RULE 74

Utulo v. Vda. de Garcia

Facts: Juan Sanchez died intestate leaving his widow and 3 children as heirs. His widow, Vda. de Garcia
was appointed administratix. One of their children Luz, died leaving her spouse Pablo Utulo and her
mother as forced heirs. Utulo commenced the judicial administration of her properties where Vda. de
Garcia opposed arguing that there is no need for judicial administration and in case it should be granted
by court that she be appointed administratix. The CFI appointed Utulo as judicial administrator hence this
appeal.
Issue: W/N there was need of judicial administration
Held: NO! The general rule as provided for in Sec. 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that that if no
executor is named in the will, or if a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted. However this
is subject to 2 exceptions provided by Secs. 596 and 597 of the same Code. Sec. 596 provides that when
all the heirs are of lawful age, and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator. Sec. 597 provides that if the property left does not exceed P6,000, the heirs may apply to
the competent court to proceed with the summary partition without instituting the judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator.
When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or
not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and
costly or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court. Rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of death hence his heirs succeed immediately to all the property
of the deceased. It is at their option if they want to enter upon the administration of the property or if they
want to partition it. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is no need for the
intervention of an administrator.

2. FULE vs. FULE

G.R. No. 21859 September 30, 1924
INTESTATE ESTATE OF SATURNINO FULE, deceased. CIRIACO FULE, Petitioner-appellant,
vs. ANASTACIO FULE, ET.AL., Opponents-appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
FACTS:
1 Saturnino Fule died intestate. One of his heirs, Ciriaco Fule, petitioned the CFI of Laguna for the
appointment of Cornelio Alcantara as special administrator of Saturninos estate. - GRANTED
2 The children of Saturnino opposed alleging that they were all of age and, that the deceased had
left no debts and that his property had already been partitioned among his children during his
lifetime
3 Ciriaco prayed for the motion of the oppositors to be denied
4 CFI revoked the appointment of special administrator and ordered him to render an account. The
appointment of an administrator was then denied and the court recommended that petitioner
amend his petition within 30 days from this date and present an ordinary action for partition.
5 Ciriaco filed MR or motion for new trial. This was opposed upon the ground that the judgment of
previous had become final and non-appealable.
6 CFI annulled and set aside its previous order and granted Ciriaco the leave to amend his petition
7 Petition was later denied by the CFI on the ground that all of the deceaseds property had been in
the possession of his heirs for many years before his death; and that at the time of his death
there were no debts and no property to be administered. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES: WoN administration is necessary
HELD:
NO. It may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the present action, that at the time of his
death no debts existed against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
It was previously held by the Court that: " 'Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the
rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the
heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the
heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the
estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire
to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do
this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege "
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be
burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in
any way whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs when they are adults and when there
are no debts against the estate.

PEREIRA vs. CA
FACTS: Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away without a will.
He was survived by his legitimate spouse, herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita
Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.
Nagac filed before RTC for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of
the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.
Victoria opposed alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and
praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said
estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
CFI - appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate. CA affirmed
ISSUE: Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary?
HELD: NEGATIVE. Generally, when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator. However, when all the
heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition
the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator.
Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. It has been uniformly held that in such
case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings.
Nevertheless, the Court may decide that there is a "good reason" to warrant a judicial
administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors
depending on the circumstances of each case.

5. VDA. DE REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991
FACTS: During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land in Carmona, Cavite. He sought to
bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System. Unfortunately, he died without the title having
been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the
administrator of his property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs. Lot No. 1A-14 appeared
to be allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children.
In 1941, the original certificate of title for the whole property was issued. It was, kept by Juan Poblete,
son-in law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of
this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters,
more or less, to Dalmacio Gardiola. According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No.1-A-14.
The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately took
possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.
In 1967, the surviving heirs gave effect to the subdivision plan created on 1936. They formally
partitioned the property. Therefore, the heirs received their share of this land. Including Rafael Reyes, Jr.
Son of Rafael Sr. TCTs were issued to him representing the land which should have been received by his
father.
Now, the heirs of Rafael Jr. sued Gardiola, saying that they are the true owners of the land, as shown
by the torrens title over the land. Gardiolas defense was that he bought the land from Rafael Sr. and that
Rafael Jr. could not have inherited this land for it was disposed of by his father way before he inherited it.
RTC- ruled in favor of Rafael Jr.s heirs. Stating that there was no evidence that the Gavinos children
had a written partition agreement. CA reversed.
ISSUE: WoN the partition done in 1936 was valid
Held: AFFIRMATIVE. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of
Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among
heirs to be in writing to be valid.
In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,
held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose
the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims.
The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a
plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred
that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral
partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and
why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by
some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer
of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the
heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.

6. SPOUSES BENATIRO vs HEIRS OF CUYOS

FACTS: Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos had nine children, namely: Francisco,
Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. In 1966, Evaristo died
leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu.
Gloria was initially appointed as administratrix. In connection, the Clerk of Court, Atty. Taneo was
appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of
partition. In his Commissioners Report, Atty. Taneo stated that out of the nine heirs, only respondents
Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend. He reported that those who were present agreed not to
partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it and divide the proceeds equally.
Columba bought the properties.
The CFI appointed Lope Cuyosas the new administrator of the estate based on Glorias absence
& change of residence. The Court ordered him to execute the deed of sale.
Following such order, Lope executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Columba.
Later, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, Enrique and Salud filed with the CA a petition for annulment
of the order of the CFI of Cebu, alleging that the CFIs order was null and void and of no effect, the same
being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular; that such report
practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share of their father's estate, clearly showing
that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.
The CA granted the petition and declared the CFI order and the Certificates of Title issued in the
name of Columba null & void, hence this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the sale based on the Commissioners Report is valid
HELD: Negative. The Court held that the CFIs order should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the
ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process.
Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that the annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. However, jurisprudence recognizes denial of due
process as additional ground therefor.
The veracity of Atty. Taneos report was doubtful. There was no evidence showing that the heirs
indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they
were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. The
Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures
of the alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto. It was imperative that all the heirs
must be present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests.
The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing
conformity thereto. The CFI's order based on a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of
due process.
Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void
judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab
initio.

BRITO vs. DIANALA

FACTS: Petitioners herein filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the RTC
against Jose Maria Golez.
Petitioners claims that decedent Esteban and Eufemia Dichimo died intestate and upon their
death Vicente and Eusebio, as compulsory heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in turn, Vicente and
Eusebio, and their respective spouses, also died intestate leaving their pro indiviso shares of Lot No.
1536-B as part of the inheritance of the complainants. Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco,
alleged that they are the heirs of Vicente Dichimo, while Edito, Maria, Herminia, Leonora, Felicito and
Merlinda claimed to be the heirs of Eusebio Dichimo. They also claim that Vicente and Eusebio are the
only heirs of Esteban and Eufemia;
Respondents, on the other hand claim that prior to his marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married
to a certain Francisca Dumalagan; that Esteban and Francisca bore five children, all of whom are already
deceased; that herein respondents are the heirs of Esteban and Francisca's children and that they are in
open, actual, public and uninterrupted possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more than 30 years;
that their legal interests over the subject lot prevails over those of petitioner and his co-heirs; that, in fact,
petitioner and his co-heirs have already disposed of their shares in the said property a long time ago.
The trial court issued an Order dismissing without prejudice respondents' Answer-in-Intervention
for their failure to secure the services of a counsel despite ample opportunity given them.
Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a Compromise Agreement
wherein Lot No. 1536-B was divided between Jose Maria Golez, on one hand, and the heirs of Vicente
Dichimo, on the other.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-12561 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City in the name of
Margarita, Bienvenido and Francisco.
Herein petitioner and his co-heirs filed another Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages, this time against herein respondents. The case, filed with the RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60,
was docketed as Civil Case No. 548-C.Herein respondents, on the other hand, filed with the same court a
Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against petitioner and his co-heirs docketed as Civil Case
No. 588-C.
The RTC issued Joint Orders, dismissing Civil Case No. 548-C for violation of the rule on forum
shopping; dismissing Civil Case No. 588-C for want of jurisdiction. On appeal, the CA set aside the Joint
Orders of the RTC dismissing Civil Case No. 588-C.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are bound by the judgment rendered Civil Case No. 12887.
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is affirmed.
It is true that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with
motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.In the
present case, when respondents filed their Answer-in-Intervention they submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the court, in turn, acquired jurisdiction over their persons. Respondents, thus,
became parties to the action. Subsequently, however, respondents' Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed
without prejudice. From then on, they ceased to be parties in the case so much so that they did not have
the opportunity to present evidence to support their claims, much less participate in the compromise
agreement entered into by and between herein petitioner and his co-heirs on one hand and the defendant
in Civil Case No. 12887 on the other. Stated differently, when their Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed,
herein respondents lost their standing in court and, consequently, became strangers to Civil Case No.
12887. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers
to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. Thus, being strangers to Civil Case No.
12887,
respondents
are
not
bound
by
the
judgment
rendered
therein.
Neither does the Court concur with petitioner's argument that respondents are barred by prescription for
having filed their complaint for reconveyance only after more than eight years from the discovery of the
fraud allegedly committed by petitioner and his co-heirs, arguing that under the law an action for
reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in four years, which period is reckoned from

the discovery of the fraud. In their complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that
petitioner and his co-heirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud. Article 1456 of the Civil Code
providesthataperson acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of which is the date of registration of the deed or
the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was
obtained by petitioner and his co-heirs on September 28, 1990, while respondents filed their complaint for
reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year prescriptive period has not yet
expired.
The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioner's contention that respondents are guilty of laches and
are already estopped from questioning the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 on the ground
that they slept on their rights and allowed the said decision to become final. In the first place, respondents
cannot be faulted for not appealing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 simply because they
are no longer parties to the case and, as such, have no personality to assail the said judgment.Secondly,
respondents' act of filing their action for reconveyance within the ten-year prescriptive perioddoes not
constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting their right. The Court has ruled that, unless reasons of
inequitable proportions are adduced, a delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not
considered to be a delay that would bar relief.Laches is recourse in equity.Equity, however, is applied only
in the absence, never in contravention, of statutory law. Moreover, the prescriptive period applies only if
there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession thereof.
Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run against
him.Thus, when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession
of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the rationale for the rule being, that his undisturbed
possession provides him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed
only by the one who is in possession.
In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the subject property
as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a separate action against respondents for
recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to respondents' possession of the disputed property, it
follows that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As such, with more reason should
respondents not be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is one in equity, cannot be set up to
resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right. The action filed by respondents with the RTC of
Cadiz City is for reconveyance and damages. They are not seeking the amendment nor the annulment of
the Decision of the RTC of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 12887. They are simply after the recovery of
what they claim as their rightful share in the subject lot as heirs of Esteban Dichimo.
As earlier discussed, respondents' Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed by the RTC of Bacolod City
without prejudice. This leaves them with no other optionbutto institute a separate action for the protection
and enforcement of their rights and interests. It will be the height of inequity to declare herein petitioner
and his co-heirs as exclusive owners of the disputed lot without giving respondents the opportunity to
prove their claims that they have legal interest over the subject parcel of land, that it forms part of the
estate of their deceased predecessor and that they are in open, and uninterrupted possession of the
same for more than 30 years. Much more, it would be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

RULE 75
1. [CASE TITLE] Ethel Grimm Roberts, petitioner vs. Judge Tomas R. Leonidas, Branch 38, Court
of First Instance; Maxine Tate-Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II and Linda Grimm, respondents.
[CASE #] G.R. No. L-55509
[DATE] June 19, 1982
[PONENTE] Aquino, J.
[NATURE] Petition for Allowance of Wills
Doctrine: A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule
75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs.
Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who
died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.
Facts: Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on
November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children,
named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm
Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce.
He executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he
described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate
outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were
given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate in Utah.
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978.
In its order, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil. Two weeks
later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel,
Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of
the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal
representatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate. It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half
conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus
the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila. The agreement indicated the computation of the "net
distributable estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm.
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net
Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of
the net distributable estate and marital share.
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty- three days after Grimm's
death, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, through lawyers, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court
of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was named special
administratrix.
The second wife, Maxine, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the
ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she
be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his
Philippine estate.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A.
Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a
petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition
approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be
appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received

by them and to return the same to Maxine. Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were
defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was
illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was
contrary to the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of
October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the
testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard
in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to
the petition for probate.
Issue: Whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an intestate
proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after
a probate in the Utah district court).
Held: Yes, Branch 38 can entertain the intestate proceeding in Branch 20. Therefore, the intestate case
should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.
The Court held that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

.Roberts v. Leonidas; G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984

FACTS: Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, is married to Maxine Tate Grimm (second
wife) and had two children, Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm. He also had two children
with his first wife, Juanita Kegley Grimm (divorced), named Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm
Roberts (McFadden).
On January 23, 1959, he executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his
Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second
will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. The two children of the first marriage were given
their legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country.
He died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. On March 7, 1978, the two wills
and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm in the Third Judicial District Court of
Utah. However, on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and
Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with
knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah
regarding the estate.
43 days after Edwards death, Ethel, the daughter of the first marriage, filed a petition for intestate
proceeding. Maxine, the second wife, opposed on the ground of the pendency of the probate proceedings
in Utah. Later, September 8, 1980, Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a
petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition
approved by the intestate court be set aside. They alleged that they were defrauded due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the
intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the
decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge Leonidas. Ethel then filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or
alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter
of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate.
ISSUE: Whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an
intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch
38 (after a probate in the Utah district court).
HELD: YES. The respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because
Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs.
Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who
died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to
the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose.
Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices
and other papers in the testate case.

2. URIARTE vs. CFI

Vicente Uriarte vs. CFI Negros Occidental, CFI Manila, Juan Uriarte Zamanoca and Higinio Uriarte
May 29, 1970
Dizon, J.
Short version: Vicente filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of his father in Negros.
Subsequently, a petition for probate of the will of his father was filed in Manila. Court held that the proper
court to try the case was Negros. The deceased was a non-resident alien and while his properties were
not in just one place, it was Negros who first took cognizance of the case. However, the will was already
probated in Manila and the Court blamed Vicente for being negligent in raising the improper venue issue
in time. The probate of the will was affirmed.
FACTS
November 6, 1961 Vicente filed with CFI Negros a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late
Don Juan Uriarte alleging therein that as a natural son of the latter, he was the sole heir and that during
the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in CFI Negros for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son
CFI Negros appointed the PNB as special administrator and later set the date for the hearing of the
petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance with law.
The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, PNB never actually qualified as special
administrator.
December 19, 1961 Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to the petition alleging that he was a nephew of
the deceased Juan Uriarte who had executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated
copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted to the court upon receipt and further
questioning Vicentes capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding.
August 28, 1962 Juan Uriarte Zamacona commenced a special proceeding in CFI Manila for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte and filed with CFI Negros a
Motion to Dismiss on these grounds:
As a deceased left a last will, there was no basis to proceed with the intestate proceedings
Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate the intestate proceedings, he not
being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent.
Vicente opposed the MTD contending that, as CFI Negros was first to take cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of Juan Uriarte, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same.
CFI Negros granted Juan Uriarte Zamaconas MTD and dismissed the proceeding before it. MR denied.
He filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. The administrator appointed by CFI Manila

objected to the approval of the record on appeal. While this was pending, Vicente Uriarte filed a petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Therefore, CFI Negros disapproved the record on appeal to give
way to the certiorari.
Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in CFI Manila asking for leave to intervene therein, for the
dismissal of the petition and for the annulment of the proceedings had in the special proceeding therein.
Motion was denied.
It appears from the records that Vicente had filed a civil case in CFi Negros during the lifetime of Juan
Uriarte to obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgement as his natural child. It is likewise clear
that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced the petition for settlement of estate, he
had not yet been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before CFI Negros has not gone further than the
appointment of PNB as special administrator (who failed to qualify).
On the other hand, CFI Manila admitted to probate the document submitted to it, as thelast will of Juan
Uriarte, the petition for probate appearing not to have been contested.
ISSUE: Whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for probate of the last will of Juan
Uriarte with CFI Negros or was entitled to commenced the corresponding separate proceedings in CFI
Manila
REASONING
Rule 73, Section: the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which
he had estate.
The deceased Juan Uriarte was a non-resident alien. Therefore, the CFIs in provinces where he left any
property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceedings for the
settlement of his estate.
Vicente argues that when CFI Negros took cognizance, CFI Manila no longer had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the special proceeding.
It cannot be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his
will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will,
proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over
the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
These facts support the view that Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have submitted the will for probate in
CFI Negros either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion in the already pending
special proceeding:
1 It is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to
unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved.
2 When Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicentes petition for the issuance of letters of
sdministration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte had left

a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to CFI Negros. When Juan
Uriarte Zamacona filed his MTD in CFI Negros, he had submitted there a copy of the alleged will
of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that he knew before filing the petition for
probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in CFi negros
for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person.
It is well settled that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in this case, Vicente has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded
from doing so by laches. He knew of the existence of the will since 1961 when Higinio Urirate opposed
the initial petition in CFI Negros. He was also served with notice of the alleged will and of the filing of
petition for its probate when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed an MTD in CFI Negros on 1962. He only filed
the omnibus motion in the Manila Court on April 1963. By then, The Manila Court had already appointed
an administrator and had admitted the will to probate. Toa llow him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila court and the validity of all the proceedings therein
would put a premium on his negligence.
SC is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of
similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is
raised too late.
DISPOITIVE petition dismissed

3. ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-24742
October 26, 1973

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons,
residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children
from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI)
Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife (widow), filed a petition
with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named
executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but the said court held in
abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon City shall have acted on the probate
proceedings. CFI Cebu, in effect deferred to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on ground of lack of jurisdiction
and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Lourdes filed special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent CA. CA favored Lourdes holding that CFI Cebu had
first acquired jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1
2

Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon City court ordering it to
refrain from proceeding with the testate proceedings.
Whether or not CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to
CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings.

HELD:
1 Yes. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside
all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the
deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the
deceased testator's wish.
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is
not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. Conversely, such court, may
upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another
court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and
their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died
intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition
before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for
probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City
court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby
be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the
exclusion of all other courts.
2 No. Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to
the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73,
section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must
exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore,
as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court undisputably
had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

NOTE (additional info):

Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings should be by appeal: Under Rule
73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate
on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon
City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile
therein with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be contested
except by appeal from said court in the original case except when want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.
When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had improper venue:
the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as
affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over
again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province is too
obvious to require comment. It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named
and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance
therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to
require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the
Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.

4. ALFREDO G. BALUYUT vs.HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, ENCARNACION LOPEZ VDA. DE

BALUYUT, JOSE ESPINO and CORAZON ESPINO
G.R. No. L-42088, May 7, 1976
FACTS:
Soltero Baluyut died on January 6, 1975 at the age of 86, leaving an estate valued at not less
than Php2M. A few weeks later, his nephew Alfredo Baluyut filed before the CFI of Quezon City a verified
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor, alleging that Encarnacion Lopez Baluyut,
Solteros widow, was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedents estate. Believing that
Soltero executed a will, Alfredo prayed that he be appointed as special administrator in the meantime.
The CFI granted Alfredos petition.
Mrs. Baluyut filed an opposition to the appointment. She claimed that the allegation as to her
mental incapacity was libelous, and that she was unaware that her husband executed a will. Finding that
Mrs. Baluyut was mentally qualified, the CFI cancelled Alfredos appointment. However, upon filing of a
motion for reconsideration, Alfredos appointment was again appointed as special administrator, together
with Jose Espino, an acknowledged natural child of Soltero.
Mrs. Baluyut again countered, arguing that Jose effectively rid Alfredo of any interest in the estate
of Soltero by exclusion, he being a collateral relative. Alfredo naturally opposed, arguing that Jose was
not a natural child of the decedent, at the same time insisting that Mrs. Baluyut was incapable of
becoming an administratrix, as declared by another court in a separate guardianship proceeding.
Based on the testimony of Mrs. Baluyut herself, the probate court terminated the appointment of
Jose and Alfredo as administrators and ordered that the former be appointed as administratrix, due to her
preferential right to be appointed as such. Letters of administration were issued in her favor after posting
a Php20,000.00 bond. In appointing Mrs. Baluyut as administratrix, the court proceeded upon the
assumption that as a collateral relative, Alfredo had no interest in the estate of Soltero.
Aggrieved, Alfredo elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a special civil action for certiorari.
During the course of the proceedings, the alleged will of the decedent was apparently discovered
and presented to the court. Although the decision did not dwell on the contents of the will and the manner
through which it was discovered, the decision did mention that Alfredo was named a legatee therein,
giving him standing to question the qualifications of the administratrix.
ISSUES:
1

W/N the court erred in finding Mrs. Baluyut mentally capable of becoming an administratrix on the
basis of her testimony

W/N the proceeding in the lower court must be converted into a testamentary proceeding after the
alleged will has been presented

DECISION:
1

Yes. A hearing is necessary in order to determine the suitability of the person to be appointed
administrator by giving him the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a
chance to contest the petition. Whether Sotero Baluyut died testate or intestate, it is imperative in
the interest of the orderly administration of justice that a hearing be held to determine Mrs.
Baluyut's fitness to act as executrix or administratrix. Persons questioning her capacity should be
given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.

Yes. It is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding.
The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. ( Art. 838, Civil
Code; See. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249).

After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and proceedings for
the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will should be conducted.

5. RAFAEL E. MANINANG AND SOLEDAD L. MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO
L.
PRONOVE, JR., AS JUDGE OF THE CFI OF RIZAL AND BERNARDO S. ASENETA
19 June 1982; G.R. No. L-57848; MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
FACTS
Clemencia Aseneta died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81 on 21 May 1977. She left a
holographic will:
"It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and
all my personal properties shall be inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose
family I have lived continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her husband
Pamping have been kind to me. x x x
I have found peace and happiness with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive and
especially now when I am now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not
incompetent as Nonoy would like me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I
do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will."
Petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent (hereinafter
referred to as the Testate Case).
Herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta ( the adopted son) claims to be the sole heir of decedent
Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings (hereinafter the Intestate Case).
The testate and intestate cases were ordered consolidated.
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the
holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and,
therefore, intestacy should ensue.
Petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will;
and that respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent.
Lower Court dismissed TESTATE case and subsequent MR and appointed Bernardo as the
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia Aseneta "considering that he is a
forced heir of said deceased while oppositor Soledad Maninang is not, and considering further
that Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown to be unfit to perform the duties of the trust."
Soledad filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court which was likewise denied and the
respondent Court ruled that the trial Judge's Order of dismissal was final in nature as it finally
disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the proper remedy, which petitioners
failed to avail of. Continuing, it said that even granting that the lower Court committed errors in
issuing the questioned Orders, those are errors of judgment reviewable only by appeal and not by
Certiorari.
ISSUE
W/N the Court a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate Case: YES, acted in
excess of jurisdiction; generally the probate of a Will is mandatory.
RATIO
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated
and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be
rendered nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity:
"x x x The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the
provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The
questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has
been authenticated x x x"

"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance
with the requirements of the law."
The cases relied upon by Bernardo, the Nuguid and the Balanay cases, provide the exception rather than
the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because
"practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the
controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the
question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where
the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will
demanded.
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely
preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether
under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the
latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are totally different:
"x x x The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition
under Article 854 of the New Civil Code 'shall annul the institution of heir.' This annulment is in toto,
unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also 'annul the
institution of heirs', but only 'insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited', which last phrase was
omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better
stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs
have been illegally deprived."
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been
thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that
respondent Bernardo has been preterited. We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that
conclusion is not indubitable.
Procedural aspect: respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate
Case, Certiorari is a proper remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be
corrected by Certiorari. And even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, in the broader
interests of justice, a petition for Certiorari should be entertained, particularly where appeal would not
afford speedy and adequate relief.

6. CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, et.al.

vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO
G.R. No .L-45425 March 27, 1992
FACTS: On January 28, 1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving her "testamento" in
the possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia Lizares. On February 6, 1968, Eustaquia filed a
petition for the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan, before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 8452. On July 10, 1968,
Eustaquia filed a project of partition which was granted by the probate court in an order dated January 8,
1971.On November 28, 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio,
Remedios L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia
Lizares executed an agreement of partition and subdivision.A year later or on November 23, 1973,
Eustquia Lizares died single without any descendant. In due time, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares
were appointed joint administrators of Eustquia's intestate estate.
On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will of Maria
Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion
Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios Vda. de Guinto (hereinafter collectively referred to as Celsa L. Vda. de
Kilayko, et al.) filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 8452 to reopen once again the testate estate
proceedings of Maria Lizares.
On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the testate proceedings and
holding that inasmuch as the settlement of an estate is a proceeding in rem, the judgment therein is
binding against the whole world. Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. then filed a motion for reconsideration of
said order. It was denied on June 17, 1974. Hence, on October 14, 1974, the said movants filed a
complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the joining administrators of
the estate of Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. On the same date, they availed of their rights
under Rule 14, Section 24 of Rules of Court by filing a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental.
On January 23, 1975, the joint administrators filed a motion for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens on the contentions that there existed exceptional circumstances which justified the cancellation
of the notice of lis pendens and that no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiffs. On September 20,
1976, respondent judge issued an order granting the motion for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. The
court simultaneously held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint.
ISSUE: w/n there was a valid partition and w/n there is a need to reopen the testate proceedings
RULING: The petition in G.R. No. 45965 is impressed with merit. In testate succession, there can be no
valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will
and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world,
the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a
will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance
with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.
In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares, the
executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted on January 8, 1971, a project of partition in which the parcels of
land, subject matters of the complaint for reconveyance, were included as property of the estate and
assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In accordance with said project of
partition which was approved by the probate court, Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios
Lizares Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares
executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision on November 28, 1972, whereby they agreed to
terminate their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of SWO-7446 and 552 covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005, T-65006, T-65007 and T-65008. These facts taken
altogether show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court
and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.
Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise of a
complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of
a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. Thus, where a piece of land has
been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was affected through improper

means or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and
operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition
according to the tenor of the partition. The question of private respondents title over the lots in question
has been concluded by the partition and became a closed matter.
All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present. Thus, the order approving the distribution of
the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs instituted in said will has become final and unappealable; the
probate court that rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; the
judgment or orders had been rendered on the merits; the special proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Maria Lizares was a proceeding in rem that was directed against the whole world including
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.,
The contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. that they are conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in
the testate estate of Maria Lizares is not meritorious. While the allegation of the joint administrators that
paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary
substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is also baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon
Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may
said paragraphs be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.
It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such heir should
die a second heir also designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The
substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code
but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. In this case, the instituted heir,
Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon
Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia.
With respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the properties involved, there is no merit in
the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., that the lower court acted contrary to law and/or gravely
abused its discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens. The cancellation of such a precautionary
notice, being a mere incident in an action, may be ordered by the court having jurisdiction over it at any
given time. Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled "after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary
to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded." In this case, the lower court ordered the
cancellation of said notice on the principal reason that the administrators of the properties involved are
subject to the supervision of the court and the said properties are under custodia legis. Therefore, such
notice was not necessary to protect the rights of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. More so in this case
where it turned out that their claim to the properties left by Eustaquia is without any legal basis.
. Vda. de Kilayko vs. Tengco
Facts:
The testator died without an issue leaving her last will and testament to her niece , Eustaquia Lizarez. The
will was probated and the project of partition was granted. The decree of distribution became final.
However, there
were
errors
in
the
distribution
as alleged
by Kilayko
et
al.
Issues:
Whether or not the errors in the distribution warrants the reopening of the estate of the testator.
Held:
No,

the

error

will

not

cause

the

reopening

of

the

succession.

Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the validity or
invalidity
of
the
project
of
partition
becomes
irrelevant.
The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside
is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence
not
imputable
to
negligence.

The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once.

7. IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.

CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979
June 30, 1964
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
1 Testator: Josefa Villacorta, died in 1958
2 Petition for allowance and admission to probate of the alleged will, and for the appointment of
petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor

According to him, Josefa executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house of her
daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro Guevara Street, Manila, published before and attested by
three instrumental witnesses: Attorney Torres and Trinidad, and Mr. Diy (did not testify, in the
States)
Acknowledged before the notary
Actually prepared by Attorney Samson, who was also present during the execution and signing,
together with former Governor Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Icasiano and a little girl
The will consists of 5 pages and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain
the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three

3
4
5
6

But the duplicate copy attached to the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the
testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
Pages of the original and duplicate of said will were duly numbered
Attestation clause contains all the facts required by law to be recited therein and is signed by the
aforesaid attesting witnesses
Will is written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrix, and that the attestation
clause is in a language also known to and spoken by the witnesses
The will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies, and both the original and the
duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before Notary Public
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may
have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was
signed in his presence.
Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition; and, she petitioned to have herself
appointed as a special administrator, to which proponent objected.
Hence, the court issued an order appointing the Philippine Trust Company as special administrator.
Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting as his own Natividad's
opposition to the probate of the alleged will.

ISSUE:
1 Were the signatures of the testatrix appearing in the duplicate original written by the same? YES
2 Is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence? NO
3 Should the Court deny probate, for the reason that one witness inadvertently failed to sign? NO
4 Since the original will is existent, is the duplicate not entitled to probate? NO
HELD:
First Issue
1 We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the testatrix signed both
original and duplicate copies of the will spontaneously
In the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and
Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the documents
That the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by
both the testator and the witnesses
And read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they were actually
signed
That the attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the
witnesses
The expert has, in fact, used as standards only three other signatures of the testatrix besides
those affixed to the original of the testament
2 Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned signatures
does not appear reliable, considering the standard and challenged writings were affixed to different
kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power.
Second Issue
1 The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither
2 Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might
as well die intestate.
The testamentary dispositions that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they
should respect the distribution made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the
free part do not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence.
They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by ordinary
experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being diverted into the hands of nonheirs and speculators.
Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on another occassion.
Third Issue

Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other
witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the
notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses.
2 The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the
law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of
the statutory requisites
3 That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is
shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of
signatures in every page.
4 The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence
that no one was aware of the defect at the time.
Fourth Issue
1 Since they opposed probate of original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily
discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma
2 If the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon
duplicate , and the same is probatable.
3 If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be
considered, being superfluous and irrelevant.
4 At any rate, said duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the
original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.
5 Appellants were duly notified of the proposed amendment, and it is nowhere proved or claimed that
the amendment deprived the appellants of any substantial right
We see no error in admitting the amended petition.

8.
REMEDIOS

NUGUID,

June
vs.
FELIX

23,
NUGUID

and

PAZ

SALONGA

1966
NUGUID

Facts: Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz
Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,
Lourdes
and
Alberto,
all
surnamed
Nuguid.
Remedios Nuguid Petitioner prayed to the CFI to admit to probate a holographic will allegedly executed
by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her. The will instituted Remedios as universal heir and
omitted
Felix
and
Paz
completely.
CFI held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of
the
deceased
Rosario
Nuguid"
and
dismissed
the
petition
without
costs.
Issue: Whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic
validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the
issue
of
law,
to
wit:
Is
the
will
intrinsically
a
nullity?
YES. We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained.
On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on

the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet
head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable
controversy
crying
for
solution.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in
the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will
completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of
their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. The onesentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or
bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce,
Rosario Nuguid died intestate. The nullification of such institution of universal heir without any other
testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
Issue: WON this is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition. From this, petitioner
draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar".
Held: This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory
heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " Express as disinheritance should be, the
same
must
be
supported
by
a
legal
cause
specified
in
the
will
itself.
The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their
names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the
said
forced
heirs
suffer
from
preterition.
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of
heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the
form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been
illegally deprived.
Issue: WON compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the
institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the
extent
of
said
legitimes.
Yes, they are entitled to their legitimes but the institution of heir is still invalidated by law not just merely
reduced to the extent of said legitimes. Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri, et al. vs. Akutin:
If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments
reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total or partial
nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And
the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or
betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of
construing,
we
would
be
destroying
integral
provisions
of
the
Civil
Code.
The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of
heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814,

which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution
of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are
separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but
because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that
is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again
an
institution
of
heirs
cannot
be
taken
as
a
legacy.
25
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil
Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely
provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The
entire
will
is
null.
Order
affirmed.
No
costs
allowed.
So
ordered.
-MJA
.
Remedios
NUGUID,
petitioner
Felix
NUGUID
and
Paz
Salonga
NUGUID,
G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966

and
appellant,
vs.
oppositors
and
appellees.

FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six
brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed
Nuguid.
On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her
death. The will stated as follows:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain
amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die
to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I
have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will
annexed be issued to her. This was opposed by the parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz.
The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of the parents and
declared that there was indeed preterition of compulsory heirs.
Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively disinherited and that they are entitled
to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the
heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.
ISSUE:
May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still be valid with respect to
the free portion of the will?
RULING:
No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of the Civil Code states that (T)he
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in
the direct ascending line her parents. The will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing
by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited.
This is a clear case of preterition.
It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this
posture that the Supreme Court held that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.

Remedios claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the legitime and that she should thus
be considered a devisee or legatee is without merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and
legatees must be expressly stated in the will. Such was not present.
Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of disinheritance as the law
also requires that, for disinheritance to be proper, the disinheritance should be clearly and expressly
stated in the will. Absent that, no inference of disinheritance may be had.
9. [G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014.]
THELMA M. ARANAS, petitioner, vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and
FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, respondents.
FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita
V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita
M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first
marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir
Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He
assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property
in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as
the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no
opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the consideration and
approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real
properties but only personal properties" worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20;
furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of
Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma
moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. Teresita filed
a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her inventory with copies of three
certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed of assignment
executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of
P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of
P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P30,000.00.
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory. The RTC issued an
order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable
the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory. Thelma opposed the approval of the
inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by
Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. The RTC denied the administratrix's motion for
approval of inventory and orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties which are
supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado. The RTC also directed the
administratrix to render an account of her administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado
which had come to her possession.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of March 14,
2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had
already been sold to Mervir Realty,

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion of the inclusion of parcels of land
known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the
Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be
submitted by the administratrix is concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been
either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his
lifetime?
RULING: No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted
and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18,
2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with
dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado,
Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of
suit.
RATIO:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall
only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether
property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the
discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person
dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes dutybound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three
months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. Within three (3) months after his
appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all
the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his
or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has
come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the
administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no
exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent
can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or
entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent
is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the
administrator, and in malting a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to
facilitate the administration of the estate." Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an
estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the
inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of

the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence
of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges
enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace
the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion." As long
as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The
trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong
to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v.
Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court,
relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during
the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if
there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination
of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether
the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of
resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code
required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass
of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may
be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of
the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby
expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to
the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or
bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was
best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the
estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as
part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial
or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to

perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.

11. (RULE 75) PABLO RALLA VS. JUDGE UNTALAN, G.R. Nos. L-63253-54 April 27, 1989
FACTS:
1 Rosendo Ralla, a widower, filed a petition for the probate of his own will in the CFI Albay leaving
his entire estate to his son, Pablo Ralla (the petitioner herein who, upon his death during the
pendency of this petition, was substituted by his heirs), leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro.
2 Pedro Ralla filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella
3 In the course of the hearing of the probate case Pablo Ralla filed a motion to dismiss the petition
for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late
father, Rosendo Ralla, for its probate would no longer be beneficial and advantageous to him.
This motion was denied, and the denial was denied by the CA and the SC.
4 The petitioner reiterated his lack of interest in the probate of the subject will. Consequently, the
court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho, declared Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo
Ralla who should share equally upon the division of the latter's estate, and thereupon converted
the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.
5 The brothers extra judicially partitioned 63 parcels of land, apparently forming the estate of their
deceased mother, Paz Escarella, dividing it between the two of them.
6 Eleven years later, Joaquin Chancoco, brother-in- law of the petitioner (Pablo) filed a petition for
the probate of the same will of Rosendo Ralla on the ground that the decedent owed him
P5,000.00. Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of the petitioner, was appointed special administrator
GRANTED, all objected by PEDRO (respondent)
7 Heirs of Pedro Ralla (the private respondents herein) moved to exclude from the estate of
Rosendo Ralla the aforesaid parcels of land (ung pinaghatian nung magkapatid)
8 Respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan ruled, that the 63 parcels of land should be included in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla and that said proceedings (both
Special Proceedings No. 564(ung finile ni Rosendo) and Special Proceedings No. 1106 (filed ni
Joaquin), which were ordered consolidated by this Court) should proceed as probate
proceedings.
9 Respondents sought the reconsideration for the exclusion of the 63 parcel of lands from the
probate proceedings. The partition was upheld and the lands should be excluded from the
probate proceedings.
10 Petitioners assails this ruling
ISSUE: WON the extrajudicial partition of the 63 parcels made after the filing of the petition for the
probate of the Will, and before said Will was probated, is a NULLITY, considering that as already decided
by this Court in the case of Ernesto M. Guevara, vs. Rosario Guevara et al., Vol. 74 Phil. Reports, there
can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the Will had been probated
HELD: VALID. It was made distinct and independent of the probate of the will of their father.
The SC do not find any grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the questioned Order of upholding the
partition. The first issued orders were merely interlocutory orders, courts may correct or amend if it deems
proper.
The properties involved in the present petition were the subject of the project of partition signed by both
the petitioner, Pablo Ralla, and Pedro Ralla in Civil Case No. 2023; the lower court approved the said

project of partition and the Ralla brothers jointly manifested that they had already received "the ownership
and possession of the respective parcels of land adjudicated to them in the said project of partition," and
upon their motion Judge Ezekiel Grageda declared the partition case closed and terminated in its Order of
December 29, 1967; there was no appeal made
Therefore the partition is valid and binding upon the petitioner and Pedro Ralla, as well as upon their
heirs, especially as this was accompanied by delivery of possession to them of their respective shares in
the inheritance from their mother, the late Paz Escarella. They are duty bound to respect the division
agreed upon by them and embodied in the document of partition.
Thus, the petitioner could no longer question the exclusion of the lands subject of the partition
from the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rosendo Ralla.
The rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of
course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will.
Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where there are two separate cases (Civil Case No.
2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each involving the
estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar
properties.
Furthermore, the Court had occasion to rule that where a partition had not only been approved
and thus become a judgment of the court, but distribution of the estate in pursuance of such
partition had fully been carried out, and the heirs had received the property assigned to them,
they are precluded from subsequently attacking its validity or any part of it.
Likewise where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation that the
inclusion was effected through improper means or without the petitioners' knowledge, the partition barred
any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of
the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition . . . They can not attack the
partition collaterally, as they are trying to do in this case
12. Danilo ALUAD, et al., petitioners vs.
Zenaido ALUAD, respondent
G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses
Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six lots of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After his death,
Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself and thereafter, she executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property
Inter Vivos in favor of Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed provided that such
will become effective upon the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the
Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded. Provided, however, that anytime during the
lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of
any or even all of the parcels of the land.
Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last will and testament
devising four (4) of the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months after
Matildes death. Thereafter, Marias heirs (herein petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for
declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido,
alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots have been previously
alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners
however, CA reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which held that the Deed of Donation was
actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the
formalities of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the present Petition
for Review has been filed.
ISSUES:
1
2

Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or not such deed is
valid.
If so, whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the lots in question to Zenaido
Aluad.

RULING:
The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad one of mortis causa. The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed
of Donation to become effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of no other interpretation than to
mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother during the
formers lifetime. Further the statement, anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them
who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land
herein donated, means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to
dispose them.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but
they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the
Civil Code. It is void and transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the
formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted to Maria.
Matilde thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and testament, subject to the qualification
that her will must be probated. With respect to the conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by
Matilde to Zenaido.

UY KIAO ENG, VS. NIXON LEE

Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy Kiao
Eng, herein petitioner, before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to produce the holographic will of
his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.
When the case was originally presented before the RTC, petitioner demurred after the
presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, contending that her son failed to prove that she
had in her custody the original holographic will. Demurrer was ultimately granted
The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit but thereafter ordered the mother to produce
the will. It ruled this time that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in
her possession the holographic will.
The mother filed a motion for reconsideration with CA - DENIED.
Left with no other recourse, the mother brought the matter before this Court, contending in the
main that the petition for mandamus is not the proper remedy and that the testimonial evidence used by
the appellate court as basis for its ruling is inadmissible.
Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy in this case
Held: NEGATIVE. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the
name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results
from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law.
Recognized in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce
contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will
not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is
imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus
being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved
herethe production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules
that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a
photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules
of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will
whether the same is in his possession or not.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production
of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee
lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

Seangio vs. Reyes

FACTS: There was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was denominated as
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana. The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo
did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will
under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act
of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory
heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court
is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic
validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is
clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2)
private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance
constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply because
Segundos will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory
heirs.
The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition for
certiorari was filed where petitioners argued as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
which respectively mandate the court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned
may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published
three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and (b)
cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatee and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title
clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir.
Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically
void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike,
with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of
Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and
extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners,
and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.
Held: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article 783) can be clearly deduced from
the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property,
the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of those who would succeed
in the absence of the eldest son.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the
intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law should
be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the document,
even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will.
Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were
not preterited in the will. It was Segundos last expression bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs,
with the sole exception of Alfredo.

DY YIENG SEANGIO vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES

Facts: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio before the RTC of Manila. Petitioners opposed contending that Segundo left a holographic will
disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause, thus, the intestate proceedings
are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. A petition
for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was subsequently filed by petitioners before the RTC.
Private respondents moved for its dismissal on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does
not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code as the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance and nothing else. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent and that the rule on preterition does
not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or
more compulsory heirs. The RTC issued its order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings as the
will clearly shows that there is preterition since the other heirs were omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil
Code thus applies. Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Issue(s):
1 W/N the will was a holographic will?
2 W/N there was preterition?
Ruling:
1 Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from
the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other
words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor
of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. Holographic wills, therefore, should be
construed in a manner where the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and
the intention of the testator should be taken into account. Considering that the questioned
document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose.
2

No, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It
was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the
exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.

Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy
over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory.

15. GERONA v DE GUZMAN

Facts: Petitioner Gerona heirs are the legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman.
Placida was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife Teodora de la Cruz. After the
death of Teodora, Marcelo married Camila Ramos. Their children are herein respondents de Guzman
heirs. Marcelo died some time in Septermber 1945 and respondents executed a deed of extra-judicial
settlement of his estate. They fraudulently stipulated therein that they were the only surviving heirs of
Marcelo although knowing that petitioners were also his forced heirs. They were able to cause the
transfer the certificates of 7 parcels of land each in their names. The petitioners discovered the fraud only
the year before the institution of the case. Petitioners seek to annul the extra-judicial settlement as well as
have their shares in the said properties reconveyed to them.
Contentions: Defendants argue that Placida de Guzman was not entitled to share in the estate of
Marcelo as she was an illegitimate child and that the action of the Petitioners is barred by the statute of
limitations.
Rulings:
TRIAL COURT: The trial court dismissed the case after finding that Placida was a legitimate child of
Marcelo and that the properties described herein belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo and
Camila. It also ruled that Petitioners action had already prescribed.
CA: affirmed ruling of the trial court
Contentions: Petitioners assert that since they are co-heirs of Marcelo, the action for partition is not
subject to the statue of limitations; that if affected, the period of 4 years did not begin to run until discovery

of the fraud. They claim that the fraud done by respondents took place in 1956 or 1957 and that it had not
prescribed when the present action was commenced.
SC: The rule holds true only when the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse
title. The statute of limitations operates from the time the adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the
property.
The defendants excluded the petitioners from the estate of Marcelo when they executed the deed of
extra-judicial settlement claiming that they are the sole heirs thus setting up an adverse title to the estate.
An action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from
fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations and the action may only be filed within 4 years from the
discovery of the fraud. In the case at bar, the discovery was made on June 25, 1948 when the deed was
filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the names of the respondents
exclusively. Plaintiffs complaint was not filed until November 4, 1958 or more than 10 years after.
Ignacio Gerona as well as Maria Concepcion attained the age of majortity in 1948 thus had 4 years from
date of discovery within which to file an action.
Francisco and Delfin attained the age of majority in 1952 and 1954, thus had 2 years after removal of
legal incapacity within which to commence their action.
16. PEREZ vs. CHUA
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, dismissing the appellants'
complaint for reconveyance on grounds of prescription and laches. This appeal was originally brought to
the Court of Appeals, but was certified to this Court because only questions of law are raised therein.
Facts:
1 On April 13, 1928, Francisco Arcillas and his wife Rosario Perez executed a deed of mortgage in
favor of Nanon L. Worcester over twenty-three (23) parcels of land located in Zamboanga City,
registered in the names of the spouses Arcallas, to secure their loan of US $13,500.00. Under the
contract, the loan was payable in installments to the creditor-MORTGAGEE for a period of five
years, "the first installment thereof to be paid on or before three (3) months after the date of this
instrument and the remaining installments in regular quarterly intervals thereafter."
2 For violation of the aforestated stipulation, an action for foreclosure of mortgage was instituted
sometime in 1930 by Mrs. Worcester against the spouses Arcillas in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga. During the pendency of the action, or on May 4, 1930, Francisco Arcillas died. He
was survived by the plaintiffs herein, namely: his widow Rosario Perez, and their children
Francisco, Jose, Rosa, Trinidad, Encarnacion, Leoncia, Juan, Tomas, Anastacio, Moises and
Manuel, all surnamed Arcillas.
3 As no notice of death of defendant Francisco Arcillas was filed with the court, the trial Judge
proceeded with the case without substitution of the deceased by his legal representative or heirs.
On August 23, 1930, a judgment was rendered in favor of the mortgagee. A writ of execution was
thereafter issued, and in the ensuing auction sale conducted on September 19, 1930, the
properties encumbered were sold to Mrs. Worcester as highest bidder. On October 6, 1930, the
court issued the corresponding order of confirmation of sale; and upon registration of the sheriff's
certificate of sale and the order of confirmation on November 24, 1930, the certificates of title of
the spouses Arcillas were cancelled and, in lieu thereof, transfer certificates of title were issued in
the name of Mrs. Worcester.
4 Two days later, Mrs. Worcester sold the said lands to Enrique Ong Chua, who obtained new
certificates of title in his name, and possessed the said properties as owner. Upon Enrique's
demise, the lands in question passed to his heirs: Pilar, Rufina, Justino Alfonso, Benita, Rosa,
Asuncion, Francisco and Teresita, all surnamed Ong Chua, who have been in continuous, open
and adverse possession of these lands up to the present time.
5 Thirty-eight years thereafter, or on October 14, 1968, Rosario Perez and her children filed the
instant action in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga against the Ong Chuas for annulment
of their certificates of title and for reconveyance, and accounting of the fruits of, the twenty-three
parcels of land in question.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the case.

Held: Negative
The appellants' cause of action to cancel the certificates of title in question accrued from 1930, the year
of the recording of the sheriff's deed and the issuance of the certificates of title. Thirty-eight years had
thus elapsed before appellants instituted the present action on October 14, 1968. The continuous and
public assertion of title by the appellees and their predecessor-in-interest during this period of time was
more than sufficient to extinguish the appellants' action. The period of extinctive prescription under
Chapter III of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the time, was only ten years.
Appellants contend, however, that the judgment rendered by the court in the foreclosure proceedings in
1930 was erroneous because no proper substitution was made of Francisco Arcillas, one of the
defendants who died during the pendency of the action; and since the certificates of title obtained by Mrs.
Worcester under said erroneous judgment were subject to an implied trust, which is continuing and
subsisting, the appellants' action for reconveyance cannot prescribe because prescription does not run
against their predecessor's title registered under Act 496.
Appellants' thesis overlooks the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that an action to enforce an implied
trust may be barred not only by prescription for 10 years but also by laches. Implied trusts and express
trusts are distinguishable. An express trust, which is created by the intention of the parties, disables the
trustee from acquiring for his own benefit a property committed to his custody or management at least
while he does not openly repudiate the trust and makes such repudiation known to the beneficiary. Upon
the other hand, in a constructive trust, which is exclusively created by law, laches constitutes the bar to an
action to enforce the trust, and repudiation is not required, unless there is concealment of the facts giving
rise to the trust.
In Go Chi Gun, et al. vs. Co Cho et al. , this Court spelled out the four elements of the equitable defense
of laches, to wit: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks remedy; (2) delay in
asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants'
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the
part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury
or prejudice to the defendant in the events relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to
be barred.
In the case at bar, these four elements are present. As pointed out, Mrs. Worcester, after having acquired
the property at public auction and having obtained the certificates of title in her name, sold on November
26, 1930 the properties in question to Enrique Ong Chua, the appellees' predecessors-in-interest.
Appellants allowed almost four decades to lapse before taking any remedial action. Because of their
passivity and inaction during this entire period, appellees were made to feel secure in their belief that their
late father had rightly acquired the lands in question and that no action would be filed against them. They
were thus induced to spend time, effort and money in cultivating the land, paying the taxes, and
introducing improvements therein. Undoubtedly, they would be prejudiced if the instant action for
reconveyance is not barred. It is the established principle in this jurisdiction that inaction and neglect of a
party to assert a right can convert what otherwise could be a valid claim into a stale demand.