ARTICLE III, SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Rabino, et al vs Cruz et, al

FACTS:

This case rooted between David Palmenco, et al. and Adora Cruz, et al., where herein petitioners,
Rabino, et al. where not impleaded as defendants in said civil cases although they are also
occupants of land in dispute. MTC decision in said case was for Palmenco, to vacate the premises in
question and restore the possession thereof of the plaintiffs.
A writ of execution was issued by MTC but was resisted by Palmenco, et al.
Herein petitioners Rabino filed an opposition to the writ of demolition and an action for damages.

Palmenco also filed an action for injunction with damages at the RTC. A temporary restraining order
was issued by the trial court directing the respondents and other defendants to refrain implementing
alias writ of demolition.
For the third time, the case was brought to the Court of Appeals through the petition for certiorari filed
by Adora Cruz, with prayer to prohibit the judge of RTC Antipolo from conducting further proceedings
related to Civil Case Nos. 630 and 631.
ISSUE:

against petitioners who were not impleaded as defendants but also

occupants of the said land in dispute.
W/N the writ of execution may be forced
HELD:

Judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action.
This is anchored on right of person to due process of law.
In order to have due process, following conditions must be met:
1. Court or tribunal with judicial power to hear and determine the matter.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over person of defendant or property subject of the
proceedings.
3. Defendant is given an opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment is rendered upon lawful hearing.
Due process of law was denied to the petitioners. Hence, judgment rendered in Civil Cases cannot
be enforced against them.
Right to due process is one of the building blocks of the edifice of our democratic form of
government; courts must be vigilant in safeguarding it.
ARTICLE III, SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Philcomsat vs Alcuaz
FACTS:
EO 196 placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of NTC.
Petitioner filed with NTC an application for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has

been continuously operating and maintaining and to continue providing the international satellite
communications services.
Petitioner was granted one-year provisional authority to render service and charge the rates it was then
charging.
NTC extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, but it directed the petitioner
to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen per cent (15%) on the present authorized rates.
Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction on the ground that the Commission in its on-going review of
present service rates, takes note that after an initial evaluation of the financial statements of applicant, there is
merit in a REDUCTION in some of applicant's rates, subject to further reductions, should the Commission find
in its further evaluation that more reduction should be effected either on the basis of a provisional authorization
or in the final consideration of the case.
ISSUE:

W/N the order violates the procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and hearing and the rate
reduction was unjust, thus violative of the substantive due process.
HELD:
Yes. The questioned order violated due process because it was issued without notice to petitioner and without benefit of a
hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on initial evaluation and that the petitioner had not been
given an opportunity to present its side before the order in question was issued.
ARTICLE III, SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Medenilla vs CSC
FACTS:
This is a petition seeking the annulment of the resolutions issued by the Civil Service Commission which disapproved the
appointment of the petitioner to the position of Supervising Human Manpower Development Officer.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the resolution, however, it was denied because petitioner alleged that CSC failed to notify
her, the existence of an appeal filed before the CSC, thereby denying her due process of law.
ISSUE:
W / N there was a violation of due process of law.
HELD:
Contention is without merit. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is not
always the cornerstone of due process. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute
absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.
In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
ARTICLE III, SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
American Inter-Fashion Corp. vs Office of the President
FACTS:

This case arose from an April 24, 1984 ruling of the GTEB that respondent Glorious Sun was guilty of
misdeclaration of imported raw materials resulting in dollar salting abroad and, therefore, its export
quotas should be cancelled. Its quotas were given to two newly-formed corporations-De Soleil
Apparel Manufacturing Corporation (De Soleil and the American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC).
These two corporations were joint ventures of the Hongkong investors and majority stockholders of
Glorious Sun on one hand and, allegedly, a member of the family and a crony of President Marcos on
the other. The Office of the President set aside the GTEB decision and remanded the case for
genuine hearings where due process would be accorded both parties. The petitioner now alleges that
the GTEB decision is res judicata and that Glorious Sun was given every opportunity to be heard by
the Board.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Malacaang decision suffers from grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:

The cancellation of the export quotas of the private respondent was a violation of its constitutional
right to due process by GTEB. Before the cancellation in 1984, private respondent had been enjoying
export quotas as early as 1977.
In effect, the private respondent in export quota allocation which was initially a privilege evolved into
some form of property right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without due process
only to hurriedly confer it to another. While it is true that such allocations were mere privileges which
it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, the privileges have been accorded to private respondent
for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially since not only do these
privileges determine the continued existence of private respondent but also the livelihood of its
workers.
ARTICLE III, SEC 1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
US v Toribio
FACTS:

Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because
his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He
was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court.
ISSUE:
May the State interfere with property rights?
HELD:
Yes, whenever the public interests demand it.
The legislature determines not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such
interests. To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear
1) that the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, really requires such interference,
2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
3) not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

ARTICLE III, SEC 1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

Corona vs United Harbor
FACTS:
PPA promulgated an order saying: "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a
term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation
of performance." Herein respondents questioned the order and requested for its suspension before DOTC, however, the secretary of
DOCT said that the matter is within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors of PPA. Respondents appealed the ruling to the Office of
the President. Now, the OP through Corona, dismissed the appeal and lifted the restraining order issued earlier.

ISSUE:
May the license of the harbour pilots be cancelled without a hearing?
HELD:
No. The order failed to meet the condition set by law. The Court a quo pointed out out that the Bureau of Customs, the

precursor of the PPA, recognized pilotage as a profession and, therefore, a property right. Thus, abbreviating
the term within which that privilege may be exercised would be an interference with the property rights of the
harbor pilots. Consequently, any withdrawal or alteration of such property right must be strictly made in
accordance with the constitutional mandate of due process of law. This was apparently not followed by the
PPA when it did not conduct public hearings prior to the issuance of PPA-AO No. 04-92.
ARTICLE III, SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW
Telebap vs COMELEC
FACTS:

RA 6646 prohibits sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads, except to COMELEC.
The law in question prohibits mass media from selling or donating print space or air time to the
candidates and requires COMELEC instead to procure print space or air time for allocation to the
candidates.
The petitioners contention is that the said law denies the radio and TV companies the equal
protection of laws because the said law is not applicable to print media; Therefore, the unequal
treatment between print media and the radio & TV media.
ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 6646 (Omnibus Election Code) prevents radio and TV broadcast companies from
exercising their right to due process and equal protection if the law.
HELD:

Petitioners contention is without merit. There are important differences in characteristics between two
media, which justify differential treatment between the two. Government spends public funds for
allocation of and regulation of broadcast industry, which it does not do in case of print media. To
provide free air time for COMELEC time is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. Also, radio and
TV broadcast has wider reach compared to print media, which is why it needs to be regulated during
the election campaign period.

ARTICLE III, SEC 2: REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT

Placer vs Villanueva
FACTS:

Petitioners filed information in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and
Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of said
information, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance
of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to
the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the
information to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause
by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue
warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscals certification in the information of the existence of
probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest.
ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the
fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation
HELD:

Judge may rely upon the fiscals certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with the
warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial
discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge
must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the
face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals certification
and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to
existence of probable cause.
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT
Tambasen vs People
FACTS:

P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant alleging that he received information that Petitioner had in
his possession at his house M-16 Armalite rifles, hand grenades, .45 Cal. pistols, dynamite sticks and
subversive documents, which were used or intended to be used for illegal purposes. The application was
granted.
Then, a police team searched the house of petitioner and seized 2 envelopes containing P14000, handset
with antennae, transceiver with antennae, regulator supply, academy notebook and assorted papers and
handset battery pack.
Petitioner moved that the search and seizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to
him.
The MTCC in its order directed Lt. Col. Torres to return the money seized to petitioner ruling that any seizure
should be limited to the specified items covered thereby.
Sol-Gen petitioned with the RTC for the annulment of the order of MTCC citing that pending the determination
of legality of seizure of the articles, they should remain in custogia legis. RTC granted the petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned in the search warrant was legal.
HELD:

Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized. The police acts beyond the parameters of their authority if they seize articles not described
in the search warrants. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized, to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion; that unreasonable search and seizure may not be made and
that
abuses
may
not
be
committed.

Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to return the money seized.
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Guazon de Villa
FACTS:

41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in their
place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no specific target house to be
search and that there is any search warrant or warrant of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in
their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. The residents complained that
their homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their
money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported incidents of
mauling, spot-beatings and maltreatment.
The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contend that the Constitution
grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of
peace in the state.
ISSUE:

Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.
HELD:

It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the
methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities. Based on the facts stated by the parties, it
appears to have been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any
houses were searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of the
squatters and low income families are fully protected.
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
People vs Barrios
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
People vs Sevilla
FACTS:

A team of police officers went to the house of the accused to enforce a warrant of arrest. Some
members of the Narcotics Command joined the team to look for marijuana. Accused was
subsequently charged with illegal possession of marijuana.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the search for marijuana is illegal.

HELD:

The search is illegal. It is not a search incidental to a valid arrest since the Narcotics Command
joined the team of police officers for the specific purpose of conducting a search.
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
Umil vs Ramos
FACTS:

This case is a result of the consolidation of separate motions filed by petitioners seeking
reconsideration of Courts promulgated decision on October 9, 1990 where petitions were dismissed.
The Court clarified that the decision did not rule that mere suspicion that one is a communist party or
NPA member is valid ground for his arrest without warrant.

Petitioners contend that upholding questioned arrests made without warrant, in relying on Rules of
Court Section 5, Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards fact that such arrest violated the constitutional rights of
the persons arrested.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest of petitioner was valid even in the absence of a warrant.
HELD:

If arrests were made in accordance with law, detention resulting from such arrest also is accordance
with law. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court states that:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
Power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements for Sec., Rule 113
are met. The rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities. Probable cause, not evidence of guilt, is the reason for warrantless arrest. Even if
persons are later acquitted, arresting officers are not liable.
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
Larranaga vs CA
FACTS:

Petitioner Margarita G. Larranaga filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction seeking to annul the information for kidnapping and
serious illegal detention against her minor son, Francisco Juan Larranagga alias Paco, filed in the
RTC of Cebu City as well as the warrant of arrest issued as a consequence thereof.
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 3: EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Ople vs Torres
FACTS:

Administrative Order 308, Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System is

sought to be invalidated. Blas F. Ople, herein petitioner, is a member of the Senate while Ruben D.
Torres is the Executive Secretary. The respondents contention is that the computerized system will
be facilitating convenient transaction of business with basic services and social security providers
and other government instrumentalities. The system will properly and efficiently identify persons
seeking basic services and social security, reducing fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations.
The system will make use of biometrics, where biological or physiological characteristics of a person
are used such as retinal scan, finger-scanning, artificial nose and thermo gram.
On the other hand, petitioner points out that the said administrative order impermissibly intrudes on
our citizenrys protected zone of privacy. Also, the said administrative order is a usurpation of the
power of Congress to legislate.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the said administrative order infringes the citizenrys right to privacy thus should be
rendered unconstitutional.
HELD:
Yes, it is unconstitutional.

The essence of privacy is the right to be let alone. The fear of right to privacy

being threatened is not groundless because of numerous options available to the implementers.
There is a potential misuse of the data to be gathered. The more frequent use of the National ID, the
more huge the data can be collected. Vast information can be temping for the government for misuse
of personal information of the user. Also, the administrative order does not tell how data will be
handled; who shall control or access the data; under what circumstances, and; for what purpose.

ARTICLE III, SEC 4: SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT

Eastern Broadcasting vs Dans Jr.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 4: LIBEL
Policarpio vs Manila Times
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 4: OBSCENITY
Gonzales vs Kalao-Katigbak
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 5: FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
US vs Ballard
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 5: NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
Aglipay vs Ruiz
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 6: LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Santiago vs Vasquez
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 7: RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Akbayan vs Aquino
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 9: ELELMENTS OF TAKING
US vs Causby
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 9: JUST COMPENSATION
Santos vs Landbank
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 9: JUDICIAL REVIEW
Republic vs De Knecht
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 10:
PNB vs O.P
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 12: RIGHTS IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
Arroyo vs CA

FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 12: RIGHTS IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
People vs Barlis
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 12: RIGHTS IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
People vs Taylaran
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 12: RIGHTS IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
People vs Binamira
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 12: RIGHTS IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
People vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 13: RIGHT TO BAIL
Moslares vs CA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 14: RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Salaw vs NLRC
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 14: RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
People vs Legaspi
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 14: RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
People vs Dimapilis
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 14: RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
Cadalin vs POEA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 14: RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL
Martelino vs Alejandro
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 14: TRIAL IN ABSENTIA; RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
People vs Veneracion
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:

ARTICLE III, SEC 17: RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

Pascual vs Board of Medical Examiners
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 21: ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY
People vs Ylagan
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 21: TERMINATION OF JEOPARDY
People vs CA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE III, SEC 22:
People vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE IV, SEC 1: CITIZENSHIP
Labo Jr vs COMELEC
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE XIII, SEC 3:
Union vs Nestle
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
ARTICLE XIII, SEC 18:
EPZA vs CHR
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD: