RULE 110

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th
Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO
BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:
An information for attempted homicide was filed against private respondents Rafael, Adiston, and Jose, all
surnamed Anadilla. The court dismissed the case considering that the offended party is no longer interested in the
further prosecution of the case. The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied
by the court a quo.
ISSUE: Whether the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed
by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed but the prosecuting fiscal.

G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

HELD:

GANCAYCO, J.:

No. While the Crespo doctrine has settled that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should
be dismissed (after the complaint or information has been filed in court), still, any move on the part of the
complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without the objection of the accused, should
first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal for his own review on the matter. It is only after hearing the prosecuting
fiscals view that the Court should exercise it exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the case.

FACTS:
Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa
against Petitioner Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraigment the
Petitioner filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with
the Secretary of Justice for the filing of the information. Presiding Judge Mogul, herein respondent, denied the
motion. Subsequently, MR was denied. But arraignment was deferred for Petitioner to elevate the matter to the
CA, which restrained Respondent Judge from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders from DOJ. DOJ
resolved the petition ordering dismissal for insufficiency of evidence. Notwithstanding the same, Respondent
Judge proceeded with the case.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court may proceed with prosecution regardless of the motion filed by the Provincial
Fiscal, upon instructions of the Sec. of Justice, to dismiss the case.
HELD: YES.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to
do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny
the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was
filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
Republic v. Sunga

People v Ocaya
GR L-47448. May 17, 1978
FACTS:
On or about the 23rd day of July, 1977, in Don Carlos, Bukidnon, Philippines accused Esterlina Marapao, Leticia
Marapao, and Diosdado Marapao, attacked and assaulted one Mrs. LOLITA ARES, a mother who was then still on
the twelfth (12th) day from her child delivery, wrestling her to the ground and thereafter throwing and hitting her
with a fist-size stone at the face, which injury considerably deforms her face, and further causing upon said Mrs.
LOLITA ARES to suffer a relapse (nabughat in the local dialect) arising from her weak constitution due to her
recent child delivery, which relapse incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for a period of more
than thirty (30) days.
The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits has been held, much less that warrants for the
arrest of the accused had been issued. Instead, after "scanning the records of (the) case", respondent judge motu
proprio ordered the dismissal of the case "as the crime of slight or less physical injury is not within the jurisdiction
of the court". The fiscal's motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for alleged lack of
jurisdiction.
HELD:
The orders of the respondent judge was held NULL & VOID.
The jurisdiction of the court in a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the information or
criminal complaint, and not by the result of the evidence presented at the trial, nor the trial judges
personal appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits without hearing the parties and their witnesses. Moreover,
once jurisdiction has attached to the person and subject-matter, the subsequent happening of events, though it

may have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not divest the court of jurisdiction already
attached.
G.R. No. 141881 November 21, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VIRGILIO BERNABE y RAFOL, accused-appellant.
Facts:
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape employed upon his daughter Maria Esnelia Bernabe. On
October 29, 1998, around 1:30 o' clock in the morning, Maria was sleeping with her sister in a room of their house
located when he came home very drunk. Appellant entered said room, approached Maria and started kissing her
nape as well as other parts of her body. Then, appellant removed her panty and inserted his penis into her vagina.
She resisted by pushing him but to no avail. Appellant succeeded in satisfying his beastly desires on his own
daughter just like what happened in the previous years starting 1994.Maria could not take it anymore so she
reported the incident to her cousin, Cristina Martin. Later, she also told her aunts about it. At 2:00 o'clock in the
morning of the same day, she was accompanied by her aunts to the Pasay City policeheadquarters, where she
lodged a complaint for rape against appellant and executed a sworn statement. At 4:00 o'clock in the morning,
policemen came to Maria Esnelia's house and arrested appellant. The Medical Examination conducted upon
Maria showed that was no injuries found on the hymen as well as the outside genital parts of the victim. Appellant
denied raping his daughter. The trial court handed down a judgment of conviction sentencing accused of death
penalty.
Issue:
Whether or not death penalty was correctly imposed.
Held:
No. Before, the death penalty can be properly imposed for the crime of rape in accordance with Republic Act
No. 7659, an allegation of the complainant's age as well as filial relationship with the accused is essential. Both
minority and actual relationship between the parties must be alleged and proved, otherwise, barred is any
conviction for rape in its qualified form. In the case at bar, while the Information alleged both the minority of the
victim and her relationship with appellant, the prosecution failed to prove the victim's age when it presented only
the baptismal certificate of Maria Esnelia and not her birth certificate. It is elementary that a baptismal certificate
only proves the fact of baptism but not the circumstances of birth. Without essential proof on the matter of the
date of birth of complainant, or other convincing evidence in the absence thereof, the Court cannot rule with
certainty whether Maria Esnelia was indeed a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, especially so
because she does not appear to be obviously a minor, as she allegedly was already 17 years old at the time of the
assault. Withal, the penalty of death imposed by the trial court on appellant should be reduced to reclusion
perpetua as provided for by law
Nota bene:
This is in relation to Secs.8 and 9 of rule 110 although it was not used as a basis in the decision.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. CASTANITO GANO Y SAGUYONG a.k.a JERRY PEREZ, ALLAN PEREZ, ALLAN SAGUYONG and
JERRY GANO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 134373. February 28, 2001
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Eduardo Zulueta, a relative of the victims, corroborated to the fact that accused Castanito Gano killed
three (3) persons by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.
The lifeless body of Ponciano Salen was found at the dirty kitchen, while that of Anicia Salen was inside a
room on the second floor. Outside the other room in the same floor was the body of Conchita Marbella. Police
officers recovered stolen items from Castantino when the latter was apprehended in Butuan City. Their
investigation at the scene of the crime showed that the cabinet where the assorted items, specifically the
wristwatches, jewelry, wallet and cash were supposedly kept, showed signs of having been forcibly opened. He
learned later from the victims relatives that the stolen goods were taken from the cabinet.
Police officers recovered stolen items from Castantino when the latter was apprehended in Butuan City.
Their investigation at the scene of the crime showed that the cabinet where the assorted items, specifically the
wristwatches, jewelry, wallet and cash were supposedly kept, showed signs of having been forcibly opened. He
learned later from the victims relatives that the stolen goods were taken from the cabinet.
Angelica Marbella, four (4) years old, the only living witness to the killing of her mother and grandparents,
categorically stated that the accused, known to her as Allan, perpetrated the gruesome killings. She likewise
pointed to the accused as the one who stole the money from the drawer of her mother, her Mickey Mouse watch
and other valuables. She also identified her set of bloodstained garments presented in evidence and explained
that the bloodstains came from her "Mommy."
Castanito denied having robbed the victims of their valuables and insisted that he saw the alleged stolen
items for the first time only during the trial. Giving full credence to the testimony of minor Angelica Marbella, the
trial court convicted the accused of the crime of robbery with homicide. In imposing the death penalty on the
accused, the trial court appreciated two (2) aggravating circumstances based on the number of victims killed.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the multiplicity of homicides could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance

2. Whether dwelling may be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
HELD:
1.

NO.

It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as
aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the same Code regarding mitigating
circumstances where there is specific paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances.

It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the robbery)
would result in an anomalous situation where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one
rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A
penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is
not clearly made so by the statute.
2.

NO.

Pursuant to the Secs. 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect 1
December 2000, the Rules now require that the information or complaint allege not only the qualifying but the
aggravating circumstances as well, otherwise, the same cannot be properly appreciated. Guided by the
consecrated rule that when a penal statute, substantive and remedial or procedural, is favorable to the accused,
the courts shall give it a retroactive application and so we must in this case as the Information does not allege
dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.

In People vs. Amadore, we held that the attendance of any of the circumstances under the provisions of Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7659, mandating the death penalty are in the nature of qualifying circumstances and the
absence of proper averment thereof in the complaint will bar the imposition of that extreme penalty. The
information in this case did not allege the qualifying circumstance, that the rape was committed in full view of a
niece (a relative within the third degree of consanguinity). Because of this deficiency, appellant was not properly
apprised of the extent of the punishment which the charges against him entailed.
Further, while the decision of the trial court held that dwelling and the use of a deadly weapon aggravated the
crime committed, we find that these were not averred in the information. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that every complaint or information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances with specificity. This requirement of procedure has retroactive effect and is applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage insofar as it is favorable to the appellant. Procedural laws
are retroactive in that sense and to that extent

FACTS:

In sum, we find that no aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances have been properly pleaded and proved
by the prosecution in this case. The result is that the crime committed by appellant is only simple rape, which
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, the law prevailing at the time of
commission thereof, is punished only with reclusion perpetua.

On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, finding
accused Sanico Nuevo @ "Sany" guilty of rape and sentencing him to death.

People vs. Yaoto

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANICO NUEVO @ "SANY"

His conviction stemmed from the following information:

That, in the evening, on or about the 4th day of December, 1994, in the municipality of Godod,
Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, moved by lewd
and unchaste design and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with one ROBERTA CIDO, a 20 year
old married woman, against her will and without her consent.
The trial court found the prosecutions version of events and found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged with aggravating circumstances of dwelling and committed in full view of the relative within the
third degree of consanguinity (Sec. 11 R.A. 7659), but since there was no mitigating circumstance to offset the
above aggravating circumstances, the Court sentenced the accused to suffer the maximum penalty provided by
law which is DEATH.
ISSUE:

FACTS:
In the afternoon of June 2, 1997, seventeen-year old Angeline Yaoto and her father, herein accused-appellant
Eduardo Yaoto, were the only persons left in the house of Angelina's grandmother. Accused-appellant suddenly hit
Angeline with a belt, then tied her hands to the sofa with a piece of rope, removed her shorts, panties, blouse and
bra. When Angeline was completely naked, accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her. Angeline's
resistance proved futile as accused-appellant easily overpowered her.
In the morning of June 7, 1997, Angeline was sleeping in the sala when accused-appellant lay down beside her,
touched her thighs and whispered his intention to have sexual intercourse with her again. Just like the first time,
he mauled her but this time, he tied her feet when she refused. When accused-appellant fell asleep after the
intercourse, Angeline seized the opportunity to escape. She proceeded to the Valenzuela Police Station, where
she narrated her ordeal at the hands of her father, causing the police authorities to apprehend accused-appellant.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. He
was sentenced the penalty of death.

Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying and aggravating circumstances in the instant
case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty of death is proper in the case at bar.

HELD:

HELD:
No. The Court held that while the qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged in the two Informations,
accused-appellant's relationship with Angeline was not. The failure to allege in the information the
relationship of the victim to the offender concurrently with the minority of the victim bars accusedappellant's conviction for rape in its qualified form. The requisite for the complete allegations on the
particulars of the indictment is based on the right of the accused to be fully informed of the nature of the

No, the trial erred in doing so. We agree with the trial court that Roberta had sufficiently identified appellant as the
person who raped her, by means of force, violence and intimidation, against her will and without her consent.
However, it is our view that the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance under par. 3, Section
11, R.A. 7659, concerning the presence of a relative, to justify the imposition of the death penalty.

charges against him so that he may adequately prepare for his defense pursuant to the due process
clause of the Constitution.

[G.R. No. 123340. August 29, 2002]

CARPIO, J.:

RULE 111

FACTS:

[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO
LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.

The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document before the Manila Regional Trial Court. Petitioner, in a Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, established that
she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs.
Since the offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense,
the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal case. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its
decision acquitting petitioner for reasonable doubt. Also, with respect to the civil aspect of the case, RTC
ordered the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan.

Facts:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Capitulo and driven by
petitioner Casupanan, figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with MCTC of Capas, Tarlac.
Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was filed, the
criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to
dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC
granted the motion and dismissed the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted
that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC
denied the motion for reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
the Caps RTC assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal. The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28,
1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
Held:
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action to
recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal
action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil
Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even
with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate,
distinct and independent of the civil action deemed instituted in the criminal action. Similarly, the accused can file
a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly
allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may
be litigated in a separate civil action. Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan
and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum
shopping is erroneous.
LUTGARDA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the
HEIRS OF ESTANISLAWA C. REYES, represented by MIGUEL C. REYES, respondents.

MR was filed by Petitioner and furnished the City Prosecutor of the same, assailing the RTC ruling on the
civil aspect. RTC denied MR for lack of merit. When elevated to the CA, CA dismissed the case for being
insufficient in substance.

ISSUE: Whether RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to decide on the civil aspect of the criminal case.

HELD: YES.
If the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the accused, and the crime was
committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all matters that the law requires
the court to resolve. This includes the power to order the restitution to the offended party of real property located
in another province.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the
crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that
the law requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising
from the crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [E]very person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable. Article 104 of the same Code states that civil liability x x x includes restitution.
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPIECCI) v. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as
Presiding Judge of the RTC, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS
FACTS:
The prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Misamis Oriental an information for estafa
against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of
P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner, for
deposit with the teller of petitioner. Subsequently, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the RTC a complaint
against Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment
arising out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the ground that
there is a pending criminal case in RTC, arising from the same facts.

The trial court issued an order dismissing the civil case. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order. The trial court granted respondent's motion for reconsideration, thereby recalling the dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without having
reserved the filing of the civil action.
HELD:
As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the
criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the
personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity
which is civil in nature.
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Civil liability includes restitution, reparation
for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages. The offended party may prove the civil liability
of an accused arising from the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either
deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted. Only the civil liability arising from the offense
charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from
the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a
reservation (Section 3, Rule 111). An independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed
against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no
reservation as to its filing.
Wherefore, the Court DENIES the petition.
Elcano vs. Hill
GR L-24803. May 26, 1977
FACTS: Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence of the crime, was criminally prosecuted for the
killing of Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted for lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.Pedro
Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it
deciding that civil action regarding the case is already barred.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed.
HELD: No. The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence
that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
In Barredo v Garcia (dual charactercivil and criminal of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation):
"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under boththe Penal Code
and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could
have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action

under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who
was being sued."
"It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because
his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case aria for which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his
crime.
[G.R. No. 104392. February 20, 1996]
RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (First
Division), HON. RUBEN C. AYSON, in his capacity as Acting
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Baguio City, and
ALFREDO BOADO, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas
Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site. On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in
a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Boado. As a result of the accident, a
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed
against petitioners driver Andaya, with the Baguio RTC. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by
private respondent Boado against petitioner. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil
case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the trial court denied petitioners
motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal
action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case. Petitioner took the matter
on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could not proceed
independently of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring it separately had been made in the
criminal case. CA held that the trial court correctly denied petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings in the
civil case.
Issue:
Whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for
damages against petitioner following article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Held:
No. After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court reached the conclusion that the right to bring an
action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be
dismissed. 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the
recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil
actions are not limited to those which arise from the offense charged, as originally provided in Rule 111 before
the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the
recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. The rule requiring

reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is RESERVED and the complaint against
petitioner is DISMISSED.
REMEDIOS NOTA SAPIERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RAMON SUA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128927. September 14, 1999]
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On several occasions petitioner Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from Monrico
Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de
Guzman. These checks were signed at the back by petitioner. When presented for payment, the checks were
dishonored because the drawers account was already closed. Private respondent Ramon Sua informed Arturo
de Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4)
charges of estafa were filed against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Arturo de Guzman
was charged with two (2) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, Cases against petitioner and de Guzman were
consolidated and tried jointly. Subsequently, they were acquitted. Private Respondent appealed the decision of the
RTC with regard to the civil aspect. However, Petitioner contended that the acquittal in the criminal case was
absolute.
Petition for mandamus was filed with the CA, which ordered that he could appeal with respect to the civil
aspect. Subsequently, Private Respondent was able to collect twice from Petitioner. Hence, this petition alleging
that Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner civilly liable to private respondent because her acquittal by the
trial court from charges of estafa was absolute.

accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him and they promptly filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide against petitioner. Prosecutor Villa Ignacio informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers,
that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
While the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in court, the victim,
Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s). Accordingly, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated
homicide, filed an information for murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Counsel for petitioner filed with
the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the
information was filed.
The trial court issued an Order granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation but later on recalled and
cancelled it and set the hearing of the case.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court assailing the Order,
contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been previously
conducted, in violation of his right to due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

ISSUE: Whether the acquittal by RTC from charges of estafa was absolute
HELD:NO.
Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as amended, specifically provides: "Extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the court expressly
declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not
derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.
RULE 112
Go v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, petitioner shot Eldon Maguan then
boarded his car and left the scene. The police launched a manhunt for petitioner. Petitioner presented himself
before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was

HELD:
No, petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. On the same day that the information for
murder was filed with the RTC, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the
trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right
to preliminary investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation
may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not
by the RTC.
While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by
statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or
some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial
is inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To
deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due
process.

The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the
time of entering a plea at arraignment. In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to
preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the
Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before
being forced to stand trial.

Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right to
preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without
previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation." Petitioner claimed his right to
preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his
release.