Sagrada Orden de Predicadores del Santisimo Rosario Filipinas vs.

National
Coconut Corporation [91 SCRA 503 G.R. No.L-3756 June 30, 1952]
Post
under case
digests, Civil
by Schizophrenic Mind

Law at Tuesday,

March

20,

2012 Posted

Facts: Plaintiffs land was acquired during the Japanese occupation by Taiwan Tekkosho
for the sum of P140,000, and the titled was issued in the Japanese corporations name.
After liberation, the Alien Property Custodian of USA took possession, control, and
custody of the land by virtue of the Trading with the Enemy Act as it belonged to an
enemy national. Then it was occupied by NACOCO. Plaintiff then claimed the property
through an action in court. The parties then presented a joint petition where plaintiff
claims that the sale in favor of Taiwan Tekkosho was void as it was executed under
threats, duress, and intimidation. It was agreed that the title would be cancelled and reissued in the name of plaintiff. It was also agreed that the interest of the Alien Property
Custodian of USA over the property be cancelled and that NACOCO leave the
premises.

NACOCO does not contest that he is liable for rent after the judgment was rendered
with regard to plaintiffs claim over the property.

Issue: Whether NACOCO can be liable for rentals from the date when it began to
occupy the premises to the date it vacated it.

Held: NACOCO is not liable for rentals prior to the judgment. For NACOCO to be liable
at all, its obligations must arise from any of the sources of obligations, namely law,
contract or quasi-contract, crime or negligence. NACOCO is not guilty of any offense at
all, because it entered the premises and occupied it with the permission of the entity
that had the legal control and administration thereof, the Alien Property Custodian of
USA.

Sagrada Orden v. National Coconut Corporation (1952)

SUMMARY: NACOCO is being sued for rentals for its occupation of warehouse by the
owner, Sagrada Orden. Sagrada Orden was registered owner before WW2. However,
the property was acquired by a Japanese Corporation during the Occupation. NACOCO
gained possession of the property from the Alien Property Custodian, which took control
of properties belonging to enemy nationals after the war. The Supreme Court held that
NACOCO could not be liable therefor, the alleged obligation to pay rentals not being
hinged on law, contract, quasi-contract, crime, or negligence.

FACTS:
Sagrada Orden owns a piece of land in Pandacan and the warehouse which stands on
it. Title to the property was registered in its name before WW2.
During the Japanese occupation, the land was acquired by Taiwan Tekkosho, a
Japanese corporation, for P140,000. As such, title was issued in its name.
After liberation, the Alien Property Custodian of the USA took possession, control, and
custody of the property, on the strength of the Trading with the Enemy Act, on the
ground that the property belonged to an enemy national.
Under a custodianship agreement with the Alien Property Custodian, the property was
later occupied by Copra Export Management Company, and then by the National
Coconut Corporation.
Sagrada Orden made a claim to the property before the Alien Property Custodian, but
this was denied.
So, Sagrada Orden brought an action against the Alien Property Custodian to annul the
sale of property to Taiwan Tekkosho, and recover its possession. The court rendered
judgment releasing the Alien Property Custodian and Philippine Government from
liability, and entitling Sagrada Orden the recovery of reasonable rentals from NACOCO.
The present action is an action to recover such rentals covering the time NACOCO
occupied the premises.
NACOCO argued that it occupied the property in good faith, and under no obligation to
pay rentals for the use and occupation of the warehouse.
However, the court rendered judgment ordering NACOCO to pay Sagrada Orden
rentals, in the sum of P3000/ month. It ratiocinated that Sagrada Orden has always
been the owner of the property, as the sale to Taiwan Tekkosho was void.

ISSUE: WON NACOCO is liable for rentals to Sagrada Orden NO

RATIO:
If NACOCO is liable, its obligation must arise from any of the sources of obligations:
law, contract, quasi-contract, crime, or negligence.
Law The Court has tried in vain to find a law or provision thereof upon which the claim
can be supported.
Contract There was no privity of contract between the Alien Property Custodian and
Taiwan Tekkosho, such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee may be held
responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the property. Also, there was
no agreement, not even implied, between the Alien Property Custodian and NACOCO
for the latter to pay rentals on the property. The Copra Export Management Company,
which preceded NACOCO, does not appear to have paid rentals therefor. There was no
provision in the custodianship agreement for the payment of rentals.
Quasi-contract The Court has tried in vain to find a principle in quasi-contracts or
equity upon which the claim can be supported.
Crime NACOCO is not guilty of any offense at all. It entered the premises and
occupied the property with the permission of the Alien Property Custodian.
Negligence There was no negligence on NACOCOs part.
As NACOCO entered into possession of the property without any expectation for such
use and occupation, it cannot be held liable therefor.
DISPOSITIVE: Lower courts ruling is reversed. NACOCO is not liable for rentals to
Sagrada Orden.

Alyanna Apacible B2015

Pelayo vs. Lauron 12 Phil. 453

FACTS
On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint against
Marelo Lauron and Juana Abellana. On the night of October 13th of the same year, the
plaintiff was called to render medical assistance to the defendants daughter-in-law, who
was about to gie birth. After the consultation of Dr. Escao, it was deemed that the
operation was going to be difficult for child birth, but regardless, Dr. Pelayo proceeded
with the job of operating on the subject and also removed the afterbirth. The operation
went on until morning, and on the same day, visited several times and billed the
defendants the just amount of P500 for the services rendered to which defendants
refused to pay. In answer to the complaint, counsel for the defendants denied all of the
allegation and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in
consequence of the said childbirth, that when she was alive she lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with them, and
that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay
their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the
defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
ISSUE Can the defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation?
RULING
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasicontracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any
kind of fault or negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those
expressly determined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable
ones. Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting
parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.)
The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and
143.) If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and
spouses were mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that,
when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the
other was under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a
physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the
sickness by which life is jeopardized. The party bound to furnish such support was
therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the medical expert for his
professional services. In the face of the above legal precepts, it was unquestionable that
the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he
rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, was the

husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law of the defendants herein.
Posted by: Kenny Melody at 10:10 PM Labels: oblicon case digests, oblicon digests,
oblicon notes, obligations and contracts, obligations and contracts digests,

Pelayo vs. Lauron

FACTS
An action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by P. J.
O'Brien to recover the sum of P15,000 alleged to have been lost by Leung Ben to P.J.
OBrien in a series of gambling, banking and percentage games conducted during the
two or three months prior to the institution of the suit. In Leung Bens verified complaint,
OBrien asked for an attachment against the property of Leung Ben on the ground that
the latter was about to depart from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud his
creditors. This attachment was issued, and acting under that authority, the sheriff
attached the sum of P15,000 which had been deposited by the OBrien with the
International Banking Corporation. Leung Bien filed a motion to quash the attachment,
which was dismissed by the court. Hence this application for a writ of certiorari, the
purpose of which was to quash an attachment issued from the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila.
ISSUE:
Was the statutory obligation to restore money won at gaming an obligation arising from
"contract, express or implied?"
RULING
Yes. Upon general principles, recognized both in the civil and common law, money lost
in gaming and voluntarily paid by the loser to the winner cannot, in the absence of
statute, be recovered in a civil action. But Act No. 1757 of the Philippine Commission,
which defines and penalizes several forms of gambling, contains numerous provisions
recognizing the right to recover money lost in gambling or in playing certain games. The
original complaint filed in the Court of First Instance was not clear as to the particular
section of Act No. 1757 under which the action was brought, but was alleged that the
money was lost at gambling, banking, and percentage game in which the defendant
was a banker. It must therefore be assumed that the action was based upon the right of
recovery given in section 7 of said Act, which declared that an action may be brought
against the banker by any person losing money at a banking or percentage game. It
was observed that according to the Civil Code obligations are supposed to be derived
either from (1) the law, (2) contracts and quasi-contracts, (3) illicit acts and omission, or

(4) acts in which some sort ob lame or negligence is present. This enumeration of
sources of obligations and the obligation imposed by law are different types. The
obligations which in the Code are indicated as quasi-contracts, as well as those arising
ex lege, are in the common la system, merged into the category of obligations imposed
by law, and all are denominated implied contracts. In the case under consideration, the
duty of OBrien to refund the money which he won from the LeungBen at gaming was a
duty imposed by statute. It therefore arose ex lege. Furthermore, it was a duty to return
a certain sum which had passed from OBrien to Leung Ben. By all the criteria which the
common law supplies, this a duty in the nature of debt and is properly classified as an
implied contract. It was well- settled by the English authorities that money lost in
gambling or by lottery, if recoverable at all, can be recovered by the loser in an action of
indebitatus assumpsit for money had and received. This meant that in the common law
the duty to return money won in this way was an implied contract, or quasi-contract. The
phase in question should be interpreted in such a way as to include all obligations,
whether arising from consent or ex lege, because that was equivalent to eliminating all
distinction between the first and the fifth paragraphs by practically striking out the first
two lines of paragraph one. The Legislature had deliberately established this distinction,
and while we may be unable to see any reason why it should have been made, it was
our duty to apply and interpret the law, and we were not authorized under the guise of
interpretation to virtually repeal part of the statute. Nor can it be said that the relations
between the parties litigant constitute a quasi-contract. In the first place, quasicontracts are "lawful and purely voluntary acts by which the authors thereof
become obligated in favor of a third person. . . ." The act which gave rise to the
obligation ex lege relied upon by Leung Ben in the court below is illicit an unlawful
gambling game. In the second place, the first paragraph of section 412 of the Code of
Civil Procedure does not authorize an attachment in actions arising out of quasi
contracts, but only in actions arising out of contract, express or implied. Posted by
Kenny Melody at 10:07 PM Labels: Leung Ben vs. P.J. OBrien, oblicon case digests,
oblicon digests, obligations and contracts, obligations and contracts digests

Peoples Car inc. v. Commando Security, 51 SCRA 40

doctrine
A party under contract is, in law, liable to its customer for the damages caused the
customer's car, which had been entrusted into its custody. The party is therefore justified
in law in making good such damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor its
contract and indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which had been caused directly
by the unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant's security guard in breach of their

contract. As ordained in Article 1159, Civil Code, "obligations arising from contracts have
the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith."
Peoples Car
(Commonado)

Inc

(Peoples)

contracted

Commonado

Security

Agency

Facts
Peoples Car Inc (Peoples) contracted Commonado Security Agency (Commonado)
under a Guard Service Contract. A guard under contract, while on duty, took out a
customers car [Joseph Luy] for a joyride. While driving along JP Laurel St, Davao City,
the guard lost control of the car and the car fell into a ditch. The car guard was charged
with qualified theft and the car and company sustained damages amounting to P8,489.
Peoples Car Inc claims that the security agency is liable under paragraph 5 of their
contract1 as they assumed the sole responsibility for the acts done during their watch
hours by the guards. Commondao countered that under the contract their liability shall
not exceed P1,000.00 per guard post (par. 4).
Davao RTC held for Commonado and limited award of damages to P1,000.00 based on
the contract. RTC also commented that if the situation was one falling on par. 5,
Peoples should have insisted and not paid the damages to Luy, and told him instead to
bring a case where Commonado would be become a party through a third-party
complaint or as a co-defendant.
Issue/s
Whether the award of P1,000.00 was proper.
Held
NO. Court reversed and awarded the full amount of actual damages.
The limited liability is only applicable is loss or damage was through the negligence of
Commondos guards, not when the guards deliberately disregarded his duty to
safeguard Peoples property by taking a customers car out on a joyride.
Plaintiff was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the customer's car,
which had been entrusted into its custody. Plaintiff therefore was in law justified in
making good such damages and relying in turn on defendant to honor its contract and
indemnify it for such undisputed damages, which had been caused directly by the
unlawful and wrongful acts of defendant's security guard in breach of their contract. As
1

ordained in Article 1159, Civil Code, "obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith."
Plaintiff in law could not tell its customer, as per the trial court's view, that "under the
Guard Service Contract it was not liable for the damage but the defendant" since the
customer could not hold defendant to account for the damages as he had no privity of
contract with defendant. Such an approach of telling the adverse party to go to court,
notwithstanding his plainly valid claim, aside from its ethical deficiency among others,
could hardly create any goodwill for plaintiff's business, in the same way that
defendant's baseless attempt to evade fully discharging its contractual liability to plaintiff
cannot be expected to have brought it more business. Worse, the administration of
justice is prejudiced, since the court dockets are unduly burdened with unnecessary
litigation.

'Par. 4. Party of the Second Part (defendant) through the negligence of its guards,
after an investigation has been conducted by the Party of the First Part (plaintiff)
wherein the Party of the Second Part has been duly represented shall assume full
responsibilities for any loss or damages that may occur to any property of the Party of
the First Part for which it is accountable, during the watch hours of the Party of the
Second Part, provided the same is reported to the Party of the Second Part within
twenty-four (24) hours of the occurrence, except where such loss or damage is due to
force majeure, provided however that after the proper investigation to be made thereof
that the guard on post is found negligent and that the amount of the loss shall not
exceed ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS per guard post.'
'Par. 5 The party of the Second Part assumes the responsibility for the proper
performance by the guards employed, of their duties and (shall) be solely responsible
for the acts done during their watch hours, the Party of the First Part being specifically
released from any and all liabilities to the former's employee or to the third parties
arising from the acts or omissions done by the guard during their tour of duty.' ...

Pichel vs. Alonzo 111 SCRA 341

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines
Facts:
This case originated in the lower Court as an action for the annulment of a "Deed of
Sale" dated August 14, 1968 and executed by Prudencio Alonzo, as vendor, in favor of
Luis Pichel, as vendee, involving property awarded to the former by the Philippine
Government under Republic Act No. 477. That the sale of the coconut fruits are for all
the fruits on the aforementioned parcel of land presently found therein as well as for
future fruits to be produced on the said parcel of land during the years period; which
shall commence to run as of SEPTEMBER 15,1968; up to JANUARY 1, 1976.
In July 1972, defendant for the first time since the execution of the deed of sale in his
favor, caused the harvest of the fruit of the coconut trees in the land.
Issue:
Whether or not the agreement in question is denominated by the parties as a deed of
sale of fruits of the coconut trees found in the vendor's land or it actually is, for all legal
intents and purposes, a contract of lease of the land itself?
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that construction or interpretation of the document in question
is not called for. A perusal of the deed fails to disclose any ambiguity or obscurity in its
provisions, nor is there doubt as to the real intention of the contracting parties. The
terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, hence the literal and plain meaning
thereof should be observed. Such is the mandate of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides that:
Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control ... .
Pursuant to the afore-quoted legal provision, the first and fundamental duty of the courts
is the application of the contract according to its express terms, interpretation being
resorted to only when such literal application is impossible. 9 The provisions of the
contract itself and its characteristics govern its nature. 4
Simply and directly stated, the "Deed of Sale dated August 14, 1968 is precisely what it
purports to be. It is a document evidencing the agreement of herein parties for the sale
of coconut fruits of Lot No. 21, and not for the lease of the land itself as found by the
lower Court. In clear and express terms, the document defines the object of the contract
thus: "the herein sale of the coconut fruits are for the fruits on the aforementioned parcel

of land during the years (from) SEPTEMBER 15, 1968; up to JANUARY 1, 1976."
Moreover, as petitioner correctly asserts, the document in question expresses a valid
contract of sale. It has the essential elements of a contract of sale as defined under
Article 1485 of the New Civil Code which provides thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.

People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690

FACTS:
On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a
hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he
inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie
200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her
vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object has already been
removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody skirt,
foul smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An
OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it
was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the
attending physician that a Negro inserted the object to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter
was made liable for rape with homicide.
ISSUE:
W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
HELD:
No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the
incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender
age. As evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A
doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario Baluyot
by Ritter was different from that which caused her death. As evidence, Rosario herself
said to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She also told
the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.
Ritter was also acquitted for the criminal case of rape with homicide. However, it does
not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the victims

heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.
Andamo vs. IAC
Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990 Fernan,
C.J.
Doctrine: It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations.
Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Facts: Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land
situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent
corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of the latter,
waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners land, caused a young man to drown,
damagaed petitioners crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the
livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some other destructions. This prompted
petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation under
Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.
Issue:
Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by
respondents waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code on quasidelicts.
Held:
Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is
one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. All the elements of
a quasidelict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11 Clearly, from petitioners
complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged
to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by
petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis
for the recovery of damages. It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not
without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing
cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person. SIC
UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have

mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered. Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority
shall be held liable under the law of Karma. Digest by: 2S, San Beda Law 2010201

Federation of Free Farmers vs. CAPalay Increase

There are 4 parties in this case: a. FFF (union representing the farmers) b. Planters (the
group which harvests the lands where the farmers work) c. Santos and Tikol (individual
planters) d. Central or Victorias (milling corp, Planters bring their harvest here to be
milled).
The law, Sugar Act of 1952 - RA 809 stipulates that any increase in the share of
proceeds of milled sugarcane and derivatives obtained by planters from the Central,
60% of said increase should be paid by planters to their respective laborers.
FFF alleged that they have not been paid from 1952-53 despite the 10% increase and
from 1953-1974 with the 4% increase. CA ruled planters and Victorias jointly and
severally liable. FFF claimed too that Planters and Victorias entered into an agreement
when they have no legal right bec the law has already provided the ratio of division.
Victorias claimed that they should not be held jointly and severally liable. The action
filed was not founded on torts but on either an obligation created by a contract or by law,
and even if on torts, the action has prescribed. They have paid the Planters so the
Planters should only be the one sued.
Planters claim they have freedom to stipulate ration as they might agree. And that they
have paid the laborers.
Issue:
a. WON Planters and Victorias should be severally liable
b. WON agreement bet Planters and Victorias were permissible under RA 809

Held:
a. NO. Legal basis is that arising from law which does not impose upon Centrals any
liability, whether expressly or impliedly, any joint and several liability. No contract bet
sugar mill and the laborers. Principal liability on Planters and secondarily on Dept or
Labor.

b. YES. RA 809 applicable only in the absence of a written milling agreement or in the
absence of any stipulation on the benefits which the laborers are entitled.

Source: Law and Contract

**Brinas vs. People Maling Sigaw ng Konduktor

Brinas convicted for double homicide thru reckless imprudence but acquitted
Bunecamino (asst conductor) and Millan (engineman), Brinas was the conductor. Brinas
told the passengers that they are near the town but before the victims were able to
alight, train already caught up speed. During the pendency of the criminal action, the
heirs of deceased filed separate civil action against Manila Railroad Company.

Issue:
WON the civil action can be pursued on the pendency of the civil action.

Held:
Yes. Source of obligation is that of a culpa-contractual and not an act or omission
punishable by law. Two different sources of oblig. Institution of criminal action on the
case does not interrupt the separate civil action for damages based on quasi-delict for
the same accident. Reckless Imprudence vs. Quasi-Delict. Reckless imprudent
Principal, Art. 2176 person who caused the crime liable, Art. 2180 solidary liability of
employer.

Source: Culpa-Contractual.

**Tan vs. Nifatan Isa-isa na silang namamatay, na-acquit pa.

Lim of a wealthy family was shot dead by the Tan brothers. But the Tan brothers one by
one died before the instant petition could be filed. The wife of Lim with the children
instituted an action for damages against charged 10 years from the happening of the
crime. Tans filed motion to dismiss because of acquittal.

ISSUE:
a. WON the action has prescribed.
b. WON civil action would still prosper even when the accused were acquitted.

Held:
a. No. Action for prescription for liabilities and charges of crimes is 20 years.

b. Yes. The reason for acquittal was not stated or explained and Art. 33 allows
independent civil action in case of physical injuries including death. (ROC?).

10 years prescription for actions when source is created by law. 5 years when not fixed
by the Code or other laws. 20 years for crimes or delicts as source of obligations.

Source: Delict or Crimes.

People vs Abungan namatay yung kriminal

Abungan convicted of murder sentenced to RP and ordered to pay indemnity of

P50,000. Abungan died.

Issue: WON death of Abungan extinguishes his criminal and civil liability

Held:
Yes. Extinguised based on delicts. Art. 89(1) of RPC, death of convict occurs before
final judgment, extinguished. But only criminal liability is extinguished and also the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on offense. Claim for Civil liability survives
if the same may also be predicated on a source of oblig other than delict.
Source: Crimes or Delicts. Acts or omission.

Del Rio vs. Palanca Hindi naman ikaw ang tatay, bakit ka nagbibigay.

Del Rio wanted to recover money which he furnished to the family of defendant for the
support and subsistence of the defs 5 children.

Issue: WON P can recover money.

Held: No. There are qualifications: a) support given to dependent of one who is bound
to give support but fails to do so b) support supplied by a stranger c) support was given
without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty. 3rd req lacking. Def knew
about support and even disagrees with it.
Source: Law. Article 1894 of CC which gives qualifications.