People of the Philippines vs Jose

Vera
65 Phil. 56 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
Probation Law
Separation of Powers Undue Delegation of Powers Power to Pardon
Constitutionality of Laws May the State Question Its Own Laws
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The
matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu
Unjiengs petition for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the
petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the
hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that
courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have
no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law (Act
No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with
probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if
construed as a province, has no designated probation officer hence, a Manila court
cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is
unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws.
HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of provinces whether or nor to
apply the probation law if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will
appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed
hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it
gave the option to the provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law
however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executives
power to grant pardon. They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in
effect encroached upon the executives power to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution
agreed with the issues raised by HSBC ironic because their main stance was the nonapplicability of the probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in
provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing
the State as well as the People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like
Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of
Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is now
questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had
been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of
the equal protection clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the
law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a province decides not to install a
probation officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the
provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to
provinces where the respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But
nowhere in the law did it state as to what standard (sufficient standard test) should

provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation law in their
province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its
whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress
to provide for probation. Probation does not encroach upon the Presidents power to grant
pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix penalties
while pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties.

FERDINAND R. MARCOS II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE

COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and
HERMINIA D. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Government action is once again

assailed as precipitate and unfair, suffering the basic and oftly implored
requisites of due process of law. Specifically, the petition assails the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 31363, where the said court held:
[1]

"In view of all the foregoing, we rule that the deficiency income tax assessments and
estate tax assessment, are already final and (u)nappealable -and- the subsequent levy
of real properties is a tax remedy resorted to by the government, sanctioned by
Section 213 and 218 of the National Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax
remedy is distinct and separate from the other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil
actions and Criminal actions), and is not affected or precluded by the pendency of any
other tax remedies instituted by the government.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
petition for certiorari with prayer for Restraining Order and Injunction.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos,
the former President of the Republic of the Philippines, the matter of the
settlement of his estate, and its dues to the government in estate taxes, are
still unresolved, the latter issue being now before this Court for
resolution.Specifically, petitioner Ferdinand R. Marcos II, the eldest son of the
decedent, questions the actuations of the respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue in assessing, and collecting through the summary remedy of
Levy on Real Properties, estate and income tax delinquencies upon the estate
and properties of his father, despite the pendency of the proceedings on

probate of the will of the late president, which is docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
10279 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156.
Petitioner had filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with an application for writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order on June 28, 1993, seeking to I. Annul and set aside the Notices of Levy on real property dated February 22, 1993
and May 20, 1993, issued by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
II. Annul and set aside the Notices of Sale dated May 26, 1993;
III. Enjoin the Head Revenue Executive Assistant Director II (Collection Service),
from proceeding with the Auction of the real properties covered by Notices ofSale.
After the parties had pleaded their case, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision on November 29, 1994, ruling that the deficiency assessments for
estate and income tax made upon the petitioner and the estate of the
deceased President Marcos have already become final and unappealable,
and may thus be enforced by the summary remedy of levying upon the
properties of the late President, as was done by the respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
[2]

"WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the

petition for Certiorari with prayer for Restraining Order and Injunction.
No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED."
Unperturbed, petitioner is now before us assailing the validity of the
appellate court's decision, assigning the following as errors:
A. RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SUMMARY TAX
REMEDIES RESORTED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT ARE NOT AFFECTED AND
PRECLUDED BY THE PENDENCY OF THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE ALLOWANCE
OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED WILL.TO THE CONTRARY, THIS PROBATE
PROCEEDING PRECISELY PLACED ALL PROPERTIES WHICH FORM PART OF THE LATE
PRESIDENT'S ESTATE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS OF THE PROBATE COURT TO THE
EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

B. RESPONDENT COURT ARBITRARILY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY DECIDING THAT

SINCE THE TAX ASSESSMENTS OF PETITIONER AND HIS PARENTS HAD ALREADY
BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE, THERE WAS NO NEED TO GO INTO THE MERITS
OF THE GROUNDS CITED IN THE PETITION. INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER THE TAX
ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL, HOWEVER, PETITIONER HAS THE
RIGHT TO QUESTION THE UNLAWFUL MANNER AND METHOD IN WHICH TAX
COLLECTION IS SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED BY RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER AND
DE GUZMAN. THUS, RESPONDENT COURT SHOULD HAVE FAVORABLY CONSIDERED
THE MERITS OF THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS IN THE PETITION:

(1) The Notices of Levy on Real Property were issued beyond the period provided
in the Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-68.
(2) [a] The numerous pending court cases questioning the late President's
ownership or interests in several properties (both personal and real) make the total
value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax due, incapable of exact
pecuniary determination at this time. Thus, respondents assessment of the estate
tax and their issuance of the Notices of Levy and Sale are premature, confiscatory
and oppressive.
[b] Petitioner, as one of the late President's compulsory heirs, was never notified,
much less served with copies of the Notices of Levy, contrary to the mandate of
Section 213 of the NIRC. As such, petitioner was never given an opportunity to
contest the Notices in violation of his right to due process of law.
C. ON ACCOUNT OF THE CLEAR MERIT OF THE PETITION, RESPONDENT COURT
MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO POWER TO GRANT INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF TO PETITIONER. SECTION 219 OF THE NIRC NOTWITHSTANDING, COURTS
POSSESS THE POWER TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN
RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER'S AND DE GUZMAN'S ARBITRARY METHOD OF
COLLECTING THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCY ESTATE AND INCOME TAXES BY MEANS OF
LEVY.

The facts as found by the appellate court are undisputed, and are hereby
adopted:
"On September 29, 1989, former President Ferdinand Marcos died in Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA.
On June 27, 1990, a Special Tax Audit Team was created to conduct investigations
and examinations of the tax liabilities and obligations of the late president, as well as
that of his family, associates and "cronies". Said audit team concluded its investigation
with a Memorandum dated July 26, 1991. The investigation disclosed that the

Marcoses failed to file a written notice of the death of the decedent, an estate tax
returns [sic], as well as several income tax returns covering the years 1982 to 1986,
-all in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos before the
Regional Trial of Quezon City for violations of Sections 82, 83 and 84 (has penalized
under Sections 253 and 254 in relation to Section 252- a & b) of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thereby caused the preparation and filing of
the Estate Tax Return for the estate of the late president, the Income Tax Returns of
the Spouses Marcos for the years 1985 to 1986, and the Income Tax Returns of
petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II for the years 1982 to 1985.
On July 26, 1991, the BIR issued the following: (1) Deficiency estate tax assessment
no. FAC-2-89-91-002464 (against the estate of the late president Ferdinand Marcos in
the amount of P23,293,607,638.00 Pesos); (2) Deficiency income tax assessment no.
FAC-1-85-91-002452 and Deficiency income tax assessment no. FAC-1-86-91002451 (against the Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in the amounts of
P149,551.70 and P184,009,737.40 representing deficiency income tax for the years
1985 and 1986); (3) Deficiency income tax assessment nos. FAC-1-82-91-002460 to
FAC-1-85-91-002463 (against petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II in the
amounts of P258.70 pesos; P9,386.40 Pesos; P4,388.30 Pesos; and P6,376.60 Pesos
representing his deficiency income taxes for the years 1982 to 1985).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue avers that copies of the deficiency estate and
income tax assessments were all personally and constructively served on August 26,
1991 and September 12, 1991 upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos (through her caretaker Mr.
Martinez) at her last known address at No. 204 Ortega St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes
'D' and 'E' of the Petition). Likewise, copies of the deficiency tax assessments issued
against petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II were also personally and
constructively served upon him (through his caretaker) on September 12, 1991, at his
last known address at Don Mariano Marcos St. corner P. Guevarra St., San Juan,
M.M. (Annexes 'J' and 'J-1' of the Petition). Thereafter, Formal Assessment notices
were served on October 20, 1992, upon Mrs. Marcos c/o petitioner, at his office,
House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Quezon City. Moreover, a notice to
Taxpayer inviting Mrs. Marcos (or her duly authorized representative or counsel), to a
conference, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos, Dean Antonio Coronel - but to
no avail.

The deficiency tax assessments were not protested administratively, by Mrs. Marcos
and the other heirs of the late president, within 30 days from service of said
assessments.
On February 22, 1993, the BIR Commissioner issued twenty-two notices of levy on
real property against certain parcels of land owned by the Marcoses - to satisfy the
alleged estate tax and deficiency income taxes of Spouses Marcos.
On May 20, 1993, four more Notices of Levy on real property were issued for the
purpose of satisfying the deficiency income taxes.
On May 26, 1993, additional four (4) notices of Levy on real property were again
issued. The foregoing tax remedies were resorted to pursuant to Sections 205 and 213
of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
In response to a letter dated March 12, 1993 sent by Atty. Loreto Ata (counsel of
herein petitioner) calling the attention of the BIR and requesting that they be duly
notified of any action taken by the BIR affecting the interest of their client Ferdinand
'Bongbong Marcos II, as well as the interest of the late president - copies of the
aforesaid notices were served on April 7, 1993 and on June 10, 1993, upon Mrs.
Imelda Marcos, the petitioner, and their counsel of record, 'De Borja, Medialdea, Ata,
Bello, Guevarra and Serapio Law Office'.
Notices of sale at public auction were posted on May 26, 1993, at the lobby of the
City Hall of Tacloban City. The public auction for the sale of the eleven (11) parcels
of land took place on July 5, 1993. There being no bidder, the lots were declared
forfeited in favor of the government.
On June 25, 1993, petitioner Ferdinand 'Bongbong' Marcos II filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction."
It has been repeatedly observed, and not without merit, that the
enforcement of tax laws and the collection of taxes, is of paramount
importance for the sustenance of government. Taxes are the lifeblood of the
government
and
should
be
collected
without
unnecessary
hindrance. However, such collection should be made in accordance with law
as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. It is
therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the

authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the
promotion of the common good, may be achieved."
[3]

Whether or not the proper avenues of assessment and collection of the

said tax obligations were taken by the respondent Bureau is now the subject
of the Court's inquiry.
Petitioner posits that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subsequent sale
of properties of the late President Marcos effected by the BIR are null and
void for disregarding the established procedure for the enforcement of taxes
due upon the estate of the deceased. The case of Domingo vs. Garlitos is
specifically cited to bolster the argument that "the ordinary procedure by which
to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased, person, as
in an inheritance (estate) tax, is for the claimant to present a claim before the
probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount
therefor." This remedy is allegedly, exclusive, and cannot be effected through
any other means.
[4]

Petitioner goes further, submitting that the probate court is not precluded
from denying a request by the government for the immediate payment of
taxes, and should order the payment of the same only within the period fixed
by the probate court for the payment of all the debts of the decedent. In this
regard, petitioner cites the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. The
Administratrix of the Estate of Echarri (67 Phil 502), where it was held that:
"The case of Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Collector of Internal
Revenue (52 Phil 803), relied upon by the petitioner-appellant is good authority on the
proposition that the court having control over the administration proceedings has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim presented by the government for taxes due and to
order the administrator to pay the tax should it find that the assessment was proper,
and that the tax was legal, due and collectible. And the rule laid down in that case
must be understood in relation to the case of Collector of Customs vs. Haygood,
supra., as to the procedure to be followed in a given case by the government to
effectuate the collection of the tax. Categorically stated, where during the pendency of
judicial administration over the estate of a deceased person a claim for taxes is
presented by the government, the court has the authority to order payment by the
administrator; but, in the same way that it has authority to order payment or
satisfaction, it also has the negative authority to deny the same. While there are cases
where courts are required to perform certain duties mandatory and ministerial in

character, the function of the court in a case of the present character is not one of
them; and here, the court cannot be an organism endowed withlatitude of judgment in
one direction, and converted into a mere mechanical contrivance in another direction."
On the other hand, it is argued by the BIR, that the state's authority to
collect internal revenue taxes is paramount. Thus, the pendency of probate
proceedings over the estate of the deceased does not preclude the
assessment and collection, through summary remedies, of estate taxes over
the same. According to the respondent, claims for payment of estate and
income taxes due and assessed after the death of the decedent need not be
presented in the form of a claim against the estate. These can and should be
paid immediately. The probate court is not the government agency to decide
whether an estate is liable for payment of estate of income taxes. Well-settled
is the rule that the probate court is a court with special and limited jurisdiction.
Concededly, the authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with
limited jurisdiction, as a probate court over estate of deceased individual, is
not a trifling thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective,
cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by
the very parties invoking its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his
prospective heirs before final adjudication; to determine who are the heirs of
the decedent; the recognition of a natural child; the status of a woman
claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of
an heir by the testator; and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary
rights.
[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

The pivotal question the court is tasked to resolve refers to the authority of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue to collect by the summary remedy of levying
upon, and sale of real properties of the decedent, estate tax deficiencies,
without the cognition and authority of the court sitting in probate over the
supposed will of the deceased.
The nature of the process of estate tax collection has been described as
follows:
"Strictly speaking, the assessment of an inheritance tax does not directly involve the
administration of a decedent's estate, although it may be viewed as an incident to the

complete settlement of an estate, and, under some statutes, it is made the duty of the
probate court to make the amount of the inheritance tax a part of the final decree of
distribution of the estate. It is not against the property of decedent, nor is it a claim
against the estate as such, but it is against the interest or property right which the heir,
legatee, devisee, etc., has in the property formerly held by decedent. Further, under
some statutes, it has been held that it is not a suit or controversy between the parties,
nor is it an adversary proceeding between the state and the person who owes the tax
on the inheritance. However, under other statutes it has been held that the hearing and
determination of the cash value of the assets and the determination of the tax are
adversary proceedings. The proceeding has been held to be necessarily a proceeding
in rem.
[11]

In the Philippine experience, the enforcement and collection of estate tax,

is executive in character, as the legislature has seen it fit to ascribe this task to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Section 3 of the National Internal Revenue
Code attests to this:
"Sec. 3. Powers and duties of the Bureau.-The powers and duties of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue shall comprehend the assessment and collection of all national
internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges, and the enforcement of all forfeitures,
penalties, and fines connected therewith, including the execution of judgments in all
cases decided in its favor by the Court of Tax Appeals and the ordinary courts. Said
Bureau shall also give effect to and administer the supervisory and police
powerconferred to it by this Code or other laws."
Thus, it was in Vera vs. Fernandez that the court recognized the liberal
treatment of claims for taxes charged against the estate of the decedent. Such
taxes, we said, were exempted from the application of the statute of nonclaims, and this is justified by the necessity of government funding,
immortalized in the maxim that taxes are the lifeblood of the
government. Vectigalia nervi sunt rei publicae - taxes are the sinews of the
state.
[12]

"Taxes assessed against the estate of a deceased person, after administration is opened,
need not be submitted to the committee on claims in the ordinary course of
administration. In the exercise of its control over the administrator, the court may
direct the payment of such taxes upon motion showing that the taxes have been
assessed against the estate."

Such liberal treatment of internal revenue taxes in the probate

proceedings extends so far, even to allowing the enforcement of tax
obligations against the heirs of the decedent, even after distribution of the
estate's properties.
"Claims for taxes, whether assessed before or after the death of the deceased, can be
collected from the heirs even after the distribution of the properties of the
decedent. They are exempted from the application of the statute of non-claims. The
heirs shall be liable therefor, in proportion to their share in the inheritance."
[13]

"Thus, the Government has two ways of collecting the taxes in question. One, by
going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the amount of the tax
proportionate to the inheritance received. Another remedy, pursuant to the lien created
by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all property and rights to property belong to the
taxpayer for unpaid income tax, is by subjecting said property of the estate which is in
the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of the tax due the estate.
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105, September 15, 1967.)
From the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in
probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory
requirement in the collection of estate taxes. It cannot therefore be argued
that the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the
properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was
required to seek first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the Tax
Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of the
probate or estate settlement court's approval of the state's claim for estate
taxes, before the same can be enforced and collected.
On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or
settlement court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial
administrator of the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any
party interested in the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This
provision disproves the petitioner's contention that it is the probate court which
approves the assessment and collection of the estate tax.
If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the
estate taxes, this should have been pursued through the proper administrative
and judicial avenues provided for by law.

Section 229 of the NIRC tells us how:

"Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment.-When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or
his duly authorized representative finds that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall
first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a period to be prescribed by
implementing regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said notice. If
the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner shall issue an assessment based on his
findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for
reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form and manner as may be prescribed by
implementing regulations within (30) days from receipt of the assessment; otherwise,
the assessment shall become final and unappealable.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association or corporation
adversely affected by the decision on the protest may appeal to the Court of Tax
Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of said decision; otherwise, the decision
shall become final, executory and demandable. (As inserted by P.D. 1773)"
Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time
required for the filing of the same, petitioner, and the other heirs never
questioned the assessments served upon them, allowing the same to lapse
into finality, and prompting the BIR to collect the said taxes by levying upon
the properties left by President Marcos.
Petitioner submits, however, that "while the assessment of taxes may have
been validly undertaken by the Government, collection thereof may have been
done in violation of the law. Thus, the manner and method in which the latter
is enforced may be questioned separately, and irrespective of the finality of
the former, because the Government does not have the unbridled discretion to
enforce collection without regard to the clear provision of law."
[14]

Petitioner specifically points out that applying Memorandum Circular No.

38-68, implementing Sections 318 and 324 of the old tax code (Republic Act
5203), the BIR's Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties, were issued
beyond the allowed period, and are therefore null and void:
"...the Notices of Levy on Real Property (Annexes 0 to NN of Annex C of this
Petition) in satisfaction of said assessments were still issued by respondents well
beyond the period mandated in Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-68. These

Notices of Levy were issued only on 22 February 1993 and 20 May 1993 when at
least seventeen (17) months had already lapsed from the last service of tax assessment
on 12 September 1991. As no notices of distraint of personal property were first
issued by respondents, the latter should have complied with Revenue Memorandum
Circular No. 38-68 and issued these Notices of Levy not earlier than three (3) months
nor later than six (6) months from 12 September 1991. In accordance with the
Circular, respondents only had until 12 March 1992 (the last day of the sixth month)
within which to issue these Notices of Levy. The Notices of Levy, having been issued
beyond the period allowed by law, are thus void and of no effect."
[15]

We hold otherwise. The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued
within the prescriptive period and in accordance with the provisions of the
present Tax Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having already become
final, executory, and demandable, the same can now be collected through the
summary remedy of distraint or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the NIRC.
The applicable provision in regard to the prescriptive period for the
assessment and collection of tax deficiency in this instance is Article 223 of
the NIRC, which pertinently provides:
"Sec. 223. Exceptions as to a period of limitation of assessment and collection of
taxes.- (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a
failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the
collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten (10)
years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud, or omission: Provided, That, in a fraud
assessment which has become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be judicially
taken cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for the collection thereof.
xxx
(c) Any internal revenue tax which has been assessed within the period of limitation
above prescribed, may be collected by distraint or levy or by a proceeding in court
within three years following the assessment of the tax.
xxx
The omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent failure to
contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's
cause, as under the above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return,
the tax may be assessed at any time within ten years after the omission, and

any tax so assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within three
years following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax assessment
had become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards
protesting the validity of the said assessment, there is now no reason why the
BIR cannot continue with the collection of the said tax. Any objection against
the assessment should have been pursued following the avenue paved in
Section 229 of the NIRC on protests on assessments of internal revenue
taxes.
Petitioner further argues that "the numerous pending court cases
questioning the late president's ownership or interests in several properties
(both real and personal) make the total value of his estate, and the
consequent estate tax due, incapable of exact pecuniary determination at this
time.Thus, respondents' assessment of the estate tax and their issuance of
the Notices of Levy and sale are premature and oppressive." He points out the
pendency of Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0001-0034 and 0141, which
were filed by the government to question the ownership and interests of the
late President in real and personal properties located within and outside the
Philippines. Petitioner, however, omits to allege whether the properties levied
upon by the BIR in the collection of estate taxes upon the decedent's estate
were among those involved in the said cases pending in the
Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the court is at a loss as to how these cases are
relevant to the matter at issue. The mere fact that the decedent has pending
cases involving ill-gotten wealth does not affect the enforcement of tax
assessments over the properties indubitably included in his estate.
Petitioner also expresses his reservation as to the propriety of the BIR's
total assessment of P23,292,607,638.00, stating that this amount deviates
from the findings of the Department of Justice's Panel of Prosecutors as per
its resolution of 20 September 1991. Allegedly, this is clear evidence of the
uncertainty on the part of the Government as to the total value of the estate of
the late President.
This is, to our mind, the petitioner's last ditch effort to assail the
assessment of estate tax which had already become final and unappealable.
It is not the Department of Justice which is the government agency tasked
to determine the amount of taxes due upon the subject estate, but the Bureau
of Internal Revenue whose determinations and assessments are presumed
[16]

correct and made in good faith. The taxpayer has the duty of proving
otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of
official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. Even an assessment
based on estimates is prima facie valid and lawful where it does not appear to
have been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously. The burden of proof is upon the
complaining party to show clearly that the assessment is erroneous. Failure to
present proof of error in the assessment will justify the judicial affirmance of
said assessment. In this instance, petitioner has not pointed out one single
provision in the Memorandum of the Special Audit Team which gave rise to
the questioned assessment, which bears a trace of falsity. Indeed, the
petitioner's attack on the assessment bears mainly on the alleged improbable
and unconscionable amount of the taxes charged. But mere rhetoric cannot
supply the basis for the charge of impropriety of the assessments made.
[17]

[18]

Moreover, these objections to the assessments should have been raised,

considering the ample remedies afforded the taxpayer by the Tax Code,with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, as described
earlier, and cannot be raised now via Petition for Certiorari, under the pretext
of grave abuse of discretion. The course of action taken by the petitioner
reflects his disregard or even repugnance of the established institutions for
governance in the scheme of a well-ordered society. The subject tax
assessments having become final, executory and enforceable, the same can
no longer be contested by means of a disguised protest. In the
main, Certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a lost appeal or remedy.
This judicial policy becomes more pronounced in view of the absence of
sufficient attack against the actuations of government.
[19]

On the matter of sufficiency of service of Notices of Assessment to the

petitioner, we find the respondent appellate court's pronouncements sound
and resilient to petitioner's attacks.
"Anent grounds 3(b) and (B) - both alleging/claiming lack of notice - We find, after
considering the facts and circumstances, as well as evidences, that there was
sufficient, constructive and/or actual notice of assessments, levy and sale, sent to
herein petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos as well as to his mother Mrs. Imelda
Marcos.
Even if we are to rule out the notices of assessments personally given to the caretaker
of Mrs. Marcos at the latter's last known address, on August 26, 1991 and September

12, 1991, as well as the notices of assessment personally given to the caretaker of
petitioner also at his last known address on September 12, 1991 - the subsequent
notices given thereafter could no longer be ignored as they were sent at a time when
petitioner was already here in the Philippines, and at a place where said notices would
surely be called to petitioner's attention, and received by responsible persons of
sufficient age and discretion.
Thus, on October 20, 1992, formal assessment notices were served upon Mrs. Marcos
c/o the petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Q.C.
(Annexes "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-3"; pp. 207-210, Comment/Memorandum of
OSG). Moreover, a notice to taxpayer dated October 8, 1992 inviting Mrs. Marcos to
a conference relative to her tax liabilities, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos Dean Antonio Coronel (Annex "B", p. 211, ibid). Thereafter, copies of Notices were
also served upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner and their counsel "De Borja,
Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and Serapio Law Office", on April 7, 1993 and June
10, 1993. Despite all of these Notices, petitioner never lifted a finger to protest the
assessments, (upon which the Levy and sale of properties were based), nor appealed
the same to the Court of Tax Appeals.
There being sufficient service of Notices to herein petitioner (and his mother) and it
appearing that petitioner continuously ignored said Notices despite several
opportunities given him to file a protest and to thereafter appeal to the Court of Tax
Appeals, - the tax assessments subject of this case, upon which the levy and sale of
properties were based, could no longer be contested (directly or indirectly) via this
instant petition for certiorari."
[20]

Petitioner argues that all the questioned Notices of Levy, however, must be
nullified for having been issued without validly serving copies thereof to the
petitioner. As a mandatory heir of the decedent, petitioner avers that he has
an interest in the subject estate, and notices of levy upon its properties should
have been served upon him.
We do not agree. In the case of notices of levy issued to satisfy the
delinquent estate tax, the delinquent taxpayer is the Estate of the decedent,
and not necessarily, and exclusively, the petitioner as heir of the deceased. In
the same vein, in the matter of income tax delinquency of the late president
and his spouse, petitioner is not the taxpayer liable. Thus, it follows that
service of notices of levy in satisfaction of these tax delinquencies upon the

petitioner is not required by law, as under Section 213 of the NIRC, which
pertinently states:
"xxx
...Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate a description of the property
upon which levy is made. At the same time, written notice of the levy shall be mailed
to or served upon the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is
located and upon the delinquent taxpayer, or if he be absent from the Philippines, to
his agent or the manager of the business in respect to which the liability arose, or if
there be none, to the occupant of the property in question.
xxx"
The foregoing notwithstanding, the record shows that notices of warrants
of distraint and levy of sale were furnished the counsel of petitioner on April 7,
1993, and June 10, 1993, and the petitioner himself on April 12, 1993 at his
office at the Batasang Pambansa. We cannot therefore, countenance
petitioner's insistence that he was denied due process. Where there was an
opportunity to raise objections to government action, and such opportunity
was disregarded, for no justifiable reason, the party claiming oppression then
becomes the oppressor of the orderly functions of government. He who
comes to court must come with clean hands. Otherwise, he not only taints his
name, but ridicules the very structure of established authority.
[21]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the present

petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.

Ishmael Himagan vs People

of the Philippines
237 SCRA 538 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies
Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder
of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother,
Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into
suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that:
Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a
member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years
and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service
Decree provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims
that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service
Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.
HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the
member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day
or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before
the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the
trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit
the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the
period of suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be
finished.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on
preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post
while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed
to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47
of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the
suspension of accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the
phrase be terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests
that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within
that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without
justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases
where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed
without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not
without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to
dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

Philippine
Judges
Association vs Pete Prado
227 SCRA 703 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
Franking Privilege of the Judiciary
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to
withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a
privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of
charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the
postal service comes from the judiciarys use of the postal service (issuance of court
processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be
withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said
franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of
Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal
protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause.
The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to
that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster
cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the
judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend
to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have
removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is
the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from
all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not
solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no

substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the
Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking
privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because
its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes
result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all
persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of
adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to
each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong.
If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress
for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact
greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
2nd Version or PJA vs. Prado
Facts: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by
the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw
the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The
petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges
will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition assails the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 7354.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its
purpose
(2) Whether or not it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its
passage;
(3) Whether or not it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary
Held:

(1) Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." The
purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the
title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being
considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or
otherwise, if they shall so desire.
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the
franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect
its purposes. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation,
Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry
and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith." The petitioners' contention is untenable. The
title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the
title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act,
and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement. Furthermore, the repeal of a statute on a given subject
is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and
therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent
on the subject. The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the
effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is
required to be briefly expressed in its title. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from
some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No.
7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system.
(2) It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was
returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been
duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by
President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the
Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters
that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill).
(3) It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking
privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice

President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the
Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and
officers. The withdrawal of the franking privileges was indeed discriminatory. If the problem
of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it.
The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially
where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need
it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating
the Constitution. The classification was not based on substantial distinctions.

Mario Gumabon vs Director

of the Bureau of Prisons
37 SCRA 420 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
Hernandez Doctrine
Mario Gumabon et al were charged with rebellion punished under Art. 134 of the Revised
Penal Code. Their offense was complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and
kidnapping. They were all sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their sentence had become
final and executory when the Hernandez Doctrine was promulgated by the Supreme Court.
The Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder cannot be complexed with rebellion
because murder, a regular crime, is necessarily absorbed by rebellion. Hence, without such
complexion, the penalty must be lower than reclusion perpetua. Gumabon asserted that a
non-application of the Hernandez Doctrine will lead to a deprivation of a constitutional right,
namely, the denial of equal protection. Gumabon et al, nonetheless, were convicted by
Court of First Instance but they were convicted for the very same rebellion for which
Hernandez and others were convicted (The law under which they [Gumabon et al] were
convicted is the very same law under which the latter [Hernandez et al] were convicted.) It
had not and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law,
how can the SC, in conscience, allow Gumabon et al to suffer life imprisonment, while
others can suffer only prision mayor?
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the effects of the Hernandez Doctrine.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The continued incarceration after the
twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with
the controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with
implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would
render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical offense, the only
distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and
the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer
different penalties. If Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment, then this
would be repugnant to equal protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt
with.

What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms
so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both
in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall
within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in
the group equally binding on the rest.

Panfilo Lacson vs Secretary

Hernando Perez
357 SCRA 757 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Clause Cases
Before the Sandiganbayan
On May 18, 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The
incident was later sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated case Panfilo Lacson, who, at
the time of the rub out was then the PNP Chief, among others, as the ones responsible.
They were accused of multiple murder. The case reached the Sandiganbayan. In 1996,
Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
aver that the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section
2 (par a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975 also known as An Act To Strengthen The
Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose
Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where
one or more of the principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27
or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of
only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
In 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed
the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely
suit the situation in which Lacsons cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has
foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer
of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to
overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of
petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with
the passage of RA 8249.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal
protection. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the
co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements,
namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials
whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases
where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction
that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs,
examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to
define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably
anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases,
which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus,
Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from
those similarly situated as them.
Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public
officials and, under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to all cases pending in any court.
Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are
in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng

cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already
begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

Humberto
Basco
vs
Philippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation
97 SCRA 52 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Clause
Municipal Corporation Local Autonomy Imperium in Imperio

n 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was

created by Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power
to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCORs operation was a success hence in 1978, PD
1399 was passed which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs charter was
updated through PD 1869. PAGCORs charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section
1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal
protection clause and b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.
Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together
with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.

Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities
like Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is
concerned; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise
holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local
autonomy principle.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not PD 1869 violates the local autonomy clause.
HELD:
1. No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the
equal protection is not clearly explained in Bascos petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse racing (RA 306 as amended by RA
983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are legalized under
certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD.
1869 for one, unconstitutional.
Bascos posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the
laws. The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The equal protection clause does not
prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate. The Constitution does not require situations which are different
in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.
2. No. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to
levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees
and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government.

A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on
taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such
guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should
be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the
power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers.
Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions
or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere
Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.

Francisco Tatad et al vs
Secretary of Energy
Equal Protection Oil Deregulation Law
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has
always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import
or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market
such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among
others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7%
tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against
prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries
and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on
unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art
12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which
is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is
operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex
stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the
lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing
refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense
benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep
in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New
players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building
refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build
refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their

product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4%
tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries
puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the
league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle
dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new
players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil
companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the
latter.

Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation

G.R. No. L-59234. September 30, 1982.

Facts:
Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular
No. 77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and
replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as Implementing Circular No. 52 issued
pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel of the
BLT within the National Capital Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and formulating
a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public
conveyances.
Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and
substantive due process, equal protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and
unreasonable classification and standard. Among others, they question the issuance of the
Circulars without first calling them to a conference or requiring them to submit position
papers or other documents enforceability thereof only in Metro Manila; and their being
applicable only to taxicabs and not to other transportation services.
Issues:
Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of due process was denied to the taxicab
operators and/or other persons affected by the assailed Circular No. 52.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab
operators or persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or
requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is only one of the options open
to the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing a sixyear ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to
all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.

The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially
enforcing the Circulars only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs
in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and
more constant use, thus making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the

Circulars to other transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria
required under the equal protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means
so that all persons under identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.
It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded
the Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators
or persons who maybe affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which
is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they
were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public
respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged
Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and
information that may be desired by the BOT.

Mary Concepcion Bautista

et al vs Alfredo Juinio et al
Equal Protection Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and Others
Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles
into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and
holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down
petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be
discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum
consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption.
Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars
may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban being
imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those
owned by them fall within such category.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.
HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The
classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal
situation is for the laws benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the
sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of
men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the
idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot
approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into
account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted,
which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property.
Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause
only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally
and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated

in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and
the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.

Patricio
Dumlao
vs
Commission on Elections
95 SCRA 392 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Eligibility to Office
after Being 65
Judicial Review; Requisites thereof

atricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from

his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.

In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was
enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation
hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however
have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit
assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials,
the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from
running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of
complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from
office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should
have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They have separate
issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial
review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal
and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function

be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional
question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well
taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class
can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those
of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates
should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of
younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons
more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for
elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at
ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the
same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho GR No L29646, November 10, 1978

FACTS:The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except
those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical
assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of religious
orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so as to be employed or
engage in trade in the City of Manila. Thus, a case was filed with CFI-Manila to stop
enforcement of the ordinance. CFI-Manila declared the ordinance void. Thus, the present
petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the ordinance violative of the cardinal rule of uniformity of taxation?
(2) Does it violate the principle against undue designation of legislative power?
(3) Does it violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution?
RULING:
(1) Yes. The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to
consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required
to pay it. The same amount of P50 is being collected from every employed alien whether he
is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly
paid executive.
(2) Yes. It does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of
his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any
policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the action, thus conferring upon the Mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted power, such ordinance is invalid.
(3) Yes. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor
of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right
of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.
Thus, the ordinance is invalid.

Ramon Ceniza et al vs
Commission on Elections,
COA & National Treasurer
Equal Protection Gerrymandering
**Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative
districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. **
Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421
which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter),
highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters
prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is
a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC
added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in
behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed)
questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the
regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage.
Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the
passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that
the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of
the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire
province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of
Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza
likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as
highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial
officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on
substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and
regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable
classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local
government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that The
State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of
gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional
requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a
province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that
came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore
cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June
1969.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of
their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city
would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively
independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has
sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province
where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of
the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the
election of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of
the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials.
The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to
vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component
city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voters
right of suffrage.

United
Democratic
Opposition vs Commission
on Elections
Equal Protection Access to Media
In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments were to
be placed to a plebiscite for the peoples approval. The YES vote was being advanced by
KBL Marcos Party. While the NO vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity
and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c basically provided that there be
equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use for campaigns for both sides.
On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to
11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations
nationwide. UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same
opportunity as Marcos has pursuant to Resns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand.
UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal protection before the laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal protection by virtue of COMELECs denial
of their request.
HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due process nor were they not afforded
equal protection. It is the considered view of the SC that when Marcos conducted his
pulong-pulong or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity
as President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party.
Under the Constitution, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the
program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. In instances
where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in
power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with
the governed. The president is accorded certain privileges that the opposition may not have.
Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as
they are not party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with these TV stations and
radio stations at their own expense.

Rufino
Nuez
vs
Sandiganbayan
&
the
People of the Philippines
Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan
Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD
1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of
the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims
that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because
appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and
trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC,
instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal
as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the
CA and thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as
appeals would be concerned.
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of
a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials
charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the
creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the
urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as
January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure
for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not
necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the
classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on

substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of
the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a
unanimous decision from 3 justices a showing that decisions therein are more
conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.

Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)

Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the
government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to
two appellate courts first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of
private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers,
who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the
SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial
court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination.
Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that
meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the
intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two
appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to
the people.
Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the
reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and
not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases
involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are
reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of
justice in criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject to review by two appellate
tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment
and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered
during the trial.
Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption
of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond
reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).

Antero Sison Jr. vs Acting

BIR Commissioner Ruben
Ancheta et al
Equal Protection
Sison assails the validity of BP 135 w/c further amended Sec 21 of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977. The law provides that thered be a higher tax impost against
income derived from professional income as opposed to regular income earners. Sison, as
a professional businessman, and as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, he would be
unduly discriminated against by the imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising
from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed upon fixed income or
salaried individual taxpayers. He characterizes the above section as arbitrary amounting to
class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character. There is a transgression of both
the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as of the rule
requiring uniformity in taxation.
ISSUE: Whether the imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from
business or profession than on compensation is constitutionally infirm.
HELD: The SC ruled against Sison. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be
availed of to assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of
public funds. Taxes, being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain
availability is of the essence. According to the Constitution: The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. However, the rule of uniformity does not call for perfect uniformity or
perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable. Equality and uniformity in taxation means
that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same
rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation. Where the differentiation complained of conforms to the practical
dictates of justice and equity it is not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and
is therefore uniform. There is quite a similarity then to the standard of equal protection for

all that is required is that the tax applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations
placed in similar situation.
What misled Sison is his failure to take into consideration the distinction between a tax rate
and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by
eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate.
Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. In the case of the gross income
taxation embodied in BP 135, the discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of
the income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all
taxpayers within the class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them.
Taxpayers who are recipients of compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is
practically no overhead expense, these taxpayers are not entitled to make deductions for
income tax purposes because they are in the same situation more or less. On the other
hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and businessmen, there is
no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would not be
just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and
indiscriminately impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There
is ample justification then for the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income
taxation to compensation income, while continuing the system of net income taxation as
regards professional and business income.

Citizens
Surety
&
Insurance Co., Inc. vs Judge
Ricardo Puno, Register of
Deeds Manila
Equal Protection Purchase of Land Barrio Obrero
In 1956, Resolution 542 was passed by the Register of Deeds Manila which provided that
only Filipino laborers whose wages do not exceed P180.00/month or P6.00/day and at the
same time residents of Manila may be allowed to purchase lands in Barrio Obrero, Tondo,
Manila. On 10 Oct 1966, Maria Barcelon mortgaged her 180 sq. m. land located in Barrio
Obrero to CSICI. CSICI foreclosed the property due to nonpayment and later bought the
land. CSICI later sought to register and consolidate the land before the Register of Deeds
but then Justice Puno denied the request pursuant to Resn 542 as CSICI does not meet
the qualification. CSICI averred that Resn 542 is null and void. It averred: As may be seen
from Sec 4 of Resn 542, only laborers earning not more than P180.00 a month, or P5.00 a
day are qualified to buy Lands in Barrio Obrero. Employees working in offices or
establishments and earning as much but who are not laborers cannot buy lands in that
area. Also persons who are engaged in some calling or occupation earning as much are not
also qualified. It should not be overlooked that the intention of the pertinent provisions of the
Charter of the City of Manila contained in Sections 97, 98 and 100 of said Charter is to help
the poor people of Manila to acquire residential lands on easy terms. CSICI points out that
there is no substantial difference between these laborers to those mentioned in the
Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution 542 violates equal protection.
HELD: The SC ruled against CSICI. CSICI, which is a corporation and not a lowly paid
worker, is not competent to raise this claim. For even if the SC sustain it, no benefit can
accrue to CSICI who will nonetheless be disqualified to acquire the lot. Moreover, in the
absence of manifest abuse of power, the SC not vent to substitute their judgment for that of

the City of Manila which is tasked by its Charter to acquire private lands in the city and to
subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to residents, giving first priority to
the bona-fide tenants or occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and lowsalaried employees. Obviously, the questioned resolution merely seeks to implement the
Charter provision.

Peralta et al vs Commission
on Elections et al
Equal Protection 1978 Election Code Block Voting
Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa
Elections. He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978
Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code,
grants the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper
spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the
candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided
for in the ballot the name of the political party, group or aggrupation (office-block ballot).
Peralta was vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of this
provision of the Constitution: Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from
any form of harassment and discrimination. He sought the shelter of its protection for
himself and other independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to
suffer if the assailed provision is not nullified. Essentially, in terms of individual rights, he
would raise a due process and equal protection question. The main objection of Peralta
against the optional straight party voting provided for in the Code is that an independent
candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name
of a political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an
advantage which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that
the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the laws, as
provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection.

HELD: The SC ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his
ballot, the voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will
receive more than one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party
group or aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by
party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In
the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to
join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before
filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law
accruing to candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such
alleged advantages as an official candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a
political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice is his. In making his decision,
it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the relative
advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule
depends on his voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim
that he was the victim of discrimination.

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City [G.R.

No. 23794 February 17, 1968]
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any and
all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City
a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign
countries. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte a
complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor
alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the
constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal
protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?
Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to present conditions, but also to
future conditions substantially identical to those present; and 4) the classification applies
only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and
exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing ordinance should
not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central for
the coverage of the tax.

ROQUE FLORES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , NOBELITO

RAPISORA, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the
highest number of votes for kagawad in the elections held on 28 March 1989, in Barangay
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay in accordance with Section 5
of Rep. Act No. 6679, providing in part as follows
Sec. 5. There shall be a sangguniang barangay in every duly constituted barangay which
shall be the legislative body and shall be composed of seven (7) kagawads to be elected by
the registered voters of the barangay. The candidate who obtains the highest number of
votes shall be the punong barangay . . . .
However, his election was protested by Nobelito Rapisora, herein private respondent, who
placed second in the election with 463 votes, or one vote less than the petitioner. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, sustained Rapisora and installed him as
punong barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the
latter's total. 1
Flores appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Abra, which affirmed the challenged decision
in toto. Judge Francisco O. Villarta, Jr. agreed that the four votes cast for "Flores" only,
without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid
instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another
candidate for kagawad. The judge held that the original total credited to the petitioner was
correctly reduced by 2, to 462, demoting him to second place. 2
The petitioner then went to the Commission on Elections, but his appeal was dismissed on
the ground that the public respondent had no power to review the decision of the regional
trial court. This ruling, embodied in its resolution dated 3 August 1989, 3 was presumably
based on Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, which was quoted therein in full as follows:
Sec. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be filed with the
proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate
of candidacy and has been voted for a barangay office within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the result of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest
within (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial
court may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved
party to the regional trial court which shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the appeal and whose decision on questions of fact shall be final and nonappealable. For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed.

In this petition for certiorari, the Commission on Elections is faulted for not taking
cognizance of the petitioner's appeal and for not ruling that all the four questioned votes
should have been credited to him under the equity of the incumbent rule in Section 211(2) of
the Omnibus Election Code.
The Commission on Elections was obviously of the opinion that it could not entertain the
petitioner's appeal because of the provision in Rep. Act No. 6679 that the decision of the
regional trial court in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay
elections "on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable."
While supporting the dismissal of the appeal, the Solicitor General justifies this action on an
entirely different and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution, providing that the Commission on Elections shall:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
His submission is that municipal or metropolitan courts being courts of limited jurisdiction,
their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the
decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, should have been
appealed directly to the Commission on Elections and not to the Regional Trial Court of
Abra.
It is recalled that in the case of Luison v. Garcia, 4 respondent Garcia's certificate of
candidacy was declared invalid by the Commission on Elections for non-compliance with
the statutory requirements. What he did was appeal to the court of first instance, which held
that the certificate was merely defective but not altogether null and void. Garcia continued
his candidacy on the strength of this ruling and was subsequently proclaimed elected,
thereafter assuming office as municipal mayor.

In sustaining the quo warranto petition filed against him by Luison, this Court declared that
all the votes cast for Garcia should have been rejected as stray because he did not have a
valid certificate of candidacy. The action of the Commission on Elections should have been
appealed not to the court of first instance but to the Supreme Court as required by the 1935
Constitution. Since this was not done, the resolution of the Commission on Elections

rejecting Garcia's certificate remained valid on the date of the election and rendered all
votes cast for him as stray.
The doctrine in that case, although laid down under the 1935 Constitution, is still controlling
under the present charter as the interpretation by this Court of Article IX-C, Section 2(2).
Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the
municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the
regional trial court, must be declared unconstitutional.
We make this declaration even if the law has not been squarely and properly challenged by
the petitioner.1wphi1 Ordinarily, the Court requires compliance with the requisites of a
judicial inquiry into a constitutional question. 5 In the case at bar, however, we feel there is
no point in waiting to resolve the issue now already before us until it is raised anew,
probably only in the next barangay elections. The time to resolve it is now, before such
elections. We shall therefore disregard the technical obstacles in the case at bar so that the
flaw in Rep. Act No. 6679 may be brought to the attention of Congress and the
constitutional defect in Section 9 may be corrected.
In taking this step, the Court does not disregard the fact that the petitioner was only acting
in accordance with the said law when he appealed the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tayum to the Regional Trial Court of Abra. That is what the statute specifically
directed in its Section 9 which, at the time the appeal was made, was considered
constitutional. The petitioner had a light to rely on its presumed validity as everyone
apparently did. Even the Congress and the Executive were satisfied that the measure was
constitutional when they separately approved it after careful study. Indeed, no challenge to
its validity had been lodged or even hinted not even by the public respondent as to
suggest to the petitioner that he was following the wrong procedure. In fairness to him
therefore, we shall consider his appeal to the Commission on Elections as having been
made directly from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, disregarding the detour
to the Regional Trial Court.

Accordingly, we hold that the petitioner's appeal was validly made to the Commission on
Elections under its "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests. . . involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." Its decision was in turn also
properly elevated to us pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution, stating that
"unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution that "decisions, final
orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable" applies only to questions of
fact and not of law. That provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its
authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by
the Constitution. 6 We eschew a literal reading of that provision that would contradict such
authority.
The issue the petitioner was raising was one of law, viz., whether he was entitled to the
benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule, and so subject to our review. This issue was
not resolved by the public respondent because it apparently believed itself to be without
appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Abra. Considering that
the public respondent has already manifested its position on this issue, as will appear
presently, the Court will now rule upon it directly instead of adopting the round-about way of
remanding the case to the Commission on Elections before its decision is elevated to this
Court.
Implementing Rep. Act No. 6679, the Commission on Elections promulgated Resolution No.
2022-A providing in Section 16(3) thereof that:
Incumbent Barangay Captains, whether elected, appointed or designated shall be deemed
resigned as such upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy for the office of "Kagawad,"
which is another office, for the March 28, 1989 barangay election.
This was the reason why the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, held that the four
questioned votes cast for Flores could not be credited to either Roque Flores or Anastacio
Flores and should have been regarded as stray under Section 211(1) 7 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Rejecting the petitioner's claim, the court held that Roque Flores was not
entitled to any of the four contested votes because he was not incumbent as punong
barangay (or barangay captain, as the office was formerly called) on the date of the
election.

The petitioner insists on the application to him of Section 211(2) of the Code, stating
pertinently that:
2. . . . If there are two or more candidates with the same full name, first name or surname
and one of them is the incumbent, and on the ballot is written only such full name, first
name or surname, the vote shall be counted in favor of the incumbent.because he should
not have been considered resigned but continued to be entitled to the office of punong
barangay under Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 6679, providing as follows:

Sec. 8. Incumbent elective officials running for the same office shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of then, certificates of candidacy. They shall continue to hold office
until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.
The petitioner contends that the afore-quoted administrative regulation is inofficious
because the forfeiture prescribed is not authorized by the statute itself and beyond the
intentions of the legislature. Moreover, the enforcement of the rule would lead to
discrimination against the punong barangay and in favor of the other kagawads, who, unlike
him, could remain in office while running for re-election and, additionally, benefit from the
equity-of-the-incumbent rule.
Alternatively, the petitioner argues that, assuming the regulation to be valid he was
nonetheless basically also a kagawad as he was a member of the sangguniang barangay
like the other six councilmen elected with him in 1982. In fact, Section 5 of the Rep. Act No.
6679 also speaks of seven kagawads, the foremost of whom shall again be the punong
barangay. He concludes that he should thus be regarded as running for the same office
and therefore not considered resigned when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
kagawad.
The Court does not agree.
It seems to us that the challenged resolution quite clearly expresses the mandate of the
above-quoted Section 8 that all incumbent elected officials should not be considered
resigned upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy as long as they were running for
the same position. The purpose of the resolution was merely to implement this intention,
which was clearly applicable not only to the ordinary members of the sangguniang barangay
but also to the punong barangay.
As for the questioned authority, this is found in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which empowers the public respondent to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing
the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer. . . ."

The justification given by the resolution is that the position of punong barangay is different
from that of kagawad as in fact it is. There should be no question that the punong
barangay is an essentially executive officer, as the enumeration of his functions in Section
88 of the Local Government Code will readily show, unlike the kagawad, who is vested with
mainly legislative functions (although he does assist the punong barangay in the
administration of the barangay). Under Rep. Act No. 6679, the person who wins the highest
number of votes as a kagawad becomes by operation of law the punong barangay, or the
executive of the political unit. In the particular case of the petitioner, it should be noted that

he was in fact not even elected in 1982 as one of the six councilmen but separately as the
barangay captain. He was thus correctly deemed resigned upon his filing of a certificate of
candidacy for kagawad in 1989, as this was not the position he was holding, or was
incumbent in, at the time he filed such certificate.
It is worth stressing that under the original procedure followed in the 1982 barangay
elections, the petitioner was elected barangay captain directly by the voters, separately from
the candidates running for mere membership in the sangguniang barangay. The offices of
the barangay captain and councilmen were both open to the candidates, but they could run
only for one or the other position and not simultaneously for both. By contrast, the candidate
under the present law may aspire for both offices, but can run only for one, to wit, that of
kagawad. While campaigning for this position, he may hope and actually strive to win the
highest number of votes as this would automatically make him the punong barangay. In this
sense, it may be said that he is a candidate for both offices. Strictly speaking, however, the
only office for which he may run and for which a certificate of candidacy may be admitted
is that of kagawad.
It follows that the petitioner cannot insist that he was running not for kagawad only but
ultimately also for punong barangay in the 28 March 1989 election. In fact, his certificate of
candidacy was for kagawad and not for punong barangay. As the basic position being
disputed in the barangay election was that of kagawad, that of punong barangay being
conferred only by operation of law on the candidate placing first, the petitioner had to forfeit
his position of punong barangay, which he was holding when he presented his candidacy
for kagawad. Consequently, he cannot be credited with the four contested votes for Flores
on the erroneous ground that he was still incumbent as punong barangay on the day of the
election.

The petitioner argues that he could not have run for reelection as punong barangay
because the office was no longer subject to separate or even direct election by the voters.
That may be so, but this argument goes to the wisdom of the law, not its validity, and is
better addressed to the legislature. From the strictly legal viewpoint, the statute does not
offend the equal protection clause, as there are, to repeat, substantial distinctions between
the offices of punong barangay and kagawad. Precisely , the reason for divesting the
punong barangay of his position was to place him on the same footing as the other
candidates by removing the advantages he would enjoy if he were to continue as punong
barangay while running for kagawad.
In sum, we hold that Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 is constitutionally defective and must
be struck down, but the challenged resolution must be sustained as a reasonable and valid
implementation of the said statute. The petitioner was no longer the incumbent punong

barangay on election day and so was not entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-theincumbent rule. The consequence is that the four votes claimed by him were correctly
considered stray, making the private respondent the punong barangay of Poblacion, Tayum,
Abra, for having received the highest number of votes for kagawad.
It remains to stress that although the elections involved herein pertain to the lowest level of
our political organization, this fact has not deterred the highest tribunal from taking
cognizance of this case and discussing it at length in this opinion. This only goes to show
that as long as a constitutional issue is at stake, even the barangay and its officers, for all
their humility in the political hierarchy, deserve and will get the full attention of this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it provides
that barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be
appealable to the regional trial court;
2. Declaring valid Section 16(3) of Com. Res. No. 2022-A dated January 5, 1989; and
3. Declaring private respondent Nobelito Rapisora the duly elected punong barangay of
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.