A.C. No.

244

March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
FACTS:
About two years after Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar, Severino Martinez charged
him with having falsely represented in his application for the Bar examination, that he had
the requisite academic qualifications.
The Solicitor General caused the charge to be investigatedand later he submitted a report
recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to
the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department
of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of
the "required pre-legal education".
In answer, Telesforo A. Diao claimed that although he had left high school in his third year, he
entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein,
which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to
civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd
and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to
exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials.
However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious.
Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now,
asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he
was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his
school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was
obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from
Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing
that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests,

because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under
oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education,"
(emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to
his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter
admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be,
and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the
prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN

THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR

EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of
which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling
(Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the
appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
[1]

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition
to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City,

namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation,
and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May
21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez
and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also
purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the
latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney
in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the
fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement
letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to
have
been
received
by
the
Sangguniang
Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed
his Answer with the OBC.
[2]

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases
filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their
former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the
said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in
the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a
single incident and involving the same parties as closed and
terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
[3]

As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word Attorney as they were, according to
him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC
disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
[4]

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in
his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known
that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired
judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already
dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his
good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under
oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters
is his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of
criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him
also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar.
[5]

As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the
Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney whoever may have
typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the
fact is, he is signing his communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing
fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter
1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a person
liable for indirect contempt of court.
[6]

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the
Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar
Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in the Sharia
Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.
[7]

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling,
however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders
the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose
the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for
resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter
of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only

learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.
The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.
[8]

[9]

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002
Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not been
charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a
fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or
convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the
declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending
criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath
at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether
there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The
nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court
in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a
lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the
test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
[10]

Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal
cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and
results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the
Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not
entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya, the Court had the
occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title Attorney by members of
the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The
respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4 th Judicial Sharia District
in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection
with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The
Court declared that:
[11]

persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia courts.While one who has been
admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine
Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney
is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of
law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
[12]

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling
in this case. The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who
are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest
employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and
practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would
diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the
constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage
in his application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions
before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy
to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further
orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of
appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine
Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine
Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys
as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become
moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1]

Rollo, pp. 2-25, with Annexes.

[2]

Id. at 27.

[3]

Id. at 28-32.

[4]

Supra, note 1 at 34-38.

[5]

Id. at 35-36, citing Bar Matter 1209, Petition to take the Lawyers Oath of Caesar Distrito and
Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859.

[6]

Id. at 36-37, citing Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court and Bar Matter
1209, supra.

[7]

Id. at 38.

[8]

Tan v. Sabandal, Bar Matter No. 44, February 24, 1992, 206 SCRA 473.

[9]

Leda v. Tabang, Adm. Case No. 2505, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 395.

[10]

See In Re: Victorio D. Lanuevo, Adm. Cases No. 1162-1164, 29 August 1975, 66 SCRA 245,
281.

[11]

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997, 268 SCRA 628.

[12]

Id. at 638-639.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound
effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of
law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to

proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on

a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666,
citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is.
Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis
ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the

qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be

Members of the Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the
provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of
the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by
a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice
that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it
will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on
Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that
this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is
still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities
in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of
lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members
called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys.
In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice
of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood
to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623,
626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers
spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without
litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once
articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such
as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work
is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases.
The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should
be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of
legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty.
And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal
task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead,
the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly
lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many
clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient
features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work.
The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting
and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy
of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-

variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to
as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only
for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle
most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from
the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of
the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most

cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the

younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so
to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code
but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's;
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with
public entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other

countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative

efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in
the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer
vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system
dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can
be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal

entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational
fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets
of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified
body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more
complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge
of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work.
Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory.
What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer
admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day,
he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of
NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as
the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made
use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body,
which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia MuozPalma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays
down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the

World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis

supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the
set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission,
171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so
would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of
a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of
its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081,
October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) SubArticle C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for

over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first
becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of
the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I
greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President?
And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since
he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as
required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for
the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,
may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The

procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A.
Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's
oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June
19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his
complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the
Court granted respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint.
On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging
that respondent committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients,
namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha
Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay
all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty
percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants

and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for

Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the
Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation
in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter
into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the
development into a residential subdivision of the land involved
in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929,
claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof
as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully
well that the said property was already sold at a public
auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao
del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan
City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
falsified documents purporting to be true copies of
"Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated
August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the
complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant
designated as I.S. No. 7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant
who was his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints
without legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the
Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of facts in his
pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does
not intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November
18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's
answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to
"PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to
"11". The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.

On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming
that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his
constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court,
the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining
that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for
postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of
time to file their respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p.
365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a
resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his
report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that
Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that
respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the
pendency of the case where the properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to
the execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document
where two signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox
copy) were made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and
Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the
IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this
case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous
pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is
respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with
the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative
complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since
Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present
Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All
cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be
transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for
investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases
where the investigation has been substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's
claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court

[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578,
October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under
the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of
Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the
intervention of the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any
officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and
recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court.
The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation
submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties during the
investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of
Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General
had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending
cases, the investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor
General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself
admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on
November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to
Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General
already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to
the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings
conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present
case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the
referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce
additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due
process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented
no less than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to
cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed
the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the
Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which
warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which
was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent
one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area
of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in
consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed,
respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil
Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was
acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p.

12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject
properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from
acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part
by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the
purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional
ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran
v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which
states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the
litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional
Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in
litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for
disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer
shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the
Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for
any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court
[Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as
the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a
repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case,
respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his
client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code
are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust
relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property
and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as
well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional
Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship.
Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the
new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to
Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase
by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for
which a disciplinary action may be brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented,
because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later
rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment
of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the
land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A.
GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill,
New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by
these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A.

GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights
and interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all the
improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28;
Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to
respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land
development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at
the time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT
No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was
executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for
the complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was
upon the request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent
claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the
fact that the land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public
auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this,
respondent argues, serves as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no
concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform
the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land
development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards
of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous
conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt
respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land
which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development
agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a
public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project
they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and
fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action
against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents
purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the
document filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories
to the addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T.
Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to
appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the
letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado
and complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other
parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted
that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent
wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copyattached to the letter
and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp.
327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely

agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum
as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the
addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original
addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes
willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with
the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of
fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of
Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was
committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados
[Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the
agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you
[respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including
court fees.
A
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h
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CONFORME
R
a
m
o
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A
.
G
o
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a
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s
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]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer
may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule
16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance
the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement
between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to
respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to
pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding
Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially
where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion
Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the
fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur
administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as
counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the
Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after
considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The
evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490
was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the
Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent when respondent

accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo,
p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting
interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full
disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule
15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the
Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of
harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil
Case No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while
the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed
by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and
Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for
holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass
complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution,
the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by
respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending
resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that
there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned
cases was to harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the
above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated
the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to
assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to
live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm.
Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor
General that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts
and circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious
misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6)
months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution
be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the
personal record of Atty. Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin
and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, JJ., took no part.

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A.
Zaldivar against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M.
Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a
Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the
preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally
TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the
Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed:
(1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of
criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 8600778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases
Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations
filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that
respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
was no longer vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to
institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees,

and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177
were all null and void.

On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and
Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).
Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent motion for
preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving
due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT
thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
this Court, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST
from hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163
to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from
hearing and resolving the Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend
dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition
(G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as
respondent. That Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the
"Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that additional criminal charges
for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals.
Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the
1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also
moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the
second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2)
issued a temporary restraining order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to
CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from
filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary
investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and
G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by
this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the
Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued
on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in
Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the
following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for
respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of
the original period within which to file comment on the petition for

certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction

or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as
party-respondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the
Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and
supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST
from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on
Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the
criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in Criminal
Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M.
Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we
required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in
Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of
respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner
in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In
respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article,
reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine
Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme
Court order stopping him from investigating graft cases involving
Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent
persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears
that while rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the
Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to
be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive
interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's
apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially
because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it
while big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after
Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating
graft cases filed against him.

Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations

because the latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a
friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from
investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from instituting
any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases
even if they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been
restraining me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed
graft cases against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino
government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of
the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before
the Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can
aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent persons can
prevent the progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the
weekend and that while she symphatizes with local officials who are
charged in court during election time, 'She said that it might be a
disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to know their
candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during
election time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it
a right of every citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate,
who should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988
required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days
from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the
Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and
hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the
Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from
conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the
Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.

A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April
1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his
position, made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in
the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the
court ... and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too
hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the
COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it
will embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called
over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to
dismiss the cases against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed
were sent by "some members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending
before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration
with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous
statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports on
those statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court
issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al.
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent
Gonzalez under date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE
the petitioner to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public
statements to the media which not only deal with matters subjudice but
also appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its
individual members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the
Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and
degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require
respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from
notice hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of court
and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making such public
statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of the
"Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star,"
the "Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of
April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the
position he had taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from
suit or investigation by government prosecutors or motivated by a
desire to stop him 'from investigating cases against some of their
proteges or friends;"

(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for
and on behalf of persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan,"
or sought "to pressure him to render decisions favorable to their
colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar
and not to be too hard on him and to refrain from investigating the
Commission on Audit report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme
Court because it will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases
against two Associate Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and
disbarred lawyers 'without due process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of
and circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public
respondent by three (3) members of the Court have since been
submitted to the Court and now form part of its official records, the
Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this
Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes thereto
appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment
thereon within the same period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988
addressed to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not
served on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to
CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE
the latter to comply therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus
Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above
quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption
[of innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of
an impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of
this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and
neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4)
Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the
deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion
and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and
immediately executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May
1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines21 dated 20 May 1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex
Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule
139-B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated
27 May 1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court
and addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent
Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and
Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the contempt
and disciplinary charges presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading as
Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance 29 second
explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on 22
July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of
the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of
the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority
to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate
admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the
practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper
administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to
control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court
including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the
Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an
improper interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon
the complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like
that before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the
contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is

broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee
both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the
contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional
misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary
authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the
respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for
contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over
lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary
to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the
task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on
his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration
of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary
action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt
power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of
the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as
offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present
case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit
themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A
little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the
issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due
process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him
impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the
proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in such
proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then
Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention
in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our
authority in the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear,
the members of the Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and
judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the
proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the
present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is notand does not involvea trial of an action or a suit,
but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the

Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the property and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of
a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree,
aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily
and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof
But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an
entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court,
the individual members act not as such individuals but only as a duly
constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of
their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in
the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereofas well as the people themselveswhose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave
hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the
retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a
necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court.
This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved
parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of the power because public policy demands that they, acting
as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary
action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of
the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor
and judge is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any
bias or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in
accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to
the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to
abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference
of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an
exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court,
especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is
no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially
disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements

attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present
his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him
but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the
exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here
are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is
compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in
his statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above
statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements
attributed to him are substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately
rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision
dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to
respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for
the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity
from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop
respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some
Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the
correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988
(denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated
Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free
intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per
curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not,
however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent
against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the
system of administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court
rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar
cases and had used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon
respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out
his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage
upon, the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also
totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of the
fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early
as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed
against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before
the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering
theSandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against
petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on
24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr.
Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring
the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the
decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending
before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been invented as
a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme
Court is that they have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to

their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two (2)
members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as
even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3)
members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the
consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not
pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all to
the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been made
in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the
first accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong
decision to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted
"pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the
statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross
disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the
Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from
prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination
between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon
the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while
presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This
accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely
bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is
also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges
'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court
notes that this last attack is not without relation to the other statements made by
respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was trying to
paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render
"clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts
arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once
again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy
of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to
examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of
his Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in those
administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence
in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong reasons for
and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the
continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is
appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does
not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity
to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he
should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for
making the statements adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he
asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings to

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following
allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the
contempt and administrative charges against the respondent, in the
light of the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against respondent
as shown in the language of the resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold
neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due
process in the contempt citation as well as in the possible
administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and
prejudiced as it is, respondent has no china man's chance to get fair
hearing in the contempt and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with,
perhaps passion and obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by
the entire Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration,
does not have confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and
that he "funds it extremely difficult to believe that the members of this
Tribunal can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due
process" and that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to
be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the
original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made,
respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being
incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and according to law. Once again,
he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due
process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to
public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and
anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court
to understand how respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest
tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath of
office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The
universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and duty,
not around respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be
regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary
authority of this Court over members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining
samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as
constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.

1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was
accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor
of the complainant with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the
President of the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and
"judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had
allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the
Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in
the appealed slander case. This suit was terminated, however, by compromise agreement
after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and
agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time later filed with this
Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander
case. This Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the
names of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted
against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied
for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished
me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme
Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case
entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed
against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I
did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent
falsification committed by Mr. Gica,reversed for him the decisions of
the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu,not with a view to
obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing
to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they
may well know them and work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at
240;emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for
making the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the
following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the
Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human
efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as
stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from
a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up
deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law
saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft,
corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the
government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other
words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that
because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and
injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly

committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent

del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them
that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of
the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b)
Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to
emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A
lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court
exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of
administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No.
46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one
specific issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for
review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for
disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both
instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial
discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate
and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats
to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision
and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be
anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two
highest Court of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in
deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts
by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross
ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future
will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a
reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney
owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a
fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242247: emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting
as counsel for MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to
explain certain statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due
to the mis-representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel.

(Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10,
1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a
gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used
by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a
government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the
light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the
incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create
a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner.
(Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept.
10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on
21 September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro
to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case
or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The
motion charges "It that the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice
Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief
beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January
31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the aboveentitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this
case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the
motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the decision of July
31, 1968 was rendered in this case. The appointment referred to was as
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion
presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of
side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent
wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents"
which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's
belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that there was
'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority
and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a
fourth Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the
following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the
borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral
Argument of the above-entitled casewhich condition is prohibited by
the New Rules of CourtSection 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices;
who may take part... . Only those members present when any matter
is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication ... ." This requirement is especially significant in the
present instance because the member who penned the decision was

the very member who was absent for approximately four months or
more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company
abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine
Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required
by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and
confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government, either
its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of
confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine
Government without either compensation or due process of law and
invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all
aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar
price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually,
until restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion
for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected
of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous
executives.' He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,'
but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of
July 31, 1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous
manner. He then charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we
issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before
the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of
this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of
the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds
to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus established [the
moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by
the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He puts forth
the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known
to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief
that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro would be less likely to engender favoritism and
prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at
least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible

to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it

plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only
were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse
suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out
that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife,
warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof
should not be allowed to happen in our country, 'although the process
has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis
in fact and in law.The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court.
For, inhibition is also asked if, we repeated any other justices who have
received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the
petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president.'The absurdity of this posture is at
once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed
by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit
themselves every time a case involving the Administration crops up?
Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence
thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in
fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government
operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why
the unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on the
part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is
easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a
court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words
are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not
unfamiliar to lawyers. and yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty.
Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of
justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against
improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice is
thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the
World Court and/or the United States government. It must be
remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were in ejected. More specifically, the motion
announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and
corruption of the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May

12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amount to
more than fifty million dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to
decide the case' in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has
even been embodied in Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency
between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal
from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any
move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the
appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a
change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard
explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected
where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than
punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with
the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of
disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of
behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of
justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he
asserted was "a great injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court,"
filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was
deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and had become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered
by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum"
so that "the people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that
"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed [may] never be
repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26
September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to him as
follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not
expose the tribunal's'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of
arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his
client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost
the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this
petition, 'where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own

applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution

with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he
earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will
become responsible to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566;
emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action
should not be taken against him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be
found in all courts and government offices. We have added only two
more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no
members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense,
that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us
reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken
or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only described the impersonal state of Things and
nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the
members of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender
our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost
today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our selfimposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end
our self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to
have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard
our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by
the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the
latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court
indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this
Court, made the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution
of this Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it
constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court
promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further

ground that it is likewise a violation of the most important right in the

Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation
which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and
protected by all means, because the rule of law creates and preserves
peace and order and gives satisfaction and contentment to all
concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims
resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cavemen We
do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the
premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of
Manila. Educated people should keep their temper under control at all
times! But justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the
very life of Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810;
emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court
and required counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken
against him. Counsel later explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the
killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such
acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations
unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ...
are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent
killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the
Court. ... That such threats and disrespectful language contained in a
pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has been
repeatedly decided(Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs.
Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya
vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison
vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil.
86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty
party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 580Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases
with that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it
is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily
that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and
rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which
he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said
right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety
and respect which the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812;
emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom
Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent

to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the
publication of the following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:

As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted
by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local
daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to
divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that
our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but
that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow
mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years,
I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to
change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce
that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the
Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf
may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable
bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598;
emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and
his invocation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court,
through Mr. Justice Feria, saidTo hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to
say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law
and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during
the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the coincidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court,
and consequently to lower and degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to
obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these
are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law
into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the
result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath
he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability
of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on
a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)

6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme
Court which contained the following paragraph (in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the
resolution of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is
absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed
at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust
all the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected
by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want
that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to
do, thejudicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the
victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of
this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes
of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that
erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his
thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the
proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in
contempt, Atty. Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the
truth. Examining the statements made above, the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable
disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of
its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the
parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its
power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from
which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived,
means exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the
Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of
the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar,
was neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call
the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied
upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many
reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in
question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it
is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are
annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their
natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and
impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration
of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J.

Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court
because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course
which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt,
that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he
claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim;
and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an
atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the
public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion
to promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism a movement with seditious and revolutionary
tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred
in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than
contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority
thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he
presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he
did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that
it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and
authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it had conferred
upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and
160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio
St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor
promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents
anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon
which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis
supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case
law on this matter. In the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished
for contempt or administratively disciplined lawyers who had made statements not
very different from those made in the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City
Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);

7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported),

Promulgated 29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against
Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has
in the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary
sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the statements here made by
respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the
disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the
charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the
Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed
their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute
the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase
and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had
some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by
the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14)
incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition
of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong
decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his
constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified
privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No
one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For
the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only
within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within
the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice
which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the
other; both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the
press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which

that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent

means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court
has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under
the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall
continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be
preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of
the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its
true sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press
and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of
the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be
had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted
for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by
subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the
courts. 51(Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court
effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who
are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to
every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right
of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer
of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to
the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial
power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings
of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once
more, however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr.
Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bonafide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior
intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54

(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the
Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the
manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The
subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct
or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural
and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point
out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no
repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary
has been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for
Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and
amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of
actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a
finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court.
Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of
the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon this
Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for which
he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution
of a particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a
duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of
the judicial institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in
particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in
time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not
effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general
public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few
will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of
democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper
remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to
libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this
Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an
exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual
members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely
attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of
court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of
the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the
practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to
take effect immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the
Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their
information and guidance.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

Nov 15, 2015

EN BANC
G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for Reconsideration
dated October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez, relating to the per
curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988. We have reviewed once more the
Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in the light of the argument adduced in the Motion
for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no sufficient basis for modifying the
conclusions and rulings embodied in that Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets
forth copious quotations and references to foreign texts which, however, whatever else they
may depict, do not reflect the law in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the
conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of the
"Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for Reconsideration.
1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court "to
charge respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict him of direct
contempt."
In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez is
guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the
court and member of the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie curiae" as a

technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we are aware that courts in the United
States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct contempts' as "contempts in
the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it regarded the contumacious
acts or statements (which were made both in a pleading filed before the Court and in
statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent Gonzalez as serious acts
flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal assault upon the integrity of the
Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial system. What the Court would stress is that it
required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May 1988, to explain "why he should not be
punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions" and in respect
of which, respondent was heard and given the most ample opportunity to present all
defenses, arguments and evidence that he wanted to present for the consideration of this
Court. The Court did not summarily impose punishment upon the respondent which it could
have done under Section 1 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to
consider respondent's acts as constituting "direct contempt."
2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for this Court
to charge respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the Revised Rules of
Court."
In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court
pointing out that:
[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme
Court such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of
Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge
consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.
The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for referral
of this case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines under
Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer to Rule 139 (b). It is thus
only necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule 139, referral to the Solicitor General
was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not the only course of action open to the
Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of
Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal or suspension of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or (2) upon the complaint under oath of another in
writing" (Parentheses supplied). The procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139
is the procedure provided for suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn
complaint of another person, rather than a procedure required for proceedings initiated by
the Supreme Court on its own motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would
initiate motu proprioproceedings for which it did not find probable cause to proceed against
an attorney. Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which referral is
made "for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the
prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated
against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor General if it
feels that, in a particular case, further factual investigation is needed. In the present case, as
pointed out in the per curiamResolution of the Court (page 18), there was "no need for
further investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him" and that
"in any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense: his
defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements

give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of
speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic
policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues."
In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for Reconsideration is
from a dissentingopinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United State. 1 It may be pointed out
that the majority in Green v. United States, through Mr. Justice Harlan, held, among other things,
that: Federal courts do not lack power to impose sentences in excess of one year for criminal
contempt; that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right;
nor does the (US) Constitution require that contempt subject to prison terms of more than one
year be based on grand jury indictments.
In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less dubious
manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is that from the
foundation of the United States the constitutionality of the power to punish for
contempt without the intervention of a jury has not been doubted. The First
Judiciary Act conferred such a power on the federal courts in the very act of
their establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of the Judiciary Committee of eight
that reported the bill to the Senate, five member including the chairman,
Senator, later to be Chief Justice, Ellsworth, had been delegates to the
Constitutional Convention (Oliver Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson,
Caleb Strong, Ricard Basett, William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First
Congress itself no less than nineteen member including Madison who
contemporaneously introduced the Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the
Convention. And when an abuse under this power manifested itself, and led
Congress to define more explicitly the summary power vested in the courts, it
did not remotely deny the existence of the power but merely defined the
conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act "declaratory of the law
concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.
xxxxxxxxx
Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this Court
throughout its existence . In at least two score cases in this Court, not to
mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower federal courts, the power to
punish summarily has been accepted without question. ... 2
To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at best.
The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for contempt does so
not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather he upholds and vindicates
the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its claim to respectful
behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and most especially from those
who are officers of the court.
3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this Court to
apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger"
rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."
The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was, more
modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which

penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending,

directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."
The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic
incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in the
testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a
defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The
clear and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the
appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not,
however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts. In Logunzad v.
Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera said:
...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in
the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It is
not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:
"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear
that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a
complex society preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that all times
and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained.
There are other societal values that press for recognition."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech
and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio,
television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test" (Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The principle
"requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay
of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation (Separate
Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis Supplied) 4
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we
believe that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and
were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiamResolution of
October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil" which the Supreme
Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant case, relate to threats of
physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public order. 5 What is here at
stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting
not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of
the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the
standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts.
The "substantive evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat of public
disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for
society.

4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to
hold that intent is irrelevant in charges of misconduct." What the Court
actually said on this point was:
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court.
The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization
of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed
to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. It is, upon the
other hand, not irrelevant to point out that the respondent offered no apology
in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance (Resolution, p. 7;
footnotes omitted).
The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities
(understood as pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the
processes of this Court. Human intent can only be shown derivatively and implied from an
examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that respondent's
disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail over the plain import
of what he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear import of his acts and
statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state of mind incompatible with those acts or
statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one accused of homicide cannot
successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting that while he may have inserted a
knife between the victim's ribs, he actually acted from high motives and kind feelings for the
latter.
5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court to
punish respondent for contempt of court for out of court publications."
Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern trends
in the United Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of contempt. We are,
however, unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or persuasive in our jurisdiction.
The Court went to some length to document the state of our case law on this matter in its per
curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of this case that would suggest to
this Court that that case law, which has been followed for at least half a century or so, ought
to be reversed.
6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of indefinite
suspension from the practice of law constitutes "cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment". The Court finds it difficult to consider this a substantial
constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the respondent's suspension,
far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the effect of placing,
as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in
his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance
to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by
acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and
demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting
standards of conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and
officer of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit. The denial is FINAL.

The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October 25, 1988 and
the Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 356 US 165, 2 L Ed 2d 672 (1958).
2 2 L ed 2d at 691-692; Emphasis supplied.
3 92 SCRA 476 (1979).
4 92 SCRA at 488.
5 See the separate opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzalez v.
Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 888 at 897-898 (1969).

EN BANC

[A. C. No. 2841. July 3, 2002]

RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, BRANCH IV, TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY.
SAMUEL C. OCCEA.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the

highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is
clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary
duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn
to be a fearless crusader. These were the eloquent words of the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in exalting the sacred and honorable legal profession.
But he laments the pathetic and deplorable fact that, many a law practitioner,
forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position
as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary
[1]

purveying the benefits of his enlightened advocacy in direct proportion to a

litigants financial posture instead of a faithful friend of the courts in the
dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor alike. Here, Atty. Samuel C.
Occea, as later shown by his disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such
lawyer who has become an apostate to his exalted position as an officer of the
court. He thus deserves to be weeded out from the legal profession to protect its
sanctity and nobility.
[2]

This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of

testator William C. Ogan which has since been pending in the Court of First
Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 423. In 1976, Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took
over the case from Judge Paulino S. Marquez who, in turn, inherited it from
Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting that the proceedings have been pending for
thirteen (13) years, Judge Ruiz then inquired into the principal causes of the
delay. He found out, as will be shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel C. Occea
caused the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully prolonging the
litigation through his various maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer
that he will not willingly sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any
mans cause for money or malice.
Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will
and Testament of the late William C. Ogan, his residuary estate was divided
among his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occea, was named in the
will as executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel
C. Occea, as her lawyer.
The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United
States of America), and real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The
deceased left no debt. Thus, the settlement of the estate should have been
simple and speedy. However, since the death of the testator on February 1,
1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet been terminated owing largely to
the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occea.
Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix,
Necitas Ogan-Occea, filed a project of partition on August 4, 1967. On
September 22, 1967, the probate court approved the project except certain
portions. The executrix then interposed an appeal. In view of the delay caused by
the pendency of the appeal, the other heirs filed several motions praying that the
estates remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its shares of stocks in the
Philippines and in the United States be distributed among all the heirs. The
executrix, through her husband Atty. Occea, vehemently opposed the motions,
asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked for her
husbands attorneys fee and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could
not be distributed among the heirs because the stock certificates were not in her
possession. The dispute between the executrix, on the one hand, and the other
heirs, on the other, which delayed the proceedings, centered mainly on
the P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.

Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occea, interposed
numerous appeals from the orders of the probate court. For their part, the heirs
repeatedly prayed in their motions for the release of the shares of stocks and the
remaining cash. But the executrix and Atty. Occea opposed the same, thus
prolonging the proceedings. In CA-GR No. 48716-R (December, 1974), the Court
of Appeals, in remanding the case to the probate court, had this to say:

It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their
differences with the view to closing the estate which has been pending
since 1963. The executrix, the heirs, and the lawyers, are reminded that
the prolongation of administrative proceedings can only benefit the
executor or administrator or the counsels for the contending parties. It
always results in the diminution of the share of each of the heirs
because the estate is burdened with the expenses of the administration
proceedings, the heir must have to pay attorneys fee and the longer the
proceedings the bigger the attorneys fee.
[3]

Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were
Atty. Occeas claim for attorneys fee in the amount of P250,000.00 and the
executrixs refusal, through her husband, to account for the shares of stocks
belonging to the estate which, according to her, were not in her possession. The
other heirs could not accept that explanation because as executrix, she was
charged with the responsibility of collecting all the assets of the estate.
Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix
to comment why the securities were not in her possession. She filed her
comment, through her husband, that some Philippine and American securities
were not in her possession. To determine which securities were in her
possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977, issued an order requiring her to
submit within 30 days the latest inventory of all the securities of the estate.
However, she failed to comply with the order. Judge Ruiz then issued another
order on February 6, 1978, directing her to take possession of all certificates of
stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make an up-to-date
inventory thereof with a statement of their nature and their value. Again, she did
not comply with the order.
Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the
executrix, through Atty. Occea, appealed the numerous interlocutory orders of the
probate court to the Court of Appeals, hence, adding to the delay. Because of the
propensity of the executrix, through Atty. Occea, to elevate interlocutory orders to
the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing her
to refrain from instituting any action or proceeding without first informing the
court. The executrix and her husband disobeyed this order. In fact, he filed six
cases with the Court of Appeals and one with this Court.
On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy OganGibson, one of the heirs, to go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper

action on the five parcels of land owned by the estate and to submit a report to
the probate court. To provide money for the purpose, the court ordered the
executrix to release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson the sum of $1,000.00 from the estate
fund, the same to be liquidated with supporting receipts upon her submission of
her report on or before September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed the order
before the Court of Appeals in a petition for prohibition and certiorari, docketed
therein as CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on January 13, 1981
for lack of merit, the Court of Appeals said:

Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such

an order of the court which is and would be for the benefit of the estate
and the heirs. All the other heirs completely agreed with what the trial
court did. xxx
Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the questioned orders he should be complimented in finding
ways and means of promptly and expeditiously determining the assets
of the estate to be ultimately distributed among the heirs.
On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her
failure to obey the orders of October 22, 1977, December 8, 1977, February 6,
1978 and October 16, 1979 and directed her to report to the court which
securities were and were not in her possession and to give the reason therefor.
On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occea were held in contempt
of court and fined P250.00 each for disobeying the court order of August 15,
1979 requiring the executrix to release $1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both
were given the chance to explain their failure to comply with the order, but they
did not submit any explanation. On January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. It bears emphasis that this
incident delayed the proceedings for four (4) years.
On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the
executrix to distribute immediately among the heirs all the shares of stocks of the
estate in the Batangas-Laguna Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc. and the
Motor Service Co.; to report her compliance within 10 days from notice; and
within the same period, to file a written report to the court stating (a) what other
certificates of stocks belonging to the estate are in her possession; and (b) which
certificates of stocks are not with her, giving the reasons therefor. Again, the
executrix and her husband, Atty. Occea, did not comply with the said order. The
probate court thus ordered her to explain why she should not be punished for
contempt of court. After several postponements at her instance and that of her
husband, the incident was set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them
appeared, thus delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the
executrix unfaithful in the performance of her duties, the probate court, on May
12, 1981, adjudged her in contempt of court.

Forthwith, Atty. Occea and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil
Case No. 14456 for damages (P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of
litigation) against Judge Ruiz. But, on October 13, 1981, the court dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.
After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occea filed with the
Tanodbayan a letter-complaint against Judge Ruiz, charging him with knowingly
rendering unjust interlocutory orders, in that without prior notice and hearing, he
punished the executrix for indirect contempt of court and censured her for noncompliance with the probate courts order of October 16, 1979. For lack of merit,
Atty. Occeas complaint was dismissed by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P.
Fernandez in a Resolution dated November 19, 1984.
On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occea filed with this Court Administrative Case
No. 2345-CFI against Judge Ruiz for gross inefficiency and dishonesty. In a
Resolution dated October 11, 1982, this Court dismissed the complaint for failure
of Atty. Occea to substantiate his charges during the investigation.
Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said
administrative complaint, Atty. Occea and his wife filed with the CFI of Davao City
Civil Case No. 14957 for damages against the former. The couple alleged that
they suffered damages upon reading the judges comment filed with the Supreme
Court. On June 11, 1982, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action, the comment being an absolutely privileged communication.
By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints,
found to be groundless, Atty. Occea further delayed with malice the probate
proceedings and inflicted hardship and pain upon Judge Ruiz.
More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty.
Occea has inflicted greater harm to the other heirs, with the executrix herself as
his willing partner.
From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions
were filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals by Atty. Occea, questioning
the interlocutory orders of the probate court. But most, if not all, were without
merit.
Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the
same probate proceedings, was also harassed by Atty. Occea with groundless
administrative charges and suits, both criminal and civil. These cases, while
pending, were then utilized by Atty. Occea in securing restraining orders from the
Court of Appeals or as grounds for the judges inhibition.
Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
providing inter alia that the CFI may suspend an attorney from the practice of law
for cause, Judge Ruiz, on May 26, 1982, filed with the same probate court
Administrative Case No. 44 charging Atty. Occea with gross misconduct, violation
of his oath as a lawyer and willful disobedience of lawful court orders. Instead of
filing an answer, he submitted a motion praying for the inhibition of Judge Ruiz.

This motion was denied. Atty. Occea was then directed to file his answer within
15 days from notice which was extended to another 15 days upon his motion.
Still, he did not file an answer. What he submitted was a motion to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.
Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982,
morning and afternoon. Upon Atty. Occeas motion, he was given an extension of
15 days from November 3, 1982 within which to file his answer. However, he did
not comply. Neither did he appear during the hearing.
Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court
issued a temporary restraining order in G. R. No. 62453, Samuel Occea vs.
District Judge Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol for prohibition. However, on
August 15, 1983, this Court dismissed Atty. Occeas petition for lack of merit. The
hearing of the administrative case was set on January 30 and 31, 1984, but
again, he did not appear.
The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occea failed to appear. Upon his
telegraphic request, the hearing was reset on December 13 and 14, 1984. On
December 7, 1984, he filed his Answer and Motion for Referral to the Solicitor
General or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion was denied. The
hearing was reset on May 8 and 9, 1985. Upon another telegraphic request of
Atty. Occea, the hearing was postponed to August 14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did
not appear. Thus, in its order of August 15, 1985, the probate court considered
his failure to appear as a waiver of his right to present evidence.
[4]

On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing

that Atty. Occea has abused, misused and overused the judicial system, Judge
Ruiz rendered a decision suspending him from the practice of law for three (3)
years. The decision unfolded a long list of his administrative offenses, thus:
[5]

[6]

[7]

Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court;

gross misconduct in office
During the probate proceedings, respondent Occea, on behalf of his
wife executrix, filed with the Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with the
Supreme Court one (1) case, assailing the order of the probate court
directing the said executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized to
determine the assets of the estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be taken
from the estate; and the order ordering the same executrix to report to
the probate court the securities belonging to the estate. Atty. Occeas
refusal to obey the said orders and elevating the same to the higher
courts unnecessarily delayed the probate proceedings.
II

Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless

suits and gave aid or consent to the same; delayed
persons for money or malice
Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the
probate court two actions for damages which were both dismissed for
lack of merit and lack of cause of action. Respondent also filed with the
Tanodbayan a letter-complaint charging the judge of the probate court
with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders. The complaint was
likewise dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent also filed with this
Court an administrative complaint which was again dismissed for failure
of respondent to substantiate the charge.
By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative
complaint and criminal charge which were found to be groundless and
unsubstantiated, respondent unduly delayed the settlement of the estate
proceedings by harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend time, effort and
money to defend himself against said frivolous and unmeritorious cases.
In fact, respondents propensity to file groundless administrative
charges, as well as civil and criminal suits, harassed not only Judge
Ruiz but also the previous judges who handled the case. As a measure
of self defense, these judges were compelled to prepare and file
pleadings or comments thereby using time which could have been
devoted to expediting the closure of the estate proceedings.
Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than
13 petitions were filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court. Most, if not all
of these petitions, were determined to be groundless and without merit.
III

Disobeying the laws

Respondent violated his lawyers oath of office by flagrantly disobeying
the clear provision of Rule 140, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court,
entitled Charges Against Judges of First Instance, which reads as
follows:
Sec. 6. Confidential - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall
be private and confidential.

During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No.

23345-CFI, Exh. Z) filed by respondent against Judge Ruiz in the
Supreme Court, he violated the private and confidential nature thereof
three (3) times, to wit:
1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for prohibition and certiorari, entitled Estate of William C. Ogan, et al.
vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-10604, questioning
an interlocutory order of the probate court (No. 2, Exh. V) to which he
attached as Annex AW a complete copy of his aforesaid administrative
complaint against Judge Ruiz albeit the same is completely immaterial
to the issue raised in said petition.
2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled Estate of
William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No.
SP-13162 (No. 4, Exh. V), impugning an interlocutory order of the
probate court, he attached as Annex C thereof a true and complete copy
of the said administrative complaint although not relevant to the
question therein raised; and
3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint
with the Tanodbayan (Exh. Y), he also attached as Annex A thereof a
true and complete copy of said administrative complaint against Judge
Ruiz even if said administrative complaint is not germane to the charge
(Page 2, No. 1, Exh. Y).
By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent,
as an officer of the court, put to naught one of the principal purposes
thereof which is to protect the personal and professional reputation of
judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and
irresponsible clients, litigants and counsels (In re Abistado, 57 Phil.
668; Murillo vs. Superable, Adm. Case No. 341, March 23, 1960; Moran,
Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. VI, page 260). Respondent committed
gross misconduct in office and has not conducted himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion.
IV

Did falsehood and consented to the

doing of same in court.

In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456
(Exh. W), respondent alleged in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. W-1) that
his wife-executrix Necitas Ogan Occea was held in contempt and
censured, without any hearing, for not obeying the probate courts
order of October 16, 1979 (Exh. N).
However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No.
423) would show that in the order of February 26, 1980, the probate
court directed said executrix to explain within 5 days from notice why
she should not be cited for contempt (Exh. O). In the order of April 8,
1980, the contempt charge was set for hearing on June 23, 1980, at
9:00 oclock in the morning (Exh. P) but was reset to October 22, 1980
after the lifting of the restraining order of the Court of Appeals (Exh. Q).
This was again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the denial by the
Supreme Court of the respondents petition for review impugning the
Court of Appeals decision. As stated in the order of May 12, 1981, page
2, paragraph 3 (Exh. R), copies of the order setting the hearing of the
contempt charge on said date (April 20, 1981) were received by the
respondent and his wife-executrix on March 24, 1981. On the date of
the hearing, neither the executrix nor respondent appeared. The
following day (April 21, 1981), the court received executrixs motion for
postponement of the hearing, which was denied for lack of merit.
Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981 (Exh. R) was rendered holding
the executrix in contempt and penalized with censure.
In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel
did not attend.
Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he
subsequently alleged under oath in his letter-complaint to the
Tanodbayan, dated March 29, 1982, against Judge Ruiz (Exh. Y)
that without prior notice and without any hearing, Judge Ruiz
adjudged executrix Necitas Ogan Occea guilty of contempt and
censuring her (page 2, paragraph 2, Exh. Y-2; page 5, paragraph 9b,
Exh. Y-3).
Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of
August 15, 1979 (Exh. C), directing said executrix to remit immediately
the sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir Nancy Ogan-Gibson with which to
meet whatever necessary expenses that she might incur in inquiring into
the status of the 5 parcels of land owned by the estate at Vinton County,
Ohio, U.S.A., respondent and his wife-executrix committed falsehood

when they stated in their petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. No. SP-10326 that the said order was issued without hearing and
thus a violation of procedural due process. The Court of Appeals, in its
decision which has become final (Exh. E), confirmed this falsehood
when it held that the petitioner-executrixwas not deprived of her right
to be heard when the respondent judge issued the two orders in
question (Page 6, Exh. E).
In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 138 and Section 9,
Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court, Judge Ruiz, on November 26, 1985,
transmitted to this Court a certified true copy of the order of suspension and a full
statement of facts.
[8]

[9]

[10]

On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeas motion, restrained
Judge Ruiz from enforcing his decision of November 14, 1985. The case then
has remained pending so that on May 30, 1989, this Court issued an
Order requiring the parties to move in the premises, by informing the Court
about the status of the decision or order suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occea from
the practice of law, Judge Ruiz particularly indicating if he still pursues the instant
case, within ten (10) days from notice.
[11]

On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for
this Courts action on his decision suspending Atty. Occea.
On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occea filed an Explanation and Motion praying that
the case be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and
recommendation. This Court denied the motion and instead referred the case to
Atty. Emilio Rebueno (now deceased), then Bar Confidant, for evaluation, report
and recommendation. After going over the records, he recommended that the
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the
decision dated November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occea from the
practice of law for a period of three years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty.
Samuel C. Occea be DISBARRED from the practice of law for grave violation of
his oath of office as attorney; likewise, that his name be DROPPED from the roll
of attorneys.
We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the same being supported by the facts on record.
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct
showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. His guilt, however, cannot be presumed. It must indicate the
dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof.
Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon
reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his
own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel. All these requirements
have been complied with in the case at hand.
[12]

[13]

[14]

In fact, it was Atty. Occea who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of
the administrative case against him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so
many times so that he could be accorded the full measure of due process.
The court a quo, therefore, appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex parte as
Atty. Occea deliberately failed to appear and answer the accusations against
him.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member
of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2)
malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyers oath,
(7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Not only did Atty.
Occea commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and willful
disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these transgressions, he violated the
lawyers oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following duties, thus:

I, __________________,of __________________,do
(place of birth)
solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willing promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
As shown by the records, Atty. Occea gravely violated his oath of office in his
handling of Special Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show
that through his atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the disposition of
the case for the last thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not
only to the heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For
respondents part and that of his wife, such prolonged litigation obviously
benefited them. As aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, the delay can only
benefit the executor or administrator and the longer the proceedings, the bigger
the attorneys fees. But the more tragic reality is the fact that Atty. Occea has
caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the
administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly
immoral conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice
law.

This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to
the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed.
Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party
nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause
of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice.
[15]

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege

bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and
morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings
with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal
profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this Court which
includes suspension and disbarment.
[16]

[17]

Clearly, Atty. Occeas conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal
profession even for a single moment.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the legal profession. Atty. Occea has definitely fallen
below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and
grossly immoral acts. This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers equipment in the practice
of his profession, because it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for
the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays
their trust and confidence. Thus, for his serious administrative offenses,
punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occea deserves the ultimate
penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
[18]

[19]

[20]

WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEA is DISBARRED from the practice

of law. His name is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona,
JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., abroad (on leave).

"Apostasy In The Legal Profession," address delivered by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro to the Delegates to the IBP Greater Manila Regional Convention, held at the Magsaysay
Hall, SSS Building, Quezon City on June 22, 1975; 64 SCRA 784, 790 (1975).
[1]

[2]

Ibid..

[3]

Records, p. 10.

[4]

Rollo, pp. 2-4; Decision on Administrative Case No. 44, pp. 1-2.

[5]

Rollo, p. 11; Decision on Administrative Case No. 44, p. 12.

[6]

Pursuant to Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

"SEC. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance.- The Court
of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension, such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises."
[7]

Rollo, p. 2; Decision on Administrative Case No. 44 dated November 14, 1985.

SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings
in Supreme Court. - Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance
shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy
and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and make
such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as
such, as the facts warrant. See also Tajan vs. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154 (1974).
[8]

SEC. 9. Procedure in Court of Appeals or Courts of First Instance. - As far as may be

applicable, the procedure above outlined shall likewise govern the filing and investigation of
complaint against attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in Courts of First Instance. In case of
suspension of the respondent, the judge of first instance or Justice of the Court of Appeals shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full
statement of the facts upon which the same is based.
[9]

[10]

Rollo, p. 1.

[11]

Rollo, p. 33.

Maligsa vs. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408 (1997); Mabuhay vs. Garcia, 330 SCRA 236, 240, 241
(2000).
[12]

Manubay vs. Garcia, ibid., citing Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. vs. Atty. Primo R.
Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406 (1999) and Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978).
[13]

[14]

Sec. 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

[15]

Marcias vs. Uy Kim, 45 SCRA 251 (1970); Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 273 (1976).

Resurrection vs. Sayson, Adm. Case No. 1037, December 14, 1998, 300 SCRA 129, 137;
People vs. Santocildes, Jr., G. R. No. 109141, December 21, 1999, 321 SCRA 310, 316.
[16]

[17]

Resurreccion vs. Sayson, ibid..

[18]

People vs. Tuned, 181 SCRA 692 (1990); Lead vs. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 (1992).

[19]

Rivera vs. Angeles, 339 SCRA 149 (2000), citing Fernandez vs. Garcia, 223 SCRA 425 (1993).

[20]

Busios vs. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 (1997), cited in Rivera vs. Angeles, ibid..

EN BANC
FOODSPHERE, INC.,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 7199

[Formerly CBD 04-1386]
Present:

- versus -

ATTY.
MELANIO
MAURICIO, JR.,
Respondent.

PUNO, C.J.
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
L. CHICO-NAZARIO
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:
July 22, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business
of meat processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and
grocery products under the brand name CDO, filed a Verified Complaint [1] for
disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr.,
popularly known as Batas Mauricio (respondent), a writer/columnist of
tabloids
including Balitang
Patas BATAS,
Bagong
TIKTIK,
TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG

BATAStelecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG

BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of
lawyers oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly
bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of
CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were
eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and
soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and
Drug Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the
presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1993, the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during
which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from
complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in
contravention of company policy and, in any event, outrageous.
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental
expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they were supported by
receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the Corderos threatened to bring
the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to
the complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent
complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August 10-16,
2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12[2] which
complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing
vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the
articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos.

Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the

Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of
which would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his BATAS Foundation.And
respondent directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the tabloids
and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN[3] seeking the
withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed
the
complaint.[4] Respondent,
who
affixed
his
signature
to
the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a
tabloid that he prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising
Contract[5] asking complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas
BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a total amount
of P360,000, and a Program Profile[6] of the television program KAKAMPI
MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with
the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy
30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page
advertisements in the tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per
advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television program
at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer,
respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were
disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with the publication of
the articles/columns.[7]
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double
B- BATAS NG BAYAN at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a
supposed contest sponsored by said program, which announcement was
transcribed as follows:

OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron

pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pacontest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553.
Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang
contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan
malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa
akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa
nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest
na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung
tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g]
may uod? [8] (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put
complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue
ofBalitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned KADIRI ANG CDO
LIVER SPREAD! In another article, he wrote IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG
CDO SILIPIN![9] which appeared in the same publication in its September 713, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004
issue, he wrote another article entitled DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO.[10]
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING
HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following
articles:[11] (a) Uod sa liver spread, Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);
[12]
(b) Uod, itinanggi ng CDO, Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277);
[13]
(c) Pagpapatigil sa CDO, Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278);
[14]
(d) Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado, Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.279);[15] (e) Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod, Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.280);[16] (f) Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy, Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.281);[17] (g) Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards, Setyembre 14,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284);[18] (h) Brutalidad ng CDO guards, Setyembre 15,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);[19] (i) CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP,
Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287);[20] (j) May uod na CDO liver spread
sa Puregold binili, Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288);[21] (k) Desperado
na ang CDO, Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290); [22] (l) Atty. Rufus
Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO, Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);
[23]
(m) Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero, Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon

7,Blg. 292);[24] (n) Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO, Setyembre 23,
2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293).[25]
In his September 8, 2004 column Anggulo ng Batas published in Hataw!,
respondent wrote an article Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread.[26]
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television
program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of
what complainant claimed to be the same baseless and malicious
allegations/issues against it.[27]
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several
others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356
of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time of
the filing of the present administrative complaint.[28]
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed
his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases
to the Department of Justice,[29] alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???)
Prosecutors of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting
for miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office
would ever act on his complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by
Villarez, and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the
wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to
be meted to them?

9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that

justice would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their cause, but, more
importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in
Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many generosities in
the past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the
City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing
products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to
think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior
displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who
dare complain against the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps,
top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates and
relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints
against the Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough
and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he filed his
kidnapping charge here;[30]

And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction [31] which
respondent filed, as counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the
newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela
City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of
whatever is inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced
that this Office has no jurisdiction over this action.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx

Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against

respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04, [33]before
the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order
notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against
complainant[34] and to malign complainant through his television shows.

Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating

Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with
the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation:
[35]

I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty.
[Melanio] Mauricio, et al., the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O
of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which
in part reads:
Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order included in the instant plaintiffs
motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to
appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is constrained
to GRANT the said plaintiffs prater, as it is GRANTED, in
order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the
defendants, their agents, representatives or any person
acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from
further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any
matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more
specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on
plaintiff and its products.
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on
respondent by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has
not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his
receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the
clear directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from further
publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the
Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices
and/or defects on plaintiff and its products, respondent in clear defiance of
this Order came out with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his
column Atty. Batas, 2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the
tabloid Balitang Bayan Toro (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule
13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: A lawyer
shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his Entry of
Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the
Department of Justice. In said pleading, respondent made the following
statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts
aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the
Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the
impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it
and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild
allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his
pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain
[t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd
[s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers.
III.
The Kasunduan entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein
complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared,
witnessed and signed by herein respondent.
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs
recognized that the said Kasunduan was not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed the
complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the Kasunduan and the consequent
dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein complainant,
respondent inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to disparage
and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous
articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August
to 17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already abovestated, respondent continued to come out with these articles against
complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining
order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent

did not deny that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for
publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service,
that is, to expose the defects of complainants products to the consuming
public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of
respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainants
failure to give in to respondents request that complainant advertise in the
tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainants explanation
is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for
his barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from the fact
that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the Kasunduan
which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for
approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said
Kasunduan and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste
complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement.
Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as
it could have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero.
Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media
personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least,
deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[36](Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114

dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice of law
for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity
for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, [37] which confidence may
be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the
IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of
the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for

his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the
tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a
status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and
broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent
continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the same
time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. For he
defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a member of
the legal profession to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities.
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper,

by using intemperate language.

Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:[38]
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted
members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to
advance the interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor

and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one
to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating
but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar
to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial
to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.[39] (Underscoring supplied)

By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting

standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times
uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.[40]
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be
underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,[41] the therein complainant
engaged therein-herein respondents services as she was impressed by the propoor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality,[42]only to
later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an
exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by
him.Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening
to him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid
that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of
complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents
motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was
motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against the
therein complainant.[43]
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
three years is, in the premises, sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the

lawyers oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He
isWARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

[1]

Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), pp. 1-21.

Annex B of the complaint, id. at 23.
[3]
Annexes C and C-1, id. at 24-25.
[4]
Annex F, id at 29. The Order reads:
[2]

Before us is a Kasunduan dated 10 August 2004 duly signed by the parties praying that the aboveentitled case be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that they have agreed to settle their differences
amicably.
The Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1 s. 1993, the Rules and Regulations Implementing
the provisions of Chapter III[,] Title V of RA 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of
thePhilippines provides for the encouragement of both parties to settle the case amicably. (Rule III,
Section 1, C.1)
The agreement of the parties is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy.
PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the above-captioned case is hereby DISMISSED.
xxxx
[5]
Annex D, id. at 26.
[6]
Annexes E and E-1, id. at 27-28.
[7]
Id. at 7.
[8]
Id. at 8.
[9]
Annex G-1, id. at 32-33.
[10]
Annex G-2, id. at 34-35.
[11]
Attached to the complaint as Annexes H-series.
[12]
Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), p. 37.
[13]
Id. at 38.
[14]
Inadvertently not attached to the Annexes H-series.
[15]
Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), at 39.
[16]
Id. at 40.
[17]
Id. at 41.
[18]
Id. at 42.
[19]
Id. at 43.
[20]
Id. at 44.
[21]
Id. at 45.
[22]
Id. at 46.
[23]
Id. at 47.
[24]
Id. at 48.
[25]
Not attached but is supposedly included in the Annexes H-series of the complaint.
[26]
Rollo (Vol. I of the CBD rollo), p. 49.
[27]
Id. at 10. The copies of the complaint-affidavits are attached as Annexes J, J-1, and J-2.
[28]
Ibid.
[29]
Id. at 121-125.
[30]
Id. at 122-124.
[31]
Id. at 126-128.
[32]
Id. at 126.
[33]
The complaint was for libel but a reading of the complaint shows that it was a complaint for damages.
Annex L, id. at 129-164.
[34]
Respondent wrote and publicized: Buwelta sa CDO (October 2004); Child Abuse Kontra
CDO (November 2-8, 2004).
[35]
Rollo (Vol. III of CBD rollo), pp. 37-41.
[36]
Id. at 45-48.
[37]
Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA 209, 221.
[38]
A.C. No. 6567, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 359.
[39]
Id. at 368.
[40]
Vide Catu v. Rellosa, supra note 37 at 220.
[41]
A.C. No. 5655, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 508.
[42]
Id. at 509.
[43]
A.C. No. 5655, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 307, 318.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 1203

May 15, 1903

In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.
W. A. Kincaid for defendant.
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First
Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be
suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had
been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in
force in said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and after its
organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading
the law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer to
these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading
testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H. D.
Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in his
behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that the
charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made an order
suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of
the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they were
such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of
the accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of
such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating
or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an
officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for
which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of
a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a violation
of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United States, vs. Terrell
was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and
as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to
be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will
be served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in the
Philippine Islands for the term of one year from the 7th day of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of law
for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.

Footnotes
1 Page 222, supra.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for
more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against
Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case
27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the
machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court,
in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on
August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of
execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in
Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago
moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January
31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago
thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing
the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the
sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners
Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the
final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his coplaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to
annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment
was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes
Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon

and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They
alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the
judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor,
and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business
which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal
partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from
registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title
and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A
situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon
City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City
cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners.
But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court
again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. On May
3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being
fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this
Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no
merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration
was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the
same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The
respondents then appealed to this Court (L-27140). We dismissed the petition in a minute
resolution on February 8, 1967.
1wph1.t

The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said
court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it
rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of
possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made
permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and
ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986
on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the present
petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal
court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the
writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued
against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals
that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.

2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in one case and the
husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the
petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her
husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at par
with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the protection of the
common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal
partnership benefited from the husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is
adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a
"stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong,
for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business that
failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the
sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that
the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction
to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the
judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the
property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present
case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any
interest therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of
possession was issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is
much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the
property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is
normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties
advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her
husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in 1963;
(6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff
from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17,
1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal
properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts
to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the
complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the
properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging
business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise
the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now
effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.

(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half
share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse,
but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable
estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be

assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction does
not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise.4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement. The
Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is conjugal property. By the
Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision under
review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be vacated
by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here;
the decision would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in
effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal
union.

6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's
sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the
fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos,
abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the
judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the
petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14)
years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one
court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried
to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of
the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a predator
of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's

cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and
cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his
client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If
he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to
advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,
and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable. 7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to seek
justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which might
again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio examined
the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We find that

(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits
has not even started;

(b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs
Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an
amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no
action has yet been taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to
the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and
amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The
Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of
the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to
Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit,
did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether
or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we
have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of
Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein-before
quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castaedas
and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain
machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000
up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails
to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was
irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castaeda spouses to
pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the
auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a
mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the
properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the
amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and
because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the
purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor,
and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not
exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castaedas but
did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the
Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the
judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.

This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover
barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on
account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of
action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless,
the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was unfounded and
as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not
less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the
transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castaedas, they were unlawfully
deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use
being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded action
besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the
defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy
and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the
registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants
sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers
acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to
the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also
mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also
acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the
defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint,
which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to
the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had
previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio
Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano
(60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the
properties are the subject of a pending litigation.
Discussion on The Causes of Action
of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause
of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint,
for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of

the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castaedas
and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's
levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon,
then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that
the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and it must
therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the refiling of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are
assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of
Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1 L-24757, Oct. 25, 1967, 21 SCRA 486.
2 Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29.
3 Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 768; Madrigal vs. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 414.
4 Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. Capitol Subdivision, L-25887, July 26, 1966,
17 SCRA 736; Angela Estate, Inc. vs. CFI Negros Occidental, L-27084, July
31, 1968, 24 SCRA 509; Locsin vs. Climaco, L-27319, January 31,1969, 26
SCRA 833; 43 C.J.S. 35.
5 Annex D to Petition, rollo, p. 46.
6 Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637, 646.
7 Id., July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 291, 297-298.
EN BANC
March 23, 1929
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,

Duran & Lim for respondent.

Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board
of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in
Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase
of land as required by the cadastral office; can renew lost documents of your
animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead; and can
execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although
long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his
town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is willing to help and serve
the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of
barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our
induction into office as member of the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next
month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions
or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in
particular. You can come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me
any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence
here in Echague. I will attend the session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back
home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer
and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will
exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see
me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can always find me there on
every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of
documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary
public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are
in the belief that my residence as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I
would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public.
Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in Echague.

I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any
of your meetings or social gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to
live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in
your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection
with the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court
and would charge only three pesos for every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of
members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal
section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following: "The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted
by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917.
Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his brother
lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and
conduct. The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a
matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per
se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by
personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through
touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to
secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement
for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner
of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. It is
unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up
strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is
disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof
in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to
secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or
reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases
to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital
attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly

advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to
seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves
upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of
any practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be
disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals
was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by
an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been provided in
a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar itself, and have been upheld as
constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a
profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash.,
1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; Peoplevs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of
cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards
of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise
peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That
should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent
stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons.
Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here
be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of the
Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only
reprimanded. We think that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude
toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The
commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the
bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his
intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future.
A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should
be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have
influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should, therefore,
not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with
by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent
Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the
period of one month from April 1, 1929,
Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions

OSTRAND, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been sufficient
punishment.
EN BANC
A.C. No. L-1117

March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published
an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said
advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication
and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such
professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law
profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only
once in the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent
of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public.
Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill
as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer
degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism
by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the

temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct."
(Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law
for the period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by
writing circular letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the
solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is
of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought
in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement
at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of
"legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA),
(3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5)
Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their
valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law
and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by
the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues
involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to

distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search,
evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance,
passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the
public, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is
offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first
of all, to the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical
services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements
subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all
the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of
the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal

support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to
make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as
the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room
for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of
acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only
one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences
of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to
Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to
induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered
"the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as
that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address

those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage,"

makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to
emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive
of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here
it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as
earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of
an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law,
morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing
the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be
prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in
general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them
from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the
great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using
a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both
are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all
of its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical
assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general
and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may
be undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of
the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to
be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and
void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required
to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine law,
that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer
should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and
that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed
exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer
that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody
should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without
such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice in
a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged
in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic machines"
(pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts
of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic,
Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the
realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal

work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement

which announces a certainAtty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of
law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It
has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and
advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and
ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law,
and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent
lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the
Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business
name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to
engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting
for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated

herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the
Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and
for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it
merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general
public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons

and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment
of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments
Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid
law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount

consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from the
danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be
engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year
course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and
then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified
to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to
the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the
general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish
these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court
may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being
exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of
being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it
appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional
Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal
services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public
from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being qualified
to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to
give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence,
adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be
given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name The Legal
Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the impression again that

Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its

President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the
structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases
for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law,
(are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in
this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to
solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal
Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which
is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one
has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only
by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for
said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the
trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular
needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of
the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could
become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is
not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go
about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the
public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or
not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge
of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of
law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can
render effective service unless he is familiar with such
statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear
that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of
that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he
shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It
is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact
that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate
or inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular
business or profession. A good example is the architect, who
must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws
plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire
tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure
that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they
are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate
and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his
land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in
respect to the building code and the like, then an architect
who performed this function would probably be considered to
be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted
by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of
the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most

important body of the industrial relations experts are the

officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it
has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter,
and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be very
cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established
method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain
function have no right to do so, or that the technical education
given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their
business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees,
to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the
fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the
zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a
minor feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program,
he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of
the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations
and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept
the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar.
Here, however, there may be an exception where the
business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales
are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the
value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the
principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to

the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can

accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of
a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant
should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the
proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of
New Jersey is without power to interfere with such
determination or to forbid representation before the agency by
one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person,
or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions
purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful
calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the
bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client
as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he
is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding
services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with a
priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem

is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon

Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved
is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic,
renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving
information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law
is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the
principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a
particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect
this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the
forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of
law. But that is the situation with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney
and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE
THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At
most the book assumes to offer general advice on common
problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person. Similarly the defendant's publication does not purport
to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation
in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication
and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . .
There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale
of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating
to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an
interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on
divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the
kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal

contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in

the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies
and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents
(The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to
the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D
270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly nondiagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services
"involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of
law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual
inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage.
With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See
Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second
paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph)
fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for
the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note
that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and
interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the
meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them
of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of
legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public
tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then
takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also
practicing law. 16Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another
and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion
as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing
law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid
down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law

practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the

work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying
the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as
advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by
trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission
and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized
legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like
foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory
to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate

legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or

administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids
and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation
will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have
to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course
of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will
not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court
since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13,
1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for
Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of
respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic,
with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in
Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated
as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of
it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medicolegal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed
up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start
by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how
you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And
once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things
like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care
of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can
take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa

hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold
or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which
would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for
the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of
sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client
and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited
to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various
statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of
court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously
acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing
profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the
rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation
and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to
the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the
public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable
persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in
this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should
first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has
done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there
are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education,
while there are none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant"
evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public.
One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which
set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has
even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the
United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of
Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules
or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That
policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and
remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give
something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort
to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the
lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the
interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in
a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the
practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the
present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by

the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.
The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be
the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer
is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as
well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He
easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the
extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the
restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative
data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public
or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a
mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish
his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or
the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only
a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm
name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He
may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by
said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked
and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case
at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that
an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made
only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems,
to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose
integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At
this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair,
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary
action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 49Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the
Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s
for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within
the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in
nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence,
a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing
some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of
respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the
instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under
the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A"
and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance
herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

# Footnotes
1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and on
the left side of "The Legal Clinic, Inc." in both advertisements which were
published in a newspaper of general circulation.
2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691.
3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated December
10, 1991, Rollo, 328.
4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal
Affairs, 1, 10; Rollo, 209, 218.
5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on
Bar Discipline, and Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29, Rollo 414-416,
425-427.

6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman,

Committee on Lawyers' Rights and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del
Rosario, President, 5-6; Rollo, 241-242.
7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty.
Mariano M. Magsalin, Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.
8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo, 105106.
9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370371.
10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge,
WLAP Free Legal Aid Clinic, 1-2; Rollo, 169-170.
11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe, President, and Atty.
Barbara Anne C. Migallos, 8-12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.
12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.
13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.
14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504;
Rhode Island Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139,
144.
15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.
16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.
17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.
18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert and Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS 46218.
19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).
20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.
21 Rollo, 130-131.
22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-373.
23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
24 Phil. Ass'n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co.,
et al., 42 SCRA 302 (1971).
25 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 863, 864.

26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.

27 Lowell Bar Ass'n. vs. Loeb. 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S.,
Attorney and Client 64, 865.
28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.
29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), 11-12, citing
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974)
and Shayne, The Paralegal Profession, Oceana Publications, 1977,
Appendix II and III; Rollo, 116-117.
30 Illustrations:
(a) A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court
(Rule 138-A, Rules of Court);
(b) An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law
to appear for the Government of the Philippines in a case in which the
government has an interest (Sec. 33, Rule 138,id.);
(c) An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court for the
purpose of conducting the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
(d) A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and
ability, who is appointed counsel de oficio to defend the accused in localities
where members of the bar are not available (Sec. 4, Rule 116, id.);
(e) Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the Philippine
Patent Office (now known as the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer) in trademark, service mark and trade name cases (Rule
23, Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases);
(f) A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations
Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself as a party
to the case; (2) he represents an organization or its members, provided that
he shall be made to present written proof that he is properly authorized; or (3)
he is duly-accredited members of any legal aid office duly recognized by the
Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases
referred thereto by the latter (New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission);
(g) An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant in a case
falling under the Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and
(h) Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing the
studies of law in a reputable university or school of law is deemed sufficient
qualification for appointment (Sec. 233, Administrative Code of 1917).
See Rollo, 144-145.

31 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 866; Johnstown Coal and Coke Co. of New
York vs. U.S., 102 Ct. Cl. 285.
32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.
33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.
34 Rule 3.01, id.
35 Rule 3.04, id.
36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.
38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).
39 The advertisement in said case was as follows: "Marriage license
promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation
on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.".
40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80.
41 Op. cit., 80.
43 * * * Missing * * * .
44 Op. cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24,
1930); A.B.A. Ops. 53 (Dec. 14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941),
241 (Feb. 21, 1942), 284 (Aug. 1951); and 286 (Sept. 25, 1952). .
45 Supra, Fn 2.
46 Id., 810, 825.
47 Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association, 12, citing the American
Bar Association Journal, January, 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248.
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of Religious Affairs vs.
Bayot, supra, Fn 38.
49 U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People vs. Luna, 102 Phil.
968 (1958).
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No.
902-A and Sec. 121, Corporation Code.
EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint,
sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the
name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of
Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for
the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to
Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker &
McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not
having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their
memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in
Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents,
aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero
& Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker &
McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render
legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others
engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical
because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker
& McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova,
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

Plana, J., took no part.

Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.
EN BANC

January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated
November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and
the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the
views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the
overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable
Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to
existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor
of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written
oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written
memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to
the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration
for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was
signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the
same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out
of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out
the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the
same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme
Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability
and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments,
comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to
Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and
presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as
well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the
Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar
integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on
Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial
support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua
non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in
the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include
all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with
power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up
by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession
based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice
and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion
of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum
Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme
Court.

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench
and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and
adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal
profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within
its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it,
and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of
local practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not
lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to
obtain in many of our provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for

practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession
throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees
schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide
involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious
problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the
exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional
authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor
restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration
of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional
hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of
association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on
Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in
issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege,
moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only
to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to
the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State,
the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

 Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far
and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance
with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective
action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no
organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore,
it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of
such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient
means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that
requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote
or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to
pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in
any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the
quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper
subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of
the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the
Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean
that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while
the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate
the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through an
Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses.
The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose
such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential
inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of
annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in
any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions
taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which
said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of
speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should
become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the
very purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a
"free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection
would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The
conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse
to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by
his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has
never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the
agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although
the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the
members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and
through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more
effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court,
because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar

integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for

new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the
Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as
the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar
integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of
the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful
participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar
facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly
membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive
profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary
consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;
cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar
integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in
England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has
been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored
public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics
compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently
conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total
of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual
responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or
2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a
total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have
submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for
Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed
opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite
ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14
per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per
cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar
integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration
of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the
context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of
the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance
with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 "for the purpose
of ascertaining the advisability of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction,"
the Commission is composed of Supreme Court Associate Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro (Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retired Supreme Court Associate
Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, Supreme Court Associate Justice (then Court of
Appeals Presiding Justice) Salvador V. Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director
Crisolito Pascual, Ex-Senator Tecla San Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law
Dean and Constitutional Convention Delegate Feliciano Jover Ledesma
(Members).
2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno,
Roman Ozaeta, Jose P. Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A.
Panuncialman), the petition represented the unanimous consensus of 53 Bar
Associations (from all over the Philippines) reached in convention at the Far
Eastern University Auditorium in Manila on June 23, 1962.
3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and Vicente L.
Arcega, the Camarines Norte Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin, the
Camarines Sur Bar Association and the Manila Bar Association.
4 The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submitted
memoranda in favor of Bar integration, while the Manila Bar Association
submitted a memoranda opposing Bar integration.
5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991
FERNANDO T. COLLANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICENTE C. RENOMERON respondent.

PER CURIAM:p
This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant
Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V
& G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban
City, for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration

of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The
present complaint charges the respondent with the following offenses:
1. Neglecting or refusing inspite (sic) repeated requests and without sufficient
justification, to act within reasonable time (sic) the registration of 163 Deeds
of Absolute Sale with Assignment and the eventual issuance and transfer of
the corresponding 163 transfer certificates of titles to the GSIS, for the
purpose of obtaining some pecuniary or material benefit from the person or
persons interested therein.
2. Conduct unbecoming of public official.
3. Dishonesty.
4. Extortion.
5. Directly receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection
with pending official transaction before him.
6. Causing undue injury to a party, the GSIS [or] Government through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
7. Gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (p. 10, Rollo.)
As early as January 15, 1987, V & G had requested the respondent Register of Deeds to
register some 163 deeds of sale with assignment (in favor of the GSIS) of lots of the V & G
mortgaged to GSIS by the lot buyers. There was no action from the respondent.
Another request was made on February 16, 1987 for him to approve or deny registration of
the uniform deeds of absolute sale with assignment. Still no action except to require V & G to
submit proof of real estate tax payment and to clarify certain details about the transactions.
Although V & G complied with the desired requirements, respondent Renomeron suspended
the registration of the documents pending compliance by V & G with a certain "special
arrangement" between them, which was that V & G should provide him with a weekly round
trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu
thereof, the sale of respondent's Quezon City house and lot by V & G or GSIS
representatives.
On May 19, 1987, respondent confided to the complainant that he would act favorably on the
163 registrable documents of V & G if the latter would execute clarificatory affidavits and
send money for a round trip plane ticket for him.
The plane fare amounting to P800 (without the pocket money of P2,000) was sent to
respondent through his niece.
Because of V & G's failure to give him pocket money in addition to plane fare, respondent
imposed additional registration requirements. Fed up with the respondent's extortionate
tactics, the complainant wrote him a letter on May 20, 1987 challenging him to act on all
pending applications for registration of V & G within twenty-four (24) hours.

On May 22, 1987, respondent formally denied registration of the transfer of 163 certificates
of title to the GSIS on the uniform ground that the deeds of absolute sale with assignment
were ambiguous as to parties and subject matter. On May 26, 1987, Attorney Collantes
moved for a reconsideration of said denial, stressing that:
... since the year 1973 continuously up to December 1986 for a period of
nearly fifteen (15) years or for a sum total of more than 2,000 same set of
documents which have been repeatedly and uniformly registered in the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City under Attys. Modesto Garcia and
Pablo Amascual Jr., it is only during the incumbency of Atty. Vicente C.
Renomeron, that the very same documents of the same tenor have been
refused or denied registration ... (p. 15, Rollo.)
On May 27, 1987, respondent elevated the matter en consulta to the Administrator, National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) (now the Land Registration
Authority [LRA]). In a Resolution dated July 27,1987 (Consulta No. 1579), the NLTDRA ruled
that the questioned documents were registrable. Heedless of the NLTDRA's opinion,
respondent continued to sit on V & Gs 163 deeds of sale with assignment.
Exasperated by respondent's conduct, the complainant filed with the NLTDRA on June 4,
1987 administrative charges (docketed as Adm. Case No. 87-15), against respondent
Register of Deeds.
Upon receipt of the charges, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio directed
respondent to explain in writing why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken
against him. Respondent was further asked whether he would submit his case on the basis
of his answer, or be heard in a formal investigation.
In his answer dated July 9, 1987, respondent denied the charges of extortion and of directly
receiving pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with the official transactions
awaiting his action.
Although an investigator was appointed by NLTDRA Administrator Bonifacio to hear Attorney
Collantes' charges against him, Attorney Renomeron waived his right to a formal
investigation. Both parties submitted the case for resolution based on the pleadings.
The investigator, Attorney Leonardo Da Jose, recommended dropping the charges of: (1)
dishonesty; (2) causing undue injury to a party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) gross ignorance of the law and procedure. He
opined that the charge of neglecting or refusing, in spite repeated requests and without
sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on the registration of the documents
involved, in order to extort some pecuniary or material benefit from the interested party,
absorbed the charges of conduct unbecoming of a public official, extortion, and directly
receiving some pecuniary or material benefit for himself in connection with pending official
transactions before him.
Brushing aside the investigator's recommendation, NLTDRA Administrator Teodoro G.
Bonifacio on February 22, 1988, recommended to Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez
that the respondent: (1) be found guilty of simple neglect of duty: (2) be reprimanded to act
with dispatch on documents presented to him for registration; and (3) be warned that a
repetition of similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

After due investigation of the charges, Secretary Ordoez found respondent guilty of grave
misconduct.
Our study and consideration of the records of the case indicate that ample
evidence supports the Investigating Officer's findings that the respondent
committed grave misconduct.
The respondent unreasonably delayed action on the documents presented to
him for registration and, notwithstanding representations by the parties
interested for expeditious action on the said documents, he continued with
his inaction.
The records indicate that the respondent eventually formally denied the
registration of the documents involved; that he himself elevated the question
on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio after he
formally denied the registration thereof, that the Administrator then resolved
in favor of the registrability of the said documents in question; and that, such
resolution of the Administrator notwithstanding, the respondent still refused
the registration thereof but demanded from the parties interested the
submission of additional requirements not adverted to in his previous denial.
xxx xxx xxx
In relation to the alleged 'special arrangement,' although the respondent
claims that he neither touched nor received the money sent to him, on record
remains uncontroverted the circumstance that his niece, Ms. de la Cruz,
retrieved from him the amount of P800.00 earlier sent to him as plane fare,
not in the original denomination of P100.00 bills but in P50.00 bills. The
respondent had ample opportunity to clarify or to countervail this related
incident in his letter dated 5 September 1987 to Administrator Bonifacio but
he never did so.
... We believe that, in this case, the respondent's being new in office cannot
serve to mitigate his liability. His being so should have motivated him to be
more aware of applicable laws, rules and regulations and should have
prompted him to do his best in the discharge of his duties. (pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
Secretary Ordoez recommended to President Corazon C. Aquino that Renomeron be
dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in the government service, effective immediately.
As recommended by the Secretary of Justice, the President of the Philippines, by Adm.
Order No. 165 dated May 3, 1990, dismissed the respondent from the government service
(pp. 1419, Rollo).
Less than two weeks after filing his complaint against Renomeron in the NLTDRA, Attorney
Collantes also filed in this Court on June 16, 1987, a disbarment complaint against said
respondent.
The issue in this disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent register of deeds, as a
lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his malfeasances as a public official. The

answer is yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as
a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968),
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath
is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or
other disciplinary action (Legal Ethics, Ruben E. Agpalo, 1983 Edition, pp. 66-67).
As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:
A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to
impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an "officer of the
court" on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the
courts in the proper. fair, speedy, and efficient administration of justice. As an
officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his
every exertion the only criterion he that truth and justice triumph. This
discipline is what as given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its
exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility
all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described
as moral character.
Membership in the Bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of
the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose
conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and
whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest of truth and justice, for
which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader. (Apostacy in the Legal
Profession, 64 SCRA 784, 789- 790; emphasis supplied.)
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to process documents
and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from directly or
indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of
their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the
course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7,
subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Rule 7.03, Code
of Professional Responsibility.)
This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may
practice the profession of law (Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must
pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling" (Court Administrator vs.
Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).

The acts of dishonesty and oppression which Attorney Renomeron committed as a public
official have demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law
(Bautista vs. Judge Guevarra, 142 SCRA 632; Court Administrator vs. Rodolfo G. Hermoso,
150 SCRA 269). He should therefore be disbarred.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from
the practice of law in the Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

BIDIN, J.:
In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National Bank
charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset
Management Group of complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thus:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in said service.
by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which
respondent during his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in
arranging the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros
Ong Siy for P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr.
Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from
the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction between
Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146,
respondent who had since left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the
counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.

Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by
complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct
and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by
the Civil Service Commission.
Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of complainants Asset
Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the spouses
Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to the
couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a
result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer,
Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted that he appeared as counsel for Mrs.
Ong Siy but only with respect to the execution pending appeal of the RTC decision. He
alleged that he did not participate in the litigation of the case before the trial court. With
respect to the case of the Almeda spouses, respondent alleged that he never appeared as
counsel for them. He contended that while the law firm "Cedo Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates"
is designated as counsel of record, the case is actually handled only by Atty. Pedro Ferrer.
Respondent averred that he did not enter into a general partnership with Atty. Pedro Ferrer
nor with the other lawyers named therein. They are only using the aforesaid name to
designate a law firm maintained by lawyers, who although not partners, maintain one office
as well as one clerical and supporting staff. Each one of them handles their own cases
independently and individually receives the revenues therefrom which are not shared among
them.
In the resolution of this Court dated January 27, 1992, this case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the investigation conducted by the IBP, it was discovered that respondent was
previously fined by this Court in the amount of P1,000.00 in connection with G.R. No. 94456
entitled "Milagros Ong Siy vs. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, et al." for forum shopping, where
respondent appeared as counsel for petitioner Milagros Ong Siy "through the law firm of
Cedo Ferrer Maynigo and Associates."
The IBP further found that the charges herein against respondent were fully substantiated.
Respondent's averment that the law firm handling the case of the Almeda spouses is not a
partnership deserves scant consideration in the light of the attestation of complainant's
counsel, Atty. Pedro Singson, that in one of the hearings of the Almeda spouses' case,
respondent attended the same with his partner Atty. Ferrer, and although he did not enter his
appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before the
court. Furthermore, during the hearing of the application for a writ of injunction in the same
case, respondent impliedly admitted being the partner of Atty. Ferrer, when it was made of
record that respondent was working in the same office as Atty. Ferrer.
Moreover, the IBP noted that assuming the alleged set-up of the firm is true, it is in itself a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 15.02) since the clients secrets
and confidential records and information are exposed to the other lawyers and staff members
at all times.
From the foregoing, the IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to devise
ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in
the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for

the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by
respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he expected to earn.
The IBP thus recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for 3
years.
The records show that after the Board of Governors of the IBP had, on October 4, 1994,
submitted to this Court its Report and recommendation in this case, respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated October 25, 1994 of the recommendation contained in the
said Report with the IBP Board of Governors. On December 12, 1994, respondent also filed
another "Motion to Set Hearing" before this Court, the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration.
In resolving this case, the Court took into consideration the aforesaid pleadings.
In addition to the findings of the IBP, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize
the paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. In the
similar case of Pasay Law and Conscience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA 24 [1980]) where
a former Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor of PARGO who participated in the investigation
of the Anti-Graft case against Mayor Pablo Cuneta later on acted as counsel for the said
Mayor in the same anti-graft case, this Court, citing Nombrado vs. Hernandez (26 SCRA 13
119681) ruled:
The Solicitor General is of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree
with him, that even if respondent did not use against his client any
information or evidence acquired by him as counsel it cannot be denied that
he did become privy to information regarding the ownership of the parcel of
land which was later litigated in the forcible entry case, for it was the dispute
over the land that triggered the mauling incident which gave rise to the
criminal action for physical injuries. This Court's remarks in Hilado vs. David,
84 Phil. 571, are apropos:
"Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of
litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the complexity of what is said in
the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other
matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause."
Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his
former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact
of their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as
counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the case ofHilado vs.
David, supra, this Tribunal further said:
Hence the necessity of setting the existence of the bare relationship of
attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This
stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice. . . . It is founded on principles of public
policy, of good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorney, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's

confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double

dealing. Only thus can litigants. be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.
The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal force and effect to
respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive of complainant bank, respondent
now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his former employer
involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in
violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and
conflicting interests, to wit:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest
when, in behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO
from the practice of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts
in Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989
IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP")
held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the
following were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or
their alternates) and proclaimed as officers:

NAME
Atty. Violeta Drilon

POSITION
President

Atty. Bella Tiro

Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao

Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo

Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy

Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles

Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes

Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza

Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni

Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon

Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine

Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel

Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco

Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong

Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the
Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some
members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings
and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists
for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon
Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious
intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in
violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme Courten banc,

exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oathtaking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the
canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed
by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the
participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to
device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and
extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for
president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday,
June 17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya,
June 10, 1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin
Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the
editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical
of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three
principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who
reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage
because Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the
pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having
regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had
been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her.
Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the
U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of
ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is
employed, and that government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor
Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of
personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably
Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of outof-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously,
womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which
allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to
twenty votes which were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly
involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they
plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention
Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some
embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.

Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989,
directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal
officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20,
1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the
aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate
approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental
principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of
existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no
lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the
House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would be chosen on the
basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection
with the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates,
there is a widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by
word of mouth, that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP
positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including
vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes,
attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting
between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on
the other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were
committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco,
Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry.
The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued
by the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star
hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists
(Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they
billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the
Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential
candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in
their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to
testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention.
Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth
of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were
subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP
elections. Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews
with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press
Freedom Law, refused to identify.

The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing
evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge
of the relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and
adopt the same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and
every activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and
shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasijudicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any
position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor,
officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any
Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as
of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public
office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to
IBP elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. The following
acts and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a
candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other
member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through
another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a
statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legalsize sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by
persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective,
judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well
as the advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote,
or to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other
indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment,
transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any

person; or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made,

offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and
Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a
ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if
elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring
member pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the
following violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president,
executive vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of
Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around
the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP
President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar
dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City,
Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern
Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they
announced their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers,
soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried
nomination forms and requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the
forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started
campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections
which determined the membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter
presidents (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He
submitted photocopies of his nomination forms which read:
"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin,
Jr., Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B.
Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo
T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado
Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg,
Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio
C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr.,
Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr.,
Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P.
Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he
had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal
commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The
reason, he said, is that. some of those who had committed their votes to him were
"manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695;
Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show
that Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural
Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD
(Cabinet Officers for Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The
plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant
Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco,
and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was
informed by Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified
that sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the
projected trip of his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers
for a client. While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an
official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB
plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the
Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose
in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked
with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support
(t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her
group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to
Bicol to monitor certain regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the
typhoon that hit the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity
brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and
requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane.

Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon,
Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for
Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr.,
an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates
for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive VicePresident; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez
(Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern
Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P.
Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr.
(Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice
President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil
Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose
Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern
Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon
Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B.
Bernardino, Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama,
Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P.
Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He
mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000)
from Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to
get a written commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado
na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's
ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did
not use them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not
want to be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to
Mrs. Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce
paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto
Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of
Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).

(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.

(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn,
which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly
ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers
of the Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills
of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo
Ligutan Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia,
Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy
Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad,
Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco
Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William
Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr.,
Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni,
Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza,
Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat,
Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not
24) rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group
bookings were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28,
1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the
rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where
her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites.
According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the
contract that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the
"IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano
Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain
a group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the
arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages
consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel
Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an
outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He
made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons
contributed for that down payment:

(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office)

P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio

20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office)

10,000

(d) Jay Castro

10,000

(e) Danny Deen

20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office)

10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno

20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel

15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every
time the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or
associates could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too.
Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the
Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied
was registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest during the convention. She
admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty.
Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).
The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the
Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A.
Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong
Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel
Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan,
Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes
Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente
Real, Sylvio Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis
Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.
Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave
P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm
could campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid
seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers
of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being

sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom Jose
Grapilon and Simeon Datumanong are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a
"sigma rho sister," her husband being a sigma rhoan.
Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm
who attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through
Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).
Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the
votes of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already
committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t.
t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).
(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.
Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt
Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of
P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total
of P57,632.45.
Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department
manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that
Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits EFlores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).
As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed
themselves to his candidacy.
The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E.
Asuncion, Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo,
Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto,
Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador
Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo
Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.
(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding
an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I,
IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP
convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some
moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma
Rho Fraternity. When asked about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto
explained: "More than the husband of Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is
that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."
He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle
which included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and
Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and
weaknesses of the other groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.

Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of
P23,110 during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to
Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from his room.
Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys
Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for
Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the "action center' or "war room"
where campaign strategies were discussed before and during the convention. It was in these
rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the
Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.
(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the
IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of
ascertaining whether it was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because
the receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June
28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during
any election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a
non-election year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet
of paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his
bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys.
Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed
by his own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized
by the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the
convention floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at
the convention site this year than in previous years. The election was more heated and
expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a
candidate for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign
materials were distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of
the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a
candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).

Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his
candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy
Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of
the Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the
Tripartite meet of the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club
in Baguio City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys.
Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited
her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo
also tried to enlist her support during the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their
nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier
committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This
statement, however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the
alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G.
Nalapo an IBP candidate who also withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated
(t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor
became Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator
Tiro went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that
the presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for
Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who
allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas,
expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped
from one camp to another. He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport
he was met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the
Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited
him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for him. He declined
the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three
candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at
the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the
elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned
Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant
Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered
to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989,
pp. 101-104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman,
Henry Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that
he was already committed to Nisce.

He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions
(Atty. Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4,
1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning.
Of this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president)
contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association
composed of Quezon City lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol
provinces, Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 914).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the
expenses for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and
his purchases of airplane tickets for some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that
her campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the
rooms, food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill
of P302,197.30 at convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the
national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the
elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of
the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce
and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the
better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to
solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of
Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets,
slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting,
either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution
of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in
three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by
Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the
chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data
of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to
P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to
distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the
giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of
labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel;
the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some
families who accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some
candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some

rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and
tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of
the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a
corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to
"promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1,
Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers
themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and
cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association
detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being
bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor
elevate it in the public's esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright
prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates,
during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The
subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had
been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to
deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed
during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution
(See. 8, Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members
among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection
of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the
position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much
coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the
corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the
seriousness of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is
viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not
entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as
the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously
diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and
honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates
(approved by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the
following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and

(c) the executive vice-president,

be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP
under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by
the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among
themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The
right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July
9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then
elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive VicePresident shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president
may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the
rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed;
whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
have a President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of
Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable,
on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their
respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the
Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The
Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman,
Secretary-Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9)
Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the
Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each
region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different
Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:

Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month
before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the
governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be
rotated among the chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the
first paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership
shall be held prior to any election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are
hereby deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of
this Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby
repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions
within three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within
thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in
Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vicepresident. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers
held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled
"Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as
connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may
not present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to
administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are
without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are
warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
EN BANC

A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992

EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's
good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar
Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505,
which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at
Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was
performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code 1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished
his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to
ensure a stable future for them.Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together
as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his
application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations
but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming
that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy
to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that
after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June
1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he
admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the
marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law
studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our
future."He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the
Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my
marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred
that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for
which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was
Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a
misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her
Complaint against Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and
allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying
for Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:

a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid

marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a
mockery of our marriage institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already
married in his application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he
submitted to the Supreme Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing
of the affidavit ofdesistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on
the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not
sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced
me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he
wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court.
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned
letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken
his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could
not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a
friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of
Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before
the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that
the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were
both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so
as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a fullpledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even
(sic) you go to any court." According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned,
Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8A-1").
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it
is Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had
covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and
take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the
absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage
and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never
lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he
honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report,
with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him
since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he
be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings
he had filed before this Court.

On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the
indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find
Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he
was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for
which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of
Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application
for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified
him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral
character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single"
not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also
because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere
afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to
Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage
of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the
Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings
submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in
paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet,
during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted
any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his
signature appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which
were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in
this Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f])
and [g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant
(par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on
its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made
public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he
contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in order from the
beginning."
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned
letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons
that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for
failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had
reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter

No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable
to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again
refused to honor his marriage to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting
submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with
Complainant in order to serve his purpose.In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to
be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty
from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No.
2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in
the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the
Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent toadmission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law(People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360,
30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice GeorgeA. Malcolm: "As
good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the
attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v.
Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the
same to all Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, GrioAquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest
or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
EN BANC

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.
RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law
filed against respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed
to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all
of which were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February
1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the
several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness,
reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the
Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the language,
meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal profession"
(Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin
and Boquia each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February
1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for
ready reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and
Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath. They

alleged that respondent had deliberately and maliciously excluded them in

his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is without merit considering that
in his Petition of 28 June 1988, respondent had discussed said cases quite
lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant
Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No.
624, had passed away so that they are in no position to submit their
respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent
to take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting
with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the
then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O.
Angeles, without authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter;
and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of
respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to
Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24
February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President,
Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the present Board of Officers with the
undersigned as President had not issued any testimonial attesting to the
good moral character and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states
that the IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that
signed by the former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty.
Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986,
and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any certification from the
IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present
Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST
whether or not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good
moral character as to entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the
reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a COMMENT on
respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and
received on 25 August 1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent,
is not aware of any acts committed by him as would disqualify him from
admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however, that there is
Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the
Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of

Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc.,
for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said
respondent, per complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, is
alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel
of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not
susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged
to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed and
the land sold at public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land
until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February
1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the
Clerk of CourtMunicipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City
Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime,
nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the
above findings, the Board does not find any acts committed by the petitioner
to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply to
Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants
Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica,
dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent
Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of
respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the
case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon as
resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March
1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of
respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and
surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar
Matter 44, informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been
restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no
necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no
further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and
reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become a member of the Philippine
Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission
to the legal profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-taking at a time
most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990, which also
required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November
1990, stated thus:

Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal

disposition which raises the question whether personal forgiveness is enough
basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and
maintain the importance and finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's
resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any
party to change or amend said final resolutions which are already res
judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions,
these cases therefore should not in the least be considered as anything
which is subject and subservient to the changing moods and dispositions of
the parties, devoid of any permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming
change in tactics and strategy could not improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional
Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio
Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this
Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil
Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of
Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was already considered closed and
terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been
reached between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the
counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free
Patent in Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of
Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper
annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid
Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of possession or
ownership over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of
Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its
cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our
Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and
Dagpin were required to comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive
judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no
pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the
Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a Motion
dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid
Motion pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January 1991
requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.

To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a
Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof
of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of
complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the
Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to
take the Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10)
years having elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after
careful consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken
cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic
consciousness. At that time, we had not received the objections from complainant Tan to
Sabandal's taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal"
was instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's
procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public
domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time,
Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense and was
declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was
eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the bogus certificate of
title to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further
expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The
Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the said amicable
settlement and prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the amicable
settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must also be
stressed that in 1985, at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the
lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then submitting to
this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character without, however,
mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the Court
now entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands.
Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which he
could not but have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not
speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public
service, which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed by the Republic against
him where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the suit had been
compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable settlement
was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of
the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a bank loan,
mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale
of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same until the civil case
filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor
and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for

Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting several Motions for
Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to
lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously
made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by
the Government against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother
his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in
SBC 619) have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment.
They have already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant
Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his favor,
the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also
known to possess good moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a
high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal
training as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and
one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble
profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess
good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined
as "including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30,
1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no
moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner
v. Bar Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR,
this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed
to take the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

In Bar Matter No. 44 (Eufrosina Yap Tan and Nicolas El. Sabandal) Bar Matter No. 59
(Benjamin Cabigon v. Nicolas El Sabandal) & SBC 624 (Cornelio Agnis and
Diomedes Agnis v. Nicolas El. Sabandal) [126 SCRA 60].

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &
VICTORIANO TENAZASpetitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, &
QUINTIN MUNINGrespondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue
presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en
banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No.
72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for
professional services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU
et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations
rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of
complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18
October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants,
filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November
1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants
Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection
to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin
Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the
backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he
is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and
appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and
subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to
be voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late
filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965. 1 He asked for reconsideration, but,
considering that the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court
admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer
to the petitioner for review. 2 The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's
brief. 3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers'
Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, 4 that an
agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is
allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is
immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the
absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties
shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of
Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same
section adds that
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine
and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the
orderly presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified
members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said
court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation
for such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a
reasonable compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of
attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be
a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot,
therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in
representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as
well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the
public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting
persons not licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under
statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that
compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not
been admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the services
were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law
unless he has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good
standing at the time. 6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; 7 that acting as
an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or
an act done in violation of law; 9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the
public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in
a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary
measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's
fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely
legal, by seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded
attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by nonlawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said
court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid
reasons and cannot justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it
was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition
for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were
included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended
that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was
belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees
which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor
organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its
members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and
economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may
prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases Appeals. Any person aggrieved by
any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial
burden of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before
the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice,
registering their appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court.
If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should
actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not
brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case.
Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally
engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10%
of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed
in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ. concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, page 37.
2 Rollo, page 62.
3 Rollo, page 75.
4 22 SCRA, 1266.
5 4 A.L.R. 1088, Editorial note.
6 7 C.J.S 1022.
7 See also, Foundation Finance Co. vs. Robins, 153 So. 833 179 La. 259,
reversing (App) 149 So. 166.
8 Rule 71, Rules of Court.
9 Harris v. Clark, 142 N.E. 881, 81 Ind. App. 494.
10 Harriman v. Straham, 33 P. 2d 1067, 47 Wyo. 208.
11 4 A.L.R. 1089.
12 NLU v. Dinglasan, L-7945, 23 March 1956, 52 O.G. No. 4, 1933.
13 Section 1(a), Republic Act 875.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO
SABSALON,respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to
annul the decision 1of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering
petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their
accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the
date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as
and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts
involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to
clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as
taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist
only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is
also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that
beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners
as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule.
Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-airconditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a
P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he
already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was
working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab
of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all
his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went
to his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same
terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on
an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions,
he failed to report for work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous
day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite

repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards
it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash
deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his
deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi
he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the
expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund
of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his
termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi
seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration
Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal
and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took
private respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not
consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the
filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents
failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi
Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his
taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment
with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private
respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the
labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the
beginning of this resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now
before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the
NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are
supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by
the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived
at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any
shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor
Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the
Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry.
Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded
therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. No employer shall require his
worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the
reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment
supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such
trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a

recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary

of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or
damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does
not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the
remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners,
the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer
existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must
be returned to them with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00

P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his
deposits through valesor he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners
in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned
questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not
withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash
deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision:
"Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the
taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has
driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents
(petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to
shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person
who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider
the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in
parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash
payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents
from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the

Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi
industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized
representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter
only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the
members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized
representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the
foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's
fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his
client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an
attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship
cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash
expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the
computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo
Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up
to the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Penned by Presiding Commission Bartolome S. Carale, with Commissioner

S. E. Veloso concurring, in NLRC NCR CA No. 003285-92; Rollo, 35.
2 It appears that Maldigan was hired in November, 1987, although petitioners
claim that he was already working as an extra driver in October, 1986.
Sabsalon started working on June 24, 1979.
3 San Miguel Corporation vs. Javate, Jr., G.R. No. 54244, January 27, 1992,
205 SCRA 469; Planters Products, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 78524 &
78739, January 20, 1989, 169 SCRA 328.
4 San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 88268, June 2, 1992,
209 SCRA 494.
5 Rollo, 88.
6 Rollo, 24.
7 Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

8 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et al. vs. Binalbagan

Isabela Sugar Co., et al., L-23959, November 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 302.
EN BANC
Resolution

March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of
1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern
as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the
Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to
the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in
any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying
difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of
strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to
the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per
cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent
was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by
this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note
to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower
than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of
Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this
court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and
submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it.
Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated
their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June
21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year,
reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines
in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one

hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a
general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth,
nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar
examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar
examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act,
any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as
part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any
subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall
be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades
shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may
obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission
to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground
for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their
grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to
revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act
No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they
have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by
this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are
appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the
law, the following statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act
No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946

(August)

206

121

18

1946

(November)

477

228

43

1947

749

340

1948

899

409

11

1949

1,218

532

164

1950

1,316

893

26

1951

2,068

879

196

1952

2,738 1,033

426

1953

2,555
968
TOTAL

284

12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586
have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere
motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of
said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations,
but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest
grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be
sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of
which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951
had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125
unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are
still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, although
as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed
as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on
the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in
which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia,
Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity
of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A.
Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario,
Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the
memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R.
Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema
themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have
exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has

been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the
voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to
place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation
has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of
the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And
now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094),
because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of
preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest
demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of
the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor
and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the
statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.
There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were
made available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also published
them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published
continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since
1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since
1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts
of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable
principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of
similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the
judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States,
and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial
history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can
not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against
its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs.
Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR
1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed
in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within
our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been
cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the
Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State,
denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a
statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860,
which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the
state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either
of them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the
Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of
appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good
moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and
ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had
previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which
they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which
this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had
imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the
section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision"
expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution,
evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is
nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any
portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the
inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is
urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to
grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing,
and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite
qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided
that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the
degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution
required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text
of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York,
the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an
institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge

of able professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a
formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite
period of study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the
preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal
requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential,
unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the
applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law
committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and
hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that
the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements
of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that
the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the
students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act
admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to
the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it
operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection
with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present
condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of
admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain
cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may
be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed
in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the
court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not
decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different
on the matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most
solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and

principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and
(3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a
judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not
legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are
attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter
had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the
validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the
courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history
of the English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has
been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe
the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the
courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function.
This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it
stands alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly.
(Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the
bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional
authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment
will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to
impose other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p.
444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct,
independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all
the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective
functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of
government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General
ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive.
By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our
state government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune
from embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the
courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty
thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is
an attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no
small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal
and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into
disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their
bars, at least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to
the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to
Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who
should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the
Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all
titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to
determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that
entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either
a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power
exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made
of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and
coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power
traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is
no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional
power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative
control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make
the three great departments of government separate and independent of one
another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by
prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the
dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department,
and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional
provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of
attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect
the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications
required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from
which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing
additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper
administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to
admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an
attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is
quite likely true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is
in pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh
unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial
function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A.
12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to
practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor.
Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333,
18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan,
48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W.
1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by
the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an

attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of
the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly
uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a
purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications
may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation
of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that
there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the
public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for
doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin,
242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is
a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more
than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such
attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the
performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common
law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is
almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is
filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar
is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon
its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department
conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate
department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of
government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to
practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from
the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules
and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to
determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and
counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the
legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test
oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office
as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon
evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has
always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an
examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in
the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years
preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of
the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission
sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite

qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and
conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and
are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good
behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial
power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases.
It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of
Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that
court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may,
with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may
very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial
functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be
the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with
citations in this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of
one of the inherent powers of the court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an
inherent power of the court. A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac.
1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L.
R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is
that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and
govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while
the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are
past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the
distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of
them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do
so directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials,
ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken
in the progress of a judicial inquiry. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted
in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a
judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the
bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments

even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in
question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement
the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no
valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had
Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement
the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this
Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify
or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a
better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of
its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the
practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for
the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and
supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other,
giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part;
the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the
existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest
requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The
legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency
that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession,
and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its
traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is
realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not

repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar
that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took examination
and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided
that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of
law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guaria and he discharged
the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without
previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case
seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground
that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety,
entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands
under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular
standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at
any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the
position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge
or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the
position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant
attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal,
attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be
licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination,
upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction
of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and
failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated
March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the
various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four
points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the
performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative
indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in
the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the bar,
we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion,
he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination
"upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he
has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is
urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain

in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the
context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a
proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission
of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this mandatory
construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention
of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States,
articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and
confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case
such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used
in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress
prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that
extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the
provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the
fact that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the
qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that
the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant
was not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior
to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears
that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for
admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not
think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof
if his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude
therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines,
should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four
points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view
also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor
of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in
the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent
and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government
service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be
justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the
ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory
evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a
committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if
he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed
by general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer
from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who
began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a
diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would
pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their
studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was
unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of
diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly
passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend
section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and
counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so
far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the
following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the
supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be
granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said
rules". In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the
holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under
the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring
an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and
showing that the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and
accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the
proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part
of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course
of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this
court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is
claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein,
and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,
prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to
admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice,
and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court
as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could
only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2.
The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the
holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to

argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as
from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law
conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature,
in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law
establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought.
There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one,
having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs.
People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad
Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience,
may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but
the place where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot
furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based
upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature
undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law,
and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning, character, or
ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons
who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into
two classes First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state
before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two
years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office, who
are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of
this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for
making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are
dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are
fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted
upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made allsufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of
persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will
furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law
November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who
began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in
study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although
they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on
the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before
December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the
other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless.
Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to
the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of
bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards
to its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has
power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must
admit and license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be
exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through
general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all.
Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to
pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129

U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of
every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession
he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of
like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a
distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to
every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some
requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The
interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them that is, the
right to continue their prosecution is often of great value to the possessors and
cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property
can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly
situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even
statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the
possession on the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may
be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the
time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of
infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28
S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W.
345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to
practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of
legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to
practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other
qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the
Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it
would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme
Court to admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the
military or naval forces of the United States during the World War and received a
honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the
purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War
Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at
the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground
that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In
re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur.
151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to
be valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and
those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the
rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon
pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones.
Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be
based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other
individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can
be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation
and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and

circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference
made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not
general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial
reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am.
Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951,
70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and
73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general
average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive
of the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is
none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general
average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful
candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the
exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact
that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one
concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its
retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does
Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal
permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75
per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69
per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those
who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent
as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable.
These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to
or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done cancel the license that was
issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed
law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this
Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained
by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law.
Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to
complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to
the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent,
with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said
law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules
promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This
is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the
judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them.
And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it
falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which
such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals.
The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may
happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in
this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this
case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have
temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system
for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which
vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is
obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following
reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar
examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to
practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the
admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges
the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of
these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for
justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to
do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as
they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to
improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is
therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate
decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to
existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes,
is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the
Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is
undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what
the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law
is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations
in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of
the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of
two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to
take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have
voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of
1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and
without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is
valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the
Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be
permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on
the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
A resume of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive
follows:

August, 19461

Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo

Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin
Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates

206

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

12

73'S

72'S

Number of candidates who passed

85

Number of candidates who failed

121

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

18

Percentage of success

(per cent)

41.62

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

58.74

Passing grade

(per cent)

72

November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose
Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates
Number of candidates whose grades were raised

481
19

(72 per cent and above 73 per cent --Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Number of candidates who passed

249

Number of candidates who failed

228

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

43

Percentage of success

(per cent)

52.20

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

47.80

Passing grade
(By resolution of the Court).

(per cent)

72

October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.
Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos
B. Hilado, Members.
Number of candidates

749

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per

43
1

cent
69 per cent

40

68 per cent

Number of candidates who passed

409

Number of candidates who failed

340

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

972

Percentage of success

(per cent)

54.59

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

45.41

Passing grade

(per cent)

69

(by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1
per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not
benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in
Civil Law.

August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis
P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico
Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael
Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
Number of candidates

899

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

64

71's

29

70's

35

Number of candidates who passed

490

Number of candidates who failed

409

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

11

Percentage of success

(per cent)

62.40

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

37.60

Passing grade

(per cent)

70

(by resolution of the Court).

August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo,
Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates
Number of candidates whose grades were raised
(74's)
Number of candidates who passed

1,218
55

686

Number of candidates who failed

532

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

164

Percentage of success

(per cent)

56.28

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

43.72

Passing grade

(per cent)

74

(by resolution of the Court).

August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.
Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B.
Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A.
Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
Number of candidates

1,316

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

38

(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and

authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed

432

Number of candidates who failed

894

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

26

Percentage of success

(per cent)

32.14

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

67.86

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of candidates

2,068

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

112

Number of candidates who passed

1,189

Number of candidates who failed

879

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

196

Percentage of success

(per cent)

57.49

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

42.51

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
Pea, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Number of candidates

2,738

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

163

Number of candidates who passed

1,705

Number of candidates who failed

1,033

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

426

Percentage of success

(per cent)

62.27

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

37.73

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio
Pea, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
Number of candidates

2,555

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

100

Number of candidates who passed

1,570

Number of candidates who failed

986

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

284

Percentage of success

(per cent)

61.04

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

38.96

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the
years in which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented
motions for reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for
reconsideration without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
Av.
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L.

66

71

61

76 80

83

73

75

71.4

MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino

76

72

74

75 70

70

65

72

71.45

MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V.

64

64

65

68 83

74

68

80

69.85

1948
MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R.

71

68

66

75 63

75

70

88

69.9

MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu.

75

73

73

65 63

66

65

80

69.95

MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud

72

66

71

75 78

68

65

50

69.65

69

79

75

75 71

89

55

75

70.8

76

80

62

86 81

72

60

65

70.5

63

85

70

77 80

81

65

80

71.8

10. Alacar, Pascual C.

61

63

83

79 71

85

65

80

72.05

11. Amog, Pedro M.

75

66

76

78 81

74

55

85

72.2

12. Apolinario, Miguel S.

75

84

78

78 70

70

60

75

71.95

13. Aquino, Maximo G.

82

77

71

77 76

77

60

75

73.15

14. Asinas, Candido D.

75

83

69

80 81

83

55

85

72.65

15. Baldivino, Jose B.

75

65

72

82 82

69

60

80

71.95

16. Balintona, Bernardo

75

80

64

78 74

67

65

70

70

17. Banawa, Angel L.

78

70

70

75 81

83

60

60

72.3

18. Bandala, Anacleto A.

66

80

66

71 93

72

55

70

69.6

19. Bandon, Alawadin L.

74

79

69

77 91

73

60

80

73.35

20. Baquero, Benjamin

76

79

64

77 85

72

65

75

72.5

21. Blanco, Jose

75

75

70

75 77

76

60

90

72.5

22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T.

75

71

72

78 67

82

60

75

70.85

1949
7. Abaya, Jesus A.
MRD- 8. Advincula, David D.
9. Agraviador, Alfredo L.

23. Canda, Benjamin S.

75

72

75

82 76

77

65

75

73.55

24. Canon, Guillermo

77

86

67

88 75

69

70

85

73.9

25. Carlos, Estela S.

75

81

81

79 72

73

65

70

73.8

26. Cerezo, Gregorio O.

69

76

76

79 71

80

55

80

70.4

27. Clarin, Manuel L.

75

82

76

81 73

69

70

75

73.95

28. Claudo, Conrado O.

76

62

78

77 73

72

60

70

71.4

29. Condevillamar, Antonio V. 68

65

74

80 85

75

60

75

71.65

72

75

69

82 83

79

65

80

73.4

31. Corona, Olvido D.

68

76

73

81 81

72

60

75

71.15

32. Dizon, Marcial C.

76

86

69

83 75

74

65

80

73.1

33. Enriquez, Agustin P.

75

77

70

81 81

77

65

80

73.75

34. Espiritu, Irineo E.

80

88

69

75 76

77

65

75

73.8

35. Fernandez, Macario J.

63

82

76

75 81

84

65

75

72.95

36. Gallardo, Amando C.

78

79

67

77 76

75

60

65

70.95

37. Garcia, Freidrich M.

76

80

66

75 72

70

60

75

69.7

38. Garcia, Julian L.

64

77

68

82 89

77

65

75

72.15

39. Garcia, Leon Mo.

77

86

71

80 60

82

65

75

71.85

40. Garcia, Pedro V.

76

82

73

81 74

83

60

85

73.6

41. Garcia, Santiago C.

62

91

79

75 72

75

65

80

71.8

42. Genoves, Pedro

75

83

70

78 87

76

55

80

72.7

43. Gonzales, Amado P.

75

71

71

75 86

75

60

75

72.65

MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R.

44. Guia, Odon R. de

77

76

66

81 74

76

60

75

70.9

45. Fernandez, Simeon

62

68

71

80 74

90

65

75

70.85

46. Jakosalem, Filoteo

82

83

73

82 61

87

65

70

73.6

47. Jesus, Felipe D. de

75

83

67

79 78

85

60

75

72.45

48. Jocom, Jacobo M.

77

77

74

77 74

64

55

85

70.65

49. Juares, Nicolas

77

84

56

76 73

82

60

85

70

50. Kalalang, Remigio

65

75

74

80 70

70

65

85

70.3

51. Layumas, Vicente L.

67

84

65

75 89

66

60

80

70.3

52. Leyson, Amancio F.

69

83

75

76 81

75

65

75

73.15

53. Libanan, Marcelino

71

83

61

77 80

81

65

85

71.75

54. Lim, Jose E.

77

77

72

76 72

64

65

70

71.15

55. Lim, Jose F.

70

75

62

83 80

71

65

80

70.4

56. Linao, Mariano M.

66

84

76

78 80

75

60

75

71.75

57. Lopez, Angelo P.

67

81

75

72 79

81

55

80

71

58. Lopez, Eliezar M.

77

75

60

75 77

85

60

75

70.7

59. Lopez, Nicanor S.

72

71

70

78 77

84

60

75

71.55

60. Manoleto, Proceso D.

72

70

65

78 81

90

60

80

71.95

61. Mancao, Alfredo P.

67

64

71

83 76

76

65

80

70.95

62. Manera, Mariano A.

75

78

75

75 68

79

60

65

71

63. Mercado, Arsenio N.

67

64

71

83 76

76

65

80

70.95

64. Miranda, Benjamin G.

76

81

67

82 74

77

65

80

72.55

65. Manad, Andres B.

77

75

68

82 69

72

65

75

71.15

66. Orosco, Casimiro P.

72

84

69

81 70

82

65

75

71.9

67. Padua, Manuel C.

76

76

68

80 79

79

50

75

70.1

68. Palang, Basilio S.

71

75

82

71 55

87

55

75

69.6

69. Palma, Cuadrato

62

75

69

93 80

79

55

80

69.5

70. Paganiban, Jose V.

67

83

61

81 91

74

60

75

70.6

71. Pareja, Felipe

66

71

75

81 67

74

60

70

68.75

72. Patalinjug, Eriberto

73

77

78

73 78

71

55

75

71.25

73. Paulin, Jose C.

66

69

71

77 83

82

65

75

72.1

74. Pido, Serafin C.

72

78

63

80 71

85

70

80

72.05

75. Pimentel, Luis P.

77

75

76

81 76

68

55

80

71.6

76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C.

72

78

68

89 79

81

65

85

73.55

77. Regalario, Benito B.

72

80

64

80 75

81

55

80

69.55

78. Robis, Casto P.

62

77

74

73 68

80

70

80

70.9

79. Rodil, Francisco C.

68

69

70

81 76

75

65

75

70.75

80. Rodriguez, Mariano I.

80

75

69

80 72

80

65

80

73.35

81. Romero, Crispulo P.

78

75

66

77 76

83

65

75

72.85

82. Saez, Porfirio D.

75

75

72

81 69

77

60

75

71

83. Saliguma, Crisogono D.

79

79

74

78 69

65

65

70

71.8

84. Samano, Fortunato A.

75

84

72

77 70

82

60

75

71.9

1948

85. Santos, Faustina C.

71

68

68

76 75

85

55

75

69.5

86. Santos, Josefina R.

68

69

76

71 77

82

65

75

72.3

87. Seludo, Ananias G.

75

80

69

79 77

82

65

75

73.25

88. Semilia, Rafael I.

68

85

55

83 89

79

65

80

71.25

89. Telan, Gaudencio

77

79

70

75 70

75

60

75

70.85

90. Tesorero, Leocadio T.

75

71

63

75 82

62

65

63

69.65

91. Torre, Valentin S. de la

85

81

71

76 69

65

55

70

70.4

92. Torres, Ariston L.

78

71

72

81 61

84

55

85

70.4

93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de

70

75

71

79 65

80

65

80

70.65

94. Viado, Jose

67

70

74

75 75

90

55

80

70.7

95. Villacarlos, Delfin A.

73

87

71

82 69

70

75

85

73.85

96. Villamil, Leonor S.

73

81

76

86 86

73

55

85

73.6

97. Zabala, Amando A.

76

70

67

75 76

76

60

75

70.6

70

71

78

81 76

72

64

96

73.4

99. Espaola, Pablo S.

71

78

55

76 85

69

65

93

70.2

100. Foronda, Clarencio J.

60

78

68

79 84

88

62

93

71.9

101. Hechanova, Vicente

59

76

75

75 69

68

75

96

71.3

MRD- Pealosa, Osias R.

102.

80

78

61

76 61

77

66

85

70.2

103. Sarmiento, Floro A.

65

86

63

82 89

72

60

72

70.15

1950
MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la

MRD- Torre, Catalino P.

104.

75

85

68

78 69

67

65

69

70.25

105. Ungson, Fernando S.

61

87

75

70 57

85

83

82

72.8

106. Abasolo, Romulo

77

70

64

65 76

70

76

64

71.7

107. Adeva, Daniel G.

75

59

74

65 69

51

78

67

70.4

108. Aguilar, Vicente Z.

73

63

68

75 70

69

75

75

71.25

109. Amodia, Juan T.

75

76

66

75 76

60

77

76

72.35

MRD- Aosa, Pablo S.

110.

76

78

63

75 74

61

75

79

71.6

111. Antiola, Anastacio R.

68

76

75

70 71

70

81

66

73.05

112. Aquino, S. Rey A.

70

71

71

60 74

62

76

77

71.1

113. Atienza, Manuel G.

71

78

68

80 86

51

82

75

73.85

114. Avancea, Alfonso

71

71

65

75 70

72

78

80

71.8

MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N.

115.

75

73

75

70 72

65

75

76

73.25

116. Barinaga, Jeremias L.

68

69

73

70 74

50

80

79

71.2

MRD- Barrientos, Ambrosio D.

117.

76

60

67

55 74

63

77

62

70.25

MRD- Benitez, Tomas P.

118.

67

75

75

60 73

72

75

78

72.2

119. Biason, Sixto F.

73

82

67

65 66

72

77

68

71.25

MRD- Brias, Isagani A.

120.

71

69

74

70 76

52

79

72

71.95

1951

121. Buela, Arcadio P.

72

77

61

70 71

58

79

71

69.75

122. Cabilao, Leonardo S.

73

50

75

75 75

60

71

79

71.25

123. Cabrera, Ireneo M.

75

66

70

65 72

81

70

79

72.4

64

73

73

80 73

57

75

59

69.65

64

73

73

80 73

57

75

59

69.65

127. Calimlim, Pedro B.

66

82

69

60 69

52

83

75

70

128. Camello, Sotero H.

70

77

63

65 75

66

84

64

71.55

129. Campos, Juan A.

71

88

70

75 64

69

71

62

70.15

130. Castillo, Antonio del

78

78

70

60 79

67

69

76

72.65

MRD- Castillo, Dominador Ad.

131.

75

61

72

75 74

71

67

66

71.1

MRD- Castro, Jesus B.

132.

72

86

72

75 65

75

76

71

72.85

133. Casuga, Bienvenido B.

75

72

72

70 69

61

75

60

70.95

134. Cabangbang, Santiago

B.

77

67

61

80 73

59

83

76

72.2

135. Cruz, Federico S.

69

74

75

75 68

65

76

70

71.65

136. Dacanay, Eufemio P.

70

73

62

75 72

69

85

71

72.05

137. Deysolong, Felisberto

66

62

72

75 70

62

83

62

70.85

MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose N.

138.

78

79

63

75 73

75

81

59

73.5

139. Espinosa, Domingo L.

78

63

58

70 70

67

87

63

71.6

124. Cacacho, Emilio V.

125. Calilung, Soledad C.
MRD- Calimlim, Jose B.
126.

MRD- Farol, Evencia C.

140.

80

78

66

75 81

72

62

73

72.25

141. Felix, Conrado S.

71

71

75

65 70

58

75

69

70.75

142. Fernan, Pablo L.

67

88

66

85 73

68

78

75

72.35

143. Gandioco, Salvador G.

64

58

66

65 76

70

89

75

72.1

144. Gastardo, Crispin B.

70

69

68

75 78

66

86

72

73.9

145. Genson, Angelo B.

75

57

73

65 67

54

78

56

69.55

146. Guiani, Guinald M.

68

60

75

65 74

67

75

77

71.5

147. Guina, Graciano P.

66

69

67

60 78

52

83

61

69.6

74

74

75

75 71

69

75

71

73.35

149. Ibarra, Venancio M.

60

75

74

70 74

70

80

75

71.9

150. Imperial, Monico L.

72

78

75

75 72

56

82

77

73.7

MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M.

151.

71

70

63

85 71

60

85

53

70.85

152. Inandan, Fortunato C.

77

77

67

53 73

75

79

57

72.5

153. Jimenez, Florencio C.

75

70

70

75 72

61

75

78

72.05

154. Kintanar, Woodrow M.

70

83

72

65 76

73

75

69

72.95

155. Languido, Cesar V.

63

71

63

85 70

61

85

79

70.55

156. Lavilles, Cesar L.

61

89

75

55 73

63

75

78

70.55

157. Llenos, Francisco U.

64

70

65

60 72

65

92

75

71.75

158. Leon, Marcelo D. de

63

73

60

85 75

75

90

70

72.75

MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P.

148.

159. Llanto, Priscilla

72

68

60

65 76

67

84

68

71.35

160. Machachor, Oscar

68

59

78

70 67

57

75

75

70.15

MRD- Magsino, Encarnacion

161.

77

66

70

70 76

71

75

61

72.75

MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio M.

162.

70

61

75

65 75

50

91

51

72.3

163. Manio, Gregorio

67

67

69

80 71

67

75

75

70.65

164. Puzon, Eduardo S.

72

82

60

60 69

70

68

72

62.05

MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R.

165.

66

75

74

70 75

67

81

75

73.15

166. Martin, Benjamin S.

68

72

63

75 69

63

84

62

70.1

MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina S.

167.

70

80

75

80 76

66

82

51

73.95

MRD- Montero, Leodegario C.

168.

73

67

66

80 81

65

81

75

73.75

169. Monzon, Candido T.

70

72

74

75 67

70

77

69

72.05

170. Natividad, Alberto M.

73

79

68

65 73

69

75

79

72.2

MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C.

171.

70

72

68

85 81

66

71

74

72.1

66

66

75

65 79

68

85

62

73.5

75

81

76

65 74

67

75

69

73.75

174. Olaviar, Jose O.

72

70

69

55 66

70

77

75

70.5

MRD- Perez, Cesario Z.

175.

75

76

66

80 72

63

82

69

72.95

70

66

65

70 75

64

75

70

69.95

172. Nisce, Camilo Z.

MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de
173.

176. Pogado, Causin O.

177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75

73

62

65 78

59

75

66

70.2

178. Recinto, Ireneo I.

73

76

68

75 74

68

80

53

72.3

MRD- Redor, Francisco K.

179.

62

77

73

75 69

64

76

69

70

MRD- Regis, Deogracias A.

180.

76

74

68

65 65

65

88

75

73.35

67

78

61

80 71

77

79

65

70.9

70

72

62

60 88

66

67

79

70.15

183. Rosario, Prisco del

70

64

70

70 72

73

85

57

72.65

184. Rosario, Vicente D. del

75

91

65

75 68

68

79

62

72.2

185. Saavedra, Felipe

73

80

63

75 76

73

68

62

70.35

186. Salazar, Alfredo N.

66

72

73

75 67

68

77

69

70.85

187. Salem, Romulo R.

77

81

72

65 73

60

76

75

73

188. Foz, Julita A.

75

72

75

75 65

70

76

64

72.5

189. Santa Ana, Candido T.

77

69

65

75 81

75

70

75

73

190. Santos, Aquilino

72

66

69

65 68

70

81

71

71.7

191. Santos, Valeriano V.

76

72

75

75 68

62

76

79

73.1

192. Suico, Samuel

73

79

72

75 71

59

84

65

73.3

193. Suson, Teodorico

74

68

66

80 66

59

79

67

70.35

194. Tado, Florentino P.

64

76

67

65 76

72

76

53

69.7

195. Tapayan, Domingo A.

69

72

69

70 76

73

82

79

73.75

181. Rigor, Estelita C.

MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, Estela
182.

MRDTiausas, Miguel V.
196.

67

60

71

75 79

67

84

60

72.7

197. Torres, Carlos P.

68

71

71

70 70

63

82

71

71.6

198. Tria, Hipolito

69

72

75

60 69

54

78

66

70.05

199. Velasco, Avelino A.

65

72

75

75 71

67

78

76

72.1

200. Villa, Francisco C.

65

80

73

75 68

79

65

75

70.2

201. Villagonzalo, Job R.

78

67

74

65 72

51

69

71

70.25

202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro

75

74

75

55 75

66

67

75

71.45

203. Abacon, Pablo

75

72

78

81 78

72

64

55

72.7

MRP- Abad, Agapito

204.

73

76

73

85 75

63

62

75

70.95

MRP- Abella, Ludovico B.

205.

70

81

76

81 70

66

77

58

72.7

MRP- Abellera, Geronimo F.

206.

75

79

79

87 76

51

63

70

71.7

MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N.

207.

71

72

78

84 70

75

69

70

72.9

208. Alandy, Doroteo R.

64

83

93

91 68

59

60

60

71.2

209. Alano, Fabian T.

70

83

61

83 72

87

72

70

71.9

71

79

80

81 73

70

72

62

73.65

211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag.

75

85

71

73 76

65

68

65

71.85

212. Acosta, Dionisio N.

75

81

78

87 56

65

77

70

72.8

1952

MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V.

210.

MRP- Abinguna, Agapito C.

213.

66

85

80

84 75

58

76

75

73.65

214. Adove, Nehemias C.

76

86

78

77 66

78

69

62

73.55

215. Adrias, Inocencio C.

75

83

61

88 76

67

79

75

73.4

216. Aglugub, Andres R.

75

83

73

88 72

62

72

62

72.65

217. Andrada, Mariano L.

76

85

66

87 63

77

75

77

73.

MRP- Almeda, Serafin V.

218.

72

72

75

81 61

67

73

65

70.75

219. Almonte-Peralta,
Felicidad

73

71

72

91 75

67

65

53

70.7

MRP- Amodia, Juan T.

220.

75

79

68

85 62

64

75

78

71.4

MRP- Antonio, Felino A.

221.

71

76

81

83 79

52

72

70

73.3

MRP- Antonio, Jose S.

222.

75

92

90

68 65

64

68

60

73.75

223. Aonuevo, Ramos B.

71

87

78

81 64

63

74

76

72.7

224. Aquino, S. Rey A.

67

77

57

78 69

70

69

80

67.7

225. Arteche, Filomeno D.

78

83

50

89 76

77

70

70

70.8

MRP- Arribas, Isaac M.

226.

75

78

70

81 73

70

67

78

72.2

MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D.

227.

72

67

78

89 72

67

77

65

73.95

228. Atienza, Ricardo

72

87

70

79 66

55

75

75

70.85

229. Balacuit, Camilo N.

75

78

89

75 70

54

66

75

73.3

MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S.

77

84

83

80 69

70

61

65

73

230.
231. Balcita, Oscar C.

75

77

79

90 64

60

67

50

70.65

232. Barilea, Dominador Z.

71

67

82

77 64

61

65

80

70.5

MRP- Banta, Jose Y.

233.

75

80

77

81 75

63

71

75

73.95

MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio D.

234.

76

70

67

80 67

65

70

81

70.7

235. Batucan, Jose M.

66

76

78

88 62

76

67

78

71.2

236. Bautista, Atilano C.

70

82

84

85 58

61

71

62

71.25

237. Bautista, Celso J.

71

68

63

87 80

67

80

70

72.75

238. Belderon, Jose

76

81

76

92 70

66

67

62

72.65

MRP- Belo, Victor B.

239.

76

77

64

73 75

71

76

76

72.85

MRP- Bejec, Conceso D.

240.

79

80

73

82 63

77

75

50

73.15

MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M.

241.

72

75

81

73 75

57

75

80

73.95

MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74

242.

84

77

84 75

63

68

62

72.85

MRP- Beria, Roger C.

243.

70

80

79

79 68

72

64

78

71.85

MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M.

244.

75

86

65

92 64

64

84

75

73.45

MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M.

245.

73

69

78

83 73

59

70

82

72.75

MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B.

246.

76

86

76

83 68

59

71

78

73.05

247. Buenafe, Avelina R.

78

80

75

75 70

55

72

80

72.75

248. Bueno, Anastacio F.

73

78

71

78 71

67

71

60

71.15

249. Borres, Maximino L.

67

85

62

91 72

63

76

80

70.9

MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V.

250.

72

71

76

75 74

70

71

60

72.2

MRP- Cabello, Melecio F.

251.

72

78

78

89 58

70

67

71

70.5

MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M.

252.

79

88

53

91 71

85

75

76

73.3

253. Cabreros, Paulino N.

71

79

83

84 60

62

71

50

70.85

254. Calayag, Florentino R.

69

79

66

88 69

75

68

76

70.6

76

72

80

67 62

71

66

62

70.85

70

82

81

77 78

51

75

75

73.7

MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N.

257.

76

87

69

80 58

64

78

75

71.8

258. Calagi, Mateo C.

73

93

71

87 70

66

69

62

71.8

259. Canda, Benjamin S.

72

71

77

90 62

75

66

82

71.95

260. Cantoria, Eulogio

71

80

71

89 70

55

72

75

71

261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado

67

78

71

90 65

75

72

60

70.65

262. Capitulo, Alejandro P.

75

70

53

87 78

63

76

91

71.2

MRP- Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo

263.

75

93

81

76 64

75

68

56

73.15

MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V.

264.

75

86

70

87 77

52

77

82

73.9

MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la

255.
256. Canabal, Isabel

MRP- Campanilla, Mariano B.

265.

80

75

78

77 73

71

63

76

73.65

MRP- Campos, Juan A.

266.

66

85

83

84 67

61

80

57

73.25

267. Cardoso, Angelita G.

78

71

73

76 79

56

69

60

71.8

268. Cartagena, Herminio R.

71

72

65

89 64

73

80

70

71.65

65

75

77

76 85

60

75

69

73.15

270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V.

70

78

72

73 77

69

64

80

71.2

271. Castro, Pedro L. de

70

68

69

87 76

75

72

70

73.35

272. Cerio, Juan A.

75

82

75

86 60

54

76

75

71.75

273. Colorado, Alfonso R.

68

75

80

74 77

66

67

80

72.6

274. Chavez, Doroteo M.

73

65

79

84 73

69

66

84

73.1

275. Chavez, Honorato A.

77

76

79

86 74

53

71

75

73.65

MRP- Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69

276.

81

74

82 76

61

78

80

73.85

MRP- Castro, Daniel T.

269.

277. Cortez, Armando R.

78

60

88

86 60

66

69

64

73.1

278. Crisostomo, Jesus L.

76

87

74

76 62

55

76

66

71.45

MRP- Cornejo, Crisanto R.

279.

68

87

78

86 79

50

80

60

73.7

MRP- Cruz, Raymundo

280.

75

81

79

85 72

57

68

75

72.95

MRP- Cunanan, Jose C.

281.

78

92

63

83 76

72

68

65

72.4

70

82

64

92 67

75

73

76

71.45

282. Cunanan, Salvador F.

283. Cimafranca, Agustin B.

71

76

76

80 70

71

75

71

73.35

284. Crisol, Getulio R.

70

91

78

85 68

55

71

50

70.8

MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R.

285.

76

82

69

82 66

62

80

71

72.85

MRP- Datu, Alfredo J.

286.

70

75

72

86 80

55

68

79

71.5

287. Dacuma, Luis B.

71

67

87

83 71

50

65

70

71.25

MRP- Degamo, Pedro R.

288.

73

80

82

74 80

67

67

57

73.65

70

84

82

84 77

52

73

50

72.65

75

83

86

73 54

54

75

75

72.25

73

84

64

89 71

78

75

66

72.8

MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M.

292.

71

77

71

81 69

75

80

70

73.65

MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R.

293.

70

76

82

73 79

70

72

56

73.9

MRP- Delgado, Abner

294.

75

84

63

67 64

60

70

72

68.35

MRP- Domingo, Dominador T.

295.

70

69

81

82 68

63

71

75

72.2

70

78

53

88 75

77

62

76

68.05

MRP- Duque, Antonio S.

297.

75

77

78

86 76

72

64

75

73.9

298. Duque, Castulo

75

80

73

83 66

67

65

66

70.65

299. Ebbah, Percival B.

70

80

85

76 66

63

76

75

73.95

289. Delgado, Vicente N.

MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A.
290.
291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo

296. Ducusin, Agapito B.

300. Edisa, Sulpicio

65

77

75

89 75

62

75

65

72

301. Edradan, Rosa C.

70

75

84

84 71

59

69

86

73.4

MRP- Enage, Jacinto N.

302.

66

70

88

93 72

67

65

75

73.2

MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso B.

303.

75

86

73

81 63

77

69

75

72.65

304. Encarnacion, Cesar

65

78

58

68 66

64

75

78

67.1

305. Estoista, Agustin A.

78

76

74

86 58

67

70

76

71.7

MRP- Fabros, Jose B.

306.

66

75

80

82 80

71

67

70

73.05

MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P.

307.

77

69

82

83 65

60

75

75

73.9

308. Fajardo, Genaro P.

70

79

77

79 79

50

73

75

72.5

309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75

75

72

87 63

63

77

70

72.15

310. Familara, Raymundo Z.

68

75

87

83 64

65

68

65

71.85

311. Farias, Dionisio

70

78

89

66 65

75

70

50

72.75

312. Favila, Hilario B.

71

84

74

70 75

67

73

59

72.2

MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I.

313.

71

69

70

85 69

81

72

70

72.25

MRP- Fernando, Lope F.

314.

73

77

86

79 70

76

64

50

73

MRP- Flores, Dionisio S.

315.

78

72

77

83 67

60

68

73

72.05

MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B.

316.

70

82

70

70 78

65

64

75

70.35

MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la

76

88

72

74 60

71

79

79

73.55

317.
318. Fohmantes, Nazario S.

72

79

71

77 68

61

76

60

70.9

MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B.

319.

76

81

74

69 71

71

73

60

72.85

320. Gabuya, Jesus S.

70

83

82

83 70

63

75

65

73.75

321. Galang, Victor N.

69

83

84

76 70

57

71

60

71.95

322. Gaerlan, Manuel L.

73

87

77

90 67

61

72

75

73.15

323. Galem, Nestor R.

72

79

86

78 60

61

75

70

73.05

324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B.

75

88

75

75 63

70

70

65

71.85

70

78

84

91 80

51

65

70

72.85

326. Galindo, Eulalio D.

70

89

87

65 78

71

62

62

73.4

327. Galman, Patrocinio G.

72

72

80

85 71

56

70

53

71.15

328. Gamalinda, Carlos S.

76

79

81

86 67

63

69

55

72.55

329. Gamboa, Antonio G.

71

67

70

72 76

60

75

68

70.95

330. Gannod, Jose A.

69

80

75

81 68

62

73

68

71.25

MRP- Garcia, Matias N.

331.

67

78

74

90 79

59

76

65

72.8

MRP- Ganete, Carmelo

332.

75

87

77

82 74

57

68

81

73.3

333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R.

75

67

80

82 67

57

64

70

70.5

334. Gofredo, Claro C.

68

78

72

86 78

52

70

76

70.9

335. Gomez, Jose S.

71

76

71

81 76

63

69

62

70.85

MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B.

325.

MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V.

336.

68

93

85

78 64

69

70

54

72.35

MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C.

337.

77

75

71

89 55

70

70

60

70.05

MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de

338.

66

68

90

84 77

59

69

65

73.3

339. Grageda, Jose M. A.

70

85

72

67 70

60

73

73

70.75

340. Guzman, Juan de

75

86

69

84 64

79

75

76

73.6

MRP- Guzman, Mateo de

341.

76

79

79

73 72

69

68

80

73.9

342. Guzman, Salvador B.

71

61

74

72 61

66

78

75

70.75

343. Guzman, Salvador T. de

75

84

64

81 74

61

78

58

71.75

344. Habelito, Geronimo E.

71

76

71

87 73

60

67

55

69.65

345. Hedriana, Naterno G.

75

68

84

76 66

58

76

60

72.9

346. Hernandez, Quintin B.

67

75

72

81 72

72

66

76

70.6

347. Homeres, Agustin R.

73

84

65

86 70

77

63

76

70.7

348. Ines, Leonilo F.

65

88

71

88 77

73

61

70

70.55

349. Jamer, Alipio S.

68

75

83

89 80

61

65

50

72

MRP- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M.

350.

75

65

68

85 76

70

83

54

73.8

MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio

351.

73

86

72

78 82

67

67

64

72.8

MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F.

352.

76

75

78

84 71

66

70

77

73.85

1952

353. Jaring, Antonio S.

72

77

79

70 72

57

71

50

70.75

MRP- Javier, Aquilino M.

354.

75

84

79

78 77

61

66

66

73.05

75

75

72

88 78

58

76

43

72.4

MRP- Jose, Nestor L.

356.

78

61

64

73 68

76

64

80

69.7

357. La Q, Jose M.

75

71

75

72 70

67

81

59

73.5

358. Leon, Brigido C. de

67

75

78

91 78

51

72

80

72.55

359. Leones, Constante B.

68

81

79

84 73

60

77

60

73

360. Liboro, Horacio T.

72

69

80

87 73

62

70

61

72.4

361. Llanera, Cesar L.

77

81

80

78 64

59

75

63

73

362. Lomontod, Jose P.

75

76

69

70 73

76

74

75

73.2

363. Luna, Lucito

70

75

69

83 59

53

74

75

68.4

MRP- Luz, Lauro L.

364.

76

90

78

88 64

58

75

77

73.95

MRP- Macasaet, Tomas S.

365.

73

81

72

83 66

75

72

70

72.5

366. Magbiray, Godofredo V.

80

67

84

76 70

62

65

68

73.05

367. Majarais, Rodolfo P.

70

62

64

82 88

75

71

79

72.85

MRP- Makabenta, Eduardo

368.

75

90

77

83 59

71

72

78

73.3

MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S.

369.

74

83

74

89 58

60

72

76

71.1

370. Maloles, Iluminado M.

70

87

73

76 77

50

76

76

72.3

355. Jomuad, Francisco

371. Maniquis, Daniel R.

75

80

73

91 69

71

65

70

72.1

372. Maraa, Arsenio

65

79

60

72 73

51

75

86

67.9

373. Marasigan, Napoleon

75

71

83

75 69

62

69

70

72.75

MRP- Marco, Jaime P.

374.

75

67

74

76 64

75

75

57

71.9

MRP- Martir, Osmundo P.

375.

70

86

76

78 72

71

75

53

72.95

MRP- Masancay, Amando E.

376.

73

87

75

77 72

50

78

80

73.2

MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio T.

377.

62

87

72

79 73

76

69

77

71.3

378. Mara, Guillermo L.

70

78

78

89 75

67

66

65

72.35

MRP- Mercado, Felipe A.

379.

73

77

82

82 78

52

69

85

73.9

MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P.

380.

70

82

73

86 77

52

79

65

72.8

381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr.,

79

78

73

75 71

68

69

53

71.95

MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio

382. D.

79

79

68

88 64

78

69

83

73.1

MRP- Montero, Leodegario C.

383.

72

89

69

89 70

68

70

75

72.15

384. Morada, Servillano S.

75

76

67

71 65

66

75

76

70.9

385. Mocorro, Generoso

78

84

78

84 60

73

68

70

73

75

78

75

85 72

55

77

66

73.15

80

78

70

94 72

75

70

57

73.75

MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao L.

386.
387. Motus, Rodentor P.

388. Macario, Pedro R.

70

67

74

86 78

63

72

66

72.15

MRP- Nadela, Geredion T.

389.

72

64

64

81 73

50

75

75

69.15

MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P.

390.

67

70

71

76 76

79

75

57

72.05

391. Nieto, Benedicto S.

69

79

77

77 72

62

76

76

72.9

MRP- Noguera, Raymundo

392.

71

86

81

80 73

56

72

70

73.15

MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R.

393.

70

70

69

73 57

37

64

72

63.6

394. Nono, Pacifico G.

67

77

78

67 75

59

71

76

71.35

MRP- Nuval, Manuel R.

395.

78

72

67

90 72

68

78

67

73.65

396. Ocampo, Augusto

75

90

77

72 69

55

65

67

60.7

397. Oliveros, Amado A.

72

75

68

72 84

50

75

79

71.9

398. Opia, Jr., Pedro

76

77

74

67 73

66

68

70

71.85

MRP- Olaviar, Jose O.

399.

70

62

85

81 74

50

68

79

71.8

MRP- Olandesca, Per O.

400.

70

91

76

87 72

66

70

79

73.45

401. Orden, Apolonio J.

72

65

84

86 66

50

72

68

71.45

402. Ortiz, Melencio T.

71

75

78

81 66

67

70

78

72.1

MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S.

403.

72

64

76

86 72

61

76

75

72.95

404. Pacifico, Vicente V.

76

79

69

80 76

52

72

80

71.95

MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D.

75

69

72

75 78

58

75

70

72.6

405.
406. Padlan, Crispin M.

71

66

76

79 68

67

74

66

71.65

407. Padilla, Jose C.

70

65

67

82 78

75

78

75

73.3

408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71

88

78

86 59

75

78

50

72.95

MRP- Palma, Bartolome

409.

67

81

80

82 71

75

69

75

73.25

MRP- Papa, Angel A.

410.

75

72

85

85 77

59

63

71

73.45

MRP- Parayno, Mario V.

411.

71

88

74

89 69

66

76

73

73.65

412. Paria, Santos L.

70

87

85

77 64

67

63

76

71.85

MRP- Pasion, Anastacio

413.

63

80

68

81 82

79

76

58

72.55

414. Pastrana, Rizal R.

69

76

71

76 68

63

77

83

71.65

MRP- Paulin, Jose O.

415.

70

66

80

87 75

50

65

80

70.9

MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C.

416.

79

87

73

83 69

71

68

65

73.2

417. Pea, Jesus

75

75

75

62 75

70

60

66

70.4

418. Perez, Toribio R.

71

64

81

92 69

58

67

70

71.25

419. Pestao, Melquiades

77

81

74

87 59

68

76

75

73.2

MRP- Pido, Serafin C.

420.

77

81

72

82 69

71

60

75

71.15

421. Pinlac, Filemon

67

76

74

86 65

79

65

72

70.55

422. Poblete, Celso B.

72

79

82

76 66

64

74

50

72.15

MRP- Piza, Luz

423.

68

70

75

87 74

67

64

75

70.8

424. Puzon, Eduardo S.

72

80

81

69 72

53

67

70

71.05

425. Quetulio, Josefina D.

75

90

60

93 64

78

76

83

72.9

MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V.

426.

69

88

79

82 65

62

71

66

71.55

MRP- Quietson, Bayani R.

427.

73

75

76

77 70

81

71

53

72.85

428. Racho, Macario D.

68

75

81

82 78

53

66

54

70.55

429. Ramirez, Sabas P.

71

80

73

87 62

62

75

80

71.65

MRP- Raffian, Jose A.

430.

80

83

79

79 62

72

68

65

73.25

MRP- Ramos, Patricio S.

431.

75

87

76

75 72

72

61

75

72.25

MRP- Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78

432.

84

76

90 48

75

80

65

73.45

MRP- Raro, Celso

433.

75

81

76

67 75

77

55

77

71.4

MRP- Rayos, Victor S.

434.

75

86

79

91 71

67

67

70

73.9

435. Revilla, Mariano S.

75

78

81

90 70

54

69

81

73.35

436. Reyes, Abdon L.

72

64

81

78 76

73

69

53

72.85

437. Reyes, Domingo B.

72

87

78

83 72

75

62

70

72.7

438. Reyes, Francisco M.

75

85

84

68 75

71

68

50

73.9

439. Reyes, Lozano M.

80

57

78

79 78

65

64

79

73.35

75

75

82

82 76

64

68

60

73.65

MRP- Reyes, Oscar R.

440.
441. Rigonan, Cesar V.

71

85

65

86 75

70

76

70

72.7

442. Rivera, Honorio

71

56

70

90 71

65

75

71

71.2

MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura A.

443.

72

88

72

94 68

73

66

80

72.6

MRP- Robles, Enrique

444.

75

77

75

77 82

64

69

70

73.7

445. Rodriguez, Orestes

Arellano

76

75

76

63 69

77

65

78

72.25

446. Roldan, Jose V.

67

80

79

83 73

71

75

70

73.9

447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del

80

75

65

70 68

72

80

70

73.15

448. Rosario, Restituto F. del

75

75

79

90 68

65

66

63

72.1

MRP- Sabelino, Conrado S.

449.

71

81

69

75 77

71

75

70

72.95

450. San Juan, Damaso

77

86

72

89 59

76

65

72

71.6

451. Saiel, Felix L.

72

93

76

80 67

75

66

62

72.1

452. Samaniego, Jesus B.

75

80

76

72 60

67

68

70

70.6

MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75

453.

83

70

83 77

67

77

60

73.95

MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q.

454.

71

75

81

90 62

64

76

68

72.95

455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal

75

76

84

93 63

65

59

70

71.8

456. Santillan, Juanito Ll.

76

89

83

83 63

58

65

52

71.25

75

75

78

82 73

76

66

70

73.7

MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C.

457.

MRP- Santos, Ruperto M.

458.

67

54

69

76 63

64

71

60

66.75

MRP- Santos, Aquilino C.

459.

72

71

73

79 73

79

71

85

73.8

MRP- Santos, Rufino A.

460.

75

81

79

85 74

72

66

54

73.3

461. Suanding, Bantas

75

67

67

92 79

59

76

76

73.1

76

79

76

78 72

75

68

67

73.5

463. Songco, Felicisimo G.

70

68

82

84 60

69

76

65

73.35

464. Soriano, Aniceto S.

64

79

77

80 80

53

70

65

70.7

465. Suarez, Pablo D.

73

85

70

87 76

70

64

70

71.9

MRP- Sybico, Jesus L.

466.

79

70

70

72 75

75

72

60

73.05

69

68

77

79 74

68

72

60

71.85

MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita

468.

81

79

72

80 62

75

73

80

73.95

MRP- Tando, Amado T.

469.

71

82

78

83 71

61

71

60

72

470. Tasico, Severo E.

71

69

75

89 70

75

67

63

71.65

471. Tiburcio, Ismael P.

73

82

72

93 76

57

68

54

71.15

MRP- Tiongson, Federico T.

472.

70

70

76

84 77

75

75

50

73.45

MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C.

473.

75

89

63

84 85

73

73

50

73.4

474. Torrijas, Alfredo A.

77

66

67

83 68

75

71

63

71.3

MRP- Sulit, Feliz M.

462.

467. Tabaque, Benjamin R.

MRP- Tobias, Artemio M.

475.

69

58

74

81 71

55

65

57

67.55

MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio

476.

76

86

76

86 70

68

75

50

73.8

MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O.

477.

66

91

83

75 63

66

67

65

70.8

478. Trinidad, Pedro O.

66

78

78

85 78

51

64

75

70.8

80

82

77

82 67

56

68

75

72.6

480. Umali, Osmundo C.

68

75

81

80 71

69

68

60

71.7

481. Umayam, Juanito C.

77

75

87

85 56

56

66

60

71

75

72

75

74 73

76

71

70

73.55

483. Valino, Francisco M.

72

81

80

84 62

78

71

75

73.7

484. Varela, Dominador M.

67

75

81

86 72

57

81

70

73.85

485. Vega, Macairog L. de

78

62

79

87 70

70

71

65

73.8

MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D.

486.

71

80

74

85 60

66

76

76

71.85

487. Velez, Maria E.

73

70

89

80 56

50

72

67

71.05

MRP- Venal, Artemio V.

488.

78

91

58

67 76

55

75

73

73.65

489. Venus, Conrado B.

69

81

74

85 62

66

72

77

77.05

MRP- Verzosa, Federico B.

490.

75

79

72

88 76

68

74

59

73.7

MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V.

491.

75

83

70

76 64

64

75

65

71.2

MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J.

479.

MRP- Usita, Gelacio U.

482.

MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C.

492.

75

85

79

88 66

77

67

70

73.95

73

69

70

88 76

66

69

50

70.75

80

85

67

77 62

75

76

73

73.15

495. Viterbo, Jose H.

80

77

65

93 70

65

65

65

70.65

496. Yaranon, Pedro

70

77

76

85 72

50

75

75

71.85

MRP- Yasay, Mariano R.

497.

75

75

72

76 63

77

70

60

71.1

MRP- Ygay, Venancio M.

498.

73

80

83

84 62

59

72

77

72.65

499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro

73

82

78

75 60

81

75

75

73.95

500. Zamora, Alberto

70

65

76

79 62

77

69

82

71.3

501. Rigonan, Felipe C.

70

79

69

89 76

62

71

64

71.2

493. Villar, Custodio R.

MRP- Villaseor, Leonidas F.
494.

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed
in previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations
together with their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for
reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1946

68

67

76

76 73

73

49

50

66.5

1950

59

80

67

77 62

80

71

57

67.4

2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.

1951

65

76

58

55 59

63

75

72

64.9

1952

65

68

75

84 72

59

73

57

69.75

1953

57

74

68

68 76

52

71

76

66.7

MRD-1949

75

75

70

75 77

76

60

90

72.15

1951

64

71

58

65 68

70

75

71

66.95

1950

71

80

62

75 75

81

55

92

69.3

1951

70

60

61

65 77

64

67

81

67.85

MRD-1949

69

70

76

73 76

71

55

60

68.65

1950

60

71

55

67 67

75

56

89

68.1

MRD-1949

60

70

82

79 70

69

60

80

69.25

1950

57

65

51

69 54

85

56

84

60.3

1946

63

53

69

76 75

76

57

69

66.55

1952

70

75

69

83 59

53

74

75

68.4

3. Blanco, Jose B.

4. Condeno, Mateo

5. Ducusin, Agapito B.

6. Garcia, Manuel N.

7. Luna, Lucito A.

8. Maraa, Arsenio s.

1949

72

68

68

75 75

72

60

75

69.35

1952

65

79

60

72 73

51

75

86

67.9

1951

61

60

58

60 70

63

75

64

64.8

1952

70

77

65

79 66

52

70

50

66.4

1953

78

64

66

68 81

50

71

78

70.65

1950

25

75

45

75 45

52

46

71

46.2

1951

70

77

65

79 66

52

70

50

66.4

1952

75

75

75

62 75

70

60

66

70.4

1950

68

78

70

75 69

70

58

69

67.75

1951

65

62

75

60 73

57

75

71

66.8

1949

65

75

72

75 60

75

55

85

66.65

1951

68

57

48

60 91

66

55

75

64.05

1952

68

53

68

67 58

56

75

64

65.7

67

80

51

69 69

77

73

53

66.35

9. Montano, Manuel M.

10. Pea, Jesus S.

11. Placido, Sr., Isidro

12. Rementizo, Filemon S.

13. Amao, Sulpicio M.

1952

1953

65

67

78

74 75

62

69

80

70.9

1951

67

60

70

65 68

56

75

66

67.75

1952

70

71

67

78 67

75

71

70

70.1

1948

39

69

82

75 76

72

55

50

63.5

MRD-1949

67

56

69

75 72

77

60

75

68

1951

70

59

55

60 68

57

78

67

65.8

1952

62

76

54

82 72

77

66

65

66.65

1953

73

71

70

65 78

64

65

78

70.4

1951

60

64

55

70 68

52

70

75

62.85

1952

75

64

70

81 76

55

61

75

69.1

1953

70

71

79

65 72

54

66

80

70

MRD-1948

50

64

76

66 66

69

60

52

63.1

MRD-1949

47

66

78

64 71

86

65

85

68

1950

35

65

40

75 63

57

27

49

45

14. Rodulfa, Juan T.

15. Sanchez, Juan J.

16. Santos, Constantino

17. Santos, Salvador H.

18. Sevilla, Macario C.

MRD-1951

68

59

72

55 69

65

75

75

69.3

1953

70

73

74

70 81

56

69

71

71.05

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all-presented motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of
Republic Act No. 972. A list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for
reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:
1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Acenas, Calixto R.

73

70

68

62 82

51

67

77

73.45

2. Alcantara, Pedro N.

67

70

75

85 87

54

71

80

72.8

3. Alejandro, Exequiel

67

72

71

75 80

76

75

77

73.4

4. Andres, Gregorio M.

70

73

86

58 79

50

71

78

72.7

5. Arnaiz, Antonio E.

66

80

76

58 79

68

77

81

73.4

6. Asis, Floriano U. de

66

78

75

81 77

55

73

69

71.25

7. Bacaiso, Celestino M.

71

65

76

68 76

50

75

70

70.95

8. Bala, Florencio F.

64

82

47

70 82

58

75

82

67

9. Baldo, Olegario A.

57

74

68

68 76

52

71

76

66.7

10. Barrios, Benjamin O.

65

71

76

75 80

62

83

73

73.95

11. Buhay, Eduardo L.

73

76

71

91 76

61

74

78

73.35

12. Burgos, Dominador C.

72

80

89

61 66

37

69

68

70.05

13. Cario, Eldo J.

79

81

60

75 74

74

76

74

73

14. Casar, Dimapuro

67

73

84

79 77

61

71

74

73.35

15. Castaeda, Gregorio

70

73

80

71 75

70

73

78

73.95

16. Estrellado, Benjamin R.

67

79

64

73 82

62

71

74

70.2

17. Fabunan, Edilberto C.

70

72

68

69 77

60

76

74

71.1

18. Feril, Domingo B.

75

71

84

65 70

60

65

70

71.6

19. Fernandez, Alejandro G.

65

75

87

80 81

63

61

80

72.8

20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss)

76

80

86

77 64

74

66

69

73.9

21. Garcia, Rafael B.

70

86

70

75 73

63

73

75

71.65

22. Gracia, Miguel L. de

73

68

75

59 80

51

72

71

71

23. Gungon, Armando G.

68

76

76

84 77

57

77

83

73.6

24. Gutierrez, Antonio S.

68

77

66

70 72

59

71

74

69.1

25. Ilejay, Abraham I.

77

70

76

77 81

62

70

68

73.7

26. Leon, Benjamin La. De

66

66

75

70 77

55

71

82

70.35

27. Lugtu, Felipe L.

62

70

78

65 78

56

69

81

69.9

28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid

76

64

67

69 73

59

73

75

70.45

29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G.

77

76

68

68 71

51

75

78

70.85

30. Maloles, Julius G.

77

71

60

71 79

62

68

72

69.75

31. Mandi, Santiago P.

65

76

70

61 79

68

75

72

71.1

32. Margete, Rufino C.

70

76

66

75 85

73

71

75

72.75

33. Melocoton, Nestorio B.

70

81

73

78 83

52

72

75

72.35

34. Molina, Manuel C.

75

78

70

61 75

63

66

85

70.95

35. Muoz, Mariano A.

75

80

86

67 74

57

68

76

73.75

36. Navarro, Buenaventura M.

80

75

65

75 83

55

73

79

73

37. Nodado, Domiciano R.

60

67

67

50 70

50

56

75

61.7

38. Papas, Sisenando B.

65

62

71

61 70

56

66

67

66

39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando

63

75

71

62 83

67

70

72

70.4

40. Padula, Benjamin C.

70

77

54

62 74

78

75

68

69.05

41. Pasno, Enrique M.

78

72

66

54 71

58

72

78

69.85

42. Pea, Jr., Narciso

70

95

81

78 67

66

67

73

72.55

43. Peralta, Rodolfo P.

70

70

52

81 68

63

59

69

63.7

44. Pigar, Leopoldo R.

76

75

78

61 72

72

71

79

73.75

45. Publico, Paciano L.

68

69

76

76 70

59

74

67

70.6

46. Radaza, Leovigildo

75

78

76

61 77

50

71

86

72.2

47. Ramos, Bernardo M.

64

62

75

93 81

52

66

80

70.1

48. Rabaino, Andres D.

68

72

75

73 78

55

69

76

70.65

49. Ravanera, Oscar N.

70

77

80

71 82

62

69

78

73.6

50. Renovilla, Jose M.

65

75

80

68 79

52

62

78

69.5

51. Sabaot, Solomon B.

69

73

80

69 82

69

69

79

73.85

52. Sumaway, Ricardo S.

66

76

69

76 74

56

72

68

69.1

53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O.

70

77

74

75 73

50

68

72

69.55

54. Vera, Federico V. de

60

61

47

77 69

50

67

77

60.9

55. Viray, Venancio Bustos

65

67

67

52 73

64

71

65

67.15

56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss)

63

70

56

75 68

54

70

77

64.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.

Av.
1. Ala, Narciso

70

71

73

59 73

74

81

77

73.5

2. Alcantara, Pedro N.

67

70

75

85 87

54

71

80

72.8

3. Arellano, Antonio L.

74

66

73

60 78

63

78

72

72.9

4. Buhay, Eduardo L.

73

76

71

91 76

61

74

78

73.35

5. Calautit, Celestino R.

71

78

84

75 75

61

68

72

73.2

6. Casuncad, Sulvio P.

61

73

82

69 81

68

71

84

73.05

7. Enriquez, Pelagio y
Concepcion

84

69

76

75 82

50

58

79

72.05

8. Estonina, Severino

80

74

64

89 81

56

68

82

72.4

9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q.

65

75

87

80 81

63

61

80

72.8

10. Fernandez, Luis N.

70

75

77

75 78

67

72

73

73.35

11. Figueroa, Alfredo A.

70

75

87

78 75

50

68

68

72.3

12. Formilleza, Pedro

65

75

89

68 83

51

70

75

73.25

13. Garcia, Manuel M.

69

68

83

83 73

62

62

70

71

14. Grospe, Vicente E.

68

75

78

66 79

61

69

82

71.6

15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952)

72

79

86

78 60

61

75

70

73.05

16. Jacobo, Rafael F.

76

76

75

74 76

50

72

76

72.3

17. Macalindong, Reinerio L.

67

77

79

79 74

72

68

77

72.75

18. Mangubat, Antonio M.

70

70

78

61 80

74

62

70

71.45

19. Montano, Manuel M.

78

64

66

68 81

50

71

78

70.65

20. Plomantes, Marcos

73

67

74

58 68

70

76

71

71.6

21. Ramos, Eugenio R.

70

80

76

67 72

69

72

79

72.6

22. Reyes, Juan R.

71

73

77

76 81

59

72

74

73.2

23. Reyes, Santiago R.

65

78

83

60 76

75

70

70

72.9

24. Rivera, Eulogio J.

65

67

78

74 75

62

69

80

70.9

25. Santos, Constantino P.

73

71

70

65 78

64

65

78

70.4

26. Santos, Salvador H.

70

71

79

65 72

54

66

80

70

27. Sevilla, Macario C.

70

73

74

70 81

56

69

71

71.05

28. Villavicencio, Jose A.

78

75

70

67 69

77

64

77

73.2

29. Viray, Ruperto G.

76

73

76

73 80

58

68

83

73.25

There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution.
Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general
average in the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per
cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but
raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the
introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to
amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the
admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace
many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us.
The proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have
passed the examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of
70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the
average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights: Civil
Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15
per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5
per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per
cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates
shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have

obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account
in determining their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided,
however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his
third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects
and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. Any applicant who has
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per
cent in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been
otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5,
8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be
compelled to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is
not the case in any other government examination. The Rules of Court have
therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any
subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President
requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was
signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part.
With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment
provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although
failing to pass the examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next
examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan,
one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that
although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in
an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing
them, by the time that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be
several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he
shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and
remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and
passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which requires a
candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The
only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination
in no more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number
of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object
and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of
law. When a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he
possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law
subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal
profession and adequately render the legal service required by prospective clients.
But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have obtained a passing
grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year later,
and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any
subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all

around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the
practice of law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This
amendment provides that any application who has obtained a general average of 70
per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who
obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946 without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of
those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but
retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we
are not exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to
70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction
retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that
after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general
average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of
those who have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of repudiating,
reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less
than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question
involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into
law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during
the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order
on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the
subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final
decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar
are officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is
admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit,
competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied
admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a
general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order to
pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared that he was
not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present
amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs
counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in
effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its
officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and
in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We
repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and
seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the
standard of the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved,
however, by admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar
examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious
fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per
cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination
held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the
corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as
it does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the
Supreme Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted
that after every bar examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general
average but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who
have failed. The provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the
Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may
have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets
a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other
professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public
accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not
repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the
Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946
UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of
Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent
in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent
in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a
candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to
take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored
in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act,
any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as
part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any
bar examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject
or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing

general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that
he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from
1946 to 1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but
were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing
mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74
in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give
satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in
the general averages for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951
bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar
examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the
condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per
cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the
Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials
and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the
available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from
those years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed
the supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected
to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the
bill would admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar
examination". He considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is
not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing what
the Supreme Court have already established as precedent by making as low as 69
per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar
candidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as having
passed the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent of our
Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps
which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could
not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due
consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took
the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still
enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous
resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or
corrective statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a
"valid classification" as against class legislation, is very expressed in the following
American Jurisprudence:

A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who
possess a common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a
"natural" and substantial differentiation between those included in the class and
those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it
cannot be again split and then have the dissevered factions of the original unit
designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier,
199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions
which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the
members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes
the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the
mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It
permits them when there are special evils with which the general laws are
incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form. . . .
The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of
discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be
revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S.
36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the
extent of the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme
Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The
President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with
the information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court
are taking the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress
in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5,
1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without
vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution)
numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President
and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the
polls.

Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this
Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to
determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The
power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power
should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is
only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to
the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on
the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are
within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has
made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond
the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates
who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in
1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the
privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass
candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is
necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is
furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in
1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those
taking earlier or later are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the
rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this
Court to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed
to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of
75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing
mark has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more.
Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging
from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the
examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful
candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but,
upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were
raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original
list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but

below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had
been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of
69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar
examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar
candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of
the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947
the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per
cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of
Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general
averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the
precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors,
practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing
general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held
after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable
comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the
Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the
important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of
Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners
before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all
the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to
become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it within the
required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress
which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per
cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any
bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after
July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or
grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of
Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this
Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under
and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general averages
prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953
a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of
bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason
alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved
"a new question of public interest."

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by
the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall
have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal,
alter or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the
Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is
concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar
examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various
petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my
opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar
candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court
expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions
on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year,
are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the
motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only
because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court,
to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional
sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike
justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other
examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the
Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and
contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection of the law.
Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any
obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and
equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to
correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different
passing general averages in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated
against, because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the
war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during
said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as
those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the
reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the
Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in
the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then
brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by
the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is
one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication
prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have
already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty
purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the
Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and
decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will
not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had obtained the general
average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and
unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the
bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to
practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under
previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general
averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127
by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the
resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who
obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained
a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the
examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general average
at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the
Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general
average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the
1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not
inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of
the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative
enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against
public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the
general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held
public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members
of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before
passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress,
representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I
am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through
their duly elected representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission
to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this
Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we
can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given
effect in its entirety.

Separate Opinions
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22320

July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968,
specifically directed against the following observation therein made:
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the
petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly,
abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple
money judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions
were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far
from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them
to subvert the very ends of justice.
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their
counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners,
while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far
as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the
treble costs adjudged against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature
deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer
conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our
decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners'
counsels in this adventure is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso
Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed
alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be
overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.

Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were
conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in
CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in
order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the
execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale
six times. More than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same
has yet to be satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their
counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final
judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as
expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed
out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of
Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and
asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the
basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII
presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any
action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of
first instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on
October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff
from carrying out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels,
the movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of
Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and,
anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before
the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the
writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of
the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very
same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her
aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the
scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for
hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly
notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is
waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift
writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer
of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal),
Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the
issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of
Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection
with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most
probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala,
presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction
sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the
judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the
injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was
already prepared with another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in
the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19,

1963, which denied his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of
execution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October
19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a
party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was
merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez
spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set
for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the
said cash dividends within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled. 2 Consequently, the
respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates
the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any
particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement
of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact
becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth
on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money
judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies"
they ventured to adopt, such that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they
interposed another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile,
justice was delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was
practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and
55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of
which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard,
the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff
from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the
levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a
permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of
the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil
cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and
often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt.
(Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded
as having been instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must
not be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed
of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292
were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in
question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for
devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested
remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they
sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal
and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292
were filed respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the
enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch

VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their
territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary
injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the
principal action in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the
said cases they could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned
civil case 7532 when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of
execution in the basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced
in the former case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon
her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same
when they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction
based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case until the latter was also
dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then
of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel
happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and
vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause
is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit,
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his
client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of
justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the
participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court
ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their
counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so
that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were
responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil
case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of
November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas,
upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court
of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No.
39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision abovementioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963
when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First
Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that
the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407
on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin
Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent
motion is the same motion discussed above, which, curiously enough, antedated by at least
one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22,
1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall
pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Footnotes
See "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration," Annex "G" of Petition for Certiorari with
Urgent Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
1

See "Manifestation," Annex "2" of Answer.

On February 4, 1961, Damaso Perez and Gregorio Subong elevated the judgment in
the basic civil case 39407 to this Court on a petition for certiorari, which was denied
for lack of merit.
3

Acosta, et al. vs. Alvendia, et al., L-14598, October 31, 1960; Samar Mining Co., Inc.
vs, Arnado, L-17109, June 30, 1961; Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing
Co., Inc. vs. The National Administrator of Regional Office No. 2, etc., et al., L-20491,
August 31, 1965, and the cases cited therein.
4

Cabigao vs. Del Rosario, 44 Phil. 182; Philippine National Bank vs. Javellana, 92
Phil. 525; Araneta vs. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 522.
5

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR
LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M.
OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners.
Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.

The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees AssociationNATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free
Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the
Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was
formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU
unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting
president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members
of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade
Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of
the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956
as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was
soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was
hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was
likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective
bargaining with the Unions.
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the
Companies for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which
were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make
whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.
Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on
the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as
a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on
collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the
Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the
Unions' proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping
their demand for union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did
not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand
for union security, promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to April
15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this
particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point by point, en
toto. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counterproposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the
Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise the
Companies "would no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money
benefits retroactive to October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two
petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set
by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no
satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the
Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands,
particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May
15, 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula
which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the

former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered
the Companies' unfair labor practices.
Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in
salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after
the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the
Unions.
On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life
Building at Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the
respondent Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of
the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.
However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:
1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do
so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights
at the office where comfortable cots have been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
The decision to make is yours whether you still believe in the motives of
the strike or in the fairness of the Management.
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were
convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958,
some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958
Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records
section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the
Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a
picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries.
The Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with
the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular
Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the
resistance offered by some picketers.

Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence,
the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of
Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise
filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which,
on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the
Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the
said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the
Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to
and from, out and in, of the Companies' building.
On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to
the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more
convinced of our decision.
We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your
positions open for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do
so with or without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies,
and if there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you
until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you
have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the
Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three
cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two
others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well
as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or
else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to
work on June 2, 1958.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee
initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with
pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted
immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's
office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's
office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34
officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that
they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the

specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano
Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU;
Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees AssociationNATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified
months later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given
separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to
now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given
to them.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the
Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with
(1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted
action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and
return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid
overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before
June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the
Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union
membership and degree of participation in the strike.
On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of
the complaint, stating special defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio
Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack
of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of
the said decision, and their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was
denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on October
20, 1965.
Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:
1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out
individually to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B;
2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of
readmission of employees after the strike;
3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing
officials and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of
investigation and the opportunity to present their side in regard to activities
undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and
4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions,
with full back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual
reinstatement to their usual employment.
I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a
legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree. The said letters were
directed to the striking employees individually by registered special delivery mail at that

without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employees in the
collective bargaining.
The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a
strike following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant
would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them
should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as
an active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing
with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining
representatives. (31 Am. Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.
[CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045)
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining
agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in
connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding
individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is
still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative
(Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of
interference. Thus, the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging
their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as
constituting interference with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining
(Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act of interference for the
employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified
therein, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual
solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative
urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor
practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to
undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free
from the employer's molestation.1
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order
to entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the
Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit
B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event
they did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the
Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent
contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield
Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers
with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work
performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would
abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or unionbusting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a
strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are
represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to
determine what the consequences of returning to work would be.
Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following
acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the

making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of
mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the
purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits
in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the
employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a
restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits
in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work
in.2
Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which
states that "the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike
and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of
First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers
returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The
circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the
injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality
of the letters, which were calculated, or which tended, to interfere with the employees' right
to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair
labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted
or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is
not, and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes
unfair labor practice.
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees
within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has
engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with
the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not
necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact
intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a
reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an
adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining. (Francisco,
Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A., 1948, 170 F2d
735).
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but
should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding
them. The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"
... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not
only on the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised
against the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances.
Under this "doctrine" expressions of opinion by an employer which, though
innocent in themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the
circumstances under which they were uttered, the history of the particular
employer's labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection
with an established collateral plan of coercion or interference. (Rothenberg
on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.)
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended
renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter
hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel
manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After

the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the
Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without
increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from
their unions. And during the negotiations in the Department of Labor, despite the fact that the
petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union
shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents
adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the
chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the
former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to strike, the strikers were individually sent
copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work
upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and
manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others,
escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings
occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the
process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life
Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. Then
the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not
dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal
actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance
restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of
the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and
vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the
injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent again individually and by registered
special delivery mail to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not report
for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the
respondents thru a screening committee of which Ramon Garcia was a member
refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges."
However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the
respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not,
however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the
breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents.
Among the non-strikers with pending criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso
Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto, Manuel
Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable
cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them
on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without
stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit, however,
that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by the
fiscal and by the courts..
lwph1.t

Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters,
exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents
scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them.
To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in
order to protect and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an
economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a
"deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some
union men who did not actually know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that
exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia:

TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MANILA
Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions
intends to go on strike against
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.
Plaza Moraga, Manila
THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP
Plaza Moraga, Manila
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION
Plaza Moraga, Manila .
for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...
However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from
January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on
collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958,
the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of
Strike," which so far as material, reads:
3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop,
you filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January
1958, citing `deadlock in collective bargaining' which could have been for no
other issue than the union shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958.)
The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And
the actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the
management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal
collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by the
management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and [who] became
supervisors without increase in salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of
employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this
assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6)
months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they could not go
on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7,
respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for
union shop, the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec.
14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands
within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well
reasoned, workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the group
companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the
employee must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (2) there
must be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958,
otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employees reported
back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953, they must be considered as
having complied with the first and third conditions.

Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the
second condition. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958,
63 members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal
charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances
34 officials and union members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that
they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that nonstrikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising
from the same incidents whence the criminal charges against the strikers evolved, were
readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of
discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a
violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act.
The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They
separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it,
on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even
after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the
criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for
one union official who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later
participated in crashing through the picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to
work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the union activity of the
rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied
reinstatement.
So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized
by the Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who
participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers,
such dismissal being evidence of discrimination against those dismissed and
constituting a waiver of the employer's right to dismiss the striking employees
and a condonation of the fault committed by them." (Carlos and Fernando,
Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines
Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.)
It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from
charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work the respondents
delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen
Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant
corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to
imagine that these two employees having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the
picketers during the strike were hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of
placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form
of discrimination in rehiring.
Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the
machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers,
and reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a
job in another mill, which was imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on
Strikes, p. 473, citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland
Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545; emphasis supplied.)
Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening
committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed back and
around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in

exercising for the management the authority to screen the returning employees, the
committee admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6,
1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening
committee, while admitting the discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the
management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking through
the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the
discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left
in the hands of that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the
strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)
Of course, the respondents through Ramon Garcia tried to explain the basis for such
discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during
the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation
was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between
acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was
the basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory
examination of the evidence on record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose
dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of
misconduct."
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker
was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As
earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the
respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but
when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required
clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later
received letters from the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor:
This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular LifeFGU Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.
The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed
acts of misconduct while picketing during the last strike. Because this may
not constitute sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment
without pay, we are giving you the amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to
one-half month pay for every year of your service in the Group Company.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.
Very truly
yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE
M. OLBES
President,
Insurance Life
Acting
President,
FGU.

The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the
dismissed strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the
fiscal's office and the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not
indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not
report for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming
evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the
respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many
others, Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to whom he and his group
presented themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De
Asis, as the one who received them and later directed them when Olbes refused them an
audience to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He likewise categorically
stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If
Tabasondra were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents
to produce De Asis and Enage who testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on
several occasions to rebut his testimony. The respondents did nothing of the kind.
Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention to his nonadmission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the
respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required
that before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does
not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five
strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike,
reported for work at various times during the next three days, but were told that there were
no openings. Said the Court:
... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that,
in taking back six union men, the respondent's officials discriminated against
the latter on account of their union activities and that the excuse given that
they did not apply until after the quota was full was an afterthought and not
the true reason for the discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio
& Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews,
Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728)
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused
readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement
when an employee reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved
from the duty of returning further.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the
Companies spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant
union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find
this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the
witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the
officials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an
outgoing traveller on a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central

Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an
allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket
money; hence, this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies.
It was only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent
Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have
revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. And his competence in figures could not be
doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified public
accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of
Gonzales' trip which the respondents never denied or tried to
disprove his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and
advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic
Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give
"publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising,
speaking, patrolling or by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only
the right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the
purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are
expected to expose the truth before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a
union man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on
whether or not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede to union
demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of management. And
his statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by the
Constitution.
Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor
relation is to me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn its
publicity on any labor oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness,
or objectionable working conditions. The employer, too, should be free to
answer and to turn publicity on the records of the leaders of the unions which
seek the confidence of his men ... (Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.)
(Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.)
The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos
committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics of
accountancy. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the
Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this
stated. Moreover, the relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer
and not a client. And with regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo,
both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made
by Tongos, the lower court should not have given them much weight. The firm of these
witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the
Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more inclined to favor the
respondents rather than Tongos.
Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Dao, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo
Ramirez, opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-readmission
allegedly because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and
Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the Companies, from entering the
Companies' premises on May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on
Garcia's chest and forehead acts considered inimical to the interest of the respondents.
The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took
part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and
therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino

Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. But
despite these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are
grounds to believe that the picketers are not responsible for what happened. The picketing
on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report,
exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Moreover,
although the Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at
Escolta, Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at
Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the
personnel records section, reported for work at the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a
reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such an
incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's
office and applying for injunction from the court of first instance. Besides, under the
circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from
the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their
rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or
unlawful transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not
resort to violence.
lwph1.t

The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or
diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary: .
We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual
in any extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle
waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose
feelings are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot
words lead to blows on the picket line. The transformation from economic to
physical combat by those engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even
when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is
to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of the Congress when it
provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing therein should be
construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act would
indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by
the Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the
possibility of reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d
472, cited in Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378)
Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary
incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has
been held that:
Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p.
855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.)
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law,
they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement.
In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar
to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford
Motor Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.)

Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking
employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had
pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the
strikers is thus in order.
[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with
those whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the
inference that union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his
[employer] objection, the Board has usually required reinstatement."
(Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third Annual Report of NLRB [1938], p. 211.)
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly
because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as president of
the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could
use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended
to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and customers from entering the
Companies' buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket line had
been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only when management men made
incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of
Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is
an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management
dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights
between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law,
p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor practice,
Ibarra's misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides,
the only evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike
was the testimony of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board of directors of
the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a
"turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo
Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) another matter which emphasizes the
respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances, there is good ground to
believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of the union members. This act of
the respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the
petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer
of union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference,
restraint or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize,
form and join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice.
... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity
even where no discharges result. The information obtained by means of
espionage is in valuable to the employer and can be used in a variety of
cases to break a union." The unfair labor practice is committed whether the
espionage is carried on by a professional labor spy or detective, by officials
or supervisory employees of the employer, or by fellow employees acting at
the request or direction of the employer, or an ex-employee..." (Teller, Labor
Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.) .
IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of
the Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement

to their usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of
this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of
the unfair labor practices committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported
back for work upon the invitation of the respondents they were discriminatorily
dismissed. The members and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement
with back pay.
[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the
part of an employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are
entitled to reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p.
418.)
[A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the
Act is entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication that the
discharge was illegal." (Id., citingWaterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d
760; N. L. R. B. v. Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern
Wood Preserving Co., 135 F. 2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d
390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky
Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of
these union members have already been filled by replacements.
[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the
strike or where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor
practice," the employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the
striking or lock-out employees position has been filled by replacement. Under
such circumstances, if no job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that
previously held by the aggrieved employee can be found, the employer must
discharge the replacement employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or
locked-out worker to his old or comparable position ... If the employer's
improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers are entitled
to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees wherever
necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.)
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay
payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are
entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even
though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under
the same conditions just before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of
conditions amounting to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial
Peace Act and the employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell
Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778,
Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13
SCRA 258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We
have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the
date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell
Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra).
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958,
which the latter did. A great number of them, however, were refused readmission because
they had criminal charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although non-

strikers who were also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers
who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily
dismissed employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. This is true even with
respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were
found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement
(Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their
unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked by the respondents' men.
However, since the employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of
the Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may have found other
employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever they may
have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate
somewhat the liability of the company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is
allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another (Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v.
Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]).
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the
dismissed employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employers may be
authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the
required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the required compensation, the said
Act may not be invoked to justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union
activities.
... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to
terminate the employment of its employee by serving notice on him one
month in advance, or, in the absence thereof, by paying him one month
compensation from the date of the termination of his employment, such Act
does not give to the employer a blanket authority to terminate the
employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind such termination.
Certainly, it cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of
the court or a scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has
been the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller,
et al., 99 Phil. 904 [1956].)
Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of
Industrial Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not
therefore precluded from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of
Philippine Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & Lu
Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).
V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding
Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private
respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the
instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the
respondents' brief: .
... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:
In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a
determination as to whether or not the acts of the employees
concerned justified the adoption of the employer of
disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the
employees may be able to put up a valid defense in a criminal

prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or neutralize

the employer's right to impose discipline on said
employees. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of an
employee of the criminal charge against him is a bar to the
employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should
the act upon which the criminal charged was based constitute
nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer's
interest... The act of the employees now under consideration
may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for
dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication
Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28,
1964.) (emphasis supplied)
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored
portions of the above citation read however as follows:
Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente,
we are inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as proper
disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which allegedly caused their
dismissal reveals that it really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the
supposed exertion of political pressure by the Manila Chronicle management
upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-filing of the case against the
employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the dismissal of Vicente and
Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article as "a report of
some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official
functions" and, therefore, does away with the presumption of malice. This
being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have been
viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under
the Penal Code. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act
could stand criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid
act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against
them. This is not sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is
qualified privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so, the exempting
character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or
neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may warrant
employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that not
even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a
bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the
act upon which the criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless an
activity inimical to the employer's interest.
In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his
"suspicion," which actually amounts to a public accusation, that his employer
is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate
activities on the employees, which charge, in the least, would sully the
employer's reputation, can be nothing but an act inimical to the said
employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made in the union
newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a
reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity, because such end
can be achieved without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of
the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct
which is a just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)

It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the
respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For
it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision.
Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent
Judge's decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other
sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against
the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the
misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the
respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the
courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied
and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the
respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the
respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway,
the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's decision
is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court's
decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against
him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act
upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to
the employer's interest."
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and
rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same
word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and
salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all
other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the
decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain
terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this
Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present
is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court
may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the
public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously
discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from
this Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim
reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded
from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the
citations are correct.
Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial
change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is our view,
nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be
more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the
Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is
entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning
Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958
up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Cf. Chicago Apparatus Company, 12 NLRB 1002; Fruehauf Trailer Co., 1
NLRB 68; Remington Rand, Inc., 2 NLRB 626; Metropolitan Engineering Co.,
4 NLRB 542; Ritzwoller Company, 11 NLRB 79; American Mfg. Co., 5 NLRB
443; Ralph A. Fruendich, Inc., 2 NLRB 802).
2 See Robert Bros., Inc., 8 NLRB 925; Hercules Campbell Body, Inc., 7
NLRB 431; Aronson Printing Co., 13 NLRB 799; E.A. Laboratories, Inc., 88
NLRB 673; Star Beef Company, 92 NLRB 1018; Jackson Press, Inc., 96
NLRB 132.
* As reproduced on pp. 123-127 of the mimeographed and paperbound
Supreme Court decisions for December 1964.
** Id., p. 126. (The entire decision may now be found in printed form in 12
SCRA 699-700.)
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25291 March 10, 1977
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
INSURANCE GROUP WORKER & EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR
LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M.
OLBES AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J:
The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd., FGU Insurance Group, and Jose M. Olbes,
through a motion for reconsideration filed on April 21, 1971, ask this Court to re-examine its
decision dated January 30, 1971.
In the main, the respondents question the review made by this Court of the determination of
facts reached by the Court of Industrial Relations and the consequent revision of the said

findings of fact. The respondents allege that this Court "swept into unmerited oblivion the
voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence" they proffered which evidence consisted
of
Exhibits "1" to "38", and the testimony of Messrs. Felipe Enage, Enrique
Clemente, Vicente Abella, Rodolfo R. Encarnacion, Nestor Cipriano, Mauro
Blardoni, Sr., Ramon Garcia, Ramon M. Zosa, Vicente R. Ayllon, Antonio L.
Castillo, Carlos Valencia, Juan S. Raymundo, Jose Olbes, Calixto S.
Fernandez, Detective Lieutenant Felino Singh of the Manila Police
Department Sergeant Crisanto Lorenzo of the Manila Police Department, and
Feliciano Morada. 1
Concededly, the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations, if supported by
substantial evidence, bind this Court. 2 This, for the reason that the rule of substantial evidence,
rather than the rule of preponderance of evidence applicable in ordinary civil cases, governs the
Court of Industrial Relations in its findings of fact. 3 And substantial evidence refers to "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." 4 There too, the substantiality, of the evidence depends on its quantitative as well as
its qualitative aspects. For, to be considered as substantial, Evidence should primarily be
credible. 5
However, findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations unsupported by substantial and
credible evidence do not bind this Court. 6 And, certainly, the failure of substantial and credible
proof to sustain the findings of fact of the Court of industrial Relations justifies the review by this
Court of the said factual determination. Conmitantly, the need to revise, reverse or modify the
factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations arises to enable this court to draw the
appropriate and correct conclusions for the proper resolution of the questions on the rights and
obligations of the parties involved.
Thus, before coming to the numerous errors which respondents claim have been committed
by this Court in reviewing and reversing the factual determination reached by the Court of
Industrial Relations, we reiterate what we stated in the decision of January 10, 1971: we
deemed it necessary to review the entire factual milieu of the case in controversy and to
reverse the factual findings arrived at by the Court of Industrial Relations because we found
the sa same unsupported by Substantial evidence and much more, by credible proof.
The errors allegedly committed by this Court in its factual findings and its conclusions
derived therefrom, properly summed up and grouped, fall into three categories (1) those
pertaining to findings and conclusions without basis on record or contrary to the evidence on
records (2) those referring to findings and conclusions contrary to the factual determination
made by and conclusions arrived at by the Court of Industrial Relations, and (3) those
relating to issues not raises or errors not assigned by the parties.
To the respondents' first cauldron of steaming objections belong the following factual findings
and conclusions of this Court purportedly unsupported by the records or contrary to what
appears in the same: (1) that the respondents instructed Ramon Garcia and Vicente Abella
to create the disturbance which occurred on May 21, 1958; (2) that Garcia issued a circular
to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the
NATU; (3) that the respondents did not make counter-proposals to the Unions' demands and
that the said respondents insisted on the Unions' dropping their demands for union security,
"promising money benefits if this was done;" (4) that the Court of First Instance of Manila
issued the restraining order "on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases
against striking members of the Unions;" (5) that "more than 120 criminal charges" were filed

against the members of the Unions; (6) that the respondents hired Felipe Enage and Garcia,
"former legal counsels of the petitioner, as personnel manager and assistant corporate
secretary respectively, with attractive compensations," and (7) that Jose M. Olbes "brought
three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the
presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru
only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line
posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building."
1. Anent the first point raised by the respondents, this Court, in the decision of January 30,
1971, stated:
There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the
latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal
charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction
from the court of first instance. 7
Earlier in the decision (Page 4) and in the preceding statements, this Court briefly recounted
the circumstances attending the occurrence. To claim that this Court, in the above-quoted
portion of the decision, found and categorically stated that Garcia and Abella participated in
some sort of a pre- planned scheme to "create the disturbance" constitutes but a mistaken
impression of the statement of this Court. The statement simply express that in the
circumstances already mentioned which circumstances the records unraveled lurked
the distinct likelihood that Garcia and Abella purposely provided the provocation for the
incident.
2. We find the second objection of the respondents well-taken, for the records offer little to
provide sufficient clarity on whether or not Garcia, as acting president of the Insular Life/FGU
unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association, "in a circular issued in his name
and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the
FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU)." The transcript of the
proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations reveals only Garcia's apparent
adeptness at evasion and inability to recall, among other things, whether or not he issued the
circular aforementioned. Nonetheless, the foregoing questioned statement of this Court in
the narration of facts in the decision bears no materiality to the conclusions finally arrived at.
3. The respondents claim the statement of this Court that "the Companies did not make any
counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for union
security, promising money benefits if this was done" as "truly false" and "an unwarranted
deviation from the truth." Far from being so, we find that the records precisely support the
finding. The thrust of the testimony of Enage (Pages 13 to 65, tsn, March 30, 1960; pages 7
to 13, tsn, April 29, 1960) the chairman of the negotiating committee for the respondents
verily points out that the said respondents omitted, without sufficient reasons, to present
counter-proposals to the Unions' demands. This, in addition to the testimonial evidence
offered by Ignacio Lacsina (Pages 56 to 62, tsn, September 8, 1958) chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Unions, supports the finding that, indeed, the respondents
offered no counter-proposals to the demands of the said Unions. At most, the records reveal,
the respondents, to placate the Unions, indulged in the superficial discussion of the
demands, requiring the said Unions to explain and clarify the import of their demands. Then,
too, the totality of the testimonial evidence of Lacsina (pages 35 to 38, tsn, October 14,
1958) and the Unions' panel members Villaruel (Pages 60 to 61, tsn, November 21, 1958)
and Du Timbol (Pages 25 to 26 and 30, tsn, November 18, 1959) clearly indicates that the

respondents more than persuaded the Unions to drop their union security demands with the
promise of monetary benefits.
4. We consider the objection of the respondents to the statement of this Court that the Court
of First Instance of Manila issued the restraining order "on the basis of the pendency of the
various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions" as well-founded. The records
show that the respondents predicated their petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction (Exhibit "32-B") upon certain acts which the said respondents claimed the
picketing members of the striking Unions committed through "force, threats, intimidation,
coercion and violence." The restraining order (Exhibit "33-C") issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila on May 31, 1958 makes no express mention of the pendency of the
various criminal charges already filed against the picketing members of the striking Unions.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that on the day the Court of First Instance of Manila issued
the restraining order, several criminal charges (Exhibits "19," "20", "23" to "29," inclusive and
"31") had been filed already with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila against many of the
picketing members of the Unions.
5. The respondents also question the statement of this Court giving the impression of the
filing of "more than 120 criminal charges" against the members of the striking Unions. The
evidence at hand (Exhibits "19", "20," "23", to "31," inclusive) show, as of June 2, 1958, four
complaints for coercion and seven for grave coercion already filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal of Manila. Each of the preliminary investigation memoranda, however, except three
(Exhibits "26," "29" and "30") names several members of the striking Unions collectively as
accused. Counting the charges individually prescinding from the fact that a number of the
members of the striking Unions then faced two or more charges, having been named as
accused in more than one memorandum the charges add up to eighty-four. On this point, we
sustain the objection of the respondents.
6. The respondents also allege as objectionable the following statement of this Court:
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals
for an amended renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements
to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former
legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant
corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. 8
The respondents claim the "falsity of the finding" that Enage and Garcia worked as "legal
counsels of the petitioners" and alleged this Court as "unduly unkind" in giving the
impression that they enticed Enage and Garcia "from their positions as 'legal counsels of the
petitioners' with high salaries." The records, however, evince that Garcia served as
Secretary-Treasurer of the Federation of Free Workers (Pages 59 to 61, tsn, August 4, 1961)
and that Garcia handled cases for the Federation of Free Workers (Page 58, tsn, August 4,
1961) with which the Unions then formed an affiliation (Pages 59 to 62, tsn, August 4, 1961;
page 62, tsn, January 16, 1962). With respect to Enage, the records show that he worked
with the Federation of Free Workers (Page 25, tsn, April 29, 1960). Even the respondents, in
their brief (Page 46), stated that Garcia and Enage worked as counsels for the Federation of
Free Workers. Nevertheless, assuming the truth of the respondents' assertion that neither
Garcia nor Enage served as counsel, directly or indirectly through the Federation of Free
Workers, for the Unions, this passing mention of the disputed former connection of Garcia
and Enage to the said Unions bears no relevance to the principal merits of the case at bar.
As to the other observations of the respondents, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the
same for only a misreading of the aforequoted portion of the decision gives, in the words of

the respondents themselves, "the unkind impression that respondents enticed them (Enage
and Garcia) from their position as 'legal counsels of the petitioners' with high salaries."
7. The respondents' allegation that no evidence supports the statement of this Court that
they, through their president and manager Jose Olbes,
brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men,
who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied
by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and
in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of
the Insular Life Building.9
rounds up the objections of the said respondents properly falling under the first group, The
respondents claim the absence of Evidence showing that: (1) Olbes held the position of
manager; (2) Olbes brought three truckloads of "non-strikers and others;" (3) armed men
escorted the non-strikers and others;" (4) eight entrances provided access to the three
buildings; and (5) that the gate through which the non-strikers and others entered measured
"less than two meters wide."
Object number one deals with an inconsequential detail whether or not Olbes held, in any
capacity, the position of manager which bears no materiality to the main issues raised by
the case at hand.
As to number two, the evidence of the respondents' own witnesses Ramon Zosa (Page
38, tsn, December 5, 1960), Nestor Cipriano (Pages 18, 19 and 26, tsn, February 1, 1961)
and Olbes (Pages 7 to 13, 33, 34 and 45 to 50, tsn, October 2, 1962) more than
sufficiently indicate the truth that Olbes led three busloads of non-strikers and others to the
picketed buildings. To this effect too, testified some witnesses of the Unions, particularly
Ponciano Abesamis (Pages 57 to 66, tsn, January 20, 1959) and Jose Victorio (Pages 19 to
25, tsn, June 11, 1959).
Regarding number three, the records miss to evince clearly whether or not armed men
escorted the three JD buses filled with non-strikers and others to the respondents' picketed
premises.
On number four, a collation of all the evidence bearing on this objection ion reveal the
following means of access of the office premises of the respondents comprised of almost
one block bounded by Plaza Cervantes, Plaza Moraga, Muelle de la Industria and Juan
Luna: (1) the Plaza Cervantes entrance to the Insular Life Building (Page 8, tsn, February 8,
1961); (2) the two Plaza Moraga entrances to the Insular Life Building (Page 8, tsn,
September 13, 1960); (3) the basement entrance to the Insular Life Building (Page 29, tsn,
October 2, 1962); (4) the Juan Luna entrance to the Ayala Building (Page 11, tsn, August 4,
1961); (5) the Muelle de la Industria entrance to the Ayala Building (Page 27, tsn, August 4,
1961); (6) the Plaza Moraga entrance to the Filipinas Building (Page 21, tsn, August 18,
1959); and (7) the entrance to the National City Bank of New York the premises of which
have a connecting door to the lobby of the Ayala Building (Page 30, tsn, October 2, 1962).
As to objection number five, not one of the parties offers any specific evidence showing the
exact measurement of the gate through which the non-strikers and others entered. The
evidence on record relevant to this point disclose that the gate measures about two to three
meters wide.

The respondents further unleash their vigorous exception to the following findings arrived at
by this Court; (1) that the respondents discriminated against the strikers in the re-admission;
(2) that the respondents dismissed thirty-four strikers without lawful cause; (3) that the
respondents omitted to give the dismissed strikers the opportunity to defend themselves
against the supposed charges against them; and (4) that the respondents' letter of May 21,
1959 (Exhibit "A") contained "promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them
to return to work" and that the said respondents' letter of May 31, 1958 (Exhibit "B")
contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees' in the event of their
failure to report for work on June 2, 1958. The respondents strongly protest against the
alteration and reversal made by this Court of the factual determination reached by the Court
of Industrial Relations on these salient points.
Setting aside the incisive dissection performed by the respondents on the statements of this
Court relevant and related to the aforementioned findings, the arguments of the said
respondents all but lead to their primary objection that this Court erred in finding that they
committed unfair labor practice. For, admittedly, the foregoing findings provided this Court
with the unshakeable bases in arriving at the inescapable conclusion that the respondents
committed unfair labor practice.
In the decision of January 30, 1971, this Court, fully cognizant that the findings now
questioned by the respondents constituted the considerations of importance to the issues
involved in the case at bar, sufficiently and clearly, albeit lengthily, discussed all of them. And
a consultation with and a combing of the voluminous records disclose the evidence,
substantial and credible, in support of the said findings.
The respondents labor under the impression that, in the controversy at hand, the findings of
fact of the Court of Industrial Relations deserve much weight and consideration. The said
findings of fact, the respondents argue, should remain conclusive. However, the want of
substantial evidence, nay, credible proof, to uphold the findings of the Court of Industrial
Relations on the matters now disputed by the respondents, brought about by the mistaken
appreciation of the facts, prompted this Court to review the facts on record and to alter and
reverse the determination reached by the said Court of Industrial Relations. These,
consequently, resulted in a view rather different from that of the Court of Industrial Relations.
Not infrequently, the Court of Industrial Relations misapprehends the facts and, eventually,
arrives at erroneous conclusions. For in the Court of Industrial Relations, only one judge
hears the case and usually, not even a judge hears the same. Instead, a hearing examiner
an employee of the Court of Industrial Relations takes charge of the proceedings and
receives the evidence. After hearing, the hearing examiner submits his report on the case to
the judge. The judge then studies the case and, relying on the ability and integrity of the
hearing examiner who saw and heard the witnesses and submitted the report, renders the
decision. More often than not, the proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations drag
through years before the case finally becomes subject to study and decision by the judge.
And even in the reconsideration of the decision asked for by the aggrieved party, no
rehearing takes place before the Court of Industrial Relations en banc. The individual judges,
if they have the disposition and the time to do so, review the evidence on record or merely
read and rely upon the memoranda submitted by the respective parties and the decision
subject of reconsideration, giving due consideration to the capability, competency and probity
of the judge who penned the said decision. And almost invariably, the Court of Industrial
Relations en banc upholds the decision for reconsideration. 10

The case at bar, this Court notes, passed from the hands of one hearing examiner Arsenio
Adriano to another Guillermo Medina. This case also took more than seven years
before its determination by the Court of Industrial Relations. These factors, we opine,
contributed to the misapprehension of facts committed by the Court of Industrial Relations
warranting a review of the factual determination in its totality.
Thus, this Court finds it neither important nor imperative to pursue any further discussion and
resolution of the matters claimed by the respondents as contrary to the findings of the Court
of Industrial Relations. And for the satisfaction of the respondents, an examination of the
entire evidence on record makes it more apparent that evidence of quantity and quality
sustain, the findings of this Court on the aforementioned matters now disputed by them.
To the third group of the respondents' objections appertain those findings of this Court on
issues not raised or errors not assigned by the parties. The respondents question the action
taken by this Court in discussing and resolving the following: (1) the question as to the
nature of the strike staged by the Unions; (2) the issue as to whether or not the respondents
refused to bargain collectively in good faith; and (3) the question as to the reclassification of
eighty-seven employees as supervisors.
Concededly, the Rules of Court, in proceedings before the appellate courts, namely, the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, require the party seeking the review of a judgment
to set out in his brief the errors upon which he relies for reversal. Otherwise, the appellate
courts would not consider those errors not properly assigned or specified. 11 However, the
Supreme Court has ample authority to review and resolve matters not assigned and specified as
errors by either of the parties in the appeal if it finds the consideration and determination of the
same essential and indispensable in order to arrive at a just decision in the case. 12 This Court,
thus, has the authority to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors if the unassigned errors
closely relate to errors properly pinpointed out or if the unassigned errors refer to matters upon
which the determination of the questions raised by the errors properly assigned depend. 13
The same also applies to issues not specifically raised by the parties. The Supreme Court,
likewise, has broad discretionary powers, in the resolution of a controversy, to take into
consideration matters on record which the parties fail to submit to the Court as specific
questions for determination. 14 Where the issues already raised also rest on other issues not
specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to the former
and as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has the authority to include them in
its discussion of the controversy as well as to pass upon them. In brief, in those cases wherein
questions not particularly raised by the parties surface as necessary for the complete adjudication
of the rights and obligations of the parties and such questions fall within the issues already
framed by the parties, the interests of justice dictate that the Court consider and resolve them.
In the case at hand, the questions as to the nature of the strike staged by the Unions, the
refusal of the respondents to bargain collectively in good faith, and the reclassification of
eighty-seven employees as supervisors relate closely to the determination of whether or not
the respondents committed unfair labor practice. Thus, this Court found it necessary to
resolve these issues, without confining itself to those tendered by the parties.
In the same vein, we are also constrained to reassess the ruling in our decision of January
30, 1971 to the effect that the strikes must receive backwages from the date of the act of
discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge or their offer to return to work up to the
date of their actual reinstatement, deducting therefrom whatever they have earned pending
readmission.

Significant changes have since supervened as to the method of awarding backwages. In a

line of cases, the court has established a policy of fixing the amount of backwages to a just
and reasonable level without qualification or deduction.
Blazing the trail is Mercury Drug Co. vs. CIR, 15 L-23357, April 30, 1974, which enunciated the
policy. The doctrine is not without justification, for, in the same case, it was stated that the evident
aim is "to avoid protracted delay in the execution of the award of backwages due to extended
hearings and unavoidable delays and difficulties encountered in determining the earnings of the
laid-off employees ordered to be reinstated with backwages during the pendency of the case for
purposes of deducting the same from the gross backwages awarded."
Feati University Club vs. Feati University, L-35103, August 25, 1974, adopted a consensus
policy of pegging the amount of backwages to their total equivalent for three
years (depending on the circumstances) without deduction or qualification. The rationale for
the policy was stated in the following words:
As has been noted, this formula of awarding reasonable net
backwages without deduction or qualification relieves the employees from
proving or disproving their earnings during their lay-off and the employers
from submitting counterproofs, and obviates the twin evils of Idleness on the
part of the employee who would "with folded arms, remain inactive in the
expectation that a windfall would come to him" (Itogon Suyoc Mines, Inc. vs.
Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, 24 SCRA 873 (1968), cited in Diwa ng
Pagkakaisa vs. Filtex International Corp., 43 SCRA 217 (1972))
and attrition and protracted delay in satisfying such award on the part of
unscrupulous employers who have seized upon the further proceedings to
determine the actual earnings of the wrongfully dismissed or laid-off
employees to hold unduly extended hearings for each and every employee
awarded backwages and thereby render practically nugatory such award and
compel the employees to agree to unconscionable settlements of their
backwages award in order to satisfy their dire need. (See La Campana Food
Products, Inc. vs. CIR, 28 SCRA 314 (1969) and Kaisahan ng Mga
Manggagawa vs. La Campana Food Products, Inc., 36 SCRA 142 (1970)).
The above judicial policy became entrenched in our jurisprudence when the Court, in Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation and B.H. Tenefrancia vs. CIR, et al., L-34300, November 22, 1974,
reiterated the same way of computation, decreeing the grant of backwages not
exceeding three years without requiring the parties to submit proof of compensation received
from other sources from the time of the illegal dismissal until actual reinstatement. 16
We must now respond to the pronouncements in the above and related cases if we are to
give our law on the matter order, direction and light.
Here, a total of eighteen (18) years has elapsed from June 2, 1958, date of the
commencement of the backwages. Considering all the commencement of the backwages.
Considering all the circumstances at bar, viz., the lengthy procedural and technical
manipulations of the parties, the delay in the resolution of the case by the court below, the
complexity of the issues raised by the parties which were resolved only on January 30, 1971,
etc., the Court considers the fixing and limitation of the backwages award to their total
equivalent of three years without qualification and deduction as applicable to and fully
justified in the case at bar.

The Court finds no sufficient or compelling reason to further depart from its judgment as
embodied in the decision of January 30, 1971.
ACCORDINGLY, subject to the above modification as to backwages, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied, and the judgment of the Court as embodied in its decision
of January 30, 1971 is affirmed in all other respects. This denial is immediately executor.
Barredo., Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

With the observation that for him the opinion likewise signifies that Attorney Felipe Enage
had been acting all the while on accordance with the strict requirements of legal ethics.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
With the observation that for him the opinion likewise signifies that Attorney Felipe Enage
had been acting all the while on accordance with the strict requirements of legal ethics.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Footnotes
1 Motion for Reconsideration, page 3.
2 Laguna Transportation Employees Union, et al., vs. Laguna Transportation
Co., Inc., 23 SCRA 173; Tanglaw ng Paggawa vs. Court of Industrial
Relations and Red V Coconut Products, Ltd., 25 SCRA 19; Laguna College
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 25 SCRA 167; Philippine Educational
Institution and Monzon vs. MLQSEA Faculty Association and Quimosing, 26
SCRA 272; G. Liner and/or de Keyser vs. National Labor Union, et al., 26
SCRA 282; National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA
Consolidated Union, et al., 27 SCRA 227; Alhambra Industries, Inc. vs. Court
of Industrial Relations and Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Alhambra
(PAFLU), 29 SCRA 138; Gonzales vs. Victory Labor Union (VICLU), et al., 30
SCRA 47; Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (LMM) vs. Court of

Industrial Relations and Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera Otros

Trabajadores de Filipinas (FOITAF), 36 SCRA 600; and other numerous
cases.
3 Industrial, Commercial, Agricultural Workers Organization (ICAWO) vs.
Bautista, et al., 7 SCRA 907; Sanchez vs. Court of industrial Relations, et al.,
8 SCRA 654,
4 Gonzales vs. Victory Labor Union (VICLU), et al., Ibid.; Lakas ng
Manggagawang Makabayan (LMM) vs. Court of Industrial Relations and
Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros
Trabajadores de Filipinas (FOITAF), Ibid.
5 Gonzales vs. Victory Labor Union (VICLU), et al., Ibid.
6 Union of the Philippine Education Employees (NLU) vs. Philippine
Education Co., 91 Phil. 93; Ormoc Sugar CO., Inc. and Revilla vs. OSCO
Workers Fraternity Labor Union (OWFLU), et al., 1 SCRA 21; Lu Do & Lu Ym
Corporation vs. Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) and
Progressive Employees and Laborers Union (PELU), 11 SCRA 134.
7 Decision, page 19.
8 Decision. page 10.
9 Decision, page 10.
10 Donato vs. Philippine Marine Officers Association and Court of Industrial
Relations, G.R. No. L-12506, May 18, 1959.
11 Saura import & Export Co., Inc. vs. Philippine International Surety Co., Inc.
and Philippine National Bank, 8 SCRA 143.
12 Miguel, and Miguel vs. Court of Appeals and Reyes, 29 SCRA 760.
13 Paterno, et al. vs. Jao Yan, 1 SCRA 631; Saura Import & Export Co., Inc.
vs. Philippine International Surety Co., Inc. and Philippine National
Bank, supra.
14 Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 2 SCRA 873.
15 Applied in NASSCO vs. CIR, L-31852 and L-32724, June 28, 1974 and
Almira, et al. vs. B.F. Goodrich Phil., Inc., L-34974, July 25, 1974.
16 Invoking practically the same theory is the case of Radio Communications
of the Philippines vs. Philippine Communications Electronics and Electricity
Workers' Federacion (FCWF), L-37662, July 15, 1975.