Rugay Regis Jr.

[34] TSN, March 4, 1998, pp. 37-38.

[48] People v. Lazaro, supra., citing several cases. See also People v. Narvasa, supra.;
People v. Molina, supra.; People v. Villanueva, 275 SCRA 489, July 15, 1997.

[35] See People v. Baniel, supra.

[49] People v. Molina, supra.

[36] Paras, Rules of Court Annotated, 2nd ed., p. 78, citing Graham on Evidence. See also
Appellees Brief, pp. 21-22.

[50] See People v. Barita et al., GR No. 123541, February 8, 2000; Dizon v. CA, 311 SCRA 1,
July 22, 1999.

[51] In fact, appellant admits that he did not have any misunderstanding with the arresting
officers. Neither could he think of any reason why they would file false charges against him.
(TSN, May 4, 1998, p. 42)
[52] See People v. Dizon, supra.
[53] TSN, May 4, 1998, pp. 37-39.

[61] That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

[62] See People v. Atop, 286 SCRA 157, February 10, 1998; People v. Deleverio, 289 SCA
547, April 24, 1998.
[63] See Tanada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515, May 31, 1935; Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173, February
15, 1935.

[54] Ibid.
[64] People v. Jayson, supra.
[55] Article 148 of the RPC reads:
[65] Supra at p. 177, per Mendoza, J.
ART. 148. Direct assaults. -- Any person or persons who, without public uprising, shall employ
force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the
crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist
any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is
committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the
offender lays hands upon a person in authority. xxx.

[66] Offenses under the Revised Penal Code which carry a penalty lighter than that for illegal
possession of a high-powered firearm include (1) indirect assault (Article 149), (2) tumults and
other disturbances (Article 153), (3) discharge of firearms (Article 254), (4) light threats (Article
285), and (5) light coercion (Article 287).
[67] Article 155 (1) of the Revised Penal code provides the penalty of arresto menor or fine not
exceeding 200 pesos upon "[a]ny person who within any town or public place, shall discharge
any firearm, rocket, firecracker or other explosive calculated to cause alarm or danger."

[56] Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) reads:

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period. (emphasis ours)

[68] Article 266 (1) imposes the penalty of arresto menor "when an offender has inflicted
physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or
shall require medical attention during the same period." For example, when a person hits the
head of another with the butt of an unlicensed M-14 rifle, thereby incapacitating the latter for
one to nine days, the accused may be charged only with slight physical injuries, not illegal
possession of firearms.

[57] Article 249; cf. 51, RPC.

[58] Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense. An authority on criminal law writes that when the
accused is guilty of a complex crime, the penalty immediately lower is the next below the
penalty provided for the gravest crime. (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book One, 1981
ed., p. 769.) Since direct assault is punishable with prision correccional in its medium and
maximum period, the penalty next lower in degree is arresto mayor (maximum) to prision
correccional (minimum). Accordingly, the indeterminate penalty for direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide is 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional.
[59] 282 SCRA 166, 176-177, November 18, 1997.
[60] People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, July 24, 1996; People v. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601,
February 26, 1990.

[69] Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, the duration of arresto menor is one to thirty
days.
[70] That penal laws should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170562
June 29, 2007
ANGEL CELINO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU CITY, HON. DELANO F. VILLARUZ, Presiding Judge,
Branch 16, Regional Trial Court, Capiz, Roxas City, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Court of Appeals
Decision dated April 18, 20051 affirming the trial courts denial of petitioner Angel Celino, Sr.s
Motion to Quash; and Resolution dated September 26, 2005 2 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Decision.
The following facts are not disputed:
Two separate informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City charging
petitioner with violation of Section 2(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban), 3 and
Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8294 4 (illegal possession of firearm), as
follows:
Criminal Case No. C-137-04
That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly carry outside of his residence an armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number
3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live ammunitions of the

same caliber during the election period December 15, 2005 to June 9, 2004 without first
having obtained the proper authority in writing from the Commission on Elections, Manila,
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Criminal Case No. C-138-04
That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and control one (1) armalite rifle colt M16 with serial
number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live ammunitions of
the same caliber without first having obtained the proper license or necessary permit to
possess the said firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-138-04, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban
violation charge.7
Prior to his arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-137-04, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 8
contending that he "cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x x x if he was also
charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the
same set of facts x x x."9
By Order of July 29, 2004,10 the trial court denied the Motion to Quash on the basis of this
Courts11 affirmation in Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses12 of therein respondent judges denial of a
similar motion to quash on the ground that "the other offense charged x x x is not one of those
enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x." 13 Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied by September 22, 2004 Resolution,14 hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari 15
before the Court of Appeals.
By Decision dated April 18, 2005,16 the appellate court affirmed the trial courts denial of the
Motion to Quash. Petitioners May 9, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration 17 having been denied
by Resolution of September 26, 2005,18 petitioner filed the present petition.
The petition fails.
Petitioners remedy to challenge the appellate courts decision and resolution was to file a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on or before October 20, 2005 or 15 days after
he received a copy of the appellate court's resolution on October 5, 2005 19 denying his motion
for reconsideration. Instead, petitioner chose to file the present petition under Rule 65 only on
December 2, 2005,20 a good 58 days after he received the said resolution.
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for lost appeal. Certiorari lies only when there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Why the
question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the appellate court committed grave abuse of
discretion, could not have been raised on appeal, no reason
therefor has been advanced.21
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
While this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit
Associate Justice
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice,
has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having
been filed under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary period under said Rule, it
finds nothing in the present case to warrant a liberal application of the Rules, no justification
having been proffered, as just stated, why the petition was filed beyond the reglementary
period,22 especially considering that it is substantially just a replication of the petition earlier
filed before the appellate court.

Technicality aside, the petition fails just the same.

The relevant provision of R.A. 8294 reads:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms
or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. x x x.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .
44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and
caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by
burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime
of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed
as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.
xxxx
(Underscoring supplied)
The crux of the controversy lies in the interpretation of the underscored proviso. Petitioner,
citing Agote v. Lorenzo,23 People v. Ladjaalam,24 and other similar cases,25 contends that the
mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution
for illegal possession of firearm. The Solicitor General contends otherwise on the basis of
Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses 26 and People v. Valdez.27
In Agote,28 this Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for gun ban violation but exonerated
him of the illegal possession of firearm charge because it "cannot but set aside petitioners
conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearm since another
crime was committed at the same time, i.e., violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the
Gun Ban."29 Agote is based on Ladjaalam30 where this Court held:
x x x A simple reading [of RA 8294] shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of
firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms
becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault
with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held
liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of
DANTE O. TINGA
the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA
Associate Justice
8294's simple language is most favorable to herein
appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for
the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.
Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of
firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. x x x
xxxx

x x x The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that "no other crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the
law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have
expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish,
neither should we.31
The law is indeed clear. The accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms,
provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested. The word "committed" taken
in its ordinary sense, and in light of the Constitutional presumption of innocence, 32 necessarily
implies a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution
or voluntary admission.33
Petitioners reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan, Almeida, and
Bernal is, therefore, misplaced. In each one of these cases, the accused were exonerated of
illegal possession of firearms because of their commission, as shown by their conviction, of
some other crime.34 In the present case, however, petitioner has only been accused of
committing a violation of the COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not synonymous with guilt,
there is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged. 35
Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply.
More applicable is Margarejo36 where, as stated earlier, this Court affirmed the denial of a
motion to quash an information for illegal possession of firearm on the ground that "the other
offense charged [i.e., violation of gun ban] x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A.
8294 x x x."37 in consonance with the earlier pronouncement in Valdez 38 that "all pending
cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no
other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x." 39
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any
information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession
of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,40 or absorbed as an element of rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat. 41 Conversely, when the other offense involved
is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession
of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.
Finally, as a general rule, the remedy of an accused from the denial of his motion to quash is
for him to go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom
in the manner authorized by law.42 Although the special civil action for certiorari may be
availed of in case there is a grave abuse of discretion, 43 the appellate court correctly
dismissed the petition as that vitiating error is not attendant in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING *
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO **
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
C ERTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
On Official Leave.
**
Acting Chairperson.
1
CA rollo at 99-103.
2
Id. at 149.
3
Rules and Regulations on: (A) Bearing, Carrying or Transporting Firearms or Other Deadly
Weapons; (B) Security Personnel or Bodyguards; (C) Bearing Arms By Any Member of
Security or Police Organization of Government Agencies and Other Similar Organization; (D)
Organization or Maintenance of Reaction Forces During the Election Period in Connection
with the May 10, 2004, Synchronized National and Local Elections.
4
An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as Amended, entitled
"Codifying the laws on illegal/unlawful possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or
distribution of firearms, ammunitions, or explosives or instruments used in the manufacture of
firearms, ammunitions or explosives and imposing stiffer penalties for certain violations thereof
and for relevant purposes." (Took effect July 6, 1997)
5
CA rollo at 24. No copy found in RTC records.
6
Records, p. 1.
7
Rollo, p. 8.
8
Records, pp. 25-31.
9
Id. at 27.
10
Id. at 48-52.
11
En Banc.
12
417 Phil. 506 (2001).
13
Id. at 512.
14
Records, p. 91.
15
CA rollo, pp. 2-60.

16

Id. at 99-103. Penned by Justice Arsenio J. Magpale with the concurrence of Justices
Sesinando E. Villon and Enrico A. Lanzanas.
17
Id. at 108-117.
18
Id. at 132. Penned by Justice Arsenio J. Magpale with the concurrence of Justices
Sesinando E. Villon and Enrico A. Lanzanas.
19
Id. at 131.
20
Rollo, p. 128.
21
Heirs of Grio v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 165073, June 30, 2006, 494
SCRA 329, 341 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 97 (2000).
22
Id. at 342, citing The President, Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 151280, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 682, 688.
23
G.R. No. 142675, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 60.
24
395 Phil. 1 (2000).
25
Evangelista v. Sistoza, 414 Phil. 874 (2001); People v. Garcia, 424 Phil. 158 (2002); People
v. Bernal, 437 Phil. 11 (2002); People v. Pangilinan, 443 Phil. 198 (2003); and People v.
Almeida, 463 Phil. 637 (2003).
26
Supra note 12.
27
364 Phil. 259 (1999).
28
Supra note 23.
29
Id. at 75.
30
Supra note 24.

31

Id. at 35-36.
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14, par. (2).
33
Vide People v. Concepcion, 55 Phil. 485, 491 (1930), where this Court held that "inasmuch
as every defendant is presumed innocent until convicted by a competent court after due
process of law of the crime with which he is charged, [the accused] is still innocent in the eyes
of the law, notwithstanding the filing of the information against him for the aforesaid crime."
34
Maintenance of drug den and direct assault with attempted homicide in Ladjaalam; robbery
in Evangelista; kidnapping for ransom with serious illegal detention in Garcia and in
Pangilinan; murder and gun ban violation in Bernal; illegal possession of drugs in Almeida;
and gun ban violation in Agote.
35
On the contrary, petitioner even claimed, through his "not guilty" plea in Criminal Case No.
C-137-04 that he did not commit a violation of the COMELEC Gun Ban. (Rollo, p. 8)
36
Supra note 12.
37
Supra note 13.
38
Supra note 27.
39
Id. at 279.
40
R.A. No. 8294, Sec. 1.
41
Ibid.
42
Soriano v. Casanova, G.R. No. 163400, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 431, 439.
43
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151, 176 (1996).
32