Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies

Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions

Luke Robinson
Department of Philosophy
Southern Methodist University
Abstract
What are moral principles? In particular, what are moral principles of the sort that (if
they exist) ground moral obligations orat the very leastparticular moral truths? I argue
that we can fruitfully conceive of such principles as real, irreducibly dispositional
properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that are responsible for and thereby
explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and actions. Such moral dispositions (or moral
powers) are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations and of particular
truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. Moreover, they can do other
things that moral principles are supposed to do: explain the phenomena falling within
their scope, support counterfactuals, and ground moral necessities, necessary connections
between obligating reasons and obligations. And they are apt to be the truthmakers for
moral laws, or lawlike moral generalizations.

1. Introduction
What are moral principles? The question is ambiguous. By moral principles one
might mean (e.g.) principles of the sort that figure in moral theories and the like.
Principles in this propositional sensethe sense in which principle means a
fundamental truth, proposition, or assumptionare clearly propositions of one
kind or another. But its far from clear that moral principles of the sort that I have
in mind areor even could bepropositions.
The sort of moral principles that I have in mind are the sort that (if they exist)
are the metaphysical grounds of moral obligations orat the very leastof
particular truths about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc. That is,
they are principles in the genetic sense, the sense in which principle means the
origin, source, or ultimate basis of something. It is moral principles in this genetic
sense that moral theorists have in mind when they claim (e.g.) that morality is
composed of an irreducible plurality of principles (Hooker 2000, p. 2); or that the
aim of moral theory is to identify one first principle, or common ground of
obligation that would be the source of obligation (Mill 1871, chap. I, paras. 3,
I would like to thank Eric Barnes and Steve Sverdlik for helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this paper.

4); or that [p]rinciples are not like theories, for theories explain what is true in
particular cases without determining it, while principles determine what is true in
particular cases and explain it (Dancy 1983, p. 533); or that particular moral
truths are asymmetrically metaphysically dependent upon the more general truths
stated in first principles (Brink 1994, p. 197). For moral principles that compose
morality, or that constitute the ground or source of obligation, or that differ from
theories in that they not only explain but also determine what is true in particular
cases, or that are metaphysically prior to particular moral truths, would be moral
principles in the genetic sense. That is, they would be the origins, sources, or
ultimate bases of moral obligations orat the very leastof particular truths
about what is morally permissible, impermissible, etc.
Moral principles in the genetic sense (if they exist) are apt to be the
truthmakers for moral principles in the propositional sense. But while it might be
argued that moral principles in the genetic sense are themselves best understood
as propositions, one might also argue that they are something else entirely. And
we must guard against the fallacy of supposing that such principles must be
propositions simply because we can use propositions like Promises ought to be
kept and Killing is wrong to talk about them. This is no less a fallacy than is
supposing that the laws of nature must be propositionsrather than, say, relations
between universals (Dretske 1977; Tooley 1977; Armstrong 1983)simply
because we can use propositions to talk about such laws. And its no less a fallacy
than is supposing that criminal laws must be propositionsrather than, say,
commands of a sovereign (Austin 1832) or social rules (Hart 1994)simply
because we use propositions like Stealing is illegal to talk about criminal laws.
One might think that moral principles in the genetic sensehenceforth,
moral principles simpliciterare a special class of lawlike generalizationsthat
is, laws in the sense in which that term is generally used in the literature on the
laws of nature. For example, a theory of moral principles modeled on the MillRamsey-Lewis, or best-systems, theory of the laws of nature would hold that
genuine moral principles (the principles of morality, if you will) are those moral
generalizations that figure as axioms in the best deductive systems, those systems
of true moral generalizations that strike the best balance between strength
(information content) and simplicity. But even if the laws of nature are best
understood as generalizations of one kind or another, I have argued that this is not
the right way to understand moral principles (Robinson 2008). The problem with
this law conception of moral principles is that moral principles do at least three
things that laws (in this sense) cannot do, at least not in their own rightnamely,
explain certain phenomena, support counterfactuals in particular ways, and
ground moral necessities (see section 2). (It should go without saying that moral
principles cannot be laws if laws cannot do what moral principles do.)

If we reject the law conception of moral principles two other possibilities

immediately present themselves. One is that moral principles are duty-imposing
rules.1 On this view, moral principles are the moral analogue of (e.g.) legal rules or
rules of etiquette. (Or, as in Aquinas, they are legal rules.) A second possibility is
suggested by the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory of the laws of nature: that
moral principles are relations between universals. Like the law conception, this
view holds that moral principles are the moral analogue of laws of nature. But it
incorporates an alternative conception of what such laws areone on which laws
of nature are conceived as relations between universals, rather than as
generalizations or propositions of any kind.
In this paper I argue that there is a third possibility, one that is well motivated
and deserving of serious consideration: that moral principles are moral dispositions,
or moral powers.2 In particular, I argue that we can fruitfully conceive of moral
principles as real, irreducibly dispositional properties of individuals that are
responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and
actions, moral properties such as my obligation to remain faithful to my wife and
the wrongness of John Lennons murder. Moreover, I argue that we can fruitfully
conceive of moral principles as dispositions of individual persons, such as the power
of agents to obligate themselves by promising and the power of persons to obligate
agents not to kill them. And lest I be misread, I mean to allow not only that
patients (infants, dogs, etc.) can be persons, but also that they can have those
moral dispositions of persons that need not be exercised (or manifested)
voluntarily, such as the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them.
This dispositional conception of moral principles arguably underlies W.D. Rosss
moral theory. The principles of Rosss moral theory (which are principles in the
propositional sense) seem to attribute moral dispositions to acts, moral dispositions
such as the tendency to be obligatory (1930, pp. 19-20, 28-29; 1939, pp. 86, 89).
But the view that the dispositional properties of acts ground (e.g.) the
obligatoriness thereof is in conflict with Rosss view that it is persons, rather than
acts, that bear moral properties. Obligatoriness, he argues, is not a
characteristic that attaches to acts; obligation is something that attaches to
persons (Ross 1939, p. 56). On this view, acts are not obligatory; rather, persons
have obligations to act.
An attractive way to save Ross from inconsistency here is to interpret him as
holding that the truthmakers for the principles of his moral theory (and for claims
The term duty-imposing rules is Harts (1994). I use it to refer to rules of the sort that
ground (and are therefore metaphysically prior to) duties or obligationsas opposed not only to
guidelines, rules of thumb, etc., but also to so-called descriptive rules that merely codify
independently existing norms or standards.
2 I use the term disposition as a generic term for dispositional properties: powers, capacities,
tendencies, liabilities, etc. Some use power instead (e.g., Molnar 2003, p. 57).
1

about the moral dispositions of acts in general) are dispositional properties of

persons.3 On this view, the truthmaker for the proposition an act, in so far as it is
the fulfilling of a promise, tends to be right (p. 89) might be the power of agents to
obligate themselves by promising, rather than the tendency of promise-fulfilling
acts to be right; and the truthmaker for the proposition an act, in so far as it is
the act which seems likely to produce most good, tends to be right (p. 89) might
be something like the power of persons to obligate agents to benefit them (or, to
put a quasi-Kantian spin on it, the power of rational beings to obligate themselves
to promote their own perfection and the happiness of others). On this
interpretation, Ross holds that moral principles in the genetic sense are
dispositional properties of individual persons, which properties ground both the
moral obligations of agents and the truth of (true) moral principles in the
propositional sense.
In this paper, I aim to show that this viewthat moral principles in the
genetic sense are dispositional properties of individual personsis not only
coherent, but also well motivated and deserving of serious consideration. (I neither
attempt nor pretend to show that it is true.) To this end, it may help to note the
following at the outset.
First, it should be evident from the above that when I claim that we can
fruitfully conceive of moral principles like
(POK) promises ought to be kept

and
(KW)

killing is wrong

as dispositions, I am not making any claim about propositions like Promises

ought to be kept and Killing is wrong, much less the absurd claim that such
propositions are dispositions. Rather, I am using the expressions promises ought
to be kept and killing is wrong to talk about two moral principles in the genetic
sensenamely, those principles that ground our obligations to keep promises and
to refrain from killing. I am using these expressions to make a claim about what
these and other moral principles in the genetic sense could be.
Second, in rejecting the law conception of moral principles, I am not denying
that there are moral laws. Indeed, I grant that even if moral principles are not
laws, they at least guarantee that certain ceteris paribus laws are true. For example, I
grant that POK and KW guarantee the truth of Promises ought to be kept, ceteris
paribus and Killing is wrong, ceteris paribus, respectively. Moreover, in section 6,
Rosss argument is (roughly) that obligatory acts dont exist at the time that agents are
obligated to perform them and that only existents can bear properties. By attributing not only
moral properties but also the dispositional properties that ground them to persons rather than acts,
one avoids attributing properties to non-existents.
3

I offer both an account of why this is so and an account of how we should

understand such ceteris paribus clauses. I also grant both that there might be strict
moral laws and that there is no linguistic impropriety in calling laws principles,
since they are principles in the propositional sense.
Third and finally, non-moral analogues of the view I am defending here are
defended by a number of metaphysicians and philosophers of science, including
Nancy Cartwright (1999; 1989) and Brian Ellis (2002; 2001). The view I am
defending holds that the metaphysical grounds of both obligation and laws of
obligation are real, irreducibly dispositional properties. And dispositionalists like
Cartwright and Ellis argue that such properties are the metaphysical grounds of
both causation and laws of causation, or causal laws. For example, Cartwright
argues that the laws of physics (qua science) describe not regularities, but rather the
natural powers or capacities of physical systemsi.e., the ones they have in virtue
of their natures (1999, chap. 4).4 And Ellis argues that the fundamental laws of
nature describe the ways in which things belonging to natural kinds must be
disposed to act or interact, given their essential properties and that causal laws, in
particular, describe how things with various causal powers are intrinsically
disposed to act in virtue of having these powers (2001, pp. 106, 206). On such
views, dispositions are not only the truthmakers for laws (pp. 128, 217); they are
also causal principles in the genetic sense, as they are the origin or source of causal
events and interactions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I argue that
moral principles do the following: explain certain phenomena, support
counterfactuals in particular ways, and ground moral necessities. This argument
lays the foundation for what follows, because any satisfactory, non-skeptical
conception of moral principles must account for the ability of such principles to do
what it is that they do. In section 3, I summarize the case against the law
conception and offer some reasons for developing a dispositional conception of
such principles, rather than an alternative nomological conception thereof. In section
4, I argue that we can conceive of moral principles as moral dispositions and, in
particular, as moral dispositions of persons (agents and patients). In section 5, I
argue that this conception of moral principles can do what the law conception
cannot do: account for the ability of moral principles to explain the relevant
phenomena, support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral
necessities. And in section 6, I offer accounts of why moral principlesconceived
as moral dispositionsguarantee the truth of certain ceteris paribus laws and of how
we should understand the ceteris paribus clauses in these laws. Throughout, my
principal aim is to show not only what a tenable dispositional conception of moral
On this view, Newtons law of gravity (F=Gm1m2/r2), for example, describes the powers or
capacities of massive bodies qua massive, rather than any regularity (Cartwright 1999, pp. 65, 82).
4

principles might look like, but also that the particular dispositional conception of
moral principles developed herein is well motivated and merits serious
consideration.

2. What Moral Principles Do

A (non-skeptical) conception of moral principles must account for the ability of
such principles to do what it is that they do.5 And one thing that moral principles
do is explain the phenomena falling within their scope,6 which scope at least
includes the instances of the laws they guarantee. More specifically, moral
principles explain why these phenomena obtain or occur.7 Take POK, for
instance. One phenomenon it would explain is my obligation to remain faithful to
my wife, as that is something I promised to do. Why am I obligated to remain
faithful to my wife? Because promises ought to be kept (and because I promised to
do so). Similarly, KW would explain both Mark David Chapmans obligation not
to kill John Lennon and the wrongness of his doing soi.e., the wrongness of
Lennons murder. Why was Chapman obligated not to kill Lennon? And why was
Lennons murder wrong? Because killing is wrong.
A second thing that moral principles do is support counterfactuals, or
counterfactual conditionals.8 Our next-door neighbors are away on vacation, and
our neighbors across the street are feeding their cats in their absence. Given these
facts, there is nothing wrong with our not feeding their cats: we have no obligation
to do so. But suppose that we had promised to feed their cats in their absence. In
that (counterfactual) case, we would have been obligated to feed their cats, and
our not doing so would have been wrong.
POK supports this counterfactual in at least the following way: one can infer
it from POK. That is, one can infer from POK that we would have been
obligated to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so. Moreover, POK
would also seem to be what makes it the case that we would have been so
obligated had we so promised: we would have been obligated to feed their cats
had we promised to do so because promises ought to be kept.
A third thing that moral principles do is ground moral necessities, necessary
connections between obligating reasonsright- and wrong-making circumstances
(events, states of affairs, etc.) or propertiesand obligations (or rightness and
This section reprises material from Robinson 2008, pp. 2-4.
I borrow this phrase from Dretske (1977, p. 262).
7 See, e.g., Brink 1994, pp. 188-90, 197; Crisp 2000, pp. 34-5; Dancy 1983, p. 533; Lance and
Little 2008, 2007; Pietroski 1993, pp. 499-500, 514-5; Vyrynen 2009, 2006, pp. 716-7, 726-7. But
see Jackson, Pettit, and Smith 2000, pp. 81-4; McKeever and Ridge 2006, pp. 6, 7-8, 12-4.
8 See, e.g., Lance and Little 2007, pp. 155-6, 2006a, pp. 315-6, 317-8; Pietroski 1993, pp. 492,
499-500, 514-5; Vyrynen 2009, sec. 5.
5
6

wrongness tokens). Barring unusual circumstances (e.g., coercion), promises to

necessitate obligations to . And barring unusual circumstances (e.g., self-defense),
As being a person necessitates an obligation on Bs part not to kill A. I call the
kind of necessity involved here moral necessity. (In other contexts, its often
called natural necessity.)
Whatever one calls it, moral necessity is neither logical nor conceptual
necessity. It is necessity de re (necessity grounded in things), not necessity de dicto
(necessity grounded in the meaning of words or logical form). And moral
necessities are necessary connections between circumstances or propertiesnot
logical or conceptual relations between statements, propositions, or ideas. My
promise to remain faithful to my wife necessitates my obligation to do so. (Hence,
this is singular, or token, necessitation.) Similarly, Lennons being a person
necessitated Chapmans obligation not to kill him, and my neighbors being
persons necessitates my obligation not to kill them.
These moral necessities require grounds, and they require suitably
metaphysical grounds, rather than logical or conceptual ones, even if these
grounds are no more than, say, social rules. Moreover, moral principles seem to
be these grounds.9 For instance, POK seems to be the ground of the necessary
connection between my promise to remain faithful to my wife and my obligation
to do so. My promise necessitates my obligation to keep it because promises ought
to be kept. And KW seems to be the ground not only of the necessary connection
between Lennons being a person and Chapmans obligation not to kill him, but
also of the necessary connection between my neighbors being persons and my
obligation not to kill them. Lennons being a person necessitated Chapmans
obligation not to kill him and my neighbors being persons necessitates my
obligation not to kill them because killing is wrong.

3. Rival Conceptions
The law conception of moral principles supposes that moral principles are
generalizations. But mere generalizations can neither explain the phenomena falling
within their scope, which are their instances; nor support counterfactuals in either
of the two ways in which moral principles do;10 nor ground moral necessities or,
more generally, necessary connections between distinct existences. For example,
the mere generalization All of the coins in my pocket are pennies cannot
explain why any of the coins in my pocket is a penny; nor can it support the
Might something other than moral principles ground moral necessities? What could do this
that would not count as a moral principle (in the genetic sense)?
10 This is not to deny that some accidental generalizations provide inferential support for
some counterfactuals, since not all such generalizations are mere generalizations (Armstrong 1983,
p. 47; cf. Lange 2000, pp. 16-7).
9

counterfactual that the quarter on my desk would have been a penny had it been
in my pocket; nor can it ground a (de re) necessary connection between being in
my pocket and being a penny. Likewise, if less obviously, the mere generalization
All promises ought to be kept (even if it were true) could not explain why any
promise ought to be kept; nor could it support the counterfactual that my wife and
I would have been obligated to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so;
nor could it ground a (de re) necessary connection between my promising to
remain faithful to my wife and my obligation to do so.
Thus, if moral principles are generalizations at all, they must be a special class
of lawlike generalizations. But what distinguishes lawlike generalizations from
mere generalizations such that they can do these things? It obviously wont do to
say that lawlike generalizations are generalizations that explain the relevant
phenomena, support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral
necessities. What is needed is an answer to the question
What distinguishes lawlike generalizations from mere generalizations
such that they explain the relevant phenomena, support counterfactuals
in the right ways, and ground moral necessities?

In the absence of an adequate answer to this question, we should conclude that

the law conception is mistaken: moral principles are not moral laws.11 Moreover,
even if we did have such an answer, we would still need to consider alternatives to
the law conception.
Two things bear noting in connection with the law conceptions failure to
account for the ability of moral principles to explain the relevant phenomena,
support counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral necessities. First, the
law conception of moral principles mirrors a familiar, Humean account of the
laws of nature: the regularity theory.12 Second, the regularity theory in its various
incarnations (including the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis, or best-systems, theory of laws) is
a reductive theory of laws that is intended to be consistent with the view that
I argue elsewhere (Robinson 2008) that none of the following supply an adequate answer to
this question: a best-systems theory of moral principles modeled on the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis, or
best-systems, theory of the laws of nature; Sean McKeever and Michael Ridges theory of moral
principles as action-guiding standards (2006); Pekka Vyrynens theory of moral principles as
hedged generalizations (2006; 2008; 2009); Mark Lance and Margaret Littles pragmatist
theory of moral principles as defeasible generalizations (2008; 2007; 2006a; 2006b). Moreover,
one might argue that at least some of these are best understood as accounts of moral principles in
the propositional sense or of moral laws, rather than as accounts of moral principles in the genetic
sense.
12 According to the regularity theory, the laws of nature are a special class of lawlike
generalizations, such as explanatory or counterfactual-supporting generalizations. This necessarily
glosses over some niceties. For instance, some versions of the regularity theory identify laws with a
special class of nomic regularities, rather than with lawlike generalizations. And different
versions of the theory offer different accounts of what makes a generalization or regularity a law.
11

nothingnot the laws of nature and not anything elseexplains events, supports
counterfactuals, or grounds natural necessities (necessary connections between
natural circumstances or properties). Indeed, for Humeans, the point of reducing
laws to generalizations is to avoid any commitment to non-logical necessity (Psillos
2006, pp. 461-2).
Now one might well think that laws of nature that did not explain events,
support counterfactuals, or ground natural necessities would not be laws of nature
properly so called. But this thought reflects a governing conception of the laws of
nature (Beebee 2000). And it is a point of contention in the philosophy of science
whether the so-called laws of nature govern events or merely describe them
whether, as Helen Beebee puts it, they make the facts or are purely
descriptive of them (p. 578).
Moreover, Humeans are not the only ones who hold purely descriptive, nongoverning conceptions of the laws of nature. Dispositionalists typically deny that
laws govern, and while some (e.g., Stephen Mumford [2004]) are eliminativists
about laws, others hold that laws are merely descriptive generalizations. Ellis is
representative of this latter group:
The laws of nature are still widely thought of as governing natureas
imposing order and structure upon itas if by the command of God. I
shall argue that this is quite the wrong way to think about laws of nature.
(2001, p. 203)
The basic laws of nature aredescriptions ofthe ways in which things
belonging to natural kinds must be disposed to act or interact, given their
essential properties. (p. 106)

However, unlike Humeans, dispositionalists dont reduce laws to generalizations

in order to avoid a commitment to non-logical necessity. Indeed, they reject the
Humean skepticism about non-logical necessity that motivates the regularity
theory.
What options are available to the moral theorist who is looking for a suitable
governing conception of moral principles, one that can account for the ability of
moral principles to explain the relevant phenomena, support counterfactuals in
the right ways, and ground moral necessities? One such option is to (first) identify
moral principles with moral laws and (then) develop and defend a suitable
governing conception of moral laws. For instance, one might argue that moral
laws are rules (e.g., divine commands, precepts of reason, or social rules) or
relations between universals, rather than generalizations. Call conceptions of
moral principles that identify them with moral laws nomological conceptions of moral
principles.

A second option is to develop and defend a suitable governing conception of

moral principles that does not identify such principles with moral laws. For
instance, one might argue that moral principles are dispositions and that moral
laws are merely descriptions of the ways in which agents must be obligated to act
(in suitable circumstances) given these dispositions. Its this second option that I
pursue below.
But why pursue this second option? In particular, why not stick with the
familiar idea that morality just is a system of rules and that moral principles just
are the rules that compose morality?
One reason to pursue the second option is theoretical unification. Someone
who is independently attracted to dispositionalism of the sort defended by
Cartwright, Ellis, et al. should want to explore the possibility of a moral
dispositionalism. For doing this opens up the possibility of a unified account of
causation and causal laws, on the one hand, and of moral obligation and moral
laws, on the othera unified account on which all of these are grounded in
dispositions. This is not to say that a dispositionalist like Cartwright or Ellis
couldnt conceive of moral principles as rules, rather than as dispositions. Its only
to say that such a dispositionalist should find the possibility of such a unified
account worth exploring.
A second reason is interpretive. Insofar as Ross is arguably best interpreted as
holding a dispositional conception of moral principles (see sec. 1; cf. Robinson
2006), we might better understand his influential moral theory and the theoretical
resources available to him if we have a better understanding of moral
dispositionalism and its theoretical resources. For instance, if we interpret Ross as
a moral dispositionalist, thenas section 6 illustrateshe is not committed to
denying that the valence of an obligating reason may vary as other factors vary
such that (e.g.) what is a right-making reason in one case may not be one in
another (Robinson 2006). Moreover, a better understanding of moral
dispositionalism and its theoretical resources might also help us better understand
other moral theories and the theoretical resources available to them. For instance,
it is possible to recast the core claim of Kantian ethics as the claim that
imperfectly rational beings simultaneously possess and exercise the power to
obligate themselves to respect both their own rational agency and that of others.
(Compare the view that massive bodies simultaneously possess and exercise
certain gravitational powers.) And it is possible to recast Sidgwicks claim that as
a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally,not merely at a particular
part of it (1907, p. 70), as the claim that rational beings simultaneously have and
exercise the power to obligate themselves to aim at good generally. Thus, it also
seems possible to recast the debate between Kantians, consequentialists, and

10

pluralists as a debate over what moral dispositions are possessed by agents and
patients.
A third and closely related reason is that these nomological conceptions of
moral principles are not consistent with moral theories that recognize pro tanto (or
contributory) obligating reasons (or duties). Pro tanto reasons areto use a
familiar metaphorthe sort of reasons that have weight; that outweigh and are
outweighed by one another; and that retain their weight when they are
outweighed by other, weightier (pro tanto) reasons.13 But there is no need for
someone who thinks that morality is a system of rules to think that obligating
reasons are pro tanto reasons. One could hold, for example, that I ought morally to
save a drowning child rather than keep a promise to meet a friend for coffee, not
because one reason outweighs another, but simply because the relevant moral
rule states that we must keep our promises except when preventing a great harm
requires breaking a minor promise. And this suggests a stronger claim, one that I
defend elsewhere: that moral rules cannot ground pro tanto obligating reasons.14
Moreover, I also argue elsewhere that neither relations between universals nor
lawlike generalizations can ground pro tanto obligating reasons, but that
obligating dispositions can do this.15 And if I am right about all of this, then
anyone who accepts the (broadly Rossian) view that obligating reasons are pro tanto
reasons has yet another reason to pursue the second option, to develop a
conception of moral principles as moral dispositions.

4. Moral Principles As Moral Dispositions

The dispositionalists conception of the world stands in stark contrast to that of the
Humean. And this contrast is as relevant to understanding a moral
dispositionalism as it is to understanding a dispositionalism of the sort defended by
Cartwright, Ellis, et al.
In the world as Humeans conceive it, nothing is responsible either for what
happens or for what is the case. Nothing makes anything happen or be: not the
laws of nature, and not anything else. Causes do not make their effects happen:
they do not produce or otherwise necessitate them. And nothing is as it is because
something made itor caused it to bethat way. Moreover, there is nothing in

The term pro tanto reason was introduced by Kagan (1989, p. 17) as a substitute for Rosss
term prima facie duty. However, Ross used his term to refer to token actsspecifically, token acts
that tend to be duties sans phrase (1930, pp. 28-9). And he likened these moral tendencies to those
of bodies subject to gravitational and other physical forces. Both the concept of a pro tanto reason
and that of a prima facie duty are often glossed in terms of factors that always have weight, but that
characterization is controversial.
14 See Luke Robinson, Right-Making and Wrong-Making Reasons, MS.
15 Ibid.
13

11

the world that could be responsible for anythingnothing that could make
anything happen or be. In other words, there are no natural principles in the
genetic sense: nothing is the source or origin of anything else. Rather, the world
is [just] a vast mosaic of local matters of fact, just one thing after another (Lewis
1986, p. ix).
But in the world as dispositionalists conceive it, something is responsible for
what happens and for much of what isnamely, dispositions (or powers). In their
view, the dispositional properties of individuals are responsible for and thereby
explain what they do, what they become, what they are like, etc. Aspirin relieves
headaches, and the power of the aspirin I took to do this is responsible for and
thereby explains its relieving my headache. Fish eggs develop into fish, and a
particular fish eggs real potential to do this is responsible for and thereby explains
its developing into a fish. Ravens are disposed to be black, and a particular ravens
disposition to be black is responsible for and thereby explains its occurrent
blackness. On this view, there are natural principles in the genetic sense: the
natural or innate disposition[s]16 of individuals are the origins, sources, or
ultimate bases of events, processes, states of affairs, etc.
This is, of course, an oversimplification. Single dispositions are rarely if ever
responsible for events, etc. As George Molnar puts it, events are typically
polygenicthat is, what a number of different powers [or dispositions] in
combination manifest (2003, pp. 194-5). When salt dissolves in water, for
instance, this is no less a manifestation of the waters power to dissolve salt than it
is a manifestation of the salts disposition to dissolve in water (Heil 2005, p. 350).
And processes, states of affairs, etc., are likewise typically polygenic. Indeed, the
salts dissolution is a polygenic process, and the waters being saline is a polygenic
state of affairs. But none of this is an objection to the view under consideration, for
all that follows is that responsibility for events, etc. is typically shared among a set
of dispositions (reciprocal disposition partners).
Now consider a moral case, a case of obligation. If I am obligated to remain
faithful to my wife, or if Lennons murder was wrong, then something is
responsible for and thereby explains this: it is not a bare occurrence bearing only
contingent relations to other bare occurrences. On the moral dispositionalism I
defend here, it is moral principles qua dispositional properties of individuals that
are responsible for and thereby explain such phenomena. For example, ifas
seems plausibleagents have the power to obligate themselves by promising, then
my power to do this (qua property of me) is responsible for and thereby explains
my obligation to remain faithful to my wife (qua property of me). Likewise, if
persons have the power to obligate agents not to kill them, then Lennons power
16

Oxford English Dictionary, s.v., principle.

12

to do this (qua property of him) is responsible for and thereby explains Chapmans
obligation not to kill him, as well as the wrongness of Lennons murder.
Here, too, this is an oversimplification. An agent cannot obligate herself by
making a promise to just anything: rocks and trees lack the (reciprocal) capacity to
be promisees. And persons cannot obligate non-agents not to kill them: nonagents lack the (reciprocal) capacity to be so obligatedi.e., they are not liable to
be obligated not to kill others. So the moral dispositions of promisees and
potential murderers also have (reciprocal) roles to play, and responsibility for
obligations is typicallyand perhaps alwaysshared among a set of dispositions
(reciprocal disposition partners).
This view leaves room for moral laws, just as views like Cartwrights and
Elliss leave room for causal laws. But these laws are not responsible for our
obligations. Moreover, they are comparatively poor candidates for identification
as moral principles. For on this view the obligation to keep a particular promise is
due, not to any law, but rather to a set of dispositions manifesting in combination.
Suppose, for example, that my wife and I are obligated to feed our neighbors
cats. This is not something that neighbors are normally obligated to do, so we
might ask questions such as Why are we so obligated? and How did we come
to be so obligated?. The obvious answer is that we are so obligated because we
promised to feed their cats and that we became so obligated by promising to do
just that. If this obvious answer is correct, then what is responsible for and thereby
explains our obligation on the present view is not a law, but rather the power of
moral agents to obligate themselves by promising manifesting in combination with
other relevant dispositions, including those of our neighbors qua promisees.
Hence, the best candidates for identification as moral principles are the relevant
dispositions; and if anything deserves to be identified as the moral principle at work
here, it is the power of agents to obligate themselves by promising.
Much the same is true in the case of my obligation not to kill my neighbors.
Unlike feeding ones neighbors cats, one normally does have an obligation not to
kill ones neighbors, and it is normally wrong to do so. Yet we can still ask Why
am I so obligated? and How did I come to be so obligated?. An obvious
answer is that I am so obligated because my neighbors are moral persons and that
I became so obligated by becoming a moral agent. If this answer is correct, then
what is responsible for and thereby explains my obligation on the present view is
not a law, but rather the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them
manifesting in combination with other relevant dispositions, including those of me
qua agent. Hence, once again, the best candidates for identification as moral
principles are the relevant dispositions; and if anything deserves to be identified as
the moral principle at work here, it is the power of persons to obligate agents not to
kill them.

13

Notice that both of these moral powers arelike rest mass and the capacity
of muons to decayunconditionally manifesting powers, powers whose manifestations
are not responses to stimuli (Molnar 2003, pp. 85-7) and hence do not need to be
triggered in order to manifest.17 This is noteworthy, first, because there is nothing
unusual about such powers, and second, because the mere possibility of such
powers arguably refutes any reductive conditional analysis of disposition
ascriptions, since their manifestations are not conditional on the occurrence of
stimuli, or triggering events (pp. 85-7, 90, 93). (Granted, a showing that
ascriptions of moral dispositions cannot be reductively analyzed is not sufficient to
show that any such dispositions exist. But it is sufficient to refute one argument
against their existence.)
Now in proposing that moral principles could be moral dispositions, I am not
proposing that such dispositions would be ungrounded (or baseless) dispositions.
Indeed, it seems plausible that they would be grounded in the rational,
sentimental, or perceptual powers and capacities that are constitutive of moral
agency and patiencythe moral natures of agents and patients, if you will. Indeed,
for all that I argue here, they could be those same powers and capacities. They
could even be those same powers and capacities necessarily, such that a world
with agents and patients is ipso facto a world with morality: a world with obligating
reasons, obligations, and the moral dispositions that ground them. For to say that
moral principles are irreducibly dispositional properties is not to say that they
cannot be reduced to or identified with other dispositional properties. But moral
dispositionalism as such takes no stand on these issues.
Moreover, in neither the moral case nor the non-moral case is the
dispositionalists thesis this: that the properties which are responsible for and
thereby explain the relevant phenomena are dispositional properties of individuals
that exist over and above their non-dispositional, or categorical, properties.
Rather, it is (roughly) that the properties of individuals are dispositional
properties, and that these properties are responsible for and thereby explain the
relevant phenomena in their own right, and hence without the need either for
further properties or for laws that govern. This thesis can take various forms
e.g., that the intrinsic (i.e., non-relational) properties of individuals are all
dispositional properties rather than categorical ones (e.g., Molnar 2003, pp. 15862); that every property is dispositional as well as qualitative (e.g., Martin and
Heil 1999); and that properties are clusters of powers, and hence dispositional
(e.g., Mumford 2004, pp. 171-4; Shoemaker 1980). But in no case is it that the
My promising is not a triggering of my power to obligate myself by promising but rather an
exercise of that power. So if it requires a trigger, it requires a causal trigger. But my power to
obligate agents not to kill me does not seem to require even that (see the discussion of constantly
manifesting powers below).
17

14

dispositional properties of individuals that make them powerful particulars18 are

ones that exist over and above their categorical properties.
Finally, I am not proposing that moral principles are causal dispositions.
Perhaps on the correct account of causation (if there is just one) moral dispositions
will turn out to be causal ones.19 But they may not. And moral dispositionalism
proposes no more than that moral dispositions and causal dispositions are species
of the same genera (viz., dispositions, or powers), just as some alternative views
propose no more than that moral laws and causal laws are species of the same
genera (e.g., explanatory or counterfactual-supporting generalizations). Moreover,
there may well be important disanalogies between moral dispositions and causal
ones. But that alone would no more suffice to undermine moral dispositionalism
than the existence of important disanalogies between moral and non-moral facts
or properties would suffice to undermine moral realism.

5. Doing What Moral Principles Do

Unlike the law conception, our dispositional conception of moral principles can
account for their ability to explain the relevant phenomena, support
counterfactuals in the right ways, and ground moral necessities.
Recall first that moral principles explain the phenomena falling within their
scope. For example, POK explains my obligation to remain faithful to my wife,
and KW explains both Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon and the
wrongness of his doing sothe wrongness of Lennons murder. As I implied
above, moral principles will explain why these phenomena obtain or occur if they
are responsible for them: if they make them be or happen. And moral principles
conceived as moral dispositions are responsible forand thereby explainthese
phenomena. There are, however, different ways of cashing out this view
depending, for example, on whether one takes the bearers of these dispositions to
be persons (agents and patients) or actions. So what follows is but one way of
cashing out the claim that POK qua moral disposition is responsible forand
thereby explainsmy obligation to remain faithful to my wife and that KW qua
moral disposition is responsible forand thereby explainsboth Chapmans
obligation not to kill Lennon and the wrongness of his doing so. It is not the only
way, and it is intended to be illustrative, not definitive.
Given that moral agents can obligate themselves by promising, lets stick with
the idea that POK just is the power of moral agents to obligate themselves by
promising. And lets say that my obligation to remain faithful to my wife is
The phrase is Harr and Maddens (1975, p. 5).
Cf. The question of whether moral generalizations are causal [ones] depends largely on
what the right theory of causation is (Pietroski 1993, p. 511).
18
19

15

generated by my promising to remain faithful to her qua exercise of this power.

On this view, the claim that POK is responsible for my obligation to remain
faithful to my wife should be understood as the claim that this token obligation is
generated by an exercise of a token instance of POKa POK trope. Lets also say
both that KW just is the power of moral persons20 to obligate moral agents not to
kill them, and that Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon was generated by an
exercise of this power. On this view, the claim that KW was responsible for that
obligation should be understood as the claim that it (Chapmans obligation) was
generated by an exercise of a KW trope of which Lennon was the bearer.
Now its important to note that, in this context, neither the term power nor
the term exercise connotes volition. Causal agents have causal powers,
which they exercise. And myriad things without wills have causal powers, which
powers they exercise non-voluntarily. Thus, to suggest (e.g.) that Chapmans
obligation not to kill Lennon was generated by an exercise of a KW trope borne
by Lennon is not to suggest that Lennon did anything that could constitute an
exercise of a power. Granted, I did something that could constitute an exercise of
one of my moral powers: I promised to remain faithful to my wife. But that is no
reason to suppose that all (or even most) moral powers must (or even can) be
exercised voluntarily. Moreover, the analogy between moral powers and causal
powers is actually stronger in the ChapmanLennon case than it is in the
promising case. For not only are causal powers typically exercised non-voluntarily;
such powers also typically operate on other thingsas Lennons power to obligate
Chapman didrather than on their own bearersas my power to obligate myself
by promising does.
What about the wrongness of Lennons murder? If we took the view that
actions are the bearers of the relevant dispositions, we could say that KW is the
tendency of killings to be wrong and that the wrongness of Lennons murder is
generated by an exercise of a KW trope borne by that action.21 But in keeping
with the view that KW is the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them,
we might rather say that the truthmaker for the claim that Lennons murder was
wrong is Chapmans having been obligated not to kill him. If we say this, there is
no need to give an account of what it is for KW to be responsible for the
wrongness of Lennons murder qua action property. All we need is the account
already given of what it is for KW to be responsible for Chapmans obligation qua
property of him.
Again, I mean to allow not only that patients (infants, dogs, etc.) can be persons, but also that
they can have those moral dispositions of persons that need not be exercised (or manifested)
voluntarily, such as the power of persons to obligate agents not to kill them.
21 One reason not to take this view is that it requires attributing properties to non-existents.
(See n. 3 and accompanying text.)
20

16

Once again, things are not as simple as this sketch suggests. Obligations are
typically polygenic (generated by multiple dispositions manifesting in
combination), and the moral dispositions of my wife and Chapman share some of
the responsibility for these obligations, too. For example, we are liable to be
obligated not to kill others, and Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon is no less
a manifestation of his liability (qua agent) to be obligated not to kill persons than it
is a manifestation of Lennons power (qua person) to obligate agents not to kill
him. (Likewise, the salts dissolving in water is no less a manifestation of its
disposition to dissolve in water than it is a manifestation of the waters power to
dissolve salt.) But none of this changes the basic picture of how moral principles
qua moral dispositions are responsible for the obligations and other phenomena
that they explain: they generate those phenomena by manifesting.
Now recall that moral principles support counterfactuals in two ways: one can
infer the relevant counterfactuals from them, and they (the principles) seem to be
what make it the case that the relevant counterfactuals are true. Moral principles
conceived as moral dispositions certainly support counterfactuals in the first of
these two ways. For example, from the fact that moral agents have the power to
obligate themselves by promising, one can infer that my wife and I would have
been obligated to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so. Indeed, the
whole anti-realist project of trying to reduce disposition ascriptions to subjunctive
conditionals presupposes that dispositions support counterfactuals in just this way.
Moral principles conceived as moral dispositions also support counterfactuals
in the second of these two ways. For dispositions are (inter alia) properties of
individuals in virtue of which they would do or be things (Ellis 2001, pp. 117, 129;
Heil 2005, p. 344). For example, if POK just is the power of agents to obligate
themselves by promising, then POK just is the property of my wife and methe
property of which we each bear tropesin virtue of which we would have
obligated ourselves to feed our neighbors cats had we promised to do so. And as
such, POK is what makes it the case that we would have been so obligated had we
so promised. We would have been so obligated had we so promised because
promises ought to be keptthat is, because our promising to feed our neighbors
cats would have been a successful exercise of a POK trope, one that generated an
obligation on our part to do what we promised to do: feed their cats.
Finally, recall that moral principles ground moral necessities, necessary
connections between obligating reasons and obligations. My promise to remain
faithful to my wife necessitates my obligation to do so. Here, POK is the ground
of this moral necessity, this necessary connection. Similarly, Lennons being a
person necessitated Chapmans obligation not to kill him, and my neighbors
being persons necessitates my obligation not to kill them. Here, KW is the ground
of these necessary connections.

17

Once again, moral principles conceived as moral dispositions do what moral

principles do. The connection between the exercise of a power and the outcome
generated thereby is necessary, not contingent. In the case of causal powers, that
outcome is the effect produced by the exercise of that power. The exercise of a
causal power produces, and thereby necessitates, its effect.22 The effect is the
necessary outcome of the powers exercise. The power therefore grounds the
necessary connection between the cause and the effect. For example, the aspirin I
took relieved my headache. Aspirin has the power to relieve headaches, and the
aspirin I took exercised its power to do thisthe trope of this power that it bore.
This exercise produced, and thereby necessitated, my relief. My relief is its
necessary outcome. (Note that this is singular, or token, necessitation and, in
particular, singular, or token, causation. Hence, the claim is not that the
probability of this outcome given my taking the aspirin was 1.) And in this sense,
the power of aspirin to relieve headaches grounds the necessary connection
between the cause (my taking the aspirin) and the effect (my relief).
In the case of obligating powers, the outcome generated by the exercise of
such a power is normally an obligationalthough in exceptional cases it may fall
short of that (see section 6). Hence, in the typical case, the exercise of an
obligating power generates, and thereby necessitates, an obligation. The
obligation is the necessary outcome of the powers exercise. The power therefore
grounds the necessary connection between the obligating reason and the
obligation. For instance, in our first example, I obligate myself to remain faithful to
my wife by promising to do so. Agents have the power to obligate themselves by
promising, and I exercised my power (qua agent) to do thisthe trope of this
power that I bear. This exercise generated, and thereby necessitated, my
obligation. My obligation is its necessary outcome. (Once again, this is singular, or
token, necessitation.) And in this sense, POK (the power of agents to obligate
themselves by promising) grounds the necessary connection between the
obligating reason (my promise to remain faithful to my wife) and the obligation
(my obligation to remain faithful to my wife).
Our second example adds an important complexity. Chapmans obligation
not to kill Lennon was generated, and thus necessitated, by the exercise of an
obligating power: Lennons power qua person to obligate agents not to kill him,
which is a KW trope. And in this sense, KW grounds the necessary connection
between the obligating reason (Lennons being a person) and the obligation
The exercise of the power creates the second feature and in that sense necessitates it
(Cartwright et al. 2005, p. 811). It is not laws that [explain and necessitate]; it is causes. The cause
necessitates its effectit makes it happen, or brings it about; and the occurrence of the effect is
explained by the occurrence of the cause (Cartwright 1993, p. 428). [Causal] laws describe
natural kinds of processes that are the displays of causal powers.[E]vents activating these powers
necessitate other events that are their displays (Ellis 2001, p. 287).
22

18

(Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon). That much is the same. The difference
is this. Neither Lennon nor Chapman did anything that constitutes either the
exercise or the triggering of Lennons power qua person to obligate agents not to kill
him. But then again, neither needed to. For unlike POK, KW is what we might
call a constantly manifesting power, a power thatlike rest massis exercised for
as long as it is not prevented from doing so.23
If the idea of a constantly manifesting obligating power sounds odd, consider
the following. Moral persons have moral rights, including the right not to be
killed. These rights are properties of their bearers. (Indeed, on some accounts they
are properties their bearers have in virtue of their moral natures: the powers and
capacities that make them moral persons.) These rights impose obligations on
others, which obligations are necessitated by these rights. And at least some of
these rights, including the right not to be killed, do this more or less constantly. In
other words, at least some moral rights, including the right not to be killed, act like
constantly manifesting obligating powers.
Moreover, given that the right not to be killed acts like a constantly
manifesting obligating power, we might plausibly identify KW with the right not
to be killed. We might then identify the KW trope borne by Lennonhis power
qua person to obligate agents not to kill himwith Lennons right not to be killed.
This yields the plausible view that Lennons right not to be killed was what
obligated Chapman not to kill him. The exercise of Lennons right not to be killed
qua trope of KW generated, and thereby necessitated, Chapmans obligation not
to kill Lennon. And, in that sense, Lennons right not to be killed was responsible
for and thereby explains Chapmans obligation not to kill Lennon. Hence, our
dispositional conception of moral principles coheres in explanatorily powerful
ways with plausible views about the moral rights of persons, including the view
that such rights ground at least some moral obligations.

6. Ceteris Paribus Laws

Now my aim here is not to defend any particular account of moral laws.
Nevertheless, I did claim that even if moral principles are not laws, they at least
guarantee that certain ceteris paribus laws are true. This claim raises three questions:

Constantly manifesting powers should be distinguished from continuously manifesting powers,

powers that are exercised for as long as they exist (Molnar 2003, p. 86). Continuously
manifesting powers are a subset of constantly manifesting powers, which are themselves a subset of
unconditionally manifesting powers (see p. 14). The difference between constantly and
continuously manifesting powers is an extrinsic one: continuously manifesting powers (of which
rest mass is one) are simply constantly manifesting powers for which no masks exist (see n. 25).
They remain liable, at least in principle, to being both finked (see n. 25) and prevented from
exercising successfully (see below).
23

19

(1) why do moral principles guarantee laws; (2) why might those laws be ceteris
paribus laws rather than strict laws; and (3) what sense is to be given to the ceteris
paribus qualifier in this context, what does it mean?
The moral dispositionalist has ready answers to these three questions. First,
moral principles guarantee laws because they are dispositions, and because
dispositions guarantee the truth of certain generalizations. For example, if an
agent has the power to obligate herself by promising, it follows that she obligates
herself, not whenever she exercises that power, but rather whenever she exercises
that power successfully.24 And if agents as such have the power to obligate
themselves by promising, it follows that agents obligate themselves whenever they
exercise this power successfully. Thus, if POK is the power of agents to obligate
themselves by promising, it follows that promises ought to be kept, ceteris paribus. (It
does not follow that all promises obligate [see below].)
Second, these laws might hold only ceteris paribus because dispositions can (e.g.)
fail to manifest if necessary enabling conditions are absent, be prevented from
manifesting by masks and finks,25 and manifest unsuccessfully because opposing
dispositions are also manifesting. For example, if I promise to kill Smith, Smiths
power (qua person) to obligate me not to kill him might mask my power to obligate
myself by promising such thatin this casemy having promised to is not an
obligating reason, not even a pro tanto obligating reason. If not, that power will at
least oppose my power to obligate myself by promising such that I am not
obligated to kill him.
Third, the sense to be given to the ceteris paribus qualifier in this context is
when other things relevant to the disposition are equal (Molnar 1999, p. 7)
that is, when relevant enabling conditions are present; when relevant interfering
or opposing dispositions are absent, inoperative, or ineffectual; etc. Thus, our
dispositional conception of moral principles can explain not only why there are
moral laws and why these laws might hold only ceteris paribus, but also how we
should understand the ceteris paribus clauses in these laws.
Moreover, we can now see that this conception of moral principles can also
explain why the necessary connections between obligating reasons and obligations
do not hold universally. Promises to do not always necessitate obligations to ,
It follows from the concept power that the power to X cannot be exercised in the right
circumstances without X obtaining (Cartwright et al. 2005, p. 812).
25 A mask is anything with the power to prevent the manifestation of a disposition without
making its bearer lose that disposition. Packing materials used in the shipping of fragile objects
mask their fragility (Johnston 1992, p. 233). A fink is anything with the power to make an object
lose or acquire a disposition upon the occurrence of that dispositions trigger or stimulus (Martin
1994, pp. 2-3; Lewis 1997, p. 144). A circuit breaker is a fink: it causes a circuit to lose its capacity
to carry a current above a given magnitude upon the occurrence of the very event that would
otherwise trigger the manifestation of that capacity.
24

20

but rather do so barring unusual circumstances (see p. 7). My promise to remain

faithful to my wife necessitates my obligation to do so. But I might have had no
such obligation if my wife had coerced me into marrying her. Likewise, As being
a person does not always necessitate an obligation on Bs part not to kill A, but
rather does so barring unusual circumstances. If you are trying to kill me, I might
have no obligation not to kill you despite your being a person. The explanation
for why the necessary connections between obligating reasons and obligations do
not hold universally is simply that dispositions can (e.g.) fail to manifest if
necessary enabling conditions are absent, be prevented from manifesting by masks
and finks, and manifest unsuccessfully because opposing dispositions are also
manifesting.
To see (again) how this works, consider the following variant of our third
example.
Our neighbors return home from their vacation to find their cats dead.
Mistakenly thinking that my wife and I had promised to feed them
during their absence, they fly into a homicidal rage and try to kill us.
Unfortunately, deadly force is our only available means of defense.

To keep things simple, lets stipulate that it is permissible for me to kill our
homicidal neighbors.
What the dispositionalist will say here is that one of two things is happening.
Either the KW tropes borne by our neighbors (their rights not to be killed, if you
like) are being masked (see n. 25) or otherwise prevented from manifesting. Or else
they are manifesting unsuccessfully, and thus not succeeding in obligating me not
to kill them. Which the dispositionalist says will depend on whether or not she
wants to say that our neighbors being persons is a pro tanto obligating reason, or
that I have a pro tanto obligation not to kill them. If she wants to say that it is such a
reason, she will say that the KW tropes borne by our neighbors are manifesting
unsuccessfullythat they are manifesting and thereby generating pro tanto
obligations (moral forces, if you like), but that they are not thereby obligating me
(at the overall level) not to kill our neighbors. But if she wants to say that our
neighbors being persons is not a pro tanto obligating reason in this case, she will
say that these KW tropes are being masked or otherwise prevented from
manifesting. Either would be sufficient to explain why our neighbors being
persons fails to necessitate an obligation on my part not to kill them in the unusual
circumstances of this variant case. Hence, we need not consider the difficult
question of which is the correct view.

21

7. Conclusion
What are moral principles? I have argued that we can fruitfully conceive of moral
principles in the genetic sense as moral dispositions and, in particular, as real,
irreducibly dispositional properties of individual persons (agents and patients) that
are responsible for and thereby explain the moral properties of (e.g.) agents and
actions. Such dispositions are apt to be the metaphysical grounds of moral
obligations and of particular truths about what is morally permissible,
impermissible, etc. Moreover, they can do what moral principles do: explain the
phenomena falling within their scope, support counterfactuals in the right ways,
and ground moral necessities. And they are apt to be the truthmakers for moral
laws.
I concede, however, that a complete defense of this (or any) dispositional
conception of moral principles requires further argument. For example, I have
offered no argument either against the view that moral principles are moral rules
or against the view that they are relations between universals. I have only
claimedon the basis of arguments offered elsewherethat neither view is
consistent with moral theories that recognize pro tanto obligating reasons (or duties)
and that such theories therefore require alternative conceptions of moral
principles. Nevertheless, I have shown not only what a tenable dispositional
conception of moral principles might look like, but also that the particular
dispositional conception of moral principles developed here is well motivated and
merits serious consideration.
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