Rule involved: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

Where the law makes

no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Issue: Does the anti-wiretapping law, RA 4200, allow parties to a conversation to tape it
without the consent of all those involved?
What was construed:
The word any in Sec. 1 of RA 4200: It shall be unlawful for ANY person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
Dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
Facts of the case: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by Ester Garcia inside Garcias office.
Ramirez taped the conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for insulting and
humiliating her, using as evidence the transcript of the conversation, based on the tape
recording.
Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the anti-wire tapping act,
because it was done without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed that what the
law forbids is for other parties, who are not part of the conversation, to record it using the
instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier case that was dismissed because
the instrument used was not mentioned in the law).
The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a motion to quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals reversed it.
Ratio: First, the court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any
person to secretly record a conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication.
The congressional records also showed that the intent was that permission must be sought
from all parties in the conversation. This is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties, Sen. Tanada said during
the deliberations.
The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where
the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Decision: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. Costs against Ramirez.
Abello Vs. CIR
Abello v. CIRG.R. No. 120721February 23, 2005
Topics: gift not defined in the Tax Code Civil Code definition on donation applies;
election contributions are subject togift tax they are not exempt even if such transfers
are with intentions, motives or purpose
Facts:

During the 1987 national elections, petitioners, who are partners in the Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala andCruz (ACCRA) law firm, contributed P882,661.31 each to the
campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, then runningfor the Senate. BIR assessed
each of the petitioners P263,032.66 for their contributions. Petitioners questioned
theassessment to the BIR, claiming that political or electoral contributions are not
considered gifts under the NIRC so theyare not liable for donors tax. The claim for
exemption was denied by the Commissioner. The CTA ruled in favor of thepetitioners,
but such ruling was overturned by the CA, thus this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not electoral contributions are subject to donors tax.
Held:
Yes, they are. The NIRC does not define transfer of property by gift. However, Article 18
of the Civil Code, states: In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and
special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by theprovisions of this Code. Thus,
reference may be made to the definition of a donation in the Civil Code. Article 725
of saidCode defines donation as: . . . an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Donation has the
following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in
the patrimonyof the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or
animus donandi
.The present case falls squarely within the definition of a donation. Petitioners each gave
P882,661.31 to the campaignfunds of Senator Edgardo Angara, without any material
consideration. All three elements of a donation are present. Thepatrimony of the four
petitioners were reduced by P882,661.31 each. Senator Angaras patrimony
correspondinglyincreased by P3,530,645.24. There was intent to do an act of liberality or
animus donandi was present since each of thepetitioners gave their contributions without
any consideration. Taken together with the Civil Code definition of donation,Section 91
of the NIRC is clear and unambiguous, thereby leaving no room for construction.Since
animus donandi or the intention to do an act of liberality is an essential element of a
donation, petitioners arguethat it is important to look into the intention of the giver to
determine if a political contribution is a gift. Petitioners argument is not tenable. First
of all, donative intent is a creature of the mind. It cannot be perceived except by
thematerial and tangible acts which manifest its presence. This being the case, donative
intent is presumed present whenone gives a part of ones patrimony to another without
consideration. Second, donative intent is not negated when theperson donating has other
intentions, motives or purposes which do not contradict donative intent. This Court is
notconvinced that since the purpose of the contribution was to help elect a candidate,
there was no donative intent.Petitioners contribution of money without any material
consideration evinces animus donandi
.Petitioners claim that since the purpose of electoral contributions is to influence the
results of the elections, donativeintent is not present. They claim that the purpose of
electoral contributions is brought on by the desire of the giver toinfluence the result of an
election by supporting candidates who would influence the shaping of government
policies thatwould promote the general welfare and economic well-being of the
electorate, including the giver himself. Petitionersattempt to place the barrier of
mutual exclusivity between donative intent and the purpose of political contributions.

ThisCourt reiterates that donative intent is not negated by the presence of other
intentions, motives or purposes which do notcontradict donative intent. Petitioners
attempt is strained. The fact that petitioners will somehow in the future benefitfrom the
election of the candidate to whom they contribute, in no way amounts to a valuable
material consideration so asto remove political contributions from the purview of a
donation. Senator Angara was under no obligation to benefit thepetitioners. The proper
performance of his duties as a legislator is his obligation as an elected public servant
of theFilipino people and not a consideration for the political contributions he received.
In fact, as a public servant, he may evenbe called to enact laws that are contrary to the
interests of his benefactors, for the benefit of the greater good

Abello v. CIRG.R. No. 120721February 23, 2005Topics:

gift not defined in the Tax Code Civil Code definition on donation applies; election
contributions are subject togift tax they are not exempt even if such transfers are with
intentions, motives or purpose
Facts:
During the 1987 national elections, petitioners, who are partners in the Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala andCruz (ACCRA) law firm, contributed P882,661.31 each to the
campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, then runningfor the Senate. BIR assessed
each of the petitioners P263,032.66 for their contributions. Petitioners questioned
theassessment to the BIR, claiming that political or electoral contributions are not
considered gifts under the NIRC so theyare not liable for donors tax. The claim for
exemption was denied by the Commissioner. The CTA ruled in favor of thepetitioners,
but such ruling was overturned by the CA, thus this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not electoral contributions are subject to donors tax.
Held:
Yes, they are. The NIRC does not define transfer of property by gift. However, Article 18
of the Civil Code, states: In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and
special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by theprovisions of this Code. Thus,
reference may be made to the definition of a donation in the Civil Code. Article 725
of saidCode defines donation as: . . . an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Donation has the
following elements: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in
the patrimonyof the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or
animus donandi
.The present case falls squarely within the definition of a donation. Petitioners each gave
P
882,661.31 to the campaignfunds of Senator Edgardo Angara, without any material
consideration. All three elements of a donation are present. Thepatrimony of the four
petitioners were reduced by P

882,661.31 each. Senator Angaras patrimony correspondinglyincreased by

P3,530,645.24. There was intent to do an act of liberality or
animus donandi
was present since each of thepetitioners gave their contributions without any
consideration. Taken together with the Civil Code definition of donation,Section 91 of the
NIRC is clear and unambiguous, thereby leaving no room for construction.Since
animus donandi
or the intention to do an act of liberality is an essential element of a donation, petitioners
arguethat it is important to look into the intention of the giver to determine if a political
contribution is a gift. Petitioners argument is not tenable. First of all, donative intent is a
creature of the mind. It cannot be perceived except by thematerial and tangible acts which
manifest its presence. This being the case, donative intent is presumed present whenone
gives a part of ones patrimony to another without consideration. Second, donative intent
is not negated when theperson donating has other intentions, motives or purposes which
do not contradict donative intent. This Court is notconvinced that since the purpose of the
contribution was to help elect a candidate, there was no donative intent.Petitioners
contribution of money without any material consideration evinces
animus donandi
.Petitioners claim that since the purpose of electoral contributions is to influence the
results of the elections, donativeintent is not present. They claim that the purpose of
electoral contributions is brought on by the desire of the giver toinfluence the result of an
election by supporting candidates who would influence the shaping of government
policies thatwould promote the general welfare and economic well-being of the
electorate, including the giver himself. Petitionersattempt to place the barrier of
mutual exclusivity between donative intent and the purpose of political contributions.
ThisCourt reiterates that donative intent is not negated by the presence of other
intentions, motives or purposes which do notcontradict donative intent. Petitioners
attempt is strained. The fact that petitioners will somehow in the future benefitfrom the
election of the candidate to whom they contribute, in no way amounts to a valuable
material consideration so asto remove political contributions from the purview of a
donation. Senator Angara was under no obligation to benefit thepetitioners. The proper
performance of his duties as a legislator is his obligation as an elected public servant
of theFilipino people and not a consideration for the political contributions he received.
In fact, as a public servant, he may evenbe called to enact laws that are contrary to the
interests of his benefactors, for the benefit of the greater good

CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS AND SOLICITOR-GENERAL

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Facts: Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who became a Canadian
citizen through naturalization. Subsequently, the petitioner married the respondent
(Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a Filipina, in Pasig City. After the wedding, petitioner went back

to Canada due to work commitments; however, when he came back he was shocked to
discover that the respondent is having an affair with another man. Thus, petitioner went
back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor,
Ontario, Canada granted the petitioners petition for divorce. The divorce decree took
effect a month later, January 8, 2006.
Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and found another woman that he
wants to marry. Thus, for his love to his fiance; the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and the respondents
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the marriage between him
and the respondent still subsists under the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of 1982.
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage dissolved with the RTC. The RTC denied his petition,
hence this recourse by the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to
aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
Ruling: No.
Even though the trial court is correct in its conclusion that the alien spouse can claim no
right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right
it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse due to the given the rationale and intent
behind the enactment, and as such the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
limits its applicability for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.
However, we qualify the above conclusion made by the trial court because in our
jurisdiction, the foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petitions for its recognition. Even though, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens- with the
complementary statement that his conclusion is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the
petition filed by Corpuz before the RTC. the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest
to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides
for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of

jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient
to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that
the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not
kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with
the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above,
will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.