Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31630 June 23, 1988
CATALINO BLAZA and DOMINGO GERUELA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
The law says 1 that in a criminal action, the "appellate court may, upon motion of the appellee or on its
own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the
time prescribed by this Rule, except in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de oficio." Applying
this rule, the Court of Appeals 2 dismissed the appeal taken by petitioners Blaza and Geruela from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance convicting them of robbery, 3 it appearing that their counsel de
parte had failed to file the brief in their behalf as appellants despite three (3) extensions.
The notice to file brief, sent by the Appellate Court's Clerk to petitioners' counsel 4 at Naga City, was
received by the latter on April 2, 1969. The notice contained the usual advise that all the evidence, both
oral and documentary, was already attached to the record (and was there available to the appellants), and
counsel had 30 days from notice within which to file brief. 5
On April 30, 1969, petitioners' counsel filed the first of the three (3) motions for extension that he
would present, within which to file the appellants' brief. All three were granted.
The first motion for extension alleged as ground that the brief was "now being prepared but because
of heavy pressure of work in the law office, ... counsel shall be unable to finish and file said brief
within the period still remaining." The second motion, dated May 22, 1969, averred that (a) the brief
was then "undergoing final revision but the same cannot be possibly finished and printed within the
period still remaining," 6 and, (b) moreover, counsel had to attend the convention and second advanced
course for municipal judges from May 2 to 10, 1969.
The third and last motion for extension stated that counsel could not finishl the brief because he did
not have a copy of the transcripts of stenographic notes of the testimony of (1) Bruna Biata (the
offended party), (2) Filomena Boreta (a prosecution witness), and (3) Morentino Dalaodao (a
defense witness), and prayed for this reason that the Court of Appeals send down to the Trial Court
a copy of said transcripts, and that he be granted 20 days from notice of receipt of said transcripts,
by the Court a quo within which to file the appellants' brief .The Court of Appeals granted him a 30day extension, but ignored his suggestion for transmission of a copy of the transcripts to the Trial
Court.

The appellants' brief was never filed. The last extension expired on July 1, 1969, and then three
months passed, without said brief being presented. Hence, on November 5, 1969, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petitioners' appeal. Its resolution reads as follows:
On June 28, 1969, this Court resolved to grant (counsel of) accused-appellants an
aggregate extension of 30 days from June 1, 1969, within which to file his appeal
brief. Said extension expired on July 1, 1969, yet no appellants' brief has been filed
with this court up to the present time.
WHEREFORE, this appeal is hereby ordered dismissed.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court denied their motion. 7 The Court refused to
consider the unavailability of the transcript of stenographic notes in the premises as a valid excuse for the
failure of the appellants' counsel to file brief, pointing out that "it is the duty of counsel to come to this
Court and read the transcript if he has no copies of the same."
The petitioners have come to this Court through an application for certiorari advocating the theory
that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in disregarding their plea that the transcripts
of stenographic notes be transmitted to the Trial Court and that thereafter they be given a 20-day
extension to file their brief. According to them, the Court of Appeals thereby ignored the provisions of
Section 8, Rule 122which requires that a copy of the transcripts be made available in the Lower
Court, and ignored, too, the petitioners' sad plight who, being too poor to buy a copy of the
transcripts or to send their counsel to Manila to read the same, had been thus deprived of the
opportunity to ventilate their meritorious defense before the Appellate Court. They pray for
annulment of the resolution dismissing their appeal, and that denying reconsideration of that
dismissal.
The petitioners are not entitled to relief. They are bound by their counsel's acts 8 and, unfortunately for
them, the record adequately establishes that the failure of their counsel de parte to file brief in their behalf
is inexcusable. He did not adopt "the norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. 9
In the first place, Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1964 Rules, invoked by the petitioners, does not justify
their counsel's request that a copy of the transcript be sent down to the lower court. The section
states 10 among other things that
... The original and three copies of the transcript of stenographic notes shall ... be
transmitted to the clerk of the appellate court together with the record ... . The other
copy of the transcript shall remain in the lower court.
There is no satisfactory showing that no such copy of the transcript had in truth been retained in the
lower court, as thus required by the Rules. The presumption of course is that "official duty has been
regularly performed." 11and nothing in the record appears to warrant its overthrow or negation.
The fact is that petitioners' counsel had been given more than sufficient time within which to file brief.
He had been accorded no less than ninety (90) days for this purpose: the original thirty (30) days
provided by Section 3 of Rule 124, and the sixty (60) days' extension prayed for in their three (3)
motions. The last resolution of the Court should have put him on notice. The resolution disregarded
his proposal that a copy of the transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimony of the named
witnesses be transmitted to the Trial Court for his perusal; it merely granted him an extension of 30

days. He did nothing. He neither moved for reconsideration nor invited attention to his clients'
supposedly sad plight, as he now does before this Court.
He would have this Court think that the reason for his inaction was that he was awaiting the
Appellate Court's resolution on his application for extension and for the sending down to the Trial
Court of a copy of the transcripts. This is a false assertion. The record shows that his office received
the resolution on July 15, 1969, by registered mail, this being evidenced by Registry Return Receipt
No. 938. Despite this, he did not bestir himself to attempt to remedy the situation in some way. For
three (3) months, he did nothing.
He could have presented his brief, such as it was. According to him, the brief was
already "undergoing final revision" and would be "finished and printed" within the second extension
sought by him. He could have completed the brief and submitted it albeit somewhat tardily; and as
regards the discussion therein of the testimonial evidence of the three (3) witnesses whose
transcripts he desired the Appellate Court to make available to him, he could have relied on his
notes and recollection of their declarations: he had after all heard the evidence given by prosecution
witnesses Bruna Biata and Filomena, and cross-examined them, as the record reveals; and it was
he who had conducted the direct examination of defense witness Florentino Dalaodao and heard his
cross-examination. 12 He did not. He did nothing at all, until his clients' appeal was dismissed.
The filing of a brief by an attorney within the period set therefor by law is a duty not only to his client
but also to the court; the law declares that extension of time to do so are not granted except for good
and sufficient cause; and courts have broad discretion in the determination of the sufficiency of the
cause given as well as the length of time for the extension. 13 These familiar principles and the relevant
facts make abundantly clear that the petitioners' counsel has been fairly, and correctly, dealt with by the
Court of Appeals, in the matter of extensions for him to file appellant's brief. His failure to file brief under
the circumstances is, to repeat, simply inexcusable.
The Court has nevertheless gone over the record in an effort to discover whether there is some
tenability to the petitioners' substantive claim of a meritorious defense. They say that their Identity as
the robbers had not been sufficiently established because, "While the complaining witness herself
asserted during the trial that she supposedly recognized the accused-appellants on the occasion
when they allegedly robbed her, yet it is admitted that when she reported the incident to the barrio
lieutenant the following morning, she could not then tell the barrio official as to who the culprits were
" 14 Arguments of this sort can scarcely be deemed persuasive. Victims of a robbery can not ordinarily and
in the absence of special circumstances, be expected to know the names of those who have robbed
them. What is important is that the victims recognize and Identify them on the witness stand; 15 for
obviously, Identification of the offenders' persons in Court is far more significant than naming them. 16
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, and the resolutions of the Court of Appeals sought to be
nullified and set aside are AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Sec. 8, Rule 120, Rules of 1940; Sec. 8, Rule 120, Rules of 1964; Sec. 8, Rule
124, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the rule being substantially the same in civil
cases (Sec. 1 [f], Rule 50)
2 By resolution dated November 5, 1969 in CA G.R. No. 06643-CR: Mendoza,
J., ponente, with Rodriguez and Yatco, JJ., concurring.
3 They were charged, in Crim. Case No. 4317 of the CFI of Camarines Sur [Hon. P.
R. Palacio, presiding], with breaking into the house of Bruna Biato and forcibly taking
P112.00 in cash, pieces of jewelry worth P55.00, and some chickens, found guilty of
the offense and each sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 2 years, 10
months and 27 days of prison correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 21 days of
prison mayor, as maximum, and to pay civil indemnity.
4 Atty. Augusta A. Pardalis.
5 Sec. 3, Rule 124, Rules of 1964.
6 Emphasis supplied.
7 By Resolution dated January 6, 1970.
8 SEE, e.g., Peo v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167,169, citing 16 C.J., 1145; Vivero v.
Santos, et al., 98 Phil. 500, 503-504 (holding that if mistakes of counsel were held to
be proper ground for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long
as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel
had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned, citing De Florez v.
Reynolds, Fed. Cas. No. 3742, 16 Blatch [U.S.] 397, and U.S. v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33,
Montes v. CFI of Tayabas, 48 Phil. 640 and Isaac v. Mendoza, 89 Phil. 279); Palanca
v. American Food Mfg. Co., 24 SCRA 819, 828;
9 3 Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517.
10 4 Emphasis supplied.
11 Sec. 5(m), Rule 131.
12 Minutes of the Trial, pp. 9-12: CA Record.
13 SEE Sec. 15, Rule 46, Rules of Court; Daisug v. CA, 40 SCRA 474; Roxas, et al.
v. CA, G.R. No. 76549, Dec. 10, 1987, citing De Guzman v. Cuevas, Sr., 114 SCRA
650.
14 Rollo, pp. 17,18.
15 People v. Mendoza, 205 SCRA 459.
16 People v. Catipon, 139 SCRA 192.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23956

July 21, 1967

ELPIDIO JAVELLANA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NICOLAS LUTERO, Judge of the Municipal Court of Iloilo City and the ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHBISHOP OF JARO, defendants-appellees.
Hautea and Hinojales for plaintiff-appellant.
Luisito C. Hofilea for defendants-appellees.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo (CC 6425) dismissing a
petition for relief directed against the judgment rendered by the municipal court of Iloilo City in its civil
case 7220.
On March 29, 1963 the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint against
Elpidio Javellana with the municipal court of Iloilo City, presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The
hearing, originally set for April 30, 1963, was postponed to May 24 for failure of the defendant to
receive summons, and then postponed again to June 27 for the same reason. It was thereafter
postponed to July 16, then to July 24, and finally to August 27, all at the behest of the defendant's
Atty. Jose Hautea, on the grounds that "he has not finished his business transactions in Manila" and
that "he hurt his right foot toe." The last postponement was granted by the municipal court with the
warning that no further postponement would be entertained.
When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963, neither the defendant nor his counsel Atty.
Hautea appeared although one Atty. Romy Pea who was present in court verbally moved for the
postponement of the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending to a business
transaction. The plaintiff's counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the defendant and his
counsel were well aware of the court's previous admonition that no further postponement of the case
would be granted, and then manifested that the witnesses and the evidence for the plaintiff were

ready for presentation on that date. The verbal motion for postponement was denied and the plaintiff
was directed to adduce his evidence. During the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, the
municipal court received a telegram from Atty. Hautea requesting postponement of the hearing. The
trial proceeded nevertheless, and, on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, the court on the same date
rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant. The latter's counsel received a copy of
the decision on September 9, 1963. On the following September 11, he filed a motion to set aside
judgment and for new trial. This motion was denied on September 26; a copy of the order of denial
was received by him on the same date.
On November 16, 1963, or about 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a petition
for relief (from the judgment of the municipal court)with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, praying
that the decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on the merits, and,
pending determination of the petition, that an injunction issue restraining the enforcement of the
decision. Counsel for the petitioner averred that his absence on the date of the trial was excusable
as he attended to a very urgent business transaction in Manila; that before his departure for the
latter city, he verbally informed the respondent judge that his return to Iloilo might be delayed and
that he might not arrive on time for the trial of the case as set; that he called at both the law office
and the residence of the counsel for the private respondent to inform him of the desired
postponement and the reason therefor, but the latter was in Bacolod at the time; that he exercised
utmost diligence and precaution in the sense that while in Manila he sent a telegram to the
respondent judge, asking for postponement; and that notwithstanding all the foregoing, the municipal
court nevertheless proceeded with the trial in his absence and that of his client, allowed the private
respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and rendered a decision against the petitioner, thus
depriving the latter of his day in court. Counsel for the petitioner further asserted that his client has a
good and substantial defense, which is, that the complainant had given his client an option to buy
the premises subject-matter of the complaint below, and that a reopening of the case would cause
the private respondent no real injury.
This petition was given due course, the respondents were required to file their answers, and a
cease-and-desist order was issued as prayed for. On February 22, 1964, after due hearing, the
Court of First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the petition.
1wph1.t

Hence the present recourse.

From the perspective of the environmental circumstances obtaining in this case, the present appeal
is palpably devoid of merit.
A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and with
due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare for trial with diligence
and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer case, such as the one
at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is obvious that the counsel for
the petitioner-appellant has been remiss in this respect.
The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said counsel. The
last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the unequivocal admonition by the judgment
that no further postponement would be countenanced. The case was reset for hearing on August 27,
1963, which means that the appellant's counsel had more than a month's time to so adjust his
schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict between his business transactions and his calendar of
hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the appellant appeared at the trial. His absence on

the latter date was not occasioned by illness or some other supervening occurrence which
unavoidably and justifiably prevented him from appearing in court.
In our view, it was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give
preferential attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal court as a mere
marionette that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals
more than just a modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established machinery of justice.
Nor is his censurable conduct mitigated by the appearance in court on August 27 of another attorney
who verbally moved for postponement nor by his telegram received by the municipal judge on the
same date asking for continuance. These circumstances, upon the contrary, emphasize his
presumptuousness vis-a-vis the municipal judge.
It is thus crystal-clear from the foregoing disquisition that the petitioner-appellant was not deprived of
his day in court, and that the respondent municipal judge did not err in proceeding with the trial,
allowing the private respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and thereafter rendering decision
for the plaintiff-appellee. It follows that the petitioner was not entitled to the remedy of a petition for
relief.
Moreover, after the denial of his motion to set aside judgment and for new trial, the appellant had
ample time to appeal; instead he allowed the judgment to become final and executory. His argument
that an appeal would have been futile as there was no evidence upon which such appeal could be
based, merits scant consideration. An appeal from the decision of a municipal court to the Court of
First Instance has the effect of vacating the decision (sec. 9, Rule 40, view Rules of Court; sec. 9,
Rule 40, of the old Rules), and the action is to be tried de novowithout regard to the proof presented
in the municipal court or the conclusions reached thereon (Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, 56 Phil.
344, 351; Lizo vs. Carandang, 73 Phil. 649; Crisostomo vs. Director of Prisons, 41 Phil. 368). To
grant the appellant's petition for relief would amount to reviving his right to appeal which he had
irretrievably lost through the gross inaction of his counsel (see Espinosa vs. Yatco, etc., et al., L16435, Jan. 31, 1963, and the cases therein cited). This in law cannot be done.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed. As this appeal is patently frivolous and dilatory,
this Court, under the authority of section 3 of Rule 142 of the Rules of Court, hereby assesses treble
costs against the petitioner-appellant Elpidio Javellana, said costs to be paid by his counsel, Atty.
Jose Hautea.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.