PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

1. TANADA VS TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

FACTS: The petitioner seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public

officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders; a right that is stated in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution that, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENTS: The respondents, through the Solicitor
General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no
legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in
the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question. The
said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.

CONTENTION OF THE PETIONERS: The petitioners maintain that since the subject of
the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a
public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.
The right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no
less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute
this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate
the same.
To give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate

their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees
have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of
the specific contents and texts of such decrees.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned. 6
DECISION OF THE COURT: The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

2. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. VS HON. RUBEN D.

TORRES
August 6, 1992

Facts: As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by

Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben
Torres issued Department Order No.16, Series of 1991, temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the
POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.
The POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37,
Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic
workers for Hong Kong.
Contention if the State: PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the
aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their

implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with grave abuse
of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars; that the assailed DOLE and POEA are contrary to the constitution,
and are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive. They have also failed to comply
with the requirements of the publication and filing with the Office of
Administrative national Register.
Held: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not
commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly
grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and
placement activities, to wit:
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to
restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies
within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement
Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this
title.
SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in
administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing
complexities of the modern society.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and
unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the
Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the
Civil Code to wit:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided;
Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other
government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of
this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing
rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective
fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of
general circulation;
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987 which provide:
Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it.
Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within

three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided
by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective
fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different
date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed
in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected
by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
3. Philippine International Trading Corporation, Petitioner vs. Hon.
Presiding Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles
Facts: The PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION (PITC) filed
this Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision
dated January 4, 1993 of public respondent Hon. Zosimo Z. Angeles.
PITC is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC)
created during Marcos regime to undertake and regulate trades between
Philippines and SOCPEC countries including PROC (pursuant to PD1071, LOI
444 & EO 133).
During Aquinos presidency she made PITC one of DTIs line agencies. This does
not mean, however, that PITC has lost the authority to issue administrative orders (AOs).
PITC issued AO No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 where importation from China must be
accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to
Peoples Republic of China (PROC) carried out by the improper himself or through a tieup with a legitimate importer with 1-1 ratio.

PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from

China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement
of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial
court upheld and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The
court contends further authority to process and approve applications for
imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has
already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence the
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

Decision: Decision affirmed. The Supreme Court held that PITC is

empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within
the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs
Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and
private laws shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall

begin 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of

general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.
4. RODOLFO S. DE JESUS VS COMMISSION ON AUDIT
August 12, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioners were receiving honoraria as designated officials of LWUA,
prior to the effectivity of the Republic Act No. 6758 which provides for
the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into
standardized salary rates except for certain additional compensations.
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued DBM CC No.
10, discontinuing without qualification all allowances and fringe
benefits granted on top of basic salary effective November 1, 1989 in
order to implement R.A. 6758,.
Respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on
post audit, the payment of honoraria to petitioners.
Petitioners appealed to the COA questioning the validity and
enforceability of DBM CCC No. 10. In its decision dated January 29,
1993, the COA upheld the validity and effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10
and sanctioned the disallowance of petitioners honoraria.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of
publication in the Official Gazette
RULING:
The DBM CCC No. 1 is more than a mere interpretative or internal
regulation, it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances
and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul
together. At the very least, before the said circular may be permitted to
substantially reduce their income, the government officials and
employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the
publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines - to the end that they be given
amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have,
and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in
keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and
transparency.
The Supreme Court ruled that the DBM CCC No. 1 is ineffective due to
its non publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the country and that the other issue at bar is
unnecessary.
The respondents are ordered to pass on audit the honoraria of
petitioners.

5. Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs. Vega

June 28, 2001
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the
liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB). Thereafter, the PVB
employees union, herein petitioner, filed claim for accrued and unpaid
employee wages and benefits. On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to
Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and
which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for
benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. In May 1992,
Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen
despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge
Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further
that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its
publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER
: With the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio,
and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.
N.B: functus officio- of no further official authority or legal efficacy used of
an officer no longer in office or of an instrument, power, or agency that has
fulfilled the purpose of its creation <once exercised, their power of approval
or disapproval is functus officio
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
SUPREME COURT RULING
: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15
days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless
otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any
event be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process
in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed
to govern it.
6. De Roy vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by Feliza De Roy and Virgilio
Ramos collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of

Luis Bernal, resulting in injuries to his family and the death of Marissa Bernal,
a daughter. They had been warned to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. De Roy and
Ramos were found guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to the
Bernals. De Roy appealed to the Court of Appeals but they affirmed the
ruling of the Regional Trial Court. On the last day of filing a motion for
reconsideration, De Roys counsel filed a motion for extension. The Court of
Appeals denied it because. in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon
(August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roys counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be
applicable because it was never published in the Official Gazette.
Issue:
Whether Supreme Court decisions are laws that should be published in the
Official Gazette.
Decision:
No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in
the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
7.
UNCIANO
PARAMEDICAL
COLLEGE,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

INC,

petitioners,

Facts:
Around the latter part of July 1989, Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes
initiated a petition proposing to the school authorities the organization of a
student council in the school. They solicited support of their petition from the
studentry by asking the students to endorse the same with their signatures.
They were able to get at least 180 signatures. On August 18, 1989, Elena
Villegas and a certain student named Solomon Barroa were summoned to
the Office of Dr. Moral and were admonished not to proceed with the
proposal because, according to her, the school does not allow and had never
allowed such an organization.
On September 12, 1989, the news leaked out that the above-named
students would be barred from enrolment and on December 1989, the
students were formally informed that they were denied to enrol for the
second semester.
On May 16, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order

effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petitioner school from not enrolling private
respondents in its College of Nursing and setting the hearing for the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990.
Crime: grave abuse of discretion with regards to the trial courts act of
issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered
petitioners to allow private respondents to enrol for the first semester of
school year 1990- 1991
Contention of the Defendant (court of appeals):
The arguments advanced in support of the petition are mainly
anchored on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ALCUAZ, et al.
vs. Philippine School of Business Administration which held that'It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is
considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 (of the)
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student
registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the 'written contracts'
required for college teachers are for 'one semester.' It is thus evident that
after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing
contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers . . .
But in the recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, et
al., (185 SCRA 523), the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled its
decision in the Alcuaz case which the case in bar is based.
Issue: whether the new ruling of the supreme court may be applied
retroactively with respect to the case at bar/
Contention of the Petitioner:
Petitioners argue that under the then prevailing Alcuaz doctrine which
was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the contract between them and private
respondents was validly terminated under the principles of Alcuaz case.
Although the said doctrine was abandoned in the later case of Non vs.
Dames II which was promulgated on May 20, 1990, when the termination of
contract between the students and the petitioners has already elapsed.
Ruling of the SC:
The Supreme Court held that in the case, the principles under the case
of Alcuaz must apply because settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this
Court (Supreme Court) is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
In the present case, the contract between the parties was validly terminated
upon the end of the first semester of school year 1989-1990, or in October,
1989. This is the status quo. The trial court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
which ordered petitioners to allow private respondents to enroll for
the first semester of school year 1990-1991. Private respondents (the
students through their parents) do not possess any clear legal right to re-

enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged legally to re-admit them.

The petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 7, 1991 and its resolution dated June 3, 1991 are SET ASIDE.
The orders of the trial court dated June 4, 1990 and June 13, 1990 and the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction are likewise SET ASIDE.

8. Emeterio Cui-Plaintiff vs Arellano University-Defendant

Facts: Emeterio was a law student of the Arellano University. He finished his
studies up to the 4th year of 1st semester. On his 2nd semester, he decided to
transfer in Abad Santos University where his uncle was transferred. His uncle
Franciso Capistrano was the former Dean of the College of Law and legal
counsel of Arellano University.
Emeterio, during all the time he was studying law in Arellano University was
awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition
fees were returned to him after the end of semesters and when his
scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees
was paid by Emeterio to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from
the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the
college of law or the fourth year, was in a total of P1,033.87.
After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the
bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the
transcripts of his records in Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter
to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he
had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above
stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts,
plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest.
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated,
he was made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby
waive my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the
University (defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash.
Moreover, Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of
1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private
schools, colleges and universities.
Issue: Whether or not the contract is null and void.
Contention of the Defendant: Emeterio signed an agreement with the

University relinquishing his right to transfer another school without having

refunded to the University, the equivalent of the scholarship cash.
Contention of the Plaintiff: Emeterio shall get his transcripts with
reimbursing all the scholarship cash that was granted to him by the
University.
Decision: There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether
or not the contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University on
September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel
vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court
said: 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a
consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the
practice of government officers.' It might take more than a government
bureau or office to lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your
communication, but courts consider the practices of government officials as
one of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been
consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine
of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not
recognize or uphold a transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is
calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic
honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere
64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University
understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which
prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have
not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which
is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the
authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was
repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs.
Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to
declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the
contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some
established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good
morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The
policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy.
Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding
students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that
university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the
business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals?
Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted
principles of morality which have received some kind of social and practical
confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and
keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of
social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in
Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements

Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free
scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the
corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So
also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States after
which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these
institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant
students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help
gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien.
(Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one
shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954,
date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing
defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.
9. Illuh Asaali vs Commissioner of Customs
December 16, 1968
Criminal Law Characteristics of Penal Laws Territoriality
In 1950, customs officers intercepted 5 ships owned by Illuh Asaali et al. Said
ships were found to be from Borneo and were on their way to a port in Tawitawi, Sulu. On board the ships were rattan products and cigarettes. The
customs confiscated said items on the ground that Asaali et al do not have
the required import permits for the said goods.
Asaali questioned the legality of the seizure as he contended that the
customs officers did not intercept them within Philippine waters but rather,
they were intercepted in the high seas. Hence, according to Asaali, Philippine
import laws have no application to the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Asaalis contention is correct.
HELD: No. Asaalis contention is without merit. The Revised Penal Code
leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability not only within the
Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its
jurisdiction against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship. The
ships intercepted were of Philippine registry.
Further, it has been an establish principle that a state has the right to protect
itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to
the high seas. The authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute
and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannon by a
foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile act which it is its
duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be
exercised beyond the limits of its territory.
PS: Madali lang yung case kaya di ko na dinagdagan, about
territoriality lang naman..hehe
10. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, vs. JOSE
JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

Facts:

A case was appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas, in
finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
Which rises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of
our ruling in People v. Mapa.
In facts on September 5, 1964 on or about 9:00 oclock p.m. the accused keep in his
possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one
(1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.
Contentention of the Accused: He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration
because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent
from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent
from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with
them the authority to possess and carry the firearm and he was entitled to acquittal on
the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs.
Lucero.
Issue:
Should the accused-appellant be acquitted on the bases of the Supreme Court
rulings in the Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in the view of the
complete reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?
Contention of the State:
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero,
supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's
judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he
was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he
had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold
and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that
the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless,
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms;
and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace
officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of
the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances
of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a
necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect
the capture of a Huk leader. InMapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine
in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero.
Held:
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New
Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since
this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that

law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero andMacarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence
of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in
question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should
not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is
necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
society.
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to
the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang andLucero, under which no criminal
liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not
be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is
acquitted, with costs de oficio.
11. Carlos Alonzo vs Intermediate Appellate Court
150 SCRA 259
Facts:
Five brothers inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in
the name of their deceased parents. Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share by
way of absolute sale. Euataquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share in Con Pacto de
Retro Sale to the same vendee. By virtue of same agreements, the petitioners occupied,
after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the
portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. With
their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a
part of the enclosed area. 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five co-heirs, sought to
redeem the area sold to the Spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it
appeared that he was an American citizen. However, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed
her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. The
other co heir claimed that they are unaware of the sale of the said property and also
alleged that the area occupied by the Spouses had merely mortgaged by Celestino and
Eustalgia.
Issue:
Whether or not the actual knowledge of the sales by the coheir satisfied the
requirement of the law.
Rulings:
The coheirs in this case undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given to them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began
and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the
complaint for redemption in 1977, without the coheirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justification for this exemption.

The 30-day period starts when the co-heirs were actually informed of
the sale. This could have happened when none of the co-heirs made a move

to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, Tecla Padua filed her
complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because
the period for its exercise had already expired.
12. VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two
children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alices business in
Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property.
CONTENTION OF PETITIONER: Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no
community property as of June 11, 1982.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: Judge Romillo denied the MTD in the mentioned
case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property is applicable in the Philippines?
HELD: It is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between Alice and
Richard, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case
is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the
divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States
of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in
this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the

husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
13. IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL VS HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA
June 30, 1989/174 SCRA
Facts:
Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, married Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national, in Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany in 1979. After a year, their
daughter Isabella Pilapil Geiling was born. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany after
only three and a half years of marriage, in January 1983, which was granted on 1986 by
Division 20 of Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany. Petitioner also filed
an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 on January 1983, which was still pending as Civil Case
No. 83-15866.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, five months after the decree of the divorce, private respondent filed
two criminal cases of adultery against petitioner before the City Fiscal of Manila for
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with a certain William
Chua sometime in 1982 and Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
Issue:
Whether or not the case for adultery should prosper even though they are no longer
husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
Ruling:
No. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code states that only the offended spouse can
initiate the complaint for adultery through a sworn written complaint. The Supreme
Court contends that the status, or legal capacity of the complainant, or in this case the
offended spouse, is determined at the time the complaint was filed. Since the complaint
was filed five months after the decree of divorce and thus dissolution of the marriage,
the private respondent has no legal capacity as husband to initiate the complaint of
adultery.
14. LLORENTE VS COURT OF APPEALS

345 SCRA 592 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Laws Nationality Principle Effects of
Foreign Divorce
Succession Last Will and Testament of an Alien
In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S. Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente

got married in Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.

In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He discovered that Paula was already living
illicitly with Ceferino Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino and Paula even had a son.
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her monetary support. Eventually,
Lorenzo and Paula agreed in writing Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if the latter agrees to waive
all monetary support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned to the United States.
In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in California. Paula was represented by an
American counsel. The divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce became final.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno. They had three children.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia and their
children (nothing for Paula). In 1983, he went to court for the wills probate and to have Alicia as the
administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding can be terminated, Lorenzo died.
Later, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate.
The trial court ruled that Lorenzos marriage with Alicia is void because the divorce he obtained abroad is
void. The trial court ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence divorce is not applicable to him. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzos divorce abroad should be recognized.
HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became an American citizen in 1943. Hence,
when he obtained the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen. Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides:
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status are no
longer applicable to him. Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be respected. The rule
is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for the latter to determine the effects of the
divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.
Anent the issue on Lorenzos last will and testament, it must be respected. He is an alien and is not
covered by our laws on succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts for probate, then
the case was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to prove the
validity of the will.

15. WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.
Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati RTC.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from Germany. The decree provides
that the parental custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang. Wolfgang filed a
motion to dismiss the nullity case as a divorce decree had already been promulgated,
which was granted by respondent Judge Salonga.
Carmen filed a motion with a prayer that the case should proceed for the purpose of
determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially set aside her previous order for the
purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.
Contention of the accused:
Whether the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce
from a foreign country.
Contention of the state:
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity
to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that
judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody
of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what
was the extent of private respondents participation in the proceedings in the German
court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she
commented on the proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services
Office. Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had
no counsel to assist her in said proceedings. More importantly, the divorce judgment
was issued to petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that
when a couple lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably
dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the
trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is
in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the childs
welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody.
Held:
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding
the custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private
respondent. Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the
matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at issue.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby

declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who
has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded
promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.

16. Testate Estate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward Bellis

Facts:
Amor G. Bellis, born and was a citizen of the state of Texas and of the United
States. He had five legitimate children Edward Bellis et al by his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, had three legitimate children by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy who survived him and had three illegitimate
children: Amor Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Mirriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amor Bellis executed a will in the Philippines which are:
a.$240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives,
in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will
was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The Peoples Bank and Trust
Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
Executors Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition
where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by
the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies
of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of
P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate
into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd
marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they
were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

Contention:
They were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children
Issue:
Whether Texas law or Philippine law must apply.
Held:
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the
lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to
raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of
the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if
Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for
the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked
nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case
falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17
in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under

consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and

regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of
the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil
Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted.
This is not correct. Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding
the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated
Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while
reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of
the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which
must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of
this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law
of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one
to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from
this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming
that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine
will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50
Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced

heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of

the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
costs against appellants. So ordered.

17. G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. vs.
MAGDALENA C.
BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN
Facts:

On April 24, 1950, the CFI Manila, Judge Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate
a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila.
Later in 1956, the executor filed a project of partition. Meanwhile, Magdalena, the wife
of Bohanan and his two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions
disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been
deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them. The will has not
given the wife any share in the estate left by the testator.
Magdalena further argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the
Reno divorce secured by the testator from her, and that said divorce should be declared
a nullity in the courts jurisdiction.
However, the court refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the
laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his
properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
On the part of the children, both received legacies in the amount of P6,000.00 only.
Issue:
Whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which
are short of the
legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid?
Ruling:
Yes. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died
in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be
earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. Says the law
on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession
as well as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property and the country in which it is
found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil
Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that
the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his

domicile and his permanent residence.

18. IN THE MATTER OF TESTATE INTERSTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
ADOLFO ZNAR VS HELEN GARCIA

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,

DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased,
Executor and
Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
January 31, 1963
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he
resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to
the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. However, during the
entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a
citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a
legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to
have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims
that California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred
back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable;
that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights
of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir
of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil
Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately
apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are
no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property
possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not
being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of
Christensen?
RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that
there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to
Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which should apply to
Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says: If there
is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed
to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.
Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the
Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a

circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.

19. ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
-Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc.
located at 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. As part payment thereof,
Albenson was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in the
amount of P2,575.00 and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks
(Rollo, p. 148).
-Check was later dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Company
traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to
one Eugenio Baltao, the president of Guaranteed and the recipient of the
unpaid mild steel plates.
-Albenson made an extrajudicial demand upon Baltao, however, it appears
that the respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who
manages the E.L. Woodworks in the same Baltao Building, 3267 V.Mapa
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same address of Guaranteed.
- In filing information for violation of BP 22, Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he
had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence,
but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his
right.
- Baltao claims ignorance for the complaint filed against him and alleging
that he had not been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary
investigation.
-Fiscal Mauro Castro exonerated Baltao and castigated Sumaway for failing to
exercise prudence in performing his duty that caused injustice to the
respondent.
- Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him, Baltao,
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Albenson. The trial court
favoured the Baltao while the court of appeals only reduced the damages.
The respondent then brought the case before the Supreme Court.
[BPP 22: AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A
CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.]
ISSUES/CRIME:
Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.
ACCUSED CONTENTION:
Baltao claims that he never had any dealings with Albenson since his
corporation Guaranteed is a defunct entity (inactive or no longer exist) and
that he did not issue the dishonored check.
STATES CONTENTION:

Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didnt have the intent to
cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect
what was due to them.
There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP
22. Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who
issued check based on ff inquiries:

SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao

Bank said signature belonged to EB
EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr.
and the III.

There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson.

There must be proof that:
the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person and
that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless
Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:
1. There is a legal right or duty
2. Exercised in bad faith
3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:
1. There is an act which is legal
2. But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
3. It is done with intent to injure
A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek
ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find
means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the
absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral
damages cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does
not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right
to litigate.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R.C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.

20.CUSTODIO, et al., vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
PacificoMabasa owns a property behind the properties of spouses Cristino and
BrigidaCustodio and spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos. The passageway leading to
Mabasas house passes through the properties of the Custodios and the Santoses.
Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos built a fence around
their property. This effectively deprived Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa then
sued the Custodios and the Santoses to compel them to grant his right of way with
damages. Mabasa claims that he lost tenants because of the blockade done by the
families in front. The trial court ruled in favor of Mabasa. It ordered the Custodios and
the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanent easement and right of way and for Mabasa to
pay just compensation. The Santoses and the Custodios appealed. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the CA modified the ruling by awarding
damages in favor of Mabasa (Actual damages: P65k, Moral damages: P30k, Exemplary
damages: P10k).
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of damages by the Court of Appeals is proper.
STATES CONTENTION:
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
ACCUSEDS CONTENTION:
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.Petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not
appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of
way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the
finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the
grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.
HELD:
No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of damnum absque injuria.
In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses (damage) when his
tenants left because of the fence made by the Santoses. However, when Santos built

the fence, he was well within his right. He built the fence inside his property. There was
no existing easement agreement, either by contract or by operation of law, on his
property. Hence, Santos has all the right to build the fence. It was only after the
judgment in the trial court that the easement was created which was even conditioned
on the payment of Mabasa of the just compensation. Santos did not commit a legal
injury against Mabasa when he built the fence, therefore, there is no actionable wrong
as basis for the award of damages. In this case, the damage has to be borne by Mabasa.
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an
action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has
been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and
though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in
the latters favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria.
The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action
reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means.

21. BARONS MARKETING CORP., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC. respondents.[G. R. No. 126486. February 9, 1998]

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On August 31, 1973, Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. [Phelps] appointed Barons
Marketing, Corporation [Barons] as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables
effective September 1, 1973. Barons was given 60 days credit for its purchases of
Phelps electrical products.
During the period covering December 1986 to August 17, 1987, Barons purchased,
on credit, from Phelps various electrical wires and cables in the total amount
of P4,102,438.30. These wires and cables were in turn sold by the Barons to
MERALCO(Barons being the accredited supplier of the electrical requirements of
MERALCO).
Under the sales invoices issued by Phelps to Barons for the subject purchases, it is
stipulated that interest at 12% on the amount due for attorneys fees and collection.
On September 7, 1987, Barons paid Phelps the amount of P300,000.00 leaving an
unpaid account on the deliveries of P3,802,478.20. On several occasions, Phelps
wrote Barons demanding payment of its outstanding obligations due to them.
In response, Barons wrote Phelps on October 5, 1987 requesting the latter if it could
pay its outstanding account in monthly installments of P500,000.00 plus 1% interest
per month commencing on October 15, 1987 until full payment. I was, however,
rejected by Phelpsand reiterated its demand for the full payment of Barons account.

On 29 October 1987, Phelps filed a complaint before the Pasig Regional Trial Court
against Baronsfor the recovery of P3,802,478.20 including interest. Phelps likewise
prayed that it be awarded attorneys fees at the rate of 25% of the amount
demanded, exemplary damages amounting to at least P100,000.00, the expenses of
litigation and the costs of suit.
Both parties appealed to respondent court (Court of appeals). Phelps claimed that
the trial court should have awarded it the sum of P3,802,478.20 rather than
P3,108,000.00. The latter amount appears in Barons prayer as a result of a

typographical error.
On the other hand, Barons reiterated its claims for damages as a result of creditors
abuse. It also alleged that Phelps failed to prove its cause of action against it.
On 25 June 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying the decision of
the trial court the Court finds Phelps to have preponderantly proven its case and
hereby orders Baronsto pay Phelps the following: (a) P3,802,478.20 constituting the
unpaid balance of defendants purchases from plaintiff and interest thereon at 12%
per annum computed from the respective expiration of the 60-day credit term, vis-avis the various sales invoices and/or delivery receipts; and (b)5% of the preceding
obligation for and as attorneys fees.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the private respondent (Phelps) is guilty of abuse of right.
2. Whether the private respondent is entitled to interest and attorneys fees.
***Its okay to remove this contention part since theyre the same with the ruling
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER [BARONS]:
Petitioner now invokes Article 19 and Article 21of the Civil Code, claiming that
private respondent abused its rights when it rejected petitioners offer of settlement
and subsequently filed the action for collection.

Petitioner nevertheless urges this Court to reduce the attorneys fees for being
grossly excessive, considering the nature of the case which is a mere action for
collection of a sum of money. It may be pointed out however that the above penalty
is supposed to answer not only for attorneys fees but for collection fees as well

CONTENTION OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT [PHELPS]:

Both parties agree that to constitute an abuse of rights under Article 19 Barons must
act with bad faith or intent to prejudice Phelps. They cite the following comments of
Tolentino as their authority: . . .There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is
exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. . . . The exercise of
a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure
another. . . .
Private respondent argues that petitioner failed to question the award of attorneys
fees on appeal before respondent court and raised the issue only in its motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, petitioner should be deemed to have waived its right
to question such award.

RESOLUTION/RULING:
1. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the
burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same.In the case at
bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of private
respondent. Petitioners allegation that private respondent was motivated by a desire
to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner so that private respondent itself
may deal directly with MERALCO is simply not supported by the evidence. At most,
such supposition is merely speculative.
The private respondent was driven by very legitimate reasons for rejecting

petitioners offer and instituting the action for collection before the trial court. As
pointed out by private respondent, the corporation had its own cash position to
protect in order for it to pay its own obligations.This is not such a lame and poor
rationalization as petitioner purports it to be. For if private respondent were to be
required to accept petitioners offer, there would be no reason for the latter to reject
similar offers from its other debtors. Clearly, this would be inimical to the interests of
any enterprise, especially a profit-oriented one like private respondent. It is plain to
see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights, not an abuse thereof. Under
these circumstances, we do not deem private respondent to have acted in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy as to violate the provisions
of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Having ruled that private respondents acts did not transgress the provisions of
Article 21, petitioner cannot be entitled to moral damages or, for that matter,
exemplary damages. While the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved,
petitioner must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded.As we have observed above, petitioner has failed to
discharge this burden.
2. The Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not
assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED,and the attorneys and collection fees
are reduced to ten percent (10%) of the principal but is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

22. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation Vs CA 176 SCRA 778,
August 25, 1989
Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent
and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. He
reported to the petitioner that he has found out anomalies in the company as
regards fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it
lost several thousands of pesos.. The petitioner, though, pronounced him as
the primary suspect of such reported anomalies and thus forced him to have
a one week leave leaving all his drawers and files open and leave his
duplicate key in the office. After said forced leave, he returned back to the
company and was called to be a crook and a swindler by the petitioner. They
had hem undergo a lie detector test and also asked him to submit a
specimen of his hand writing. The police submitted the report as regards the
result of said tests and relieved the private respondent of being guilty of said
anomaly. The petitioner hired a private investigator who later on submitted a
report saying that Tobias is found guilty. The report, though, subjected him to
further investigation. The police underwent reexamination of the specimen
submitted and reiterated the same result saying that Tobias is not guilty of
said anomaly. Nevertheless, the petitioner issued a memorandum of
suspension to Tobias and filed charges against him, primarily estafa. The
court dismissed the case and the petitioner appealed the same but was

again dismissed. Later on, Tobias received a notice that he has been
dismissed from work and thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The
court dismissed the complaint so he appealed again to the NLRC and the
decision was reversed granting thus the complaint. The petitioner appealed
to and the earlier decision was reinstated. Tobias then filed for appeal the
Secretarys Labor with the office of the president. While the appeal was on
going, the two parties made a compromise.
Tobias applied for a work at another company but was not accepted because
the petitioner sent a message to the company saying that Tobias was
dismissed due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner
Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila rendered judgment in favor of private respondent
by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as
actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral
damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias
appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a
decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration having been denied, thus the instant petition for
review on certiorari was filed.
Issue: Whether petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent,
Tobias.
Held
Yes, they are liable for damages. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code
provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence". if gross negligence warrants the
award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified
when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith.
As in the Zuluetacase, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been
committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of
exemplary damages to the latter. Petition by Hendry is denied and the
decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Costs to the petitioner.
23. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI) VS.COURT
OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA
FACTS:
Plaintiff-respondent Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio
Communications Of ThePhils., Inc. (Petitioner), sent through its Manila Office,
reading as follows:
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO DIONELA
CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY

WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER

LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER
115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA
DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO

Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to
him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue
embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other
people have come to know of said defamatory words. The telegram sent
through its facilities was received in its station at Legaspi City. Nobody other
than the operator manned the teletype machine which automatically
receives telegrams being transmitted. The said telegram was detached from
the machine and placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff.
The additional words in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the
telegram when delivered.
Loreto Dionela charged a civil case for recovery of damages against the RCPI
based on Art. 19 and 20 of the Civil Code before the trial court.Defendant corporation
(RCPI) contended before the trial court that the additional words in Tagalog was a
private joke between the sending and receiving operators which was not meant to be
attached and that they were not addressed to or intended to malign Loreto Dionela and
therefore did not form part of the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not
defamatory.

The trial court decided in favour of Loreto Dionela. The RCPI brought the case
to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower court. The
RCPI, unsatisfied, filed a motion for reconsideration before the same court
and the same was denied. Thereafter, makulitkasitalaga, RCPI filed a petition
for review before the Supreme Court which is now the case at bar.
The Petitioner Corp. (RCPI) CONTENDS that:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner-employer should
answer directly and primarily for the civil liability arising from the criminal act of
its employee.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was sufficient
publication of the alleged libelous telegram in question, as contemplated by law
on libel.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of petitionercompany-employer is predicated on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Articles
on Human Relations.

HELD:
S.C. affirmed the judgment of the appellate court.
In regard to issue no. 1, the action for damages was filed in the lower court directly
against Respondent Corporation not as an employer subsidiarily liable under the
provisions of Article 1161 of the New Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of
the New Civil Code. As well as on respondent's breach of contract thru the negligence of
its own employees.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and
transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through the facilities
of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. There is no question that in the case at bar,
libelous matters were included in the message transmitted, without the consent or
knowledge of the sender. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in
adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent.
As a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts of
its employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To
hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit
of petitioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of the
petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases, negligence must be
proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard to
substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing
speaks for itself), by considering the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the
injury.
RCPI was negligent as it failed to take necessary or precautionary measures to avoid the
occurrence of the humiliating incident complained of.

24. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner vs. ROMEO A. JADER,

respondent.
FACTS: Romeo Jader took his law proper at UE from 1984-88. During the first
semester of his last year in law school, he failed to take the examination for
Practice Court I in which he obtained an incomplete grade. He filed an
application for removal of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos Ortega
on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28 and on May
30, the professor gave him a grade of 5.
His name was still on the tentative list of candidates for
graduation. Likewise, his named appeared in the invitation for the
commencement exercises which was held on April 16, 1988. When he learnt
of his deficiency, he dropped from his Bar Review classes thereby made him
ineligible to take the bar exam.
He filed a civil suit against UE for damages because he suffered
moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, and sleepless nights due to UEs negligence. The

petitioner denied liability arguing that it never led respondent to believe that
he completed the requirements for an LlB degree when his name was
included in the tentative list of graduating students. The court ruled in favor
of the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not UE be held liable for damages to the respondent.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
The court ruled that the petitioners liability arose from its failure to promptly
inform the result of the examination and in misleading respondent into
believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation.
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to
respondent for the latters actual damages, we hold that respondent should
not have been awarded moral damages. As a senior law student respondent
should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner is ordered to pay the sum of Php 35, 470 with legal interest of 6%
per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid;
the amount of Php 5000 as attorneys fees and the cost of the suit. The
award of moral damages is deleted.
25. CONRADO L. DE RAMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon,
petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil
Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of
fourteen (14) municipal employees. Petitioner de Rama justified his recall
request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were
midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in
violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. While the matter
was pending before the CSC, three of the above-named employees filed with
the CSC a claim for payment of their salaries, alleging that although their
appointments were declared permanent by ConradoGulim, Director II of the
CSC Field Office based in Quezon, petitioner de Rama withheld the payment
of their salaries and benefits pursuant to Office Order No. 95-01, which was
issued on June 30, 1995, wherein the appointments of the said fourteen (14)
employees were recalled. Based on the documents submitted, the Legal and
Quasi-Judicial Division of the CSC issued an Order finding that since the
claimants-employees had assumed their respective positions and performed
their duties pursuant to their appointments, they are therefore entitled to
receive the salaries and benefits appurtenant to their positions.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE: Mayor de Rama failed to present evidence that
subject appointments should be revoked or recalled because of any of the
abovementioned grounds enumerated. As a matter of fact, said
appointments were even approved by the Head, Civil Service Field Office,

Lucena City when submitted for attestation. In the absence of a clear

showing that these appointments were issued in violation of any of these
grounds, the Commission has no other recourse but to uphold their validity.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of
the CSCs Resolution, as well as the Order of the CSC Legal and Quasi-Judicial
Division, averring that the CSC was without jurisdiction: (1) to refuse to
revoke the subject appointments; and (2) to uphold the validity of said
appointments, even assuming that there was failure to present evidence that
would prove that these appointments contravened existing laws or rules. He
also posited that the CSC erred in finding the appointments valid despite the
existence of circumstances showing that the same were fraudulently issued
and processed.
HELD: The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that
they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in
Lucena City, and for petitioners failure to present evidence that would
warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments.
On November 21, 1996, the CSC denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. The CSC reiterated its ruling that:
In the absence of any showing that these alleged midnight appointments
were defective in form and in substance, nor is there evidence presented to
show that subject appointments were issued in contravention of law or rules,
these appointments are deemed valid and in effect.
26. CECILIO PE, ET AL. VS ALFONSO PE 5 SCRA 200 MAY 30 1962
FACTS: The defendant was regarded as a family member so he was allowed
to visit the plaintiffs house and to ask Lolita to teach him to pray the rosary.
Defendant, a married man, had a clandestine love affair with Lolita, the 24
year old unmarried woman. When the family learnt about their secret affair,
defendant was forbidden to visit their house and to see Lolita. However, their
affair still continued. On April 1957, Lolita disappeared from her brothers
house in Quezon City. A note written by the defendant was seen on the
aparador of Lolita.Plaintiffs claim for damages is based on the fact that
defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe
thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy. The family filed an action for damages in pursuant
with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the injury caused to the family of Lolita by the
defendant is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
HELD:The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolitas
affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru
an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making
her fall in love with him. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio
and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita.
Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations

with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has
committed and injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil
Code.
27. HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
-109 PHIL. 629FACTS:
The complainant Soledad Cagigas is thirty six years old, a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent. The petitioner Francisco
Hermosisima is ten years younger than complainant, and an apprentice pilot.
Intimacy developed between them and thus sometime 1953 after coming
from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin. In February 1954,
the woman advised the man that she is pregnant whereupon the man
promised to marry her. Their daughter Chris Hermosisima was born June
1954 in a private clinic. However, subsequently the man married one
Romanita Perez. Hence, Soledad filed a complaint against Francisco for
acknowledgement of her child as a natural child of the petitioner, as well as
for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to
marry. The CFI declared the child a natural daughter of the defendant,
ordered Francisco to support the child by giving a monthly alimony, awarded
actual damages and moral damages. On appeal of the petitioner, the
CA affirmed the assailed decision however increased the amount for actual
and moral damages.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the award for moral damages is valid.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that no moral damages can be had in
the intant case because it was the woman who virtually seduced the man by
surrendering herself to him because she a girl ten years older was
overwhelmed by her love for him, she wanted to bind him by having a fruit
of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
28. ERLINDA ESTOPA VS. LORETTO PIANSAY
109 PHIL 1440
FACTS:
The plaintiff Erlinda Estopa, a beautiful girl of twenty-three, residing in
Bago, Negros Occidental, with her widowed mother, Felicidad Estopa, stated
that she fell in love and submitted herself completely to the defendant
Loreto Piansay, Jr., sometime in September, 1957, after a courtship that
lasted for a couple of months during which period the defendant consistently
promised and succeeded to make her believe in him that he was going to
marry her; that sometime in December, 1957, the plaintiff was informed

reliably that defendant was backing out from his promise of marriage so she
demanded defendants compliance to his promise in order to vindicate her
honor, and plaintiff went to the extent of asking the help of defendants
parents, but all her efforts were in vain. Finally, realizing that her efforts were
futile but knowing that her cause was not completely lost, she decided to file
her complaint, not to compel defendant to marry her, but to demand from
him a compensation for the damages that she sustained.
The trial court sided with the plaintiff and awarding to the plaintiff the
sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages, P2,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P1,000.00 as attorneys fees.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:
1. Breach of promise to marry is not actionable cause
2. There should be no damages granted to the plaintiff because there was no
deceit or fraud employed.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE:
1. Piansay should be liable for damages because of the social humiliation,
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and moral shock
suffered by Estopa because of the said breach of promise to marry.ua1aw
library
RESOLUTION:
We have today decided that in this jurisdiction, under the New Civil
Code, the mere breach of a promise to marry is not actionable. (Hermosisima
v. Court of Appeals, Supra, 631); and we have reversed the Cebu courts
award for moral damages in a breach of promise suit. Consistently with such
ruling, Loreto Piansay, Jr. may not be condemned to pay moral damages, in
this case.
Now, as plaintiff has no right to moral damages, she may not demand
exemplary damages. (She lays no claim to temperate or compensatory
damages.)
"While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the
plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded. (Art. 2234, New Civil Code.) (Italics
supplied.)
Therefore, as plaintiff is not entitled to any damages at all, there is no reason
to require Piansay, Jr. to satisfy attorneys fees.
Judgment reversed, defendant absolved from all liability. No costs.

29. Wassmer vs. Velez

12 SCRA 648 (1964)
FACTS:
Francisco Veles and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of
love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
September 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be, which reads:
Dear Bet,
We will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on
the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only
create a scandal.
Pacquing.
Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued
Velez for damages. Velez contended that there is no provision of the Civil
Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. The records
reveal, however, that on August 23, 1954 Wassmer and Velez applied for
marriage license, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for
September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-bes trousseau, party dresses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the
maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with
accessories was bought.
And then, with but two days before the wedding, Velez simply called off the
wedding, went to Mindanao and never returned and was never heard from
again.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE:
1. That there are already actual damages that were incurred by the offended
part (B. Wassmer) thus it just proper for the accused to pay for the said
damages incurred pursuant to Art. 21 of the New Civil Code.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:
1. Breach of promise to marry is not actionable. No specific provision of the
law punishes said act.
RESOLUTION:
This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. Mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding

and go through all the above-described preparation and publication, only to

walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 of the Civil Code.

30. AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO vs.

IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for
acknowledgment, support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. The
case was filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and docketed as Civil
Case No. 8881. In her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges, among others, that
sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant
located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that the day following
their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was
billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that Amelita
asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening,
Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of
getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of
marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual
contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they repeated their
sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in
Manila, as a result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support
fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan
who is the father of the child yet to be born at the time of the filing of the complaint;
that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a waitress; that
Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of P5,000 to
P8,000. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.

In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's
Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. By way of
counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment of exemplary damages and litigation
expense including attorney's fees for the filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the
complaint impleading as co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was born on
August 3, 1975. In its order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court admitted the
amended complaint.

On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint
reiterating his previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son.

Trial Court rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino and against defendant Ivan
Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of
actual and moral damages; and, the sum of P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees.
The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.

From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration.
Ivan Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not
supported by evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the recognition
and support of her son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff

Amelita Constantino and plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino, and against defendant
Ivan Mendez ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by
way of actual and moral damages and the sum of P200.00 as and by way of payment of
the hospital and medical bills incurred during the delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael
Constantino; to recognize as his own illegitimate child the plaintiff-minor Michael
Constantino who shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining
to a child of such status; to give a permanent monthly support in favor of plaintiff
Michael Constantino the amount of P300.00; and the sum of P5,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.

ISSUE: whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in setting aside the
decision of the trial court and in dismissing the complaint.

CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED: Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual

findings of the trial and in not affirming the decision of the trial court. They also pointed
out that the appellate court committed a misapprehension of facts when it concluded
that Ivan did not have sexual access with Amelita during the first or second week of
November, 1976 (should be 1974), the time of the conception of the child.

CONTENTION OF THE STATE: It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of
the trial court have only a persuasive and not a conclusive effect on the Court of
Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals
to review the factual findings of the trial court and rectify the errors it committed as
may have been properly assigned and as could be established by a re-examination of
the evidence on record. It is the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not those of the

trial court, that as a rule are considered final and conclusive even on this Court.

Based on the evidence on record, that Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and
convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael
Constantino.

HELD: Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil
Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her
virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse is
not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse
is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's
Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was attracted
to Ivan (TSN, December 3, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise
of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was
informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a
married man. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and November,
1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the
alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.

31. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals

219 SCRA 115 Civil Law Torts and Damages Breach of promise to Marry Article 21
of the Civil Code

In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou

Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange
student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and
intimate. On Marilous account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the
end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they
expressed their intention to get married. Marilous parents then started inviting
sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to
slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had
sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began
maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou and he
told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home
and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he
cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an
Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of
his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which
provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is
the deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of
the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into
sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals.
She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to
Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashems blatant disregard of Filipino
traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good
customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country
and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect
our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the
concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this case where
the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books such as the absence of a law
penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to
marry was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages
may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual
lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then
actual damages may be recovered.

32. ARTURO VALENZUELA and HOSPITALITA VALENZUELA v. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS et al.

168 SCRA 623

FACTS
Petitioner Arturo Valenzuela [Valenzuela] is a general agent of Philippine
American General Insurance Company [Philamgen] since 1965. As such, he
was authorized to solicit and sell in behalf of Philamgen all kinds of non-life
insurance, and in consideration of services rendered was entitled to receive
the full agents commission of 32.5% from Philamgen. From 1973 to 1975,
Valenzuela solicited marine insurance from Delta Motors. However,
Valenzuela did not receive his full commission.
In 1977, Philamgen started to become interested in and expressed its intent
to share in the commission due Valenzuela on a 50-50 basis, but he refused.
In 1978, Philamgen and its President [Aragon] insisted on the sharing of the
commission with Valenzuela, but he firmly reiterated his objection to the
proposals. Because of the refusal of Valenzuela, Philamgen and its officers
took drastic action. They reversed the commission due him by not crediting
in his account the commission earned from the Delta Motors insurance,
placed agency transactions on a cash and carry basis, threatened the
cancellation of policies issued by his agency, and started to leak out news
that Valenzuela has a substantial account with Philamgen. This resulted in
the decline of his business as insurance agent. Philamgen terminated the
General Agency Agreement of Valenzuela in December 1978.
Valenzuela filed a complaint against Philamgen, and the RTC ruled in his
favor, as his termination was found to be unjustified. However, the CA ruled
in favor of Philamgen, as CA ordered Valenzuela to pay Philamgen the
amount corresponding to the unpaid and uncollected premiums. Hence, this
petition for review of the decision of Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
(1)Whether Valenzuela should be held liable for unpaid and uncollected
premiums.
(2)Whether or not Philamgen and/or its officers can be held liable for
damages due to the termination of the General Agency Agreement it
entered into with the petitioners.
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED
Since admittedly the premiums have not been paid, the policies issued have
lapsed. The insurance coverage did not go into effect or did not continue and
the obligation of Philamgen as insurer ceased. Hence, for Philamgen which
had no more liability under the lapsed and inexistent policies to demand,
much less sue Valenzuela for the unpaid premiums would be the height of

injustice and unfair dealing.

DECISION
(1)NO. Under Section 77 of the Insurance Code, the remedy for the nonpayment of premiums is to put an end to and render the insurance policy
not binding.

The non-payment of premium does not merely suspend but puts

an end to an insurance contract since the time of the payment is
peculiarly of the essence of the contract.
An insurer cannot treat a contract as valid for the purpose of
collecting premiums and invalid for the purpose of indemnity.
The foregoing findings are buttressed by Section 776 of the
Insurance Code (PD 612), which now provides that no contract of
insurance by an insurance company is valid and binding unless
and until the premium thereof has been paid, notwithstanding
any agreement to the contrary.
(2)Presiding from the foregoing, and considering that the private
respondents terminated Valenzuela with evident mala fide it necessarily
follows that the former are liable in damages. Respondent Philamgen has
been appropriating for itself all these years the gross billings and income
that it unceremoniously took away from the petitioners. The
preponderance of the authorities sustain the preposition that a principal
can be held liable for damages in cases of unjust termination of agency.
In (Danon v. Brimo, 42 Phil. 133 [1921]), this Court ruled that where no
time for the continuance of the contract is fixed by its terms, either party
is at liberty to terminate it at will, subject only to the ordinary
requirements of good faith. The right of the principal to terminate his
authority is absolute and unrestricted, except only that he may not do so
in bad faith.
The court in its decision awarded to Valenzuela compensatory damages.
Under Article 2200 of the new Civil Code, "indemnification for damages
shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of
the profits which the obligee failed to obtain." The circumstances of the
case, however, require that the contractual relationship between the
parties shall be terminated upon the satisfaction of the judgment. No
more claims arising from or as a result of the agency shall be entertained
by the courts after that date. The petition is GRANTED.
33. JESUS B. RUIZ vs. ENCARNACION UCOL (G.R. No. L-45404 August 7,
1987)

Facts: Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B.

Ruiz filed an administrative charge against defendant-appellee Encarnacion
Ucol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt Ilocos Norte. In her answer to
the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz
who wanted to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by Encarnacion
Ucol's husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged to have made remarks
that Atty. Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges.
The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal
complaint for libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of
Ucol's answer.
Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty. During the proceedings
in the libel case, complainant Atty. Ruiz entered his appearance and
participated as private prosecutor. After trial, the lower court rendered
judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement was made by the trial court as
to the civil liability of the accused.
Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate
complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case
was founded.
Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that
the cause of action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Issue: The only issue being whether or not the civil action for damages was
already barred by the criminal case of libel.
Contention of the accused: "that the respondent Court of Appeals
committed a grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the present case but
instead in ordering the same remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings ... ."
Contention of the state: Analyzing defendant's answer Exh. "5", even with
meticulous care, the Court did not find any defamatory imputation which
causes dishonor or discredit to the complainant. She was the victim of an
unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against her honor, honesty,
character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense, which she did in
her answer, to protect her honesty and integrity and the very job upon which
her family depend for their livelihood. Every sentence in her answer (Exh.
"5") is relevant, and constitutes privileged matter. She did not go further
than her interest or duties require. She did not go beyond explaining what
was said of her in the complaint for the purpose of repairing if not entirely
removing the effects of the charge against her. She had absolutely no motive
to libel Atty. Ruiz who, by the way, cast the first stone.
Decision: Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case, since
the decision of the trial court did not pass upon the civil aspect of the
criminal case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in
cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action distinct
from the criminal proceedings is not without limitations. The Supreme Court

found that the appeal of Ruiz is without merit as records of the trial court
manifest that the suit being charged by Ruiz to be a harassment suit on the
following grounds. (1)Ruiz had something to do with the administrative
complaint, (2) Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucols answer in
the administrative case after the administrative cases dismissal, (3)Third, he
acted as private prosecutor in the criminal case actively handling as a lawyer
the very case where he was the complainant. And (4)fourth, after the
accused was acquitted on the basis of the facts stated above, Atty. Ruiz
pursued his anger at the Ucols with implacability by filing a civil action for
damages. As stated by the trial judge, "court actions are not established for
parties to give bent to their prejudice." This is doubly true when the party
incessantly filing cases is a member of the bar. He should set an example in
sobriety and in trying to prevent false and groundless suits.
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The petition filed by petitioner Encarnacion Ucol is likewise
DISMISSED for patent lack of merit.
34. ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and
JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984)

FACTS:
On or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the
municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla,
Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto
Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias
Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually
helping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio
Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3,
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of
said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures
therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares
and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his
family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral
damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions:
Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being
policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
ISSUE:

1. whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from
the criminal charge.
2. May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?
CONTENTION OF THE ACCUSED:
1. The court of appeals committed a grave error of law or gravely abused its
discretion in imposing upon petitioners payment of damages to complainants
after acquitting petitioners of the crime charged from which said liability arose.
2. The court of appeals erred in holding in its resolution dated December 26, 1974
that since appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt, not on facts that
no unlawful act was committed, the imposition of actual damages is correct.
3. The court of appeals committed a legal inconsistency, if not plain judicial error, in
holding in its appealed resolution that petitioners committed an unlawful act, that
is taking the law into their hands, destructing (sic) 'complainants' properties',
after holding in its main decision of November 6, 1974 that the acts for which
they were charged did not constitute grave coercion and they were not charged
of any other crime.
4. The court of appeals erred in ordering the petitioners herein, appellants in ca-g.r.
no. 13456cr, jointly and severally, to pay complainants p9,600.00 in supposed
actual damages
Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32
of the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in
question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the
removal of the goods inside the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of
the goods taken out, piled them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a
rope, and after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of
said stall of Antonio Vergara.
CONTENTION OF THE STATE:
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants
Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defence that they did so in order to abate
what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, this finds no support in law and in
fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which
allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a
nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.

RULING:
1. The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. The petition was dismiss for lack of merit.
2. While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for
the actual damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the

demolition of the stall and loss of some of their properties.

WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense
that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they
are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the amount of
P9,600.00, as actual damages.
35. Marcelo Jervoso and Norma Closa vs People of the Phils. and CA
G.R. No. 89306 September 13, 1990
Petition for review of the decision of the CA
Grio-Aquino, J.:
Topic: Criminal Procedure, Rule 111, Rules of Court
Facts: RTC of Manila and the CA convicted petitioner Marcelo Jervoso of
homicide for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso; and convicted Marcelos
wife, Norma Closa, of slight physical injuries committed against the
deceased. The RTC imposed the penalty of imprisonment and ordered the
petitioners to indemnify the heirs of the deceased R. Jervoso in the amount
of P30,000. CA affirmed the order of indemnification.
Issue: Whether indemnity may be recovered by the heirs of R. Jervoso
despite the reservation by the said heirs of their right to file a separate civil
action against the accused.
Ruling: CA decision affirmed, except the award of P30,000 as indemnity for
damages which should be deleted.
Sec 1 Rule 111 of the RC states that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the RPC, and
damages under Arts 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the CC arising from the same act
or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes
the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of the
said civil actions separately waives the others.
The term "physical injuries" in Art. 33 is used in a generic sense. It
includes consummated, frustrated, or attempted homicide. Having reserved
and filed in the RTC Mla a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of
the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased R.
Jervoso, are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against
the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same
criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of
R. Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity for his death
despite their reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The

Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the award.

36. MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA,
EDGAR MARCIA, and RENATO YAP, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER, INC.,Respondents. [G.R. No. L34529. January 27, 1983.]
Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of the CA.
FACTS: In 1956, a passenger bus in Pampanga operated by private
respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee Felardo Paje,
collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death
and in physical injuries to herein petitioners. Thereupon, an information for
homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed
against Paje in the CFI of Pampanga. A month later, an action for damages
was filed in the CFI of Rizal by petitioners against the Victory Liner, Inc. and
Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and
negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. Paje was convicted by
the CFI but was acquitted on appeal ruling that appellant was not even guilty
of civil negligence and that it was a pure accident. The CFI of Rizal
subsequently dismissed the civil case.
Petitioners argument:
The civil action for damages against private respondents for physical injuries
resulting from negligence is an independent one, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, under the provisions of articles 33, 2176
and 2177 of the new civil code and section 2 of rule 111 of the rules of court.
ISSUE: W/N the civil action is an independent one, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action.
RULING: Decision of CA affirmed.
Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes
mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code. The above article speaks only of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein
petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were
not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages
may be instituted in connection therewith.
The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries
but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and
physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap.
They are not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil
Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
37. Maria Benita A. Dulay, Et Al., V. The Court Of Appeals, Et Al.(1995)

G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995

Lesson Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:

December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the

security guard on duty at Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed
Atty. Napoleon Dulay

Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her

own behalf and in behalf of her minor children filed an action for damages
against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the
firearm and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard)
and/or Superguard Security Corp. (Superguard) as employers
for negligence having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury

Superguard:

Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of

his duties, and was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil
liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasioffenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay

ISSUE: W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and
can be civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for
homicide

HELD: YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the
merits

Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil

action prior to the criminal action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification

for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article
2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which
are voluntary and intentional.

Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only

acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary

extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,

refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused

It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot

Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred
while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.

38. MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. AGUSTIN P.

MONTESA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-14534
February 28, 1962
Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, Romulo L. Chua and Dewey G. Soriano for respondents.
DIZON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L. Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin P.
Montesa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz, Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan, and Olimpia A. Yco, to enjoin the former from proceeding with the trial
of Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the final determination of Civil Case No. 1446 of the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information for
Bigamy was filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (Criminal Case No. 3405), alleging that the latter, having previously
married one Estrella Guarin, and without said marriage having been dissolved,
contracted a second marriage with said complainant.
On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil Case
No. 1446 against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the
ground of duress, force and intimidation. On the 30th of the same month respondent
Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground
that it stated no cause of action, but the same was denied on July 7 of the same
year. 1wph1.t
On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to
suspend proceedings therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue
involved in Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a
prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion on September 20, 1958 as
well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and ordered his arraignment. After
entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present action.
We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930,
February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question we further said must be determinative
of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another
court (People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should
the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence,
petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation, it
is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is
determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other
hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with
respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said court.

In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for
bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is
vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the
action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same rule when the
contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he
entered into it because of duress, force and intimidation.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted. Without costs.

39. QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO (GR No. L-48157 March 16, 1988)

FACTS:
Ejectment Case. Private Respondent claims to own the land and Petitioner
through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth entered their property. Petitioner raised
in his affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case that an administrative
case is pending before the Office of Land Authority between the same parties and
involving the same piece of land.
In the administrative case Petitioner dispute the right of the Private Respondent over
the property for default in payments for the purchase of the lot. Petitioner argue that
the administrative case was determinative of private respondents right toe eject
petitioner from the from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a
judicial action until after its termination.
The Municipal Court denied the Motion to Dismiss contained in the Petitioners
affirmative defenses. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. Private
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing there is no Prejudicial Question.
The Land Authority filed and Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in the CFI praying
that the Petition for Certiorari be granted and the ejectment case be dismissed and the
Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.
The Petition was denied by the CFI finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to
be one of prior possession and Motion to Intervene was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner and Intervenor raised the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE PARTIES

INVOLVING THE LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE EJECTMENT CASE CONSTITUTES A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHICH WOULD OPERATE AS A BAR TO SAID EJECTMENT CASE.

DECISION: PETITION IS GRANTED. CIVIL CASE No. 2526 of the then MUNICIPAL COURT
OF MALABON RIZAL IS HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED. No Costs.

Technically, No prejudicial question.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. (Zapata v. Montessa 4 SCRA 510
(1962); Pp v. Aragon, 500 G. No. 10, 4863) The Doctrine of Prejudicial Question comes
into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the
issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be preemptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the
existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause
the suspension of the latter pending final determination of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111
of the Revised Rules of Court are:
the Civil Action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal
action
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
However because of intimate correlation of the two proceedings and
the possibility of the Land Authority in deciding in favor of Petitioner which
will terminate or suspend Private Respondents Right to Eject Petitioner, the
SC gave the lower court and advise. This advise became the which became
the basis for deciding the case.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court
to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a
determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
jurisprudence dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding
the possibility of petitioners right of possession being upheld in the pending
administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to
expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise of futility.
Thus, 1 AM Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance
to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the parties
and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to the second action cannot be
properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second
action should be stayed. (at page 622)
While the rule is properly applicable for instances involving two [2] court actions,
the existence in the instant case of the same consideration of identity of parties and
issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as
the need to resolve the parties right of possession before the ejectment case may be
properly determined, justifies the rules analogous application to the case at bar.
Fortich-Celdran, et al vs. Caldran, et al, 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogous

situation. In sustaining the assailed order of the then CFI of Misamis Oriental ordering
the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public document against several
persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane until the civil case
involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged document shall have been
decided, this Court cited as a reason therefor its own action on administrative charges
against said Santiago Catane, as follows:
It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court
against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in Abeyance, thus:
As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by respondent
attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 (Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane,
etc, et al.) is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu CFI, action on the
herein complaint is withheld until that litigation has finally been decided. Complainant
Celdran shall inform the Court about such decision.(SC minute resolution April 27,
1962 in Adm Case No. 77, Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc. et. al)

If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial question to

an administrative case. We see no reason why the reverse may bot be so considered in
the proper case, such as in the petition at bar.

The SC even noted the Wisdom of Its advice.

Finally, events occurring during the pendency of the petition attest to the wisdom of the
conclusion herein reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner, it was
stated that he intervenor Land Authority which later became the Department of
Agrarian REform had promulgated a decision in the administrative case affirming the
cancellation of Agreement to Sell issued in favor of the private respondent. With this
development, the folly of allowing the ejectment case to proceed is too evident to need
further elaboration.

40. IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS,

respondent. [G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria
Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. An information for bigamy was
filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, in RTC Br. 226 Quezon City.
Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was

celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to

suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the
pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to
the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal
case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:
Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second
marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension
of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE:
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a
civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
DECISION:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is
a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is
based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action
would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the
defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue
raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or
not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of
the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A
party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately
alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet
presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its
case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal
charge through a non-criminal suit.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration
of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is
that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the
validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was
void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no
judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be
prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous
marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not
been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration
of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same
judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and
eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void
and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage
aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and
thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of
nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such
scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held
in Landicho v. Relova:
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration
of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who
contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for
lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her
marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage
license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they
had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The issue in this case is limited to
the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve
the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the
Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that
"every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds." Hence, parties should not be
permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same
must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the

nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as

there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. No
matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the
intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40
of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can
render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the
criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that
the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question. This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes
presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be
successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing
that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the
marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the
judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why
should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to
delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own
disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous
marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence
during the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the
second marriage was contracted rests upon the defense,[18] but that is a
matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it
should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be
used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action.
The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy.
Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he
entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after
he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is
that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial
question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution.
As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having
obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be
said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current
jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of
such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage

will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its
nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar,
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man
at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this
legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the
fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence
of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own
malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.