I.

The Philippines and the Republic of Kroi Sha established diplomatic relations and immediately their
respective Presidents signed the following:
1. Executive Agreement allowing the Republic of Kroi Sha to establish its embassy and consular
offices within Metro Manila; and
2. Executive Agreement allowing the Republic of Kroi Sha to bring to the Philippines its military
complement, warships and armaments, from time to time not exceeding one month,
o

For the purpose of training exercises with Philippine military forces and exempting from
Philippine criminal jurisdiction acts committed in line of duty by foreign military
personnel, and

From paying custom duties on all the goods brought by said foreign forces into
Philippine territory in connection with the holding of the activities authorized under the
said Executive Agreement.

Senator Maagap questioned the constitutionality of the said Executive Agreements and demanded that
the Executive Agreements be submitted to the Senate for ratification pursuant to the Philippine
Constitution.

Is Senator Maagap correct? Explain. (4%)

RELEVANT PRINCIPLES: G.R. No. L-14279
The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the making of
"treaties" which are, however, distinct and different from "executive agreements," which may be validly
entered into without such concurrence.
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the Senate.
Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the
Senate or by Congress.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have
entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by
our courts.
International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international

agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well -established national policies and
traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of
executive agreements.
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as
executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal
instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated "agreements" time or "protocols". The point
where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether
denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be
difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of
executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other
than those entered into under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign
governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the
act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant
precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by th e
Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,
navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and
commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and
copyrights, etcetera. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, su ch as
tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect of the settlement of claims against foreign
governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
II.
1.
A bill was introduced in the House of Representatives in order to i mplement faithfully the provisions of
the UNCLOS to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Congressman Pat Rio Tek questioned the constitutionality of the bill on the ground that the provisions of
UNCLOS are violative of the provisions of the Constitution defining the Philippine internal waters and
territorial sea. Do you agree or not with the said objection? Explain. (3%)
RELEVANT PRINCIPLE: G.R No. 187167
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law
unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to
the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners
extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and
maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution or as "archipelagic
waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water

lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed
and subsoil.
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines
drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
x xx x
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect
the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of
its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained
therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law
norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the
interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the
international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Indeed,
bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to
grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys
limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary
international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent
passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States
which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage
through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under
UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters
landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters
subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States
archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of
their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones,
placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States
territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.

Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles

and State Policies) must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II
as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights x x x." Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting
implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although
Oposa v. Factoran treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as
an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation.
The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2,
paragraph 2) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict
observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international
community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis
maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III
grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200
nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that
attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
2.
Describe the following maritime regimes:
1. Territorial Sea 12 nautical miles from the baseline
2. Contiguous Zone 24 nautical miles from the baseline
3. Exclusive Economic Zone Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) "shall not extend beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines
4. Continental Shelf (4%) The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil
of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.