Professional Documents
Culture Documents
April 4, 2007
CARMELO
C.
BERNARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and F.T. YLANG-YLANG
MARKETING CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Carmelo C. Bernardo assails the Resolutions1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 2004 and January 14,
2005 dismissing his petition and denying reconsideration,
respectively.
Petitioner was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila with six counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law, for issuing on December 3, 1997 six postdated
checks in equal amounts of P22,500. Save for the check
numbers and dates of maturity, four Informations under
Criminal Case Nos. 320977 to 320980 were similarly worded
as follows:
That on or about December 3, 1997, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously make or draw and issue to F.T. YLANGYLANG MARKETING, CORP. rep. by Dennis Tan to apply on
account or for value PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK check no.
0007806 [0007805, 0007804, 0007803] dated April 30, [March
30, February 28, January 30] 1998 payable to YLANG-YLANG
MFG. in the amount of P22,500.00 said accused well knowing
that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for reason
"Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said F.T. YLANG-YLANG
MARKETING CORP. the amount of the check or to make
arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5)
banking days after receiving said notice.
2
Contrary to law.
alias warrant
of
arrest
issued
against
SO ORDERED.
The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19,
of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as follows:
Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
he informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory
process
to
secure
the
attendance of witnesses and the production
of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment,
trial
may
proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustified.
The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of
criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely
deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of
the defendant's escape. The old case ofPeople v.
Avancea 8 required his presence at certain stages of the trial
which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the
defendant had not re-appeared or remained at large. As his
right to be present at these stages was then held not waivable
even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the
fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar
as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not been
recaptured.
CRUZ, J.:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the
case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. 1 As a
result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed,
with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not
guilty. 2 Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the
prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide,
succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him
bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. 3 The
respondent judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the
illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. 4 But he was
gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing
continue in accordance with the constitutional provision
authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. 5 The
respondent judge denied the motion, however, and suspended
all proceedings until the return of the accused. 6 The order of
the trial court is now before us on certiorari and mandamus. 7
The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He
mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal reading
of the rule when he should have viewed it from the broader
perspective of its intendment.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President
Corazon C. Aquino installed her regime by issuing Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 1,1 creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this
Commission the herculean task of recovering the ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates.2 Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensure
PCGG's unhampered performance of its task.3
G.R. No. 174340
On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455
was submitted to the Senate and referred to theCommittee on
Accountability
of
Public
Officers
and
Investigations and Committee on Public Services. However, on
March 28, 2006, upon motion of Senator Francis N. Pangilinan,
it was transferred to the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises.5
xxxxxx
Relevantly, Chairman Sabio's letter to Sen. Gordon
dated August 19, 2006 pointed out that the
anomalous transactions referred to in the P.S.
Resolution No. 455 are subject of pending cases
before the regular courts, the Sandiganbayan and the
Supreme Court (Pending cases include: a. Samuel
Divina v. Manuel Nieto, Jr., et al., CA-G.R. No. 89102;
b. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v.
Manuel Nieto, et al.; c. Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation v. Manuel D. Andal, Civil Case
No. 06-095, RTC, Branch 61, Makati City;
d. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v.
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Your Honor, my father was a judge, died
being a judge. I was here in the Supreme
Court as Chief of Staff of Justice Feria. I
would definitely honor the Supreme Court
and the rule of law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You will answer the questions of the
Senators if we say that?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Yes, Your Honor. That is the law already as
far as I am concerned.
With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced that
he and his Commissioners are shielded from testifying before
respondent Senate Committees by Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1.
In effect, his argument that the said provision exempts him and
his co-respondent Commissioners from testifying before
respondent Senate Committees concerning Senate Res. No.
455 utterly lacks merit.
Incidentally, an argument repeated by Chairman Sabio is that
respondent Senate Committees have no power to punish him
and his Commissioners for contempt of the Senate.
The argument is misleading.
Article VI, Section 21 provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for "contempt of
Senate Committees and the Philippine Senate" wasapproved
by Senate President Villar and signed by fifteen (15)
Senators. From this, it can be concluded that the Order is
under the authority, not only of the respondent Senate
Committees, but of the entire Senate.
At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry
not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but
also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is
a direct conferral of powerto the committees. Father Bernas,
in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed
out its significance:
It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly
recognizes the power of investigation not just of
Congress but also of "any of its committees." This is
significant because it constitutes a direct
conferral of investigatory power upon the
committees and it means that the means which
the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative function are also
available to the Committees.38
This is a reasonable conclusion. The conferral of the legislative
power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry
with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective
discharge. Otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 will be
meaningless. The indispensability and usefulness of the power
of contempt in a legislative inquiry is underscored in a catena
of cases, foreign and local.
In the 1821 case of Anderson v. Dunn,39 the function of the
Houses of Congress with respect to the contempt power was
likened to that of a court, thus:
ATTY.
MANUEL
J.
LASERNA,
JR., petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 161658
November 3, 2008
AQUILINO
Q.
PIMENTEL,
JR., petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among
other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard
the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing
shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods,
the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected
to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
contained in the school's student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing
x x x;
November 3, 2008
SOCIAL
JUSTICE
SOCIETY
(SJS), petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 158633
November 3, 2008
of
RA
Petition
9165 and
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under
the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission program,
who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be
exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of
this Act subject to the following conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most
vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects
of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more
critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug
dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art.
III17 of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long
come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the
validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the
medium of mandatory random drug testing among students
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO AWID alias "NONOY" and MADUM GANIH alias
"COMMANDER
MISTAH"
and
also
known
as
"MIS," Accused.
MADUM GANIH alias "COMMANDER MISTAH" and also
known as "MIS," Appellant.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This is a kidnapping for ransom case where the complainant
identified one of the accused as he stood with three others in
front of the police station while she sat in her tinted vehicle.
The Facts and the Case
On May 31, 2001 the city public prosecutor filed a second
amended information1 for kidnapping with ransom and serious
illegal detention against the accused Madum Ganih alias
"Commander Mistah" or "Mis," Rodrigo Awid alias "Nonoy,"
million in exchange for her. Her husband told her to bargain for
a lesser amount since all he had was P1 million. Ganih
demanded a partial payment of P200,000.00 but Mrs. Lees
family could give only P50,000.00. Mrs. Lees eldest daughter,
Michelle,13]testified that she gave the money to a certain
Geater Libas but Ganih later complained that he got
onlyP35,000.00.14
Calling her family a third time, the kidnappers reduced their
demand to P4 million and threatened to cut off Mrs. Lees head
unless this was paid.15 At their last call to her husband, Mr. Lee
requested the kidnappers to release his wife for P1.2 million.
Ganih did not respond immediately as he said he still had to
confer with their leader, a certain "boy," whom Mrs. Lee could
not recognize as he always covered his face whenever he
came to visit.16
In the evening of May 5, 2000, Ganih told Mrs. Lee that they
would release her the next day. At about 4:00 a.m. of May 6,
2000, her abductors brought Mrs. Lee to Arena Blanco in
Zamboanga City where Ganih gave herP100.00 for fare and an
M203 bullet as memento. She eventually got home.17
Sometime after, Police Chief Inspector Gucela and his men
arrested a certain alias "Mis" at Sta. Barbara, Zamboanga
City.18 They asked Mrs. Lee to see if she can identify him at the
police station. She came on board her Pajero with Gucela by
her side but she refused to go out of her tinted vehicle because
she did not want to be seen. She could, however, clearly see
those outside of it. Subsequently, the police officers brought
Ganih and three others to stand in front of the police office.
Mrs. Lee recognized and identified Ganih as one of her
kidnappers.19
For his part, Ganih, denied the charge against him. He testified
that he had been known as "Madz," not "Mis," and that he had
never been known as "Kumander Mistah." He claimed that he
was at home in Barangay Kaliantana, Naga, Zamboanga del
Sur, the whole day of January 10, 2000. Further, he said he
attended the birthday party of Barangay Chairman Hassan
Arani at his house at 2:00 p.m. on May 6, 2000. He also
claimed that the police did not make him stand in a proper
police line-up for identification.20
On May 21, 2002 the RTC rendered judgment,21 convicting
Ganih of the crime charged and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of death. The RTC, however, acquitted Awid for
insufficiency of evidence. The court also ordered Ganih to
return the ransom money of P1,250,000.00 as well as the
value of Mrs. Lees diamond earrings and Rado wristwatch,
which totaled P95,000.00.
Upon review, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision
dated November 12, 2007,22 affirming the conviction of Ganih
but amending the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
The CA also awarded Mrs. LeeP1,250,000.00 in actual
damages, P25,000.00 in temperate damages, P50,000.00 in
civil
indemnity, P100,000.00
in
moral
damages,
and P25,000.00 in exemplary damages.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not accused Ganih, in
conspiracy with others, kidnapped Mrs. Lee for a ransom.
The Courts Ruling
To prove the crime charged, the prosecution had to show (a)
that the accused was a private person; (b) that he kidnapped
or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her
liberty; (c) that the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and (d)
that the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.23] All
these have been proved in this case.
The Court entertains no doubt that Ganih and the others with
him kidnapped Mrs. Lee to trade her freedom for a price. Ganih
initially demanded P15 million for her but he reduced his
demand when Mr. Lee could raise only P1.2 million. The
kidnappers actually received this ransom as evidenced by the
fact that they immediately released Mrs. Lee after the last
negotiation.
Significantly, Ganih offered nothing but his bare denial and
unsubstantiated alibi to counter the overwhelming evidence
that the prosecution adduced against him. His other contention
is that the police made Mrs. Lee identify him, not in a proper
police line-up but in a mere show-up after giving her some
improper suggestions.
But the manner in which Mrs. Lee identified Ganih was
substantially the same as in any proper police line-up except
that this one took place outside the police station on account of
Mrs. Lees desire not to be seen while making the
identification. The police did not show Ganih alone to Mrs. Lee,
which would suggest that he was their suspect. They made
three other men stand with Ganih in front of the police station
while Mrs. Lee gazed on them behind the tinted windows of her
vehicle.24]
September 7, 2010
His two (2) companions were left outside and he was told by
Atty. Rous that he had already apprised Lorenzo of his rights,
but Lorenzo still wanted to give a statement.35
Upon the instruction of Atty. Rous, he took down the statement
of Lorenzo, the three (3) of them in one (1) corner of the room
while over at the receiving area there were the secretary and a
lady lawyer. The statement of Lorenzo was in Tagalog,
typewritten in question-and-answer form. Each time after he
had asked a question, Atty. Rous would in turn ask Lorenzo if
he wanted to answer it, and Lorenzo would answer yes. He
was at the typewriter, and the two (2) (Atty. Rous and Lorenzo)
were infront of him, seated across each other. The taking of the
statement started at about 3:10 in the afternoon and was
finished in more than one (1) hour. He asked Lorenzo to read
first his statement, and then Atty. Rous read it also. Next, they
went up to the office of Fiscal Refuerzo, but was referred by
the secretary to the inquest fiscal on duty, Fiscal Ben dela
Cruz. At his office, Fiscal dela Cruz asked Lorenzo to stand
infront of him and asked if the statement was voluntarily given
by him, if what was contained therein was true, and if he was
ready to swear before him. Lorenzo answered yes, and the
subscribing of his statement before Fiscal dela Cruz was also
witnessed by Atty. Rous.36 Lorenzo had earlier told him and his
companions at the PARAC office that his participation in the
ambush-slay of Abadilla was that of a lookout, and that he was
only forced to join the group because of the threat to his
family.37
SPO2 Tarala admitted that the first time he went to the IBP
Office at the Hall of Justice was on June 20, 1996 when SPO2
Garcia, Jr. took the statement of Joel de Jesus. Since only
SPO2 Garcia, Jr. and Joel stayed inside the room, he and his
companion just walked around.38
Atty. Rous testified that he was one (1) of the free legal aid
counsels of the Free Legal Aid Committee of the IBP-Quezon
City Chapter. One (1) of their primary duties was to assist
indigents in their cases, and aside from this, they were also
tasked to assist the various suspects during custodial
investigations in the various investigations of different
agencies, such as the CIS and PNP. He recalled handling at
least ten (10) to fifteen (15) of such custodial investigations. On
June 21, 1996, he assisted a person by the name of Lorenzo
delos Santos accompanied by a police investigator (whose
name he could no longer remember) from the Central Police
District, who told him that the said suspect was willing to make
a confession and asked if he could assist him during his
custodial investigation. He identified Lorenzo inside the
courtroom.39 The police investigator had informed him of the
charge against Lorenzo, which was the killing of Abadilla.40
Before the start of the investigation of Lorenzo, Atty. Rous
related that he asked the policeman to leave him and Lorenzo.
When the investigators were gone, he asked Lorenzo to
remove his shirt so he could see if there were any tell-tale
marks of any harm or specific mark upon him. Having satisfied
himself that there were no such mark on the suspects body,
Atty. Rous began interviewing him. He asked Lorenzo if he was
willing to execute a confession, and Lorenzo answered he was
willing to do so. He then asked Lorenzo if he was willing to
have him as his counsel. Evidently, Lorenzo wanted him to be
his counsel during the custodial investigation for the taking of
his statement. Convinced that Lorenzo was giving his
statement without any pressure or force, they started the
investigation proper. The police investigator who accompanied
Lorenzo to their office was the one (1) who had propounded
questions in Tagalog and typed the answers given by Lorenzo
also in Tagalog. He was just within hearing distance and was
present during the entire time of the taking of Lorenzos
statement. Afterwards, he let Lorenzo read the typewritten
statement, and he asked Lorenzo if those were the questions
given to him and the answers he had given, to which he replied
in the affirmative. He further asked Lorenzo if he was willing to
sign the statement without pressure, and Lorenzo said he was
willing to sign the same. He asked Lorenzo to sign his
statement before the office of Prosecutor Ben dela Cruz.
Prosecutor dela Cruz first read the statement and then asked
Lorenzo if he was willing to sign the same, and he answered in
the affirmative. Lorenzo signed the statement in their presence;
he and Prosecutor dela Cruz also signed it.41
which was registered in his own name, but said jeep had been
mortgaged to Danilo Lintag since May 27, 1996.92
Lorenzo presented as witness Edith Lingan, an employee of
Felipe M. Santos, who corroborated his alibi.93
Augusto Santos testified that on June 13, 1996 at around 7:00
oclock in the morning, he accompanied his brother-in-law
Jonas Ayhon whose wife, his sister, gave birth on June 11,
1996 at the Jose Fabella Hospital at Sta. Cruz, Manila. He
stayed there until 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. On June 26,
1996, five (5) men suddenly barged into their house. He was
hit in the neck with a .45 cal. pistol, blindfolded and brought
outside where he was beaten. They had no warrant of arrest
but were forcing him to admit that Joel de Jesus gave him big
money and that he knew what it was. He told them that he did
not know anything, and that Joel was his enemy, as his Tito
Lorenzo had a quarrel with Joel in which he helped his Tito. He
confirmed the contents of the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
3, 1996 which he executed at Camp Crame, and also
presented a copy of the birth certificate of the baby delivered
by his sister at Fabella Hospital.94
Jonas Padel Ayhon corroborated the foregoing testimony of his
brother-in-law, Augusto "Ogie" Santos, whose half-sister was
his wife.95
Rameses de Jesus testified that on June 12, 1996 at 7:00
oclock in the evening, he and Lumanog left for Mabalacat,
Pampanga on board the latters brand new Mitsubishi Lancer,
together with Romeo Costibollo, Manny dela Rosa and Boni
Mandaro. They arrived in Mabalacat at about 10:00 oclock in
the evening and after resting they started digging infront of the
church, inside the compound of the Tiglao family, Lumanogs
in-laws. They dug until 4:00 oclock in the morning of June 13,
1996. Thereafter, they slept and woke up at around 10:00
oclock in the morning. They helped in the preparations for the
celebration of the wedding anniversary of the Tiglaos. After
eating lunch, they drank liquor. They returned to Manila only on
June 14, 1996 at 7:00 p.m.. On June 19, 1996, they went back
to Pampanga and returned to Manila on June 20, 1996. At
around 10:00 p.m., they proceeded to Fairview, Quezon City to
visit the sick child of Romeo Costibollo who was then confined
at Fairview Polymedic Hospital. After Costibollo and Lumanog
alighted from their car and while he was parking infront of the
hospital, several armed men came. Two (2) men approached
him from behind and asked him if Costibollo and Lumanog
were his companions. When he replied yes, he was pushed
inside the car; Costibollo and Lumanog were handcuffed.
Without any warrant, they were apprehended, blindfolded and
taken to a place where he was tortured. They were forcing him
to admit that he and his companions killed "Kabise" who was
the ex-governor of Ilocos Norte. Despite his denials they
continued to torture him by electrocution and suffocation with a
plastic bag. A policeman arrived with Fortuna, who was asked
how much Ram gave them, to which Fortuna replied
"P10,000.00." He got mad at Fortuna and cursed him for telling
such a lie. After two (2) days, he was brought to Camp Karingal
still blindfolded. He was again tortured for two (2) days, the
policemen forcing him to admit he participated in the killing of
Col. Abadilla. When he could no longer bear the torture, he
finally admitted to Insp. Castillo that he took part in the Abadilla
ambush-slay. When the one (1) interviewing him asked how he
did it, he just said that Fortuna came to his house with an
owner-type jeep and two (2) other persons, and that they rode
to Dau, Pampanga and headed to Tarlac, on their way to Ilocos
to kill Abadilla. Insp. Castillo got angry, saying that he was just
fooling them and he was again hit.96
Rameses continued to narrate that after two (2) or three (3)
days stay at Camp Karingal, he and the other accused were
presented at a press conference. During the inquest conducted
by Fiscal Refuerzo, he saw Freddie Alejo for the first time, and
also his co-accused Lumanog, Fortuna, Lorenzo, Joel and
Augusto. As far as he knew, they had brought the matter of the
torture they suffered in the hands of policemen to the DOJ.97
On cross-examination, Rameses was shown a medical
certificate issued by Dr. Servillano B. Ritualo III at the PNP
General Hospital, Camp Crame, but he said he could no longer
remember the date he was examined by said doctor. He
xxx
Accused
During
x x x [emphasis supplied.]
Confession
guard Alejo who went along with the PARAC squad to Fairview
on June 19, 1996, while the rest of appellants were taken by
the same operatives in follow-up operations after Joel provided
them with the identities of his conspirators and where they
could be found.
R.A. No. 7438,137 approved on May 15, 1992, has reinforced
the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons
under custodial investigation. The pertinent provisions read:
SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under
Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.
a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his
order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any
person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter,
in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed
to confer private with the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the
services of his own counsel, he must be provided by with a
competent and independent counsel.
xxxx
f. As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the
practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
"inviting" officer for any violation of law. [emphasis supplied.]
Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed
him of his constitutional rights to remain silent, that any
information he would give could be used against him, and that
he had the right to a competent and independent counsel,
preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the
services of counsel he will be provided with one (1). However,
since these rights can only be waived in writing and with the
assistance of counsel, there could not have been such a valid
waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP
Office, Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed
overnight at the police station before he was brought to said
counsel.
P/Insp. Castillo admitted that the initial questioning of Joel
began in the morning of June 20, 1996, the first time said
suspect was presented to him at the CPDC station, even
before he was brought to the IBP Office for the taking of his
formal statement. Thus, the possibility of appellant Joel having
been subjected to intimidation or violence in the hands of
police investigators as he claims, cannot be discounted. The
constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed.
Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information from a
suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by
counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the
presence of counsel.138 The purpose of providing counsel to a
person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state
practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make
self-incriminating statements.139
Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during
Joels execution of his statement before Atty. Sansano on June
20, 1996, still the said confession must be invalidated. To be
acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to
constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not
admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of
the rights of persons under custodial investigation.140
Since Joel was provided with a lawyer secured by CPDC
investigators from the IBP-Quezon City chapter, it cannot be
said that his right to a counsel "preferably of his own choice"
was not complied with, particularly as he never objected to
Atty. Sansano when the latter was presented to him to be his
counsel for the taking down of his statement. The phrase
cured any flaw that may have attended it. 172 We have held that
the inadmissibility of a police line-up identification should not
necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent incourt identification.173
We also found none of the danger signals enumerated by
Patrick M. Wall, a well-known authority in eyewitness
identification, which give warning that the identification may be
erroneous even though the method used is proper. The danger
signals contained in the list, which is not exhaustive, are:
(1) the witness originally stated that he could not
identify anyone;
(2) the identifying witness knew the accused before
the crime, but made no accusation against him when
questioned by the police;
(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the
identifying witness original description and the actual
description of the accused;
(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the
witness erroneously identified some other person;
(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the
accused;
(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails
to identify him;
(7) before the commission of the crime, the witness
had limited opportunity to see the accused;
(8) the witness and the person identified are of
different racial groups;
(9) during his original observation of the perpetrator of
the crime, the witness was unaware that a crime was
involved;
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the
witness view of the criminal and his identification of
the accused;
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
170
Alibi
Cannot
Premeditation
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION),
ANTONIO P. BELICENA, ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR.,
RAUL C. DE VERA, ROSANNA P. DIALA AND JOSEPH A.
CABOTAJE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case arose from the issuance of two Tax Credit
Certificates in favor of JAM Liner, Inc. which were investigated
and found fraudulent by the Presidential Task Force 156,
created by then President Joseph E. Estrada.
The Facts and the Case
The principal respondent in this case, Homero A. Mercado,
was the President of JAM Liner, Inc. The other respondents,
Antonio A. Belicena, Uldarico P. Andutan Jr., Raul C. De Vera,
and Rosanna P. Diala, were Department of Finance (DOF)
officials formerly assigned at its One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency
Tax Credit and Drawback Center (DOF One-Stop Shop).
The central issue that this case presents is whether or not the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
recognize the immunity from criminal prosecution that the
Ombudsman granted respondent Mercado and, as a result, in
declining to discharge him from the information as a state
witness.
Ruling of the Court
In denying the Ombudsmans motion to drop Mercado from the
information, the Sandiganbayan largely dwelt on the question
of whether or not the prosecution complied with the
requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Respondents De Vera and Diala, Mercados co-accused who
opposed the grant of immunity to him, contend that the
immunity that the Ombudsman gave Mercado does not bind
the court, which in the meantime already acquired jurisdiction
over the case against him. That immunity merely relieves
Mercado from any further proceedings, including preliminary
investigation, which the state might still attempt to initiate
against him.5
This in a way is true. But the filing of the criminal action against
an accused in court does not prevent the Ombudsman from
exercising the power that the Congress has granted him.
Section 17 of R.A. 6770 provides:
A:
The date of suspension, sir, was April 13, a few days after we
filed the application and on the third page of Exhibit "KKK-2". If
I may repeat my testimony before, this amount is much bigger
than those we filed with the Department of Finance. But the
engine and chassis number are the same except for the
amount, which was noted toP4,094,000.00, sir.11 x x x
The decision to move for the discharge of Mercado was part of
prosecutorial discretion in the determination of who should be
used as a state witness to bolster the successful prosecution of
criminal offenses. Unless made in clear violation of the Rules,
this determination should be given great weight by our courts.
As this Court held in People v. Court of Appeals:12
The Rules do not require absolute certainty in determining
those conditions. Perforce, the Judge has to rely in a large part
upon the suggestions and the considerations presented by the
prosecuting officer.
"A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself
with absolute certainty at the very outset of the trial as to
everything which may be developed in the course of the trial in
regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the
commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were
practicable or possible, there would be little need for the
formality of a trial. In coming to his conclusions as to the
necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested, as to the availability or non-availability of other
direct or corroborative evidence; as to which of the accused is
the most guilty one; and the like, the judge must rely in a large
part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the
prosecuting officer. x x x."13 (Emphasis supplied)