Facts in Verification Fraud Upon Court Occurred

The entire proceedings (past and present) has been corrupted. Even the stipulations the court

went by to order the past eviction of plaintiff is a product of material misrepresentations by his

own attorneys to support the opposition’s legal agenda. Consequently, plaintiff is complaining

his rights to a fair trial have been usurped not only by the opposition, but by the outrageous

misconduct of his own attorneys. Since they worked hand and hand to ensure the legal and

business agenda of the opposition were affirmed; albeit based on coercion, fraud and deceit.

"Fraud on the court" consists of conduct: (1) on part of officer of the court, (2) that is
directed to judicial machinery itself, (3) that is intentionally false, willfully blind to the
truth, or is in reckless disregard for the truth, that is positive averment or is concealment
when one is under duty to disclose, that deceives court. (Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d
338, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing denied, certiorari denied Rison v. Demjanjuk,
115 S.Ct. 295, 513 U.S. 914, 130 L.Ed.2d 205 (Ohio) 1993.—Fed Civ Proc 2654.“. .
.errors are so prejudicial and fundamental that expenditure of further time and
expense would be wasteful, if not futile.” (Salvatore v. State of Florida, 366 So. 2d
745 [Fla. 1978], cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S. Ct. 177, 62 L. Ed. 2d 115 [1979]).

-Fraud on the Court by the opposition’s lawyer, Kaelin and Philips, and even by the four

lawyers plaintiff hired acted to circumvent him from obtaining fair hearings in a court of law.

-Judges denied plaintiff from receiving due process of law in the Norwalk Housing Court.

This is where the offending Judges, Heckley, Grogins, and Moore, as officials of state

government must respect all of the legal rights guaranteed by the constitution is owed to citizens.

Particularly under the Fourteenth Amendment that states:

1
The lawyers representing plaintiff perverted their discretional authority, and misapplied their

power to cause devastating harm to plaintiff’s legal position. Since by sabotaging and

undermining plaintiff’s legal position during the proceedings, these lawyers willfully acted to

deny him of his right to receive a fair and impartial trial. Thereby, the causational result of such

professional misconduct is that with certain probability the matter of legal right of ownership of

the property would have been expediently decided in plaintiffs favor; if not but for the extreme

and outrageous professional misconduct of the judges and the lawyers on both sides.

“ an officer of the court…are all attorneys” (People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410
N.E.2d 626 [1980]). “Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a
proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United
States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is
fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the
parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a
member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not
performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have
been directly corrupted."
      
"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace
that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud
perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the
usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication."
(Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶
60.23). The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not
in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."

“Litigant commits "fraud on court" when litigant and attorney concoct some
unconscionable scheme calculated to impair court's ability fairly and impartially to
adjudicate dispute. (Sandstrom v. ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83.—Fed Civ Proc 1741.

2
 “Fruad on the court’ may occur when acts of party prevent his adversary from fully and
fairly presenting his case or defense (Abatti v. C.I.R., 859 F.2d 115, Me., (1990).—Fed Civ
Proc 2654 . . . “Plaintiffs' fraudulent scheme of manufacturing evidence to support their business
loss claim and subsequently covering-up their scheme constituted "fraud on the court" warranting
sanctions. (Derzack v. County of Allegheny, Pa., 173 F.R.D. 40ff affirmed 118 F.3d 1575 (Pa.
1996).—Fed Civ Proc 2791.

Fraud Upon the Court by Phillips and Kaelin

Fraud Upon the Court by the Plaintiff’s own Attorneys

Whereby, plaintiff’s attorneys, as officers of the court, perpetrated a continuous and pervasive

pattern of interfering with his ability to obtain his right to justice in the courts. Since, they

circumvented him from receiving due process provided under the Laws of the Land. This is by

acting with a copious amount of outrageously perverted acts of foul play through blatant

professional misconduct.

Plaintiff’s four attorneys acted within the range of their insight to be fully aware of the

foreseeability to the proximate-cause equation of how their conduct affected his legal position.

This is where all of plaintiff’s lawyers surely knew how their professional conduct was deficient

of what was required to achieve a favorable result; or how their detrimental actions caused the

desecration of plaintiff achieving his legal opportunities where he could have prevailed.

In effect, plaintiff’s lawyers and those of the opposition acted in concert with corrupt intent. This

is with engaging in a scheme and artifice to defraud plaintiff out of obtaining his rights to relief

offered through due process of law. Thereby, constituting constituent elements of malfeasance

and misfeasance conduct, dedicated to be averse to plaintiff’s legal position, while beneficial to

3
the position of defendants. Clearly, the plaintiff’s lawyers perverted their discretionary position

of trust, when they willfully and wantonly acted with intentional professional misconduct for the

opposition to gain an undue advantage. Their conduct is indicated by the record is focused to

maliciously interfere with plaintiff’s opportunity to establish his legal rights to justice and obtain

equitable relief in a court of law.

“Fruad on the court’ doctrine permits court to overturn settled decrees and orders, and as
a result is narrowly construed and is defined to most egregious cases, such as bribery od
judge or juror, or improper influence exerted on court by attorney, in which integrity of
the court and its ability to function impartially is directly impaired. Fed Rules Civ. Proc.
Rule 609b0930, 28 U.S.C.A. (outen v. Baltimore County Md, 177F.R.D. 346. Affirmed
164 3F3d 625-Fed Civ Proc 2654

As in accordance with Attorney Malpractice, Chpt. 2, Standard of Care, § 2:7. - Fraud.

“ Fraud is defined as: Deceit, deception, artifice, or trickery operating prejudicially on the
rights of another, and so intended, by inducing him to part with property or surrender
some legal right. Anything calculated to deceive another to his prejudice and
accomplishing the purpose, whether it be an act, a word, silence, the suppression of truth,
or any other device contrary to the plain rules of honesty. (Ballentine’s Law Dictionary.
3rd Edition [1969]) It has been held that an attorney’s opinion, as opposed to fact if
knowingly false when offered, may be the basis for a finding of fraud. (Lietz v. Primcok
[1985] 84 Ariz 273, 327 P2d 288, 67 ALR2d 1262)

The occurrence of ‘Fraud Upon the Court’ warrants dismissal, as:

“Fraud on the court” justifying dismissal occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly
and convincingly, that party has at least sentinently set in motion some unconscionable
scheme calculated to interfere with judicial system’s ability to adjudicate matter by
improperly influencing tier or unfairly hampering presentation of opposing parties claim

4
 or defense (Perna v. Electronic Data Systems, Corp., 916 F. Supp. 388, (N.J. 1995).— Fed Civ
Proc 2791, 2820.

“To be entitled to relief from judgment on theory that defendants committed "fraud on
the court," plaintiffs had to show that defendants acted with intent to deceive or defraud
court by means of deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme. Fed.Rules Civ.
Proc.Rule 60(b)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.—Hall v. Doering, 185 F.R.D. 639 (Kan. 1999).—Fed
Civ Proc 2654.

While it is crystal clear to plaintiff by prima facie evidence of which supports the conclusion that

the four lawyers he hired were in collusion with the opposition. Since the fact history shows the

assertive conduct by plaintiff’s lawyers affirmed and furthered the legal agenda of the other side.

Yet, due to the particulars and circumstances can’t be excused by innocent explanations, such as

the result of gross neglect, or from lack of an ability to know and practice the law appropriately.

Moreover, the facts on record indicate that during the course of past legal proceedings, a

tremendous amount of incidents constituting contemptible foul play had occurred. Thereby,

demonstrating a continuous and pervasive pattern existed of palpable proportions. This is where

the corrupted lawyers of plaintiff perverted their position of trust with his representation to

profoundly support the cause of the opposition.

Whereas the court records and letters sent to plaintiff by his lawyers support the conclusion that

his lawyers were in collusion with the other side. Insomuch as this as circumstantial evidence

clearly indicates a conscious effort was evident, dedicated to undermine plaintiff’s ability to

prevail in court. This is where plaintiff’s lawyers perverted their position of trust to be

substituted with ensuring the oppositions’ ability to achieve their legal agenda. Albeit, this was

achieved by plaintiff’s lawyers working as a double agent. This is where the loyalty of duty for

5
these lawyers to perform was not directed to the one who hired them. Rather their representation

of plaintiff was misdirected to benefit the ambitions of their opposition, which is to misuse the

judicial process to cheat their own client.

“To demonstrate "actual conflict of interest," defendant claiming ineffective assistance of

counsel must be able to point to specific instances in record which suggest impairment or
compromise of his interests for benefit of another party. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.
(Whyte v. Commissioner of Correction, 736 A.2d 145, 53 Conn. App. 678 (1999),
certification denied 738 A.2d 663, 250 Conn. 920.—Crim Law 641.5(0.5).

Essentially, plaintiff’s lawyers egregiously devastated plaintiff’s legal position. Thereby,

depriving plaintiff of pursuing his available opportunities where he absolutely could have

prevailed, which they substituted with consummating the legal agenda of the opposition. Since,

lawyers and judges are ‘officers of the court,’ any fraudulent misrepresentations they may make

on a central matter in a legal dispute, constitutes a perpetration of a ‘Fraud Upon this Court.’

All of plaintiff’s lawyers performed in a similar manner to ensure his expressed interests were

not achieved, as is described of the conduct by plaintiff’s first lawyer, Demetrois Adamis.

Whereas Adamis did not require of plaintiff to be paid for his representation, nor did he even

want to protect his legal right to be compensated by entering into a ‘letter of engagement.’ Thus,

by Adamis not wanting to have a letter of engagement he deprived himself of being able to

enforce payment for legal services. Since, Adamis provided plaintiff with the legal right to refuse

to compensate him for professional services rendered, even if he performed brilliantly and

expediently achieved everything plaintiff wanted.

6
Essentially, Aldamis worked on speculation, yet neglected to pursue available options to affirm

plaintiff’s legal right to relief and afford himself an opportunity to be compensated for services.

Rather, Adamis’s representation of plaintiff during its entire course was not only nonproductive,

but was disastrously detrimental to his legal interests. This is with acts of deception, where

Aldamis acted with misfeasance and malfeasance. Thereby, to ensure he was not compensated

for his legal services. Consequently, through Adamis’s willful interference, and performance of

professional ineptness plaintiff was deprived from obtaining justice in equity.

In effect, Adamis wantonly exploited plaintiff’s trust and authority as his legal representation to

participate in a criminal enterprise to defraud his client. Consequently, after two years of

extremely incompetent and ineffective representation, plaintiff eventually fired Adamis, yet only

after it evolved to the point he was absolutely convinced of his ineptness, to thereafter hire three

other lawyers who performed with more of the same type of misconduct.

Specifically, all four of plaintiff’s lawyers related to plaintiff in the same manner to control and

deceive him. This even manifested where both of plaintiffs lawyers, Aldamis and Brown,

executed the exact same tactics to manipulate and coerce plaintiff to sign imposing stipulations

in housing court. Even when signing the stipulations was adverse to plaintiff’s expressed wishes

of not wanting to sign on to the stipulations they successfully pressured him to eventually sign.

Adamis represented plaintiff during the first stage of the eviction proceeding. This is when he

tricked plaintiff into signing the stipulation, by telling him it didn’t matter because he was

7
immediately going to file an action for dissolution of the contract thereafter. However, he

subsequently outright refused to file the action.

Whereby, this stipulation has a contingency of staying the eviction provided plaintiff does not

interfere with the property being sold by being a nuisance to prospective buyers. This gave the

opposition the ability to falsely claim that he was maliciously interfering with prospective buyers

viewing the property. Thus they fraudulently claimed this as being in violation of the stipulation

to bring him back into court to manufacture more false claims on record and get Del to sign the

second stipulation by having his lawyer coerce his compliance.

Plaintiff’s second lawyer, Donald Brown, mistreatment evolved into terrorizing him with threats

and blatant harassment. Plaintiff retained Brown, based upon the enthusiastic recommendation of

a stranger at his farm stand who engaged him in conversation, Donald Brown senior, the father

of the lawyer he hired upon his urging. Donald Brown later in the housing court assigned the real

estate listing to his father’s office of Weihart Reality of Greenwich as plaintiff’s representation.

Yet, this was without first consulting his plaintiff if it was his wishes that his property be listed.

Here lies the ‘conflict of interest’ by Brown not doing his job of exposing that the existence of a

constructive trust; insomuch as the opposition never paid any money for the title transfer. Thus,

Brown neglected to pursue under the “Uniform Fraudulent Transference Act” for the full title of

ownership to be reverted back to his client. However, if Brown got the total rights of ownership

for plaintiff he would not of had the opportunity to have RKD Ventures list with Weihart for his

father to benefit from the approximate $150,000.00 commission.

8
Brown related to plaintiff with palpable bullying with coercion and intimidate and overpower

him from being able to act upon his own volition. This is by imposing mental dominance over

plaintiff’s frail persona to deprive plaintiff from having the ability to control his own pleadings

in court. Thereby, to be substituting with the stifling of plaintiff’s desire and guaranteed right to

be heard by pleading and affirming his defense on why he should not be evicted from his own

property. This was achieved by coercing compliance by imposing his will to dominate over

plaintiff so he could not act upon his own volition in court. As a result of pressuring and

deception, plaintiff needlessly agreed to settle by a stipulation for accepting final judgment for

eviction.

Plaintiff prepared with performing all possible measures to protect himself from being evicted,

even with borrowing from someone with high interest to pay back $24.000. He was behind in the

rent because of the mysterious flood that occurred when he was in Florida. This is when he was

told not to pay rent and apply the money to restore what was damaged. Then the wrongdoers

took him to court and ignored that he spent $15,000 out of his own pocket in lieu of paying rent.

that the insurance was suppose to cover. Yet, even though plaintiff had gave Brown the $24,000

check he would not introduce into the court and plaintiff was subsequently surprised when the

judge knew nothing about the money,

However, Brown refused to apply it satisfy the court’s consideration of delinquency or being up

to date with the rent used the money as leverage to tell Del after both council met in chambers

9
that the only way he could get the money back is when he shows the court a lease to new place to

live after he has vacated. Del at that time was in a horrible position where he only had revenue of

$613 from his social security check and had borrowed many tens of thousands from friends and

maxed out his credit cards. borrowed from Injunction lease was never filed by Brown neither did

he tell the court about the $24,000 only being known when Del asked the judge who did not

know about it. This is when attorney Highland for the opposition said “we don’t want the money

released we want to hold it as a hammer over his head. To wit, Del said when I woke up this

morning and looked in the mirror I did not look like a nail.

-Abrim Heisler, Brown referred plaintiff to Heisler his law associate, on the basis of convincing

plaintiff that he specialized in housing matters. Yet, what plaintiff did not consider is that

associates in the same law firm

the court records verifies that they were working for the other side.

Heisler told Del that if he didn’t sign the stipulation that he would lose everything and Del

complied out of fear. At the time Heisler wrote up the stipulation with the other side, Del

overheard the two attorney’s describing it as a gag order. To wit, Del told Heisler that he did not

want a gag order included. Subsequently, under duress, Del signed it not realizing that almost

every element composing the stipulation is about agreeing not to talk about the property in one

manner or the other.

Heisler introduced into the record that the bargain of Del’s agreement with the wrongdoers was

that they were legally entitled to 50% of the profits. (see transcript exh D) At the time Del heard

10
this he was shocked because he never told his lawyers anything remotely related to what Heisler

declared was a material fact.

Although, plaintiff did not know that his pleadings could be estopped in the future from making

any claim in contradiction to my being in agreement with the opposition’s bogus claim. Since,

this opened the door for them to bar me from contradicting this by raising judicial estoppel.

Specifically, if I was to thereafter say in a court of law I was duped to sign on the agreement by it

being misrepresented as only a sales agreement. Not surprising the opposition in their papers

raises collateral estoppels to block Del from contesting to their wrongdoings.

Rather, plaintiff told Heisler and gave him the signed contracts in support that all his agreements

with the opposition revolved around their promise to buy most of the property for $3,000,00.00;

as was to be within an expired two year period. This is with leaving plaintiff with ownership of

the parcel that he was operating as a farm stand, which was his very incentive to go with them

because the other buyers wanted all of the land. (Instead of having a farm stand adjoining a

residential development that would be devalued).

Currently, plaintiff’s lawyers Heisler and Brown outright refused to release to him his files, or

will only on the condition he get a notarized statement from Brown. (Consequently, plaintiff

decided he will not get his file from them, so as not to bother Katz).

Consequently, in the oppositions cause of action to evict Del consisted of totally outrageous bold

faced lies that were readily impeachable. Such as saying he never paid any rent and the

11
agreement has become a bottomless pit, by sucking away their money and I am driving away

prospects interested in buying the property. Yet, in actuality, not only a couple of cents they paid

for the papers they duped me to sign. While, Del on the other hand to date have appropriated

well over $50,000 sponsoring their adventure as a byproduct of signing in good faith. In fact in

total, they collected upwards of $300,000.00 from rents and in actuality, Del managed the

property overseeing its maintenance, and even with collecting rents to hand over to them.

Not to mention, the extra $400, 000, 00 they obtained through excessive mortgaging, as an act of

conversion under the color of refinancing. This liberty of helping themselves is refuted by our

agreement, which only authorizes them to get a better rate of mortgage, not transforming a one

million lean on my property into being two million. Thus, they shed crocodile tears by implying

they are the aggrieved party from our agreement. Further implying I responded to their extending

good faith with my ill-intent in return. Yet when shone in the light of truth is extrinsic fraud of

Herculean proportions, and the perpetration of a hoax on the court for the record books.

Not surprising that in their actions they sought Del from being precluded from entering evidence

outside of the occupancy issue and needed his lawyers to coerce him to sign the stipulations.

Fraud Upon the Court by Plaintiff’s Attorneys

This is where plaintiff’s ability to affirm his legal rights and to subsequently present the legal

issues to be heard in the Norwalk Court was essentially hijacked. As this was the causation of

wanton acts of malicious interference, that undermined his rights, guaranteed under our

constitution and by State Laws.

12
 Whereas there is clear indication there has been malicious interference of plaintiff’s ability to

plead his cause. This is in accordance to the available legal opportunities to be heard for this

Court’s consideration.

“Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic within this rule where it prevents a party having a
trial or from presenting all of his or her case, or where it operates on matters pertaining
not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it was procured, so that there is not a
fair submission of the controversy; or on the other hand, fraud has been regarded as
intrinsic within this rule where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the
original action, or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated
therein.” [N.Y. Jur. 2d, Judgments § 256; N.Y. Jur. 2d § 72]. “ Under the CPLR, fraud in
its procurement is a ground for….or granting a party relief from a judgment.” (Verplanck
v. Van Buren, 76 N.Y. 247, 1879 WL 10618 [1879])

Fraud Upon the Court by the Oppostion’s Attorneys

Norwalk Court lacked jurisdiction for its declaratory decree that defendant is landlord to

plaintiff as its tenant. Since the Norwalk Housing Court is without jurisdiction over the matter

to recognize defendant as landlord of plaintiff. Consequently the Norwalk court has no control

over the subject matter and the parties in eviction proceedings . . . especially in a ‘summary

process’ proceeding, when the rights to possession is to be clear and unambiguous. Not to

mention, the matter of rent owed is not to be considered as a part of such action, just the rights of

the landlord to reestablish his possession to the disputed premises. However, the court ruled for

reasons it has yet to explain, that it determined the May 27th 2004 agreement constituted being a

lease. Even though the opposition breached it bargain and the force of its terms expired in 2006.

Accordingly, with any eviction proceeding brought by defendant in that housing court had lacked

jurisdiction to apply the law, make decisions, and declare judgments. Since the said court has

13
wrong cognizance of parties with identifying defendant as landlord and plaintiff as the tenant of

landlord. Consequently, the said court has no power and authority to hear and determine in a

judicial proceeding with defendant as landlord and plaintiff as tenant. Hence the past final

judgment of evicting tenant from the commercial property at 1353 was executed without the said

court having jurisdiction over the matter; and should be vacated as a ruling made in ultra vires.

This is with considering the said court bootstrapping itself to hear the matter on the contract
being a lease was in excess of its powers granted. Although not prohibited on the basis of being
able to determine by its discretionary determination if a document is admitted as the lease it ruled
wrongly when it had no jurisdiction. Such as if someone presented a utility bill to the court to say
this is to qualify as the lease to establish my co-owner on a 50-50 share is my tenant, since it
names him of making monthly payments to occupy our property.

Whereby, plaintiff is embracing - 42 U.S.C., ch, 21, sub I, § 1983;. . .that provides this courts
with the jurisdiction to render declaratory judgment and injunctive relief over State Judges. (See
¶ 3 mem. of law)

Whereas 42 U.S.C. § 1983 says :

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State.., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief was unavailable.

Qualified immunity, an affirmative defense, protects state and local government officials
from section 1983 damages liability when their allegedly unconstitutional conduct was

14
objectively reasonable in light of then-existing law. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982). However, the discretionary activities of these judges violated "clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." A 1983
action against a judge will only succeed if the judge's constitutional violations were non-judicial
actions, or actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction. Whereas in Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) says:
“The US Supreme court first addressed the issue of judicial immunity in Randall v.
Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 523 (1868). This is when the Court said where judges of
courts of general jurisdiction acted in excess of their jurisdiction, they might be held
liable if such acts were found to have been done maliciously or corruptly. . .Although
absolutely barring damage actions, the doctrine of immunity does not preclude suits
under 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against state judges see Mitchem v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).

The LLC’ Title to the properties exists as a constructive trust,

Misconduct of Plaintiff’s lawyers

Donald Brown junior, authorization Weichert’s listing with the housing court. Yet this is absent

of plaintiff’s authorization, or even with notification that his representation intended to authorize

plaintiffs property to be sold by Weichart with the opposition as their client.

Consequently, plaintiff is completely shut out from having any involvement in the sale and is

currently in the position of being confined to approving the sale to go through. Thereby, to

legally establish by plaintiff’s consent that the opposition is legally entitled to half of the equity

created by the sale of two properties. Not to mention, whatever else the opposition may write

into the sales agreement to protect themselves from liability.

15
proclaimed all the excellent legal work he could have his son perform for Del., yet Brown and

his partner Heisler just performed with more of the same extreme incompetence as Adamis and

acted diametrically averse to Dell’s expressed legal agenda. Essentially, all their representation

was clearly dedicated to inflict devastating harm on to Dell’s legal positions of opportunities and

to consummate the evil intent of his opposition.

BASIS FOR MISTRIAL

-The court lacks jurisdiction and cannot bootstrap itself to the case. Since the complaint is

outrageously defective in truth and with the facts stated.

-The entire proceeding has been corrupted by foul play and with major misrepresentations of

material facts to the point of making a mockery of justice. Thus, now for the case now to proceed

to trial would not only be futile to conduct jurisprudence, but would be in effect the usurpation of

plaintiff’s right to receive a fair and impartial hearing in a court of equity. As is where a:

“Mistrial" should be granted . . . as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a
character that it is apparent to the court that because of it the defendant cannot have a fair
trial and the whole proceedings are vitiated. Furthermore, [t]he trial court has a wide
discretion in passing on motions for mistrial. (Ferino v. Palmer, 133 Conn. 463, 466, 52 A.2d
433); Bansah v. Pawelcsyk, 173 Conn. 520, 522, 378 A.2d 569 (1977). The defendant must
prove to the trial court that the remarks made . . . were so prejudicial that the defendant was
deprived of the opportunity for a fair trial and the entire proceedings were tainted.

“A well-established rule is that a statement by counsel, not under oath, of a material fact
pertinent to the issues unsupported by evidence, and prejudicial to the opposing party,
constitutes reversible error unless it appears that the prejudicial effect has been effectively

16
 averted by an instruction to disregard the statement, or otherwise." (State V. Santello , 120
Conn. 486, 490, 181 A. 335 (1935).

-Evidence was improperly admitted and omitted,

- Favoritism shown for the other side the court has been unfair with this issue that it appears to

be partial to the other side.

-Ill-will was shown to defendant by the court

-Evidence tampering:

1). Evidence testimonial and declarations of fact systemically falsified by plaintiff.

-Plaintiff has dirty hands. Whereby the doctrine of unclean hands states, see attached:

17