Presidentialism

Presidentialism is one of the three major organizational models for government

institutions in contemporary representative democracies. This entry discusses its
conceptualization, reviews its origins and diffusion, summarizes its different varieties,
provides an outline of the debates about its advantages and disadvantages, and evaluates
its current relationship with democracy.

Definition
Presidentialism can be defined by the simultaneous presence of three characteristics.
The first is the existence of two agents of the electorate: a chief of governmentknown
as presidentand a legislative assemblyusually known as congressboth of which
are elected separately and by popular vote. The second characteristic is that both the
president and members of congress are elected for preestablished fixed terms, which
means that each agent's survival does not depend on the other's confidence. The
president cannot be removed by a legislative vote of no confidence on political grounds.
While the president can be removed through impeachment proceedings, impeachment is
intended as an exceptional response to illegal or improper presidential behavior, and it
requires the support of a qualified congressional majority. Likewise, the president
cannot dissolve the legislative assembly and call for parliamentary elections at his or her
discretion.
The third characteristic of presidentialism is the blending of the roles of head of
government and chief of state in the same institution, the presidency. As the head of
government, the president has authority over the overall direction of government,
appoints cabinet ministers and the upper echelons of public bureaucracy, may influence
the legislative process through the introduction of bills, and has veto and decree powers.
As head of state, the president is also the symbolic representation of the state, signs
international treaties, commands the armed forces, and has the authority to grant
pardons.
Under parliamentarism and semipresidentialism, the chief of government is not directly
elected and does not serve a fixed term. Rather, the chief of government is chosen by a
legislative majority and remains in power subject to maintaining the confidence of such
a majority. In addition, in these two systems the government can dissolve (or ask to
dissolve) the parliament and call for legislative elections before the legislative term
ends. The combination of these mechanisms functionally provides that the party or
coalition that enjoys a parliamentary majority is also the one in charge of government.
In contrast, under presidentialism, situations of divided government can exist, in
which the party (or coalition) of the chief of governmentthe presidentdoes not
enjoy a majority in congress. Under divided government, cooperation between the
executive and the legislative majority is crucial to avoid deadlock and stalemate.
In addition, both parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism are dual-executive systems.
Under both arrangements, the prerogatives of the executive are divided between a chief
of government (usually called a prime minister) and a chief of state (a monarch or a
president with limited and/or symbolic powers under parliamentarism and a president
with extensive powers under semipresidentialism).

Origins and Diffusion of Presidentialism

Presidentialism's origins can be traced to the constitutional convention that took place in
Philadelphia and produced the U.S. Constitution of 1787. The main theoretical
underpinnings, motives, and aspirations of the constitution were expressed by the
writings of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, published as The
Federalist Papers.
The most important elements of this institutional design were novel at the time: a
written constitution that aimed at defining and limiting political authority, a government
based on popular sovereignty, a chief of state named president instead of a hereditary
king, and a system of checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches designed to guarantee order and security and avoid tyranny.
The inspiration that grew from the origins and characteristics of the U.S. Constitution
legitimized later ruptures with other premodern monarchical regimes that came soon
after the American struggle for independence. Indeed, the presidential model expanded
widely throughout Latin America with the end of Spanish rule, the advent of wars of
independence (18081824), and the process of state formation that followed. Outside
the Americas, presidentialism never found the same conditions to expand and thrive. In
fact, Latin American is really the continent of presidentialism today; there are only a
handful of non-American countries employing the system, including Benin and Nigeria
in Africa and the Philippines and South Korea in Asia.

Types of Presidentialism
The term presidentialism does not necessarily imply that the executive is always and in
all cases the most powerful of the branches of government. Researchers have identified
different types of parliamentary governments depending on the primacy of the
government or the parliament (i.e., cabinet government, Kanzlerdemokratie [chancellor
democracy], or assembly government). A similar distinction can be made between at
least two types of presidential systems: those based on equilibrium among branches
and those based on executive dominance. Three variables differentiate these
categories: (1) the powers of the president vis--vis congress, (2) the role of the
Supreme Court as an arbiter of executive legislative conflict, and (3) how parties and
the party system are structured. The United States is the paradigmatic example of
presidentialism based on equilibrium among branches, while most of the other cases
fall into the executive dominance category.
The U.S. president faces a powerful legislative branch with significant legislative and
oversight prerogatives and complete autonomy with respect to its agenda and its session
calendar. On the other hand, the majority of the remaining presidential constitutions
establish a more powerful president and a weaker legislature than exists in the United
States. In contrast to the U.S. president, Latin American presidents not only enjoy
reactive powers (such as veto power) but also proactive and agenda-setting powers.
Among the latter are the following: (a) power to legislate through emergency decree
powers, (b) exclusive right of legislative initiative in some areas (such as the budget or
the organization of public administration), (c) ample powers over the budgetary process,
(d) authority to initiate a referendum on general topics or specific laws, (e) authority to
convene congress for special sessions, and (f) authority to ask congress to prioritize
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executive initiatives. Notwithstanding these powers, Latin American legislatures are not
mere rubber stamps. They do exercise their legislative and oversight powers but to a
lesser extent than their U.S. counterpart.
In addition, the Supreme Court historically has played a crucial role in the working of
U.S. presidentialism, acting as arbiter in conflicts between the executive and the
legislature. The combination of the Court's recognition as an arbiter of interbranch
conflict and its significant institutional prestige has resulted in the Court operating as a
third branch of government. This is distinct from other presidential countries where
Supreme Courts have often been unable to adequately exercise their role as arbiter due
to undue influence from the executive.
Historically, in executive-dominant presidential systems, the usual way of limiting
presidents' power has been through the adoption of non-reelection clauses (either
lifelong or nonimmediate). These measures produce presidents with ample ruling
powers but without the ability to extend their terms of office. In spite of term limits, a
number of Latin American presidents have attempted to remove these clauses,
provoking an increase of executivelegislative conflict, a weakening of the mechanisms
of horizontal accountability and oversight, and, more generally, increased levels of
political instability.
The nature and structure of parties and party systems also differentiate the types of
presidentialism in functional terms. Two-party systems with low internal party
discipline such as that of the United States not only provide the president a wider
margin to rule under divided government conditions but have also contributed to
limiting the power of presidents who enjoy a majority in congress. In any case, while
the existence of a two-party system with weak parties might allow presidents to more
successfully push their agendas, it also obliges presidents to pay careful attention to
congressional autonomy, power, and will.
On the other hand, presidential forms of government that coexist with multiparty
systems or two-party systems with disciplined parties, as is the case in much of Latin
America, have produced both cases of executive dominance and cases of compromise
between executive and congress. Clear examples of dominance situations include those
cases in which presidents, supported by a disciplined legislative majority, take full
advantage of the situation and push their own agendas without seeking agreements with
opposition parties. Presidents who lack congressional majorities may also decide to use
(and abuse) their proactive powers and rule alone, circumventing congress.
Alternatively, presidents facing a minority situation can build coalitions to avoid
deadlock and stalemate, offering cabinet positions to parties with legislative
representation in exchange for legislative support for executive initiatives. This is an
example of consensual interbranch relations.

Criticisms and Debate

During the 1980s, a large number of countries (first in Latin American and then in
Eastern European) moved toward democracy, requiring them to restore, modify, or even
create constitutions and rules for political competition. This context provided an
opportunity to discuss different government designs, to compare the advantages and
disadvantages of presidentialism and parliamentarism, and to revise and eventually

modify how political institutions were organized. The political scientist Juan Linz
occupied a prominent position in this debate as he took the lead in a fierce scholarly
criticism of presidentialism, basing his criticism on the numerous presidential
democracies in Latin America that underwent institutional crises and eventually broke
down during the 1960s and 1970s. In short, critics argued that presidentialism was less
efficient than parliamentarism in guaranteeing political stability and democratic
governability. They identified four perils or problems inherent in the logic of
presidential design.
First, the dual legitimacy created by presidentialism is prone to deadlock and stalemate.
Under presidentialism, both the agents of the popular vote (the president and the
legislature) have a legitimate claim to power and popular support without an official
procedure to solve conflicts between the two. Situations of divided government
constitute a serious difficulty as opposition parties in congress have few incentives to
cooperate if credit for success is not attributed to them, while at the same time they will
likely bear the cost of failure. Presidents may even encounter problems in marshaling
support from their own parties, as legislators of the president's party can resist or reject
bills from the executive, risking neither their positions nor the dissolution of congress.
This problem does not exist under parliamentarism, where governments can maintain
themselves in office only if they enjoy legislative support.
A second problem with presidentialism is, according to its critics, the rigidity implied in
fixed terms. Fixed terms make institutional responses to critical situations much more
difficult. The possibilities for replacing an unpopular or moribund president (e.g.,
resignation, impeachment) are complicated, and the mere intention of applying them
might result in further complications and a deepening of the crisis. On the contrary,
under parliamentary arrangements, the replacement of government and the call for
anticipated elections are normal institutionalized political solutions that are always
available and easy to use in times of crisis.
The third shortcoming of presidentialism is the majoritarian and zero-sum character of
presidential elections: Elections with only one winner generate strong political tensions.
What makes the zero-sum nature of presidentialism even more serious is that under
certain electoral rules, a candidate with little popular support or one who is strongly
deviant from the median voter can win, potentially generating crises of legitimacy and
situations of conflict, polarization, and/or crisis. Critics of presidentialism invoke as the
quintessential example the Chilean elections of 1970: The leftist candidate Salvador
Allende won the presidency with only 36.2% of votes against the center-right candidate
Jorge Alessandri with 34.9% and the Christian Democrat candidate Radomiro Tomic
with 27.8%. Despite this close margin of victory, and facing a hostile congress, Allende
began to carry out radical policies. In a context of increasing political polarization, the
government of President Allende was overthrown by the military in a coup d'tat on
September 11, 1973.
The last shortcoming that critics note is the dual character of the presidential office,
generated by the system's fusion of the roles of head of state and head of government.
The symbolic and/or ceremonial duties of the chief of state often collide with the tasks
of a head of government. To its critics, the symbolic functions of a chief of state are less
legitimate when carried out by an individual who is the leader of a party and therefore
involved in partisan power struggles.

The contributions of Linz and other critics of presidentialism sparked a revival in

interest in governmental institutions and their effect on stability and democratic
performance as well as several responses that challenged Linz's argument. For example,
scholars like Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart, while admitting some difficulties
associated with presidential systems, presented counterarguments noting some of the
advantages of presidentialism over parliamentarism.
First, according to these scholars, presidentialism offers more electoral options to
voters, who can cast votes for both the legislature and the executive and can decide to
split their vote, a possibility parliamentarism precludes.
Second, presidentialism offers citizens more opportunities to exercise accountability
and express their preferences in public policy neatly. Under presidentialism, citizens can
choose between at least two clearly different alternatives (the incumbent and the
opposition) for president and a number of alternatives from among which they can
select the candidate closest to their preferences for congress. In contrast, in
Westminster-type parliamentarisms, government and opposition are clearly defined and
it is possible for voters to determine governmental responsibility for policies, but there
is no room for minority representation. Under multiparty parliamentarism, the exact
opposite takes place: Citizens do not know in advance how their vote will reflect on the
final composition of government. In these cases, changes in the partisan composition of
the ruling coalition can take place even between elections, and parties originally in the
opposition might be invited to join the government.
The third argument in favor of presidentialism is that it better facilitates legislative
control over lawmaking and oversight of the executive. As the survival of government
is not at stake, members of congress enjoy wider margins of maneuver to adequately
analyze bills and look for broader support for an initiative, ultimately having a greater
effect on legislation.
Fourth, presidential fixed terms generate higher democratic stability in countries with
governability problems due to weak parties or highly fragmented or polarized party
systems, where it would be dif ficult to form coalitions in a parliamentary context.
Finally, some scholars argue for caveats to the notion of the zero-sum nature of
presidentialism. The existence of two agents of the electorate results in the possibility of
more than two winners. A party that does not win the presidency but obtains a
considerable number of seats in the assembly can limit the executive and block its
initiatives, especially if the president possesses only reactive legislative powers (or
limited proactive and agenda-setting powers). In contrast, Westminster-style
parliamentarisms are good examples of one party taking a dominant position in both
branches of government and exercising power with few limitations.

Presidential Democracies Today

For many years, the combination of presidentialism and democracy only succeeded in
the United States. In no other place did presidentialism coexist with a stable democratic
regime. For example, at the beginning of the 1980s, only three Latin American
countries were ruled by presidents elected in competitive elections: Colombia, Costa
Rica, and Venezuela. The remaining countries were ruled by different varieties of

nondemocratic regimes, including hegemonic party systems (Mexico) or military

dictatorships (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay).
In 2010, however, presidential democracies prevailed across the Americas. Many of
them have suffered periods of political crisis and instability, but all of them have shown
unanticipated resilience in recent years. There have been major setbacks, such as the
autogolpes (self-inflicted coups by ruling presidents to close the congress) by the
Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori in 1992 and by the Guatemalan president Jorge
Serrano in 1993. In other cases, presidential democracies survived thorny circumstances
including presidential impeachments, as was the case in Brazil (1992) and Venezuela
(1993), or presidential resignations amid usually violent social protest and uprisings, as
in the case of the Paraguayan president Ral Cubas Grau in March 1999, the Ecuadorian
Jamil Mahuad in February 2000, the Argentinean Fernando de la Ra in December
2001, and the Bolivian Gonzalo Snchez de Lozada in October 2003.
In spite of scholarly suggestions and initiatives by some politicians to modify
presidential arrangements, all the constitutional conventions convened throughout Latin
America since the late 1980s have maintained or strengthened presidentialism's basic
logic and tenets. As a consequence, today the combination of presidentialism and
democracy is not an oddity but a common feature of the political systems of a large
number of countries.

Miguel De Luca

Further Readings
Cheibub, J. A. (2007). Presidentialism, parliamentarism and democracy. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Hamilton, A., Madison, J., & Jay, J. (1961). The Federalist papers. New York: New
American Library. (Original work published 17871788)
Jones, M. P. (1995). Electoral laws and the survival of presidential democracies. Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Linz, J. J., ed. , & Valenzuela, A. (Eds.). (1994). The failure of presidential democracy.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Mainwaring, S., ed. , & Shugart, M. S. (Eds.). (1997). Presidentialism and democracy
in Latin America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Neustadt, R. (1960). Presidential power: The politics of leadership. New York: Wiley.
Prez-Lin, A. (2007). Presidential impeachment and the new political instability in
Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rossiter, C. (1956). The American presidency. New York: Harcourt Brace.

Sartori, G. (1994). Comparative constitutional engineering: An inquiry into structures,

incentives and outcomes. London: Macmillan.
Shugart, M. S., ed. , & Carey, J. M. (Eds.). (1992). Presidents and assemblies:
Constitutional design and electoral dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Entry Citation:
De Luca, Miguel. "Presidentialism." International Encyclopedia of
Political Science. Ed. Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, and Leonardo
Morlino. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2011. 2123-28.