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Marcelo vs CA

FACTS:
Jose T. Marcelo charged the petitioners with falsification of public documents committed by
forging the signature of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. in six voting trust agreements (VTA's) and
findings from the NBI and PC/PNP Crime Laboratory shows that specimen or standard
signature were not written by one and the same person. The VTA's were purportedly executed
in Quezon City and acknowledged before petitioner Dionilo Marfil, a notary public. After
conducting a preliminary investigation, there was "more than sufficient evidence" of the
forgery of the signature and an information for falsification of public documents was filed
with the RTC of Quezon City. Petitioners filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City a Motion for Review seeking the deferment of the filing of the information or
if one had been filed, the suspension of the criminal proceedings and the reversal of the
resolution. Warrants for the arrest of the petitioners were issued, and all of them except
Marcelo posted bail. Marcelo surrendered to the court and posted bail on 29 July 1991. The
petitioners, in a Manifestation and Motion, informed the Bersamin court of the filing of their
Motion for Review and prayed that further proceedings in the case be suspended until the
resolution of the Motion for Review to which motion was not acted upon. Subsequently, the
records of the case were destroyed by a fire on October 16, 1991 and reconstituted only on
Decemebr 9, 1991. On November 15, 1991, the Review Committee handed down a resolution
recommending the reversal of the resolution and withdrawal of the information in the
criminal case. The Bersamin Court granted the resolution and ordering a new information to
which was raffled in the Santiago Court of RTC QC. Petitioners posted bail. the petitioners
filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. Q-91-21285 was already final and that the appeal subsequently taken by
the private prosecutor to and the resolution thereon by the Secretary of Justice are null and
void and cannot be a valid basis for any authority to file the new information or for the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the case. Judge Santiago issued an order denying the motion to
quash on the principal ground that it was not based on any of the grounds enumerated in
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The appeal in CA was denied.
Issue:
Whether a pre-arraignment dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, which relied on the
reversal by the Review Committee of the Office of the City Prosecutor of the investigating
prosecutor's resolution to file the information, bars the filing of a new information for the
same offense after the Secretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the review committee.
HELD:
No. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioners' special civil action for certiorari
not necessarily for the reason it relied upon. The withdrawal of the information in Criminal
Case No. Q-91- 21285, or even the dismissal of the said case as decreed by the Bersamin
court, did not bar the filing of a new information as directed by the Secretary of Justice in his
Resolution of 27 January 1992. No jeopardy had attached as a result of the earlier termination
of Criminal

Case No. Q-91-21285 because the petitioners therein had not been arraigned and had, in fact,
asked for its dismissal for a cause other than that which would constitute double jeopardy. On
the contrary, the filing of the new information in Criminal Case No. Q-92-28104 straightened
the course of criminal justice which had earlier gone awry due to the precipitate action of the
Bersamin court. Nor may it be said that the prosecutor who filed the information had no
authority to do so.
Venus vs Desierto
FACTS:
petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of New Washington, Aklan, while private respondents
Mars C. Regalado and Harry P. Abayon were members of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of
said municipality. Petitioner by virtue of a resloution was authorized to negotiate in behalf of
the municipality to enter into a contract with the Board of Liquidators for the aquisition of
Garcia Diapo Enterprise. The Board then rejected the offer. Petitioner returned to New
Washington and informed the SB thereof of the denial. He likewise submitted to the
Municipal Treasurer his voucher for P1,401.00 for the transportation expenses he incurred for
the trip, which was covered by an itinerary of travel.Nevertheless, on 19 September 1988,
petitioner went to Manila at his personal expense and submitted a letter-request to the Board
of Liquidators that the public bidding be postponed to another date. However, the Board did
not accede. Petitioner then submitted his personal bid, which turned out to be the highest bid.
The property was thus sold to him and a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on 3 October 1988.
Thereafter, he introduced improvements thereon at his expense. During his incumbency as
Mayor, he allowed a portion of the lot to be used, without charge, as a garage for the
municipalitys fire truck and for the municipalitys mushroom culture laboratory. Private
respondents filed a sworn letter-complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Kalibo,
Aklan, charging petitioner with violation of paragraph (h) of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended. In a resolution[10] dated 20 October
1993, issued after due proceedings, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
recommended the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there existed no case for
violation of paragraph (h) of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The case was re-raffled
and the decision was reversed. Ombudsman Desierto likewise approved the Information[13]
charging petitioner with
having violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The Information was filed with
the Sandiganbayan on 2 May 1996 and docketed therein as Criminal Case
No. 23332. On 7 March 1997, petitioner personally surrendered to the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division).[14] His arraignment[15] was set on 10 March 1997. On 20 March 1997, petitioner
filed his motion for reconsideration[17] with the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The motion
was referred to Victor A. Pascual, Special Prosecution Officer III, the prosecuting officer of
the case and the same was reversed and dismissed for lack of probable cause.
ISSUE:
whether petitioner may validly invoke any of the foregoing exceptions. In the main, he

submits that the facts here do not make out even a prima facie case for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
HELD:
YES. As shown by the procedural antecedents, the Office of the Ombudsman has not been at
all certain in its position. Agencies tasked with the preliminary investigation and prosecution
of crimes must always be wary of undertones of political harassment. They should never
forget that the purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect one from an open and public accusation
of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State
from useless and expensive trials. It is, therefore, imperative upon such agencies to relieve
any person from the
trauma of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the
guilt of the accused. For want of reasonable ground to believe that petitioner violated Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, or for absence of probable cause therefor, the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to forthwith DISMISS Criminal Case No. 23332,
entitled People of the Philippines versus Eriberto L. Venus, and to SUBMIT to this Court a
report of its compliance within ten (10)
days from such dismissal. The temporary restraining order issued on 12 January 1998 is
hereby made permanent.
Cruz vs CA
FACTS:
The petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, along with several
others, in four separate informations for estafa thru falsification of public documents.
It was alleged that the petitioner, together with Melania Guerrero, who produced a special
power of attorney claimed establish have been executed by the late Clemente Guerrero, had
conspired with their co-accused in selling some properties of the decedent to the widow's
sister, Luz Andico, through fictitious deeds of sale notarized by the petitioner sometime in
November and December of 1980. Upon arraignment on June 1, 1984, the petitioner and his
co-accused entered a plea of not guilty. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the four informations "(did) not charge an offense." At the hearing on this
motion, the petitioner submitted testimonial and documentary evidence which was not refuted
by the prosecution. For its part, the prosecution submitted no evidence at an but later moved
to deny the motion. The motion to dismiss-to was eventually denied by the trial court, 1 as so
was the subsequent motion for reconsideration. 2 The petitioner questioned the denial of the
motions before this Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals. On April 29,
1988, the respondent courts 3 dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
WON the case must be dismissed based on the grounds presented by petitioner.
HELD:

No. It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to
constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that it
charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in considering a motion
to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish
the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.Contrary to the petitioner's
contention, a reading of the informations will disclose that the essential elements of the
offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper therefore to resolve the charges at the
very outset, in a preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of a full-blown trial. The
issues require a fuller examination. Given the circumstances of this case, we feel it would be
unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the
informations of the basis only of the petitioner's evidence, such as it is. The petitioner's
contention that the questioned transactions were already in existence before the months of
November and December 1980, when they were supposedly falsified, is a matter of defense
best examined during the trial rather than in the preliminary hearing on his motion to dismiss.
The prosecution should be given ample opportunity to prove the allegations in the
information at the appropriate time, and that is the trial itself. The
proper time to offer it, following the normal procedure prescribed in Rule 119, Section 3 of
the Rules of Court, is after the prosecution shall have presented its pay evidence during the
trial.
But we do not agree with the ruling of the respondent court that the motion to quash should
have been filed before the petitioner and his co-accused were arraigned, conformably to
Section 1 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
which provides: Sec. 1. Time to move to quash. At any time before entering his plea, the
accused may move to quash the complaint or information.
It is true that a person who does not move to quash a complaint or information until after he
has pleaded is deemed to have waived all objections then available which are grounds of a
motion to quash. 8 However, this is subject to exception. By express provision of Sec. 8 of
the same rule, failure to assert certain grounds in a motion to quash filed prior to the plea
does not operate as a waiver of the right to invoke them later. Even after
arraignment, a motion to dismiss the information may be filed if it is based on the ground
that: (a) the information charges no offense; (b) the trial court has no jurisdiction; (c) the
penalty or the offense has been extinguished; and (d) that double jeopardy has attached.
Petition is denied. Cases remanded.
KBMBPM vs Dominguez
FACTS:
Magulo
ISSUE: WON lack of PI is a ground for quashal
HELD:
No.

The right of an accused to a preliminary investigation is not among


the rights guaranteed him in the Bill of Rights. As stated in Marcos, et al. vs. Cruz, 80 "the
preliminary investigation in criminal cases is not a creation of the Constitution; its origin is
statutory and it exists and the right thereto can be invoked when so established and granted by
law. It is so specifically granted by procedural law. 81 If not waived,
absence thereof may amount to a denial of due process. 82 However, lack of preliminary
investigation is not a ground to quash or dismiss a complaint or information. Much less does
it affect the court's jurisdiction.
Orquinaza vs Pp
FACTS:
respondent Edelyn Arida, together with her witness, Julio Espinili, executed a sworn
statement before the Calamba City Police Station regarding the alleged act of petitioner of
kissing her and touching her breasts while she was taking a nap inside the Development
Room of the Calamba Model Makers factory. Arida was an employee of Calamba Model
Makers while petitioner was its General Manager. In a letter dated February 5, 2003, SPO4
Filipina Manaig referred the case of sexual harassment to the City Prosecutor of Calamba for
evaluation and proper disposition. On February 13, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Rodel
Paderayon issued a subpoena ordering respondent Arida and petitioner to appear at the Office
of the Provincial/City Prosecutor for Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss before the Office of
the City Prosecutor, arguing that the
affidavits of Arida and Espinili do not contain allegations to constitute the crime of sexual
harassment. On March 25, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Paderayon issued a resolution
finding that there was no transgression of the anti-sexual harassment law, but petitioner's act
of grabbing complainant's breasts and kissing her is punishable under another law for acts of
lasciviousness. [5] Thus, he filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) an
information charging petitioner with acts of
lasciviousness. On April 10, 2003, Judge Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan issued a warrant of
arrest against petitioner. Petitioner filed with the court an omnibus motion praying that (1) the
warrant of arrest be recalled, (2) the information be quashed, (3) the arraignment be
invalidated and set aside, and (4) the case be dismissed. He argued primarily that the
information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted by
the prosecutor was for sexual harassment and not for acts of lasciviousness. He claimed to
have been deprived of his right to due process. The motion was denied. The court held that
the authority to ascertain what charge or offense should be filed based on the evidence
belongs to the public prosecutors and not to the courts. RTC affirmed MTCC.
ISSUE:
information for 'acts of lasciviousness' is null and void for
lack of preliminary investigation on the offense charged in the information.
HELD:
NO. The conduct of another preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness
would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only be presenting the same facts

and evidence which have already been studied by the prosecutor. The Court frowns upon such
superfluity which only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of the criminal
complaint.The designation by the police officer of the offense as sexual harassment when she
referred the case to the Office of the Prosecutor is not conclusive as it is within the
competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted and determine therefrom the
appropriate offense to be charged. That is precisely the purpose of the preliminary
investigation. It is a means to allow the parties to present their affidavits and counteraffidavits before the prosecutor to enable the latter to ascertain whether there is sufficient
ground to indict the accused and to help him prepare the information to be filed in
court.preliminary investigation.
Pp vs Nitafan
ISSUE:
whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismissed a
criminal
information or complaint without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based
on the alleged violation of the latters right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy.
HELD:
NO. It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the
accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio
initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion contemplates
an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to
know on what ground/s he will based his objection to the information. Otherwise, if the judge
initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but
also takes side with the accused.
Pp vs SB
ISSUES:
On the first issue, the petitioner avers that the SB acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the information.
HELD:
YES. It does not appear from the Local Government Code that vesting of power in the local
chief executive to appoint engineer who, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall
likewise act as local building official, also carries with it the power to exercise appellate
jurisdiction over the decisions in matters involving non-issuance, suspension, revocation of
building permits. he SB should have set the pre-trial of the case instead of quashing the
Information and even acquitting the respondent. The arraignment of the respondent and his
posting a bail bond for his provisional liberty proscribed the SB from dismissing the case for
lack of probable cause. Under Section 3, Rule 117, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
motion to quash an Information may be filed only for the following grounds. The absence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of

arrest is not a ground for the quashal of the Information but is a ground for the dismissal of
the case. And yet, the SB acquitted the respondent. It is basic that the dismissal of a case is
different from the acquittal of the accused therein. By its precipitate and patently illegal acts,
the SB deprived the petitioner of its right to due process, an aberration that should not be
countenanced. The assailed Resolutions of the SB are, thus, null and void. Where the order of
dismissal was issued at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication, the
order is null and void (People v. Pamittan, 30 SCRA 98 [1969]). Double Jeopardy did not
attach.
Villaflor vs Vivar
Doctrine:
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of an information or
render it defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground
for quashing the information. Instead of dismissing the information, the court should hold the
proceeding in abeyance and order the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation.
FACTS:
An Information3 for slight physical injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 23365, was filed
against Respondent Dindo Vivar on February 7, 1997. The case from the alleged mauling of
Petitioner Gian Paulo Villaflor by respondent around 1:00 a.m. on January 27, 1997 outside
the Fat Tuesday Bar at the Ayala Alabang Town Center, Muntinlupa City. After the severe
beating he took from respondent, petition again met respondent who told him, "Sa susunod
gagamitin ko na itong baril ko"4 ("Next time, I will use my gun on you"). When the injuries
sustained by petitioner turned out to be more serious than they had appeared at first, an
Information5 for more serious physical injuries, docketed as Criminal Case No. 23787, was
filed against respondent.6 The earlier charge of slight physical injuries was withdrawn. At the
same time, another Information7 for grave threats, docketed as Criminal Case No. 237288,
was filed against
respondent on March 17, 1997. On April 14, 1997, respondent posted a cash bond of P6,000
in Criminal Case No. 23787 (for serious physical injuries)9. Instead of filing a counteraffidavit as required by the trial court, he filed on April 21, 1997, a Motion to Quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 23787 (for grave threats). He contended that the latter
should have

absorbed the threat, having been made in connection with the charge of serious physical
injuries. Thus, he concluded, Criminal Case No. 23728 should be dismissed, as the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
MTC dimissed quashal based on summary procedure.
RTC:reversed and granted quashal.
ISSUE:Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation be
considered a ground to
quash the criminal Informations for serious physical injuries and grave threats filed against
the accusedrespondent?
HELD:
NO.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the grounds on
which an accused can move to quash the complaint or information. These are: (a) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; (d) the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense
is charged, except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offense; (g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) information
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (I) the
accused has been previously convicted or is in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged.25 Nowhere in the above-mentioned section is there any mention of a lack of
a preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash. Moreover, such motion is a
prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. In the
present case, the RTC therefore erred in granting herein respondent's Motion to Quash.
Furthermore, we stress that the failure of the accused to assert any ground for a motion to
quash before arraignment, either because he had not filed the motion or had failed to allege
the grounds therefor, shall be deemed a waiver of such grounds.26 In this case, he waived his
right to file such motion when he pleaded not guilty to the charge of grave threats. dismissing
the information, the court should hold the proceeding in abeyance and order the public
prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.

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