CHAPTER SIX

DOING CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

WITH THE CONTEMPORARY THEORY
OF METAPHOR: TOWARDS A DISCOURSE MODEL
OF METAPHOR
ZOUHAIR MAALEJ

1. Introduction
In the dominant Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) models, emphasis on
ideology, power, and language (Fairclough 1989; van Dijk 1998; Wodak 2001)
has overridden concern with the conceptual structures that are behind discourse,
even though such structures have started to be investigated across discourses
(Charteris-Black 2004; Hamilton 2003; Nerlich and Dingwall 2003; Van
Teeffelen 1994; White and Herrera 2003; Wolf and Polzenhagen 2003). Overall,
critical discourse analysts addressed local issues in discourse such as lexis,
syntax, modality, etc. but global features such as analogy and metaphor have so
far received a short shrift (Wilson 1990; Chilton 2004). One important critical
development for discourse pragmatics has been initiated by Charteris-Black
(2004), which is known as critical metaphor analysisa version of CDA
drawing on the insights of CDA, pragmatics, and the Contemporary Theory of
Metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
This chapter offers a version of CDA totally reliant on Lakoff and Johnsons
(1980) theory. To establish that conceptual metaphor (and its components) does
function critically, the chapter addresses the following points: (i) the
pervasiveness of metaphor in various discourse types (Wilson 1990; Maalej
1990; Charteris-Black 2004); (ii) the analytical apparatus that conceptual
metaphor offers to the critic (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999); (iii) a distinction

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made in the cognitive paradigm between processing metaphor and

metaphoric processing (Gibbs 1999); and (iv) the role of metaphor as offering
a mental/conceptual framing by categorizing the target domain metaphorically.
It is customary within CDA to isolate three major tendencies usually
identified with three major CDA figures: the discourse-historical approach,
championed by Wodak (2001) and committed to a socio-philosophical critique
of public discourses; the socio-cognitive approach, defended by van Dijk (1998,
2001), and biased toward a cognitive view of discourse; and the socio-semiotic
approach, offered by Fairclough (1989, 1992, 1995, 2003) and biased toward a
deep Hallidayan linguistic study of discourse. There is a fourth emergent
tendency that I tentatively call the socio-literary approach, represented by Gee
(2004) and combining American linguistics, literary criticism, and
sociolinguistics. Whatever their persuasion, these tendencies seem to agree on a
common platform that includes the need to analyze discourse critically.
What, however, can be noted about these trends is that when a student or a
researcher adopts one of them as a framework it may offer a partial account of
discourse. For instance, Fairclough directs his apparatus and its linguistic
arsenal mainly to the way language encodes power relations in discourse. On the
other hand, van Dijks approach, although van Dijk (2001) refuses to be
pigeonholed and calls for a multidisciplinary model of CDA, is also geared
towards ideology. Wodak (2001) is turned towards more history in her criticism
of social structures. What the present cognitive-pragmatic discourse model of
metaphor seeks to do is let the mind interact with concepts, discourse, and the
socio-cultural context in which they both occur.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 addresses the critical
assets of the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, which are captured as its
pervasiveness, its cognitive unconscious nature, its psychological reality, and its
process-product nature. Section 2 spells out the descriptive dimension of the
model, highlighting specifically the concept of framing in cognitive semantics
and analogical and non-analogical mappings. Section 3 deals with the
interpretive dimension of the model, namely, spelling out the components of the
mapping and going ahead with making the necessary inferences about it. The
last section addresses the explanation step in the model - a cognitive-pragmatic
view of the evaluativeness and persuasiveness of metaphor in the socio-cultural
context.

2. Critical assets of the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor

To propose a discourse model of metaphor (Charteris-Black 2004: 243) based
exclusively on the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor (henceforth CTM) is to
be able to argue convincingly that the latter involves theoretical features that

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enable it to work discourse critically. Some of these will include its very
pervasiveness in language, thought, and action, its psychological reality, its
product-process nature, and its cognitive unconscious nature.

2.1 Pervasiveness
One of the most important characteristics of metaphor is its ubiquity not only in
language but also in thought (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999). It is also
pervasive in discourses as vital to our life as politics (Wilson 1990; Lakoff
1991; Maalej 1990), economics (McCloskey 1985; Henderson 1986; Maalej
1990), advertising (Tanaka 1994; Forceville 1996; Maalej 2001, 2003,
forthcoming), religion (Tracy 1979; Maalej and Triki forthcoming), literature
(Turner 1991, 1996; Steen 1994; Stockwell 2002), emotions (Lakoff and
Kvecses 1987; Kvecses 2000; Maalej 2004, forthcoming), time (Lakoff 1987;
Lakoff and Johnson 1999), morality (Johnson 1993), and the conceptualization
of other mundane concepts known as event-structure metaphor such as
purposes, states, actions, changes, and difficulties (Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and
Johnson 1999; Kvecses 2005). Apart from being pervasive in language,
thought, and discourse, metaphor is also pervasive in popular idioms and
proverbs (Gibbs 1994; Turner 2000).
This pervasiveness is further corroborated by insights from cognitive
science. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 57-8) found that very few concepts are
semantically autonomous in the sense that they do not need metaphor for their
conceptualization. Such concepts include SPACES, OBJECTS, SUBSTANCES,
and CONTAINERS. Further, Lakoff and Turner (1989: 112) point out that even
concepts such as SPACES, OBJECTS, SUBSTANCES, and CONTAINERS,
which are held to be semantically autonomous, can be understood partly
metaphorically. Thus, sense is made of semantically non-autonomous concepts,
which constitute a majority of concepts in our life, via concepts that are
semantically autonomous through conceptual metaphoric mappings (Lakoff and
Turner 1989: 113). Since it is the case that metaphor is so pervasive in language,
thought, and discourse, it can be used as an intentional and/or unintentional
critical tool, especially knowing its cognitive unconscious status.

2.2 Cognitive unconscious

Cognitive scientists assume that consciousness or conscious thought only
accounts for a small portion of general thought. Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 103)
argue that the cognitive unconscious is posited in order to explain conscious
experience and behavior that cannot be directly understood on its own terms.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 103) characterize the cognitive unconscious as the

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massive portion of the iceberg that lies below the surface, below the visible tip
that is consciousness, with the visible tip of conscious thought only accounting
for five percent of thought. It is the totality of those theoretical cognitive
mechanisms above the neural level that we have sufficient evidence for, but that
we do not have conscious access to (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 112).
Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 10) explain that:
most of our thought is unconscious, not in the Freudian sense of being repressed,
but in the sense that it operates beneath the level of cognitive awareness,
inaccessible to consciousness and operating too quickly to be focused on.

In contradistinction to the psychoanalytical conception of consciousness, Varela

et al. (1991: 48) note that cognitivism postulates mental processes of which we
are not only unaware but of which we cannot be aware. The deep reason for
this conscious awareness is due to the fact that if such cognitive processes
could be made conscious, then they could not be fast and automatic and so could
not function properly, which explains why cognitivism postulates processes
that are mental but that cannot be brought to consciousness at all (Varela et al.
1991: 49). Corroborating the unconscious nature of cognitive processes, Eich et
al. (2000: 31) explain that the cognitive unconscious has its roots in
automaticity, i.e.:
the notion that some cognitive and motoric skills, once executed deliberately,
may become automatized through extensive practice, after which we have no
direct introspective access to these procedures or their operations.

Carlson (1997: 292-3) offers experimental evidence for the cognitive

unconscious as represented by three phenomena, namely, unconscious
perception, implicit learning, and implicit memory. Claims for unconscious
perception are accounted for when environmental events that are not
consciously experienced are found to interfere with cognitive processes. Claims
for implicit learning have to do with our capacity to learn complex, rulegoverned materials without so much being able to report on the rules learned.
Claims for implicit memory are based on the fact that prior experience does
influence current performance even in the absence of the intention to remember.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 113) note in connection with consciousness and
the cognitive unconscious that: (i) The 95 percent below the surface of
conscious awareness (i.e. the cognitive unconscious) shapes and structures all
conscious thought; (ii) The cognitive unconscious is vast and intricately
structured. It includes not only all our automatic cognitive operations, but also
all our implicit knowledge. All of our knowledge and beliefs are framed in
terms of a conceptual system that resides mostly in the cognitive unconscious,

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(iii) The cognitive unconscious shapes how we automatically and unconsciously

comprehend what we experience. It constitutes our unreflective common sense.
Thus, the cognitive unconscious would be responsible for unconscious thought,
with the possible consequence that conceptual metaphor evades the full control
of our consciousness.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 115-17) argue that the cognitive unconscious is
efficacious, i.e.:
the theoretically postulated cognitive mechanisms that compose it do real
cognitive work, that they play a central role in conceptualization and reasoning
and therefore are intentional, representational, and truth characterizing.

For instance, semantic frames like restaurants, besides being intentional and
representational, are propositional, in that the frame characterizes the
structured background knowledge relative to which concepts like restaurants,
waiters, maitre ds, and checks make sense. In this sense, frames in the
cognitive unconscious definitely contribute to the semantic content and words
and to the meanings of sentences. Even if the frame is not explicitly mentioned,
it functions as an inference generating background.
If our thought is predominantly metaphoric as Lakoff and Johnson (1980,
1999) claimed, and if most of our thinking is unconscious, therefore conceptual
metaphor is itself part of this unconscious system that governs our
consciousness. Critically, this is important, because some conventional
conceptual metaphors may evade the control of consciousness, and may be
capitalized upon in passing on important ideas and judgment into a target
domain. This will be all the more important if conceptual metaphor could be
argued to be psychologically real.

2.3 Psychological reality

It might be objected that basing a critical view of discourse on conceptual
metaphor begs the question of the very controversial nature of conceptual
metaphor. The psychological reality of conceptual metaphor is provided mainly
by Gibbs and co-workers about idioms and proverbs. Gibbs et al. (1997: 150)
concluded from three experiments on the comprehension of idioms and
conceptual metaphor that metaphoric thought may, under many circumstances
have some role in peoples immediate understanding of at least some kinds of
idioms in everyday language. Gibbs (1995: 107) invokes mental images for
idioms, and argues that these mental imagery studies support the idea that the
figurative meanings of idioms are partly motivated by various conceptual
metaphors that exist independently as part of our conceptual system. On the
other hand, Gibbs and Beitel (1995: 136) show how the figurative meanings of

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many proverbial expressions are partly motivated by conceptual metaphors.

Thus, if it is not the case that all idioms and proverbs are motivated by
conceptual metaphors, conceptual metaphors are psychologically real for some
idioms and proverbs.
The nature and functioning of conceptual metaphor in this chapter begs to
differ from the standard view of metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 6) argue
that metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there
are metaphors in a persons conceptual system. Since the model proposed here
intends to work with various kinds of discourses, including the everyday, the
literary, the promotional, the scientific, etc., the view of conceptual metaphor
offered by Lakoff and Johnson seems too determinative vis--vis the linguistic
metaphors that it is said to govern. Indeed, the conceptual metaphor governing
one type of discourse may not be found in a persons conceptual system. I will
argue that in its varied manifestations, discourse may guide us to old and new
conceptual metaphors. Linguistic metaphors that trigger old conceptual
metaphors are of the conventional kind, and do not require a lot of cognitive
processing, hence probably where the cognitive unconscious nature of
conceptual metaphor comes in. However, linguistic metaphors that do not
trigger old conceptual metaphors are more linguistically creative, which requires
more cognitive attention in processing them metaphorically. If a new conceptual
metaphor enters the conceptual system, it will alter that conceptual system and
the perceptions and actions that the system gives rise to (Lakoff and Johnson
1980: 145).

2.4 Product-process nature

What is typical of the CTM is that it is conceptual in the sense that it may not
have representative linguistic metaphors in discourse in the classical sense, i.e.
one showing syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic violation or anomaly. Lakoff and
Johnson (1980: 5) tell us that this is because the metaphors that we may be
looking for turn out to be very often literal ones. To resolve this apparent
dilemma, Gibbs (1999: 40) makes a useful distinction between processing
metaphor and metaphoric processing.
Processing metaphor has to do with the cognitive, inferential system that
discourse readers unconsciously implement to work out what conceptual
metaphors entail for the target domain. Processing metaphor in this sense
presupposes that linguistic metaphors are on the surface of discourse, ready to
be linked to a conceptual frame. This will be exemplified in this chapter through
the Hashimoto discourse later on.
In metaphoric processing, however:

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the processing that occurs is metaphoric, even though there is no special
linguistic or textual material that is either metaphoric or motivated by metaphoric
modes of thought. In this way, metaphor might legitimately be viewed as one
type of cognitive strategy that colours peoples imaginative understanding of
texts and real world situations. (Gibbs 1999: 41)

Gibbs mentions childrens fairy tales, which can admit metaphoric analysis
relating internal characters in the story to external characters. In this chapter,
metaphoric processing will be exemplified through the Hashimoto discourse
later on.
Gibbs (1999: 41) believes that the distinction between processing
metaphoric language and metaphoric processing should turn out crucially
important for the poetics of cognition:
In any event, we must be careful to distinguish metaphoric processing from
processing metaphoric language and turn some of our attention to what
metaphoric processing strategies reveal about the ordinary poetic character of
human cognition. I believe that the study of metaphoric processing is one of the
important challenges for the future in terms of how metaphor is applied in
ordinary, literary and scientific contexts.

The metaphoric processing of some types of discourse in this chapter should be

able to show how the mind functions metaphorically, i.e. how it performs
metaphoric thought, rather than how it processes metaphor.
The current proposals are a tentative elaboration of Charteris-Blacks (2004:
243) discourse model of metaphor. Steen (2004: 1298) argues for threefold
dimension of language and metaphor:
All language, including metaphorical language, may therefore be argued to
perform simultaneous linguistic, conceptual, and communicative functions in
discourse. The linguistic function is to express meanings by means of words,
clauses, and clause complexes; the conceptual function is to put forth ideas by
means of concepts and propositions that are related to each other; and the
communicative function is to convey utterances with an illocutionary force and
bits of given and new information.

Since a prominent version of CDA structures its proposals around three rubrics
(Fairclough 1989), I will use the same structuring to show how the CTM can
accommodate critical, discursive, and analytical claims.
In the following three sections, to show how the critical assets of metaphor
work in discourse, they will be studied under description, interpretation, and
explanation.

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3. Description
Describing something presupposes that we can identify our object of
description. Most non-cognitive theories of metaphor seem to agree on one
identification principle, which is the fact that essentially metaphor goes awry
either syntactically, semantically, or pragmatically. To counter this criterion of
deviance, the founding fathers of the CTM have taken identification for granted
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987; Lakoff and
Turner 1989; Sweetser 1990; Gibbs 1994). There have been, however, recent
attempts to remedy this gap by a Special Interest Group on Metaphor
(PALASIGMET) of the Poetics And Linguistics Association (PALA).
Crisp (2002: 11), for one, proposes to capture metaphor identification in
propositional terms as an intermediate level between the linguistic and the
conceptual levels. Although Crisp allows for this intermediate level, in practice
he does not spell out how this propositional cognitive-sensitive metaphor
identification takes place. Crisp et al. (2002) ended up, with the help of
propositional analysis, classifying metaphor into single, compound, complex,
extended, and mixed. Working within the same framework, Steen (1999: 61)
introduces metaphor focus identification since metaphors can be either
implicit or explicit. Steen (1999) offers a five-step procedure to smooth the
passage from linguistic to conceptual metaphor, namely, metaphor focus
identification, metaphorical idea identification, nonliteral comparison
identification, nonliteral analogy identification, and nonliteral mapping
identification. Though too complex, detailed, and cumbersome to write in and
apply to each metaphor and in each metaphor analysis, such a procedure is
rewarding, especially when we realize that not all metaphors are of the form A
IS B, or that their components are not fully spelled out in surface structure
(Steen 2002: 25). Working within the same project but from a different
perspective, Heywood et al. (2002) do not, like Crisp and Steen, unpack
metaphor from its underlying propositions; instead, they use formal semantic
criteria (such as concrete and abstract) to delimit the boundaries between source
and target domains.
But Steen remains the most realistic about the import of metaphor
recognition. He argues that reader goal, reader characteristics, and metaphor
properties are factors that may enhance or impede metaphor recognition (2004:
1297). For instance, reading literature may enhance the level of recognition in
literary-minded readers, who would recognize more metaphors than if they read
journalism. More attention is assigned to positive metaphors in literature and
negative metaphors in journalism. Steen (2004: 1310) tested empirically the
recognizability of linguistic metaphors along two pairs of factors: implicitnessexplicitness and verbal-nominal, and found that students favored the nominal

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and implicit metaphors, not the verbal and explicit ones. Charteris-Black
(2004: 35) takes the identification of metaphors to be about checking whether
they exist in the first place in a text, and whether they show a tension between
a literal source domain and a metaphoric target domain. On the other extreme,
Gibbs (1992: 577) tells us that:
people often comprehend and interpret metaphors without having to recognize,
either consciously and unconsciously, that an expression is of a certain type (e.g.
that it is a metaphor, as opposed to a literal statement). Similarly, people may
comprehend or even recognize a metaphor without making any assessment of its
aptness (i.e. its appreciation).

3.1 Finding a frame

The description part of this discourse model of metaphor consists in finding a
sizeable amount of linguistic metaphors that would either be explicitly spelt out
or implicitly evoking a corresponding metaphoric concept. Usually, linguistic
metaphors unfurl gradually in discourse, clustering around a concept and
constructing conceptually an ad hoc metaphoric category (Shen 1992) or a
frame (Fillmore 1975: 1982). Fillmore (1975: 129) argues that metaphoring
can be seen as the act of applying to one scene a frame which is known to be
more basically associated with a different scene. Discussing the way people
analyze discourse, Fillmore (1975: 125) argues that:
One way of talking about it is this: the first part of a text creates or activates a
kind of schematic or outline scene, with many positions left blank, so to speak;
later parts of the text fill in the blanks (or some of them, anyway), introduce new
scenes, combine scenes through links of history or causation, or reasoning, and
so on. In other words, a person, in interpreting a text, mentally creates a partially
specified world; as he continues with the text, the details of this world get filled
in; and in the process, expectations get set up which later on are fulfilled or
thwarted, and so on.

Thus, finding linguistic metaphors is an exercise that needs patience and

attention during the reading process; one might not find what one wants from
the first reading of a given discourse, but a third reading may reveal what first
and second readings did not.

3.2 Analogical vs. non-analogical metaphors

Metaphor as a cross-domain mapping (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999) and
metaphor as structuremapping (Gentner 1982, 1983, 1988; Gentner et al. 2001)

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seem to be mutually exclusive. Gentners structure-mapping is of the analogical

kind while Lakoff and Johnsons is a non-analogical frame. Gentner (1982:
108), for instance, takes metaphor to be an analogy, arguing that we can
proceed with the characterisation of a metaphor or analogy as a structuremapping between a known domain (the base domain) and a domain of inquiry
(the target domain). For Gentner (1983: 156), the central idea is that an
analogy is an assertion that a relational structure that normally applies in one
domain can be applied in another domain. What gets applied from base to
target should constitute a mappable system of mutually interconnecting
relationships (Gentner 1983: 163) rather than single attributes or objects. Thus,
what seems to emerge from this structure-mapping theory of metaphor is that
metaphor is analogical, where in interpreting an analogy, people seek to put the
objects of the base in a one-to-one correspondence with the objects of the target
so as to obtain maximum structural match (Gentner 1988: 48).
Lakoff and Johnsons cross-domain mapping started as Gentners structuremapping, whereby metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology
(this is, the image-schema structure of the source domain) (Lakoff 1990, 54).
This has been known as the Invariance Hypothesis (henceforth, IH). Lakoff
(1993: 215) explains that what the Invariance Principle does is guarantee that,
for container-schemas, interiors will be mapped onto interiors, exteriors onto
exteriors, and boundaries onto boundaries; for path-schemas, sources will be
mapped onto sources, goals onto goals, trajectories onto trajectories, and so on.
Turner (1990: 248) notes that there are two conditions for the IH to obtain: (i)
there should be a one-to-one correspondence in the mapping between features of
the source and those of the target domains, and (ii) the order between the
features in the source domain must not be violated in their application to the
target domain. For instance, to take the LIFE-AS-JOURNEY metaphor, since
the traveler and the destination in the journey domain are separate, they must
remain separate in the target domain (the person in question and the
destination).
However, criticisms of the IH were many. Grady et al. (1996) and Grady
(1997) pinpoint a couple of cognitive anomalies with the IH: (i) the poverty of
the mapping, whereby most of the salient elements of our knowledge about
buildings are not found to be part of the mapping between theories and buildings
(e.g. windows, doors, walls, floors, occupants, etc.), and (ii) the lack of
experiential basis for associating buildings with theories. Lakoff and Johnson
themselves showed awareness of this problem as early as 1980. Dealing with the
conceptual metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, Lakoff and Johnson
(1980: 52) point out that mappings have a partial nature in the sense that they
give rise to used parts, leaving some other parts of the of the source domain
(SD) of building unused. The used parts are realized by the linguistic

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metaphors of building and structuring; however, THEORIES ARE

BUILDINGS does not give rise to linguistic metaphors with parts that are most
salient in the SD of buildings.
To face up to the broadness of the concept of IH, Lakoff (1993: 216) invokes
target domain overrides, which stipulate that the image schema structure
inherent in the target domain cannot be violated, and that inherent target domain
structure limits the possibilities for mappings automatically. Turner (1990:
250), in turn, points to some difficulties with the IH in cases where two features
of a source domain get mapped onto one target-domain feature, thus destroying
its unity, and proposes a weaker version of the IH as follows:
In metaphoric mapping, for those components of the source and target domains
determined to be involved in the mapping, preserve the image-schematic
structure of the target, and import as much image-schematic structure from the
source as is consistent with that preservation. (Turner 1990: 254)

Gentners structure-mapping and Lakoff and Johnsons conceptions of metaphor

are not as mutually exclusive as we might think. Both of them have a discursive
reality. Structure-mapping purports a total correspondence between components
of the base domain and the target domain in case a metaphor is analogy-based
while cross-domain mapping rectifies the situation by stipulating that it is the
topology of the TD that constrains the mapping, implying that not all
components of the SD get mapped onto the TD. Structure-mapping of analogybased metaphors requires mostly metaphoric processing while domain-mapping
based metaphors require processing the metaphors in question. As will be seen
later on, these two views turn out to be useful for manifestations of metaphor in
discourse.
The following discourse is an extended metaphoric discourse (Gentner et
al. 2001: 203), showing a pattern of metaphoric processing and processing
metaphor:
Fallujah: Americas Guernica (by Hector Carreon)
Los Angeles, Alta California, November 10, 2004 - (ACN - La Voz de
Aztlan). On April 26, 1937, the Nazi Luftwaffe dropped 100,000 pounds of
bombs on the peaceful Basque village of Guernica, Spain on the urging of the
Fascist Generalisimo Francisco Franco. At the end of the day, Guernica was in
total ruins and 1,654 Basque civilians had been slaughtered and 889 wounded.
The world in those days was horrified by the deed. Generalisimo Franco initially
denied to the press that the raid ever took place. Later, when photographs of the
massacre were published, the Fascist Franco blamed the destruction of Guernica
and the killings on those who defended it.

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The brutal attack on the Basque civilians by massive and indiscriminate

bombardment was immortalized by the Spanish artist Pablo Picasso in his 1937
painting titled Guernica. The painting Guernica has now become a
worldwide symbol of the horrors of war waged by evil fascists and dictators who
place no value on human life in their pursuits of political goals and conquest of
natural resources. Thomas Gordon and Max Morgan in their book, Guernica:
The Crucible of World War II quote a survivor, The air was alive with the cries
of the wounded. I saw a man crawling down the street, dragging his broken
legs.... Pieces of people and animals were lying everywhere.... In the wreckage
there was a young woman. I could not take my eyes off her. Bones stuck through
her dress. Her head twisted right around her neck. She lay, mouth open, her
tongue hanging out. I vomited and lost consciousness.
Guernica is back. This time it is not about the Nazi Luftwaffe dropping
bombs on a village in Spain but about the USA dropping bombs and massacring
hundreds of civilians that include women and children in the town of Fallujah,
Iraq. As Franco in Guernica, the USA military is denying that it is targeting
civilians, but censored reports are filtering out of Iraq that say that over half of
the Mosques in the city lie in ruins and that US Marines are utilizing outlawed
lethal gasses against the city's defenders which are also causing massive
casualties among the civilians that remain in the city. Other reports in the Arab
media talk about hundreds of civilian casualties under the rubble of homes that
were hit by USA bombs during the initial military softening of the city.
Gruesome photographs of the dead are reminiscent of the survivor's account of
Guernica as quoted above.

The title of the discourse encourages a metaphoric processing of the title

Fallujah: Americas Guernica analogically, where the cognizers can already
determine the terms of the analogy A is to B what C is to D as Falluja is to
America what Guernica was to Germany. If the cognizers historical knowledge
about Guernica is adequate, they may be positing this mapping between Fallujah
and Guernica. If it is not the case, they are given enough background knowledge
about Guernica in the first two paragraphs, which relate a fact in the history of
Spain in the 1930s and its terrible consequences in the form of a war frame
consisting of a unique war scenario whose components are the following:

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Table 6-1: Guernica war frame
War frame

Who waged the war?

Who authorized the waging?
Target of the war
Outcome of the war
Responsibility for the war

Its filling in Guernica

Nazi Luftwaffe
Generalisimo Francisco Franco
Guernica, a Spanish town
total ruins and 1,654 Basque
civilians had been slaughtered and
889 wounded
Franco blamed the destruction of
Guernica and the killings on those
who defended it

The contents of the two paragraphs relating this historical event does not
encourage metaphoric processing. We conclude that the import of these
paragraphs does not go beyond reminding us of the involvement of the Nazis
and their Fascist allies in war atrocities and crimes for which some responsible
people have gone unpunished. However, with the third paragraph, beginning
with Guernica is back, something cognitive happens: a mapping is suggested,
inviting us to attend to it with an eye to relational similarity between two
situations remote in time and history. The mapping invites us to backtrack for
relevant components for Fallujah in the history of Guernica, which actually
consists in the specific elements of the Guernica war scenario. And the
discourse is attended to as a mapping between two situations in history, whereby
metaphoric processing is adopted where metaphors in the traditional sense do
not exist per se but acquire such a metaphoric dimension by being analyzed by
our metaphoric thought this is what Gibbs calls metaphoric processing.
Discourse, however, may come as metaphoric in the sense that it clearly spells
out on the surface the two domains of the mapping side by side, and requires
processing the metaphors that it includes. Let us consider the following
discourse:
Hashimotos bare-knuckle style; trade negotiator relishes combat
Japanese trade shotgun Ryutaro Hashimoto wears his hair dramatically
lacquered, shorter but similar to the style of sumu wrestlers and ancient samurai.
The hairstyle could reflect his love for combat. [] Lately Hashimoto has tried
verbal kendo. His target: U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, who is
demanding that Japan increase market access for U.S. autos and auto parts.
Hashimoto has assailed the idea that Japanese automakers should commit to
buying more U.S.-made parts. He accuses the U.S. of bullying Japan by
threatening sanctions against Japanese luxury cars. And he has bashed Big Three

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carmakers, saying they havent tried hard enough to get into the Japanese market.
[]
The pugnacious trade minister has been described as Japans secret weapon
in the talks. His bluntness and thirst for battle have surprised U.S. negotiators,
who are more accustomed to low-key wrangling with colorless bureaucrats. []
Compromise looks to be the last thing on Hashimotos mind. He embarrassed
the U.S. last week by convincing top European trade officials to speak out
against U.S. tactics. []
U.S. negotiators are particularly bitter about Hashimotos accusation that
they are engaging in managed trade by demanding that Japans carmakers
commit to buying a certain amount of U.S. parts. []
Hashimoto, 57, and Kantor, are both skilled political infighters.
(USA TODAY, Cox 1995, quoted in Wolf and Polzenhagen 2003: 255).

As Wolf and Polzenhagen (2003: 256) rightly suggested, this discourse has a
metaphoric structure apparent right from part of the title, trade negotiator
relishes combat, which sets side by side the TD (trade) and the SD (combat).
And unlike the Falluja discourse, it is pervaded by linguistic metaphors about
trade between Japan and the US in terms of combat, which suggests the
conceptual metaphor, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BATTLES.
To recapitulate, the act of description in the discourse model of metaphor
offered in this chapter consists in a search for a metaphoric frame or mapping.
In the Falluja discourse, the discourse made it rather implicit what this mapping
consists of. It is only when we arrive at Guernica is back that we sense that
something is being done cognitively speaking. The Hashmoto discourse,
however, offers an explicit mapping on the surface of discourse where base
domain and target domain are spelt out side by side, triggered by the title, with
the linguistic metaphors unfurling progressively in discourse, thus providing it
with metaphoric coherence. In the former case, the cognizers made use of
metaphoric processing; in the latter, processing metaphors. This distinction
between metaphor as a process and metaphor as a product does not entail that
these two modes are mutually exclusive. As will be made clear in the next
section, while these are distinct modes, they tend to function together in
discourse processing.

4. Interpretation
The interpretive act consists in two major steps: (i) spelling out the elements of
the mapping, and (ii) making the necessary inferences about the different
elements of the mapping. The first step has been captured by Lakoff (1990: 48)
as involving two types of governing correspondences: ontological and epistemic
correspondences. Ontological correspondences describe the same entities both

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146

in SD and TD. Lakoff gives the following correspondences for the love-as-ajourney metaphor in English:
The lovers correspond to travelers
The love relationship corresponds to the vehicle
The state of being in the relationship corresponds to traveling in the same vehicle
The intimacy of being in the relationship corresponds to the physical closeness of
being in the vehicle.
The lovers common goals correspond to their common destinations on the
journey.
Difficulties correspond to impediments to travel.

In short, ontological correspondences offer two parallel scenarios including the

same entities across domains. Epistemic correspondences, however, take care of
mapping knowledge about entities in the SD onto entities in the TD. Such
knowledge mapping enables us to reason about the TD as if it were the SD.
The Falluja discourse offers the following correspondences as spelt out in
discourse:
Table 6-2: Mapping before entailments
Elements of the mapping
Who waged the war?
Who authorized the
waging?

SD: Guernica
Nazi Luftwaffe
Generalisimo Francisco
Franco

TD: Falluja
US Marines

Target of the war

Outcome of the war

Guernica, a Spanish town

total ruins and 1,654
Basque civilians had been
slaughtered and 889
wounded
Franco blamed the
destruction of Guernica and
the killings on those who
defended it

Falluja
hundreds of civilian
casualties under the
rubble of homes that
were hit by USA bombs

Responsibility for the war

It should be noted that two cells in the table above remain unfilled, because
discourse is silent about them. This is, by the way, the object of the second step
of the interpretive act, which is making the necessary inferences about the
different elements of the mapping. This step consists in establishing the
necessary correspondences across the elements of the frame or mapping
between Guernica and Falluja. This is obviously done through inferences that
constitute as system of entailments. Gibbs (1994: 117) claims that:

Doing CDA with the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor

147

a rich set of entailments can be drawn from any metaphor. Some of these
entailments may be specifically intended by the speaker or author of the
metaphor. Other meanings might be unauthorized but still understood as being
reasonable.

In Gentners words, looking for entailments consists in establishing a structuremapping between Guernica and Falluja, whereby we put the objects of the base
in a one-to-one correspondence with the objects of the target so as to obtain
maximum structural match (Gentner 1988: 48). The merit of structure-mapping
is that it enables us to make a number of predictions that follow if metaphors
are processed like analogies (Gentner et al. 2001: 201). This system of
predictions will be obtained inferentially. In the worldview of the war in Falluja
offered in this discourse, we cannot help but categorize the US Marines in the
same rubric as the Nazi Luftwaffe, and by extension, their commander-in-chief
President Bush, as corresponding to Hitler; Iyad Allawi, who authorized the
Marines to bombard Falluja, stands as parallel to Fascist Generalisimo Francisco
Franco; and the same Allawi is categorized as equal to the Fascist Generalisimo
Francisco Franco in blaming the destruction of Falluja and the killings on the
people who defended it. This is not all; the elements of the mapping arrived at
can themselves afford other inferences by extension. For instance, it follows
from the inference that President Bush is a Hitler that the USA is a Nazi
country; it also follows from the inference that former Prime Minister Allawi is
a Fascist that Iraq has been turned into a Fascist country under American
colonization. Lakoff and Turner (1989: 120) refer to this system of inferences as
the inferential capacity of metaphor. These inferences are arrived at through
processing the metaphors entailments. For instance, the difference between
Table 6-1 and Table 6-2 is the outcome of the processing of metaphor in
discourse. In this sense, metaphoric processing (as a mode of thought) paves the
ground for processing metaphoric discourse (as a general inferential process) to
take place.
Table 6-3: Mapping after entailments
Elements of the mapping
Who waged the war?
Who authorized the war?
Target of the war
Outcome of the war

SD: Guernica
Nazi Luftwaffe
Generalisimo
Francisco Franco
Guernica, a Spanish
town
total ruins and 1,654
Basque civilians had
been slaughtered and
889 wounded

TD: Falluja
US Marines
Former Prime Minister Iyad
Allawi
Falluja
hundreds of civilian casualties
under the rubble of homes
that were hit by USA bombs

148
Responsibility for the war

Who is in control of who

waged the war?
Which country waged the
war?

Chapter Six
Franco blamed the
destruction of Guernica
and the killings on
those who defended it
Hitler

Allawi blamed the destruction

of Falluja and the massacres
on the combatants who
defended it
Bush

Germany

USA

It should be emphasized that the conceptual metaphor that governs the foregoing
discourse (FALLUJAH IS AMERICAS GUERNICA) is not a conventional
metaphor, i.e. one that is already part of the conceptual system of readers such
as LIFE IS A JOURNEY. What creates the mapping is the analogy constructed
between two scenarios of war distant in time and space, and yet similarly
framed as can be inferred from the juxtaposition between the two scenarios of
war in Guernica and Fallujah, where the former serves as an analogical base for
the latter.
The Hashimoto discourse is more straightforward as far as its interpretation
is concerned. Right from the title, the Japanese trade negotiator is
conceptualized as having a bare-knuckle style for combat as a way of
negotiating trade with the Americans. Unlike the Falluja discourse, the
Hashimoto discourse, right from the title to the end, frames in combat register
the Japanese negotiator, which gives a certain semantic stability to discourse in
terms of combat. His personality is conceptualized as a trade shotgun and
Japans secret weapon, whose hair is modeled on the style of sumu wrestlers
and ancient samurai. His manner of speaking is conceptualized as verbal
kendo, and his behavior is conceptualized as assailing, bullying,
threatening, etc. In brief, he is conceptualized as having a certain thirst for
battle, which should evoke a thirst for blood.
It is interesting to note that the mapping between Hashimoto and combat is
not as predictable as between Falluja and Guernica, which used the pre-defined
frame of Guernica from history to structure what happened in Falluja. The
mapping is selective in the sense that the journalist behind the Hashimoto
discourse selected from the combat frame what suited the perception that he
wanted to convey to his audience about what he imagined the Japanese trade
frame was. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 10) argue that in allowing us to focus on
one aspect of a concept , a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing
on other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor. The
belligerent dimension of trade negotiations hides the fact that both parties have
to co-operate as part of negotiating, that concessions have to be made, etc.
To recapitulate, the interpretive act of the discourse model of metaphor
proposed in this chapter is a search for the meaning of the mapping established

Doing CDA with the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor

149

in the descriptive phase. This meaning is arrived at by finding out about the
ontological and epistemic correspondences (Lakoff 1990) between base and
target domains. If discourse is of the Falluja-type, the meaning of the mapping
will often follow a one-to-one correspondence between elements in the base and
those in the target arrived at inferentially. Sometimes, the inferences arrived at
will constitute a basis for other inferences, hence the collaboration between
metaphoric processing as a mode of thought and processing metaphor as a
general capacity for inferencing. If, however, the discourse is of the Hashimototype, the mapping will be more constrained by the TD topology or internal
structure as predicted by Lakoffs (1993) target domain overrides.

5. Explanation
Logically, a discourse model of metaphor will not dispense with metaphors
pragmatic dimension. Although the CTM has a conceptual bias, it still accords
due importance to this function. Explanation is captured through two pragmatic
functions of metaphor, namely, evaluation and persuasion, which relate the
conceptual, individual part of the mind to its shared, social one - or
social/cultural cognition (D'Andrade 1981).

5.1 Evaluative dimension of metaphor

Metaphor is evaluative. Averill (1990: 106), for instance, defines evaluative
metaphors as intended to convey an attitude or mood. Lakoff and Turner
(1989: 65), on the other hand, have emphasized that one of the most important
sources of power in metaphor is its power of evaluation, where we carry over
the way we evaluate the entities in the source domain. In concrete terms,
metaphors evaluate by passing on a judgment through the framing chosen in the
mapping. Sometimes, the evaluation is positive even though the SD that is
carried over to the TD is negative. For instance, General Michel Aoun was
conceptualized on Al-Jazeera TV as a political Tsunami visiting Lebanon.
What is meant by this is positive in the context of an undemocratic country even
though Tsunamis are destructive and negative. Some other times, the evaluation
may be negative. For instance, the conduct of war in Falluja by the Americans is
evaluated as essentially bad simply by choosing Guernica as a base domain or
frame to map onto Falluja. In the Hashimoto discourse again, the framing is
negative from the perspective of Americans because it does not serve their
interests. If the Japanese frame their negotiations in the way they are
conceptualized, then for them this is positive as a framing that they live by.
Glucksberg, Gildea, and Bookin (1982: 96) argue that metaphor makes positive

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Chapter Six

and negative evaluation exactly like when we use the adjectives good and
bad to make positive and negative evaluations.
The evaluative dimension of metaphors could be investigated through
Lakoff and Turners (1989: 170-1) Great Chain of Being Metaphor, which is
defined by attributes and behaviours organized in a hierarchical fashion:
HUMANS: Higher-order attributes and behavior (e.g. thought, character)
ANIMALS: Instinctual attributes and behavior
PLANTS: Biological attributes and behavior
COMPLEX OBJECTS: Structural attributes and functional behavior
NATURAL PHYSICAL THINGS: Natural physical attributes and natural
physical behaviour.

According to this Great Chain of Being Metaphor, both the components of the
Guernica and Falluja frames are evaluated negatively for what they did directly
and indirectly in the world. The frames in which Nazi Luftwaffe-US Marines,
Hitler-Bush, and Franco-Allawi, are trapped are neither favourable for members
of the base domain, nor to those of the target domain.
Similarly, Hashimoto is evaluated down the scale of being as less than a
human and more like an animal by conceptualizing him as a lover of combat,
which is an instinctual behaviour more associated with animals. Men are
associated with higher attributes and behaviour such as thought as indicated in
the Chain. The consequential effect of such a re-categorisation of Hashimoto
down the scale of being is the denial of a place for him among humans in the
Great Chain of Being Metaphor - a form of denigration.

5.2 Persuasiveness of metaphor

The persuasiveness of metaphor has mostly centered round measuring the
intensity of language (Bowers 1964; Bowers and Osborn 1966; Reinsch 1971;
Siltanen 1981; Bosman 1987; Bosman and Hagendoorn 1991). Language
intensity is defined as the quality of language which indicates the degree to
which the speakers attitude toward a concept deviates from neutrality
(Bowers 1964: 420, emphasis in original). Bowers (1964) and Bowers and
Osborn (1966), for instance, tested the intensity and power of metaphor in
bringing about attitude change in conclusions of political speeches, and found
that metaphors have more important effects than intense non-metaphors.
Replicating Bowers and Osborns (1966) study, Reinsch (1971: 145) confirmed
through a comparative study of simile and metaphor that metaphor should have
a greater effect than the simile. On the other hand, Siltanen (1981: 79-80),
replicating what Bowers (1964) and Bowers and Osborn (1966) did, concluded
that some metaphors are more persuasive than some intense non-metaphoric

Doing CDA with the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor

151

language, and that not all concluding metaphors will increase persuasive
effects of a speech.
Beside politics, the persuasiveness of metaphor has also been tested in
advertising research. Phillips and McQuarrie (2002), for instance, surveyed
magazine advertisements between 1954 and 1999, and found that advertisers
showed a transformation in rhetorical style from non-metaphoric to metaphoric
rhetoric. Sopory and Dillard (2002a, b) argued for the persuasiveness of
metaphor. Maalej (2003), on the other hand, showed the conceptual metaphor to
be crucial in persuasive advertising. In Maalej (forthcoming), I showed how
conscious awareness of the existence of a conceptual metaphor may cancel its
persuasiveness if it carries with it frames that thwart or insult the cognizers
knowledge.
Lakoff and Turner (1989: 63), besides acknowledging the conceptual
dimension of metaphor, also agree to its persuasive nature:
For the same reasons that schemas and metaphors give us power to conceptualize
and reason, so they have power over us. Anything that we rely on constantly,
unconsciously, and automatically is so much part of us that it cannot be easily
resisted, in large measure because it is barely even noticed. To the extent that we
use a conceptual schema or a conceptual metaphor, we accept its validity.
Consequently, when someone else uses it, we are predisposed to accept its
validity. For this reason, conventionalized schemas and metaphors have
persuasive power over us. (emphasis in original)

What constitutes this persuasive power of metaphor is other powers that

Lakoff and Turner (1989: 64-65) sum up as the power to structure (i.e.
imparting to a concept structure that cannot exist independent of the metaphor),
the power of options (i.e. the options of filling in the slots of the TD), the power
of reason (i.e. the capacity to borrow patterns of inference from the SD), the
power of evaluation (i.e. the power to carry over the way we evaluate the SD),
and the power of being there (i.e. the fact that conceptual metaphors are so
automatic and unconscious makes them less questionable).
In the Falluja discourse, the persuasiveness of metaphor can be reasoned
about in the very way spelt out by Lakoff and Turner. The situation in Falluja
(and its consequences) is structured by analogy to Guernica; the options of
filling the various slots in the case of Falluja are a perfect match to the ones
inherited from Guernica; the war frame in Guernica enables us to reason and
make the necessary inferences about Falluja; the negative frame of war in
Guernica makes us project a negative evaluation onto the conduct of the war in
Falluja. Our classification of Guernica as horrifying and repulsive applies to
Falluja. The moment we accept the mapping, we have been persuaded by it. If

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we reject it as inapplicable to the state of affairs at hand, we may not be easily

persuaded.
In the Hashimoto discourse, on the other hand, persuasiveness is facilitated
through the base domain of combat, which is pervasive in our everyday
experience; the domain of trade is filled in the case of Hashimoto in such a way
that we feel the journalist is genuinely finding him combative, especially in
imaginatively mixing American popular culture (shotgun, secret weapon,
wrangling) and the Japanese martial arts (sumu wrestlers, ancient samurai,
verbal kendo) to fill in the slots in the TD of trade; the domain of combat lends
this inference system, triggering entailments whereby the Japanese trade
minister becomes someone thirsty for blood not apt for negotiations; following
from this system of inference, Hashimoto is evaluated, as we suggested earlier
on, down the scale of being; the conceptual metaphor TRADE IS WAR is so
pervasive and present in many conceptual systems that we tend to accept it
without resistance. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 145) argue that metaphors can
create realities in our life. Since we have no reason to disbelieve the
journalists conceptualization of Hashimoto, we tend to accept the conceptual
metaphor, TRADE IS WAR as the reality. What is also true of metaphor is that
in all aspects of life, not just in politics or love, we define our reality in terms
of metaphors and then proceed to act on the basis of the metaphors (Lakoff and
Johnson 1980: 158).
To recapitulate, the power of metaphor to persuade may be linked to its
power to evaluate (Lakoff and Turner 1989). For instance, those who agree with
the evaluation of the situation in Falluja as bad as the one in Guernica, will very
likely be persuaded by the analogy. Those, however, on the other pole tend to
disagree with framing Falluja as Guernica, and are, therefore, very unlikely to
be persuaded. If Americans tend to agree with the negative conceptualization of
the Japanese, the evaluative dimension of metaphor may facilitate its
persuasiveness among Americans. However, if it is not the case, their evaluation
will remain unpersuasive.

6. Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to offer a critical model of metaphoric
discourse based on the nature and functioning of the CTM as represented by
conceptual metaphor. The model comes in three steps consisting of description,
interpretation, and explanation. These steps are argued to work in a
complementary fashion, with each step serving as fodder for the next one.
Description seeks to discover a potential frame, explicit or implicit, to which
metaphoric processing and/or processing metaphor are applied in view of
writing the conceptual metaphors behind discourse. Interpretation, on the other

Doing CDA with the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor

153

hand, finishes the cognitive job of description by ascertaining the mapping,

spelling it out in terms of ontological and epistemic correspondences, and
reasoning about it, making the necessary entailments by inference. As a
cognitive-pragmatic step, explanation takes care of highlighting the role of
metaphor as evaluation by linking to persuasion, thus bridging mind, discourse,
and socio-cultural context.
Questions have been raised about whether the cognitive work of
interpretation in CDA is not done by the analyst on behalf of non-analysts, and
whether, in the process, the critical analyst is not actually overinterpreting
discourse on behalf of non-analysts (OHalloran 2003: 3). In this critical model
of metaphoric discourse, the stage of interpretation is the product of a critical
mind, pursuing the results of the description offered by discourse, and following
the entailments of the conceptual metaphors arrived at. Thus, like CDA, this
critical model of metaphoric discourse is an intentional, critical enterprise done
thanks to language awareness, and may be accused of overdoing things. If the
critical assets of the CTM are psychologically real, it remains, however, an
empirical question whether the critical model of metaphoric discourse offered
here is the one that real people in real socio-cultural contexts use to make sense
of metaphor and its cohesive role in discourse construction and processing.

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and cultural cognition, especially within the framework of cognitive and

discourse linguistics, as well as English-Spanish cross-linguistic and crosscultural relations.