G.R. No.

147468

April 9, 2003

SPOUSES EDUARDO ARENAS DOMINGO & JOSEFINA CHAVEZ DOMINGO, petitioners,

Vs.
LILIA MONTINOLA ROCES, CESAR ROBERTO M. ROCES, ANA INES MAGDALENA
ROCES TOLENTINO, LUIS MIGUEL M. ROCES, JOSE ANTONIO M. ROCES and MARIA
VIDA PRESENTACION ROCES, respondents.
FACTS:
The spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces were the owners of two contiguous parcels
of land, On November 1962, the GSIS caused the annotation of an affidavit of
adverse claim on the titles alleging that the spouses have mortgaged the same to
it.
GSIS wrote a letter to Cesar Roces demanding the surrender of the owner's
duplicates of titles, Spouses Roces failed to comply, GSIS filed a petition with the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, praying that the owner's duplicates in Roces'
possession be declared null and void and that the Register of Deeds of Pasig be
directed to issue new owner's duplicates to GSIS. CFI of Rizal granted the petition.
Cesar died intestate on January 1980, survived by his widow along with all
the respondents in this case.
On July 1992, Montinola a nephew of Lila Roces executed an affidavit of selfadjudication over the said parcels of land. That the properties were acquired during
the existence of their marriage; that the spouses left no heirs except the brother of
Lilia Roces, who was his father; that neither of the spouses left any will nor any
debts; and that he was the sole heir of the Roces spouses.
Montinola filed a petition against GSIS with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
During the trial, GSIS failed to produce any document evidencing the alleged real
estate mortgage by Roces of the properties. Hence, the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Montinola. GSIS did not appeal the judgment thus became final
and executory.
Montinola sold the parcels of land to Spouses Domingo, subject to the
provisions of section 4, rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
When respondents learned of the sale of the property to petitioners, they
filed a complaint against Montinola and petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig. They argued that the affidavit of self-adjudication was fraudulent because
Montinola was not an heir of the Roces spouses and it was not true that Lilia Roces
was dead.
Petitioners in their answer alleged that they are buyers in good faith and that
the actions of the respondents was barred by estoppel and laches.
Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. CA reversed the
decision and ordered Montinola to pay the Petitioners, the title was reinstated back

to the respondents and that all other claims made by the Petitioners were
dismissed.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied hence this
petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the Petitioners in holding the annotation in the title regarding
SEC. 4, RULE 74 is an encumbrance which disqualifies them from being
innocent purchasers for value
2. Whether the Respondents was barred by Estoppel and Laches
HELD:
1. The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person,
as long as the deprived heir or creditor vindicates his rights within two
years from the date of the settlement and distribution of estate. Contrary
to petitioners' contention, the effects of this provision are not limited to
the heirs or original distributees of the estate properties, but shall affect
any transferee of the properties.
Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and cannot
now avoid the consequences brought about by the application of Rule 74,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
2. Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and cannot
now avoid the consequences brought about by the application of Rule 74,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
Delay is an indispensable requisite for a finding of estoppel by laches, but
to be barred from bringing suit on grounds of estoppel and laches, the
delay must be lengthy and unreasonable. No unreasonable delay can be
attributed to respondents in this case.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No.
62473 are AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. 125715

December 29, 1998

RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ, SALVADOR F.

MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F. MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioners,
Vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN F. MARQUEZ, respondents.
FACTS:

During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez
begot twelve children, sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land,
wherein they constructed their conjugal home.
In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael
Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting unto himself sole
ownership to the property. Thereafter on December 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr.
executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos covering the house and lot
abovementioned to three of this children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael, Jr.; (2)
Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his other
children, petitioners herein. TCT No. 33350 was cancelled and TCT No. 47572 was
issued in private respondents' name.
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the
land. However, when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572, they
immediately demanded that since they are also children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they
are entitled to their respective shares over the land in question. Private respondents
ignored petitioners demands.
Petitioners joined by Rafael Marquez Jr. filed a complaint on May 1991 for
"Reconveyance and Partition with Damages" before the trial court alleging that both
the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" were fraudulent
since the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father in
making him execute the said documents.
Private respondents argued that petitioners action was already barred by the
statute of limitations that the same shouldve been filed within 4 years.
Trial Court rendered its decision in favor of the Petitioners. Stating that:
Prescription cannot set in because an action to set aside a document which is void
ab initio does not prescribe. Both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and the "Donation
Inter Vivos" did not produce any legal effect and did not confer any right
whatsoever.
Private respondents appealed to the CA and decision of the RTC was reversed
stating that: In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in Gerona v. de Guzman,
11 SCRA 143, 157, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place in the case at
bar on June 16, 1982, when the affidavit of self-adjudication was filed with the
Register of Deeds and new certificate of title was issued in the name of Rafael
Marquez, Sr. Considering that the period from June 16, 1982, when TCT No. 33350
was issued in the name of Rafael Marquez Sr., to May 31, 1991, when appellees'
complaint was filed in court, is eight (8) years, eleven (11) months and fifteen (15)
days, appellants' action to annul the deed of self-adjudication is definitely barred by
the statute of limitation.
Petitioners filed a motion of reconsideration but proved unavailing. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:

Whether their action for reconveyance had prescribed?

HELD:
It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her
estate is governed by the present Civil Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her
compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent
therein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr.
decided to adjudicate the entire property by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication"
claiming that he is the sole surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F. Marquez.
As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented
in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their
children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title
under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established.
Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment.
They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of
confidence, obtains or holds the legal, right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, to hold.
In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property. For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall
start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus,
considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or
approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the
action.
Cognizant of the fact that the disputed land was conjugal property of the
spouses Rafael, Sr. and Felicidad, ownership of the same is to be equally divided
between both of them.
Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wife's share,
validly donate this portion to the respondents? Obviously, he cannot, as expressly
provided in Art. 736 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41214 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Except as to the
award of attorney's fees which is hereby DELETED, the judgment of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 60887 is REINSTATED. No costs.

G.R. No. L-23638

October 12, 1967

DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners,

Vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.

---------------------------------------G.R. No. L-23662

October 12, 1967

MARIANO REYES, CESAR REYES, LEONOR REYES and PACIENCIA REYES, petitioners,
Vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
FACTS:
On January 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the Court
of First Instance a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta
de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will
instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition
was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa
Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed
Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the
probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent
of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by
two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in
favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set
aside by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on August 3, 1954.
After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by decision of
June 1958, found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred
resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time when we
shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when the
question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new
trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and
resolved; on July 1959, the Court overruled the claim that proponent was in estoppel
to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the right to raise
the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."
On January 1960, the Court of First Instance appointed Ricardo Cruz as
administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory of the estate, and this
was done on February 9, 1960.
On February 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue whether the
execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale in favor of the testamentary heir, made
in 1943 and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had revoked
the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art. 869 of the Civil Code of
1889), the trial Court resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late
Benedicta de los Reyes "unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale."
Whereupon, the oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will
to probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was
appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation; that contrary to the

claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal revocation by the execution

of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made in favor of
the legatee herself, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to
probate had become final for lack of appeal;
2. Whether the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling
the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final;
3. Whether the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly
revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the
proponent on 1943 and 1944.
HELD:
1. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellant's stand is
untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively
settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of
whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized
by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109. The rule expressly
enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special
proceedings.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below
was not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive.
Hence, the appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review
the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly
lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.
2. As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara,
98 Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements
of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's,
expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the
decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence
of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the
Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised
Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on
the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation
of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious
and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.
3. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or
departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930
testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent
alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee
herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its

decision annulling these conveyances "no consideration whatever was

paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby
rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her
legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she
had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure
therefrom.
Revocation being an exception, we believe, with the Courts below, that in
the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar.
Not only that, but even if it were applicable, the annulment of the
conveyances would not necessarily result in the revocation of the
legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made in the decision
decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale
were also that it was the moral influence, originating from their
confidential relationship, which was the only cause for the execution of the
1943 and 1944 conveyances.
DECISION: In view of the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. Costs against appellants Reyes and Fernandez.
So ordered.