CAROL I NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

COMMAND AND STAFF FACULTY

DOCTORAL SCHOOL

PROCEEDINGS
THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
STRATEGIES XXI

TECHNOLOGIES MILITARY
APPLICATIONS, SIMULATIONS
AND RESOURCES
VOLUME 1

Scientific Editors:
Gabriel-Florin MOISESCU, Professor, PhD
Daniel DUMITRU, Professor, PhD
Sorin PNZARIU, Professor, PhD
Iulian MARTIN, Professor, PhD

November 05-06, 2015

Bucharest, Romania

SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
Brigadier General (ROU AF) Gabriel-Florin MOISESCU,
PhD (Carol I National Defense University, Bucharest,
Romania)
Magistrate
Lieutenant
General
Professor
Erich
CSITKOVITS, PhD (National Defense Academy, Austria)
Colonel Professor eng. Bohuslav PIKRYL, PhD
(University of Defense, Czech Republic)
Brigadier General (ret.) Professor eng. Rudolf URBAN, PhD
(University of Defense, Czech Republic)
Professor Zdenek ZEMANEK, CSc , PhD (University of
Defense, Czech Republic)
Major General Associate Professor Boguslaw PACEK, PhD
(National Defense University, Poland)
Navy
Captain
(ret.)
Associate
Professor Piotr
GAWLICZEK, PhD (National Defense University, Poland)
Colonel Professor Tadeusz SZCZUREK, Ph.D. (Military
University of Technology, Warsaw, Poland)
Brigadier General Associate Professor Dipl. Eng. Boris
URKECH, PhD (Armed Forces Academy of GMRS,
Slovakia)
Major General Professor Vuruna MLADEN, PhD (Military
Academy, Serbia)
Brigadier General Professor Slaven ZDILAR, PhD (Petar
Zrinski Defense Academy, Croatia)
Colonel Professor Mojca PEEC, PhD (Command Staff
School, Slovenia)
Brigadier General Professor Meelis KIILI, PhD (Baltic
Defense College, Estonia)
Professor Augustin MEAHER, PhD (Baltic Defense
College, Estonia)
Professor Michel RUDNIANSKI, PhD (ORT France and
International Institute of Management at CNAM)
Professor Andrs PATYI, PhD (National University for
Civil Service, Hungary)
Colonel Gabor BOLDIZSAR, PhD (National University for
Civil Service, Hungary)
Colonel Professor Laszlo KOVACS, PhD (National
University for Civil Service, Hungary)
Colonel-General (ret.) Professor Zoltan SZENES, PhD
(National University for Civil Service, Hungary)
Lieutenant Colonel Professor Christophe MIDAN, PhD
(Military School, Paris, France)
Professor Larry WATTS, PhD (USA)
Professor Radu MIHALCEA, PhD (University of Illinois,
Chicago, USA)
Colonel Associate Professor Niculae IANCU, PhD (Mihai
Viteazul National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest,
Romania)
Police Quaestor Professor Mihai BDESCU, PhD
(Alexandru Ioan CUZA Police Academy, Bucharest,
Romania)
Major-general (ret.) Professor Mihail VASILE-OZUNU,
PhD (Spiru Haret University, Romania)
Professor Adrian IVAN, PhD (Babe-Bolay University,
Cluj Napoca, Romania)
Professor George POEDE, PhD (Al.I. Cuza University,
Iai, Romania)
Profesor Emilian M. Dobrescu, PhD (The Romanian
Academy, Romania)
Professor tefan PRUN, PhD (Alexandru Ioan CUZA
Police Academy, Bucharest, Romania)
Professor George ICAL, PhD (Alexandru Ioan CUZA
Police Academy, Bucharest, Romania)

Carol-Teodor PETERFI (Organization for the Prohibition

of Chemical Weapons)

Colonel Professor Ion ROCEANU, PhD (Carol I

National Defense University , Bucharest, Romania)

Colonel Professor Daniel DUMITRU, PhD (Carol I

National Defense University , Bucharest, Romania)

Colonel Associate Professor Valentin DRAGOMIRESCU,

PhD (Carol I National Defense University , Bucharest,

Romania)
Colonel Associate Professor Iulian MARTIN, PhD (Carol
I National Defense University , Bucharest, Romania)
Colonel Associate Professor Marian STANCU, PhD
(Carol I National Defense University , Bucharest,
Romania)
Colonel Associate Professor Ion PURICEL, PhD (Carol I
National Defense University , Bucharest, Romania)
Captain (Navy) Professor Cornel MARINESCU, PhD
(Carol I National Defense University , Bucharest,
Romania)
Colonel Associate ProfessorOctavian MIREA, PhD
(Carol I National Defense University , Bucharest,
Romania)
Colonel Associate Professor Ioana ENACHE, PhD (Carol
I National Defense University , Bucharest, Romania)

ORGANIZING COMMITTEE:
CHAIRMAN: Iulian MARTIN, Professor, PhD
VICE-CHAIRMAN: Valentin DRAGOMIRESCU, Associate
Professor, PhD
MEMBERS:
Marian STANCU, Associate Professor, PhD
Ion PURICEL, Associate Professor, PhD
Cornel MARINESCU, Professor, PhD
Octavian MIREA, Associate Professor, PhD
Costinel NIU, Associate Professor, PhD
Ioan-Constantin STAN, Associate Professor, PhD
Diana Elena UUIANU, Lecturer, PhD
Laurentiu Raducu POPESCU, PhD
Andrei ION, Lecturer, PhD
Antonio DAN-UTEU, PhD Candidate
Cristian STANCIU, PhD Candidate
Daniel ROMAN, PhD Candidate
Alexandru HERCIU, PhD Candidate
Andra Sybil TEFAN (Romania)
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE:
Ion CHIORCEA (Romania)
Laureniu GRIGORE (Romania)
Tudorel LEHACI (Romania)
Gheorghe LUCA (Romania)
Andra Sybil TEFAN (Romania)
Alexandru HERCIU (Romania)
Antonio DAN-UTEU (Romania)
Elena PLEANU (Romania)
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE:
Cristian STANCIU (Romania)
Daniel ROMAN (Romania)
Nicolae SRBU (Romania)
Maria PRIOTEASA (Romania)
Elena PLEANU (Romania)
Liliana ILIE (Romania)

The responsibility of the papers content belongs entirely to their authors.

ISSN 2285-8318; ISSN-L 2285-8318

national leading-edge technology company, providing innovating

solutions to society.
A strategic partner providing its clients, from a unique source, with a
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UTI Mission
To identify customer needs and to provide global solutions, exceptional quality services and
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UTI Aims
UTI aims are means of putting forth the underlying principles of the company's mission.
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Registered
office:
Secondary office:
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IBAN:
Bank:
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Fax:
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27C Cernauti Street, 022183, Bucharest 2

UTI Business Center, 4th floor
31 Vasile Lascar St., 020492, Bucharest 2
R12695122
J40/1130/2000
RO28 RZBR 0000 0600 0265 9920
Raiffeisen Bank SMB
+40-31-10.11.884
+40-31-10.11.883
office@uti.eu.com

Rohde & Schwarz

Rohde & Schwarz is an independent group of companies specializing in
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It is a leading supplier of solutions in the fields of:
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Established 80 years ago, Rohde & Schwarz has a global presence and a dedicated service network
in over 70 countries. It has approx. 9300 employees and achieved a net revenue of 1.9 billion
(US$ 2.5 billion) in fiscal year 2012/2013 (July 2012 to June 2013). Company headquarters are in
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It is one of the leading suppliers of professional HF, VHF and UHF, military and civil radio
systems for use in stationary and mobile ground stations, on ships and airborne platforms.

Rohde &
Schwarz

Rohde & Schwarzis a very well-known manufacturer of equipment and systems for
detection, location and analysis of radio signals with applications in the following areas:
a.ointernal and external security, military and civil radio-monitoring,
b.oas well as for EW systems.
Rohde & SchwarzSIT subsidiary develops crypto products and systems necessary for:
a.othe protection of information in modern data processing and communication systems,
b.oas well as consulting and IT analysis for government authorities.
Since 2008, in Romania, Rohde & Schwarzoperates as Rohde Schwarz Romania SRL, a company
that replaces Rohde and Schwarz Representation Office and Rohde Schwarz Romania Services
SRL.
With a history of over 30 years on the Romanian market, Rohde Schwarz decided to change its
market approach to respond efficiently to customers requests in Romania.
Rohde & SchwarzRomania SRL offers to its partners also calibration services, maintenance,
repairing for the respective equipment and services and additional services such as: system
integration, installation, specialized software applications and training.
Rohde & Schwarz Romania S.R.L.
Bd. Eroii Sanitari, nr. 89, Sector 5,
Tel / Fax: +40 21 411 20 13; +40 21 410 68 46
Email: rs-romania@rohde-schwarz.com
www.rohde-schwarz.com

We design progress for...

- millions of students, teachers and parents who build the "education
of the future";
- hundreds of organisations with major impact in the Romanian business environment;
- companies oriented towards success that invest in training thousands of employees;
- tens of thousands of doctors and millions of beneficiaries of health services;
- hundreds of thousands of farmers who get easy access to European funds;
- hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries of projects financed from structural funds;
- positioning the Romanian intelligence worldwide through continuous research and development;
- recognizing Romania as part of the world's elite of educational software: more than 200 national
& international awards.
SIVECO Romania develops and exports software products and consultancy projects with high
added value to countries within the European Community, The Middle East, North Africa and the
CIS area.
SIVECO Romania is specialized in developing large and complex IT projects for education, health,
agriculture, customs organizations, European institutions, private companies and public sector.
During its over 23 years of activity, SIVECO Romania received more than 200 national and
international recognitions and prizes.
SIVECO Romania SA
Victoria Park
73-81 Bucuresti-Ploiesti Drive,
Building C4, District 1, 013685, Bucharest
Tel: +40 (21) 302 3300
Fax: +40 (21) 302 3391
Office: office@siveco.ro
Marketing: marketing@siveco.ro
PR: communication@siveco.ro

Capability! Delivered!
INTERACTIVE Systems & Business Consulting
(ISBC), part of INTERACTIVE group of companies
from Romania, is a defense industry leader in integrating Digital Communications and Command &
Control and Information Systems into complete C4ISR turnkey solutions, including Battle
Management Systems (integration of platforms electronics, inertial navigation, GPS, surveillance
radars, sensors and Fire Control Systems).
The most important side of ISBC is not only that ISBCisa technologies provider on behalf of
prestigious communications companies like Harris RF Communications and General Dynamics in
Romania but also ISBC isdeveloping highly integrated solutions for any type of platform around
Harris radios and various other types of equipment, sensors and fire control systems. All ISBC
provided systems are field proven and homologated with the Romanian forces and governmental
agencies, supporting Romanian forces in theaters of operations.
ISBC can offer to its partners, the best and most modern integrating solutions for C4ISR Systems,
having core communications based on any targeted radios which are appreciated around the world
armed forces.
ISBC isinvolved in large cooperation with Romanian Defence Industry and governmental officials
and agencies in providing the most modern capabilities for any battle field whether is in the air, at
sea or land conducted.
Working together we can make the future right today!
Interactive Software, part of INTERACTIVE group of companies from Romania, is an IT company
that has the core business mainly focused on defense and public safety sector. C2IS solutions and
C2 products provided by Interactive Software allow decision makers to understand the situations,
anticipate the courses of actions in critical situations and make the right decisions in a timely
manner.
Interactive Software strongly believes that delivering a successfully turnkey IT solution requires a
close cooperation with customers. Customer needs professional expertise to understand how the IT
technologies could work and Interactive Software can provide it. In the same time, in a close
cooperation with the customer, Interactive Software will understand better customer operational
environment in order to shape the technologies into a real expected solution. Together with
customer, Interactive Software can accelerate the transformation of existing systems into new ones
with maximum efficiency!
Interactive Software built an excellent reputation for innovation, high quality and broad
interoperability, implementing challenging projects, sometimes in harsh conditions. In this respect,
Interactive Software self-assumed also an important role as C2 COTS software developer.
Although the main customers are the Romanian governmental organizations, Interactive Software is
also providing C2 turnkey solutions, know-how and C2 COTS products to international customers,
according to their needs and their procurement policies.
INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE SRL
RO 16010582
J40/17522/2003
BUCURESTI,CALEA RAHOVEI,NR.266-268,CORP 60,ET.3,SECTOR 5
RON RO77 PIRB 4211 7641 6500 1000
PIRAEUS BANK

Esri - Liderul mondial al tehnologiei GIS

Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc. (Esri),
cu sediul in Redlands, California, USA, este liderul
mondial in domeniul GIS. Infiintat in 1969, Esri are in prezent peste 3.000 de salariati in Statele
Unite si o retea de 80 de distribuitori in intreaga lume. Esri este un motor al dezvoltarii GIS si un
promotor al tehnogiilor Open. Esri este membru principal al OGC, participand activ in
comietetele de specialitate ale ISO. Esri este de asemenea implicata direct in implementarea
directivei INSPIRE a Uniunii Europene.
Esri Romania
Esri Romania a fost fondata in anul 1999 ca o companie privata, pentru a continua distributia
produselor Esri in Romania, activitate inceputa de Geosystems Romania in 1993. Prin urmare, Esri
Romania are o prezenta continua de mai mult de 20 de ani in Romania. Esri Romania este membru
al Grupului de Companii Worldwide Esri, promovand in Romania politica si produsele Esri.
Esri Romania - Sediul Comercial
Strada Roma
Nr. 8, Ap. 1, Sector 1, Bucuresti
0040 021.231.13.81 / 231.14.22
Mission
Provide its customers with IT comprehensive and fully
integrated solutions
Vision
Develop partnership programs with leaders of technologies to provide our clients best solutions that
leverage best practices from industry.
The team is constantly enlarging certifications and capabilities so that our expertise relies on
experience, knowledge and innovation.
Values
The 20 years of experience prove the quality of principles that govern Romsys activity.
In order to fullfil all commitments to our clients, partners and employees, we respect a set of
values:
EXCELLENCE
PROFESSIONALISM
INTEGRITY
TEAM SPIRIT
PARTNERSHIP
INNOVATION
Romsys
Bucharest Business Park
12, Menuetului St., Building D
Ground floor & 4th floor, District 1
Postal code - 013713
BUCHAREST, Romania
Phone:
+40 (0)21. 529.40.00

Call Center
+40 (0)21. 529.40.00
Fax:
+40 (0)21. 529.40.15
Email:
sales@romsys.ro
marketing@romsys.ro
bd@romsys.ro

Aktis Printing House and Packaging

Aktis Printing House and Packaging activates in the polygraphic field, and has
had a production experience of over 20 years. Two departments are operating
within the company: one specialized in printed products, and the other one in the
packaging production.
The company is ISO 9001:2008 certified the quality management system is
applied to the printing activities, publishing house and related activities, and
complies both with the requirements of the internal market, and the requirements
of the external market.
Our companys products cover most of the requirements of the Romanian market in the polygraphic
and customized packaging fields.
The printing house benefits from new equipment and modern technology, operating in a completely
equipped hall on the FAUR industrial platform.
The production unit located on the Faur platform is very accessible to clients, partners and
personnel due to the two important boulevards serving the road transportation, Basarabia Boulevard
and 1 December 1918 Boulevard, and also due to availability of the means of public transportation.
Also, for travel and delivery of end products within Romania, our location is well chosen due to the
direct access to the Bucharest ring road and the A3 Motorway (The Sun Motorway).
The management team is innovative, young and well trained in the polygraphic field.
The offset production, marketing and office supplies department produces: leaflets, brochures,
presentation portfolios, books, posters, labels, flyers, calendars, jotters, magazines, business cards,
header sheets, or any other advertising, office supply or stationery products, whether customized or
not.
The digital production department executes the same type of products mentioned above, as well as
banners and prints for indoor works.
The packaging production department produces wrappers and labels from a wide range of
cardboard and/or paper, plasticized or varnished, from 80 g/square meter up to 500 g/ square meter,
embossed or unembossed wrappers, adhesive or non-adhesive, and/or corrugated and type B
corrugated lining wrappers. The production line has all the required equipment, from creation to the
delivery of the end product.
A few reasons for a successful collaboration:
1. Dedicated counseling service for identifying the best quality/price/execution deadline ratio for
your products
2. Assistance in conceiving atypical one-of-a-kind products
3. Graphical conception of the emboss outline for your wrappers
4. Mock-up execution for new products
5. Executing complete packages for fairs and exhibitions (prints, banners, promotional items)
6. Access to the photography database containing over 50 categories
7. Co-packaging services
8. Attractive discounts for fidelity
9. The option of tranche-based storage and delivery, upon request, for the large-circulation orders
10. Management of internal and external deliveries by means of courier services
11. Free transportation in Bucharest and Ilfov
For further information, the Aktis Printing House and Packaging, your business partner, is at your
disposal with the following contact information:
Adress: 256 Basarabia Blvd, FAUR industrial platform, gate 3, district 3, Bucharest, Romania
Telephone +4031.030.22.35, fax +4031.030.22.37
Customer Service telephone: +40744.654.502, +40744.654.552, +40744.654.410
e-mail: comanda@aktis.com.ro, www.aktis.com.ro

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS IN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS ............................................. 13
Iulian MARTIN
LESSONS LEARNED FROM MISTAKES IN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS ................... 21
Valentin DRAGOMIRESCU
(HOW TO) PREPARE YOURSELF FOR AN ENGLISH TEST .......................................... 28
Diana Elena UUIANU
TO GOOGLE OR NOT TO GOOGLE (TRANSLATE)
THAT IS THE QUESTION ..................................................................................................... 36
Diana Elena UUIANU
CYBERSECURITY BY MINIMIZING ATTACK SURFACES .......................................... 42
Dan COLESNIUC
Iulian MARTIN
OPERATIONAL APPROACHES REGARDING SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES AIRBORNE-COMMANDO LAND-BASED UNITS CAPABILITIES
VERSUS PARACHUTE INFANTRYS CAPABILITIES
WITHIN HOMELAND DEFENSE MAJOR OPERATIONS ............................................... 49
Ioan-Constantin STAN
Doru-Constantin TOCIL
INTEGRATION OF CYBER DEFENSE INTO THE OPERATIONAL
PLANNING PROCESS .......................................................................................................... 54
tefan-Antonio DAN-UTEU
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS PROFFESIONALS TRAINING
THROUGH SERIOUS GAMES SOLUTIONS ..................................................................... 60
tefan-Antonio DAN-UTEU
POSSIBLE DOCTRINE EVOLUTIONS DUE TO CURRENT CONFLICTS ..................... 70
Cristian-Octavian STANCIU
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THREATS
ON THE BATTLEFIELD ....................................................................................................... 75
Viorel CEASCAI
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL FATIGUE IN COMBAT ........................................ 79
Viorel CEASCAI
PENSIONS IN EUROPE AND WORLDWIDE .................................................................... 83
Mdlina SCIPANOV
IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRANTS CRISIS ON THE EU BUDGET .............................. 89
Mdlina SCIPANOV
THE GERMAN ARMY JUBILEE 1955 2015 .................................................................... 94
Andra Sybil STEFAN

THE ROLE OF GERMAN LANGUAGE IN GLOBALIZED EUROPE ............................ 100

Andra Sybil STEFAN
PUBLIC ORDER A WAY OF EXPRESSING PUBLIC INTEREST .............................. 104
Corneliu POPA
RISKS AND THREATS TO PUBLIC ORDER ................................................................... 114
Corneliu POPA
COMMUNICATION IN THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS ............................... 121
Elena-Adelina ANDREI
THE POTENTIAL OF SOCIAL NETWORKS ANALYSIS
IN FRAGMENTING TERRORIST NETWORKS............................................................... 127
Elena-Adelina ANDREI
NEW PROCEDURES FOR ASSESSMENT OF MARITIME OPERATIONS .................. 134
Marian BAHACIU
Marius-Sebastian BACCELA
THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATED UNDERWATER
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS .............................................................................................. 144
Marian BAHACIU
Marius-Sebastian BACCELA
MINE COUNTERMEASURES IN THE ACTUAL GEOSTRATEGIC SITUATION ....... 147
Lorin CHIFOR
Emanuel UNGUREANU
TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTING
MARITIME SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (MSA) ......................................................... 154
Lorin CHIFOR
Emanuel UNGUREANU
THE IMPORTANCE OF MATERIAL RESOURCES
IN THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM ............................................................................ 161
Gabriel COJOCARU
SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE DECISION-MAKING, ORGANIZATIONAL
AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS NEEDED FOR AN EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT
OF MATERIAL RESOURCES FOR GENDARMES STRUCTURES ............................. 166
Gheorghe-Marius COSTACHE
PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMAS CAUSES, EFFECTS AND MANAGEMENT ........... 174
Iuliana GUI-ALEXANDRU
ROMANIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND MILITARY-POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVES OF THE COUNTRIES OF NORTHERN EUROPE
POINTS OF VIEW ON STRATEGIC MODELS FOR GENERATING
AND MANAGING NATIONAL RESOURCES ................................................................. 179
Teodora Irina HRIB

10

NATIONAL POLICIES AND STRATEGIES FOR INFORMATION OPERATIONS ..... 185

Cristian ICHIMESCU
APPROACHES REGARDING THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNAL AUDIT IN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
(VISION, OBJECTIVES, DEVELOPMENT)...................................................................... 191
Radu-Viorel MARCU
TARGET ANALYSIS SPECIFIC TO THE VERTICAL COMPONENT
OF THE BATTLESPACE .................................................................................................... 201
Lucian MOLDOVAN
IMPROVING COMMAND AND CONTROL
IN ALLIED JOINT OPERATIONS ..................................................................................... 208
Ioan NEGRU
Florian TUDORACU
THE BLACK SEA AND NAVAL FORCES CONTRIBUTION
TO ENSURING EURO- ATLANTIC SECURITY IN THE AREA .................................... 214
Ioan NEGRU
Florian TUDORACU
CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE INCREASE
OF THE MAINTENANCE STRUCTURES OF GROUND FORCES
OF NATO STATES IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL-MILITARY CHALLENGES....... 221
Adrian NOUR
MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS
AND THE ROLE OF COMMANDER DECISION IN THIS PROCESS ........................... 226
Carol-Teodor PETERFI
THE MANIFESTATION OF HYBRID THREAT
IN CONTEMPORARY MILITARY ART ........................................................................... 238
Dan-Lucian PETRESCU
SOME CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING ECONOMIC SECURITY
AND FINANCIAL STABILITY OF THE ROMANIAN BANKING ................................. 248
Eduard Paul PETRESCUL
CHANGES IN CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING SECURITY POLICIES
IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION ................................................................................. 255
Cristian RUSU
CYBERATTACK- RISK FACTOR FOR FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS ...................... 263
Mircea Constantin CHEAU
Gerald DINC
SECURITY OF CYBER INFORMATION - THREATS, VULNERABILITIES
AND RISKS IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ......................................................... 278
Lucian SCRTOCEA

11

PRINCIPLES OF ELABORATION OF A SECURITY POLICY ....................................... 283

Laura-Ina-Veronica BOGDAN (SRBU)
TARGETING, TARGET ACQUISITION AND THE MILITARY DECISION
MAKING PROCESS ............................................................................................................ 291
Niculae SMEU
Cosmin DOBRESCU
TENDENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF SUBMARINE ......................... 298
Niculae SMEU
Cosmin DOBRESCU
STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANIFESTATION FORMS
OF THE HYBRID WAR ...................................................................................................... 326
Daniel-Cornel TEFNESCU
HEALTH AND SPORTS ..................................................................................................... 336
Maximilian-Paul TOFAN
PHYSICAL TRAINING IN MODERN ARMIES ............................................................... 340
Maximilian-Paul TOFAN
THE EURO-ATLANTIC ADAPTION OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
STRATEGIES TYPE HARD TO SOFT COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
IN PREVENTING AND MANAGING CONFLICTS ......................................................... 344
Oana Mihaela VLADU
THE LEGITIMACY OF PREVENTION AND EURO-ATLANTIC
INTERVENTION ETHICS IN CRISIS AND CONFLICT SITUATIONS ......................... 352
Oana Mihaela VLADU
DETERMINING FACTORS IN PLANNING THE COMMUNICATIONS
AND INFORMATION SYSTEM IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS ....................... 358
Petric-Marinel VOICU
ACTIVITIES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
OF COMMUNICATIONS AND IT MILITARY PERSONNEL
IN NATO MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS .................................................................. 363
Petric-Marinel VOICU
Gheorghe BOARU
INDEX OF AUTHORS ........................................................................................................ 371

12

PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS IN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Iulian MARTIN
Colonel Professor, PhD, Carol I National Defence University, Bucharest
imartinlfd@ yahoo.com

Abstract: This article focuses on predictive analysis, addressing the issues of the techniques and processes
required for such an analysis. It examines the application of data mining and Bayesian networks techniques to
intelligence analysis, presenting the importance of the crime pyramid for the law enforcement agencies and
introducing the Bayesian approach of the LEILA project regarding the serious games space.
Keywords: education, lesson, mistake, intelligence, analysis, process.

Uncertainty and the Possibility of

Prediction
In any domain, the question of
predictability is essentially a question of
eliminating uncertainty. There are four
main sources of uncertainty:
(a) Missing information - refers to
information that is unavailable, that has not
been received or has been received but
cannot be located when needed.
(b) Unreliable information - refers to
information which is received from a
source of low credibility (or a source with

Introduction
Predictive analysis is the act of
mining historical data to forecast future
events or trends. The core element of
predictive analysis is the predictor, a
variable that can be measured for an
individual or entity to predict future
behavior. Multiple predictors are combined
in order to create a predictive model,
which, subjected to analysis, can be used
for forecasting future possible events, with
an acceptable level of reliability.

Figure 1. Predictive modeling

In predictive modeling, data is
collected, a statistical model is formulated,
predictions are made, and the model is
validated (or revised) as additional data
become available.

low perceived credibility), even if the

information is highly accurate.
(c) Ambiguous or conflicting
information - refers to information that can
be interpreted in more than one way.
(d) Complex information - is
information in which it is difficult to
integrate the different aspects of data.

13

While one can reduce uncertainty

through the gathering of facts, one can
never achieve absolute certainty due to the
intangible aspects of human behavior and
the uncertain causal links between human
behavior and events development, in
general. These factors include:
-The intangible aspects of human
behavior,
-The logical limits to the attainment
of certainty through technology, and
-The lack of knowledge of causal
relationships.
A. Uncertainty and Human Behavior
Human behavior is the result of a
complex interplay among three pillars:
motivation, capability, and opportunity.
Motivation refers to the guiding
factors for behavior and includes attitudes,
desires, ends, aims, goals, objectives, and
desired end states. Capability refers to the
means or resources necessary to engage in
behavior, including psychological factors
such as intelligence, relevant facts and
physical factors such as personnel,
equipment, supplies, and technologies.
Opportunity refers to an occasion suitable
for the behavior, including factors such as
geography and time.
In addition to uncertain individual
and collective motivations, predictive
analysis is made less feasible through the
interactive nature of warfare (conventional,
symmetrical, asymmetrical, hybrid), or the
way that each sides actions influence the
decision making of the other side. For
instance, Karl von Clausewitz analyzing
war states that it is an interaction of
opposites, in which the various factors
influencing war interact with one another,
making linear progression toward goals
and objectives impossible.
B. Uncertainty and Technology
Advances in technology would seem
to promise an alleviation of uncertainty.
However, as technology advances, new
sources of uncertainty emerge. The speed,
precision, lethality, and range of weapon
systems have compressed events in time
such that commanders must make

decisions faster and therefore have less

time to process and evaluate intelligence.
Improved data collection will likely result
in faster decision cycles, with plans made
at the same level of uncertainty as before,
due to the expectation of faster decisions
enabled by communication technology, but
without the time allowed in the past for
thoughtful reflection.
C. Uncertainty of Pattern and Causality
Essentially, there are two types of
changes that must be predicted: regular, or
cyclical changes (e.g., the changing
seasons), and discontinuous changes
those that occur on a one-time, ad hoc,
basis. The difficulty in templating enemies
resides in the changing patterns of
adversary operations, or in the lack of
established patterns. One prerequisite for
any form of prediction consists in a
pattern/relationship between analyzed
events. This lack of pattern has the
potential to create uncertainty in the form
of ambiguous or conflicting information,
as the analyst attempts to discern patterns
or doctrine from a constantly adapting
adversary.
2. Techniques and processes
for predictive analysis in Intelligence
Analysis
Predictive analysis is a continuous
analytical process which enables the
Intelligence Analyst to predict threats
capabilities, intents and most probable
course(s) of action and reaction(s) to
friendly operations. Predictive analysis is a
methodology which integrates known
quantitative and qualitative variables
(relevant events, incidents, political and
social dynamics) with the aim to forecast
changes that could support friendly forces
in assessing and addressing threats.
Predictions must be based on solid
analysis using specific tools and
methodologies in order to predict what the
course of action will be and how this will
affect the actors involved.
In conventional analysis, the
Intelligence Analyst examines, assesses

14

and compares bits and pieces of raw

information, and synthesizes findings into
an intelligence product that usually reflects
enemy capabilities and vulnerability.
Predictive analysis goes one step further,
and aims to determine actors intentions
and probable courses of action.
In the field of intelligence,
predictive analysis is conducted at three
levels:
(1) Strategic: At a strategic level,
predictive analysis is called on to predict
events that are global in nature and extend
military subjects. At a strategic level it is
important to examine and make judgments
about factors such as: political, economic,
scientific and technological intentions
because they affect the strategic military
plans of a force or country. Based on these,
the law enforcement agencies must
establish objectives and allocate resources
to meet the demands of emerging threats.
(2) Operational
(actionable
intelligence about long-term threats): At
an operational level, the analysis usually
deals with threats, and is used to develop
and implement preventive responses. On
the basis of Intelligence Analysis, the law
enforcement agencies must develop plans
to meet the requirements for facing
emerging threats in suspected criminal
environment
and
complex
multijurisdictional criminality.
(3) Tactical
(actionable
intelligence about imminent or nearterms threats): At a tactical level, the
analysis usually deals with a narrower
scope of issues and events. It is often
primarily concerned with the composition,
disposition and probable courses of action
of an enemy unit just over a narrower
territory. The analyst must be proactive in
his/her information support provided to the
community, fast and aggressive in pushing
and pulling intelligence to the ground
agents, peers and up to the chain of
command.
Even if predictive analysis is
conducted at three levels, according with
David L. Carter, in law enforcement it

"can have the greatest impact on strategic

intelligence, although it can also have an
application to aid in defining standing
intelligence requirements"1. Thus, this
analytic technique will not forecast threats,
but it is focused on those variables which
have
significant
implications
for
intelligence requirements: intent of the
target, its history, capability and
opportunity.
Data Mining in Intelligence
Analysis
Predictive analytics is very versatile
and can be successfully applied to multiple
fields. It may be an efficient and effective
solution for crime or terror fighting effort.
Efficiency resides in the fact that
predictive analytics does not require costly
software or advanced statistics. A major
challenge in predictive intelligence
analysis is discovering hidden patterns and
relationships in large amounts of either raw
or previously analyzed data. The process
which can help quickly to identify
actionable pieces of information from
within larger data sets is data mining.
There is a multitude of available tools
focused on law enforcement and the
already collected data sets can be subjected
to data mining techniques, making the
predictive analytics simple to implement.
The success seems very hard to
reach in an ever-changing operating
environment defined by a significant
number of actors and an unprecedented
rate of technological progress. Very often
the ability to anticipate what is going to
happen in the future is the key to attain the
objectives in an effective and timely
manner. So, in the modern world the need
for relevant information to be processed in
order to produce intelligence is a
prerequisite for success.
To accommodate the need for
information every organization has
1 Carter, D. L. (2004). Law Enforcement
Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal
Law Enforcement Agencies. Second Edition,
January 2009, pp.270

15

employed an extended array of sensors.

Within the context of the accelerated
technological progress, the sensors and the
infrastructure used to connect them and
store the collected data developed rapidly,
conducting to massive collections of data.
Gradually the processing rate of the
extensive data gathered and stored was
outpaced by the rate of collection. So the
chance to miss or process too late relevant
data increased, as the analysis resources
were overwhelmed by the abundance and
diversity of collected data.
Being able to process in a timely
and effective manner a large quantity of
data became of utmost importance. The
optimal solution is to automatically process
this big pile of data in order to discover
patterns,
dependencies
or
unusual
situations. In essence the purpose is to
identify the relevant data and present them
in a form that enables their further use,
ensuring a seamless transition to the next
phase. The task is very complex and
requires a joint effort of people with
expertise in different domains (databases,
mathematics, statistics, and computer
science). It also requires a dedicated state
of the art infrastructure and properly
trained personnel.
The process should be continuous
as the system is constantly fed with data
gathered by the sensors that organization

owns and from other open sources.

However, the modern infrastructure
facilitates data sharing and the system can
process data collected by sensors of other
organizations. So the chance of extracting
more relevant information increases, but so
does the effort to process the data. The data
processing activities described above are
referred as data mining and represent a
process that enables the focus of analysis
resources on relevant information,
providing the opportunity to accurately
estimate what is going to happen in the
future. So the data mining has a substantial
contribution in the process of predictive
analysis, ensuring its effectives and
opportuneness.
Although it is a process that can be
used in many domains, its nature is
perfectly suited for the Intelligence
Analysis. Data mining for predictive
analysis within the context of intelligence
analysis enables the domination of the
battle-space at strategic, operational and
tactical level providing an effective way to
maximize the opportunity of making the
most of the network infrastructure resulted
from the accelerated progress of
technology in collecting data, extracting
information and producing intelligence. It
represents a necessary phase in the
relentless pursuit of gaining intelligence
superiority, benefiting from conceptual and

Figure 2. Data mining process in LEILA context

16

process based on his meta-cognition and

epistemic knowledge.

technological advantage and ultimately

may be regarded as a force multiplier.
The
LEILA
project
allows
conceiving and developing contents
specially to meet the specific needs of the
intelligence analysts field and also to give
the possibility of being assimilated by
them with its own rhythm, regardless of
space and time. The phases of this process
in order to analyze the data in online
intelligence analysts training are presented
in the figure below:
The data warehouse has a custom
architecture for different groups within the
simulation exercise. So, the different
groups of training can use and analyze both
current and historical data by adding data
marts, which are systems designed for a
particular situation of exercise. To that
end, the data is cleaned, transformed,
catalogued and made available for use by
groups of users through data mining
techniques, online analytical processing,
intelligence operations research and
decision support. However, the means to
retrieve and analyze data, to extract,
transform and load data, and to manage the
data dictionary are also considered
essential
components
of
a
data
warehousing system.
Data warehouses can be subdivided
into three data marts. Data marts store
subsets of data from a warehouse. A data
mart is the access layer of the data
warehouse environment that is used to get
data out to the particular group of users. It
is also a subset of the data warehouse that
is usually oriented to a specific situation of
exercise. Consequently, each group is
considered the owner of its data mart
including all the hardware, software and
data. This enables each group to use,
manipulate and develop their data in any
way they see fit, without altering
information inside other data marts or the
data warehouse.
In situations like the above
mentioned the intelligence analysts
undertakes an independent learning

3. Application of Bayesian networks to

intelligence analysis
Bayesian networks have been used
to carry out a large variety of tasks within
several domains. While most of the
applications of BNs have been explored in
contexts other than intelligence, some of
these can have significant implications for
the work of intelligence analysts. One
example is the work of Fenton & Neil
(2001), who developed a model for dealing
with a safety assessment problem
integrating BNs with the notion of
multiple-criteria
decision
analysis
(MCDA). On a similar note, Kocadal &
Akgil (2014) have introduced an
evolutionary Monte Carlo algorithm to
train BNs for time series forecasting.
Other applications of Bayesian
networks, however, are more closely
related to the realm of intelligence
analysis. An interesting case concerns the
task of assessing sources credibility. The
assessment of the credibility of an
evidential source is an important part of
intelligence analysis, in particular when
HUMINT is involved (Joseph & Corkill,
2011). More often than not, multiple items
of evidence, coming from sources with
varying credibility ratings associated, have
in fact to be taken into account by the
intelligence analysts and combined (fused)
together in order to reach an understanding
of the topic under investigation.
Quite understandably, such a task is
not easily feasible by an analyst without
the support of dedicated tools. The need
for formal models to complement the
natural
reasoning
capabilities
of
intelligence analysts has been advocated
over time by various researchers, notably
in (Wastell, 2010). Formal models require
in turn clean and accurate information to
work on. In the domain of intelligence
analysis, this translates into the need for
accurate evidence marshalling, the
importance of which has been highlighted
in (Schum, 2001).

17

Figure 3. Qualitative structure of a generic BN that may be employed for sources'

credibility assessment (McNaught & Sutovsky, 2012b)
Building on Schums work,
McNaught and Sutovsky have proposed to
employ Bayesian networks for designing a
powerful probabilistic approach to the
fusion of information, which could also

Figure 5. The network is articulated in four

layers:
The top layer includes nodes
corresponding to high-level hypotheses;
The second layer comprises ground truth

Figure 4. Application example of the framework proposed in (McNaught & Sutovsky,

2012b)
prove useful for both assessing the
credibility of the sources involved and reassessing them whenever new pieces of
information emerge (McNaught &
Sutovsky, 2012b). Such Bayesian networkbased framework is built upon a peculiar
Bayesian network topology as shown in

variables;
The third layer is made of nodes
representing observable indicators or
potential items of evidence;
hends the
nodes relating to the credibility
assessments of the evidential sources.

18

Figure 5. Application example of the framework proposed in (McNaught & Sutovsky,

2012b). Modifications in the probability distributions following the detection of a possible
reconnaissance operation
An example of the framework
application can be developed around the
domain of Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CIP) (McNaught & Sutovsky, 2012a,
2012b). In this example, the high-level
hypothesis states that there is an imminent
threat on a certain target CI (Tgt A).

possible reconnaissance operation on Tgt

A has been observed, a dry run attack
against Tgt A has been performed, a
human source (HUMINT 1) has provided
intelligence on an attack against Tgt A.
As soon as the analyst receives new
evidence, the credibility of the human

Figure 6. Application example of the framework proposed in (McNaught & Sutovsky,

2012b). Modifications in the probability distributions following the non-detection of a dry
run attack
Directly connected to the top-level node,
source is re-assessed. For example, if the
there is a ground truth variable, which in
analysis of CCTV footage reveals that
this case corresponds to the proposition
activities compatible with a reconnaissance
that pre-attack planning on Tgt A has taken
operation have been performed, this backs
place. Three observable indicators derive
up the information provided by the human
from the proposition in the second layer: a
source. The probability distribution

19

associated with HUMINT 1 consequently

changes (to 48%/40%/12%), improving its
credibility. Of course, also the probabilities
change, reflecting the new information. An
imminent threat to Tgt A is now
considered true with 60% probability while
pre-attacking planning on Tgt A is
considered true with 90% probability (the
difference is due to the fact that a preattack planning does not necessarily
reflects into a threat).
The same logics apply if additional
intelligence arrives to the analyst,
informing him/her that no dry run
attacks have been noticed. The Bayesian
network will react to the new information,
reducing the probability of an imminent
threat to Tgt A (which decreases from 60%
to 30%) and, in turn, reducing the
credibility of the human source (the
information provided by HUMINT 1 is
now not necessarily accurate, and this
reflects in the change of his/her credibility
probability distribution associated to
38%/44%/18%).
The framework proposed by
McNaught & Sutovsky and described
herein can be implemented by means of the
University of Pittsburgh Decision Systems
Laboratorys SMILE62 software, a set of
C++ libraries, which also offers a
Windows
user-friendly
development
environment (GeNIe).

References
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

20

Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy, and

Alison J. Sherley, The Effectiveness of
Counter-terrorism Strategies, January, 2006
Johnston, R. (2005). Analytic Culture in the
U.S.
Intelligence
Community.
An
Ethnographic Study. Washington, DC:
Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the
Study of Intelligence. Retrieved from
http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/analytic.pdf
Carter, D. L. (2004). Law Enforcement
Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and
Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies.
Retrieved
from
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e09042536
.pdf
Sloman, J. (2012). Fixing Intelligence
Analysis: From Specialists to Experts. Small
Wars
Journal.
Retrieved
from
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fixingintelligence-analysis-from-specialists-toexperts.
Moore, D. T. (2007). Critical Thinking and
Intelligence Analysis. Retrieved from
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dia/nd
ic_moore_crit_analysis_hires.pdf
Marrin, S. (2003). CIAs Kent School:
Improving Training for New Analysts.
International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 16(4), 609637.
FEMA. (2014). Federal Emergency
Management Agency National Preparedness
Directorate
National
Training
and
Education Division Course Catalog.
Retrieved
from
https://www.firstrespondertraining.gov/catal
ogs/NTED_Course_Catalog.pdf
Richard Heuer Psychology of Intelligence
Analysis , p 97

LESSONS LEARNED FROM MISTAKES IN INTELLIGENCE

ANALYSIS
Valentin DRAGOMIRESCU
Colonel Associate Professor, PhD, Carol I National Defence University, Bucharest
valydrag1@ yahoo.com
Abstract: This article presents a synthesis of the main negative consequences and lessons learned resulting from
mistakes of analysis based on several recent cases in which information structures have failed not only in
predicting events but also in situations management or even post-event, in order to draw relevant conclusions
to explain these dysfunctions. The research is part of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Learning Application
(LEILA) project and, based on lessons learned resulting from mistakes of analysis, there were defined a set of
user requirements and learning needs for training improvement of intelligence analysts using serious games
platforms. We grouped the events analyzed into the following categories: terrorist attacks, weapons of mass
destruction, regional conflicts and cyber war, and then we asked the serious question whether the principle of
lessons learned is working in the analysis of information, that is, where the probability of routine is excluded,
the data and variables of the problem being every time different.
Keywords: education, lesson, mistake, intelligence, analysis, process.

his experiences apply to the whole

Intelligence Community (IC). This
learning experience is a way to think about
what intelligence analysis is now in the
context of desired end goals and
outcomes.[2]
The issue of failures in information
analysis is a permanent one because of the
resonance that the harsh criticism against
the structures of intelligence (the way in
which information is formally packaged
within a sentence) has in the media. The
consequences of these failures can include
bad decisions at the highest levels, can
influence foreign policies, and can change
the course of history and the fate of
nations. The sensation aroused by these
topics made even these failures be
classified, according to the level of
surprise caused and their consequences, in
"tops" of the most humiliating failures for
information analysts community.
This is not my intention. My analysis
of several recent cases in which
information structures have failed, not only
in predicting events but also in the
management of situations, or even in postevent management, aims at drawing
relevant conclusions to explain these
dysfunctions. I asked the serious question

1. Introduction
Something can be considered a
lesson learned when the solution to a
problem identified is implemented and
known to all and the problem does not
happen again. History has shown that in
intelligence analysis, successes often
remain unknown to the general public,
while on the contrary, failures resound and
penalize the community information
analyst, even more when consequences are
disastrous and affect people's lives and the
history of nations.
I believe every intelligence product
must be rooted in a strong understanding
of the audience it is written for is a
conclusion of Martin Petersen, a retired
senior CIA Directorate Intelligence officer
and the author of a number of articles on
intelligence and intelligence analysis. After
40 years of thinking and writing about
intelligence and intelligence analysis, and
based on experiences which are drawn
from his work in the CIA, he concluded:
We all learn the craft of intelligence
analysis by doing. The lessons are iterative
and frequently opaque, and they generally
come slowly.[1] But his five fundamental
truths and six things that he learned from

21

of what the principle of lessons learned

means in the analysis of information
where the probability of routine
installation is excluded, the data and
variables of the problem being every time
different. On the other hand, claiming that
intelligence analysts cannot go wrong is
equally absurd. We can, in the best case,
find solutions to reduce the percentage of
inaccurate estimates, but between the
frequently invoked "distance" between
information structures and decision makers
(or the too low voice of IC) and the
suspicion of "manufacturing" evidence in
support of an unshakeable political will,
information structures can be found in a
variety of positions.[3]
There are a number of reasons why
intelligence analysis is inadequate, but a
key reason is that intelligence-gathering
and intelligence-analysis are erroneously
considered as separate things, and analysts
live in fear of raising any alarms before it
is clear that there is a dire situation: in
other words, when it is already too late.
The bottom line is that it is too risky in
terms of career for analysts to go out on a
limb with policymakers.

occurrence, and possibly the failures that

led to that occurrence.
In other words, failures in
intelligence analysis occur at various
stages of the events development.
Furthermore, there seems to be no
particular stage which, for reasons
pertaining to its nature, would be more
protected against these failures or, on the
contrary, more vulnerable than others.
This observation means more or
less that to consider a priori the risks of
making mistakes in different stages of an
event is very important. It should be put in
perspective with respect to the second
dimension considered above.
Firstly, there may be failures which
are more prone to occur at some stages of
the event development than at others. For
instance what happened in Syria, after the
chemical attack, or in Spain, after the
explosion which took place in Madrid
Railways station, is characteristic of postevent failures. For instance, as it will be
seen in more details hereunder, what
happened in Spain was the destruction or
removal of material, equipment or
information which was essential to support
a firmly grounded analysis of what had
happened.
Secondly, depending or not on the
particular stage of the event development
being considered, such failures of
intelligence analysis can be gathered into
different categories, each one being related
to specific issues. The cases which were
analyzed point out in particular five
different types of issues:
a. Weak connections among
the actors in charge of managing the
various stages of the event
Thus:
The ex post analysis of the
terrorist attack in Madrids railways station
pointed out a lack of ability to establish
connections among the actors and among
the events in time and space;
What should have normally
been the anticipation and prevention phase
of the 9/11 terrorist attack, was

2. Lessons learned from mistakes

of analysis
The analysis of several recent cases
highlights failures of intelligence analysis
with respect to two dimensions:
1. The development stage of the
event subject of intelligence analysis;
2. The intrinsic nature of the
failure.
As far as the development stage is
concerned, the cases analyzed pointed out
failures that occurred during:
The anticipation and / or
prevention stage;
The
occurrence
and
the
development of the event itself;
The post event phase, when
enquiries were conducted in order to
understand the reasons of the events

22

characterized by a lack of information

sharing between the actors who were
supposedly in charge of that anticipation
and prevention;
Moreover, even when the
connection among the various actors was
established at an apparently sufficient
level, it did not translate into a timely
delivery of relevant information.
b. Negligence in information
collection
Let us consider for instance the
terrorist attack on the trains in Madrid
railways station:
Not enough care was taken of
the collection and management of
evidence that could be found where the
explosion took place;
The place where the explosion
occurred was not properly preserved after
the event;
This contributed to altering or
even losing critical evidence;
c. Misinterpretation
Consider for instance the case
of Afghanistan, where a terrorist who had
won the confidence of American military
officers, blew himself out, causing the
death of several military personnel. This
tragic incident points out the strong belief
in assumptions that reality proved to be
wrong;
The Iraqi case provides an
example of political figures and states
posture misinterpretation;
However,
misinterpretation
does not occur only at the level where
soft tools like political science are being
used. Thus, for instance, in the case of
chemical attacks in Syria, the existence of
wrong technical analysis was pointed out
as being significant. This means that
despite the confidence that one can have in
highly developed technologies, the use of
the latter does not automatically guarantee
correct and appropriate conclusions;
This is shown in the Ukrainian
case, and more specifically with events
that led to the separation of Crimea from
Ukraine, with wrong estimates on the

immediate or short term actions of the

enemy;
d. Shift of the intelligence
analysis paradigm
Such shift is mainly generated by
factors coming from outside of what
should be the appropriate field of
intelligence analysis. In that respect, the
cases of Afghanistan and Iraq have been
particularly illustrative.
As far as Afghanistan is
concerned, the ex-post analyses have
pointed out:
The hidden subordination of
intelligence analysis activities to interests
of political nature;
A
misdirection
of
the
investigation efforts by the actors in charge
of leading the development of intelligence
analysis, or by those who would be its
customers;
A superficial management of
human information resources, not taking
into account the cultural or tribal
specificities of these resources with the
consequences that the intelligence analysis
performed through the use of these
resources was in fact reflecting their own
topics of interest, and hence was biased;
On its side, the Iraqi case points
out:
Information
manipulation
about the weapons of mass destruction,
supposedly developed by Iraq, whose
existence was considered as the
cornerstone that would legitimate an attack
of the coalition against Saddam Husseins
regime;
Consequently,
repeated
administrative and political statements
with no really supporting evidence
support;
e. Flawed and/or incomplete
assessment of environmental security and
its possible consequences on operations
Such was the case for instance
during the war in Georgia, when the virtual
dimension of the confrontation space was
not taken into account right at the start of
hostilities. Everybody knows, as a result of

23

promoting this topic broadly in the

Western press, the example of war in
Georgia (2008), which opposed Georgia on
one side to South Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Russian Federation on the other. In August
2008, Russia used Cyber and Armed attack
simultaneously against Georgia.
During
this
confrontation,
Georgians strongly claimed that there were
cyber-attacks on the official sites of
Presidency, Foreign Ministry and Defense
Ministry of Georgia. Cyber-attacks were
attributed to the network of Russian
hackers RBN - Russian Business Network,
suspected to have connections with both
the Russian mafia and the Moscow
government.
On August 8th, Russian troops
crossed the border of South Ossetia
vowing to defend what they called
Russian compatriots. As this was taking
place, a multi-faceted cyber-attack began
against the Georgian infrastructure and key
government web sites. The attack
modalities included: Defacing of Web
Sites
(Hacktivism),
Web-based
Psychological Operations (Psyc-Ops), a
fierce propaganda campaign (PC) and of
course a Distributed Denial of Service
Attacks (DDoS).
According to Data Exchange
Agency (Agency established in January
2010 within the Ministry of Justice of
Georgia), these were very organized and
planned attacks. 90% of all gov.ge domain
addresses and significant fraction of .ge
domain addresses were affected by DDoS
attacks as follows:
1) Attack on governmental web
resources - Damage of reputation.
2) Shut down media, forums and
blogs - People could not get real
Information, but only misinformation of
real facts by Russian Media.
3) Block and cut off Georgian
Internet resources - Communication was
impossible within the country as well as
outside it.
According to the analysis made in
the article published by Ward Carroll on

the website http://defensetech.org/ based

on all open source intelligence, the cyberattack on Georgia analysis resulted in the
following information [on a scale of 1-5
with 5 being the highest point]:
- Scale of the attack = 3.3
- Complexity of the attack = 3.1
- Impact of the attack = 3.5
Although relations between Russia
and Georgia were already extremely
tensioned, the Georgian government was
not prepared to handle and respond to a
cyber-attack
against
communications
infrastructure. This led it to make perhaps
the most strategic move to this date in
cyber warfare. This impressive move came
when the Georgian Government decided to
relocate President Mikhail Saakashvilis
web site to a web site hosting service in
Atlanta, Georgia in the United States. The
strategic thinking surrounding this move
was twofold. First, the Russian cyber
attackers would surely think twice about
attacking a web site hosted on servers
located in the United States. Secondly, if
the Russian cyber attackers were to go
after the Presidents web site hosted on
U.S. soil, that action might bring the
United States into the conflict.
Following these events, Estonia, a
country that has one of the most advanced
informatics technologies in Europe, and
which had suffered a similar attack from
the Russian Federation in April/May of
2007, provided assistance and consultancy
to Georgian Government early on in the
cyber-attack,
subjected
of
cyber
aggression. Estonia acquired valuable
knowledge from the forensic analysis of
the cyber artifacts left behind after they
were attacked. Estonia proposed the
concept for a cyber-defense centre to
NATO in 2004, right after joining the
Alliance. In 2006 the concept was
approved by Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation and in 2007 negotiations
were held between potential Sponsoring
Nations. Since 2008, Estonia has hosted
the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE).

24

Using the Georgian pattern, Russia

launched
against
Ukraine
(2014)
sophisticated and coordinated cyberattacks which paralyzed communications
networks and overwhelmed government
websites. Ukraines critical infrastructure
suffered a series of attacks before Crimea
was annexed. The mobile phone network
and internet connections were severely
hampered, government websites were
overwhelmed with "denial of service"
attacks, social networks were corrupted,
and some of Ukraines phone and internet
cables were cut by pro-Russian forces.
According to Pierluigi Paganini, a cyberanalyst at information security firm Bit4Id,
a comparison of the cyber-attacks on
Ukraine and Georgia shows many
analogies in the way Russian entities are
trying to compromise critical infrastructure
of targeted government. [4]
Now, beyond these five particular
categories of failures, the analysis
developed in the previous section points
out the necessity to localize the failures
with respect to the two dimensions that
pertain respectively to:
The development stage of
the event;
The phase of intelligence
analysis development.
At a first level (to make things
simple), this can be represented by the
following figure which enables us to
distinguish between nine regions.

Trying to localize the entire set of

failures analyzed in the previous section is
out of scope. Therefore, we shall give only
two examples.
The first one concerns the 9/11
attack against the towers of the World
Trade Center. As mentioned above, the
connections among the various actors in
charge of anticipation and prevention were
weak. This led to a poor analysis which
made the intelligence analysis structure
unable to anticipate the terrorist attack.
Hence, this failure in connections is in
this example located in region 2.
The second example is the one of
the attack against the Madrid railways
station. It has been mentioned that the
scene (in the sense of crime scene) was not
properly preserved, which made it
impossible to collect all the information
required for establishing complete
evidence of what happened. Hence, this
failure should be localized in region 7.
From a pedagogical point of view,
the illustration above can be used to enable
the intelligence analyst to ask questions
about where failures can occur, and
especially to develop some critical
thinking when a few failures are apparent
in a region.
3. LEILA approach
During their usual activities,
analysts are faced with the situation as
follows:
1.
They Know What They
Know: They have an understanding of
what information they know, how to
access it and use it.
2.
They Know What They
Dont Know: They have identified gaps in
information that cannot be filled for some
reason. This could be due to lack of
information
(additional
collection
required) or the inability to access
available data for proper retrieval and/or
visualization or lack of understanding of a
particular discipline such as economics. A
good example of this is some of the
massive data sets available for financial

Figure 1. Regions identification

among the event stages and IA phases

25

transactions. We know that there are

patterns in the data sets, but resources
(including experience in analyzing
financial transactions) restrict access to
discovering and visualizing those patterns.
3.
They Dont Know What
They Know: The information is available
to them, but they do not know that it is
available.
This could be caused by
individual bias, lack of experience,
security
restrictions,
information
mismanagement, or lack of adequate tools
to access/visualize/analyze the entire
available information.
4.
They Dont Know What
They Dont Know: They have never
envisioned such a course of action or event
occurring, therefore they were never
looking for the information. This is the
classic situation of novel intelligence,
although novel intelligence is found in the
other three situations above. Lack of
resources or experience should never be a
discriminator against research into ways of
finding novel intelligence. In some cases
novel research is needed to discover and
visualize the data, so that patterns or even
single nodes of novel information are
understandable by the analyst.

more relevant. To determine the weight of

a given piece of information is similar to
what Richard Heuer describes as the
attempt to analyze the diagnosticity of
the evidence and arguments that is,
identify which items are most helpful in
judging the relative likelihood of the
hypotheses.[7]
This is precisely the objective of
the LEILA approach through defeasance
relations between an information I and an
hypothesis H, and corresponds to what
Richard Heuer defines as a scientific
method: The scientific method is based on
the principle of rejecting hypotheses, while
tentatively accepting only those hypotheses
that cannot be refuted. Intuitive analysis,
by comparison, generally concentrates on
confirming a hypothesis and commonly
gives more weight to evidence supporting
a hypothesis than to evidence that weakens
it. Ideally, the reverse would be true. While
analysts usually cannot apply the statistical
procedures of scientific methodology to
test their hypotheses, they can and should
adopt the conceptual strategy of seeking to
refute rather than confirm hypotheses .
References
[1] Martin Petersen, What I Learned in 40 Years of
Doing Intelligence Analysis for US Foreign
[2] Policymakers, Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55,
No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011).
[3] Johnston, R. (2005). Analytic Culture in the
U.S.
Intelligence
Community.
An
Ethnographic Study. Washington, DC:
Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the
Study of Intelligence. Retrieved from
http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/analytic.pdf
[4] Carter, D. L. (2004). Law Enforcement
Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and
Tribal
Law
Enforcement
Agencies.
Retrieved from http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/
pdf/e09042536.pdf
[5] Sloman, J. (2012). Fixing Intelligence Analysis:
From Specialists to Experts. Small Wars
Journal. Retrieved from http://smallwars
journal.com/jrnl/art/fixing-intelligenceanalysis-from-specialists-to-experts

Figure 2. Different situations in which

the analyst may be during the stages and
IA phases
In this case, the weight of
information and the consistency between
that information and the various
hypotheses under consideration become

26

[6] Moore, D. T. (2007). Critical Thinking and

Intelligence Analysis. Retrieved from
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dia/ndi
c_moore_crit_analysis_hires.pdf
[7] Marrin, S. (2003). CIAs Kent School:
Improving Training for New Analysts.
International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 16(4), 609637.

[8]

FEMA. (2014). Federal Emergency

Management Agency National Preparedness
Directorate National Training and Education
Division Course Catalog. Retrieved from
https://www.firstrespondertraining.gov/catalo
gs/NTED_Course_Catalog.pdf
[9] Richard Heuer Psychology of Intelligence
Analysis , p 97.

27

(HOW TO) PREPARE YOURSELF FOR AN ENGLISH TEST

Diana Elena UUIANU
Lecturer, PhD, Carol I National Defence University
diana.tutuianu@yahoo.com

Abstract: The idea that led to writing this paper was given to me by the countless questions I received in recent
years regarding the English test candidates need to take in order to be admitted as students at Carol I
National Defense University. Although my answer was always the methodology and the bibliography together
with a test sample are on the website of the University, this information seemed not to be enough for the eager
future candidates. So, I decided to bring more clarifications on this issue. As it was published on the webpage, in
order to join the Masters degree program, there is an eliminatory test of English that officers need to take. The
paper describes in detail an English test with multiple-choice Reading, Grammar, Vocabulary and Writing
items. It explains the mechanisms used for creating the items and provides useful tips for the future candidates,
so as to know what to expect and have a clearer picture of what and how they should prepare in order to be
successful in their endeavor.
Keywords: English test, entrance examination, useful tips.

Nowadays, the reasons why most

young people choose to follow a Masters
degree program after graduation are quite
obvious judging from the evolution of
society and the trends to be seen on the
labor market. Irrespective of the Bologna
Process and its provisions, it is
commonsensical that, at least theoretically
speaking, the more studies you have the
more chances you have to get a better paid
and more rewarding job. Therefore, there
is no wonder why Master programs are so
popular these years as compared to what
happened twenty years ago. Within the
military
system,
despite
obvious
differences pertaining to the specific
character of military education and to the
provisions of the officers career guide, it
seems that, just as it happens in the civilian
environment, following a master program
is one of the essential prerequisites of
advancing in ones career. Particularly the
Command Master program within the Staff
and Command Faculty is regarded by most
Romanian officers as a crucial element to
be added to their CVs so as to be able to
aspire to leadership positions in significant
units and even abroad, in NATO
commands. We will not elaborate further
than that on the reasons why and the ways
in which officers from the rank of captain

to that of lieutenant colonel decide to

enroll in the contest for being admitted in
the Master program. We will simply state
that the first condition that must be
fulfilled in order to pass the entrance exam,
even before getting to the exam room,
which is usually considered the first
prerequisite, is preparing for the English
exam.
First of all, according to the
Methodology regarding the admission to
study programs in Carol I National
Defense University, which is published on
the site of the university1, there are two
possibilities to get into the actual entrance
examination: to either have a valid
STANAG 6001 certificate or to pass an
English test with a mark higher than 6.
With respect to STANAG,
candidates should bear in mind that the
STANAG certificates period of validity is
four years and that the minimal admitted
levels for the four skills are 1221. In other
words, as long as you have level 2 in
Reading and Speaking, it is enough to have
level 1 in Listening and Writing.
Experience shows that it is often more
1

http://www.unap.ro/ro/oferta_edu/fcsm/PROGRA
MA%20master%20FCSM.pdf

28

difficult to get a superior level in

productive skills, but Listening, which is
not a productive skill, can be quite a
challenge as well. Anyway, if you have
level 2 in Reading and Speaking, it means
that at least theoretically you are able to do
the following2:
- prove
to
have
enough
understanding to read simple
authentic texts written in direct and
concrete terms, full of factual
information that can include
descriptions of people, places, and
objects, as well as present, past,
and future narratives;
- read authentic prose on usual topics
presented in a predictable manner
that helps the reader understand the
text;
- identify and understand the main
ideas and the details in a material
and answer the concrete questions
formulated starting from such texts;
- even if the vocabulary you have is
not extremely vast, the reader can
use contextual and
general
knowledge clues in order to
understand the text;
- describe places, people and objects
related to social activities and daily
routine;
- narrate current present, past, and
future activities;
- in simple, but complete paragraphs,
express points of view, compare
and contrast various things;
- give instructions and directions, ask
and answer a series of questions;
- participate in interactions related to
the job, family, hobbies and
personal interests, travels and
routine activities;
- use simple structures and basic
grammatical relationships.
So, if you are able to do all these things,
and are also able to cover the necessary
criteria for obtaining level 1 in Listening

and Writing, you will pass the English

exam by simply presenting the certificate
to the admission board.
There is a whole different story if
you do not have a STANAG certificate or
if its validity period has expired. In such
conditions, you have to take the English
test3 and must score over 60% in order to
pass it. The format of the test was
established according to methodological
norms4 provided by the Human Resources
Directorate. It consists of 45 multiplechoice items as follows:
15 reading comprehension items;
10 vocabulary items
10 grammar items
10 writing items.
We will consider each of the four types of
items in detail.

Reading
First of all we should mention that
the texts meant for reading have variable
lengths, but no longer than half a page.
They are authentic materials taken from
the written media or from the internet and
sometimes adjusted a little in order not to
go over the CEF B1 or STANAG 2 level.
They can be articles, adds, stories, reports,
interviews, conversations, informal or
formal letters and so on and they will
undoubtedly include some elements of
vocabulary unknown to the candidate. The
subjects will cover usual topics, everyday
life, sports, hobbies, scientific and
technical discoveries, arts, etc. Each piece
of text will be followed by several
questions and each question will be
followed by four answer choices. Just like
in the case of all the items included in this
test, there is only one correct answer. You
may be asked questions regarding the topic
of the text; the main idea of the text or of a
paragraph; specific details in the text;
synonyms for some of the terms used in
the text etc.

See STANAG descriptors as presented in

http://www.clssibiu.ro/docs/ghid_participant_new.
pdf

A complete version of a test sample can be found

at http://www.unap.ro/ro/unitati/dls/test.pdf
4
Dispoziia D.M.R.U. nr. 4 din 06.02.2012.

29

You should remember that you do

not need to know every single word in a
text to understand it or to answer questions
related to it. You can infer or guess the
meaning of some words from the context.
Each question that you are asked pertains
to a certain part of the reading text; you
have to concentrate to find it and then
concentrate on its answer, taking it one at
the time. Some people prefer to read the
whole text, after that to read the questions,
and then to come back to the text to find
the right answers. Others prefer to read the
questions first and then go through the text
in order to find the correct answers. It
depends on each individuals reading
practice and preferences. However, we
consider that the most useful strategy to be
used in this context is to skim through the
text, then read the questions, after that go
to the part of the text where you think you
might find the answer and read it again,
and finally read the four variants given as
possible answers and choose the one that
you consider the most appropriate. One
should bear in mind that you will almost
never find the same words used both in the
text and in the correct answer to the
question more often than not the answer
is expressed using synonyms and that
two of the choices given are quite easy to
spot as being far from the truth.
In order to have a clearer picture,
the following passage can be taken as an
example. It is featuring such question types
and its author5 states that you should be
able to answer them all in less than 6
minutes.

that flattened tens of millions of trees

in an area covering more than 2000
square kilometers. So powerful was the
force of the blast (estimated to have
been about 1,000 times greater than
that generated by the atomic bomb
dropped on Hiroshima at the end of the
Second World War) that witnesses fifty
kilometers from the epicenter reported
being hurled through the air and feeling
as if their clothes were on fire. Because
the Tunguska Fireball took place in
an almost completely uninhabited area
thousands of kilometers from the
nearest city, it went largely unremarked
at the time. The remote location was
exceedingly fortunate in that this
cataclysmic explosion would have
resulted in millions of casualties if it
had occurred in proximity to a major
population center.
Due to both the inaccessibility of
the Tunguska region and various
political upheavals in Russia, the first
scientific expedition to investigate the
blast site was not undertaken until the
1920s and had inconclusive results.
Even a century later, scientists continue
to debate the causes of this singular
event. The most widely accepted view
is that a large asteroid, or space rock,
exploded in midair before reaching
Earths surface and disintegrated into a
cloud of dust and small particles, a
hypothesis that would help to explain
the absence of an impact crater. An
alternative to this theory is the
suggestion by the Russian physicist
Edward
Drobyshevski
that the
Tunguska Fireball may have been a
natural hydrogen bomb, a comet
fragment laden with ice containing
combustible hydrogen that exploded
when the friction of Earths
atmosphere provided an ignition source
for the hydrogen.

On the morning of the 30th June

1908, the peaceful, blue skies
overlooking a vast, forested area near
the Tunguska River in central Siberia
were suddenly torn by an explosion
5

The passage was taken (and slightly adapted) from

a blog with study tips for various English exams.
This particular entry was written by Blake Hurst
and
can
be
found
at
http://www.englishtown.com/blog/how-to-masterthe-reading-section-of-the-toefl-ibt/

Example Question 1: The word

unremarked in line 8 is closest in
meaning to

30

A) unsuccessful
B) unstated
C) unnoticed
D) unimportant

Tunguska event resulted from a comet

entering Earths atmosphere.
4 A: The last sentence of the first
paragraph notes that the Tunguska
event would have caused millions of
casualties if it had occurred near a
major city.

Example Question 2: In paragraph 2,

why does the author mention the
absence of an impact crater?
A) To explain why scientists were
delayed in reaching the site of the blast
B) To identify evidence consistent with
a certain explanation
C) To strengthen a novel hypothesis
proposed by the author
D) To show a weakness in an unproven
theory

In order to prepare for this part of the test,

you could look up on the internet
downloadable samples of Toefl, PET and
First Certificate of English reading tests
and practice as much as possible on the
parts containing multiple-choice answers
of the type mentioned above.
Vocabulary

Example Question 3: According to the

less widely accepted view mentioned
in the passage, the Tunguska explosion
was caused by
A) a comet.
B) a meteorite impact.
C) an accidental detonation of a
thermonuclear weapon.
D) a midair explosion of an asteroid.

The vocabulary items may ask you

to fill in the gaps with the most appropriate
word of the four words given; to give a
synonym or an antonym of a certain word /
phrase in a context; or to read a sentence
and infer the meaning of a certain word /
phrase from the context. The items may be
verbs, adjectives, or nouns as well as
adverbs, prepositions or conjunctions
which make sense in the respective
contexts and whose meanings should be
familiar to the candidate. Moreover, some
of the items may combine knowledge of
vocabulary and knowledge of grammar.
Some examples6 are listed below:

Example Question 4: According to

paragraph 1, if the Tunguska explosion
had occurred near a large city, it is
likely that there would have been
A) many injuries and deaths.
B) an immediate investigation of the
causes of the fireball.
C) a large number of accurate
eyewitness accounts of the blast.
D) substantial damage to property.

1. Have you finished that report? No,

not
a. just
b. already
c. yet
d. still

Answers:
1 C: The Tunguska Fireball passed
largely unnoticed because it happened
in a wilderness area.
2 B: The fact that no impact crater has
been found is mentioned in support of
the majority view that an asteroid
exploded before reaching the surface of
the Earth.
3 A: This less popular view is ascribed
to Drobyshevski, who suggests that the

2. He doesnt want to any mistakes.

a. do
b. make
c. commit
d. create

The examples were made on the spot and are not

part of the databank of items which may be
included in future tests.

31

3. Dont be so ! You will have to

wait if you want to talk to the Dean.
a. impatient
b. mean
c. untidy
d. uncomfortable

4. I waited a lot for that meeting, but in

the end it was put off for another day
when more people would be able to
come. synonym of the underlined
phrase
a. cut off
b. postponed
c. canceled
d. turned off

5. You shouldnt be so annoyed about

Janes performance. antonym of the
underlined word
a. worried
b. bothered
c. concerned
d. pleased

Verb tenses Present Simple and

Continuous; Past Simple and
Continuous; used to, Present
Perfect Simple; Past Perfect
Simple; Future Simple and to be
going to;
Modal Verbs basic values and
modals showing probability
present forms
Passive Voice
Plural of nouns; countable and
uncountable nouns, some/any/no,
a little/ a few
Comparison of adjectives and
adverbs
Use of adjectives and adverbs
Asking questions
Some common prepositions
following particular verbs and
adjectives
IF Clause (1st and 2nd types)

Any kind of practice is more than welcome

and the more exercises you do, the better
chances of success you will have. No
matter if you are learning English or you
are practicing what you have already
learned, the idea is to concentrate on things
that make a difference, as items will most
likely deal with such issues. Here are only
a few such instances of sensitive aspects
you need to consider:
Remember that yesterday, last,
ago are adverbs specific for Past
Tense and never to be used with
Present Perfect;
Present Perfect is never used in
sentences starting with when, but it
should be used in sentences that
include the idea the first time;
Past Perfect is always used in
relation to another past action;
Future is never used in complex
sentences in time clauses beginning
when, before, after, as soon as, by
the time, until etc; in such cases,
Present Tense is needed;
Unlike in Romanian, money, news,
advice, information, knowledge,

Answers:
1. c
2. b
3. a
4. b
5. d
In order to prepare for this part, the same
advice is applicable as in the case of any
vocabulary test: read and listen to English
texts as much as possible; look up the
unknown words
and phrases in
dictionaries; practice on-line intermediate
vocabulary tests.
Grammar
Grammar items are diverse and
cover quite a wide range of grammar
issues, obviously, without going beyond
CEF B1 and level 2 STANAG. So, in order
to prepare for this part, you need to take
any intermediate grammar book or go on
the Internet on any grammar site and go
through the following topics:

32

evidence have singular verb

agreement;
In order to use a superlative form
of adjectives, you need to have at
least three items to compare; if you
only have two items, the
superlative will be a combination
of comparative and superlative, for
example, the best friend (I have
many friends) / the better friend (I
am referring only to two friends);
Passive Voice may be used in two
ways for verbs that take both a
direct and an indirect object;
therefore you should not be
surprised at examples such as I was
given the latest news when I
arrived;
There are similarities among modal
verbs: must is associated with have
to, should with ought to, etc;
Adjectives are used with nouns and
the verb to be (or another verb of
the same type) while adverbs are
used with all the other verbs and
adjectives (He is a good English
speaker. / He speaks English well. /
He is really good at English.);
Collocations including adjectives
or verbs followed by prepositions
(such as, to be interested in, to be
proud of, to participate in must be
learned by heart; the same goes for
structures requiring an _ing form of
the verb (such as to look forward
to, to get used to etc).

sentence which has the correct word order.

Remember that in English, unless you have
a question, the word order is Subject +
Verb followed by all the other parts of the
sentence. If you have a question, the word
order is: (Wh-word) + Auxiliary Verb (be /
have / do / will / modals etc) + Subject +
Main Verb + Direct Object / Indirect
Object / Adverbials etc.
You may be asked to put together,
in the correct order, the paragraphs of a
letter. In order to do so, read all the
paragraphs, try to follow the logical
sequence, and watch out for connective
words and phrases which are certain clues
with respect to what comes after what.
Another type of subject may ask
you to fill in the gaps with bits of
sentences or complete sentences as such
which have been taken out and jumbled. In
this case, remember that each sentence /
part of sentence can be properly placed in
only one of the ten gaps. A useful strategy
would be to read the letter / article on the
whole and translate it into Romanian, then
read the fragments that need to be inserted
and translate them as well. Then, fill in the
gaps with the fragments you are certain of
first. Finally, take each of the remaining
fragments and insert them in each
remaining gap. See whether they fit, using
anything you can as clues (starting with the
way each fragment begins and ending with
its Romanian translation). All in all, this
strategy should help you place every
element of this puzzle in the place where it
belongs.
An example7 is provided below. As
you can see, the same text can be used for
the Writing part of the test in both ways
mentioned above.

Writing
The Writing part of the test is
improperly called that, since it is based
mainly on reading comprehension. You
will not be required to write anything
yourselves. However, what you will be
required to do involves knowledge of
written English with respect to the word
order in a sentence, to collocations, and to
paragraph order in a letter or article.
Thus, you may be asked to choose
from the four variants given the one

For items 40 through 45 arrange the

given items a to f in the correct order
so as to make up a letter.

The example was taken from the sample test on

the
webpage
of
the
University
http://www.unap.ro/ro/unitati/dls/test.pdf

33

a. Please confirm that you still need the

book and Ill place the order. If there is
anything else I can do for you, let me
know and Ill be happy to help you.

you to receive the books? Im asking

44.
Please confirm that you still need the
book and Ill place the order. If there is
anything else I can do for you, let me
know and 45.
Bye for now,

b. It must have got lost in the mail.

Anyway, I understand that you need
me to buy some books for you. I
checked on the Internet and I found out
that it takes them two weeks to deliver
the books after the order is placed.

a. Ill be happy to help you

b. you need me to buy
c. for the books to get to me
d. because your letter is so old
e. after the order is placed
f. because I saw that you sent

c. Dear Susan,
d. If it takes two weeks for the books to
get to me, it will probably take one
more week for me to send them to you.
Is this too late for you to receive the
books? Im asking because your letter
is so old.

Answers: 40 f, 41 b, 42 e, 43 c, 44 d,
45 a
The conclusion is that the English
part of the entrance examination is not so
difficult, but it is not so easy either.
Studying the textbooks given as
bibliography Prospects Intermediate,
Prospects Upper-Intermediate, and Manual
de limba englez pentru concursul de
admitere n Academia de nalte Studii
Militare is essential for passing the
exam. Also, as it was mentioned above, it
is a good idea to do as many exercises as
you can find on the Internet, of all the
types described in this paper. One final
word of advice: you should not rely on
the fact that at some point in your past
you studied English, just as you should
not rely on the fact that you have been
on various missions in theatres of
operations! If you have not practiced
English lately and usually in a constant
manner, you might find yourself in a
difficult position. So, do give the English
test the place it deserves in your
preoccupations and preparation for the
exam. This is the only way in which you
will be able to take it.

e. Bye for now,

f. I only received your letter yesterday.
It was very strange because I saw that
you sent it over a month ago.
Answers: 40 c, 41 f, 42 b, 43 d, 44 a,
45 e
Or
Fill in the gaps 40 through 45 with the
correct items a to f so as to make up a
letter.
Dear Susan,
I only received your letter yesterday. It
was very strange 40 it over a month
ago.
It must have got lost in the mail.
Anyway, I understand that 41 some
books for you. I checked on the
Internet and I found out that it takes
them two weeks to deliver the books
42 .
If it takes two weeks 43, it will
probably take one more week for me to
send them to you. Is this too late for

Bibliography
1

34

Wilson, Ken and Taylor, James,

Prospects.
Students
Book
Intermediate. Macmillan, 2006.

4
5

Wilson, Ken, Taylor, James and

Howard-Williams,
Deirdre,
Prospects. Students Book UpperIntermediate. Macmillan, 2006.
*** Manual de limba englez
pentru concursul de admitere n
Academia de nalte Studii
Militare. Bucureti, Editura AISM,
2001.
www.ets.org/toefl/pbt/prepare/tips/

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

35

www.testden.com/
www.i-courses.org/reading-tips/
www.fluentu.com/toefl/blog/toeflreading-tips
www.study.com/academy/lesson
www.ego4u.com
www.examenglish.com
www.cambridgeenglish.org/
www.unap.ro

TO GOOGLE OR NOT TO GOOGLE (TRANSLATE)

THAT IS THE QUESTION
Diana Elena UUIANU
Lecturer, PhD, Carol I National Defence University
diana.tutuianu@yahoo.com

Abstract: Nowadays everybody uses the Internet. This is an axiomatic statement just as true as everybody
knows English. And by everybody we mean literally everybody between 18 and 65 years old, that is, people
who are one way or another studying or working in various fields. All these people use Google as search engine
for various purposes and there are few professionals who have never had contact with something written in
English via Google. Also, we are certain that many of these people have at least once attempted to translate
something from and into English using Google Translate. Results are, however, not always actually not ever up to expectations. The present paper refers to some aspects related to the art of translation and presents
arguments why Google translate should be avoided particularly in the academic research field.
Keywords: translation difficulties, Google translate, academic work.

Even though the aim of this paper

is not to be perceived as a laudation to the
Internet and its benefits actually, on the
contrary we consider it fair enough, right
from the beginning, to emphasize the fact
that the Internet is an undeniable part of
our contemporary life. Firstly, to support
that assumption, we have to say that, willynilly, it is really omnipresent in our daily
routine, both at work or at home, since it
has become an indispensable means of
communication. And by this, we mean
both in writing (via texting, emailing,
using social media) and in face to face
communication (via Skype, Viber, etc.).
Secondly, beyond allowing people to keep
in touch, to make friends and to share
personal experiences, it is a very
convenient tool meant to make your life
easier (i.e. through its virtual banking
facilities for electronic payments and
transactions) and also to fill if not
entirely kill your spare time (through an
unimaginable range of specialized
programs and various applications
covering the entire range of entertainment
activities everything from games to
music and movies). Thirdly, the Internet
represents a highly dependable source of
information via its different searching
engines, essential for increasing and

improving your personal and professional

knowledge. And, when we are speaking
about knowledge, we can definitely
include under this huge and generous
umbrella-term, the knowledge of a
foreign language.
Accordingly, in our specific case,
we will try to stay focused on and to refer
only to English, as an internationally
recognized
communication
vehicle
agreed on and used in so many domains of
activity, all around the world, starting from
diplomacy and ending with education and
training, including the military one. Thus,
by using the Internet anyone can make
extensive research regarding this linguistic
field when needing to translate something
from and into English, by looking up word
definitions, synonyms, collocations, and
even complete vocabulary lessons with
exercises. Except for Speaking, in most
cases, and to a certain extent Writing, the
other skills (Listening and Reading) can be
practiced and improved. There is a huge
amount of materials on the Internet, easily
accessible and
downloadable with
grammar and vocabulary explanations and
tons of exercises for all ages and levels of
English knowledge.
At the same time, a big portion of
the vast variety of information available on

36

the Internet for each domain can be

accessed mostly, or even only in English.
That means that anybody, who is interested
in acquiring any sort of specific data and
exploiting any piece of information for
improving his/her knowledge and/or skills
in his/her line of work, should be able to
understand English. Then, it so happens
that in many cases, the Internet utilizer
needs to use the translated form of that
data and information into his/her mother
language. In the specific field of military
doctrines, rules, regulations, standards and
agreements, this was done in many
situations when, especially after joining
NATO and the EU, all these documents
had to be translated into Romanian and
adapted so as to function as a starting point
for Romanian similar documents that
needed to be issued.
On an individual level, the officers
in the Romanian Armed Forces actually
all the personnel working in the military
system need English for professional
purposes in the following instances:
- when going on missions;
- when taking part in multinational
exercises or courses abroad;
- when working in structures that
have different encounters with foreign
partners or when being part of various task
groups that need to negotiate, establish,
set, and so on various methodologies,
plans, strategies;
- when having to communicate
with foreigners via any kind of
correspondence;
- when being involved in projects
that are undertaken at an international
level.
Obviously, any person that would
be interested in his/her professional growth
must search and the Internet is the
primary and most convenient source for
information
and
data
in
his/her
professional field. This is a general truth.
Reality shows, however, that people use
the Internet for professional research in
most cases only if they have to, for one
reason or another. One such reason the

best of all, in our opinion is when they

need to prepare for an exam in order to
occupy a certain position or to advance in
ones career by going through a certain
type of training. For instance, if you want
to get a PhD, no matter the domain, you
have to publish various papers and articles.
If you want to get a certain academic title
or if you want to work in a research
center/department of an institution, you
need to publish various papers and articles.
This happens in all the fields, and the
military field is no exception to the rule.
People who work in the system of military
education, people who work in central
structures, people who work in the
research area, they all participate in
conferences and symposiums, courses,
seminars, and workshops just as they all
send articles to various publications in
order to make their knowledge known, to
share experience, and to play an active role
in the scientific community.
And here comes the big issue: all
these conferences, symposiums, courses,
seminars, workshops, reviews, journals or
bulletins have English as common
language. In other words, in order to
present or to send a paper to any of these,
you have to either do it from the beginning
in English or translate it afterwards. There
are people who have been constantly and
thoroughly exposed to English people
who took several English courses, who
participated in various forms of training
abroad (for extensive periods of time), who
worked abroad (for extensive periods of
time), who use English on a daily basis
(due to the specificity of their duties), or,
why not, who have English as a hobby. All
these people could take the chance and
translate their work into English or, better
yet, write it in English from the beginning.
However, if you do not fall in one or
another of these categories, do not
attempt to do it at home, as they say.
Therefore, no matter if what you need is a
material translated into Romanian or if it is
your material translated into English, you
either are proficient enough in English to

37

do it alone, or you resort to the expertise of

a professional translator. These are the best
ways in which you could make sure that
the message, knowledge, experience, etc.
that you want to transmit is exactly what
will be rendered in the other language.
People should become aware once and for
all that this mechanism of converting
words, sentences, paragraphs or full texts
from a language to another cannot be done
by anybody, at any time, in a random way,
because the overall accuracy of the content
and its message could be dramatically
affected.
Generally speaking, an uninitiated
person could feel free to proceed and to
translate in accordance with his/her own
rules without any problem. Additionally, at
the end of the day, he/she could also feel
totally entitled to ask, Whats the big deal
with this translation issue? At first glance,
you could say yes, this ad-hoc translator is
more than right because there is nothing
special in using a bilingual dictionary,
looking up meanings and finding
corresponding words in the other language,
and after that combining them and turning
everything into the same text. Especially
if the ad-hoc translator knows a little
English, as many people say.
Definitely, speaking from the view
point of a professional in the field, such an
approach would work and be sufficient
only
for
non-educated,
ignorant,
superficial, naive individuals. For those
working in this field, for any scholar and
even for those non-professionals who have
encountered and had to cope with this
issue at least once in their life/carrier, this
is a completely different story. For them,
the matter itself is viewed from a different
approach and it looks more relevant, more
complicated
and
complex,
more
sophisticated and more challenging, more
demanding, more inter-related with other
domains
of
activity,
requiring
professionalism,
responsibility
and
competence.
Actually, from a professionals
perspective, this subject converges to the

same old dilemma regarding the translating

activity, whether it is a science or an art. In
our opinion, due to its complexity and
specificity, the activity of translating
includes balanced portions of both
parameters and represents an intertwining
mixture of art and craft. If we are allowed
to define it in a very original way, we
could say that, in our perception, the
translating act does represent a remarkable
combination of scientific art and art-based
science in the domain of linguistics.
On the one hand, this process of
translation, which consists of a vast array
of
methods
and
techniques
of
understanding, interpreting, transforming
and moving words and texts from one
language to another, is more than a simple
pre-established
scheme
of
turning
something into something else. From
personal experience, we can admit the fact
that beyond linguistic background, rich
vocabulary and solid grammar knowledge,
this implies expertize, sometimes real
cultural awareness, a mandatory and
uninterrupted
contact
with
and
understanding of specialized terminology
and novelties in the field. Additionally, it
clearly requires a mixture of the ability to
think out of the box and a genuine talent of
picking up the most suitable words and
expressions for easing and facilitating the
readers task, the proper understanding of
the translated text.
On the other hand and here we
are referring strictly to the case of literary
translation it requires that touch of
inspiration, creativity and imagination, that
unique capacity of expressing thoughts and
images through the power of the words and
getting the best of their association and
combination. In addition to the translators
linguistic proficiency and professional
background,
to
his/her
mental
organization, to personality traits and
beliefs, it is obvious that the translating
activity is inter-related to some extent to
the translators personal contribution based
on his/her own interpretation and
adaptation. Moreover, as a translator, you

38

need to have and prove a certain dose of

imagination necessary to put yourself in an
entire spectrum of specific situations, in
different circumstances and contexts. Plus,
you have to virtually travel and live in
various places in the world, in different
periods of times along history, to try to
impersonate different characters, and all of
these just for being the eyes and ears of
any potential reader, and for assuring that
level of credibility and coherence of your
translating act. By this modality of
understanding the text and by those virtual
postures, you can really feel how it is to be
in the readers shoes and you can assess
your final product from that angle.
For this purpose, on a case by case
basis, you undoubtedly need to interpret
and adapt the original text in a
personalized
manner,
but
without
modifying its message. Only by avoiding
any dramatic alterations, will you be able
to preserve it and make it as vivid,
touchable,
explicit,
approachable,
digestible and realistic, as in its original
form. Just by using this translating
recipe, by transforming any kind of word
combinations in that sort of virtual
expressive images, audible sounds, floating
scents, profound feelings and emotions, a
successful translator can be defined as an
artist with certain scientific skills in his/her
branch of activity. Only such a translator
could avoid a visible discrepancy between
the original text and its translated version
and would be able to reveal and make the
difference between an outstanding writing
style, an average but still acceptable one
and a really bad one. By presenting its
final product to a specific audience, by
wrapping an original well-done work in its
new clothes, he/she would implicitly
give a hand to taking the author out of the
no-name land and changing its status of a
completely anonymous figure into a
potential future best-seller maker.
Again, the entire plea in the
paragraphs above was meant to show how
difficult it is to be a real translator and how
many sides and perspectives of things you

have to keep in mind when you want, even

for a temporary interval, to play the role of
translator. In other words, one should not
imagine that if he/she has been on a few
missions (with his Romanian colleagues)
or in a few trips, or studied some English
in secondary school, they are able to
translate a paper well from English into
Romanian, to translate it from Romanian
into English being entirely out of question.
In order to make a good translation you
need to know the language you are
translating into at least as good as you
know the language you are translating
from, if not even better!
And here we come back to the
Internet, and to Google. Due to its
multitude of functions and the reliability of
services offered via Google, it seems
that nowadays, everybody who uses a
computer is bound to use Google. And,
unsurprisingly, it seems that everybody
who is interested in translating something
into Romanian or from Romanian into a
foreign language is bound to use Google
translate. The reason and the first hand
explanation for this phenomenon are very
simple, since those using it do not have to
do anything but expose the specific text to
the translation mechanism by selecting the
languages, inserting the text, pressing a
virtual button and receiving the translation
into English which is just a click away.
Not only will you be put in the position of
not having to waste your precious time, but
also, you will not need to exhaust yourself
by using your brain intensively and
extensively.
Once again, this paper is not
intended to be a manifest against Google
as such, and not even against Google
translate; however, we are trying to point
out the detrimental manner in which this
tool and other similar ones has started
to be used. From the point of view of a
teacher of English and a translator, the
issue of resorting to a machine to do this
delicate job is quite controversial, not to
say it out bluntly that it is unacceptable. It
is quite difficult to rely on this tool even

39

when what needs to be translated is a

simple word, as most words have more
than one meaning and they should be used
differently in particular contexts. Google
translate can be used in the absence of a
dictionary, but it is advisable to check the
result
for
possible
errors,
misunderstandings,
misinterpretations
which cannot be ruled out or ignored due
to the fact that a machine (no matter how
sophisticated) cannot be more than that:
just a machine.
We hope that the following
examples are more than self-explanatory
and strongly support our point of view.
They were taken from various papers
intended to be published or presented at
conferences. Far from meaning any
disrespect towards their authors or
minimizing the scientific value of the
papers, our intention is only that of
emphasizing once again that big and
sometimes huge mistakes can be made by
using a translation engine.

whole life to universal macrocosm

molded went in the past, is
currently under way and will
continue to develop in the future
being led guidance system of
order guided by the same spirit of
the Soviet elite genetic or universal
harmony
increasing the pace of everyday
life today, increasingly dominated
national unrest, social and
economic specialization on the
other hand continue to offenders,
multiple pregnancy (!) police
function becomes more significant
every day more difficult

There are hundreds of such

examples, and we will not insist to present
them as we consider we have made our
point clear enough. The main issue with
Google translate or any other similar
instant translator is that it has no concern
for and no way of perceiving and applying
differences in meaning among the various
translations that a word in Romanian can
have in English. Moreover, it does not
differentiate
between
different
grammatical categories (such as adjectives
and adverbs, for instance), just as it does
not respect the rules regarding word order
in English which are quite different from
those in Romanian. Finally, in most cases,
it is a mere enumeration of words in
English that does not make sense to an
English speaker. Again, in most cases, it
does not make sense to the Romanian
speaker either, even if he/she knows
English and is trying to decipher the
Romanian words behind what they read.
The conclusion would be that Google
should be used for all the purposes in the
world, but not for translating scientific
papers into English. It would be a shame to
waste a perfectly conceived and created
work by not giving it an appropriate
translation.

pentru ndeplinirea misiunilor

pe linie de armat.. = the
performance of the tasks on line
weapon
ofieri din toate categoriile =
officers from all the walks of our
armed forces
instituii de nvmnt pe linie
de arm = in schools of the gun
line
in the last decade have outlined
some of the concepts using the
economy as an instrument of war in
question have developed economic
wars
must take steps to manage their
own safety grounds that national
security is a developer for the
region and for some organizations
that joined this purpose
all of nature in its intensity was
designed by competition and in a
spirit of order prevails an
ordinance intrinsic principle of
universal nature which means that

40

Bibliography
1

Bell, Roger T., Translation and

Translating, Longman Group UK
Ltd.
Newmark, Peter, A Textbook of
Translation, Library of Congress
Cataloging-in-Publication Data
tefan,
Andra
Sybil,
The
Importance of Foreign Languages
in the Globalization Era, Sesiunea

4
5
6

41

de comunicri tiinifice Strategii

XXI, 2010
http://www.laetusinpraesens.org/do
cs/lingcul2.php
http://translationjournal.net/journal/
13educ.htm
https://www.noslanguesourlanguages.gc.ca/collaborateurscontributors/articles/20130805traduction-translation-eng.html
www.ttt.org/theory/difficulties.html

CYBERSECURITY BY MINIMIZING ATTACK SURFACES

Dan COLESNIUC
Iulian MARTIN
Ministry of National Defense
drcamc@gmail.com
Colonel Professor, PhD, Carol I, National Defence University, Bucharest
imartinlfd@ yahoo.com

Abstract: Improving cyber security knowledge, skills and capability of a nation will be essential for supporting
an open society and for protecting its vital infrastructures such as telecommunication networks, power grid
networks, industries, nancial infrastructures etc. Considering the pervasiveness of cyberspace and its relevance
in any form of economy for the present and the future, the security that a nation will be able to provide for its
cyberspace will be a measure of its independence, of its economic strength and of its capability to maintain its
wealth for the following generations. An essential component of the European Programme for Critical
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) is the Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN). The
article underline one theory concerning to attack surface reduction. That approach will be a more secure
application environment that will increase the effectiveness of defensive measures.
Keywords: Information and Communication System, Cyberspace, Capability, Attack Surface, Protection, Secure
Application, Effectiveness.

1.

and shareholders condence, resulting in a

negative reputation and, therefore, in value
destruction [3]. If attention is focused on
the aspects associated with the presence of
cyberspace relating to CIP, it is referred to
as Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection (CIIP). The boundary between
CIP and CIIP is very weak, because of the
tight inter-relationships between the
physical world and the virtual world.
Literature often considers the two
terms as interchangeable, and some authors
have suggested the use of the acronym
CI(I)P Considering the peculiar traits due
to the digital domain, the cyber threat for
CIIP in the cyberspace domain raises
urgent and complex challenges in the eld
of protection and security.
It is important to understand the
differences
among
the
following
expressions: cyber security, cyber crime
and cyber terrorism. Cyber crime is
identied as the set of offenses ranging
from identity theft to scams via Internet
banking and cyber ransom.
Therefore, cyber crime concerns the
civil area. Cyber terrorism concerns the
military area: it consists, in fact, in the set

EU cyber security policy

Information
systems
are
fundamental to the organizational structure
and the mechanisms of operation of
business, industry and government
institutions. However, such systems,
especially with reference to critical
infrastructure, are vulnerable to growing
violations due to interconnectivity [1].
Types of interdependence among
infrastructures became more important, so
increasing the cyber risk exposure for the
private sector and the public sector in a
national and an international context. The
importance of cyber risk is due to its
potential disastrous effects, especially
when you consider that one criteria
dening the critical infrastructure is the
analysis of the impact of any damage to the
same infrastructure. It is worth pointing
out that only some of the damage resulting
from a cyber risk can be evaluated in
economic terms (production losses,
damage to property, theft of cash, etc.),
while others are less obvious [2].
Interference
with
information
systems could result in loss of consumer

42

of actions that organizations or groups

accomplish in cyberspace for subversive
purposes. For both areas, civil and
military, cyber security is critical.
Cyber security is the collection of
tools, policies, security concepts, security
safeguards, guidelines, risk management
approaches,
actions,
training,
best
practices, assurance and technologies that
can be used to protect the cyber
environment and organization and users
assets [4].
This sector is characterized by an
evolving and not fully completed
regulatory framework and a complexity
coming from the combination of
Information
and
Communication
Technology (ICT) with other systems
essential to the sustainability of the key
features of modern societies. Therefore,
cyber security is a very interesting issue
for both academics and professionals [3].
In Europe two main priorities have
been identied:
protection of infrastructures
based on ICT identied as
critical infrastructure;
protection from cyber crime.
In February 2013, the European
Commission published a European strategy
for cyber security [5] dening the
principles that should guide the EU cyber
security policy.
In particular, the EU Strategy is
structured into the following ve strategic
priorities:
achieving cyber resilience;
drastically reducing cyber crime;
developing cyber defense policy
and capabilities related to the
common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP);
developing the industrial and
technological resources for cyber
security;
establishing
a
coherent
international cyberspace policy
for the European Union and
promoting core EU values: the
EU strategy is aimed at

maintaining an open, free and

secure cyberspace.
The critical infrastructure of every
country, ranging from oil pipelines to the
electricity grid, from gas to water, from
transportation,
to
nancial/banking
systems, to public services, is increasingly
electronically managed. The progressive
introduction of network, monitoring and
control systems, as well as the
interdependence that has arisen, has
certainly improved the performance level
of such infrastructure, but it has also
allowed access to cyber criminals, with
consequent cyber attacks and the
increasing risk of a domino effect.
Therefore, the scenario has became
more and more complex in recent years, as
the introduction of advanced technology
added new sources of potential risk
alongside the traditional threats. An
effective infrastructure protection includes
threat
identication,
vulnerability
reduction and attack source identication.
This activity aims at service downtime
minimization and damage limitation.
According to the 2013 Data Breach
Investigations Report [5] in 2012, the
greatest number of cyber attacks were for
economic reasons: 75% of attacks were
nancial cyber crimes, followed by
government espionage campaigns, aimed,
primarily, at the theft of intellectual
property (government information, trade
secrets and technical resources), which
determined 20% of cyber threats. In
particular, espionage attacks are not
conned to government agencies and
military
departments
but
include
production companies, IT and professional
organizations.
Considering the methods of attack,
the most popular was hacking, which
featured in more than half (52%) of data
breaches. With regard to types of cyber
threats, the McAfee annual report, 2013
Threats Prediction, revealed that mobile
devices are already, and will be even more
so, in the crosshairs of cyber crime. The
inuence of the Anonymous group should

43

decrease, while large-scale attacks against

critical infrastructure will probably
increase.
The maintenance of a good level of
cyber security in the EU context involves
disparate
sectors
with
different
jurisdictions and responsibilities, both at
national and EU level. Managing cyber
security through centralized supervision at
European level is not feasible. National
governments have the main responsibility
for the maintenance of a good level of
security and must cooperate at EU level in
case of risks and security breaches that
extend beyond national boundaries.

The European strategy invites

member states to encourage information
sharing between national structures
involved in cyber security and the private
sector, so that they can have both a
comprehensive vision of risks and security
threats, and a better comprehension of
cyber crime techniques so as to respond
more rapidly and effectively.
Several organizations are involved at
EU level. In the NIS area, the European
Network and Information Security Agency
(ENISA), established in 2004, is
responsible for improving network and
information security. Currently a new

Figure 1. EU cyber security strategy:

Interacting organizations at national and EU level
The structures involved in the
maintenance of cyber security are
organized in three fundamental areas:
Network and Information Security (NIS),
law enforcement and defense [4].
At national level member states
should have already, or as a result of the
European cyber security strategy, national
structures in each of the aforementioned
areas (see gure 1). Member states are
responsible for carefully dening the roles
and responsibilities of such national
structures.

regulation [4] to strengthen ENISA and

modernize its mandate is under
examination by the Council of Europe and
the European Parliament.
ENISA will also be responsible for
building expertise in security of industrial
control systems, transport and energy
infrastructure. A Computer Emergency
Response Team at EU level (CERT-EU),
responsible for the security of the IT
systems of EU agencies and institutions,
was established in 2012.

44

2.

the access points to build up a picture over

time of what constitutes normal traffic
across the perimeter; thus, knowing the
normality, will be easier at the system
level to identify the potential anomalies
regarding to workstation, specifically
where those anomalies might indicate the
signature of new attempts attack [8];
a limited attack surface determine
with a high probability the concentration
of attacks in certain points, which will
allow the organization to locate its most
valuables
assets furthers from any
conceivable point of attack [7].
In this context, establishing a
defensive surface isn't an easy task in the
virtual space, characterized by the absence
of
physical
boundaries.
However,
information systems have a fundamental
characteristics, data processing and onward
transmission for decision making.
Accordingly, cyber attacks can
only target two things the processing, or a
data component of the system. The studies
[8] underline that, attacks comprise three
distinct elements targets, enablers and
channels.
Targets are the specific processes
or data resources that an adversary aims to
control, while enablers are all of the other
processes and data resources that the
attacker might employ to obtain that
control.
Thus, the attacker gets control over
those enabling resources by exploiting
vulnerable communication channels or
protocols. In practice targets are usually
data of value or system processes that the
attacker wishes to control.
Enablers are any of the other
processes running within the system that
the attacker could use to achieve their
selected purposes. In addition, because
computers rely on communication
channels to access both enablers and
targets. So, these elements, targets,
enablers and channels characterize a
potential attack vectors against any system.
To limit an attack surface should
start with the identification and control of

Reducing the applications

expsore against cyber attacks

The objectives of defensive planning

has always been to ensure that the
attackers only option is thoroughly
prepared defence. Nonetheless, the
fundamental challenge of attacks in
cyberspace is that there are no physical
limitations and so attacks can originate
from an unlimited number places and be of
an uncharacterizable range of type.
Consequently, cyberspace is the perfect
field for asymmetric warfare and limiting
access to the systems interface as well as
in the underlying code [7] will minimize
the potential attack surface.
In the virtual environment, the surface
exposed at attacks is the part of the system
that is accessible to unauthenticated users.
The boundaries of the attack surface can
include any input, operation or service
request that can be performed from the
system interface.
In effect, there is a vulnerability if at
the surface level there are no a functional
controls for a given attack vector [8].
Different types of attacks originates
from external area, the most sensible
option for the defense is to reduce the size
o that perimeter. Thus, by limiting the
scope of any feasible attack to a few
accessible points, each of those points can
then be rigorously controlled and normal
defense measures can be implemented [8].
This
fundamental
principle
of
restriction and rigorous control of
accessible points provides the justification
for the attack surface limitation strategy
that can be evidenced by:
the creation of an optimum attack
surface allows the defense to marshal its
forces to protect only those places that can
possibly be attacked, such as defined
portals and interfaces; so the maximum
defensive reserve is available at the point
of attack [10];
a limited and well defined attack
surface allows the monitoring systems at

45

communication channels (enabled by system

processes) within the system, taking into
account that they are configured to operate
as a part of the system design process.
Thus, each channel is associated with
the data it has been created to access and at
the system level is possible to construct a
map of planning a virtual defense by
focusing on the channels and their access
rules.
In this way, optimum defense against
any known attack will flow from that
knowledge. In addition, association between
channels and their enabling process
regarding to the minimization of the attack
surface involves mapping potential targets
for attack to the communication channels
that access them and then underlining the
enablers within those channels.
After the identification of all
reasonable targets in the system, the
channels and protocols that access those
targets have to identified and mapped.
Afterwards, all enablers on those
channels are then be identified down to the
workstation level process and any known or
potential
vulnerability
should
be
characterized and countered by an explicit
mechanism to ensure proper control.
Prioritization of attacker goals is
important because in the pragmatic world
its impossible to secure everything.
Therefore, the things that are the most
important have to have greatest amount of
assurance and planning the defense under
lies the limitation of attack surface, can
ensure that those resources are concentrated
at the points that justify the greatest amount
of protection.
The theory concerning to attack
surface limitation in virtual space is built
around three fundamental principles [10]:
reduction of the amount of
code available to unauthenticated users; so,
for attack surface minimization would be to
ensure that the data exit and entries are
purposely restricted to an optimum number
of rigorously controlled access points;
restricting
the
default
privileges of any running application to the

lowest practical level; the appropriate

restriction of each programs default
privileges can go a long way toward
reducing the attack surface and by so
doing ensure an overall defensible system;
reduction the amount of
running code within the system; the
elimination of each unnecessary service
will reduce the amount of running code
and thereby reduce the attack surface of
the system.
The corollary to these principles is
the definition of privileges to access an
enabling process. In computing, the
definition of privilege is the all purpose
mechanism for controlling access to
enablers and channels. The privileges
traditionally apply to three fundamental
actions within the system, read, write and
run.
Based of the definition above,
regarding to targets, enablers and channels,
its possible to evaluate the risk concerning
NIS (Network and Information Security)
by calculating the operative state
probability
of
information
and
communication system.
Admitting the independence of the
three elements (targets, enablers, channels)
the probability state will be evaluate by the
binomial method, as follows:
n

i 1

qi

(2.1)

where:
n number of the independent
components analyzed;
pi - probability of success for each
element i (i=1,...,3) ;
qi - probability of failure for each
element i (i=1,...,3).
Binomial relations for calculating
the probability state (based on 2.1 formula)
are the following:
- probability state when the risks
dont affect the system components:
n

i 1

i 1

P0 pi

46

i
i i

where:
i - attacks rate that produce
dysfunctionality at the component level;
i - functional recovery rate
of components;
- state probability with i element
faulty and the others elements (n-1=3-1) in
operation:

faulty and the others (n-k) elements in

operation.
Finally, by calculating the state
probabilities will be possible to build the
risk matrix associated to the information and
network security system, considering that
the tree system components (targets,
enablers, channels) are systematically
attacked, as shown in the table 1.
Table 1. Risk matrix

PROBABILITY
HARDLY
FREQUENT PROBABLE OCCASIONAL
UNLIKELY
SEVERITY
EVER
VERY HIGH
IN (0,7)
IN (0,55)
IN (0,4)
R (0,24)
M (0,08)
(0,8)
CRITICAL (0,4)
IN (0,4)
IN (0,3)
H (0,2)
M (0,12)
L (0,05)
SERIOUSLY
H (0,2)
H (0,15)
M (0,1)
L (0,06)
T (0,02)
(0,2)
MINOR (0,1)
M (0,1)
M (0,1)
L (0,05)
T (0,03)
T (0,01)
NEGLIGIBLE
L (0,05)
L (0,04)
T (0,03)
T (0,02)
T (0,01)
(0,05)

Pi P0

qi

P0 i
pi
i

where:
T tolerable risk, reduced effects on
the securities objectives (values:
0,01-0,03);
L low risk, minor effects on the
securities objectives (values: 0,040,06); there is a low concern;
M medium risk, the risk can effect
the securities objectives (values:
0,07-0,12);
H high risk, the risk is
significantly, there is a high potential
for affecting the securities objectives
(values: 0,15-0,24);
IN intolerable risk, the risk is very
high and affect directly the securities
objectives (values: 0,3-0,7).

i =1,...,3
(2.3)

- state probability with i,j elements

faulty and the other element (n-2=3-2) in
operation:

Pi P0

qi q j
j

P0 i
pi p j
i j

j=1,...,3 ij

i,
(2.4)

- state probability with i,j,k elements

faulty:

Pi P0

Conclusions

qi q j q k
j k

P0 i

pi p j pk
i j j

Ensuring cyber security for a nation

is a duty that cannot disregard good
technology skills and competences. Any
government organization that is involved in
the national cyber security strategy thus
needs to have such skills in-house and its
governance needs to be aware of and
able to
(2.6)
assess cyber and information technology
risks.

i, j, k = 1,...,3 i j k
(2.5)
In case of the n identical elements
(p1 = ... = p3 = p) the general term of the
binomial (p+q)n is:
Ckn qk pn-k k = 0,1,..., n
which represents (in the general
case) the state probability with k elements

47

The latter point is critical because if

an organizations governance does not
have appropriate technology competences,
it will either overestimate or underestimate
a threat or simply not understanding what
is going on. Efforts made in improving the
protection of national critical economic
sectors cannot be made in isolation with
respect to the rest of the world because
cyber threats intrinsically cross borders.
Thus a defense cannot be only on
the perimeter, but there is the need of
international
collaborations
and
networking. Cooperation among national
CERTs is denitely expected as well as
cooperation at the political and law
enforcement level with the signature of
appropriate bilateral or multilateral
agreements.
The restriction of the attack surface
across an organizations system is based
around target and attack enabler
identification and limitation of access
rights through the enabling channels. In
order to ensure a highly controlled
environment its necessary to pay attention
to the details of system operation and how
those operations impact the critical assets
within the system.
Thus, if all priority targets can be
identified and the channels and protocols
that enable access can be characterized, it
will be possible to take the necessary
system administration steps to ensure that
access along those channels is properly

controlled by specifically designating and

monitoring privileges for all users. The
evaluation of the state probability depends
of the type of entity, of purposes of
analysis and operating parameter values,
corresponding elements (, , p, q).
References
[1] Gordon L.A., and Sohail T., A Framework for
using
insurance
for
cyber-risk
management, 2003;
[2] Byres E.J. and Lowe J.,The Myths and Facts
behind Cyber Security Risks for Industrial
Control Systems, 2004;
[3] McNulty, M.S., Applied Risk of Complex
Systems, 2002.
[4] European Union, Cybersecurity Strategy of the
European Union: An Open, Safe and
Secure Cyberspace", 2013;
[5]The 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report,
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resource
s/reports/rp_databreachinvestigationsreport-2013_en_xg.pdf;
[6] European Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council",
Concerning the European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA),
(2010);
[7] Michael Howard, Measuring Relative Attack
Surface, 2003.
[8]
http://www.sans.edu/research/securitylaboratory/article/did/attack-surface, The
Attack Surface Problem, 2011;
[9] Jeannette Wing, Kymie TanAn approach to
measuring a systems attack surface,
technical report, 2007;
[10] Howard, Michel, Mitigate Security Risk by
Minimizing the Code you Expose to
Users, 2004.

48

OPERATIONAL APPROACHES REGARDING SPECIAL

OPERATIONS FORCES AIRBORNE-COMMANDO LAND-BASED
UNITS CAPABILITIES VERSUS PARACHUTE INFANTRYS
CAPABILITIES WITHIN HOMELAND DEFENSE
MAJOR OPERATIONS
Ioan-Constantin STAN, PhD
Doru-Constantin TOCIL, PhD

Abstract: The most effective capability employment consists of SOF desired direct, and indirect effects utility, at
Joint Task Force (JTF) operational level, exploited by Joint Force Commander (JFC), that achieves major
impact over campaign/major operation endstate, in order to provide multilateral, versatile support for tactical
conventional units objectives achievements. Meanwhile, alongside SOF action arms, Parachute Infantry Units
capabilities, belong to large formations from Land Forces Service, need to be efficiently exploited by strategic,
and mostly operational leaders within different phases of the Homeland Defense Major Operations/Campaign,
as a versatile force multiplier, under JFC operational control (OPCON).
Keywords: special operations forces, Parachute Infantry, capabilities, Homeland Defense.

operations main activities conducted by

SOF Airborne-Commando Land-Based
Units2, the authors pointed out future
opportunities of the reorganization and
employment, within Special Operations
Forces Community belong to Romanian
Armed Forces, especially throughout
notional Homeland Defense Major
Campaign; additionally, SOF Land-Based
Units capabilities were argued positively
within possible participation of NATOs
Collective Defense missions, under
authority of articles 4, and 5 belong to The
Treaty from Washington.
As part of our current researching
debate, the central subject outlines a
selective approach of the SOF AirborneCommando Land-Based Units critical
capabilities versus Airborne Light-Infantry
Task Forces capabilities belong to
conventional forces3, especially large

Critical Doctrinal Approaches

Comparative Analysis Regarding
Special Operations Forces (SOF)
Airborne Commando Land-Based Units
and Parachute Infantrys Capabilities
Within our last researching study
regarding future possibilities of Special
Operations Forces (SOF) AirborneCommando
Land-Based
Units
Employment belong to Romanian Armed
Forced1, we obviously stressed the critical
capabilities of these military components,
by highlighting its doctrinal principles and
essential roles, associated to strategicoperational significance missions, in the
frame of Homeland Defense Major
Operations. From this point of view, by
consolidating its strategic utility of special
1

Col. Ioan-Constantin Stan, PhD & COL DoruConstantin TOCILA, PhD, Strategic Utility
Approaches of the Special Operations Forces
Airborne Commando Land Based Units. A
Viewpoint of Special Operations Forces Airborne
Commando Land Based Units Employment in the
Frame of Homeland Defense and NATO Collective
Missions, in The 10th International Conference
,,STRATEGIES XXI, Technologies Military
Applications, Simulations and Resources, Volume
2, (Bucharest: ,,Carol I NDU Press Centre, 2014);

By SOF Airborne-Commando Land-Based Units

terminology, are defined all doctrinal SOF Land
Operational Units designated to particularly carry
out airborne direct actions full spectrum missions,
and special reconnaissance (see US Army
Rangers);
3
Romanian MoD, Romanian Armed Force
Doctrine, (Bucharest: Military General Staff,
2012), 132; Conventional Forces consist of those

49

formations within Land Forces Service.

Subsequently, operational capabilities
approach previously marked out will be
used for particular argumentation of the
role, operational frame and missions
belong to those two types of the actionable
forces,
by
considering
several
recommendations regarding future and
feasible strategic/operational utility within
Romanian Armed Forces.
By selective analysis of the current
operational concepts, doctrinal sources
regarding military capabilities of those two
primary airborne based operations entities,
and ultimately personal experience
throughout operational-tactical levels of
command and execution, we can state
there are similarities, and particularities in
order to employ its within Homeland
Defense Full Spectrum Missions. In this
context, the most effective capability
employment consists of its desired direct
and indirect effects utility, at Joint Task
Force (JTF)4 operational level, exploited
by Joint Force Commander (JFC) that
achieves
major
impact
over
campaign/major operation end-state, in
order to provide multilateral, versatile
support for tactical conventional units
objectives achievements.
Continuing its efficient capabilities
employment perspective, we should
outline military interagency close support
to achieve future operational successes.
From this point, airborne operations
planning
and
conducting
phases
integration entirely throughout Operational
Planning Process, alongside Air Force

Servicemen becomes a sine qua non

condition, in order to respect doctrinal
principles of strategic-operational action
arms employment, by using designated
airdrop insertion platforms, according to
Ground
Force
Commander
Plan.
Additionally, within common operational
capabilities
perspective
previously
analyzed, the human resources high level
quality regarding recruitment, selection,
training, leadership education, and military
career development, continuously highlight
a critical capability for those two entities
personnel success; however, all these
manning
processes
are
differently
conducted, and built by SOF, in
accordance with operational concepts and
doctrinal fundamentals, resulted in
strategic multidimensional significance of
its roles, throughout all state-power
instruments5. In this respect, we can
obviously outline that SOF personnel
proficiency resulted in ,,out the box
training and education type follows
versatile and unconventional human
potential, and thinking, while preparing
their operators and soldiers for upcoming
volatile situations, and high political risk
missions.
Because our researching study
comes to selectively and comparatively,
highlight the role of those key-capabilities
belong to both SOF Airborne-Commando
Land-Based Units, and Parachute Infantry
Task Force, needed to be exploited within
Homeland Defense Operational Frame, we
recommend to continue our debate by
identifying several strategic feasible
solutions through Romanian Armed Forces
Services, as part of military decisionmakers, and leadership efforts to develop

designated military components, others than those

especially mentioned by national authorities as of
being capable of conducting special operations, as
well as the forces that do not exploit WMD to
perform their missions. By this debate, in terms of
conventional forces, are defined all command
components, and actionable fighting elements that
belong to large formations of Land Forces Service.
4
Idem 3, 133; Joint Task Force consists of
,,package of forces aggregated by order for
conducting national territory defensive joint
operation or/and operations/missions under Allied
Command Operations operational control;

Col. Ioan-Constantin Stan, PhD&COL DoruConstantin TOCILA, PhD, Operational and

Tactical Integration of Special Operations. Current
Doctrinal Approaches versus Future Perspective for
Romanian Armed Land Forces Warfighting
Functions Development, in The 10th International
Conference ,,STRATEGIES XXI, Technologies
Military Applications, Simulations and Resources,
Volume 2, (Bucharest: ,,Carol I NDU Press
Centre, 2014);

50

and consolidate its large formations and

formations capabilities in short, medium
and long term.

strongly outline the significance of the

depth operational vertical maneuver,
conducted by Parachute Infantry Task
Forces, under temporary operational
control of conventional forces (CF)6 large
formations or Joint Forces Command
direct authority. In the same time, we
consider current techniques, tactics, and
procedures (TTPs), stated throughout
Operational/Tactical Formations Field
Manuals (Mechanized, Infantry Brigades)
should be aligned to new doctrinal
operational concepts, in order to efficiently
integrate efforts dedicated for achievement
of Airborne Conventional Forces desired
effects, and ultimately, to fulfill
operational synchronization at Joint Forces
Command level within Homeland Defense
Major Operation frame time. In addition to
our previous recommendation, by long
term perspective, we can consider that new
upcoming Parachute Infantry Task Forces
should be employed by strategic military
decision-makers, in order to accomplish
assumed political decisions towards
collective security organizations, by
possible capabilities package participation
for NATO Reaction Force (NRF), and/or
European Battlegroups (EU BGs).
Regarding relevant approaches and
possibilities to efficiently reorganize and
employ
upcoming
SOF
Airborne
Commando Land-Based Units operational
capabilities, we express our opinion that
human potential, organizational culture,
and high level individual and collective
training should be essentially exploited
within strategic significance military
operations, in order to successfully achieve
desired direct and indirect effects
regarding deterrence of the possible defiant

Ones Institutionalized Feasible

Solutions at National Military Level
At this time, the national military
doctrine
fundamentals
regarding
interagency approach of those four state
power instruments (political, economic,
information, and military) effectively
outlines the major significance of the
operational effects achieved by Romanian
SOF, mostly within national major
operations, while consolidating its high
combat readiness for stand-by combined
joint operations under control of the
international security organizations, such
as North-Atlantic Alliance, and/or
European Union.
From this point, Romanian SOF
entities define the specialized component
of the national military instrument with the
highest operational proficiency, being
employed by strategic decision-makers in
order to fulfill multidimensional objectives
that result in achieving direct, and/or
indirect effects through all national power
dimensions:
political,
economic,
information, and military. Meanwhile,
alongside SOF action arms, we can
positively affirm that Parachute Infantry
Units capabilities, belong to large
formations from Land Forces Service,
should be efficiently exploited by strategic
and mostly operational leaders within
different phases of the Homeland Defense
Major Operations/Campaign, as a versatile
force multiplier, under JFC operational
control (OPCON). Moreover, we consider
that desired effects achieved by
exploitation of the Parachute Infantry
Units capabilities can firmly support the
Allies
Collective
Defense
Major
Operations and/or ones Non-Article 5,
under NATO Authority.
According to this operational
perspective, we acknowledge that Land
Forces Operations Doctrine should

Idem 3, 132; Conventional Forces consist of those

designated military components, others than those
especially mentionated by national authorities as of
being capable of conducting special operations, as
well as the forces that do not exploit WMD to
perform their missions. Throughout this study, in
terms of conventional forces, are defined all
command components, and actionable elements
that belong to large formations and formations of
Romanian Military Land Forces Service.

51

intents toward Romanias proximity

national territory, while simultaneously
conducting initial forcible assault, to
control and counterattack an armed
aggression against Romanian state. By
similarity with Parachute Infantry Task
Units capabilities package, within
medium and long term, we reaffirm that
SOF Airborne Commando Land-Based
Units distinguished human resource
potential, the excellent organizational
ethos, and high performance displayed
throughout its training and education
processes can bring out decisive arguments
to reorganize, train, and evaluate those
Task Units within NRF and/or EU BGs
operational headlines requirements, in
order to stress Romanias role as credible
regional security actor along NorthAtlantic Alliances south-eastern flank.

Parachute Infantry Task Units should be

and remain, in short, medium and long
term, ones of the national decision makers
operational priority, in order to rapidly
establish and consolidate stand-by forces
capabilities packages with versatile
potential (SOF), and primary kinetic,
forcible entry action arms components
(Para Inf), that ultimately, bring out major
impact over both Homeland Defense and
possible next participations to NATOs
Collective Defense Responses.
Bibliography
Doctrines/Field Manuals/Military
Dictionaries:
1. ROU MoD, Romanian Armed Forces
Doctrine,
(Bucharest:
Military
General Staff, 2012);
2. ROU
MoD,
S.M.G./F.O.S.-3.2
Doctrine
for
Joint
Special
Operations,(Bucharest:
Military
General Staff, Romanian Armed
Forces Press Center, 2007);
3. NATO
Standardization
Agency
(NSA), AJP-3.5: Allied Joint Doctrine
for Special Operations, (Bruxelles:
SHAPE, 2013);
4. US Department of the Army, FM 7-85,
Ranger
Unit
Operations,
(Washington: Headquarters, 1987);
5. US Department of the Army, FM 35.50, Army Special Operations Forces
Ranger Operations, (Washington:
Headquarters, 2008);
6. NATO
Standardization
Agency
(NSA), AAP-6: NATO Glossary of
Terms and Definitions, (Bruxelles:
SHAPE, 2007);
7. Eugen Predatu, Dictionary of Military
Terms, (Bucharest: Romanian Armed
Forces Press Center, 2006).
Military Literature/Periodicals:
8. COL Ioan-Constantin Stan, PhD &
COL Doru-Constantin TOCILA, PhD,
Strategic Utility Approaches of the
Special Operations Forces Airborne
Commando Land Based Units. A
Viewpoint of Special Operations

Instead of conclusions
Considering all these previous
operational arguments as proper, and
common sense solutions for its
institutionalization, at Romanian Military
Central Decision-Making Level, we
appreciate the SOF Airborne Commando
Land-Based
Units
reorganization,
selection,
training,
and
evaluation
processes should be accelerated, while
continuing doctrinal reaffirmation and
operational concepts implementation about
its strategic value missions.
In the same time, we consider new
doctrinal Land Forces fundamentals, and
warfighting concepts displayed throughout
its Field Manuals should specifically point
out Parachute Infantry Initial Forcible Task
Units
key-capabilities,
successfully
employed by ROU Joint Forces Command
C2 at operational level, in order to
efficiently exploit its strategic and unique
advantages
as
remarkable
force
multipliers.
Summarizing, we can affirm that
reorganization
and
modernization
processes of the new SOF Airborne
Commando Land-Based Units, and

52

Forces Airborne Commando Land

Based Units Employment in the
Frame of Homeland Defense and
NATO Collective Missions, in The 10th
International
Conference
,,STRATEGIES XXI, Technologies
Military Applications, Simulations
and Resources, Volume 2, (Bucharest:
,,Carol I NDU Press Centre, 2014);
9. COL
Ioan-Constantin
Stan,
PhD&COL
Doru-Constantin
TOCILA, PhD, Operational and
Tactical Integration of Special
Operations.
Current
Doctrinal
Approaches versus Future Perspective

for Romanian Armed Land Forces

Warfighting Functions Development, in
The 10th International Conference
,,STRATEGIES XXI, Technologies
Military Applications, Simulations and
Resources, Volume 2, (Bucharest:
,,Carol I NDU Press Centre, 2014);
10. William H. McRaven, The Theory of
Special Operations, (Monterey: Naval
Postgraduate School, 1993);
11. COL(ret.) Vasile SOARE, PhD,
Special Forces. Airborne Commandos
within Actions, (Bucharest: Ziua Press
Centre, 2002).

53

INTEGRATION OF CYBER DEFENSE INTO THE OPERATIONAL

PLANNING PROCESS
tefan-Antonio DAN-UTEU
LTC, Senior instructor PhD candidate, Command and Staff Faculty
Carol I National Defence University
dan.antonio@gmail.com

Abstract: The emergence of the cyber operational environment and its associated issues raise several challenges
across the military operational planning process. This new paradigm should be acknowledged and taken into
account by commanders and military planners in order to ensure the success of their operations. Any future
military exercise and operation must contain a cyber component, in terms of specialized personnel, specific
activities, procedures and injections, which should ensure the necessary conditions for the availability,
protection and dissemination of information required by our own forces as well as the appropriate means to
deny, degrade or disrupt the use of the adversary command and control systems or other cyber capabilities.
Keywords: operational environment, operational planning, cyber defense, command and control.

The current context in which the

planning of military operations is
conducted is significantly influenced by
the implementation of technologies,
applications and systems pertaining to the
field of information and communication.
The increased network connectivity
ensures military planners with quick access
to significant data, accelerates the
processing
and
dissemination
of
information analysis products, contributes
to an accurate common operational picture
and accelerates the preparations and
transmission of orders for military
operation. By judicious exploitation of
these above-mentioned benefits our own
decision cycle can be shortened,
overtaking the opponent's decision cycle
and ensuring the necessary conditions for
gaining or maintaining the initiative and
the success of own forces planned
operations.
Thus, in line with modern high-tech
battleground characteristics, populated
with increasingly complex command and
control
systems,
sensor
networks,
communication and information systems,
drones and interconnected battle platforms
there is an obvious growing importance
that should be attributed to the cyber and
electromagnetic environments as they

become critical to the success of military

actions.
In extent, the large scale
implementation of information and
communication technologies
and their increasing importance in the
contemporary human and institutional
relationships determines the attribution of
a growing importance to the management
of the cyber and electromagnetic
environment. It is necessary that this new
reality, marked by the emergence of these
two new operational environments, to be
acknowledged and taken into account by
commanders and military planners in order
to ensure the success of their operations.
We believe that any military operation
must contain a cyber component (in terms
of specialized personnel and specific
activities), which should ensure the
provision for the availability, protection
and dissemination of information required
by own forces as well as the appropriate
means to deny, degrade or disrupt the use
of the adversary command and control
system and other cyber capabilities.
Some modern armed forces have
taken a leap forward on the way to
integration of cyber defense into the
operational planning. A good example is
the US provisional doctrine for unified

Proiect cofinanat din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operaional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor
Umane 2007-2013 Investete n OAMENI

54

land operations which stipulates that staffs

and military commanders plan, conduct
and carry out operations in the cyber and
electromagnetic environments, defined as
"activities leveraged to seize, retain, and
exploit an advantage over adversaries and
enemies in both cyberspace and the

and
influence
activities,
signals
intelligence, and network operations.2
At implementation level the US
doctrinal provisions are reflected in an
approach which aims the integration in the
operational planning and synchronization,
along three lines of effort, of the activities

Figure 1. Operational view4

electromagnetic
spectrum,
while
simultaneously denying and degrading
adversary and enemy use of the same and
protecting the mission command system".1
Also the mission command
doctrine stipulates that, in order to ensure
the success of operations, the commanders
supported by their staff, must integrate, as
part of the operations process, the
cyberspace operations, electromagnetic
spectrum operations and electronic
warfare. These activities must be
synchronized across all command echelons
and warfighting functions, enabling inform

to be conducted in the cyber and

electromagnetic environment, respectively
cyber operations, electronic warfare
operations and electromagnetic spectrum
management operations.3
From this perspective the figure 1
depicts the cyber electromagnetic activities
operational view.
In order to integrate and
synchronize4the elements from these three
areas of interest, this approach involves, in
2

ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, Department of the

Army, Washington, DC, 17 May 2012;
3
FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities,
Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 12
February 2014;
4
Ibidem;

ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, Department

of the Army, Washington, DC, 16 May 2012;

Proiect cofinanat din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operaional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor
Umane 2007-2013 Investete n OAMENI

55

addition to establishing a common

operational language, the justification and
definition of roles and responsibilities
associated
with
the
commanders,
subordinate staff and troops.
The
rational
and
efficient
exploitation of cyberspace, in conjunction
with the electromagnetic environment,
ensure the achievement of communication
requirements, processing and sharing of
information and the integration and
synchronization of military operations
along the entire chain of command and
along all the warfighting functions.
However,
due
to
their
specific
characteristics, the cyberspace and the
electromagnetic environment provides also
to the potential adversaries opportunities
for exploitation, ion terms of planning,
conducting and executing of cyber and/or
electronic attacks against our own
communication and information networks
and weapons systems. Therefore a
fundamental requirement needed to be met
for the successful execution of our planned
operations is to ensure the security and
defense of the cyber and electromagnetic
environment simultaneously denying their
use by the adversary.
This goal can be achieved through
the implementation of necessary measures
to integrate and synchronize operations
within cyberspace and the electromagnetic
spectrum, resulting in an improved
common knowledge of the operational
environment, a shortening of decisionmaking cycle, an increased efficiency of
leadership at all command levels and
increased defense possibilities against
enemy attacks.
Taking into account the fact that
the activities in the cyber environment
depends
increasingly
on
wireless
technologies it is obvious that operations
conducted in this environment must be deconflicted and synchronized with the
specific electronic warfare operations and
spectrum management, as they concurred
on the same natural resource. All three
types of operations should be perceived as

inter-relational
and
interdependent.
Starting from this joint feature of the cyber
and electromagnetic operations, the
military planners must determine, plan and
design in a joint manner the specific
operations, ensuring their integration and
synchronization with the classical physical
operations, kinetic by nature.
Within
each
military
unit
establishment should exist a cyber staff
element responsible for the planning,
preparation, conduct and assessment of
cyber related activities and operations,
both defensive and offensive. This staff
element should ensure the achievement of
multiple and complex tasks as follows:
Develop and integrate cyber
elements and actions into exercises and
operation plans;
Support cyber policies and ensure
compliance of cyber activities with
applicable policy laws and regulations;
Plan, prepare, execute, and assess
cyber operations;
Identify and coordinate cyber
intelligence support requirements;
Integrate intelligence preparation
of the cyber environment into the
operations process;
Evaluate offensive and defensive
requirements for cyber capabilities;

Maintain
available
cyber
resources;
Identify and propose targets
within cyberspace to superior echelon for
assessment and approval;
Plan, coordinate, and evaluate
friendly cyber operations;
Implement friendly electronic and
network security measures;
Identify civilian/commercial
cyber related infrastructure capabilities
within the unit assigned area of operations.
Cyber operations should be
integrated into plans and orders through
the military decision making process. The
staff element responsible for cyber
operations should be actively involved in
all the steps of the operational planning
process (receipt of mission, mission

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analysis,
course
of
action-COA
development, analysis, comparison and
approval, orders production, dissemination
and transition) as well as in preparation,
execution and assessment of the operation
phases. It should ensure also the
integration of cyber specific elements into
the intelligence preparation of the
battlefield,
targeting
process,
risk
management, and continuing activities
processes.
Taking into account the complexity
and the very dynamic nature of cyberrelated activities, the cyber staff element
need to be directly connected and work
closely with the information staff element,
operations staff element as well as with the
communication and information systems
element, in order to achieve efficient
awareness and prompt reaction to the
changing operational environment.
It is important to emphasize that a
modern armed force must possess the
necessary capabilities to conduct cyber
operations while maintaining efficiency in
the use of advantages offered by an
electromagnetic spectrum which becomes
more and more congested. This approach
has the potential to provide tactical,
operational and strategic advantages,
which traditionally have been achieved
only through violent means and physical
destruction.
However, we must be keeping in
mind that cyber operations may involve a
number of problems and challenges that
require reflection. Thus, the associated
judicial-legal issues may negatively
influence the duration of decision making
and approval cycles for the courses of
action. Also, due to the increased
interconnectivity of current information
networks, cyber operations may cause
undesired effects, difficult to predict,
effects which may spread beyond the
classic battlefield geographical limits.
Although a permanent solution and
thoroughly tested throughout history, the
use of kinetic means and methods presents
the major disadvantage of direct and

collateral losses of lives and civilian

property. In antithesis, cyber operations
have a more subtle feature, they are mostly
non-lethal and, once started, takes place
virtually at the speed of information
transmission.
In order to ensure the unity of
effort in achieving the objective of creating
an operational cyber capability an
important role should be played by the
specific cyber doctrine requirements. Also
organizational
and
infrastructure
requirements should be aligned with the
selection, training and skills development
of cyber operations leaders and specialists.
This can be achieved through advanced
programs of study and training, mainly
with practical emphasis, which must
include, in an integrative manner,
disciplines which although related are
traditionally studied separately, disciplines
covering the fields of reconnaissance,
intelligence, information, communications,
computer networks and electronic warfare.
The cyber operations can have a
defensive or offensive feature. The
defensive operations can be easily
integrated in the operational planning as
they are passive in nature and network
protection is already implemented.
However, the offensive cyber operations
are directly linked to the available so
called cyber weapons.
The potential for integrating the
cyber weapons in the war game requires
further justification and experimentation.
Apparently, due to the typology and nature
of these new types of military means there
is no a significant difference between their
deployment and use at tactical, operational
or strategic level. The interconnected
structure of modern computer and
communications networks may prevent the
limitation of a cyber-attack, whose effects
can propagates beyond expectations and
may cause negative consequences of
different
magnitudes,
inducing
a
significant potential risk even at political
level.

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It is necessary that the armed forces

determine ways to use the new information
technologies and applications in order to
identify the attackers before a cyber attack
can occur, or at least during its on-going
timeframe, and not in a post-factum
manner, as the majority of cyber attacks
are currently assessed.
Due to the specific characteristics
of cyber environment the offensive and
defensive actions deployed in this
environment are not easy to be separated,
the differences between them having a
high degree of uncertainty and been
characterized by the fact that it is not
possible to be defined with clarity and also
by the fact that they cannot be conducted
in isolation mode. Even though, the
majority of cyber experts agreed on the
fact that, regardless an exact definition, the
cyber environment favors the attacker.
These considerations emphasize the
potential role that offensive cyber
operations may play in the future military
confrontations. As a general said, through
an analogy with a medieval kinetic
confrontation "Catching arrows is not all
that much fun. At some point, it's
preferable to go kill the archer."5
Initiatives for integration of cyber
defense into the operational planning exist
also at NATO level. The adopted Smart
Defense concept aims an innovative
approach to support the development of the
Alliance's military capabilities, including
cyber capabilities, through improved
cooperation
between
the
military,
academia and industry and through
encouraging national and multinational
initiatives in the field of cyber defense.
However, the use of defense
planning process of the Alliance in the
cyber realm is facing serious challenges,
mainly due to the large variation in
equipment and training, to the degree of

development of cyber capabilities at the

component nations level and also due to
national strategies, policies and laws in the
field of cyber security.
The precondition for an effective
use of the defense planning process in
cyber defense is not only information
about existing capabilities, but also
differing national policy, legislative and
doctrinal
approaches.
Since
the
overarching goal of the defense planning
process is to bring together the civilian and
military aspects of Allied defense, there is
no reason to rule out its application to
cyber capability development.6
In accordance with the NATO
Cyber Defense Policy endorsed at the
Wales summit, the cyber-attacks can be
treated as harmful as conventional attacks
and cyber defense is now considered a part
of NATOs core task collective defense.
The ambiguity however remains as to what
degree of intensity under what kind of
circumstances would warrant the Article 5
response since the decision ultimately rests
with the North Atlantic Council that
decides on a case-by-case basis. There is
also vast discrepancy between NATO
members cyber capabilities.
Currently only about half of NATO
member nations dispose of some type of
cyber defense capability within their armed
forces but national cyber capability targets
are to be elaborated within the NATOs
Defense Planning Process by 2016 giving
rise to calls for future establishment of a
joint cyber command under the SACEUR
and development of NATO cyber warfare
doctrine.7
Annually NATO plans and
conducts specialized cyber defense
exercises and also aims to incorporate
cyber defense elements in all its military
6

Krause H., NATO on its way towards a comfort

zone in cyber defence, NATO CCD CoE, Tallin,
Estonia, 2014;
7
Kufk J., NATO after the Wales Summit:
Readying the Alliance for the Future, Octomber
2014,
at
http://www.amo.cz/editor/image/
produkty1_soubory/amocz_pp-2014-6.pdf

Maj. Gen. Brett Williams, article Offense and

defense not clearly separable in cyberspace, at
http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/offenseand-defense-not-clearly-separable-cyberspace-sayscybercom-general/2013-02-25

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exercises, both in the planning and the

execution stage. Despite the current trend
in decreasing defense budgets, the
challenges NATO must address are
increasingly complex and diversified,
prompting the need to find innovative
solutions to ensure the success of Alliance
operations not only in traditional
environments but also in the cyberspace.
Taking into account all the abovementioned considerations I can conclude
that determining how to address the
challenges
and
opportunities
that
cyberspace offers will remain an open
issue in an evolving process.
A lot of variables, as political
direction, legal and doctrinal provisions,
resources at disposal, available technology,
time capital, specialized workforce, etc.
will determine the manner in how the
armed forces develop feasible solutions to
the cyber issue. However, I believe that the
requirement to operate within this part of
the operational environment will remain,
regardless of the various constraints,
because, in the near future, to obtain and
maintain an advantage in the cyberspace
will be crucial to a successful military
operation.

2. ADRP 6-0, Mission Command,

Department of the Army, Washington,
DC, 17 May 2012;
3. FM 3-38, Cyber Electromagnetic
Activities, Department of the Army,
Washington, DC, 12 February 2014;
4. Krause H., NATO on its way towards a
comfort zone in cyber defence, NATO
CCD CoE, Tallin, Estonia, 2014;
5. Maj. Gen. Brett Williams, article
Offense and defense not clearly
separable
in
cyberspace,
at
http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/sto
ry/offense-and-defense-not-clearlyseparable-cyberspace-says-cybercomgeneral/2013-02-25, accessed on 10th
of September 2015;
6. Kufk J., policy paper NATO after the
Wales Summit: Readying the Alliance
for the Future, Octomber 2014, at
http://www.amo.cz/editor/image/produ
kty1_soubory/amocz_pp-2014-6.pdf,
accessed on 11th of September 2015.
This work was possible with the financial
support of the Sectorial Operational
Programme for Human Resources
Development 2007-2013, co-financed by
the European Social Fund, under the
project number POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385
with the title Integrated/educational
network for the formation, counseling
and orientation of doctoral students for a
research career in security, defense,
public order and national security
domains - SECNETEDU.

Bibliography
1. ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations,
Department of the Army, Washington,
DC, 16 May 2012;

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INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS PROFFESIONALS TRAINING

THROUGH SERIOUS GAMES SOLUTIONS
tefan-Antonio DAN-UTEU
LTC, Senior instructor PhD candidate, Command and Staff Faculty
Carol I National Defence Univeristy
dan.antonio@gmail.com

Abstract: The current operational environment, caractherized by new forms of hybrid threats to security and
defense, challenges the intelligence community, raising questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of the
traditional intelligence learning paradigm. The new operational requirement for intelligence is suggesting the
need of a complex, agile and adaptive analysis approach. Intelligence analysts (IA) professionals are daily
challenged with requests for rapid and accurate assessments about different subjects of interest, in an
environment in which the rough data and information is growing exponentially, putting more pressure both on
the IA and decision makers shouders. From this perspective the training of IA professionals is paramount in
ensuring the quality of intelligence products. The IA training process should include finding and rationalizing of
evidences, integration and synthesis of data from different sources, interpretation and evaluation of constantly
changing information, providing documentation and recommendations that meet the decision maker reporting
requirements. In this general context, through a holistic learning methodology and a serious games solution, the
Law Enforcement Intelligence Learning Applications - LEILA project, developed by a consortium of seven
organizations from four EU countries and co-funded by the European Commissions 7the Framework
Programme for Research and Technological Developpment under Grant Agreement no. 608303, empowers IA
by improving their cognitive capabilities, reasoning skills and creative thinking, at individual and group level.
This paper is summarizing some of the LEILA project team findings.
Keywords: information, intelligence, cycle, analysis, cognitive bias, serious games.

subsequently the processing of information

into valuable intelligence.
In order to face the challenges
posed by the societal transformation at
global level an, the military and civilian
organizations directly involved in the
prevention and fight against the security
threats, have reviewed and restructured
their way of thinking and subsequently
have reconsidered their tactics, technics
and procedures as well as their command
and control approach. Thus, every modern
organization portfolio should include an
important focus on the shift from
hyerachical to networked, on the necessity
for permanent adaptation to the
environment changes, on the identification
of the most appropriate ways for
organizational restructuring.
Within this general frame, where
everything is perceived through the
collective knowledge, the intelligence
activity is accomplished through a network

Intelligence analysis general framework

The current context in which the
planning of civilian and military operations
is conducted is significantly influenced by
the implementation of technologies,
applications and systems pertaining to the
field of information and communication,
ensuring the necessary infrastructure for a
continous an increasing data flow. The
business, economic, political and military
environments are impacted by this
exponential
increasing
volume
of
information which can introduce a lot of
noise and time-lag in the decisionmaking processes. In order to reduce or
eliminate these disturbing factors and to
determine a prompt decision and an
efficient reaction it is obvious that the
environment
associated
inteligence
processes should be properly designed,
ensuring the streamlining and filtering of
the various information flows and

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process, involving different parties

focusing on common goals, participating in
various degrees in the intelligence product
development.
The
21st
century
information boom determined a shift in
the intelligence paradigm, combining the
traditional intelligence framework with a
more collaborative approach, bringing
together intelligence experts, resources,
infrastructures and knowledge.
The transition from the need to
know to need to share should be
supported by an integrated information
infrastructure, able to offer the rapid access
to a wide range of different sources of
information, data bases and information
networks, key to every intelligence
analysis process. In a globalized world the
actors are interconnected, in qvasi real
time, the information flowing horizontaly,
vertically or diagonally between networked
entities. In this general context one key
issue for the intelligence community is to
identify, develop and implement new
technologies, platforms, procedures and
protocols in order to ensure the
management, analysis, evaluation and
exchange of information.
The evolution of organizations and
the mutations determined by the new
collaborative
intelligence
paradigm,
concurrent with the technological progress,
have determined massive changes within
the
intelligence
framework,
at
organizational and also at actional level.
Even though the tools generated through
the ITC technologies cannot be a substitute
for the human thinking and cannot direct
the intelligence processes, they can
optimize the information flows, offering an
analytical capability in support of the
information integration.
After 9/11 terrorists attacks the
cooperation and communication between
the intelligence, military and law
enforcement communities have increased,
taking advantage of the developments in
the area of information and communication
technologies and applications, sensors
fusion, data mining, artificial intelligence,

virtual reality, drone technologies etc.

However it seems that, despite this
technological apparatus at disposal, the
nowadays challenge in the intelligence
business seems to be not the employment
of technology a continuous effort
throughout history but the understanding
of what intelligence itself is.
Generally, the term intelligence is
used to designate pieces of data and
information about people, places, objects
and events linked to and objective of
interest. Subsequently, the data and
information, resulting from different
sources is refined through an analytic
process and becomes an intelligence
product used by decision makers.
According to the majority of
methodologies the intelligence cycle
process comprises several specific phases:
planning / direction/tasking, collection,
evaluation, collation/ processing, analysis,
inference development, dissemination and
re-evaluation, as depicted in figure no. 1.
The intelligence process, whatever
the field in which it is applied, is
commonly presented as a cycle of
subsequent phases. These phases deal with
focusing collection assets/sources on
information gaps, putting the information
in a logical order in order to analyse it
through various techniques, drawing
conclusions and more importantly
assessing future actions of the targets as
well as auditing the efficiency of the
process. However, this whole effort is
useless if intelligence is not appropriately
disseminated. In order to switch the IC
mentality from need to know to need to
share, the current dissemination protocol is
to share by rule and to withhold by
exception.
The intelligence cycle process has a
circular nature, and movement between the
steps is fluid. Intelligence uncovered at one
step may require going back to an earlier
step before moving forward. Thus,
evaluation and re-evaluation is an on-going
process that is applied to each stage.

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Figure no. 1. The intelligence cycle process

information, facts and information gaps

filled with certain assumptions;
Conclusions - consolidated
explanations, supported by accurate,
complete and proven to be true
information.
This evolutionary process that
begins with data symbols, then continues
with the information that involve
understanding the relationships between
systems, then knowledge that is
understanding the examples (for a common
understanding
of
the
operational
environment, in the military domain all
data and information are represented using
standard sets of symbols and systems along
with details on their display and plotting to
ensure the compatibility, and to the
greatest
extent
possible,
the
interoperability of Command, Control,
Communications,
Computers,
and
Intelligence systems). The final step is the
transition from knowledge to wisdom
namely understanding assessed and applied
knowledge by understanding not only of
phenomena, but the principles that govern
them.

A phase with specific features is

Inference
Development,
in
which
integration techniques are tools used by IA
to get useful meaning from the collected
information. The first truly analytical
product of the whole process is obtained by
generating inferences (deductions) based
on primary processed data. Premises are
outlined on the correct description of the
data and information acquired in earlier
stages and designed to select and assign
those that converge to a common point.
Thus, from a pool of data and information
one can derive a cluster of assumptions
which subsequently can generate different
combinations
leading
to
different
conclusions. The Inference Development
phase output consists in the several
products as:
Hypotheses

intuitive
explanations that requires additional
information to be confirmed or invalidated;
Predictions prospects of
future, an attempt to anticipate future
events;
Estimates

situational
assessment issued on the basis of

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The information is considered to

have value if it can answer the following
questions:
Who? The source;
What?
Description
of
event/action;
When? Timeframe of the
event/action;
Where? Location of the
event/action;
How? - The way the information
was acquired.
Why? The objective/goal
This method, known as the W4HW
matrix is widely used also in marketing as
well as in engineering. Interpretation of
data and information is the mental,
objective and impartial process, which
completes the stage of converting them
into intelligence products. This activity is
based on the theory of analysis, logic,
experience, knowledge, ways of thinking
and practical sense oriented to establish the
significance of data and information in
terms of what future events likelyhood. All
this aspects reemphasizxe the complexity
of intelligence analysis workflows, as
depicted in figure no. 2.

In particular when dealing with

complex issues, analysts can incur in
several kinds of errors that in turn can lead
to inaccurate analytic conclusions.
Examples of such mistakes are: excessive
influence played by a first impression,
based on incomplete data, an already
existing analytic line, a single explanation
that seems to fit well with the available
data; use of aprioristic explanations and
hypotheses
formulated
before
the
beginning of the analysis work; favour for
evidence that support their preferred
hypothesis, despite it could also be
consistent with alternative explanations.
Given all the available information,
the analysis of competing hypotheses ACH technique forces the analysts to take
in due consideration all the possible
explanations rather than just sticking with
the first one which seems satisfactory
enough. In order to do so, analysts are
requested to explicitly identify all the
reasonable alternative hypotheses, then to
array the evidence against each hypothesis.
Once all the hypotheses and evidence are
put together in a matrix-like style, it
becomes possible (and actually quite easy)

evaluating
the plausibility
Figure no. 2. The intelligence
analysis workflow

of

each

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hypothesis against all the available

evidence.
From a formal point of view,
performing an ACH usually involves 10
sequential steps:
Identify all the possible
hypotheses by means of
brainstorming amongst all the
analysts;
Extract all significant evidence
and arguments relevant to all
the hypotheses selected at point
1;
Arrange
hypotheses
and
evidence
on
a
matrix,
respectively as columns and
rows, then determine whether
each piece of evidence is
consistent, inconsistent, or not
applicable to each hypothesis;
Go through the matrix and
reconsider
the
listed
hypotheses, to see whether new
ones should be added;
By counting the pieces of
evidence
that
are
consistent/inconsistent
with
each hypothesis, evaluate what
are the weakest and strongest
hypotheses;

Report all the conclusions,

including weaker hypotheses
that should still be monitored as
new
information
becomes
available;
Establish the relative likelihood
for all the hypotheses;
Identify and start monitoring
indicators that would be both
consistent and inconsistent with
the full set of hypotheses.

Overview and trends in intelligence

analysis training
The training curriculum is directly
linked with the end product. In the
intelligence
community,
the
main
disciplines are generally adressing tactical
intelligence, strategic intelligence and
collection/reporting, each with a different
set of skills, experience and expertise but
interrelated, as depicted in figure no. 3.
Intelligence analysts usually begin their
training
with
an
intelligence
introduction/basic type course that enables
them to learn fundamental skills. Soon
after, they begin to specialize in one of the
three distinct analytic areas.

Figure no. 3. Relations between IA disciplines

Check if, amongst the critical

evidence, there are particularly
ones that, if proven wrong,
misleading or subject too
deception,
would
impact
significantly
on
the
explanations validity;
Check for denial and deception.
Is there missing evidence that
would instead be expected for a
given hypothesis to be true?

A tactical level intelligence analyst

focuses less on the bigger picture and more
on the information that comes from, or
supports what is happening on the ground.
The analyst must be proactive in his/her
information support provided to the
community, fast and aggressive in pushing
and pulling intelligence to the ground
agents, peers and up to the chain of
command.

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The strategic level, on the other

hand, work on longer-term threats on a
broader scale. Whereas a tactical
intelligence analyst might be focused on a
criminal case in a particular area, the
strategic one might be looking at the
national
or
transnational
criminal
organization perspective. By focusing on
understanding what the community knows
and what doesnt know the strategic
specialist
thus
analyses
threats,
vulnerabilities and knowledge gaps and
more importantly provides clarity to
facilitate the decision-maker. Therefore
critical thinking, memory and relational
intelligence become decisive for his/her
work.
The analysts working in the
collection/reporting
discipline
are
generally responsible for understanding the
intelligence
community
collection
capabilities and how they integrate in the
intelligence cycle. They also ensure that
information is disseminated in a timely
manner in order to fill the gaps and
therefore to streamline the intelligence
process from the tactical to the strategic
level. Hence, communicating with
confidence and clarity in multiple forms
and multiple languages enable these people
to be the link between the two levels.
The complexity of the skills
currently required by the IA job - a mixture
of experience, data manipulation and
critical thinking - demands a change in the
process of selection and training of
analysts as well as in the opportunities they
are offered. One of the most important
skills in the field of intelligence analysis is
the ability to think critically. This can be
defined as "a deliberate meta-cognitive
(thinking about thinking) and cognitive
(thinking) act whereby a person reflects on
the quality of the reasoning process
simultaneously while reasoning to a
conclusion. The thinker has two equally
important goals: coming to a solution and
improving the way she or he reasons
(Moore, 2007). Despite its centrality
within the work of intelligence analysts,

critical thinking has never been the main

focus of teaching, whether outside or
inside the intelligence community. Thus, it
is again reemphasized the fact that the
human factor is key in the intelligence
analysis process.
Intelligence analysis through serious
games - LEILA context
Serious games are popular games
category that is used for a purpose other
than just for the sake of entertainment.
Frequently, serious games simulate realworld events or processes designed for the
purpose of gaining experience in tasks
such as problem solving and critical
thinking. Game-based approaches in
training have the power to teach through
experiential learning and declarative
learning by allowing players to fail,
providing hints, and then allowing the
player to try again. There is an increasing
interest in the research community and in
the IA community in exploring gamebased approaches for IA training. The
simulation offers a way to improve student
understanding of the analytic process used
by intelligence analysts as well as analysts
in other fields such as business and public
policy.
The IA serious game simulations
can
give
participants
a
better
understanding of the ambiguity that IC
analysts face in their jobs, the difficult
assessments they must make based on
limited information, the complexities of
collaboration between different agencies in
the IC to produce unified judgments, and
the different perspectives of analysts and
policy makers. IA serious games can offer
a learning environment in which students
can experience intelligence analysis in
relevant scenarios. They can reflect on
how the learning experience enhances their
understanding of situations and future
performance in analysis. Intelligence in
todays world is not just about analysing
but about making operational decisions on
courses of action to be taken in the real

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world. It is also about considering the

consequences of such actions on the
environment. From this perspective a IA
simulation can evaluate a set of core skills
needed by intelligence analysts, as
creativity and critical thinking. Also a IA
serious game can be designed to address
and mitigate cognitive biases undermining
analysts
accurate
collection
and
interpretation of information. Through
gameplay, the players can be provided
with
awareness
information
and
opportunities to practice bias mitigation
techniques based on theoretical models,
such as the Heuristic-Systematic Model of
information processing.
In the context of an IA serious
game project the challenge consists in
designing learning experiences and gamesbased scenarios to:
Increase the IA awareness
of the different type of
Emotional,
Social
and
Cognitive biases and the
conditions under which
biases emerge;
Help the IA to recognize
when he is manifesting a
bias;
Provide to the IA a safe
environment where freely
experiment situations where
biases emerge and learn
from errors (experiential
learning);
Provide to the IA a range of
de-biasing strategies and an
environment to test their
efficacy
Provide to the IA an
engaging experience that
reinforce
the
learning
outcomes;
Embed in the learning
experience a broader range
of variations and scenarios
compared
with
more
traditional approaches;

Provide the IA strategies to

compensate
for
errors
resulting from biases.
The quality of the human resource
represents the biggest challenge with law
enforcement
intelligence
community
facing, than any other single factor. Thus,
the selection of personnel, recruitment
policies and their intense and staged
training are essential and indispensable.
According to Rob Johnstons Analytic
Culture in the U.S. Intelligence
Community. An Ethnographic Study, the
training has to start from the premise that
what most people know about this job is
mostly false. It is the duty of the
organization and its recruiters to present
its correct image and to work in order to
destroy the already established myths.
Based on diagnosis of the current ways of
education and training in the field of
intelligence analysis, only a few higher
education
programs
that
focuses
exclusively
on
law
enforcement
intelligence community seems to be. Most
of the education and training programs are
based on intelligence courses that
incorporate multidisciplinary topics and a
broad theoretical approach to intelligence
issues. A good program should not only
educate students by enabling them to learn
how to perform an intellectual process for
having analytical products, but it should
also train them by teaching them the
structures, techniques, and procedures
associated with the intelligence process.
Thus, the students are placed in active
roles to perform specific activities of
intelligence cycle, based on specific
scenarios, and then they have the
possibility to discuss what they learned.
This heuristics learning method is based
mainly on questioning and research, on
direct and practical experience, and on
creativity of the students.
Taking into account all the above
mentioned it is obvious that large
organizations with responsibilities in the
national security and defense are more and
more interested in finding new ways and

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66

novel approaches for an effective and

efficient training of intelligence analysis
professionals, pertaining not only to law
enforcement organizations, military and
special services but also to business
intelligence.
In line with this IA training
requirement has been initiated the Law
Enforcement
Intelligence
Learning
Applications - LEILA project. This project
has been developed by a consortium of
seven organizations from four EU
countries and co-funded by the European
Commissions
7the
Framework
Programme
for
Research
and
Technological Developpment under Grant
Agreement no. 608303, in order to
improve IA cognitive capabilities,
reasoning skills and creative thinking, at
individual and group level.
The aim of the LEILA project is to
provide law enforcement organizations
with an innovative learning methodology
to address the improvement of IA thinking,
awareness of cognitive biases, improved
filtering and efficient analysis of large
amounts of data, decision making under
social and time pressure, improved
communication and collaboration skills
leading to a creative intelligence process.
The innovation of LEILA holistic
approach is brought by the combination of
several domains which are normally
explored and adressed separately such as:
psycho-sociological
and
cognitive factors in decision
making
(e.g.
decision
biases, critical thinking,
multiple
reasoning
strategies, creativity);
decision making strategies
under uncertainty (e.g.
Bayesian approaches, game
theory);
group interaction dynamics
in intelligence analysis.

effective
and
innovative
Learning
Experiences, which can be deployed
flexibly among the targeted professionals
population of security domains and
industry as well as potentially beyond.
Intelligence
Analysts
and
Law
Enforcement Agents in different European
countries are trained very differently.
LEILAs Learning Experiences are
designed and deployed in order to be easy
to tailor in terms of sequence and selection
of modules, injection of additional content,
adaptation to specific schedules and
curricula, as well as most importantly
the possibility to deploy them in a
blended format combining traditional
class-room on-site workshops with online
modules learners can participate to without
having to leave their workplace.
The LEILA Learning Experiences,
and
particularly
their
individual
Components, address critical competences
which are not relevant only in the Law
Enforcement context. We assumed that
Intelligence Analysts operating in industry,
in the economy, society or in other local
and global organizations might also profit
from similar learning experiences, opening
up a potentially larger diffusion space for
the Learning Modules developed in
LEILA.
Three Learning Experiences have
been designed and being currently
developed in the context of the Project.
After an intensive design phase, conducted
in tight collaboration with domain experts,
the Projects exploitable foreground
consists of threeindependent LEILA
Learning Experiences, namely:
1. The VUCA Challenge (VUCA
stands
for
Volatility,
Uncertainty,
Complexity and Ambiguity) is an intensive
learning experience focusing on the
challenge of operating in crisis situations
where time is very limited, and intelligence
analysts need to filter effectively through
large amounts of information and
interactions in order to identify and address
a number of complex situations. It also
addresses other relevant competences

Based on the IA learning

methodology the goal of the LEILA
Project is the design and development of

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67

related to cognitive and behavioral biases

like Overconfidence or Fundamental
Attribution Errors.
2. The WhatATeam! Challenge
aims primarily at addressing critical
competences necessary to reach high
performance when operating in Team
Contexts, and particularly in diverse and
distributed teams, as many crossorganizational
and
international
cooperation situations require nowadays.
The focus here is hence the one of
developing
enhanced
Collaboration
Competences, targeting an impact at the
individual, teams, as well as organizational
or inter-organizational performance levels.
3. The " LabRint Challenge" is
addressing specific skills and competencies
related with the art and science of
information analysis, with particular
emphasis on the intelligence functions
and the "analytic multipliers" of the
Intelligence Analysis Cycle. The LabRint
Learning Experience workshops and
curriculum design is based on the most
relevant aspects characterizing the
operational environment of the intelligence
analysts community, with particular focus
on:
The specific framework,
defined by an information
rich environment, with
access to large quantities of
heterogeneous data which
are not accurate, complete,
conclusive, or relevant;
The diverse specialization
of subject matter experts
within the intelligence
disciplines and/or assigned
task areas;
The
specificity
of
intelligence work, in terms
of
individual
and/or
collective analysis efforts;
The trend for networked,
interdepartmental
and
interagency
intelligence
analysis
framework,
correlated
with
the

extensive use of modern

sensors, information and
communication
systems
technologies;
The frequent and extensive
collaboration with other
analysts, providing the
increase of self-awareness;
The evaluation criteria and
standards
for
the
intelligence analysis endproducts with emphasis on
Timeliness,
Accuracy,
Usability,
Completeness,
and Relevance.
The use of analytic models
and methods for hypothesis
generation
and
argumentation.
The LEILA prototype has been
tested through a series of pilots/trials in
Bucharest and Athens, with an audience
composed by IA form different law
enforcement organizations, military special
services and currently, based on lessopn
learned from the pilots is undergoing a
complex refinement and developpment
process.
The LEILA learning experiences
can be a fortunate addition to every
intelligence analysis training course taking
into account the fact that through its
instructional technology it can reduce the
cost of instruction, making it more
accessible and effective. Also it ensures
the progress tracking for the trainees,
helping them in achieving the training
targets and provides opportunities for IA to
achieve higher cognitive levels in
accordance with the IA job requirements.
Bibliography
1. Bose, R. (2008). Competitive
intelligence process and tools for
intelligence analysis. Industrial
Management & Data Systems,
108(4), 510528.
2. Dunbar, N. E., Wilson, S. N.,
Adame, B. J., Elizondo, J., Jensen,

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Umane 2007-2013 Investete n OAMENI

68

3.

4.

5.

6.

M. L., Miller, C. H., Burgoon, J.

K. (2013). Macbeth: Development
of a Training Game for the
Mitigation of Cognitive Bias.
International Journal of GameBased Learning, 3(4), 726.
Hall, W. M., & Citrenbaum, G.
(2009). Intelligence Analysis. How
to Think in Complex Environments.
Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger
Security International.
Heuer Jr., R. J. (2007). Psychology
of Intelligence Analysis (2nd ed.).
Reston, VA: Pherson Associates
LLC.
Johnston, R. (2005). Analytic
Culture in the U.S. Intelligence
Community. An Ethnographic
Study. Washington, DC: Central
Intelligence Agency, Center for the
Study
of
Intelligence.
at
http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/analyti
c.pdf
Fehringer, D., Hohhof, B., &
Johnson, T. (2006). State of the
Art: Competitive Intelligence. A
Competitive
Intelligence
Foundation Research Report 20052006. at http://www.adec.fr/files_
upload/documentation/2006072015

28250.f_060608_stateofart_sum.
pdf
7. Moore, D. T. (2007). Critical
Thinking and Intelligence Analysis.
at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/
awc/awcgate/dia/ndic_moore_crit_
analysis_hires.pdf
8. NATO. (2012b). JP 2-01, Joint and
National Intelligence Support to
Military Operations. at http://www.
dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_01.
pdf
9. NATO. (2013). JP 2-0, Joint
Intelligence. at http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/new_ pubs/jp2_0.pdf
10. LEILA project webpage at
http://www.leila-project.eu/

This work was made possible through

financial support provided through the
Sectoral Operational Program Development
of Human Resources 2007-2013, cofinanced by the European Social Fund, in the
project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with
the title Security through knowledge
Integrated/educational
network
of
training, counseling and guidance of PhD
students for a career in research of
security, defense, public order and national
security - SECNETEDU.

Proiect cofinanat din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operaional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor
Umane 2007-2013 Investete n OAMENI

69

POSSIBLE DOCTRINE EVOLUTIONS DUE TO CURRENT

CONFLICTS
Cristian-Octavian STANCIU
Lieutenant colonel, Advanced instructor, PhD student,
Staff and Command Faculty, Land Forces Department,
Carol I National Defence University

Abstract: The new perception of the expected pace of war nowadays has a major impact on the representation
of conflict and in the formulation of doctrine in general and military doctrine, in particular. Rapid adjustment
to the current pace of the next type of war will be a key factor in military strategic success. The big actors
tend to begin a game with a preconceived notion of how fast events will take place. Such events include how fast
the opposite part can be worn down and how quickly a certain segment of the game map can be occupied
without any concerns about the costs.
Keywords: strategy, doctrine, military art, war, conflict, hybrid warfare.

In the recent history of humanity,

the conflict phenomenon has undergone
various transformations and ideological
mutations; still, no matter the shape it took,
sticking to its original etymology: in Latin,
the word conflingere was translated by
hurting each other. In individual or
group mentality, more often than not, we
assimilate the notion of conflict with an
overwhelming, confusing, and destructive
situation both for the people involved in it,
and for those potentially involved in it,
inevitably feeling it in everyday life. Yet, if
we look back in time, we may make the
pertinent observation that conflict is one of
the pillars society evolution was based on.
All the changes that happened on a social
level are unconceivable without the
differences or incompatibilities among
human perceptions, aspirations, values, and
interests that create a clear path towards
the future. Nature inevitably includes
differences of opinion and interests,
therefore the certainty of conflict. Conflict
is light and darkness, hazard and chance,
stability and change, strength and
weakness, and the means to go forward.
All conflicts contain innately the germs of
creation and destruction.1
1

Permanent preoccupations for

defining conflict led to numerous theories
having as starting point its pathology, the
place where it occurs, or the way in which
it manifests itself. For purely practical
considerations, in order to build a series of
intervention strategies, conflict may be
defined conceptually, in point of shape,
dimensions and complexity, but for any
endeavor to include positive solving
effects, we have to pay attention to the
general context in which it occurs with
every particular implication, aspects
generating a certain doctrine-ideological
package.
The evolution of society and,
therefore, of the types of social
interactions, also led inevitably to the
evolution of conflict typology, which
definitely involves a more and more clear
development of individual and protection
group needs, cumulated in a series of
principles, norms, concepts, and rules
elaborated on the basis of unifying options
taken from the whole amount of
scientific theories, theoretical knowledge,
and generalizations based on practice,
pertaining entirely to doctrine. In this
situation we may state that doctrines are
products of the evolution of human
knowledge, of ideology proliferation,

Sun Tzu Art of War

70

science
development,
crystalizing
convictions, imposing options consecrated
or accepted officially and institutionally.
Contemporary doctrines, and here
we are referring to those belonging to the
military domain, have a high degree of
complexity and a comprehensive character
given especially by the dynamic changes
of the current security environment. The
approaches embraced by conceptual
thinking regarding the use and role of
force in intra- and inter-state relationships
have constantly generated military and
non-military capabilities, both stylized and
diversified, situated on high levels of
technological development, but mostly as
acts of counter-reaction for some states and
phenomena that can no longer be included
in the classical domain dictated by the
principles of armed combat.
The strategies of current conflicts,
which are closely connected to operative
art, and on the other hand, to the tactics
used, directly inter-related to the technical
capabilities of equipment and armaments,
only seldom aim at defending an enemy
and compelling him to surrender. The
purpose of the initiating party is to
demoralize the society it considers as
enemy, to destabilize social and ethnic
stability, to paralyze the economic
mechanisms ensuring its functioning, and
to do away with the fundamental and
functional institutions of the state.
Each new conflict has its distinct
parameters that necessitate specific
solutions, according to the respective
temporal and spatial circumstances and
involves cutting the Gordian knot of
well-defined and instituted reasons,
scientific techniques, and the art of
diplomacy. Judging from these ways of
reasoning
related
to
doctrines,
complementary to classical theories, by
combining the constitutive aspects of
modern conflict, hybrid theory was born,
with a dynamic, complex, and multi-lateral
composition.
In the last decade, the most
important
state actors and even

organizations, included and developed in

their strategies of security these new
hybrid challenges and threats, starting from
a common denominator: the fact that
modern conflict is actually a set of
conflicts structurally interconnected. The
concept of hybrid warfare appeared at
the beginning of 2005 and was used at that
time in order to briefly describe the
strategy used by Hezbollah in the Lebanese
war. As the Lebanese conflicting
manifestations escalated and other local
conflicts emerged having implications
upon the surrounding areas in the region,
this hybrid term started little by little to
dominate doctrine discussions referring to
the warfare of the future up to the point
where it as even adopted by the higher
decision-making military bodies and
promoted as a fundament of future military
strategies. The central core of the hybrid
phenomenon is still military action, but in
this situation the enemies use conventional
and unconventional, regular and irregular
resources and tactics in order to exploit all
the stages and dimensions of conflict.
In practice, any threat may be
hybrid, as long as it is not limited to only
one shape and dimension of war. There is
no doubt that nowadays opponents have
developed the full-spectrum area of
conflict, including the use of conventional
and unconventional tactics in all the
dimensions of war. By analyzing the
significance of the term and especially by
correlating it to the Western literature in
the field, we understand that "hybrid
warfare" is a notion referring to a large
area of hostile actions in which military
force plays just a small part and which are
performed simultaneously and in a
concentrated manner as various aspects of
a flexible strategy, with medium and long
term objectives.
In the Russian media, we find that
hybrid warfare is a military strategy
combining a conventional warfare, a small
warfare and the cybernetic warfare. In the
same way, another distinctive feature is
given by the fact that in the hybrid

71

warfare actions are conducted primarily in

the information space and the entity
controlling this space is going to obtain
victory. The theories mentioned above
were based on the latest events in Ukraine,
where the world noticed that in the given
circumstances, the information instrument
of power was all the more visible and this
led to the feeling of doctrine changing both
in the art of war and in military art.
Throughout history there have been
many instances in which, through
successfully applying the instrument of
power information remarkable results
were obtained both at the level of war and
at the level of armed combat. As an
example, we may refer to the annexation of
Sudet region in 1938, and then the
occupation of the entire Czechoslovakia by
Nazi Germany where, massive propaganda
actions combined with the riots of the
German population dominant in the area
resulted in the annexation of a region
without using weapons. This was a
remarkable strategic result, resembling
what happened in Crimea in 2014, with the
only difference that in the latter case
modern technical means were used for the
successful undertaking of information
warfare, which was a natural act at the
moment given the technological leaps.
Other events from history resembling the
war in Eastern Ukraine currently going on
may be: the Soviet-Afghan war (19791989); the Korean wars (1950-1953) and
Vietnam (1957-1975), where insurgent
forces were supported economically,
militarily and information-wise by the
great powers with geopolitical interests in
the given areas.
Making use of the lessons learned
in the domains of military science, we can
notice that subsequent to the military
events taking place in Ukraine, no change
was noticed in strategic and operational art,
so warfare has remained the same social
phenomenon with a strongly destructive
character, and whatever is called nowadays
hybrid warfare is rather a concept or a
sum of concepts generating a strategic

action plan in an armed conflict. At the

military strategic level, there were no
significant changes, preserving the same
principles of application of armed force in
different military stages during the
escalation of conflict. Military successes or
failures of the actions of our neighbors are
not the result of a mutation in the way
armed combat is conducted, but rather the
result of the more or less successful
application of the instruments of military
strategy.
At present, a series of experts in the
field, being under the influence of the good
results obtained by the American Army in
the Gulf wars, foresee more and more
often major changes in the characteristic
features of armed combat, stating that it is
no longer going to happen on large fronts,
mass armies will no longer be needed, and
classical military actions are history.
Armed combat is most probably going to
involve small, mobile troops, on certain
directions related to specific targets with a
high degree of significance, which is a
relevant aspect only when a series of
asymmetric actions are approached
between a strongly technologized force and
an inferior force, obsolete technologically.
The situation is totally different whet two
relatively equal forces are fighting, having
the same military potential. In this case, the
armed combat will involve the same
principles and procedures as 50-60 years
ago, and military actions will come back to
the same positions while the states with
less technological possibilities will try to
maintain or enhance their military potential
by enhancing the number of troops and
coming back to the same mass armies.
If we make a succinct analysis of
the events in Ukraine, we notice clearly
that in the first phase of the war, military
actions were based on movement and
maneuver on both sides, operations were
conducted in certain directions, but
towards the end of 2014, military actions
acquired
a
static,
position-related
character, just as those 100 years ago, a
classical example of the First World War.

72

Thus, by centralizing the entry elements in

the algorithm of analysis of the strategic
component, we can state that no major
doctrine change has been performed at the
given level, but rather information
instruments were applied more intensely
and concertedly, giving the illusion of an
impulse for a radical change.
Under umbrella term of hybrid
warfare, which is more and more
frequently used, there is also a popular idea
that at the level of operational military art
immediate changes have taken place,
which also lacks in realism especially
because changes cannot be implemented
instantaneously, as they need a certain
transition period. In order to bring
arguments for the given phenomenon,
more and more specialists refer, just as in
the case of the strategic level, to the events
that have happened and are still happening
in Ukraine, without being able to find a
plausible cycle of argumentation for the
changes anticipated on the operative level
and only mentioning them generally at this
stage.
If we perform a further analysis of
the concept and its major constitutive
factors for this level of military art, that is
the structure of force groups, the areas of
operations, the directions of operations, the
major objectives and, last but not least, the
armament systems with operational affects,
we can say that they have undergone some
changes not radical, though but rather
deviations from the requests of operational
art, deviations which were obviously fed
by the technological updates and led to
negative effects, thus sketching a series of
mutations at this level. It is known that at
the operation level of armed combat, force
groups have a flexible structure and are a
central element of the strategic objective
established. In the Second World War,
clear principles and rules were established
for creating operation force groups, the
same principles and rules being applied in
the aftermath of the war, the effects
generating remarkable results. The recent
Iraqi wars, where the correct application of

principles and norms of operational art led

to obtaining excellent results for the
multinational coalition, represent another
beneficial stage in the process of doctrine
evolution.
The tactical level of combat fight is
the smallest yet the most dynamic level of
military art. In order to notice the recent
changes produced at this level, in a similar
way to what happens at the operational
level, it is necessary to analyze the main
factors of influence and interaction. Reality
shows that, of all the determining factors,
this level includes a lot and just a small
amount of them have remained constant
and will probably remain so in the future
too. These are the factors pertaining to
technological developments in armament
and military technique, which have been
are still going to be the main promoters of
changes in tactics. Even if the modern
battlefield has started to shelter high
precision armament systems, sophisticated
command and control systems, efficient
protection systems and so on, which up to
a point is a natural phenomenon as long as
it is part of the evolution of society, no
essential adjustments were produced at the
tactical level of armed combat, but rather a
series of adjustments to whatever is
already present. The element of novelty at
this level appears only in the moment when
classical tactical actions are combined with
a series of asymmetric actions such as
propaganda, disinformation, economic
sanctioning measures, executed by
conventional forces in cooperation with
unconventional forces on a general
background of induced confusion, but
without taking into consideration the
principles and basic laws of armed combat.
This is practically the starting point in
elaborating new tactics, techniques and
procedures that might generate in turn a
future doctrine approach after a given
model, even though entries could be
extremely diverse.
Taking
into
account
our
considerations regarding the three levels of
military art, we can state that hybrid

73

warfare includes a range of asymmetric

actions under the classical concept,
materialized in a combination of
conventional
and
unconventional
capabilities in order to reach a precisely set
goal. In this respect, the British expert
James Sherr said that the hybrid warfare
is conceived to paralyze a state even
before realizing that conflict has already
started. This is a tactics meant to avoid
NATO provisions referring to the
perception of conflict state and initiating
reaction.2 As a possible ideological
counter-reaction, General Gerasimov,
Chief of Russian General Staff, said that
the rules of war have radically changed;
the efficiency of non-military tools in
conflict for reaching political-military
objectives surpassing that of weapons.3
Even if the concept and the
phenomenon associated to the concept
have developed from the doctrine
perspective by the reflective projection in a
series of reparatory strategies, the
operational implementation will not be
reached in a unitary manner, suffering
certain dysfunctions generated exactly by
the insufficiency of specific elements in
the branch.

Bibliography
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

Bowers C. Identifying Emerging

Hybrid
Adversaries,
Strategic
Studies Institute, 2012
Gerasimov V. - The Value of
Science in Anticipating, 2013
Hoffman F. - On Not-So-New
Warfare: Political Warfare vs.
Hybrid Threats, War on the Rocks,
2014
Kofman M., McDermott R. - No
Return to Cold War in Russias New
Military Doctrine, Eurasia Review,
2015
NATO site: http://nato.int./indexen.htm

This work was made possible through

financial support provided through the
Sectoral Operational Program Development
of Human Resources 2007-2013, cofinanced by the European Social Fund, in the
project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with
the title Security through knowledge
Integrated/educational
network
of
training, counseling and guidance of PhD
students for a career in research of
security, defense, public order and national
security - SECNETEDU.

James Sherr The Russian Challenge, Chatham

House Report
3
General Valery Vasilevich Gerasimov The
Russian Chief of General Staff
2

74

PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THREATS

ON THE BATTLEFIELD
Viorel CEASCAI
Associate Professor, PhD, Carol I National DefenCe University
vioceas2000yahoo.com
Abstract: The threats encountered on the battlefield and the difficult and extreme situations that the soldier
(used as a generic term for military personnel) has to endure are consequences of major factors of combat
circumstances. These factors may take various shapes, all of them with their particular physical and
psychological consequences. Countering these threats may be done by elaborating preventive programs that
should be based on appropriate physical and psychological training.
Keywords: psychological threat, physical threat, battlefield, important factors, physical training.

The demanding issues that the

military has to face on the battlefield takes
different shapes having the most
unexpected consequences. In most cases,
these consequences produce visible
physical and psychological effects in the
behavior of military combatants. The
soldier is just a person; he/she is neither a
machine nor a robot. The environment
influences him/her, the demands of the
battlefield causes traumas that put him/her
in the situation in which he/she might find
it difficult to accomplish the objectives of
the mission. All these issues created by the
difficult situations encountered by the
soldier constitute the same amount of
physical and psychological threats to
his/her integrity and to everything he/she
has to accomplish.
There are a lot of physical threats
generally speaking. Physiological factors
cause physical exhaustion and frequently
create conditions for low morale in the
ranks. They are manifested at all times, but
more often than not are just temporary,
localized and characterized rather by
symptoms of apathy than by contagious
crises. These threats include a series of
physical reactions of the body such as:
physical tiredness, which occurs because
of uninterrupted combat actions, during the
day and at night, in summer and in winter;
because of marching on distances longer
than 20-40 km, because of rapid assaults,

because of digging, because of passing

through large areas of mines and ruins,
because of swimming across rivers
carrying heavy weight (up to 60 kilos),
because of transporting materiel and
performing different works necessitating
high physical strength and, finally, because
of preparing for combat and combat itself
in which positions must be firmly
defended; mental fatigue, consequences of
the large array of emotions felt; the lack of
sleep, which is the normal state for
militaries in combat; tiredness of sensors,
caused by extremely loud noises affecting
their hearing and bright lights affecting
their sight; hunger, which is sometimes
caused by cutting off supplies and other
times caused by combat excitement which
makes the soldier forget to eat or lose
appetite; the thirst, which occurs a lot
faster, because the water needs of the
human body grow in stressful situations;
lack of morality, consequence of the
affective
and
intellectual
vacuum
characterizing the soldiers situation;
terrible weather phenomena which may
sometimes cause more loses than the
enemy; physiological issues, generated by
the lack of a certain degree of psychosocial and material comfort1.
1

Vezi, Andrei I., Importana pregtirii fizice n

procesul de instruire militar, Editura Universitii
Naionale de Apare Carol I, Bucureti, 2015,
pp.64-65

75

Psychological threats may become

ever more damaging because of the
psychological toxins produced literally by
the battlefield, by its smells and noise.
These appear and are amplified as an effect
of imagination, especially in the state of
waiting, under fire, when the dominant
feeling is that of the impossibility to take
action. When coming into contact with the
enemy, every solider is overwhelmed by
anxiety which is a physiological reflex of
defense; through its constitutive elements,
the anguish gives the physical warning
while the insecurity feeling gives the moral
warning of danger. In case of fear, physical
anguish persists and the insecurity feeling
grows in an exaggerated manner; at the
same time an intellectual element occurs
polarizing any activity in one direction or
another, hence the possibility to run away
or, not so often, to be incapable of
movement. A frightened person suffers an
inhibition, that is, he/she is unable to act,
to run, to think clearly, in one word, he/she
cannot do anything well. Very often, terror
immobilizes people. At other times, terror
makes them extremely active, urging them
to run frantically. As human being, in a lot
of cases, the soldier is really overwhelmed
with the sensation of fear manifested
through the fear of: death; possible
wounding that might make him lose
physical integrity; surprising actions; the
fire test that he does not know how to
overcome; isolation, that is getting lost
from the group (a fear which is stronger
than all others); pain and suffering. This
happens to every person without any
exception; these fears being felt more by
the elder than by the young; more by the
married than by the single; more by the
people with a lower level of intelligence
and culture; more by the soldiers than the
officers; more by the inactive soldiers than
the engaged ones2.
Also, fear has various physical
effects which are quite constant: violent
heartbeats; heavy stomach; sensation of ill
2

stomach; trembling and restlessness; cold

sweat; stomach tension; weakness and
fainting sensation; vomit; losing control of
ones bowels; loss of urine.
All of the above show very clearly
the threats encountered on the battlefield
and the difficult, extreme circumstances
that the soldier has to endure. All these are
possible due to major factors of combat
effort. These factors take a lot of shapes,
each of them with their psychological and
physical consequences.
Physical factors usually comprise
the environmental factors (temperature,
luminosity, sonic stage); atmospheric
conditions of living and training (shelter,
equipment,
weapons,
food);
the
individuals physical level of development
(strength, height, abilities, movement
coordination).
Psychosocial factors include: the
motivation of activity, the relationships
between individuals and groups, and the
leadership style. These may be internal
ones, those pertaining directly to the
individual, and external ones, those which
are independent of the will and power of
intervention of the human being. In the
domain of military action, especially in
case of armed fight, there is a specific
ranking of factors and elements
determining a certain level of psychophysical resistance and certain stability in
this respect. Elements stemming from each
factor may, in certain circumstances, turn
into causes determining a lower psychophysical resistance and the occurrence of
tiredness.
The human factor refers to
elements that influence directly the
psycho-physical
resistance:
physical
elements such as the physical shape
(robustness,
height,
muscle
force,
movement speed) and the degree of
physical growth; biological elements sex,
race or other anatomic-physiological
elements; psychological elements: the
quality of psychological processes and
products, the level of psychological
growth, the system of needs, desires,

Ibidem, pp.65-66

76

motives, interests, ideals, quality of

affective emotions; cultural elements,
referring to the level of general knowledge,
professional knowledge and military
knowledge; elements pertaining to talents
and attitudes: the diversity and quality of
skills, abilities, competences, degree of
motivation and interest for a certain type of
activity.
The combat technique factor is
analyzed in accordance with the principles
and demands of ergonomics, because the
unexpected, extraordinary developments as
well as the increasing costs of complex
equipment have brought to the forefront
the issue of adapting the technique to
mans limited abilities. Thus, the following
elements produce a permanent growth and
a high stability of psychological and
physical resistance: the characteristics of
production, functioning and using modern
fight means presupposing special effort
from
the
militaries,
especially
psychologically and intellectually, of fast
assimilation; the technical solution of
performing technical commands (shape,
amplitude, resistance to action) requires a
higher or lower consumption of energy,
which sooner or later leads to the
appearance of tiredness; the functional
state of combat means (reliability, degree
of wearing, spare parts situation)
determines a certain degree of confidence
in the respective technique; the level of
pollution produced by the combat
technique (physical, chemical, noise
pollution).
The environment factor refers to
those elements which compose and define
the background of action: physical and
chemical peculiarities of the background in
which military actions take place (light,
temperature,
humidity,
atmospheric
pressure, altitude, noise, vibrations). These
elements become determining factors of
psycho-physiological resistance when
surpassing certain limits, generating over
demanding conditions for the human body
that might endanger its very existence; the
peculiarities of military groups, the quality

of relationships in the group and their

cohesion; satisfying the material and
cultural needs and especially the
possibilities of relaxation.
The task factor impacts psychophysical resistance in the following
manner: the working conditions influence
in a defining manner the dynamics of
psycho-physical resistance in two respects:
work intensity or speed, either real or only
perceived as intense because of the lack of
time and the normative background, the
principles and norms leading the action;
the temporal dimension of action is in a
reversely proportional ratio with its
intensity or speed. When the two elements
have extreme values, the results are over
demands which, going beyond certain
limits, put in danger the lives of
individuals. This task factor has a different
influence
upon
the
individuals
psychological resistance when compared to
his/her responsibility in action. Performing
an activity and accomplishing a mission
always trigger the stage of assessment or
self-assessment of the effort and of the
results obtained. Work gratification
becomes stimulating for new efforts and
for overcoming disturbing, stressful
factors, while over or underestimation of
subordinates efforts becomes an element
which hiders the tendency towards effort
and makes it possible to intensify the
effects of strong action factors so as to
reduce psychological and physical
resistance.
The factors related to the presence
and the potential or real action of the
enemy are obvious in: the quality and
number of enemy forces; the quantity and
quality of armament and combat technique,
as well as in its estimated power; the
psychological actions undertaken; the
aggressors behavior in occupied territory
towards civilian population; the way
prisoners and defectors are treated.
The battlefield specific factors: the
desolate and discouraging aspect with dead
and wounded people and ruins; the
precarious living conditions; the high

77

frequency or potential danger of mass

disease; the long waiting intervals or the
sudden changes; the lack of information or,
on the contrary, an overflow of
information; the quality of leadership and
its effect upon the system of inter-human
relationships.
The consequences of psychological
and physiological threats may be
counteracted only by programs of training
and instruction able to ensure the physical,
psychological, and social stability of the
soldiers, as well as to generate and develop
the feeling of self-confidence. The
instruction process has to take into account
the important factors that do not necessitate
essential changes. This is due to the
question of efficiency of the instruction
process, in circumstances in which the
time and the financial and material means
available are limited. It is totally
nonsensical to invest time and means
without obtaining the expected results.
German military specialists consider that
in the future, a greater emphasis should be
placed on the factors that may be easily
used by instructors and trainers at all
echelons. Thus, it is known that physical
capacity and, connected to that, soldiers
effort capacity are closely connected to the
relationship between rest and tiredness3.
Within the instruction process,
physical training has ample beneficial
effects upon the body and for maintaining
the state of somatic, psychological and
psycho-social health. It has physicalsomatic effects, biological effects, as well
as psycho-somatic effects and it serves as a
foundation for all other types of behavior:
development of perception and dynamics,
attention capacity, verbal, non-verbal, and
para-verbal
communication
capacity,
development of a harmonious shape,
building a good image of the self,
development of cognitive functions,
socializing, etc. The positive effects of
physical exercises contribute to stress

prophylaxis by increasing the resistance to

illnesses, a longer active life, a more
diminished state of psycho-physical
tiredness. Physical exercises performed
regularly and systematically, especially
outdoors, play a determining role in
improving physiological functions in general
and may lead to obtaining a beneficial state
of the body called eustress4.
Using the simplest and most efficient
means at hand, physical exercises can define
the most important role they play in
surpassing the states of tiredness and stress.
Thus, they are real tools that prepare the
body for dealing successfully with the
demands waiting for them. The soldiers
who are well trained physically have a
superior psychological capacity of
preventing and combating the negative
effects of the battlefield.
Bibliography
1.

2.

3.

Andrei, I., Importana pregtirii

fizice n procesul de instruire
militar,
Editura
Universitii
Naionale de Aprare Carol I,
Bucureti, 2015.
Loghin, M., Aportul pregtirii fizice
la atenuarea strii de stress de lupt,
Editura SYLVI, Bucureti, 2004.
*** Efecte stresante ale cmpului de
lupt, Editura Militar, Bucureti,
1992.

Loghin, M., Aportul pregtirii fizice la atenuarea

strii de stres de lupt, Editura SYLVI, Bucureti,
2004, pp.70-71.

78

Ibidem, p. 88

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL FATIGUE IN COMBAT

Viorel CEASCAI
Associate Professor, PhD, Carol I National Defence University
vioceas2000yahoo.com

Abstract: Psychological and physical stress varies in time and intensity; it varies from a moment in combat to
another, from a type of warfare to another. The undesirable effects of these demanding circumstances can be
grouped under the umbrella term of combat fatigue resulting in extremely serious consequences upon the
capacity of analysis and synthesis of decision-making factors as well as upon soldiers. A type of assiduous
physical and military training in circumstances which are similar to the modern battlefield allows the fighter to
give an adequate response to strenuous conditions and maintain his/her psychological and physical stability at
the optimal levels desired.
Keywords: psychological-physical fatigue, combat, fighter, physical effort.

Tiredness or fatigue expresses a

physiological reaction of inhibition and
protection at the level of the central
nervous system that follows logically and
necessarily after performing a psychophysiological activity. Fatigue is felt as a
state of exhaustion more often than not
characterized by a lack of energy. Fatigue
is a state which is difficult to describe and
impossible to determine through usual
medical tests. No matter the definition
given, this has to also include the
relaxation and exhaustion which may be
felt simultaneously after fulfilling in good
conditions a physical or intellectual task.
The feeling of tiredness may appear
for different reasons, one of them being the
tight schedule combined with the lack of
sleep, the constant or acute worrying, the
feeling of boredom or the lack of physical
exercise. Other times, tiredness may
accompany a sickness, such as flu or cold,
and it disappears the moment when the
respective sickness disappears. Tiredness
produced by a disease or by stress exists as
long as the respective disease or stressful
state exists.
Tiredness may also be caused by
the excessive consumption of medicine or
alcohol, caffeine and drugs.
In case tiredness is accompanied by
more severe symptoms such as breathing
difficulties, abnormal bleedings, sudden loss

or gain of weight, people have to seek

specialized help.
Certain types of tiredness may cause
more serious health problems such as
decreasing the quantity of oxygen
transporting substance (hemoglobin) to be
found in red blood cells; cardiac problems
such as those at the level of coronary
arteries or weakening the heart these
limiting the quantity of blood rich in
oxygen that circles through the body;
metabolism issues, such as diabetes when
the sugar (glucoses) stays in the blood and
does not reach the cells in order to be
turned into energy; problems at the level of
thyroid: hypo or hyper thyroid issues
triggering all sorts of diseases; illnesses of
the kidneys or the liver, which cause
tiredness when the quantity of certain
chemicals in the blood reaches the toxic
level.
Combat fatigue appears at the
military personnel that are required to
make efforts that go beyond the limits of
their physical and psychological training.
Thus, inevitably, a serious feeling of
tiredness appears which can be enhanced
by extreme weather conditions, insomnia
or agitated sleep, irregular or badly
prepared meals, anxiety, frustration, and
boredom.
A prolonged and intense physical
effort may literally paralyze the combat

79

capacity of troops which are well trained

theoretically and tactically. Once extreme
fatigue sets in, it has a paralyzing effect
upon the whole body. After 72 hours of
continuous action without rest or sleep,
any well trained body or brilliant mind
becomes completely invaluable. In this
respect, great emperor Napoleon himself
used to say in his memoirs: Fatigue
makes all people turn into cowards".
For commanders and staff officers,
the effects of mental fatigue may be less
obvious, but undoubtedly more dangerous.
The officers who occupy positions
involving a lot of responsibilities do not
complain and do not get tired because of
an excessive workload, but because of the
impossibility to go on and endure the
moral wearing out, while holding on to
their efficiency and power to reason that is
expected from them. Symptoms may
include not only states of tiredness, irritability,
confusion and depression, insomnia, memory
losses or blockages, but also some manifested
at a different level: stomach problems, heart
and nervous system disorders. Another
symptom, which is even more serious and
most of the time less obvious, is the lack of
self-confidence, which affects making
decisions;
decisions
are
therefore
postponed, new data and information is
required, thus creating a vicious circle that
comprises more and more areas in order to
get to the decision that needs to be made1.
Physically demanding situations have
negative influences upon the soldiers
behavior which is reflected in the behavior
of the whole staff and, in certain
circumstances, even in the leadership
process. Once mental fatigue is installed, its
unexpected effects may have really serious
consequences upon the capacity of analysis
and synthesis of the decision-makers.
This combat fatigue may take
different shapes and have different
manifestations related to the demands that

need to be answered by any military branch

separately. Thus, after marching for two or
three days, soldiers may become almost
completely exhausted, losing their entire
physical energy and triggering a real fight
against tiredness even before the real fight
against the enemy.
Another type of fatigue affects troops
that are about to be deployed in a far away
theater of operations. We are referring here
to the so called jet-lag, which occurs after
a 14-hour flight followed by more that
500-kilometer-long drive, up to the area of
operations. Jet lag goes beyond the limit
when tiredness and stress occur; it appears
only after a long flight upon one flight
direction, for instance East-West or WestEast, and affects individuals that do not
make any physical effort and who are not
deprived of sleep2.
The ratio between the number of
soldiers with combat fatigue and the
number of dead or missing in action is
approximated by specialists to be one third
or one half during the first 30 days of
combat; if the continuous and highly
intense combat goes on, the losses caused
by combat fatigue may surpass the losses
of lives caused by the enemy, up to the
point when entire units are eliminated from
the field.
The psycho-physical fatigue is an
important factor that must be considered
carefully in planning military operations, as
it is usually to be found in two categories
the soldiers who are fighting for the first
time in their lives and those who have been
fighting continuously for several months.
Combat fatigue may make, for
instance, the infantry soldier, useless, totally
inefficient. This is predictable. The number
of such cases varies depending on the
intensity of the fight the higher the number
of wounded or killed people is, the higher
the number of combat fatigue cases will
become. There are also other factors that
may increase the number of combat fatigue
cases, for instance: not reaching targets, the

See, Andrei I. , Importana pregtirii fizice n

procesul de instruire militar, Editura Universitii
Naionale de Aprare Carol I, Bucureti, 2015,
p.68.

80

Ibidem, p.70

incapacity of conducting personal actions,

the death or wounding of friends or chiefs,
the anticipation of combat actions, the lack
of trust in the unit or its commanders, hard
living conditions, pessimism resulting from
the result of the fight or ones own survival.
The type of combat may influence
combat fatigue. The combat actions
happening at high marching or following
speed,
for
instance,
determines
significantly less cases of fatigue, as
morale tends to be higher, unlike in case of
offensive actions which involve slow
movements
(but
with
numerous
casualties). Static defense, in difficult
conditions of bombardment and assault
from the enemy, however, determines many
times ever more cases of fatigue.
The modern types of warfare
produce and will still produce in the future
more and more intense feelings of fear and
tiredness. No matter how developed the
armament, the equipment and the combat
tactics, the soldier as an individual does
not change so much regarding the psychophysiological aspects. The combatant will
always have a physical or psychological
reaction (or both) with respect to the
combat itself and each of them will have a
breaking point", either physically or
psychologically3.
Chemical
and
bacteriological
weapons may eliminate from combat or
kill more soldiers in a faster manner; the
tactic nuclear ammunition can annihilate,
burn, or irradiate; the laser jet can blind or
deafen people. Moreover, soldiers are
forced to wear protective gear for a long
period of time which makes their
movements even more difficult.
Both previous wars and those that
are going on nowadays have turned a lot of
militaries in psychological victims" who
are also physically traumatized.
In order to anticipate and confront
these consequences of the battle, soldiers resort
to alcohol or drugs, which worsens their
psychological state on long term and may
3

finally lead even to suicide after returning from

the battle.
The best measure that can be taken
in order to prevent fatigue is to have an
adequate, natural sleep, but this is a luxury
item on the battlefield and cannot be
afforded whenever needed. For this reason,
the ideal situation would be that in which
there is a magic pill which may make the
state of tiredness disappear together with
all its consequences triggered.
Psychological and physical effort
varies in time and intensity, from one
moment of the fight to another, from one
type of warfare to another. A difficult
moment is, for instance, the moment of
waiting before the assault, when soldiers
feel anxiety and tension becomes
extremely high or, on the contrary, when a
state of inertia occurs. This moment can be
compared with the start fever before the
beginning of a game or a round in sports.
These demanding circumstances will lead
eventually to increasing physical and
mental stress, which may be controlled and
maintained within acceptable parameters
for fulfilling the mission if the fighter is in
good physical and psychological shape.
When the action of these factors surpasses
certain limits and their destabilizing
influence is stronger, the fighters activity
is influenced directly and the psychophysiological stability is shattered, the
capacity of effort decreases and the
influence of these factors and their
components enter the really wide sphere of
stress.
The
importance
of
group
integration is crucial, because the soldier
feels that this offers him/her protection
against any problem coming from the
external
environment.
The
fighter
integrated in the group manages to gain
more than one who is withdrawn, not only
in point of fighting performance, but also
in point of the ability to give everything
and sacrifice himself/herself. Hope and
faith can be manifested in a lot of ways.
An absolutely real hope is that the
respective armed confrontation is going to

Ibidem, p. 71

81

end soon. Faith increases the resistance

capacity. Personal traits play an extremely
important role during battles, the sense of
humor, the good education and culture, the
intelligence making combatants fight better
than the limited people. The leadership
style can also be helpful during combat,
the commander being the one who
represents the groups interests. Physical
and military training are very important
elements. An assiduous training in
circumstances similar to the modern
battlefield allows the fighter to respond in
an adequate manner to any demanding
situations and keep his/her psycho-physical
capacities at the desired levels.
Regular
physical
exercises,
performed outdoors, are the most advisable
measures to be taken in order to maintain a
state of health, good spirits and the
capacity of getting over various hardships.
The most important role played by
physical exercises is reflected in the

preventive preparation of the body and the

increase in the capacity of physical effort,
rational eating, maintaining a normal
weight, accompanied by physical training
correctly performed are all necessary for
neutralizing the effects of psychophysiological demanding situations on the
battlefield and getting rid of the state of
tiredness and discomfort.
Bibliography
1.

2.
3.

82

Andrei, I., Importana pregtirii

fizice n procesul de instruire
militar,
Editura
Universitii
Naionale de Aprare Carol I,
Bucureti, 2015.
Dragan, I., Medicina Sportiva,
Editura Medicala, Bucureti, 2002.
*** Efecte stresante ale cmpului de
lupt, Editura Militar, Bucureti,
1992.

PENSIONS IN EUROPE AND WORLDWIDE

Mdlina SCIPANOV
Lecturer, PhD, "Carol I" National Defence University
badea_mad@yahoo.com

Abstract:Across the world, countries have reformed or are reforming their public pension system by introducing
private savings for retirement systems. Everywhere, the causes are the same: the population is aging, retired
people seem to live longer and longer, the number of contributors to social security is decreasing, the public
pension no longer ensures a reasonable rate of replacement of working income and the public pension system no
longer copes with the obligation to pay the pensions.
Keywords: private pensions, public pension, occupational pension, budget, contributions, insurance system,
annuities.

There is no common European

model organization of the pension systems.
Generally speaking, it is a system of three
pillars, but these three pillars are not the
same for all EU countries.
While the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe have adopted the model of
the World Bank (Pillar 1 public; Pillar 2
mandatory and state regulated; Pillar 3
privately run and based on individual
option) Western countries like Britain,
France, Germany and the Northern
countries such as Sweden do not have the
same social vision on the three pillars
(Pillar 1 public pension; Pillar 2
occupational pension related to the
professional category of the taxpayer and
fixed by collective agreements; Pillar 3
private pensions with individual conditions
of contribution unrelated to the
occupation)1. However, the variety of
systems is greater than the mere distinction
between East and West, rather given by the
historical moment when pillars 2 and 3
were introduced. The pension systems in
Member States differ by a number of
criteria such as the source of financing,
method of financing, way of participating
in the system, and method of calculating
retirement benefits.
According to the source of funding,
pension systems are public, funded from
the state budget, or private, here including

both those concluded by individual

agreement between the taxpayer and the
private insurer and the pensions in Pillar 2
regulated at central public level or by
collective contracts but managed privately.
In European countries, the public pensions
are the most important both in the number
of people covered and the amount of
current expenditures. Pensions are
provided at least partially (if not totally)
from public funds through statutory oldage pension. In addition to the pension
insured from the state budget, some
countries such as Sweden, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and
Romania have gone from a pension
scheme provided entirely by public funds
to supplementing it with private schemes
of financing. Usually, this contribution is a
statutory one, but insurance policies are
established between the individual and the
pension fund opted for.
According to the method of
financing, we can distinguish between
systems of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) type
and funded systems. In the first case,
current contributions collected for the
public fund are used for paying current
pensions on the principle of social
solidarity. That is, current taxpayers
financially support current retirees, the
state assuring the former that they will
receive similar protection when they retire
in their turn. However, there are
considerable variations in the extent to

http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
publication15998_en.pdf

83

which the contributions cover all public

pension
expenditure.
Usually,
the
minimally guaranteed pensions are paid
from general taxes, while the incomerelated pension schemes are covered
through special pension funds, some of
which being subsidized to a greater or
lesser extent, from the public budget. Also,
in most countries, the pensions of civil
servants do not result from a clear
financing scheme, but are considered direct
expenditures out of the government
budget. Some governments, such as that of
Sweden, created reserve funds for the
public pension system, preparing to cover
deficits in growth caused by demographic
trends. In the case of funded pension
systems, they operate through individual
accounts through the payment of
contributions by the participant or the
participant and employer. The pension will
depend on the individual contributions and
return on investment of the pension fund,
not
applying
the
principles
of
redistribution and solidarity between
generations.
As far as establishing the value of
the pension is concerned, pension systems
can operate on the basis of defining the
benefits from which the amount of pension
is calculated from the beginning, taking
into account variables such as the amount
of contributions and the length of the time
that the taxpayer paid, or on the basis of
defining contributions in which the amount
of the pension depends on the
contributions paid and on the result of
investments of pension fund assets, this
variable being only calculated precisely in
the moment of retirement. There are also
hybrid systems with features common to
both types of calculation of benefits. The
notionally-defined contribution schemes
are designed to mimic a plan of definite
contribution where the pension depends on
contributions and on investment returns. In
the
"notionally-defined
accounts",
investments return is a theoretical one set
by the government and does not represent
a real yield in financial markets. The
pension points system in Romania
functions somehow on a similar logic, the

number of points collected depending on

the total amount of contributions, but the
value of the point is set (and indexed) by
the government.
Poland: It has a statutory public
pension system with two mandatory
components2:
1.
A
nationally-defined
contribution scheme of PAYG type;
2. A scheme fully funded by
taxpayers, administered by private
investment companies, and supervised by
the state. The statutory pension system is
funded by contributions from statutory oldage pension (contribution rate is 19.52% of
gross income) divided between the two
components.
3. A voluntary private pension
system based on occupational schemes and
/ or voluntary individual accounts.
Risks: the current value of
pensions is not sustainable in the long term
as the replacement rate is expected to
decline significantly. Moreover, in 2048,
women will have 13% lower pensions than
men, due to the difference in retirement
ages. The contribution to the definite
contribution-based system was reduced in
2011 from 7.3% to 2.3% of gross salary.
The difference was redirected towards the
to-go pension scheme. The spending on
pensions is expected to increase alarmingly
in long term; however, the price is the low
level of replacement.
UK: The UK pension system has
three components:
1. Basic public pension system
provided
by
national
insurance
contributions;
2. Second State Pension (S2P)
reported revenue;
3. Private occupational and
financed pensions, as well as individual
pension schemes which play an important
role in the pension system. Employees can
opt for a private S2P pension or for a
private financed pension, most people
focusing on the second option. A particular
2

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_
explained/index.php/Population_structure_and_
ageing

84

type of aid, linked to income is directed

towards the poor pensioners.
Risks: despite reforms, the UK has
one of the lowest statutory pensions in the
EU. The overall adequacy of pensions
depends crucially on savings made to
private pensions which medium to high
income groups are able to afford. The
percentage of employees who contributed
in 2012 to a private pension is less than
60% (European Commission, 2010 Joined
Report on Pensions). In this regard, risks
become especially related to the risk of
increasing poverty rates for the ageing
population. Great Britain must optimize
the efficient testing methods of vulnerable
categories and encourage private savings.
Germany: The general public
PAYG type (Pillar I) is calculated
according to income but with a minimum
threshold of social assistance for lowincome retirees. Civil servants pensions
are paid directly from the state budget and
the professions have special pension
schemes. The calculation of the pension
point system is based on individual income
in relation to average income. Pillar I
covers 80% of the population of the
working population of Germany. The
pension point is adjusted annually by a
composite index. Pillar 2 (Riester pension,
occupational pension) is subsidized by the
state, having a supplementary series of
attached tax benefits. Pillars 2 and 3
generally operate on the principle of
defining benefits or, in some cases, on the
basis of defining contributions define a
minimum acceptable level of income3.
Risks: Population aging is more
pronounced than the European average (in
2060, 59% of the population aged over 65
years compared to 53% in the EU). The
average pension for women is much lower
than that of men (half West Germany and
two thirds East Germany). However, a
harmonization of these discrepancies is
expected by standardizing the retirement

age. Another risk is that of long-term

sustainability of public finances.
Sweden: Since 1999, public social
insurance system consists of three parts:
1. The pension calculated as part of
the income, based on a notionally defined
contribution scheme. It is indexed
according to the revenue, and its
sustainability is recalculated each year.
2.
The
premium
pension
completely funded through a defined
contribution scheme.
3. The guaranteed pension based on
a minimum of defined benefits funded
from general taxes. In the first two types of
pension, the contribution rate is fixed at
18.5% of gross income. The public pension
system is supplemented by private
occupational schemes, based on defining
contributions. More than 90% of
employees are covered by occupational
pension
fixed
through
collective
arrangements.
Risks: Swedens risks are relatively
low and long-term, primarily including the
net replacement rate decline from 65% of
salary in 2008 to 48.2% in 2048. This
decline will affect younger cohorts who
will receive lower pensions as a percentage
of salary received during their working
lives. However, given that the need to be
strengthened in the long term will be
moderate
and
Swedens
financial
sustainability is stable, the social security
system will not be affected too much.
Italy: The statutory public pension
schemes (old age pension, disability
pension, survivors pension) cover 100%
of the population of Italy officially
employed. The old system, based on
defining benefits, was replaced in
transitional stages by one of NDC
(notional defined contributions) type
applicable to persons who have entered the
labor market since 1996. This notional
capital is multiplied by specific quotients
for conversion of the retirement age which
are updated once every three years in line
with life expectancy at the retirement age.
Occupational pensions are represented by
the voluntary, funded schemes. The system
includes three options: negotiated funds

Brsch-Supan, A., Wilke, C., 2004, The german

public pension system: how it was, how it will be,
Working Paper 10525, http://www.nber.org/papers/
w10525

85

covered by collective arrangements; open

funds managed by financial intermediaries
which can be joined by individuals or
groups of workers; pension insurance
policies4.
Risks: The long-term sustainability
of public finances due to the accelerated
aging of the population, the current deficit
and the currently very high public
governmental debt are the most important
long-term risks. Ensuring adequate
pensions for future retirees is a major
challenge due to considerably shorter
working lives in recent years, the relatively
late entry of young people onto the labor
market, the atypical employment growth
and low number of contributors to private
schemes.
France: The state pension system
is financed on a pay-as-you-go principle.
State organizations pay more than 10% of
GDP in pensions, a percentage which is
very high by international standards. The
retirement age is low 60 years for both
women and men. However, some unions
have announced they would like to reduce
that age to 55 years. France has inherited a
certain distrust of the fully funded pension
schemes dating from the postwar period,
when inflation was very high having
significantly negative effects5.
Japan: In this country the pension
system is based on three pillars:
1. State pension system
2. Corporate pension scheme
3. Private pensions
The first pillar, the state, covers the
whole population and is complemented by
additional provisions for employees and
free lancers. The amount of money paid by
the state as pension depends on the years
of contribution, currently not exceeding
18% of the average monthly salary.
Employees can retire at the age of 65 since
2014. The pensions paid by additional
pension schemes can reach 30% of final

salary upon retirement. Corporate pension

schemes have a fully funded organization.
In the private insurance sector, the third
pillar, Kampo insurance company and
other cooperatives that do not find their
place in the sector, plays an important role.
United States of America: Here,
the market of life insurance and annuities
is continuously growing. In the past,
individuals made life insurance contracts
with a component of money accumulation
to protect a persons dependents against
loss of income when the respective insured
person died. Currently, in addition to all
these, people make term insurances with
do not include the component of gathering
money. Population purchased annuities
and especially variable annuities. Factors
such as aging and the Social Security
Systems ability to pay benefits to
pensioners increase the demand for
annuities as compared to the demand for
traditional insurance products. Legislation
may affect the attraction to annuities. If
pension plans are less attractive, this
determines increasing the demand for such
products. Increasing the number of
families with one parent and the average
age at which people get married tend to
cause people to buy annuities.
Central and Eastern Europe: In
Central and Eastern Europe region, 11
states have adopted the multi type private
pension model recommended by the World
Bank. The reform began in the region in
1994, first with pillar 3 of voluntary
private pensions and then with pillar 2 of
mandatory private pensions.
The countries of the region have
adopted the basic model of the World
Bank, adapting it and modifying it into
national law as found necessary. The list of
states that take into account similar
reforms includes Moldova, Ukraine,
Russia and other countries. At the end of
2008, the 11 private pension systems in
Central and Eastern Europe included more
than
300
pension
funds,
which
administered approximately 60-65 billion
euros to more than 35 million participants.
Europa: In Western Europe,
private pension schemes are different from

European Commission (2012) White Paper: An

Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable, COM
(2012)
5
https://www.cnpp.ro/pensii-internationale,accessed
12.09.2015

86

those in the Eastern part. The basic model

is that of occupational private pensions,
offered and managed by the employing
companies. Most often, the practice came
before the law companies starting to
offer "private pension packages" long
before the area becomes officially
regulated. Differences from the Eastern
system, such as the Romanian one, are
multiple and complex. Not all European
countries have private saving schemes,
although public pension systems suffer
from the same demographic problems as
the ones described above, in Romanias
case.
Globally: Globally, more and more
states turn to a private solution to reform
the public pension system. The
occupational pensions widespread in
Western Europe was adopted by the United
States of America, and many other
countries. Differences between private
pension systems around the world are even
more complex than in Europe. Globally,
total assets of private pension funds were
about 20-25 thousand billion (trillion) at
the end of 2008. The number of people
saving for old age in various private
pension schemes exceeds one billion
people. Currently, over 30 states
worldwide have adopted similar multi
pensions systems, built on the model
recommended by the World Bank. Most of
them are in Central and South America
(first in Chile in 1979) and in Central and
Eastern Europe (where 11 countries,
including Romania, have such a multi
private pension system). The private
pension system is composed of mandatory
Pillar 2 and optional Pillar 3 of private
pensions. Under the pressure of
demography and the difficult economic
and fiscal situation, EU Member States
should reform their pension systems;
otherwise, they will face major challenges
over the next 50 years. The EU population
is experiencing a pronounced aging
process. In 2060 the population over 65
will be half of the population of 15-65
years. These demographic changes will
increase costs by 4.75% of European GDP.
Economic and fiscal EU is fragile and the

already high indebtedness makes it

difficult to cover these extra costs.
Reforms are needed in the labor market to
increase employment and in the pension
systems to ensure fiscal balance on the one
hand and a decent income on the other.
The public pension systems alone
will not provide a decent income for future
pensioners and therefore individual saving
should be encouraged. Europe is aging and
seeking solutions for pension schemes,
which are the first affected by
demographic changes. The social contract
between the individual and the state and
intergenerational solidarity are the
fundament of the pension systems in
Europe, but the major demographic
changes in the coming decades will put
pressure on these systems. By 2050, the
EU will have one of the most aged
populations in the world; the dependency
ratio of the elderly population (the ratio
between the people over 65 and the
working age population) will reach 48%,
much higher than in Africa (11%), Asia
(27%), Latin America (31%) and the US
(36%). These changes will be reflected in
an increase in pension expenditure. At the
moment, at European level, pension costs
represent about 10% of GDP and by 2060
they could reach 12.5%, but some
countries may be affected in a significantly
stronger way. Italy, for example, already
has pension spending of 15% of GDP but it
also faces a more pronounced aging
process than other European countries.
Member States, trying to limit the
economic and budgetary impact of
demographic trends, adopted a series of
reforms which, on the one hand, balance
the financial situation of the pension
systems, but on the other hand will cause a
reduction of future pensions as compared
to the benefits granted up to that moment.
The shift from defined-benefits system
type to the defined-contributions system
type, connecting pension indexation in
redistributive systems to inflation are just a
few examples that work in this direction.
At the moment, at European level, the
revenues of people over 65 years old
amount to about 94% of the average total

87

household income, much of these revenues

coming from public pension systems. In
order to ensure a similar level of
replacement rates (pension income relative
to previous earnings), it is necessary,
among other things, to increase the number
of years people work by raising the
retirement age and supplementing income
from public pensions with private forms of
saving. Financing arrangements, eligibility
conditions and labor market conditions
should be adjusted to achieve a balanced
relationship between contributions and
entitlements and between the number of
active
contributors
and
retired
beneficiaries.
These
three
issues:
imbalances in the labor market, the
financial situations of pension systems and
the pension value were identified by the
Pensions White Paper as the main risks.
Since 2001, in response to
demographic trends, the EU decided on a
strategy with three directions, meant to
reduce public debt, increase employment
and reform social security systems, main
directions which are described under the
Europe 2020 strategy.
Regarding the reforms of pension
systems in the Pensions White Paper, the
following reform directions are proposed:
1. Achieving a balance between
the time spent working and the length of
retirement period by:
a. Adapting the retirement age
function of increasing life expectancy
b. Limiting access to early
retirement
c. Encouraging
a
longer
professional life
d. Eliminating
disparities
between men and women regarding
pensions.
2. Developing supplementary
private savings for retirement.
These are general directions
recommended at European level, as the

diversity of pension systems in Member

States would not allow structuring a
common policy and, moreover, in social
policies generally speaking, the regulatory
competence at European level is limited,
the lead role being at the level of the
Member States. The only logical option is
coordination at European level using
common principles. Member States are
responsible for reforming the pension
systems so as not to endanger the countrys
financial situation and, consequently, the
European Unions, but at the same time to
ensure an adequate level of income for
pensioners.
Bibliography
1. European
Commission,
Sustainability Report 2009 [online]
available at http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/publications/publ
ication15998_en.pdf
2. Letter of Intent, Memorandum of
Economic and Financial Policies,
and Technical Memorandum of
Understanding, 28 February 2011
[online]
available
to
http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/
2011/GRC/022811.pdf.
3. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/stat
istics_explained/index.php/Populati
on_structure_and_ageing
4. European Commission (2012)
White Paper: An Agenda for
Adequate, Safe and Sustainable,
COM (2012)55
5. http://www.csspp.ro Supervisory
Commission of the Private Pension
System - PPSSC.
6. http://www.cnpp.ro
National
House of Public Pensions website
7. http://www.asfromania.ro/
FSAwebsite
8. http://www.cnpas.org/ - National
House of Pensions website

88

IMPLICATIONS OF IMMIGRANTS CRISIS ON THE EU BUDGET

Mdlina SCIPANOV
Lecturer, PhD, "Carol I" National Defence University
badea_mad@yahoo.com

Abstract: Europe faces an immigration phenomenon from the Arab world, which it is not prepared for, neither
from an administrative nor from a moral point of view. Thus, what initially appeared to be a purely
humanitarian crisis becomes, in the light of recent information published in mass media, a possible invasion
planned by some political leaders in the Muslim world, with the aim of destabilizing the European Union.
Keywords: budget, crisis, natural resources, expenditure, Asylum and Migration Fund, The Internal Security
Fund.

agency Frontex 2and EASO like European Asylum Support Office.

"The draft budget as we are
debating it today was drawn up 4 months
ago, and recent weeks have brought
developments which, in my opinion,
justify a substantial increase in European
funds intended for an effective response to
the refugee crisis," said Vice President
INTA.3
Another
important
measure
forwarded by the Commission to help
resolve the immigrants crisis was passing
the six countries neighboring the EU Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey - to the
category of safe states. This means that
their citizens will get harder residence
permit in countries in the EU. It is not
normal for candidate countries to join the
EU to be considered states where citizens
fear for their lives.
Citizens should feel comfortable
and safe whenever they are in the EU.
When compared with the previous period,
the amounts for areas such as citizenship,
asylum, migration, health, consumer

An effective European response to

the refugee crisis requires a substantial
increase in the amounts allocated for this
purpose in the EU budget for 2016.
The question that was asked upon
opening the first meeting of the
Commission of International Trade (INTA)
of the autumn session of the European
Parliament (EP) was whether the amounts
provided for 2016 budget are sufficient for
Europe to give an effective response to the
refugee issue or these amounts should be
increased.
According to Iuliu Winkler, Vice
President of INTA, the proposed EU
budget for 2016 has been designed with
sufficient flexibility, with reserves of over
2 billion euros that can be redirected to the
most important priorities. In his view, in
addition to the investments necessary for
Europe, is crucial to raise significantly all
allocations that can help Member States to
cope with the wave of refugees. "The
response to this crisis must be a European
one because Member States alone cannot
cope with the crisis."1
The 2016 budget finances the
European Agenda for Migration, provides
funding for emergency assistance for the
most exposed Member States and provides
increasing amounts for the European

FRONTEX - Agency for the Management of

Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of
the Member States of the European Union was
established by Regulation (EC) no. 2007/2004 /
Council (of 26 October 2004, OJ L 349 /
25.11.2004).
3
http://www.avantulliber.ro/2015/08/31/iuliuwinkler- more money from the European budget to
the crisis immigrants access: 15.09.2015

www.mediafax.ro access 1.10.2015

89

protection and security will increase by

26.5% for 2014-2020.
The Asylum and Migration Fund,
with a budget of 3.1 billion euro, promotes
the effective management of migration
flows and the implementation of a
common approach to asylum and
immigration.
The Internal Security Fund, worth
3.8 billion euros, aims to combat crime,
including terrorism. It also facilitates travel
in the EU, guaranteeing a high level of
control at the external borders of the EU.
The EU has mobilized funds to
support the most affected Member States.
Thus, it allocated over 70 million euros in
emergency funds, to complement the 7
billion of the multiannual financing
allocated to the Member States in 20142020 to support their efforts regarding
migration and border management.
The European Commission and
member states have mobilized around
EUR 4 billion in the form of humanitarian
assistance,
development
assistance,
economic aid and assistance to stabilize the
situation of both residents of Syria and
Syrian refugees and communities that have
hosted them in neighboring countries,
namely Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and
Egypt. The European Commission has
allocated 1.8 billion in EU funds to
establish an "emergency trust fund for
stability and addressing the root causes of
irregular migration from Africa".4
Therewith, the EU budget must be
part of the solution, and responses to the
crisis problem of immigrants will be
reflected in the EU budget for 2016 that is
just emerging in the negotiations between
the EC and the EU Council.
All European states will be
supported for receiving migrants, including
Romania. The European Union provides a
lump sum of 6,000 euros for each asylum
seeker hosted, plus other substantial funds
we receive to settle immigrants expenses.

The EU budget is geared

particularly to areas where EU funding can
bring real change. It finances what national
budgets would not finance or what would
be more costly for them.
Many of the EU's achievements
would not have been possible without a
common budget. The existence of a
European budget allows us to address
common challenges in an effective way,
which would not be possible if the 28
Member States acted on their own. The
EU's responsibilities have grown over the
years, and its budget is currently funding
numerous fields, in the interest of all
European citizens.
The EU budget contributes to
achieving several objectives, such as safer
and healthier food, new and improved
roads, railways and airports, a cleaner
environment, greater security at external
borders of the EU, opportunities to study
abroad, possibility to carry out cultural
exchanges. The EU also provides support
and humanitarian assistance to populations
in many regions of the world.5
Thus it was proposed to increase by
500 million euro the spendings in the EU
related to asylum, migration, and
integration. Besides money, the European
Union Member States allocate substantial
funds for other related measures in the
field of asylum, migration and integration.
Romania, for example, has allocated to
these related costs about 24 million euros
for the period 2014-2020.
Long-term EU budget 2014-2020
(expenditure limits):6
- conservation and management of
natural resources - common agricultural
policy and rural development: 373.2
billion
- Freedom, Security and Justice home affairs: 15.7 billion
- EU as a global actor international business: 58.7 billion
- administration: 61.6 Billion

5http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/budget/index_ro.htm

http://www.ziare.com/articles / contributions +
States + EU access: 23.09.2015

access: 2.10.2015
6
www.europa.eu access 5.10.2015

90

- competitiveness for growth and

employment - research and technology:
125.6 billion
- cohesion
for
growth
and
employment - employment, territorial
cohesion and cooperation: 325.1 billion.
The EU 2015 budget provides
145.3 billion in commitments and 141.2
billion in payments; also, a little more than
that to economic growth and foreign policy.
Of the total, 88% will be spent in and by the
Member States, 6% goes to foreign policy,
while 6% is used for managing the EU. The
EU budget for 2015 allocates a 2% larger
sum for projects than in 2014 and it is
sufficient to provide more than 1% for
payments. Most payment appropriations is
allocated to areas that stimulate economic
growth and employment (+ 29.5% vs. 2014),
such as research (Horizon 2020), transEuropean energy, transport and ICT
(Mechanism for interconnecting Europe) or
the 'Jobs for Youth. Other areas where
payments are growing are the Asylum,
Migration and Integration (+ 140%) and
protecting the health of Europeans and
European users (+ 20%).

The
European
Commission
proposed for 2016 a 1.8 billion euro fund
to improve the situation in Africa.
If we want in the future people not
to migrate to Europe, we should contribute
to the improvement of the situation in their
countries, and this means security, food,
drinking water, health, education. The
sharp increase in the number of people
forced to flee their homes and seek refuge
to escape the violence is a test for the
European Union.
The European Union will distribute
a total of 160,000 refugees in the coming
years. The announcement was made by
European Commission President in his
speech in front of the Parliament in
Strasbourg Community. Jean Claude
Juncker says that the Schengen area of free
movement in Europe will resist the huge
pressure wave of immigrants.
The
European
Commission
proposes a temporary clause of solidarity:
if - for justified or objective reasons, such
as a natural disaster - a Member State
cannot fully or partially fulfill the
commitment to relocate the refugees, then

H ow the E uropea n U nion s pends its money?

EU budget 2015: 145.3 billion euros

Global Europe:
including development aid

6%
Other, administration

Security and Citizenship, Justice

6%

2%
Sustainable growth Natural Resources:

Smart and favorable

Inclusion: jobs

agriculture, environment

competitiveness, regional development

40%

46%

Source: Brochure "Understanding EU policies"

http://europa.eu/pol/index_ro.htm

91

it will have to make financial contributions

to the EU budget amounting to 0.002
percent of national GDP.
The European Commission will
analyze the reasons given by that country
and will decide whether it is justified or
not to participate in the collective effort for
a maximum duration of 12 months. In case
of partial participation in the relocation,
the
amount
will
be
reduced
proportionately, EC explains in a press
release.
Relocating refugees will be
performed on mandatory basis, using
objective and quantifiable criteria: 40% of
the population size, 40% of GDP, 10% of
the average number of asylum applications
in the past, 10% unemployment rate.
European
Commission issued
additional shares of refugees table
incumbent on each country. Romania will
have to receive 4,646 more refugees most
of whom will be drawn from Hungary, so
in conjunction with the figures in May, a
total of 6,351 immigrants will be reached.
Among the countries that will
receive most immigrants, Romania holds
the 6th place.
1. Germany 31,443
2. France 24,031
3. Spain 14,931
4. Poland 9,287
5. Netherlands 7,214
6. Romania 4,646
7. Belgium 4,564
The countries with the fewest
refugees:
1. Malta 133
2. Cyprus 274
3. Estonia 373
4. Luxembourg 440
5. Slovenia 631
6. Lithuania 780
European countries must provide
330.7 million euros in addition to the EU
budget promised to provide the expected
reactions to the refugee crisis.
The European Union has promised
to take a number of actions in order to

manage the unprecedented influx of

migrants after World War II.
The
European
Commission
proposed amendments to the budget to
finance these measures. Yet, the national
contributions to the EU budget are a
frequent reason for dispute between the
European Commission and Member States.
"We will continue our efforts to reach
common European solutions," said
Commission
Chairman,
Jean-Claude
Juncker, in a statement.
According to the proposal, Member
States will have to employ extra EUR
330.7 million, which will however not be
paid until next year. These funds will be
used, together with EUR 70.6 million
representing reallocated money, to provide
emergency support to the most affected
Member States to employ 120 people
within Frontex, Europol and the European
Asylum to support the asylum (EASO) and
to provide more help to countries outside
the EU that host Syrian refugees.
In
addition,
the
European
Commission plans to allocate other 400
million euros to aid this year non-EU
countries concerned and humanitarian
organizations active in refugee camps,
namely the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees and the World Food Programme.
EU governments and the European
Parliament must give their final consent
before the largest part of the amount of
801.3 million euros is released. The
Commission has appealed to this effect to
both parties to speed up decision making.
"Europe is facing the consequences of one
of the biggest crises in recent history. We
use the EU budget in a flexible way to
respond to the crisis," said Vice President
of the EC budget, Kristalina Georgieva.
In conclusion, the immigrants
crisis we are now facing is unprecedented
and there is no "recipe" for solving it. Yet,
clearly, the solution can only be a
European one. Every time Europe was in
crisis, we solved the problem at European
level. Since the beginning of the year,
nearly 500,000 people have arrived in

92

Europe. Most of them fled Syria, because

of the Islamic State terror in Libya, or the
dictatorship in Eritrea. (...) The figures are
impressive. For some, they are scary, but
this is no time to be afraid, it is time to act
together, with determination and boldness:
the European Union, its institutions and
Member States, urged Jean-Claude
Juncker (President of the Commission).

3.

Bibliography

7.

1.

2.

4.
5.
6.

The EU budget, myth and reality:

http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explaine
d/myths/myths_en.cfm
Europe 2020
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/ind
ex_ro.htm

8.
9.

93

Multiannual financial framework

for 20142020:http://ec.europa.eu/budget/ref
orm
Annual activity reports for the
various EU policies:
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesi
s/aar/index_en.htm
The site of the General Directorate
of Migration and Home Affairs
Annual activity reports for the
various EU policies:
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesi
s/aar/index_en.htm
https://twitter.com/EU_Budget

THE GERMAN ARMY JUBILEE 1955 2015

Andra Sybil STEFAN
Lecturer, PhD, Carol I National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania,
e-mail:andrasybil@gmail.com

Abstract: Being the most powerful European economy, with a high turnover in exports at international level,
Germany is conditioned and all the same interested in the social, political, but especially economical stability of
all its business partners. This is obviously one of the main reasons of its taking part in international military
actions, sustained by the international military organizations and alliances. By assuming different
responsibilities within the political and economical organizations and alliances, Germanys role increases,
transforming it into an important actor of the international security politics.
Keywords: Bundeswehr, military, Germany, Europe.

German army between - 1945 1990

could not last, and the antagonistic

interests of the 4 winning states have
gradually but surely lead to another form
of war, the Cold War. The ones who had
escaped the slaughter of the war were now
subject to a crucifying separation people
of the same nation were separated based on
geographical principles: Eastern and
Western areas of influence. The separation
culminated within the capital city of
Berlin, a city which, in its turn, was
separated in four sectors: American,
British, French and Soviet. The wall
separating the area under Soviet control
from the other three areas represented the
symbol of the Cold War, starting with 13th
August 1961, until 9th November 1989.
Therefore, one of the first
consequences was the establishment of
different political and economical systems
in the two occupied areas, the
transformation being initialed by
creating the two German states: on 23rd
May 1949, the Federal Republic of
Germany is created, and 7th October 1949
the German Democratic Republic a
minor consequence of the influential and
unseen powers. The division ended 41
years later, when the two parts of a
temporarily divided state reunited.
The German army existed, during
all this time, under the circumstance of
special restrictions, imposed by those who
had won the Second World War.

Mankind lived through two

moments of hope 1945 we will not
allow a third World War and 1990,
which brings major direct or indirect
changes on the socio-political and
economical stage, having both national and
international consequences.
In 1945, the Second World War
ended with huge losses and leaving deep
traces in the souls of all nations:
physically and psychologically mutilated
persons, families in mourning, all of these
victims fighting in an insane war, which
was not theirs, but of those who rule the
world. And when the healing process
hadnt even properly started, there is
suddenly another war, much more
insidious and with much worse
consequences: the Cold War. Unseen
people were dictating, while the people in
plain sight were suffering. An easily to
follow example is the post-war evolution
of the German state.
Creating two German states the
German Democratic Republic and the
Federal Republic of Germany was the
result of a forced alliance between Western
democracies (the USA, Great Britain and
France) and a communist state (the USSR).
If initially there was no issue about
dividing the state, neither politically, nor
economically, this momentary alliance
the joint fight against the Third Reich

94

Along with the dismemberment of

the Soviet Empire and the abolition of the
Warsaw Pact, there is only one pole of
military power left in the world, the USA,
which develops NATO, under whose
protecting cover the different member
states transform and modernize their army.
Immediately after the end of the
war and many years afterwards, the
catchphrase We do not want war
anymore could be often heard, and this
was the idea leading the German people.
The military problem was one of the most
disputed issued in the Federal Republic of
Germany, where neither the population,
nor the politicians could agree: Do we
accept rearming or not? Do we need an
own army or not? If we have an army,
what will its responsibilities be? What
guarantee do we have, as citizens, that we
will not relive the horrors of the Second
World War?
But the events evolved, both inside
the country Germany became a sovereign
state, started to economically recover (it
could, for example, give work places for
foreigners: Italians, Greeks, Portuguese),
as well as outside the national territory:
consolidation of the power of the area
under Soviet influence, establishment of
the intervention units of the German
Democratic Republic (October 1948) and
starting the war in Korea (25th June 1950)
are only some of the factors that
contributed to the decision of the winning
states for the remilitarization of Germany.
Konrad Adenauer, the first
Chancellor and Foreign Affairs Minister of
the Federal Republic of Germany, after the
end of the Second World War, followed,
through his politics, to regain the
sovereignty of Germany, to integrate it in
the Western structures and to assume an
active role for his country with the NATO
alliance. The goal he had set he
accomplished, so that, six years later, 12th
November 1955 is considered the official
day of the establishment of the army in the
Federal Republic of Germany, a very
important step for a completely
demilitarized country between 1945 and

1955 (in 1949, the German Parliament

excluded the possibility of national
rearming and establishing a German army).
The same year, on 9th May 1955 (the
German state had border troops) the
Federal Republic of Germany adheres to
NATO, the action being the result of its
strategic position on the border with the
Eastern block and with the member
countries of the Warsaw Pact, whose
armies had as a main goal defense /
fighting against the West. But the Federal
Republic of Germany was not allowed to
go back to the military power it had had
before and during the war. In order to
eliminate any possibility of getting out of
control, the German Constitution forbade
the army to become a state within a state.
The concept used by the army was
that of internal leadership, the military
being just a citizen in a uniform. The
sociologist Martin Kutz shows1 in his
paper that there have been many years
until the brutal methods of instruction were
forgotten a very sad but telling example:
right in the first year after the introduction
of the compulsory military service, 1957,
15 soldiers died, being forced to swim
across the river Iller, without being
permitted to have the necessary equipment.
Brutal, ruthless training methods were used
on daily basis in the German army and
they were long afterwards still used. From
this perspective, the fear of the German
people to return to military dictatorship
was very entitled. Approximately 10 years
later, when in the army all the officers who
wanted to enroll were accepted and the
majority came from simple families, the
interruption of brutal traditions during
training was managed. These former
methods had been introduced by the old
aristocratic families, which represented the
majority of German army leadership.

Kutz, Martin, Reform und Restauration der

Offizierausbildung der Bundeswehr: Strukturen und
Konzeptionen
der
Offizierausbildung
im
Widerstreit Militrischer und Politischer Interessen,
Baden-Baden Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1982,
ISBN 378900751x

95

A change in attitude within the modern

army of Germany

politicians and political scientists, who do

not consider the dependency towards the
US army as beneficial for any European
state.
The
German
army,
the
Bundeswehr, had a total of 500,000
soldiers after the reunification of the
country (the Bundeswehr took from
Nationale Volksarmee the army of the
German Democratic Republic, around
20,000 people), but four years later, in
1994, as a consequence of a decision taken
by the federal government, the total was
reduced to 370,000. Along with the
number, the type of missions and tasks was
also modified: if before 1990, the army had
as a main goal the defense of the national
territory, after reunification, Germany sent
more and more soldiers to take part in
international actions, in missions within
international
alliances,
aiming
at
maintaining peace and security, preventing
acts of terrorism and organized crime,
granting help in case of natural disasters.
Soon after the reestablishment of
the army, in 1955, Germany has showed a
great restraint in taking part in
international military actions. The actions
of the army were mostly reduced to
humanitarian missions. This state of fact
determined Gerhard Schrder to say that
the greatest achievement of his legislative
period was the effective participation in the
war of aggression in Yugoslavia, in 19992.
Skepticism returns amidst the population
after 2001, when the conflict in
Afghanistan escalades, while the political
statements do not support the military
action, which must absolutely take place
under UN, NATO or EU mandates, and
they recommend negotiation as a first step.
That was the cause for Germany to restrain
itself in 2011 from voting in favor of
resolution 1973, rejecting the participation
with German soldiers in the war in Libya.
The attitude remains almost the same in
case of the war in Syria, too.

The dissolution of the Warsaw

Pact, the dismemberment of the USSR and,
consequently, the getting out from under
the USSR of the eastern countries were
elements that have determined, within
these
countries,
the
restructuring,
organization, training and taking part in
combat of soldiers during different military
events in the world.
Unfortunately, 1990 did not bring
any peace, but a number of new risks and
threats, very different in origin,
importance, evolution and consequences
on short and long terms, which forced all
partners of international alliances and
organizations to unite and fight against
terrorism, the increase of production and
traffic of weapons of mass destruction, of
internationally and regionally organized
crime, etc. Recently, a decision has been
taken for women in the army to be also
part of the German special intervention
forces.
All countries, Germany included,
are aware that fighting against such risks
involves not only talks and / or political
sanctions, but also military participation,
the army of each state needing to always
be ready for action, both for defending the
national territory, as well as for acting
anywhere in the world, where there is need
for support inside the alliance. But armies
needed to correspond to new requests.
If during the Cold War, changes
within the federal army were relatively
static, without major modification,
starting with 1990, these transformations,
determined by the political and implicitly
economical changes, which appeared on
international level, have become very
dynamic and lead to major changes within
the German army, both regarding its
conception, as well as its structure and
equipment. Transforming and reducing the
military staff were not only some
characteristics of one army, but of all the
armies of the European countries, aspect
that is negatively perceived by some

Geis, Anna: Die Zivilmacht Deutschland und die

Enttabuisierung
des
Militrisches,
HSFKStandpunkte, Nr.2/2005, p.2

96

The more numerous the military

interventions of German army abroad
were, the more skepticism amidst the
population and even politicians regarding
the justification of these actions. In 2009, it
comes down to a law being given that the
German army intervenes only under UN,
NATO or EU mandates, while the right to
self-defense stays untouchable.3
In spite of the divergence of
opinion, it is stated, not only inside the
country, but also by politicians from
partner countries, that Germany must
change its attitude, must try to take profit
in its economical capacity, political and
geostrategic role that it presently plays, in
the importance it has for promoting its own
interests and the interests of the European
Union.
The result of EU and NATO
enlargement has created a circle of
protection around the German state, but
this does not guarantee a lack of danger.
Being a globalized nation, domestic and
world security are, as far as Germany is
concerned, inseparable.
Dangers have diversified and
extended, being able to have repercussions
both on a limited space, as well as on a
larger scale, on short and long terms:
climate changes (sometimes created on
purpose), famine, lack of raw materials and
wars deriving from these, pandemics,
aggressions
through
internet
and
socializing networks, coups and civil wars,
etc.
It is obvious that, in such a political
and military context, a state cannot remain
a simple spectator. The operation theater
has extended now it is the whole world
fact that, by chance or being aware of the
importance of his statement, was expressed
by the German Minister of Defense, Peter
Struck, in 2005: the action area of the
German army is the entire world.
In order to keep their standards of
living, all EU member countries, including
Germany, but also those outside this

organization must try to contribute at

keeping the economical and political
stability at national and international
levels, and this objective can be reached
only by avoiding conflicts of any nature, at
any level. But it is very true that, in limit
situations, when all forms of peaceful
solutions for contentious issues had no
result, then people must resort to the
military way, too. Decades after decades,
Germany has benefitted from the
protections ensured by NATO and the
USA. Today, the allies are waiting for
Germany to defend itself, but especially to
contribute to the defense of the alliance
partners. The army has the role of
defending the nations interests, as well as
those of the alliance, to prevent, stop or
even solve crises and conflicts from
different parts of the world, where, if
conflict evolves, most of the states will be
affected at international level, not only
those close to the focal point of the
conflict.
In this context, the security politics
must be pragmatic, must especially focus
on the areas where more focal points of
conflict are developed North Africa,
Middle East, Central Asia.
In order to be able to act promptly
and efficiently, Bundeswehr must be
technically equipped and have well-trained
soldiers, with analysis and discernment
skills in evaluating conflict situations,
capable to efficiently organize themselves,
both for rapid reaction, as an answer to a
particular situation, as well as for a long
term strategy.
Defending the national territory, as
well as the entire territory of the alliance
remains one of the main missions of the
German army, as, in western and southern
Europe, the risk of internal (civil war)
conflicts, as well as inter-state conflicts is
continually rising. This is how we
understand why it is mandatory for
Germany to take part in the construction of
a NATO joint anti-missile shield. On the
other hand, even after withdrawing from
Afghanistan, Germany has to have its army
ready to intervene in areas of crisis,

Wachstum,
Bildung,
Zusammenarbeit,
Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP,
26.10.2009, p.123.

97

beyond the European borders. The

Bundeswehr must be always ready to fight
for human rights, both in NATO, as well as
in the EU and UN structures.
In order to change the rather
reserved, expecting attitude, regarding
different foreign policy problems and in
the military field, attitude that both some
politicians, as well as a part of the citizens
share and that bothers the majority of
political partners in the other European
states, the project Neue Macht Neue
Verantwortung was initiated in the period
between November 2012 December
2013, by the German Marshall Fund
(GMF), along with Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik (SWP). On this project,
specialists from very different fields of
activity economical, sociological,
security, media and even the members of
some NGOs took part.
The cooperation with the armies of
the neighbor states, of the partners and
allies is almost mandatory especially
nowadays, when, as a result of reducing
the staff of the national armies and of their
weaponry no state can defend itself any
longer and, as a consequence, a
relationship of interdependence between
the armies of the states within the same
organization is created and, more than that,
even the three international organizations
UN, NATO and EU are in a process of
transformation from the point of view of
organizing, of the missions attributed to
them, of their responsibilities. This fact
shows that Germany has the opportunity,
even the obligation to participate not only
in the operations themselves, but even in
their settlement, to try to find solutions for
the renewal and adaptation to the new
political and social contexts.
The UN is the only one of the
international organizations having the
mission to ensure world peace, respecting
of human rights, international cooperation,
respecting international law. The charter of
this organization regulates world order, in
which Germany is very interested, being
permanently prepared to invest in this

organization, and its strengthening and the

strengthening of the organizations with the
UN structure constitute one of the main
goals of Germanys foreign policy. But
NATO and EU must wait to be asked by
the UN to apply the principles of
international law and, in case of need, to
intervene with military means.
Germany has announced its
intentions to participate in the support of a
strong and efficient form of NATO, this
being a frame that has turned out to be
efficient for political talks on the strategic
level where the US expect more from
Europe and Germany in particular.
Concerning the plan of military operations,
Europe must wait for the US to very rarely
overtake command; the US even intends to
take a lesser part in the different
operations. This is the reason why Europe
and Germany will have to be prepared, to
have the frame of NATO operations ready,
so that they be as least as possible forced
to appeal to the help of the US.
Conclusions
From a reserved attitude, Germany
has ended up being active in very many
focal points of conflict, and in some
situations has remained to ensure the
consolidation of peace, thus helping the
populations to get back to a normal life.
The most telling conclusion is the map
where the missions that the German army
executes beyond the borders of the
country, beyond the borders of Europe, are
posted.

98

Bibliography
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

Clement, Rolf; Jris, Paul E., 50

Jahre Bundeswehr, 1955-2005,
Hamburg, Mittler 2005, 288 p.
Geis, Anna, Die Zivilmacht
Deutschland
und
die
Enttabuisierung des Militrisches,
HSFK-Standpunkte, Nr.2/2005, p.2
Kutz,
Martin,
Reform
und
Restauration der Offizierausbildung
der Bundeswehr: Strukturen und
Konzeptionen
der
Offizierausbildung im Widerstreit
Militrischer
und
Politischer
Interessen, Baden-Baden Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1982, ISBN
378900751x
Pommerin, Reiner - Zur Tradition
der Bundeswehr, in: Jahrbuch der
Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, 2006, p.
131-155

6.

7.

99

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

(SWP)+German Marshall Fund of
the Unitated States (GMF), Neue
MachtNeue
Verantwortung.
Elemente einer deutschen Auenund Sicherheitspolitik fr eine Welt
in Umbruch, Berlin, 2013, 52 p.
Uzulis, Andr, Die Bundeswehr.
Eine politische Geschichte von
1955 bis heute, Hamburg> Mittler
2005, 204 p.
Jahresbericht, Wachstum, Bildung,
Zusammenarbeit, Koalitionsvertrag
zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP,
26.10.2009,
p.123.,
http://www.bundes
regierung.de/Content/DE/_Anlagen
/ Buerokratieabbau/2013-07-29-jb2009.pdf?__blob=publication
File&v=3, accessed October 27,
2015

THE ROLE OF GERMAN LANGUAGE IN GLOBALIZED EUROPE

Andra Sybil STEFAN
Lecturer, PhD, Carol I National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania,
e-mail:andrasybil@gmail.com

Abstract: Communicating is the necessary condition for people to understand each other, to work and
cooperate. English is the international language, but to speak the native language of business partners, means a
lot for the profit of the business itself. The article seeks to highlight the importance of learning a foreign
language, even if it is not a frequently spoken one: each language brings a benefit and never a loss.
Keywords: German, teaching, learning, foreign language.

Ludwig Eichinger, director of the

Institute for the German Language,
asserted that: despite the fact that there are
a lot of resident foreign nationals in
Germany, one should not forget that:
Germany is comparatively multilingual
but on another level quite monolingual.
The establishment is very much based on
the German language. The educational
system is also quite rightly based on the
German language.1
If we used the word EUROPE
(eastern Europe, western Europe, southern
Europe or central Europe), we would get a
very high number of combinations. The
same number of languages is spoken on
this continent, more than 80. But what
place does Europe held in teaching
German language? And, on the other hand,
how should Europe be presented, in all its
diversity, with all the contradictions that it
must face by itself, Europe, now, when it
should be united, but it is still bruised by
conflicts?
Once the border between East and
West was cancelled, we were all given the
possibility to get in contact with new
realities, to be forced to change (even
radically) our way of thinking, of
approaching problems in life. But in order
to really have the knowledge, we need that

necessary linguistic instrument, the foreign

language.
Economic, political, military and
not the least cultural relationships between
states, all of these determine a dynamic of
the foreign language learning process. If
we were to mention the 12 languages, that
are internationally spoken as mother
tongues and that are the most frequent, we
would get the following: Chinese is on the
first place in the world, followed by
English and Spanish. Japanese, German
and French take places 10-12. Between the
first place and the last places there are
Russian, Hindi-Urdu, Indonesian, Arabic,
Portuguese and Bengali.
In the course of the last decades
German was for different reasons subject
to significant fluctuations. How ever it is
important to emphasize that German could
be considered an European regional
language in the east; because the linguistic
connection between Germany and its
eastern neighbors (the residential areas
with large German speaking populations)
dates back centuries, and those countries
have a strong tradition of learning German.
But when can we think of a
language as being more or less spoken? Of
course, it is not the number of native
speakers which is edifying, but the
economic and political importance
attributed to that foreign language.
According to these criteria, English holds
the first place, it is the international
currency for any kind of linguistic

http://www.dw.com/en/the-german-languagesrole-in-a-changing-world/a-2619624,
retrived
27.10.2015

100

exchange. Speaking English today is a

matter of course and indisputable. Media
determine a cultural globalization,
slowly but surely. English is not an
advantage anymore today, it is a basic
condition.
That is why speaking a second
foreign language has turned itself into an
advantage. From this perspective, of the
worldwide importance of a foreign
language, the next foreign languages are
Spanish, French and German. I will try to
demonstrate below which are the factors
contributing to the international value of a
foreign language, in this case, of German
language.
Germany has played an important
role since the beginning of the European
Union and, in time, it became more and
more active at international level, both
economically and politically. International
linguistic policy does not treat German as
an isolated language anymore. Presently,
approximately 100 million people speak
German, as a mother tongue, in Europe
and in several states it holds the status of
an official language: Germany, Austria,
Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Luxemburg,
southern Tirol (the north of Italy), and in
some eastern areas of Belgium and France
(Elsass). We also should not forget the
minority communities, having German as a
native tongue, the German communities in
Romania, Bulgaria and Russia. We should
also remind the fact that, because of a
single vote against, German did not
become the official language of the United
States of America (the proposal was made
within the American Congress session, a
session that took place on the 13 of
January 1795). Therefore, a very rarely
stated, but real fact: German is the most
spoken language in Europe, as a native
tongue. Apart from these speakers, other
20 million people are learning German,
having at their disposal 244,000 teachers,
57% of whom are in central Europe,
Eastern Europe, and central Asia. From
127 of Goethe-Institut Inter Nationes
institutes worldwide, 31 are in the EU

countries, while other 45 are in the other

European countries. Germany plays an
increasingly important part in inter-cultural
relationships, especially through the
important offer of scholarships for youth
students, MAs, PhDs, researchers, or
people
with
secondary
school,
confectioners, masons, and other trades.
Having 14 neighbors, the German space
has slowly, but surely become a space of
exchange and transit.
From the perspective of using the
foreign language, German is situated on
the third place, after English and Russian,
followed by Spanish (10 million) and
French (5 million). According to some
Korean studies (knowing the fact that the
Korean economy has largely invested in
Eastern Europe), German language slowly
takes the place of English in the economic
field.
Globally speaking, books published
in German (Germany, Austria and
Switzerland) hold second place. In other
words, every 5th book is in German.
In the technical field, German is an
international
language.
Technical
publications hold a second place here, too.
Whoever speaks German can get
information in any field of modern
technology. After the USA, Germany is the
most requested place for foreign students,
no matter of the field of studies.
Once reunited, Germany has
become, within the EU, the country with
the highest population number and the
highest economical power (the GDP of
Germany represents approximately 30% of
the Social Domestic Product of the EU).
From the linguistic point of view of the
economical power, whoever speaks
German has increased chances to improve
trading relationships with one of the
biggest industrialized countries in the
world and one of the biggest exporting
countries.
All these aspects have determined
us, the teachers, too, to adapt our methods
of teaching, even the duration of the
courses. Manuals that deal strictly with

101

grammar are not over-dated, from the point

of view of knowledge, even though, from
the perspective of teaching techniques,
teachers are adapting to interactive
teaching, the student being required to
participate in teaching. But the vocabulary,
the conversation classes! Starting from the
courses organized by the Centre for
Foreign Languages within different
schools for foreign languages, students
must always be able to have a conversation
on daily subjects. Authentic texts, both
those in the foreign language, as well as
those from the mother tongue, from
newspapers, news shows or talk-shows on
politics or social subjects must not miss
from conversation classes. These texts are
both didactic material, as well as possible
discussion subjects outside the foreign
language course, when students take part
in different professional activities.
In this regard, both reading and
listening skills (with or without visual aid
audio text or video), and speaking skills
must be developed. Any day, any political,
economic and military event represents a
new conversation subject. The seminars
for developing the speaking skill must be
permanently adapted to the breakneck pace
of international (political and economic)
events, so that students could face any kind
of requests, after graduating the foreign
language courses.
The student must have the
possibility to understand the texts, but
especially to be able to complete the
gaps that might appear due to an
unknown word. For such exercises, the
texts of different publications (printed or
on the internet) represent a permanent
source for the German teacher. But these
texts cannot be just put in front of the
students, they need to be prepared,
processed. There are more types of
exercises that we did in the classroom:
- students answer already prepared
questions;
- a student asks the questions to the
text, while the other students
answer (the group is in control, not
the teacher).

The second type of exercises does

not only develop the understanding of the
text (which is necessary to be able to
correctly formulate the questions), but
also, at the same time, the listening skill
and, this time, we are not talking about a
native speaker, who cannot make grammar
or vocabulary mistakes, but we are talking
about the colleagues, whose mistakes, if
they appear, must be detected and
corrected. With this second type of
exercise, I believe the advantages are much
bigger, both for the teacher and for the
student.
If the subjects of the written texts,
after the student had in front of his/her
eyes the new words and expressions, are
followed by the listening exercises
(preferably videos at first, to help the
student once more, by visual support), I
dont think we, teachers, can any longer be
afraid there may be lacks in the language
training of the students.
Once the vocabulary notions thus
fixed, they will no longer be an obstacle in
having a conversation on the subjects
approached at the course. That is why the
topics for the conversation seminars must
be very carefully, but also very rapidly
chosen, in order not to leave any kind of
international or internal event to go
unnoticed.
The authentic audio texts really
represent a problem. Taken from the TV,
they cannot be used in the classroom for
anything else but the advanced groups.
In this direction, the German language
needs a gradual support from the
German partner. Materials for beginners
are almost impossible to find, on current,
material topics, to introduce, to practice
and finally to gradually fix, therefore to
use, the very complex vocabulary of
modern conversation subjects.
Conclusions
While most of the people say that
English is the international language of
business and society, theres never been a
better time to learn a foreign language such

102

as German, French, Russian, Chinese or

Japanese. Regardless if a language is not
quite as widespread as English, each one
offers rich sets of linguistics and subtleties,
which cannot be translated in any other
language, and it is only then that one can
really understand what the business
partner, the foreigner teacher, the writer or
anyone else wanted really to communicate.
An extra known language will always be a
benefit for each of us.
When we speak about German as a
foreign language, we have to bear some
important aspects in mind and the first one
should be that Germany was, is and will be
an important country in global science,
business, politics and culture. It is the most
important trading partner for almost all
European partners and it is the fifth largest
trading partner of the U.S.A after Canada,
Japan, Mexico and China.
On the other hand it is also
important to know that Germans have one
of the highest per capita incomes of the
world and that is a guarantee that it will
remain an important actor of the
international stage. Last, but not least, one
should try to explore new linguistic
areas, because this is a very easy way for
each of us to enhance the quality of its life,
being able to know more that we can learn
by using just our mother tongue and the
second mother tongue English.

Zweitsprache-Erwerb.
Eine
longitudinale Untersuchung zur
mndlichen Sprachkompetenz bei
Schlerinnen und Schlern nichtdeutscher Herkunftssprache (ndH)
in Berlin". In: Zeitschrift fr
Fremdsprachenforschung, 14, 2,
291-300.
3.
Chlosta,
C./
Ostermann,
T./Schroeder, C. (2003): "Die
'Durchschnittsschule'
und
ihre
Sprachen: Ergebnisse des Projekts
Spracherhebung
Essener
Grundschulen
(SPREEG)".
In:
ELISe: Essener Linguistische Skripte
- elektronisch, 3, 1, 43-139.
4.
Jeuk, S. (2003): Erste Schritte in der
Zweitsprache
Deutsch.
Ein
empirische Untersuchung zum
Zweitspracherwerb
trkischer
Migrantenkinder
in
Kindertageseinrichtungen. Freiburg
Brsg.: Fillibach.
5.
Pfaff, C. W. (1987): "Functional
Approaches to Interlanguage". In:
Pfaff, C.W. (ed.): First and Second
Language Acquisition Processes.
Cambridge: Newbury House, 81102.
6.
Pfaff, C. W. (1992): "The Issue of
Grammaticalization
in
Early
German Second Language". In:
Studies in Second Language
Acquisition, 14, 3, 273-296.
7.
uuianu, Diana-Elena, Lifelong
Learning and Foreign Language
Teachers, Sesiunea de comunicri
cu
participare
internaional,
Strategii XXI, Bucureti, 2011,
Buletinul sesiunii de comunicri
tiinifice.
Internet Links
8.
http://www.dw.com

Bibliography
1.

2.

Ahrenholz, B. (2001): "Progression:

Sprachbereiche - berblick". In:
Rsch, H. (ed.): Handreichung
Deutsch als Zweitsprache. Berlin:
Senatsverwaltung
fr
Schule,
Jugend und Sport, 62-65.
Ahrenholz,
B.
(2003):
"Frderunterricht und Deutsch-als-

103

PUBLIC ORDER A WAY OF EXPRESSING PUBLIC INTEREST

Corneliu POPA
PhD student, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" Police Academy
popacorneliu42@yahoo.com

Abstract: Due to increasing the pace of everyday life today, as it is increasingly dominated by national social
and economic unrest, as well as to the continous specialization on the other hand of offenders, the multiple task
of police function becomes every day more significant and more difficult. Therefore, naturally, in order to cope
as much as possible with all its duties, police need to possess a high professional capacity. Professional skills
can be gained only by serious methodological training and education in science ,,public order and safety in this
new science which is currently developing, the police science.
Keywords: public order, national security, rule of law, risk factors, human rights.

of order guided by the same genetic spirit

of universal order or harmony4.
As an intrinsic element of nature,
man is in turn composed of elements
,,dominated by the same natural rules, by
the same universal order5, endowed in
addition with the superior quality of
human wisdom and entrusted with
fulfilling the role of contributing through
the rich resources and superior wisdom
to promoting the system of universal
order6.
This principle of natural order
should be, according to the author, at the
origin of the individuals respect to civic
order and state establishment. His
intelligence enables him not to rebel
against essential order, against the main
precepts against of natures system of
order7 but, on the contrary, put him in a
greater and more complex interdependence
to both its material and social, closer or
more distant environment, in which he is
forced to live the role of his life.8
The state, as the outcome of human
society, as the socio-political organization,
has the task through its consistency and

1. General comments on the

principle of order
Dr. Eugen Bianu, former head of
the Romanian Police in 1938, in his work
Public Order, showing the principle of
order, stated that for a fair assessment and
understanding of the institution and its
function, it is useful ,,1to show in advance
and briefly the origin, the existence, and
the supremacy of the principle of order in
the universe, both in general and in
particular in peoples lives and state
organization.2
Introducing universal order, he
appreciated that all of nature in its
intensity was designed by competition
and in a spirit of prevailing order, of an
intrinsic order principle of universal
nature3, which means that ,,the whole life
of universal macrocosm was created, was
developed in the past, is currently working
and will continue to develop in the future
too, being led by the (...) guidance system

Dr. Eugen biannual civic order - professional

guide in police science , Bucharest, 2008 , printed
works
under
Romanian
Association
of
Humanitarian Law , p. 19
2
Ibid 1
3
Ibid

Ibid pp. 19-20

Ibid pp. 20
6
Ibid pp. 20
7
Ibid pp. 22
8
Ibid p. 22
5

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sociological entity, Hans Kelsen15 founder of normativist school - considering

that the state is a system of legal rules, a
legal order, a community established by
law, while Vladimir Ilyich Lenin defined
the state as a means ensuring a classs
dominance over another. 16
State power17 is one manifestation
of the broader phenomenon of power
(authority), a phenomenon characteristic of
any society. A full analysis of this
phenomenon cannot be limited only to
questions of purely legal nature, but must
necessarily include aspects that these legal
institutions manifest concretely, in
everyday life. Expressing the proximate
genre in defining state power, its character
consists in the fact that power is an
effective possibility to express and fulfill
general will as mandatory will for the
whole society.
State power has social value, that
is, it occurs among people and is
performed on them. It appeared as the
power of social forces (groups, classes)
and was used at asserting and protecting
their interests, the road it took from
despotism to lawful and democratic
government demonstrating the social
nature of power.
Public order, attribute of state
power, can be distinguished within the
power phenomenon by the fact that it is a
power of coercion. In carrying out their
will, statesmen will resort to a whole
arsenal of means, even state coercion,
against those who do not obey, this form of
coercion being used only as a last resort,
when the states will expressed by law is
not complied with voluntarily.
Coercion differentiate state power
from the social power existing in primitive
communities of the Stone Age, which was
a civic power based on conviction, on

authority, to achieve maximum efficiency

of social order9, the supremacy of the
fundamental principle of order being found
in the whole harmony of the whole
inventory of universal order of the
world.10 The state is defined as the
legally distinct, stable and permanent
entity,
different
form
individuals
exercising power within the predetermined
competences, on a territory and with
respect to a given population.11
So, power is the key element of
state in the legal sense, but addressing this
concept differs from one society to another
and even from one form of government to
another. Thus, Leon Duguit12 said, at the
beginning of last century, that the gap
between the rulers and the ruled is a
defining element for the state, social
solidarity is a necessity of social life,
necessity that requires a certain order
embodied by the state. Consequently, the
state is social order, it is necessary
precisely because ,,governors have always
been, are and will always be the most
powerful. So, as mentioned above,
approaching the concept of state knew
various ways, Maurice Haurion13 arguing
that the state is essentially a historical
phenomenon14, being based on the idea of
power, considered as power of coercion.
Positivism, in its normativist
version, denies state any possibility of
existence as a separate historical or

Ibid p. 24, cited W. Lienhard, Le rolls them valeur

et de lordre public, Paris 1935
10
Ibid p. 25
11
John Muraru, Elena Simina Tanasescu,
Constitutional Law and public institutions,
academic course, Publisher 12, vol. II, CH Beck,
Bucharest, 2006 , p. 40
12
Leon Duguit - Trait de droit constitutionnal ,
Tome II - The General Theory of him , Etat ,
Librairie Ancienne 1923 Paris , vol . I, p. 57
13
Haurion Marcel, Precise de droit constitutionnel ,
LGDJ 1923, Paris , p. 178
14
The state appeared within a historical process in
which governments realize they must obey the
government which , in turn, assumes fully the task
of driving and liabilities arising here, op. cit.

15

Hans Kelsen , General Theory of State , printing

Oltenia , 1928 Bucureti
16
Work, ol . 29 ESPLP 1956 Bucharest
17
Muraru considers that ,,state is defined as a way
of organizing political power in the form of state
power"

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understanding the purpose and necessity of

the measures taken. It should also be
stressed that the will of individuals, social
groups, people or nation (according to the
definition we give to statesmen) expressed
by law, is not the arithmetic sum of the
individual will of the members, groups or
social classes, the law expressing the
fundamental interests of the statemens
category. The report law-will is directly
related to the democratic nature of the
state, aspect revealed by Jean Jacques
Rousseau in the Social Contract18. Also,
Ion Muraru19 considers that State power
exists only as an organized power, as a
machine, mechanism, authorities. State
power can exist only if it is organized and
organizing state power on the principle of
balance and cooperation among its
authorities has undisputable advantages in
the democratic exercise of the functions
entrusted.
Referring to peace, order and
public security, dr. Eugen Bianu20
considered
that
this
old
notion
characteristic for police activity must be
modernized ,,because, a state of order is
only natural and logical to include also a
state of quietness and safety, the right
concept being that of public order or
peoples order. In his view21, the modern
approach considers public22 safety as an
asset of the law and public order as a sui
generis asset, constituting an intermediate
category between law and morality.
By public safety23, we undestand a
peaceful state of affairs, necessary to
ensuring the existence of the state, of the
individual and of the material and ideal

property guaranteed by positive law, which

also ensures their normal development.
Public order, in turn, is defined as
that state of equilibrium which must exist
among the powers and social factors
composing a society, determined in time
and space, for its preservation and social
development. It relies on, besides the
norms imposed by certain legal provisions,
also on certain voluntary rules of social
behavior, badly needed for human
coexistence and must be imposed
voluntarily though the education of a
societys public order awareness24. In
some cases, irregularities, violations or
serious disruptions to public order must be
imposed and maintained by the authority
and force of the law. The rule of law and
democracy cannot be conceived outside a
proper regulatory framework, with
frequent violation of public order.
After the revolution of 1989,
because of great social unrest, generating
acts of disorder, the acute issue of ensuring
public order became one of the main
concerns of the new authority. Against this
background, a regulatory framework was
issued, in line with international rules and
regulations in states with advanced
democracy. On this occasion it was
discovered that the problem of public order
is very complex, seeking to harmonize
Polices right of the state as an
attribute of its authority and position as a
protector of the rights and interests of
society and human rights, the supreme
value of society.
The concept of public order has
known throughout its evolution profound
changes marked by social order, changes
which became much stronger in the last
decades. These changes were determined
or influenced by the political and social
changes, by the economic processes going
on at European and global level, as well as
the technological revolution and its
multiple implications.

18

,, Often it happens to be a great difference

between the will of all and the general will ; one
relates only to the common interest ; the other
private interest and is only a sum of particular wills.
If out of the will, which canceled each other the
most and the least, as the sum of wills, remains the
general will "
19
I. Muraru, op. cit.
20
Dr. Eugen biannual Public Order, p. 454
21
Ibid p. 345
22
Ibid p. 346
23
Ibid p. 348

24

Ibid p. 348

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Economic
globalization,
liberalization of movement of goods,
services, information and people while
maintaining and deepening disparities
between continents, civilizations and
nations, caused the emergence of new
threats to modern civilization and the
crystallization of a new society and a new
type of state, specific to the high-tech era,
required also a remodeling of public order
structures.
The
democratic
regime
is
characterized both by advanced forms of
exercising the political rights of the nation
states citizens and by the civil society
control over the state apparatus; one being
able to say that democratic society is
planning and building its true doctrines and
systems of prevention and combating the
factors jeopardizing its internal stability.
The emphasis on prevention of risk
factors is one side of the internal public
order system that distinguishes a
democracy from a totalitarian regime. In a
democratic state, the prevention of and
combating actions which disturb public
order must become a political right of
responsible citizens, able to understand and
engage their own initiative in protecting
their fundamental values. In the totalitarian
state, internal security and public order do
not protect the interests of the majority
population, but of a ruling minority, which
has no interest in involving society as a
whole in defending objectives perceived as
foreign.

conduct under the rules of law (real

effective rule of law).
Closely related to the concept of
rule of law, the legislation of a state
includes and here we are referring
particularly to the Romanian legislation
also other notions, such as national safety,
national security, public order.
In the contemporary approach,
national security integrates the following:
political, diplomatic, economic, military,
environmental, social, cultural, moral and
humanitarian areas. The security policy
includes measures and actions taken in
these areas, which are designed to
optimally
ensure
maintaining
and
strengthening, defending and promoting
fundamental interests.
National safety is a state of
equality, balance and social, economic, and
political stability necessary for the
existence and development of the
Romanian national state as a sovereign,
unitary, independent and indivisible state,
for preserving public order, as well as the
climate of the unhampered exercise of the
rights, freedoms and fundamental duties of
citizens, according to the principles and
democratic norms settled in the
Constitution.
Regarding public order - as part of
national security the reputed Romanian
specialist in constitutional law, prof.
Antonie Iorgovan, PhD defined it as the
state of lawfulness, balance and social
peace, which ensures public peace, the
security of the individual, communities and
properties, the public health and morality,
which, in accordance with the principles
and rules settled by the Constitution, is
achieved through specific measures of
police coercion.25
The
definition
follows
the
following features:
a) public order is a fact, the state of
respecting the law, fundamented on social

2. The concept of public order,

the correlation with the rule of law
and national security
An important concept used by a
states legislation is the rule of law, which
means a situation or condition created by
obeying the rules of law in social relations.
In other words, the rule of law
encompasses all the rules of conduct of a
state law (normative rule of law), and the
consequence that occurs as a result of its

25

Lilac Anthony, Administrative Law Treatise,

Revised 4th Edition , Publishing All Beck ,
Bucharest, 2005

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peace and fund balance; this state can be

reached through specific measures of
constraint taken by the police, according to
the principles and norms of the
Constitution;
b) the state of equality refers to the
social values with the highest frequency of
infringements, namely:
- Public peace;
- Security of the person, work and
property (civic security);
- Public Health (including hygiene);
- Public morals.
As a state of affairs in the social
field, public order - projection of lawful
order in the organization and functioning
of the state - reflects the observance of
rules of conduct encompassed in
legislation, of citizens rights and
freedoms, as well as of public and private
property. Its disruption affects the proper
functioning of state institutions and can
induce dangers regarding the countrys and
citizens major interests, as well as feelings
of civic insecurity.
Public order designates the
situation resulting from the application of
legal provisions on the protection of life,
physical integrity and freedom of
individuals, public and private property,
other rights and legitimate interests of
citizens, social groups and state, the rules
of social life, combating violence ,
terrorism and separatism.26
Public order comprises mainly
social order (peaceful coexistence and
harmonious cooperation between members
of the society) and the rule of law (the
normal functioning of state bodies).
Starting from the constitutional
provisions, a number of papers developed
by people working within the Ministry of
Interior define public order as the state of
law, peace and social balance which
ensures
public
peace,
peoples,
communities, and properties safety, the
public health and morality, which,

according to settled principles and norms

of the Constitution shall be attained by
specific police coercive measures.27
Public order is closely linked to the
rule of law, the distinction between them
being that any breach in the rule of law
affects public order.

26

27

3. Public order and safety

at the beginning of the 21st century
Certainluy, two of the significant
structural elements of the security
environment, at the beginning of the
millennium, are public order and security.
Regardless of geography, they are closely
related to the state of peace or conflict,
while manipulating phenomena in the
segment of public order are obviously
more numerous in times of instability. At
the beginning of the 21st century in the
Romanian society, but also in the
European area, given the relations
established within the European Union,
public order and safety has some
peculiarities that are outlined by the
literature in the field.
Only a few people have questioned
why the beginning of the millennium
should bring something new and
challenging for the way society functions
in general, since there were not only purely
positive changes regarding the global
security environment and, consequently,
the segment of public order and safety in
many nations.
Once past the psychological
threshold, we enter a certain normality,
the stable actors and nongovernmental
structures following their planned goals in
a complex and at the same time
complicated logic.
Therefore, public order and security
at the beginning of the third millennium,
presents both general elements specific to
the end of the twentieth century and certain

View Collective , public order - Component of

National Security , Publisher , 1996

Anghel Andreescu and collective , public order Component of national security, Publisher , 1996

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features expected with hope by some or

doubt by others.

nature and its phenomena? The same

Vasile Prvu states, rightly, that man and
his uncontrolled actions became the
number one enemy of society.
Despite the tremendous progress
that mankind has made in the domain of
knowledge, especially in the area of
informatics and communications, people
have not yet answered all questions
regarding daily existence, this resulting in
a state of social imbalance. Still unresolved
and with minimal immediate prospects, the
security issue is always an equation in
question, though confrontation grounds
seemed to be moving at some point to
negotiation table. Public order and safety is
closely linked to the state of conflict or
peace, and the manipulating phenomena in
the segment of public order are certainly
more numerous in times of instability.
History has witnessed that although the
Cold War ended (1947-1991), it was not
followed by an age of peace and security,
but it brought back to public attention new
questions related to crises and conflicts.
The new aspects brought by the
security environment of the twenty century
were the substantial changes that required
an adaptation of the classic criteria for the
analysis of international security, because
of the strong momentum of consolidation
received by the criminal activities. New
challenges
arose
from
economic
globalization
and
fragmentation
overlapping with classical forms of
regional
risks
and
vulnerabilities.
Moreover, there was a wave of justified
fears growing about the everyday safety of
people and communities. We could say
that organized crime has seen substantial
development during these years and
particularly
aggressive
forms
of
penetration.
The traditional foci of tension are
maintained, but the ways of solving them
is influenced, intrinsically, by the
emergence of unconventional and crossborder risks such as terrorism, organized
crime and proliferation of weapons of mass

3.1. News and Perspectives

Changes in society at the end of last
century and the beginning of this century
created a certain specificity regarding
environmental stability of public safety.
Represented by all the conditions,
processes and phenomena of political,
diplomatic, economic and social nature,
but also those in the cultural, military,
environmental or information sphere, the
domestic and international security
environment determines the protection of
the individual and the community he/she
belongs to. Regarding the transformations
that people know today, Vasile Prvu
considers that these are not new, but
should be understood both by specialists
and the general public as a real, permanent
process, all the more as the modern
existence of nations starts from the ability
to analyze and forecast the spirit of
adaptation and proactive action. In such a
context, a compulsory prerequisite for the
survival and development of socio-political
systems is the achievement of security in
its various forms. In academic
environments or in centers of decision,
security tends to be addressed in terms
associated with human rights, national
interest and cooperation / international
competition, territorial integrity, welfare,
vulnerabilities, dangers, threats, risks at all
levels: individual, national, zonal, regional
or global.28
Paradoxically, the beginning of the
millennium brought less than experts in
various fields, either individuals or groups,
expected. Scientists from different areas of
research concluded that crossing the
threshold of 2,000 years did not manage in
any way to solve the great problems of
humanity, but the unavoidable changes, of
global dimensions, have become really
visible. Who is responsible for these
changes, so evident in recent years, beyond
28

Frunzeti Zodian, 2007, p. 38

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destruction29. In this context, public

policy is no exception regarding certain
levels of mutations occurring on a regional
level or in other restricted areas. When
referring to the order and its general
character, this entails compliance with
legal norms and rules so that the balance is
achieved which is so necessary for the
normal state, at the beginning of the
controversial third millennium. If in
Western countries, normality is defined by
the notions of democracy and respect for
human rights associated with the
competitive market economy, normality in
other areas of the planet relates to specific
values different from them, but still having
some things in common with the ones
promoted by the West.
A recorded mention during the
interwar period describes public order as
the material and the outer state of facts,
which is warranted by the lawmakers and
the administrative authority, which
protects and prevents any disorder that
might be brought upon it. The
Administrative Law Treatise of Paul
Negulescu places in the sphere of public
order the security of persons and property
etc. Nowadays, by public order, we
understand, as it is defined in the work
Aspects regarding public meetings in
Romania: the state of legality, balance and
social peace, which ensures the peace,
security of people, communities and
property, health and public morality,
whose keeping, according to settled
principles and norms of the Constitution
shall be made by specific police coercive
measures (Andreescu, Zaharia, 1998: 46).
Closely related to the concept of
public order, the public behavior of
citizens also raises major interest in the
current Romanian society. Experience has
shown that public attitudes and behavior
can be influenced in a positive way, but
also in the negative way, destructive to the
climate of public safety. Manipulating
public behavior to serve the purposes

intended by circles or structures

inaccessible to public knowledge is also a
reality of nowadays, of the social
environment which we live in. In essence,
public order in the new millennium and at
the beginning of the twenty-first century,
the Romanian society and the European
area, given the relations established within
the European Union, presents some
peculiarities amid the basic elements that
make up the system and that are part of the
accepted definitions in the literature in the
field.
We identify, as a first characteristic
feature, the issue of integration into NATO
and the European Union, which gave the
Romanian society a certain stability still
under consolidation, while public order
began to tend toward Western models,
providers of security, towards the
integration into the common area, with
guarantees of civic safety. Another feature
of the dynamics of public order, after
2000, is linked to the risk factors related to
it and to national security, taking certain
shapes, too little perceivable in the past.
Relying on the increasing smuggling of
goods, money and people, criminal
organizations exhibited their influence and
power and have become wealthier as
compared to the governments of countries
they confront. This action has become a
real threat to the national security of many
countries and to international security in
general.30
In Romania, in parallel to
strengthening the climate of public order
and safety, due to the integration into
Euro-Atlantic structures, we witness in
close connection with the dynamics of
public order the specific manifestations
of organized crime in the context of
globalization and internationalization of
sharp segments of economic and social
development, primarily. In this respect, the
rise of crime, the emergence of new forms
of
crime,
the
globalization
and
internationalization of social activity in

29

30

Frunzeti Zodian, 2007, p. 39

Frunzeti, Sarcinschi 2007, p. 54

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general have highlighted several factors

such as the politico-economic or socially
potential risk for individuals or groups. In
General Considerations on the Protection
of
Public
Order,
Elijah
Gorjan
distinguishes
between
risk
factors
concerning violent political changes,
economic and financial developments with
great social impact, antisocial phenomena,
organized crime, corruption or deficiency
and inefficiency of the legal system,
incapable of regulating the social
relationships specific to constitutional
democracy (Gorjan 2002, p. 31). The risk
factors related to public order and not only
also include those related to global
economic and financial crisis, felt in our
country since the end of 2008 until now.
Therefore, the coming years are regarded
with uncertainty, to say the least, with
respect to the evolution of the economic
phenomenon, with improbable influences
upon society. As such, manipulating public
behavior is more likely than ever.
On the background of social
stability, there are a number of specific
threats to the public order of the 21st
century, a period considered by some
specialists even the beginning of a new era.
The destabilizing and provocative actions
on the public order segment include, these
years, possible conflicts and violent ethnic
and religious or terrorist actions. Currently,
many areas of conflict are interconnected
and interrelated. Ethnic and religious
clashes can be considered a true "Trojan
horse" that some stakeholders can use in
order to hasten the end of the nationsstates era, without taking into account the
boomerang effect that these destabilizing
actions could have (Frunzeti, Sarcinschi
2007, p. 59).
In the Romanian society, which is
in a safe area within the Euro-Atlantic
structures, destabilizing public order is still
possible, amid clashes with ethnic or
religious tinge. In this respect, we can
mention as an example the issues of Rroma
communities in certain areas of the country
and matters related to possible problems in

Transylvania, given the disagreements

between Greek Catholic believers and
Orthodox majority, especially on the
restoration of places of worship and
properties.
On the other hand, terrorism
represents a serious danger to national
security and therefore to public order in an
era in which society never ceases to
develop. With the development of society,
yet, the exacerbation of terrorist acts
becomes a real threat that should be
considered as an imminent risk factor.
Madeleine Albright warned, during her
tenure as Secretary of State, that the war
against terrorism is the war of the future31.
In this context of the risks and
vulnerabilities to public order, the
manipulation of public behavior is more
current than ever. Handling masses of
people, individuals, in the sense of creating
or distorting convictions to be used them to
achieve goals of sometimes occult nature,
impacting public policy, in the sense of
destabilization and disorder, is a reality in
Romania now will be and in the future too.
In search of a new identity, the conduct has
multiple deviations with dangerous
consequences in the present and future. We
agree with Vasile Prvus opinion, which
identifies, in the early years of the
beginning of XXI century, obstacles,
limitations, uncertainties and challenges of
the various crises in economy, society,
culture, civilization, nature. Among them,
says the author of the study entitled Do we
choose our future or is it forced upon us?,
the serious individual and social crisis of
31

Madeleine Albright was named Secretary of State

on 5 December 1996 Democrat President Bill
Clinton became the first US woman confirmed this
position. In 1998 , the Clinton administration fired
a missile targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. In the
first case it was considered that there were no
international terrorists camps drive , and in the
second it was assumed that it was a chemical
weapons factory . In fact , the attack would come in
response to the bombing of US embassies in Africa
two weeks before . Madeleine Albright Secretary of
State then said that "this is , unfortunately , the war
of the future" , thus justifying US attacks .

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values and especially behavioral crisis

should not be ignored, especially since
they are so detrimental for the individual
and for society. If we consider only the
decreasing interest in work, the use of
drugs, the involvement in networks of
organized crime and violence, situating in
the forefront the material interests and
neglecting on a large scale the spirit in all
its complexity are just some examples of
current behavioral crises.

10.

11.

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Law amending the Constitution no.
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Valentin
Marian-Gregoriu,
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of
Romania
in
contemporary
conditions, ArtPrint, Bucharest
2000;
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public order - Component of
national security, Publisher, 1996;
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Herder, Dimitrie Gusti 1937:
Sociology militans 1934;
Cearapin Tudor Thomas George,
management of public order at the
beginning of the century and
millennium, Publisher Bioterra,
Bucharest, 2001;
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public
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Component of National Security,
Publisher, 1996;
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Gendarmerie
Transylvanian - Tradition and
contemporaneity, Dacia Publishing
House, Cluj-Napoca, 1999;
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new European context. Coordinates
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insecurity
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Triton,
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pacify the Balkans, vol. World
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2007 Editorial Army Publishing
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Theodore
Sarcinschi
Alexander, vulnerabilities, threats
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Bucharest, 2007;
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Theodore
Zodian
Vladimir, the new millennium
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State, printing Oltenia, Bucharest,
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Tanasescu, Constitutional Law and
public
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Publishing CH Beck, 2006;
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Publishing All Beck, 2005;
W. Lienhard, Le rolls them valeur
et de l, ordre public, Paris, 1935;
Leon Duguit - Trait de droit
constitutionnal, Tome II - The
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him,

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Etat, Librairie Ancienne 1923

Paris, vol. I, p. 57;
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www.mapn.ro.
This work was made possible through
financial support provided through the
Sectoral Operational Program Development
of Human Resources 2007-2013, cofinanced by the European Social Fund, in the
project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with
the title Security through knowledge
Integrated/educational
network
of
training, counseling and guidance of PhD
students for a career in research of
security, defense, public order and national
security - SECNETEDU.

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113

RISKS AND THREATS TO PUBLIC ORDER

Corneliu POPA
PhD student, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" Police Academy
popacorneliu42@yahoo.com

Abstract: Romania is going through a period of profound unrest with complex transformations and
developments that are reflected not only in the environmental policy and domestic security but also in the
regional and continental ones. The issues of risk, threats to public order and national security and vulnerability
contributing factors are not new, but the evolution and permanent transformation of society with inherent
problems, bring forward new phenomena, trends, behaviors, able to affect the public order and security of the
states. The realities of Romania reveal the need, in the system of public order, to crystallize a strategic culture
based on knowledge of the major trends drawn from the global evolution of threats to public order and safety.
Keywords: public order and safety, citizens, globalization, immigration, crime.

As part of internal security, public

order and security are influenced by the
evolution and dynamics of the external
phenomena affecting internal security, plus
other matters of an internal nature, specific
to each state. In this context, the challenges
that arise in the way of Romania's security
also have an impact on public order and
safety in various forms and ways of
expression.
Among them, we can mention:
- globalization, which remains the
main factor influencing the global security
environment1;
- the crisis affecting the world
economic environment in recent years;
- the actions of organized crime and
cross-national networks, given the
uncertainties that affect the political and
social environment; we are living in a time
when most forms of crime know new types
of event and the general state of security of
the citizens and of the business
environment suffers amid insufficient
articulation and a certain rigidity of the
institutions in the system of public order
and safety;
- migration, particularly the illegal
one; Romania being in recent years
increasingly targeted by exponents of poor
nations, coming from countries where

1. Risks and threats to public order and

safety in Romania
Romanian security risks at present
are
mainly
internal,
non-military,
manifesting themselves in particular in
political, economic, financial, social and
environmental aspects. Continuity and
conjugation of existing vulnerabilities in
these areas may affect the security of the
country, generating interdependent, multifaceted effects, requiring new realistic and
flexible ways of action to prevent them. A
dissociation between the developments in
the domestic and international environment
is more difficult to perform in the context
of intermingling processes that can create
favorable conditions for the occurrence,
predictable or unpredictable, of the risks to
national security. Emphasizing multiple
interdependencies between countries and
the globalization and liberalization of any
kind - from the commercial aspects to the
information market makes increasingly
difficult such a dissociation, in which
internal and external risks can generate and
enhance each other.
Internal security concerns alike
citizen safety and public security, border
security, transport, energy and vital
resources supply systems and critical
infrastructure protection.

Defence Strategy of Romania - 2010

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society. Often, no matter the event, crises

causes profound disturbances in other sides
of life of a society, negatively influencing
a states security.
In recent years, in Romania there
have been produced a series of
transformations and mutations with
political, economic and social impact in
exercising the rights and freedoms of
citizens in attitude towards property and
state institutions in the organization of
society in the structure and dynamics of
criminal phenomenon, law and order and
public safety.
Also,
extremes
atmospheric
phenomena and disasters which, in recent
years, have experienced an increase both
in frequency and in magnitude, affected a
growing number of municipalities and
infrastructure elements of the national
territory, causing significant damage, and
unfortunately also casualties, particularly
in rural areas.
We also notice the emergence and
development of new types of crime
(cybercrime, forgeries, commercial piracy,
etc.), the training and specialization of
criminals, the increasingly stronger
presence of corruption at all levels and the
growing cross-border crime phenomenon.
The economic crisis of recent years,
which has affected and affects most
European countries, shows its negative
consequences in Romania, leading to the
adoption by the authorities of extremely
tough and unpopular economic measures
and lower living standards for a large part
of
the
population
with
related
consequences. The crisis also led to the
widespread return of many Romanians
who had left to work abroad. Together
with these, also came those who had left
with the intention of earning a living by
committing crimes.

economic opportunities are reduced or

demographic expansion led to acute
shortages2;
- calamities and natural disasters,
which have seen a worrying increase in
recent years amid climate change also felt
in Romania. More and more people are
affected by floods caused by rainfall and
Danube rivers overflowing or requiring
special efforts from the competent
institutions in order to reduce the negative
consequences. Also, disasters occurred due
to human action and they have affected
and may continue to affect the security of
citizens;
- the act of governing in a general
sense, and good governance as a
prerequisite for security and prosperity of a
state, on the one hand, instrument by
which democracy passes from theory and
concepts to real, everyday life3, to manage
questions that arise before the leaders and
decision-makers.
This
concept
was
formally
introduced in the Defence Strategy of
Romania - 2010 and its implications for
Romanian society are important in this
context just through its opposite
consequences.
The inefficiency of the government
act in certain areas can become a threat to
public order, in the sense of not fulfilling
the objectives set and because of the poor
use of resources. Romania's economic and
financial problems that affected the social
side, have affected and continue to affect
the functioning of Romanian society, and
in the situation when problems are
amplified, crises occur too.
In the strict public order and
security domain, crises occurs most often
in the form of their serious disorders
manifested by overcoming the legal
framework, the emergence of citizen
insecurity, ownership and infringement of
the other values generally accepted by
2

Michael Macuc, global and regional risks and

threats. Prevent and their amid higher globalization
process, the National Defense University Press
,,Carol I", Bucharest, 2007 , p. 233
3
Defence Strategy of Romania - 2010
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2. The main risks and threats in the field

of public order and safety in Romania4

consequences that may affect public order

and on the medium and long term, even
effects that affect national security. The
feeling of insecurity in the workplace of
those threatened by this phenomenon can
lead to spontaneous or organized public
events that may take valences violent
coercion makers in order to give the
measures of availability. But the most
dangerous in this respect are those who
have lost their jobs and failed, for various
reasons, finding another.
Unemployed is easily drawn into a
mass protest actions and also to handle the
situation outbreaks of violence. Also, in
the absence of other sources of income,
they may resort to committing antisocial
acts, generally known as petty crime,
especially acts affecting public and private
property, thus increasing the insecurity of
the citizens. The feeling that the job loss
would mean losing almost everything is
still present in the minds of Romanian
citizens, especially the elderly. We know
situations when they resorted to acts that
harmed life and personal integrity, but also
those of other fellow citizens.

2.1. The persistent economic,

financial and social issues, due to failure
of structural reforms and administrative
measures to manage them.
Thus, we can distinguish two
periods in the evolution of social and labor
conflicts that have marked the evolution of
Romanian post-revolutionary society, as
follows:
- the 90s The Revolution in
December 1989 offered the Romanians,
among other democratic rights and
freedoms, the right to protest, to express
dissatisfaction publicly. Often these events
took violent forms with serious
consequences on the evolution of public
order and safety. There were common
cases in which strikers occupied streets,
boulevards and even European roads.
Emblematic of this period remain the
actions of the miners, which by their
intensity and extent, by attracting a large
number of participants, endangered
national security itself, prompting the
authorities to take strong measures to stop
them. Miners actions caused disorder in
addition to state and internal insecurity and
consequences internationally. If through
the anticommunist revolution, Romania
gained a capital image externally, these
dramatic events have virtually closed its
doors for a significant period to foreign
investments;
- the period from 2009 onwards
the economic boom Romania knew at the
beginning of the third millennium was
stopped by the global economic crisis,
which manifested adverse consequences.

2.3. Increased corruption and

mismanagement of public resources
These
phenomena
are
characteristic, often, major crime, which
also greatly endanger major societal
values. Negative effects are reflected both
in the internal and external environment.
Internally, a sense of distrust is
developed among the population, by
promoting the idea that laws are optional
for some institutions are subservient to the
interests not of the country and its citizens,
and the country's resources are exploited in
the exclusive interest of a narrow segment
and privileged society. In our country,
corruption can affect various fields, state
institutions being especially targeted and
their representatives with management or
coordinating major development projects.
Privatising major branches of the national
economy has always aroused justified or
not, controversy and has often led to a
series of public events to protest against

2.2. Unemployment and the lack of

effective measures for the reintegration
into employment
The
consequences
of
unemployment, coupled with low levels of
social protection can lead to short-term
4

H. G. 196 of 2005 approving the MAI strategy of

achieving public order and safety , to increase
citizen safety and prevention of street crime

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the new private foreign and domestic

owners.
Corruption causes other criminal
acts, generates a chain of criminality by
attracting different people from various
fields, creating an optimal environment for
expression for those involved, as well as an
unstable
situation
with
serious
consequences to public order and national
security.

represent a real, current danger taking

complex shapes with respect to public
order and national security. Given that
Romania is on the eastern border of the
European Union, the damage and effects
caused by smuggling extend not only on
our countrys territory, but also throughout
the Union area. In other words, the
phenomenon threatens not only the
economy and thereby stability in Romania,
but also Western European economies,
mainly targeted by smugglers for their
activities.
Besides the economic implications,
we need to mention the violent reaction
that smugglers manifest against police
actions. Often, to dismantle smuggling
networks important police forces are
involved to prevent the outbreak of acts of
disturbing public order or conflicts
between them and smugglers.
On the issue of migrants at the
border with Serbia, there were raised by
forces of the Ministry of the Interior the
first dozen tents for receiving them. Other
camps were located near the village Lunga
in Timi and another in Stamora Moravia
area. However, Interior Ministry forces
(police, border guards, immigration
representatives structures, gendarmes and
firefighters carry out other specific tasks in
order to develop an integrated response to
the challenges of current security
environment.

2.4.
The
deepening
social
inequities and underground economy
proliferation
The two aspects can be highlighted
by a relationship of interdependence, as
follows:
amid
increasingly
sharp
differentiation among social classes and
the amplification of economic problems
for individuals, those affected tend to
procure the necessary subsistence and
other categories of goods or accepting the
services provided by them to individuals
who make a point to circumvent the law
and legal debt payment to the state for
trade, production, service delivery, etc.
In the domain of public order,
problems can arise in situations where the
relevant institutions and state security
forces intervene to restore legality and to
hold accountable those responsible. Being
satisfied with the benefits of the reduced
costs of such goods or services, citizens
can coalesce with those involved in illicit
activities, often criminals, and prevent the
staff entitled by law from applying legal
measures. Risks arise in this respect
particularly in the markets and fairs where
besides traders and those operating legally,
businessmen - under the umbrella of a
price advantage offered to buyers - harm
other traders, various companies, brands
and, last but not least, the Romanian state.
Underground economy is a pressing
problem, estimated in some open sources,
at 33% of Romanias GDP (about 50
billion).

2.6. Emigration of specialists in

various important fields
It is true that integration into the
European Union was made at a time when
our country only fulfilled minimum
Community standards. With all European
support, Romania still needs to make up
for significant economic drawbacks, as
compared to Western European countries,
felt particularly in quality of life and
economic strength of individuals.
The trend of minimizing social,
educational, cultural, ethical and moral
values, amplified by the economic crisis of
recent years has placed certain individuals,
known as elite of society (but not in the
sense of ruling class or people financially

2.5. Illegal actions in the border

area
Closely related to the underground
economy, smuggling and immigrants

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powerful or with great notoriousness), in

the position of not being able to to achieve
a higher level of training and experience in
the financial earnings offered by the state
or private system in Romania.

While the entire effort is

concentrated in the specified directions, the
attention of public order forces is diverted
from the crime phenomenon specific to
post-calamity period. The areas evacuated
or abandoned by the population because of
the threat or occurrence of disasters are
ideal environments where theft are
committed of public and private property.
Shortages may also lead to commiting
violent crimes, such as robbery or attacks
on humanitarian aid storage locations.
Ast the same time, disasters create
a state of social insecurity, tensions and
especially panic reactions manifested by
uncontrolled people, crowds of people in
certain limited areas etc5. which can lead to
endangering their safety and personal
integrity.
Due to global climate change,
Romania has been in the last decade
affected by extreme weather and the
occurrence of extreme floods, which
caused casualties and significant material
damage. Catastrophic floods that affected
much of the surface of Romania in 2006,
as well as the drought in 2007 led to major
changes in the climate of public order and
national security.

2.7. Shortcomings in protecting

classified information
These issues can become threats to
public order in conjunction with corruption
or obvious negligence by the criminal
groups, extremist, diversionary and
terrorist access to important information on
such actions in countering the phenomenon
of organized crime or terrorism or its
equivalent. In other words, the leak may
cause inefficiency in discovering and state
authorities bringing the perpetrators in
front of justice and countering the hostile
acts of order and security interests of
Romania.
2.8. Specific actions meant to
subvert confidence in state institutions
These actions often materialized
through the manipulation of information
cause confusion among the population,
amplify latent conflicts between different
components of the population, generating
often violent conflicts, and seriously
endangering public order and safety. In
this regard, the media can play a crucial
role. Because of medias desire to attract
public attention so as to increase their
rating, some aspects of public life
political, economic, social can be
presented in a subjective manner,
sometimes biased and under political
tensions, economic, social, they can lead to
extremely varied events in length and
intensity.

2.10. Exacerbation of rivalries

related to sports
In recent years, sport, particularly
football, has given rise to rivalries that
have exceeded the fair-play principle
underlying the sports competitions
worldwide transforming passions into
manifestations of extreme violence, with
serious consequences on the climate of
public order and personal security.
In Romania, the phenomenon of
violence associated with sport has seen a
resurgence towards the end of the first
decade of the third millennium, because of
importing hooligan behavior from the
western countries, favored by the absence
of a legislative and institutional framework
capable of managing new challenges. The

2.9. Production of natural

disasters, chemical, biological or nuclear
accidents
The
intervention
of
state
institutions in such situations are
specifically directed towards rescuing
people in distress, the evacuation of those
threatened by producing such events,
diminishing the effects of disasters and
calamities.

H. G. 196 of 2005 approving the MAI strategy of

achieving public order and safety, to increase
citizen safety and prevention of street crime.

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rules of common law proved ineffective

and sometimes outdated security forces in
the complexity and scale of the
phenomenon. Rivalries were manifested
violently both internally and externally at
international competitions, when the
adversity caused by the sporting event was
cumulated with other manifestations such
as
racism,
xenophobia,
extreme
nationalism.
All these have led to violent clashes
in sports arenas, especially in football, to
seriously disrupting public order, and the
emergence and amplification of insecurity
on stadiums and the lack of public and
spectators trust in the ability of state
forces to manage the problem of violence
in sport.
The phenomenon of violence in
sport is a topical issue that threatens the
climate of public order in Romania and the
possibility that in the near future we might
enjoy the sports shows in civilized
conditions, as it happens in other countries,
still remains wishful thinking.

Regarding the situation present in

European countries with respect to
migrants, we believe it is necessary to
create a broad, inclusive and adequately
funded strategy, covering both the source,
the causes, and the cooperation with transit
countries, which play a crucial role in
limiting the massive flows towards Europe.
In such a situation, the national legislation
should be introduced, aiming at tightening
penalties imposed for illegal migrant
trafficking, strengthening the legal
framework available to law enforcement
institutions in Romania.
Bibliography
1.
2.

3.

3. Conclusions
The risks, dangers and threats to
public order and stability have diversified
and some of their manifestations are
becoming increasingly hard to find in a
timeframe that allows for effective
measures to counteract.
The evolution of risks and threats is
characterized
by
an
extraordinary
dynamics, adapted to the socio-historical
conditions and changes in Romanian
society. In this context, institutions are put
in front of permanent and complex
challenges, which require response in a
realistic and flexible manner, as compared
to trends in the social environment,
especially in the field of security and order.
Currently, new trends in security and
therefore public order promote a proactive
approach to the issue in order to timely
anticipate and deter any events that may
affect the values of democracy, the
fundamental rights and freedoms of
citizens, the normal functioning of state
institutions.

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

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Strategy Ministry of Interior of the
achievements of public order and
safety, to increase citizen safety
and prevention of street crime,
published in the Official Gazette
no. 243 of 23.03.2005;
H. G. No. 929 approving the
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11.

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www.revistapentrupatrie.ro.

This work was made possible through

financial support provided through the
Sectoral Operational Program Development
of Human Resources 2007-2013, cofinanced by the European Social Fund, in the
project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with
the title Security through knowledge
Integrated/educational
network
of
training, counseling and guidance of PhD
students for a career in research of
security, defense, public order and national
security - SECNETEDU.

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120

COMMUNICATION IN THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

Elena-Adelina ANDREI
PhD student, Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy
andrei.adelina@yahoo.com

Abstract: At the basis of each organizations performance, therefore the operating intelligence environment
included, the essential element to be found is communication good communication between hierarchical flows.
The quality and functionality of communication depend on the manner in which resources are used and the goals
that are met. The efficiency of organizations relies on specialized functions of the departments and individuals
and their complementariness. These basic features of organizational activity result in the need for exchange of
information between departments, between individuals, between the organization and its socio-economic
environment.
Keywords: internal communication, types of communication, communication barriers, subordination.

of the information conveyed to them,

communication has not taken place.
Communication is the life source of
organizations
because
organizations
involve people. People cannot interact with
each other without communication. In the
absence of communication, everything
would grind to a halt. The workers in an
organization would not know the
organizations objectives so they would
not strive to achieve the organizations
objectives. Managers devote a large time
in their activity to communication. They
generally devote approximately a couple of
hours per day to communicating: they
spend time on face to face or phone
communication with their superiors,
subordinates, colleagues, customers or
suppliers. They also use written
communication in letters, reports or
memos wherever oral communication is
not feasible or not sufficient.
It so happens that very often we do
not understand exactly the meaning of the
message communicated to us and we spend
a lot of time trying to decipher the words
or gestures of our interlocutor. We can
label these coded messages as being the
consequence of a lack of understanding
and communication cycle that interpose
barriers in the way of effective
communication. Even if we speak the same
language, we do not communicate in the

Introduction
Communication has an important
role in the relations between people,
therefore in society as a whole. People
interact socially, professionally and
privately. In organizations effective
communication is significant for managers
so as to perform the basic functions of
management, like planning, organizing,
leading and controlling. Communication
helps managers to perform their jobs and
responsibilities and serves as a foundation
for planning. All the essential information
must be communicated to the managers
who, in-turn, must communicate the plans
so as to implement them. Organizing also
requires effective communication with
others about their job tasks. That way, the
products of the organizations can be built
and disseminated to the beneficiaries,
which is the main purpose of the
intelligence ones. Organizations cannot
operate
without
communication.
Communication can take various forms but
all the forms involve the transfer of
information from one party to the other. In
order for the transfer of information to
qualify as communication, the recipient
must understand the meaning of the
information transferred to them. If the
recipient does not understand the meaning

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same way. Everyone has his own way to

convey messages, to put his/her feelings
into words, which very often does not
match the others. According to theorists in
the field, people would experience fewer
emotional problems and a lower level of
stress if they knew some fundamental
issues about communication. Effective
communication in an organization
encourages
productivity,
decreases
employee turnover and improves a good
atmosphere among people. The better they
communicate
the
better
working
relationships they will develop. Not
everyone, however, comes from strong
communication backgrounds, so it is
important that employees improve their
knowledge
regarding
efficient
communication methods.

organizations complies with formal lines

of authority route flowchart (Johns, p.
328). So, there are many types of
organizational communication, grouped
according
to
the
purpose
of
communication, the degree of formality
and how it is conducted.
Depending on the purpose of
communication which goes through a
hierarchical
circuit,
there
are:
communication from the top to down,
bottom-up communication and horizontal
communication. In the descending type of
communication (from the top-down),
information travels from the tip towards
the base of the hierarchical pyramid, for
example from the bosses to subordinates.
This type of communication is needed in
staff training and in planning and
organizing activities.
Communication from the bottom
up, also known as upward communication,
lets the information travel from the bottom
to the top of hierarchy, for example from
subordinates to chiefs. This type of
communication most often takes the form
of feedback or reports of actions taken by
employees.
In
terms
of
using
communication horizontally (sideway) and
diagonally (cross), the information flows
between people on the same hierarchical
level or between departments of the
organization.
Also,
another
typology
of
communication is based on the degree of
formalization,
as
follows:
formal
communication, informal communication
and indirect communication.
Formal communication is the official one
and provides primordial information for
the proper functioning of the organization
and its goals. This implies order,
discipline, regulation and compliance with
all these rules depends very much on the
managers style.
Informal
communication
is
obviously informal and takes place in
working
groups.
This
type
of
communication helps group members to
relax and get to know each other better,

Types of internal communication

in organizations
Starting from the idea that
communication is the process by which
information is transmitted, it can be said
that in an organization we are dealing with
two
meanings:
interpersonal
communication (between individuals) and
communication between divisions and
groups of the organization (organizational
communication), types which are in a
relationship
of
interdependence
(Moldovan, p. 361).
To ensure the success of the
organization, managers absolutely need
relevant and high quality information.
"Because of its importance, information
has become a (conceptual) resource as
valuable as the physical resources (human,
financial and material) of the organization
[...] All human resource management
functions involve the formulation and
implementation decisions that are based on
relevant information." (Moldovan, p. 364).
This process of information transmission is
called communication.
Communication in organizations
has a hierarchical circuit. It can be said that
internal
communication
within

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providing a pleasant environment for

everyone. It may also launch a positive or
negative image of the organization to the
outside world, depending on how it is
perceived.
Depending on how it is conducted,
organizational communication can be
direct or indirect. Direct communication
(the personal one) is achieved when the
parties are communicating face to face and
it immediately offers the possibility of
feedback. The category of formal
communication
also
includes
the
professional
communication
among
employees.
Indirect
(impersonal)
communication is performed by forms of
communication that do not allow
immediate feedback. This requires a
transmission channel such as the phone,
the email, written documents, film, radio,
speeches. The literature in the field speaks
about communication networks within
small
groups
(Ursachi
Deaconu,
Nftnil, pp. 25-26). The types of
networks
(structured
information
transmission systems) are made of
Wheels - each individual wheel having
people in the center; Chains - people on
some level communicating with those from
a higher level only through people from
these two levels; Circular types - each
individual can communicate with the other
two; Open types - everyone can
communicate with anyone. The network
type mentioned above indicates the
managerial style used in an organization.

uneducated language, lack of real

information, ignoring certain information
considered to be known, evaluating the
reliability of the issuer, different
perceptions,
semantic
distortions,
misconceptions, stereotypes and noise;
organizational barriers related to
the number of persons reporting directly to
a manager (area control), the position of
the parties communicating in hierarchical
pyramid, or others that can distort the
information transmitted and received (for
instance, through filtering).
As mentioned above, the lack of
logic is one of the barriers to proper
communication. It is very important that
the transmitter speak coherently and
clearly and make sure that the receiver
receives what he/she needs to understand.
The message must be logical and only the
correct information must be submitted.
Also, not knowing the subject and
what you have to do (what your bosses told
to do) can be a serious barrier to effective
communication. It is necessary to clearly
know the subject of the conversation
somebody wants to have with you. If one
of the parties does not have a minimum
stock of knowledge about what the other
wants to talk about, it will be impossible
for a good quality discussion to take place.
The situation when one of the parties
speaks only to move the air, as they say, is
not useful at all.
Abuse of information should be
avoided if it is desired to establish good
communication between transmitter and
receiver. The message, consisting of the
whole information, must be synthesized
and structured so as to be easy to
understand. Too many words for one idea
can even bore the interlocutor and distract
him. In communication, the assessment
criterion
is
the
efficiency.
The
effectiveness of a message is very
important.
A language which contains only
academic or scientific terms or, on the
contrary, which comprises too poor items,
is not recommended if you want to have a

Communicational barriers
in the intelligence organizations
The barriers that interfere with the
communication are diverse and can be
divided into two main categories:

barriers
to
interpersonal
communication, related to the lack of logic
in the desired message to be transmitted,
lack of clear subject that is being
discussed, requiring minimum knowledge
on the subject, a large amount of
information, too scientific or too poor,

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good communication. Our interlocutor is

not always at the same level as us. He/she
can use a richer, more diverse language,
while another may use a poorer, sometimes
incomplete one. It is difficult to
communicate with someone who has a
different education from ours, whose
knowledge on a particular topic is much
lower. Communicating well requires skill
and one must be aware of the discrepancy
between the levels of knowledge and adapt
accordingly.
We cannot establish effective
communication with any person from the
first case we mentioned above, nor with
somebody from the second case. The
language used must lie somewhere in
between. For example, if we have a
conversation with a specialist in a domain,
and we are not part of the same area, we
must speak using as few specialized terms
as possible, or using similar but usual
words in order to better understand what
he wants to convey. The same happens in
the case of specialist teachers, etc.
Semantic issues generated by the
use of words in different ways, or of
different words in the same way can also
be a communication barrier, as the receiver
and transmitter can mean different things
by using the same words or various aspects
of the same thing. It is very important that
interlocutors understand the correct
meaning of the message conveyed.
Problems arise when we use semantic
expressions of jargon, slang, neologisms,
technical expressions etc.
Moreover, education, stereotyping
and prejudice affect the quality of
communication between two or more
people. For good communication, we
should avoid the tendency to judge the
interlocutor and disagree with his/her
views, performing a negative assessment.
We may not agree with our interlocutor,
but we must do so in a polite way that does
not offend. After all, everyone has his own
opinion about a certain thing and there is
no use to disagree with it. Do not judge or
tend to disagree with the other partys

views or make negative assessments of the

other person; it will break down
communication.
Moralization
is
another
inappropriate manner of communication
that often includes phrases such as you
should, you must, it is necessary to
that require certain behavior or conduct
from the other party that the interlocutor
might not want. The same happens in the
case of using threats in sending the
message that the person will suffer if he
does not do take the suggested solutions
proposed by the interlocutor, because
his/her proposed solution is the better and
the more effective. Even when ostensibly
offering solutions directly through advice
or through the use of some questions, the
interlocutor may feel embarrassed and
tempted to reduce the amount of
information. An example in that sense is
trying to solve the communication problem
by imposing its own logical arguments
without considering the emotional factors
involved: look how things are.
Avoiding addressing important
problems for us or even for the
interlocutor, the tendency to leave or to
change the subject stubbornly exacerbate
communication. When such replies are
given, the interlocutor can feel inhibited
and will not be able to continue the
discussion.
Thus,
a
barrier
to
communication is created again.
Personality differences are also part
of the high common barriers in the way of
communication of people in organizations,
because each person is unique in point of
personality, training, existence, and
aspirations, characteristics that influence
the understanding of messages together or
separately. People have this tendency to
reject information that threatens their
landmarks, habits or notion of the world
and those around them. Also, information
is accepted depending on the person who
conveys it.
Stereotyping, which is a label, a
picture that we form in our mind and that
affects the way of receiving the

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information, decoding or transmitting the

information in our turn, can be a barrier to
effective communication. When we have
formed stereotypes in our minds, we tend
to judge the people we interact with
according to the ideas we have already
formed. We associate them with different
traits and treat them as such.
Solidarity in the intelligence based
organization increases according to the
individuals status within the hierarchy and
this is reflected in the type of
communication. Researches have shown
that the higher the level of less pleasant
work we have to do, the more likely it is
for us to try to communicate with
colleagues, especially about topics
unrelated to the nature of job.
Communication is especially important in
organizations where a large number of
people are concentrated, and there are big
differences among its members. They must
maintain a good communication in order to
fulfill their tasks and to get a better
development.
Communication between a boss
and a subordinate is performed through an
exchange of information that should give
the boss the possibility to direct his
subordinate to the proper performance of
duties, to clarify the context of reward and
provide social and emotional support
(Johns Gary, Organizational Behavior
Bucharest Publishing House, 1998, page
329). In the process of filtration, the most
important variable is the interest, the
stakes.
Conflicting views upon different
roles may lead to difficulties in bosses
balancing the two applications of their
positions: to perform the functions of the
work framework and to provide social and
emotional support for subordinates.
The effect of slurring: this is the
tendency to avoid communicating bad
news to others. This trend occurs because
of the fear of the reaction of the receiver.
The effect of slurring is well represented in
the subordinates who avoid giving bad
news to their bosses for fear of not being

the ones to upset them, even if it is not

absolutely necessary for the transmitter to
be responsible for the bad news given.
Subordinates who most aspire to
advancing in their careers tend to rely on
communication in relation with their
bosses. They never give bad information
out of fear that they might jeopardize their
careers, and therefore these are filtrated, to
the purpose to protect the boss.
Effect function status: this is the
intermediate leaders tendency to put little
value on their relationships with
subordinates, and more on the relations
with their bosses. As I said before, the
chiefs tend to talk to the same rank as them
or an even higher one, not with
subordinates or their inferiors.
Time is another factor leading to
poor communication between boss and
subordinate. Studies have shown that
usually communication between them lasts
on average about four minutes. Therefore,
managers consider that their conversations
with subordinates happen more frequent
than they seem to the subordinates.
The position of the transmitter and
receiver in a communication process can
significantly affect the message, according
to status differences. Also, differences in
culture can cause great bottlenecks to
communication when the parties belong to
different cultural, social, religious and
organizational domains, because the
message can be understood differently
from one culture to another. Something
that in a culture means a certain thing in
another it may mean something entirely
different. Also, some people may have
certain beliefs and aspirations about a
particular thing, when to others they mean
nothing special, instead having another
thing to appreciate. These issues depend on
each culture and faith.
The faith system is a very
important thing in the cultural variation.
People can judge things from this
perspective, because we judge things in
relation to the faith which we were born
with or that we have chosen. If we respect

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each others choices, there is good

communication without barriers. Quality
varies according to social training,
upbringing and culture. The quality of our
communication thus depends on the
quality of our education, the way we have
formed our mindset and the observations
that we made around us. People can
communicate effectively if they are
preparing for it, avoiding the barriers that
can appear to hinder it. For a good
communication without barriers in its way,
we must be receptive, to be accepted, to be
comprehensible and to be able to cause a
reaction.

Numerous studies have highlighted

the usefulness of communication. Today,
more organizations, led by their managers,
offer courses with the purpose of obtaining
better communication techniques, being
aware of the great benefits they can bring
to the organization.
Bibliography
1.

2.

3.

Conclusions
Specific communication processes
of human resource management are
increasingly growing and communication
prospects are more promising. Internal
communication
within
intelligence
organizations is very important for the
smooth running of things, representing the
way in which its objectives are achieved.
As time passes, internal communication
derives more benefits from increased
attention. Managers devote more and more
of their time to communicating with
employees.
Organizational
communication
plays a particularly important role in the
proper functioning of activities undertaken
by its members. Internal communication of
intelligence organizations is what makes
the functioning of the organization
possible, through the activities and
processes that are undertaken within it.
Therefore human resource management
should focus on initiating numerous
studies, trainings, workshops, focus groups
etc. to establish better collaboration with
and among its employees.

4.

5.

6.

Anghel, Petre. 2005. Strategii

eficiente de comunicare. Cernica:
EITA
Johns, Gary. 1998. Comportament
organizational.
Bucureti:
Economic
Manolescu,
Aurel.
2001.
Managementul Resurselor Umane.
Ediia
a
treia.
Bucureti:
Economic
Moldovan,
Maria.
2001.
Managementul resurselor umane.
Bucureti: Economic, capitolul 17
Pu,
Viorica
Aura.
2006.
Comunicare i resurse Umane.
Iai: Polirom
Preda,
Marian.
2006.
Comportament
organizaional.
Teorii, exerciii i studii de caz.
Iai:Polirom

This work was made possible through

financial support provided through the
Sectoral Operational Program Development
of Human Resources 2007-2013, cofinanced by the European Social Fund, in the
project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with
the title Security through knowledge
Integrated/educational
network
of
training, counseling and guidance of PhD
students for a career in research of
security, defense, public order and national
security - SECNETEDU.

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THE POTENTIAL OF SOCIAL NETWORKS ANALYSIS

IN FRAGMENTING TERRORIST NETWORKS
Elena-Adelina ANDREI
PhD student, Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy
andrei.adelina@yahoo.com

Abstract: The theme of international terrorism is a matter of general interest, due to the global unpredictability
that it holds and the devastating effects that it involves. The development of terrorist organizations is based on
the principle of social networks, adopting the same components and interaction. Data analysis of terrorist
networks focuses on the actors (knots) and the relations (links) between them, taking into account the centrality
measures. An organization that acts as a network is analysed and the object of the study is the relationships
established among all the actors that are part of that network. The social actors are included in multiple network
links that are themselves embedded into other networks on multi-modal model structures.
Keywords: terrorism, social network analysis, risks, threats, national security

Introduction

advantage as much as the social services

have, leading to threats to national
security. As time passed, terrorist threats
became more and more prominent.
The interpersonal relations that are
developed in current society and involve
negative aspects such as promoting
competition and material interests,
demonstrating the superiority of political
thinking or religious fanaticism or the
domination of certain nations or classes
trigger negative behaviours in the base
structures of all societies.
The implementation of violence in
the mindset of the masses represents a risk
factor with deep implications in the
subconscious of individuals. In the
presence of danger and threats, defence
mechanisms are triggered instantly, taking
the form of aggression. Based on the
existing reference system, violence is
given particular significance. Terrorists
fulfil their desire of domination because
hatred produces strong sensations of
power.
Specialized research and studies
have shown that all acts of terrorism
include an initial phase in which all the
frustration builds up and the motivations of
ethical, political, ethnic or religious
cleansing materialise and data and

A series of entities have turned to

terrorism in order to fulfil their aspirations
of self-determination and self-government,
some nihilist groups due to their incapacity
to impose their doctrines and obtain
significant public support and sometimes
even due to the dissatisfaction of the
majority of population. Certain national,
social and religious minorities have used
terrorism in the fight against governments
that represent the majority. Terrorism has
also often been the response to persecution
of certain minorities or target groups.
Naturally, the development of
societies has also led to the improvement
of terrorist actions. RAND Corporation
mentioned that, out of 1022 terrorist
attacks in a 10 year period, 729 made no
victims. From a financial point of view, in
the early 1990s terrorist organisations had
illegal turnovers of 800-900 billion dollars,
the equivalent of Chinas budget at that
time. In the last decade, the accumulated
amount is up to 3,000 billion dollars.
However, the current social context
implies a series of risks and vulnerabilities
that are also more numerous due to the
explosive technological impact that
terrorist organizations have used to their

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information on the target are analysed.

Terrorist organisations offer a pathological
significance to reality that its followers
adopt, an optimal structure imposing strict
rules, strict discipline and a clear hierarchy
imposed through conspiracies. All of these
can also be realised through online social
networks that can represent actual
recruitment spaces for new followers and
organizing attacks.

psychological effect of these actions rises

in direct proportion to how violence is
applied to as many randomly selected
people as possible, sometimes with no
connection to the purpose.
Many voices also support the
version according to which the media is
guilty of several terrorist actions. The press
is considered responsible for the
proportion that these actions have acquired
in relation to how they actually are. An
American study by the Rand Corporation
highlighted the idea that terrorists want to
be watched and to receive attention from
as many people as possible and do not
actually want anyone to die; terrorism is
the publicity, the drama and is considered
to target world disorder and the overthrow
of public order.
In the French publication Le
Monde, Gerald Chaliand said that
Terrorism is a phenomenon that is
fundamentally exaggerated by the media.
This is a super-evolved phenomenon, but
one that needs to be taken seriously by all
states. The phenomenon of terrorism must
not generate psychosis, but it has to be said
that it can destabilize a Western state.
Even if the positions expressed by the
quoted authors do not refer to the nature
and objectives of terrorism and minimize
the proportions that it has taken on at
present, the activity of the media, through
its daily coverage and debates and the
conclusions that it comes to partially
confirm the accuracy of these evaluations.
The large number of terrorist acts
which happened in the last years can be
explained through the following factors:
the technical progress that facilitated fast
intercontinental travel, the arms race that
has facilitated the production and
procurement of weapons, the existence of
vulnerable targets and the increased role of
information means.
According to specialist Friederich
Hacker, terrorism needs publicity, lives
from it and kills for it. All terrorist actions
are conceived, down to the smallest details,

Terrorism and the new-media

According to
an
American
publication from 1933 named The
Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, the
main purpose of terrorists is the publicity
around terrorist attacks. Brian Houghton
also supports this idea according to which
the relationship between the media and
terrorism is that they feel a mutual need
and are in a symbiotic relationship. For
example, without television, the terrorist
becomes like the philosophy that refers to
the hypothesis of a tree falling in the
woods: no one hears it and that is why
there is no reason for it to be there. And,
without news of terrorism, television can
hardly be number one in ratings for a long
time (Larry Sloan, 1984).
George
Levasseur
(1986)
mentioned in his research that terrorism is
a type of manifestation destined to produce
extreme panic and most often collective
terror, an action amplified by the media:
Terrorist actions seek to instil a feeling of
fear that is as profound and comprehensive
as possible in order to reach a purpose the
finality of which is not always clear and
the realization of which can be immediate
or can happen at a certain point in the
future. The terror provoked by terrorism
targets physical and psychological effects
simultaneously.
Terrorism is usually accompanied
by threats, blackmail and other acts of
violence with the purpose of highlighting
terrorists determination even if they are
not presented by the media. The

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in order to reach this objective, and the

terrorist attacks on September 11th in the
USA are no exception. Out for publicity,
with the help of the media, the terrorist
obtains, in addition to the authenticity of
his reality, an added wow factor. Terrorist
acts provide the media with valuable
material and it takes them on for free, with
enthusiasm and a professional eagerness
that is extremely effective, confirming the
fact that nothing is as sensational as a
terrorist attack. Sensational events call for
total attention and all other occurrences
temporarily disappear from societys
concerns.
Within modern society, terrorist
actions represent an omnipresent threat to
the security of national, regional and
global states and their prevention
represents a priority for international
organisations such as NATO or
intelligence services. Terrorists attack
when no one expects it, as the attacks so
far have proven, and in any state of the
world, regardless of size, population,
economic and military power, religion, or
race. The September 2001 attacks in the
USA are examples that prove that all states
are vulnerable in the face of this threat.
That is why the international military
coalition against terrorism was founded.
However, the development of events in
different operation locations proves that
the fight against international terrorism
must be conceived and organized
differently.
Terrorism is a negative universal
phenomenon because of its consequences
on all levels: victims, families that are torn
apart, material damage, negative effects on
image,
loss
of
trust,
numerous
psychological
effects
that
impact
individuals development, etc. In the case
of terrorist actions, the rule according to
which the winner is the one that produces
the most damage to the enemy does not
apply. The practical objective of the fight
on international terrorism is the absence of
terrorist attacks.

So far, this objective has not been

even partially fulfilled, even though
military and other types of forces that are
great both quantitatively and qualitatively
have been drafted with this in mind.
Maybe if one took into account that
generating terrorism implies ideas,
ideologies and interests that are different in
both nature and intensity, one could draw
the conclusion that terrorism is not just a
military problem. By adopting this concept
with regard to terrorism, one can find longterm solutions for minimizing and, in time,
abolishing this phenomenon.
Moreover, with the help of all
aspects of technological evolution, the path
of terrorism to fulfilling its objectives is
becoming easier and easier, as it can easily
infiltrate electronic media and gather new
followers,
as
well
as
maintain
communication with them. Nowadays,
terrorists recruit their followers through
new media. Naturally, the development of
societies has also led to an improvement in
terrorist actions.
The facilities of the development of the
virtual environment for terrorist
structures
Ever since 2002, the dynamics of
the terrorist phenomenon is more and more
linked to using the communication
component. Islamic organizations have
adopted Internet propaganda as a distinct
line of action. Moreover, the information
environment
formed
by
global
communications and new technologies (for
transmitting, processing and storing
information) represents, in addition to the
true exchange environment of the global
economy,
the
first
confrontation
environment for categories of interests in
which the actors of the global world can
act through information/disinformation,
publicity
and
public
relations,
propaganda/counterpropaganda,
cyberattacks and espionage, media campaigns
and psychological operations.

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As
for
the
means
of
communication and action of terrorist
organizations, the virtual environment
offers them support by rapidly adapting to
mass communication; developing their
own press agencies; making the sender
and receiver anonymous; the diversity of
means of transmitting information;
receiving material simultaneously and in
real time; management and organizational
communication measures; the rapid
coordination of fund collection and
distribution; support for executing media
operations that prejudice intelligence
services worldwide; the possibility to
make financial transfers while avoiding
traditional channels.
As a consequence of these issues,
government structures specialized in the
fight against terrorism have been put in the
situation of creating and developing
international entities that monitor the
Jihadist virtual space. The globalization of
mass communication and the 2.0 web
consolidations have been favourable for
the development of terrorist structures.
With the help of the Internet, terrorists
make use of the psychological component
of the war against the unfaithful by
inducing a feeling of insecurity that
influences the public affectively.
Integrating new technologies,
adopting modern work methods, such as
collaborative platforms (for brainstorming

useful
in
making
decisions,
disseminating tasks and methods of
operation, etc.) are all part of terrorists
current concerns.

among all of the actors that are a part of

that network (family, class, school,
company, community, organization, club,
and neighbourhood). The social actors are
included in multiple networks of links that
are themselves embedded into other
networks, based on the model of multimodal structures. They have limited
resources, energy, time and abilities
available, which also limits the number of
relations and strong bonds that they can
cultivate and maintain. Generally, the
analysis of social networks involves a
complete census of all the actors and the
links between them within one or several
networks.
The mathematic methods of
representation of analysed data (matrixes,
graphs, sociograms) allow for their
computerized processing. Valdis E. Krebs
is the author of the study with regard to the
centrality coefficient in the terrorist attacks
on September 9th 2001: Uncloaking
Terrorist Networks. In his study, the
declared purpose was to uncover network
models that could reveal the methods of
action preferred by the Al-Qaeda terrorist
organization, specifying that when one
knows the means of organization that it
prefers, one shall know what to track in
countries around the world.
The author supports his point of
view by referencing the works of social
network theoreticians, so that Malcolm
Sparrow (1991) examines the application
of the analysis of social networks in
criminal activity. Sparrow describes three
problems encountered in the analysis of
the criminal network: the Incomplete it
is inevitable that some knots or links shall
be missing, thus making the activity of
investigators more difficult; Uncertainty
the difficulty of deciding who to include in
the study of network analysis; Dynamics
networks are not static, they are
permanently changing.
Social networks tend to have an
offline equivalent, regardless of their
nature and one needs to be familiar with

The analysis of online social networks

and the risks generated at a national
security level
The analysis of data about
networks is focused on the actors (knots)
and the relations between them (links).
One can analyse an organisation that acts
like a network with the object of the study
being the relationships that are established

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the means of operation and electronic

manifestation. Thanks to the very high
number of users around the world, social
networks have become more and more
relevant
for
the
communicational
strategies of intelligence services. Their
communications with the civilian society
through social networks takes place with
the purpose of information and improving
the relationship between institutions and
citizens. These also help consolidate the
cooperation between agencies, with the
private sector, as well as the academic
environment.
The development of terrorism in
the post-war period was determined by a
multitude of causes at a national, social,
political,
economic,
ideological,
psychological or religious level. Thus,
some ethnic and religious minorities have
turned to terrorism in order to fulfil their
aspirations of self-determination and selfgovernment, some nihilist groups due to
their incapacity to impose their doctrines
or in order to obtain significant popular
support, and sometimes even due to the
dissatisfaction of the majority of
population. Certain national, social and
religious minorities have used terrorism in
the fight against governments that
represent the majority. Terrorism has also
often been the response to persecution of
certain minorities or target groups.
Of course the development of
societies has also led to the improvement
of terrorist actions. The current social
context involves a series of risks and
vulnerabilities, more numerous due to the
explosive technological impact that
terrorist organisations have used to their
advantage as much as the secret services,
thus leading to threats to state security.
The information obtained from
social networks by intelligence services is
often true and proves to be very useful, as
it reveals a lot about the targeted person:
biographical identification information,
hobbies, interests, passions, environments
that they belong to, level of social

integration, position in a structure, etc.

There are a lot of cases in which various
suspects have been caught due to
information gathered on these social
networks posted by the respective persons
themselves. Based on this information
posted by the users, intelligence services
can even infer a calendar of future events,
can locate supporters of the suspects
actions and even the initiators or the theses
of ideologies that are in national securitys
area of interest.
Social networks can also represent
a scene on which users, under the guise of
false identities, can manipulate or
intoxicate in order to wilfully generate
certain reactions that affect national
security. Certain online social platforms
such as Facebook have the possibility to
influence the security policies of great
world powers. One example of this is
China, country which went through a
period of not being able to control the
content accessible to its users.
Due to the facilities that they offer,
social networks can become real support
systems for individuals or networks
involved in activities that contradict a
states security interests. These facilities
consist in: instant access to information,
rapid exchange of information between
members located far apart, speed, low
costs, anonymity, the possibility of
coordination,
promotion.
Encrypted
messages can be easily exchanged
between individuals belonging to these
structures and cause real catastrophes to
occur.
The materialization of these risks is
facilitated by elements such as: the huge
space that needs to be searched in order to
gather incriminating evidence, the publics
oblivion or lack of education with regard
to providing personal data and information
about their private lives, the precarious
protection of personal computers and
using public terminals in order to access
important personal accounts, lack of
discipline in organisations with regard to

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the policy of using the Internet at the

workplace.
The evolution of social networks is
difficult to infer through traditional
analysis methods. The analysis of the risks
of social networks with regard to the plan
of national security shows that the risks
and threats are growing. Amongst the most
important and alarming risks that have
come up as a result of the new
technologies, terrorism and all of its
determinations is the leading one. The
Internet plays an essential role in extremist
propaganda, offering a solid basis for its
development. Amongst the most important
conditions there are the following:
unlimited virtual space, ease of accessing
information, the difficulty of monitoring
users who are anonymous.

terrorism towards fulfilling its objectives

is becoming easier and easier, as it can
easily infiltrate electronic environments
and gather new followers, while also
maintaining communication with them.
Terrorists have started to gather new
recruits through new media. The
development of societies has of course led
to the improvement of terrorist actions.
Due to their good organization,
terrorist networks communicate in real
time through the virtual environment and it
is necessary to know the means of
operation and electronic manifestation.
Due to the very large number of users
around the world, social networks have
become more and more relevant for the
communication strategies of intelligence
services. Their communication with
civilian society through social networks is
made with the purpose of information,
prevention and improvement of the
relationship between institutions and
citizens.

Conclusions
Terrorism is a negative universal
phenomenon due to its consequences on
all levels: victims, families that are torn
apart, bad image, loss of trust, numerous
psychological effects that impact the
development of individuals, affecting the
development of states. In contemporary
society, terrorist actions represent an
omnipresent threat to national, regional
and global security and the fight against it
represents a priority for international
organisations and intelligence services.
They can attack any state in the world
inopportunely, as the attacks thus far have
proven. The space of the proliferation of
risks associated with using social networks
is developed based on an increase in the
level of technology, the growing
dependency on interconnected components
and the need for interdependency in
electronic systems. In the area of security,
the solutions are limited and cannot ensure
the total elimination of risks, so that the
concentrated efforts of law enforcement
agencies require continuous support.
Moreover, using all aspects of
technologic evolution, the path of

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Arquilla, John; Ronfeldt, David

(2001). Networks and Netwars:
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Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The
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Lab:
University of Arizona
Fulga, Vasile, Fulga, Dan. (2008).
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lumii contemporane. Dimensiuni
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http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwra
p/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/rt/printerFri
endly/941/863

This work was made possible through

financial support provided through the
Sectoral Operational Program Development
of Human Resources 2007-2013, cofinanced by the European Social Fund, in the
project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with
the title Security through knowledge
Integrated/educational
network
of
training, counseling and guidance of PhD
students for a career in research of
security, defense, public order and national
security - SECNETEDU.

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133

NEW PROCEDURES FOR ASSESSMENT

OF MARITIME OPERATIONS

Marian BAHACIU
Marius-Sebastian BACCELA
Masters Degree Student, Carol I National Defence University
mariobanister@yahoo.com
Masters Degree Student, Carol I National Defence University
marius_baccela@yahoo.com

Abstract: In this article I will bring to attention some aspects of maritime operations assessment. Assessment of
progress in maritime operations, based on objective and subjective measurement processes of data and
information provides a useful set of tools to maritime commanders to increase the performance and effectiveness
of their actions. The paper aims to present a model of organization and functioning of an assessment structure of
a maritime command (maritime component, Maritime Operations Centre , Task Force or Task Group).
Keywords: assessment, indicatori de performan MOP, indicatori de eficacitate- MOE.
However beautiful the strategy, you
should occasionally look at the results.
Winston Churchill

Approaches Operations (EBAO) coincided

with NATO operations in BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo and the
objectives of multi-national forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq, which required more
comprehensive evaluation than the number
of people killed or captured, military
organizations, mainly NATO, have
significantly expanded the breadth of
Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) from
addressing the impact of kinetic actions in
terms of target hits and casualties, to a
more comprehensive assessment that
measures the impact of military and
civilian government and non-government
actions
(comprehensive
approach).
Evaluation in this context can be described
as the use of data to inform and change
decisions about the current situation and
recent trends and is used to inform the
planning process. The results may provide
evidence of the impact of previous
activities, useful for future plans. 2

Introduction and theoretical aspects

Military organizations have a long
tradition in planning activities and creating
objectives and strategies for their
operations. Less effort has been put on
monitoring and evaluating the results of
executed tasks. To some extent this is due
to the fact that results have been fairly easy
to observe, e.g. the number of enemy
losses and whether a road has been secured
or not.1
In the past, most military
assessments were conducted as Battle
Damage Assessments (BDA) primarily
reflecting the number of target hits,
casualties, and deaths. Later, assessment
has gained a much broader sense, not only
measuring the impact of military actions
against opposing forces but also military or
civilian actions impacting on local people.
Switching to the concept of Effects Based
1 Harriman, David, Monitoring and evaluation in
multifunctional operations - A critical examination
of key challenges for military organizations in
measuring what matters, Swedish Defence Research
Agency, FOI

2 Processes for Assessing Outcomes of Multinational Missions, Findings of Task Group HFM185, STO Techincal Report, 2012

134

Although the genesis of what we

now call the operations assessment took
place during the World War II, by
increasing the analysis and research of
these operations, during the Vietnam War
concept has gained unprecedented
significance. Behind this effort was US
Secretary of defense, Robert McNamara. A
strong supporter of systems analysis and
other quantitative methods, McNamara
argued that the data collected on the
ground could be used to develop a fair and
accurate measuring progress. As the war
progressed and the United States pledged
more resources to it, McNamara and his
staff devoted significant effort to
developing methods to measure progress in
a conflict plagued by ambiguities and
inconsistencies. They were based on the
same types of quantitative methods based
on systems analysis that McNamara has
applied to the Pentagon to help understand
what is happening on the battlefield in
Vietnam. While this effort was a highly
innovative approach to a very difficult
problem, the process proved extremely
unreliable as accurate reflection of
progress. The emphasis on quantitative
measurement canceled consideration of
qualitative measurement and complex
nature of environment Vietnam was
ignored, by failing to take into account the
nuances and context. At the end of the war,
policy makers and military leaders were
unhappy with this method of assessment
and dismissed it as invalid and useless. In
the years following the war in Vietnam by
the end of the Cold War doctrines
regarding the evaluation of development
operations were minimal, returning to old
methods such as battle damage assessment
and the commanders estimate. The
explanation for this lies in the geopolitical
dynamics that characterized the Cold War.
It became more important to compare and
measure the military capabilities of the two
military powers (US and USSR) than the
effectiveness of their operations. Given
that the two powers were not actually
engaged in a real conflict, there was no

need for a robust operations assessment

process. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
have brought renewed attention to the
importance of operations assessment.
Initially relying on effects -based
assessment to provide the necessary
framework,
during
both
conflicts
evaluators met with one obstacle after
another and shortcomings of this approach
have become apparent. Differences
between counterinsurgency theory and
evaluation process which negatively
influenced the operations assessment in
Vietnam resurfaced, and the result was
equally frustrating. Once again, the failure
of the process to account for local context
and pitfalls in trying to quantify made the
production of accurate and useful
assessments aim to become permanent and
persistent. Assessing the success of effectsbased operations required the development
of new ways of measuring progress to
achieve the commanders objectives, who
gave rise to the development of a new
assessment framework, superior to
traditional methods, such as battle damage
assessment (BDA). Labeled effects-based
assessment (EBA), this framework has
included most of the recommendations on
the assessment arising from conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The basic idea was
to use measures of effectiveness (MOE)
and performance (MOP) to assess whether
objectives are met and that the associated
tasks are being completed. 3
Currently, substantial attention has
been paid to the concept of operations
assessment,
consistent
with
the
development of new doctrines and
concepts, such as effects-based operations
EBO, effects-based approach operations
EBAO, comprehensive approach- CA
and Assessment of progress. NATO has
developed a manual for assessment and
included a chapter on evaluation in COPD
Comprehensive Operations Planning
Directive. These developments are
3 Mushen, Emily, Schroden, Jonathan - Are We
Winning?A Brief History of Military Operations
Assessment, September, 2014

135

Figure 1. Notional assessment organization

Source: Maritime Component Commander Guidebook, July 2014, Naval War College, NEWPORT
RI 02841

certainly a step in the right direction and

should be analyzed and developed. At the
same time, the need for improvement is
still
substantial,
since
military
organizations lack a comprehensive system
of monitoring and evaluation in the field.
This makes it difficult for military
commanders to know how their operations
impact on operating environment and risks
in taking wrong decison could threaten the
progress of the operation.
Having as model the equivalent
process conducted by NATO, it was
developed in the Romania the Manual of
operations assessment SMG 60/2012. Its
purpose is to provide commanders and
staffs the information necessary for
understanding the process of operations
assessment in the general context described
in the Manual of operations planning
SMG 65/2011. In the manual it is
explained the operations assessment
process at the strategic, operational and
tactical level, roles and responsibilities, the
interrelationship between levels of
command, planning how to carry out this
assessment, etc. Evaluation of operations is
defined as "The activity that enables the
measurement of progress and results of

operations in a military context, and the

subsequent development of conclusions
and recommendations in support of
decision-making"4
Maritime Operations Assessment
Below
we
present
some
considerations regarding the assessment of
maritime operations at the operational and
tactical level and the linkage between
operations assessment process and
operations planning process.
Organization. At the Maritime
Component, Maritime Operations Center,
Task Group or Task Force level an
assessment group (MAG Maritime
Assessment Group) can be constituted,
with the task of continuous collection,
analysis, and tracks friendly force
achievement of conditions in the
fulfillment of the commanders intent,
based on approved operational plan. This
structure may consist of planners and
analysts to coordinate evaluation activities
in its own staff, collaborating with peer
components and higher headquarters, and
4 Operations Assessment Manual, SMG-60,
General Staff, Bucharest, 2012, p.15

136

collecting information from subordinate

commands and supporting agencies. Their
main purpose is to create operational
context for the commander with products
that illustrate the achievement of specified
tasks, their relation to establishing
operational conditions required to advance
the plan, identifying proximity to pending
commanders decisions, measuring the
threshold of risk to force and mission, and
making recommendations to maintain
operational momentum. This structure
constitutes a working group which gathers
representatives of the staff and contributes
to assessment and planning efforts.
Every
maritime
component
command is unique, and the following is a
notional example of an assessment
organization to support a maritime
commander (Figure 1).
Assessing the progress of the
operation is a staff-wide responsibility.
Each structure of the staff evaluates
operation in the light of its specific
expertise, and must coordinate and
integrate their individual assessments and
associated recommendations across the
operational
functions
to
produce
comprehensive assessments for the
commander, particularly in protracted
operations. Similar to almost every staff
function, this collaboration is crucial to
developing an assessment that is
representative of all aspects of the
operation. Strike and MIO operations
would not take into account all interactions
that impact the operation as a whole. This
collaboration is coordinated by a structure
sometimes called Maritime Assessment
Group MAG. MAG can be based on a
permanent
administrative/analytical
structure. MAG is cross-functional and can
include members from other major staff
structures, liaison personnel, and other
partners outside the headquarters.
The MAG fuses assessment
information to provide a comprehensive
assessment of the operation. It consolidates
and discusses emerging trends, issues, and
impacts relating to events over the various

planning horizons. They examine the

assessment plan to ensure MOEs, MOPs,
and indicators are still valid and develop
and/or make recommendations for
development of new measures and
indicators as required. The results of the
assessment working group support and
feed short-, mid-, and long-range planning
in the current operations, future operations,
and plans cells respectively. The frequency
with which the assessment working group
meets depends on the situation.
Additionally, the assessment working
group may present its findings and
recommendations to the commander for
decision. Subordinate commanders may
participate and provide their assessments
of the operations and recommendations
along with the staff.
While the MAG must operate
collaboratively, it must also maintain a
level of independence; providing the
commander with an unbiased judgment of
progress is crucial to feeding the
commanders decision cycle. From a
staffs perspective, providing this judgment
can be difficult as it sometimes draws the
staffs
previous
actions
and
or
recommendations into question.
Effects assessment begins when the
maritime planning group or operational
planning team selects measurable, desired
effects. Planning anticipates the potential
effect friendly actions will have on the
extended operating environment as well as
highlighting how friendly actions may
affect the enemy, allies and neutral parties.
The MAG may perform the following
basic functions:
1. Continuously evaluate tasks and
effects within the current phase of the
operation and the impact to conditions
required for subsequent phases. By
monitoring the execution of the plan,
assessing the progress of each phase
toward
accomplishment
of
the
commanders objectives based on the
MOE/MOP,
MAG
provides
recommendations to the commander on

137

whether the operation is progressing in

accordance with the plan.
2. Incorporate information from
cross-functional staff representatives,
LNOs, interagency and stakeholder
representatives,
HHQ,
and
peer
components. Cross-functional inputs are
critical from COPS, MIOC, information
operations cell, logistics, the Red Cell, and
functions closely tied to the current phase
of
operations
(e.g.,
fires
cell
representatives during major combat
operations, interagency cell representatives
during humanitarian aid operations).
3. Provide assessment inputs to the
assessment cell/compartment for approval
of recommendations to the commander, in
accordance with current planning efforts.
Inputs are further incorporated into
commanders
decision
venues
for
consideration and guidance to planners.
Assessment cell/compartment may
be staffed by a permanent staff of planners
and analysts and is best organized within
the plans directorate. For augmentation of
this cell, the MAG can be representatives
from:
1. Current
operations
representative;
2. Future operations and MPG
planners;
3. Maritime intelligence operations
center planner;
4. Logistics
readiness
center
representative;
5. Fires element or targeting team
representative;
6. Staff judge advocate;
7. Public relations representative;
8. Information
operations
representative;
9. Medical,
and
civil-military
operations representatives;
10. Liaison officers from senior,
component, and subordinate commands, as
required;
11. Other representatives or LNOs
as necessary (from NGOs, other OGAs,
HN, etc.).

Points of Coordination:
1. Internal:
a. Current operations;
b. Future operations;
c. Maritime planning group;
d. Information operations cell;
e. Maritime intelligence operations
center;
f. Logistics readiness center;
g. Commanders special assistants,
as required;
h. Knowledge and information
management WG;
i. Maritime air operations cell;
j. Fires element.
2. External:
a. Higher headquarters assessment
cell
b. Component
commanders
assessment cells
c. Subordinate commanders staffs
d. Other agencies, as required (other
Government agencies, NGOs,
HNs, etc.).
Inputs:
1. Commanders guidance and
intent;
2. OPLANs/OPORDs;
3. Center(s) of gravity, operational
approach, decisive points, and operational
objectives;
4. Approved operational conditions,
by phase;
5. Essential tasks;
6. Approved assumptions and
acceptable risk (to force, to mission);
7. Approved MOEs and MOPs;
8. ROE/RUF;
9. Approved CCIRs/RFIs;
10. Approved commanders decision
points;
11. Current operational situation,
including enemy reaction.
Outputs
1. Operational assessments relating
to the progression of the plan, fulfillment
of intent;
2. Operation phase transition and
force
reallocation/reprioritization
recommendations;

138

3. Operation
replanning
recommendations (branches and sequels);
4. Proximal estimations of pending
commanders
decisions,
based
on
operational conditions;
5. Risk assessment;
6. ROE/RUF/CCIR/RFI
change
recommendations;
7. Assessment
reports
and
recommendations regarding synchronization
of forces and functions to the Commander
and higher headquarters. 5
Operations
assessment
and
operational planning. Recent operations
have demonstrated the importance of

assessment to mission success. Integration

of assessment planning process into
operations planning is imperative. Like the
other major components of the staff,
members of the evaluation section must
participate in the planning process from the
beginning. This not only improves the
planning process, but ensures also
consistency in the final assessment
products. The assessment process begins
with mission analysis. Since the aim of the
assessment is to measure the progress and
results of the operation, the evaluation is
inherently related to the structures tasks,
objectives and desired end state. As such,

Figure 2. Assessment planning steps and operational planning steps

Source: Navy Planning, NWP 5-01, Edition December 2013, Department of the Navy,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

there is a close link between the

commands assessment framework and the
commanders decisions throughout the
planning and execution of the operation.

5 Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,

Maritime Operations Center, NTTP 3-32.1, edition
April 2013, Department of the Navy, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations

139

Figura 3. Funciile evalurii operaiilor

Source: Navy Planning, NWP 5-01, Edition December 2013, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations

The assessment is continuous. It

must adapt to changes in the operational
environment to ensure that the commander
receives relevant evaluation of assessment
criteria to help make timely decisions. An
early understanding of the commanders
assessment needs facilitates the staff
members (assessment section) to formulate
a proper assessment framework during the
remaining stages of the planning operation.
Operational assessment planning is
not strictly assigned to specific operational
planning steps. An example of these two
processes can be seen in Figure. 2. The
nature of the mission and staff organization
may necessitate addressing various
operational assessment attributes at
different times than notionally prescribed.
It is understood that these processes can be
tailored to meet planning variables.
Operational assessment serves three
basic functions (Figure nr. 3):
1. Assessment addresses the need
to determine the current state of operations
that requires data collection.
2. Data concerning the current
operational situation alone provides no
meaningful information without analysis as
to what the data mean. Trends, unplanned
or unanticipated effects, and impacts of
adversary action are identified by this
analysis. When compared to history and
established baselines, the comparison
provides indications of whether or not the
actions directed by the plan have affected
the operational environment in a manner
consistent with the commanders intent.
When compared to the desired military end
state, this shows progress toward achieving
certain milestones or advantages at

decisive points that better inform the

commanders decision making.
3. The most important function of
operational assessment is to determine
whether or not to change or adjust the
current plan. Negative trends or stalling
progress as measured by assessment must
be addressed. Here is where the assessment
group answers the questions Are we
doing the right things? and Are we doing
things right? The assessment group alone
can only give indication of progress. The
assessment group, planning team, and
current operations personnel work together
to develop recommendations for branch
plans or other modifications to the plan.
These recommendations are the Now
what? portion of operational assessment.
Assessment during Planning.
During the operational planning, planners
create a concept of operations to achieve
various objectives. As planners develop the
operational concept, an assessment concept
is developed for application during
execution.
Specifically,
assessment
informs decision making by determining
the level of success with respect to various
planned actions of the operation.
Operational assessment can evaluate
progress along lines of operation (LOOs)
or lines of effort (LOEs) toward the
objective(s). It can measure the impact of
designated specified events or the
achievement of desired conditions within a
phase to aid in phase transition decisions.
Tactical assessment measures the progress
of specific tasks or tactical actions
assigned to subordinate commands. It is
important to remember that the commander
will form personal judgments, in part, as a

140

result of staff input and their assessments,

discussions with subordinate commanders,
and interaction with others.
The characteristics of the operating
environment define the conditions in which
forces operate. These are also attributes of
the environment that, from an operational
standpoint, forces may desire to change to
facilitate progress toward a more desirable
condition.
Examples
of
desirable
conditions may be civil order, maritime
governance, or a positive state of
humanitarian assistance; a deficiency in
any of these may be a condition in which
change is desired. End states and

tactical objectives, effects, objectives, and

end states. Tasks can occur at all levels of
warfare: tactical, operational, and strategic.
A defining attribute of a task is that it is a
focused effort designed to achieve an
explicit purpose. Recognizing resulting
effects or the identification of a change in
the present condition of the environment to
the desired condition is a means to assess
the success of the task or objectives
accomplishment. A desired effect is a
condition that is created that supports an
associated objective, while an undesired
effect is a condition that, when recognized,
inhibits progress toward an objective.

Figura 4. Figure G-3. Linkage of Task-Effect-Objective-End State

Sursa: Navy Planning, NWP 5-01, Edition December 2013, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations

objectives are the foundation for plan

development. The activities conducted
within an operational plan follow a
systematic approach of accomplishing
objectives to achieve an overall end state.
Tasks are performed to create effects.
Successful creation of these effects
contributes to achieving objectives and
ultimately realizing end states along a line
of operation. Effects are a means to assess
progress toward the setting of conditions
that inform accomplishment of an
objective. The execution of this chain
impacts the overall state of the operating
environment. Figure G-3 provides a visual
depiction of the relationship between tasks,

Defining tasks and purposes is a

critical part of the operational planning.
Just as important for assessment is the
development of those measures to be used
to help identify trends and success in
performing tasks or creating effects. The
two most important measures are MOE
and
MOP.
MOPs
measure
the
organizations actions against an assigned
task, while MOEs assess the success of the
task in creating an effect in order to
achieve objectives. As a caution to
planners, the plan should take into account
uncertainty with respect to cause and
effect. MOPs and MOEs should be
developed with specific tasks in mind.

141

Although there is a relationship between a

task and the effect it is developed to create,
the corresponding measures should be
treated separately. This assists in
determining if successful task completion
(MOP doing things right) is the true cause
for the creation of a desired effect (MOE
doing the right things).
MOPs are normally developed by
the tasked unit or resource. MOEs and
their associated indicators should be jointly
and collaboratively developed by planners
and assessment cell personnel and
supported by other staff elements
throughout the battle rhythm starting in the
mission analysis phase and throughout the
iterative planning cycle.
The method of communicating the
assessment framework to the staff, HHQ,
other components and subordinates may
vary. One proposal is to include an annex
to appendix C of the base OPORD. Below
is an outline of such an appendix. It may
also include the assessment organization,
offices of primary responsibility (OPRs),
and concept for assessment. This example
includes objectives, effects, MOEs,
MOEIs, and collection responsibilities.
EXAMPLE:
Objectives/Effects
Objective 1: Maritime safety and
security in the JOA
Effect 1.1: Regional threats do not
impede freedom of navigation (FON) in
the JOA
MOE 1.1.1: Increase/decrease in
regional threat maritime presence
MOEI 1.1.1.1: Number of hostile
ships preparing to get under way
OPR: NIOC
MOEI 1.1.1.2: Number of hostile
ships under way
OPR: NIOC
MOE 1.1.2: Increase/decrease in
engagements with hostile ships
MOEI
1.1.2.1:
Number
of
engagements where hostile ships close to
X NM of coalition ships.
OPR: CTF XXX

MOEI
1.1.2.2:
Number
of
engagements where hostile aircraft close to
X NM of coalition ships.
OPR: CTF XXX
MOEI 1.1.2.3: Number of CDCM
radars active with coalition ships within X
NM.
OPR: CTF XXX6
COA analysis provides assessment
cell the opportunity to examine in detail
how the COA can progress in connection
with the assessment plan. COA analysis
offers the chance to test the validity of
MOE, MOP and to review the assessment
plan .
Monitoring is the manner where
staffs observe and collect relevant
information, specifically that information
about the current situation that will allow
comparison to the forecasted situation
defined in the commanders guidance,
intent and concept of operations.
The staff then analyzes and
evaluates relevant information collected, to
gauge the degree of the operations
progress. Comprehensive evaluation helps
commanders determine what might be
working, what might not be working, and
what might be needed to better accomplish
the mission.
Commanders options range from
continuing the operation as planned,
executing a branch plan, reallocating
resources or making changes in priority to
creating an entirely new concept of
operations with new actions not anticipated
in original planning. Making adjustments
includes assigning new tasks to
subordinates,
reprioritizing
support,
adjusting the other plans (ISR, protection,
etc.), or modifying a course of action in
entirety.
Commanders
integrate
recommended options based on feedback
from the staff, subordinate commanders,
and other partners.

6 Navy Planning, NWP 5-01, Edition December

2013, Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations

142

Conclusions
A well designed operations
assessment can improve the reliability and
quality of operations plans. The act of
describing the planned objectives in
measurable terms provides planners a
better understanding of the elements
affected by the proposed intervention
systems. It can thus reveal the
interdependencies inside the operational
environment. At the same time, it helps
prevent planning by headlines, a military
plan that contains radical statements about
the desired changes and planners are asked
to describe abstract objects (eg "security)
in specific and measurable terms.

3.

4.
5.

Bibliography
1.

2.

Harriman, David, Monitoring and

evaluation
in
multifunctional
operations A critical examination of
key
challenges
for
military
organizations in measuring what
matters, Swedish Defence Research
Agency,
FOI,
available
at
mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/.../04.
pdf, accessed on 09.09.2015
Processes for Assessing Outcomes of
Multi-national Missions, Findings of
Task Group HFM-185, STO Technical

6.

143

Report,
2012,
available
at
https://www.cso.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?
RDP=STO-TR-HFM-185,
accessed
on 09.09.2015
Mushen, Emily, Schroden, Jonathan,
Are We Winning?A Brief History of
Military
Operations
Assessment,
Septembrie, 2014, available at
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRec
ord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=
ADA609967, accessed on 09.09.2015
Operations Assessment Manual, SMG60, General Staff, Bucharest, 2012
Navy Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures, Maritime Operations
Center, NTTP 3-32.1, edition April
2013, Department of the Navy,
Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations
available
at
https://www.usnwc.edu/.../Maritime..
./ NTTP_3-32-1_MOC_(Apr_2013)
accessed on 09.09.2015
Navy Planning, NWP 5-01, Edition
December 2013, Department of the
Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations available at https://www.
usnwc.edu/getattachment/171afbf3a1e2-46b3-b1e9-d1fa4
b0fec5a/501_(Dec_2013)_(NWP)(Promulgated).aspx, accessed on
09.09.2015.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATED UNDERWATER

SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS
Marian BAHACIU
Marius-Sebastian BACCELA
Masters Degree Student, Carol I National Defence University
Masters Degree Student, Carol I National Defence University
mariobanister@yahoo.com
marius_baccela@yahoo.com

Abstract: Although the geostrategic conditions have changed naval priorities ,especially after the end of the
"cold war", the antisubmarine warfare still remain an important and complex issue.The antisubmarine warfare
should be deployed in accordance with the revised, new threats and the requirements of the operations area near
the coastline, as well as possibilities of submarines in these regions and methods and procedures utilized by the
forces involved in antisubmarine warfare should be adopted to the new chalange.
Keywords: submarine, target, system, integrated, coastal waters

Submarines and especially dieselelectric submarines operating in shallow

water, are difficult to find because of their
acoustic fingerprints, which, even if they
acquired via active or passive mode, are
small and difficult to be processed.In
addition, if the contact is established, it is
often only intermittently. The problem is
that in the coastal regions, a lot of false
targets will be received. These false targets
could be obtained from different sources
other than submarine (wreks, oil platform,
different submarine obstacles,etc.)
These false contacts involve
resource consumption and assume some
kind of risks, such as:
- combat antisubmarine forces
should be diverted or used whithout
reason;
- wasted fuel and acoustic and
passive sonobuoy and ammunition;
- antisubmarine forces should not
to be available when they are really
needed in the specific areas, because they
are involved in other inefficient activities;
- the results of this fact will be
failure in searching the real contact or
actually lost contact.
Because of these problems ,the
antisubmarine forces are needed to be

sustained by the integrated underwater

surveillance system which will be capable:
- to discover, maintain and classify
submarine contacts in the adverse
propagation conditions;
- to inform rapidly about submarine
contacts which can not be held for a long
period of time;
- to integrate all antisubmarine
systems (men, sensors and communications)
in order to neutralize the targets;
- to create a recognized underwater
picture of the shallow waters in the real time.
Analysis of hydrometeorology
factors has a particular relevance, they
must be analyzed not only the during the
preparation activities but also during the
leading of antisubmarine warfare.
The main factors that have to be
analyzed an integrated are:
- the hydrological factors (wind
characteristics, fog);
- hydrographic regime;
- temperature;
- salinity;
- the density and color of water;
- currents;
- directions and heights of waves;
- precipitations.
The most important factor which
affects the antisubmarine actions in coastal

144

waters is the depth of water. This fact is

important for organizing the integrated
underwater system, for the efficiency of all
methods and proceedings and finally for
using various type of sensors.
Near the coast line, sensors have a
key role in antisubmarine warfare. This
kind of sensors should be flexible and
adaptable to various conditions. Efficiency
of hydro acoustic equipment are
determined by the correct exploitation in
accordance
with
the
hydro-meteo
conditions. Range of detection in normal
conditions can vary between 0,9 and 0,30,4 from normal range.
It is also important in establishing
the range of detection to have in attention
temperature, salinity and density which
affect the speed of sound in the water. No
sensor works perfectly in all environments
and operational conditions and against any
kind of underwater targets.
The passive antisubmarine sensors
are not being effective against very silent
submarines and are depending in their
correct functioning on the previous
informations about enemy submarines.
The active antisubmarines have
problems with backround noise, they have
not a large spectrum for surveillance
especially at high depths.
Nonacoustic sensors can descover
submarine targets at various depths (visual,
magnetic anomaly detection etc) but they
are depending on hydro-meteorological
conditions.
Comanding of antisubmarine forces
are willing to have a recognized
underwater picture at the same level with
the commanding of air or land units. This
goal should be achieved via an integrated
underwater surveillance system.
A goal for this integrated
underwater surveillance system is to have
an interface with air picture in order to
have real information provided by air
assets. The major problem referring to all
kind of data provided by different sources
is to integrate and process them into a
singular system in the real time.

Processing data in the real time

provided by passive or active sonar, active
and passive sonobuoys, visual and infrared
observation, magnetic anomaly detection,
radioemitters, electronic support measures
(ESM) obviously create a great advantage
for antisubmarine forces in limiting at
minimum false alarms and offers a reliable
information for a good coordination in
searching and prosecution of the submarine
target in the coastal waters.
In antisubmarine warfare, it is very
important that the integrated surveillance
system should eliminate after processing
all information, false and known targets
and all the available assets should be
directed only towards the potential targets.
This goal involves a higher level of
automatization of underwater surveillance
system.
During the cold war there were a
lot of sonar operators which knew very
well the acoustic fingerprints not only
friendly of the submarines but also an
enemy submarine acoustic fingerprints.
Nowadays on board the ships there
are young operators, who dont have such
experience with real enemy submarines.
Thus, it is important that in the future
underwater surveillance system have acces
to a data base with all acoustic submarine
fingerprints, in order to help the operators
to monitorize high value submarine targets.
During the antisubmarine actions
operators and commanding team have no
sufficient time to classify a contact
therefore it is obvious that all processes
referring to detect and classify a submarine
target should be part of an integrated
underwater surveillance system.
When we are talking about
integrated underwater surveillance system,
we are distinguishing at least 5 subsystems
which proved to be capable to identify the
submarine targets as follows:
- subsystem of fixed sonobuoys;
- subsystem of active sonars on
board the ship;
- subsystem of towed array
systems on board the ships;

145

Crciun, Ioan, Perspective ale

aprrii antisubmarin a zonei
costiere a litoralului romanesc,
Buletinul Academiei de nalte Studii
Militare nr. 3/2002, Bucureti, Ed.
A.I.S.M., 2002.
4.
Finch, DP, Anti-submarine Warfare
(ASW) Capability Transformation:
Strategy of Response to Effects
Based Warfare, Ontario - Canada,
2011.
5.
Klingbeil R., and Shannon, John,
Utilizing
Network-Enabled
Command and Control Concepts to
Enhance
ASW
Effectiveness,
Copenhagen, 2003.
6.
Payn, Craig M., Principles of Naval
Weapon Systems, Naval Institute
Press Anapolis, 2006.
7.
Perry D, Yaw, ASW... Not Just a
Navy Sport. The need for Joint
ASW, Naval War College, Newport,
2006.
8.
Pittman, Jason C, Zone defense
Antisubmarine warfare strategy in
the age of littoral warfare, United
States Army Command and General
Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, 2008.
INTERNET
9.
Milan, Vego, Patroling the deep,
Critical anti-submarine warfare skills
must
be
restored,
pe
www.usnwc.edu/afl_, accesat n
22.09.2015

- subsystem of passive and active

sonobuoys on board of maritime patrol
aircraft antisubmarine helicopters;
- subsystem of dipping sonars on
board an antisubmarine helicopter.
The characteristics of environment
in the shallows waters limit the capacity of
sonobuoys to discover submarine targets,
often the range of detection decreases from
5 or 6 miles in open seas to 2 or 3 miles in
the shallow waters away from the targets.
This limitations should be had in
attention when its is planned to use that
kind of assets to detect a target.
It is important to mention that the
difficulties encountered by the sensors of
the antisubmarine forces affected also the
submarine sensors which are forced to use
periscope, radar and ESM to gather
information and this thing creates
opportunities in the detection of the
submarine via radar, visual, radio and
electromagnetic equipment.
In conclusion, in the future one of
the major challenging in the antisubmarine
warfare will be focused on developing
sensors and their integration in the
underwater
surveillance
integrated
1
system .

3.

Bibliography
1.

2.

Bindi, Victor, Littoral Undersea

Warfare in 2025, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, 2005.
Comitee On Network Centric Naval
Forces, Centric naval forces, a
transition strategy for enhancing
capabilities, National Academy Press
Washington DC, 2000.

. Milan Vego, Patroling the deep - Critical antisubmarine warfare skills must be restored, pe
www.usnwc.edu/afl_, accesat n 22.09.2015

146

MINE COUNTERMEASURES
IN THE ACTUAL GEOSTRATEGIC SITUATION

Lorin CHIFOR
Emanuel UNGUREANU
Masters Degree Student Carol I National Defence University
lorin_rc@yahoo.com
Masters Degree Student Carol I National Defence University
manucu_75@yahoo.com

Abstract: During military operations of any kind, which are executed in a naval environment, use of mines by a
potential enemy can be a significant threat to the success of the overall operation, an eloquent issue in the
history of wars. It is very important that the enforceability of naval operations, airborne or otherwise, of mining
by hostile forces during a period of tension, should be considered as a threat of such operations in a conflict.
When mining occurred or enforceability mining, an effort for Mine Countermeasures was necessary, in order to
allow military vessels and their commercial allies to freely use seas and enter / stand / in ports in support of
allied forces and of the civilian population, with minimal damage or loss caused by marine mines.
Keywords: Mine Countermeasures, marine mine, mine risk, offensive, defensive forces and means,
minesweeping, mine hunting.

naval capabilities, and to geopolitical and

geostrategic changes. We note that today
the place, role and functions of naval
power in the sea power, within the general
power of the state, were reviewed, and the
manifestation of their general content
derived from concepts of maritime security
and stability, namely maritime security
operations2 and maritime operations
stability.
One of the major sources of threats
to maritime security, is particularly
terrorism maritime terrorism. Therefore
most of the operations are essentially
maritime security operations, prevention /
response to the terrorist threat3.

1. Introduction
One of the main elements of
expression of a state maritime power is his
naval power. Quantifying the naval power
of the state is given mainly by sizing
composition and naval forces. Its principal
expression results in defending its
maritime interests in the areas concerned.
For the effective exercise of naval
power and conduct of operations in the
maritime area it is necessary to establish
strategy naval / maritime concepts from
naval strategy as part of the military art
(military science). The main concepts of
the naval strategy established by the
theoreticians (the sea control, sea denial,
attack
communications,
defense
communications,
maritime
power
projection)1 remain applicable today, but
ways and means of implementing them in
practice, expressed through official
documents have been in a continuous
process of adapting to developments in

For the maritime security concept see: Comandor

drd. Truc Toma-Dorel, Asigurarea securitii
maritime misiune de baz a ForelorNavale, n
Buletinul Forelor Navale nr. 13/2010, pp. 141-149;
Cpitan-comandor
Portase
Ovidiu-Marius,
Consideraii privind conceptul de securitate
maritime n mediul internaional, n Buletinul
Forelor Navale nr. 18/2013, pp. 102-116.
3
Comandor dr. Puichili Aurel, Evoluii n mediul
de securitate internaional. Componenta maritim a
securitii tendine pe plan internaional, n
Buletinul Forelor Navale nr. 18, 2013, pp. 67-101

For the maritime power, naval power and naval

strategy concepts see: Comandor dr. Marius
Hanganu, Puterea maritime i strategia naval,
Editura AISM, Bucureti, 2001;

147

There has been a transformation of

content and diversification of the Navys
missions, achieving fusion specific naval
battles with the specific Marine police,
which increases the efficiency of using the
Navy in ensuring overall security on
national, regional and global levels.
In the above context, I intend to
raise and highlight aspects of the mine
countermeasures operation today, starting
from the fact that many military specialists,
from tactical to the strategic ones, believe
that the naval mine can influence from the
sea those events held in the land.

possible in many coastal areas and even the

high seas (in terms of sovereignty over the
sea), in shallow water and deep water, with
standing mines (anchored or bottom) or
mobile mines (especially derivatives). All
these targets are included in the maritime
communications system.
Maritime communications, both in
the civilian and military ways, are
composed of:
Sea lines of communications:
Harbor (points) loading and
unloading;
Naval base;
Navigation and hydrographic
facilities for entrance / departs
ports;
Route
assisted
and
recommended
system
established in times of crisis
and war;
Maritime routes linking ports;
Choke points and straits;
The civil and military
transport ships;
Navy special ships for
defense of merchants ships.
Maritime
communications
components are targets for offensive or
terrorist mining actions. We will mention a
few that may be common to both actions
for a country or a terrorist group.

2. The threat of mines on the sea area

In the naval strategy and tactics, the
situation of danger and uncertainty due to
use of naval mines in a naval conflict or a
crisis situation, no matter who lays mines,
is perceived as threatening of mines.
Creating the threatening of mines is a
result of operations / actions mining
rigorously planned and executed or
improvised by a state, a separatist group or
a terrorist group.
The wide range of situations,
possibilities, forces and means, including
Mine Countermeasures (part of Mine
Warfare), require that today, more than
ever, threatening of mines on the important
communication
routes
should
be
considered as a major risk to maritime
security.
Areas with stronger dangers of
mines are characterized, first, by the
correlation between depths, the mines and
the possibility of using their capabilities.
Therefore the probability of finding mines
in certain areas depends on the mines
capabilities that the enemy/opponent could
have.
By executing offensive actions of
mining in the classical or terrorist way,
multiple politico-military purposes are
achieved. Therefore, most probably such
actions will be executed in the important
sea areas for the state that is considered an
enemy. Globally, mining (laying mines) is

2.1. Sea Lines of Communications

- SLOCs
Since ancient times, maritime
communications were the route that has led
national economies and world economy in
general. Most of the economic exchanges
between countries are carried by sea.
So, sea lines of communications are
vital routes that include shipping lines (sea
lines maritime traffic - established
economic criteria and the safety of
navigation), straits, canals, and rivers
shared by civilian ships and military
vessels.
Civil sea lines of communications
are set primarily on short distance criterion
to avoid additional costs. Sea lines of

148

it is higher in coastal areas

(where depths are smaller) and decreases
with increasing distance from the coast;
it is likely to choke points
(entrance ports, passes, canals etc.) and
maritime communications routes;
it can precede the initial strike of
the enemy forces in order to block the
ports or dislocation points;
The main forces that can
perform offensive mining and against
whom defense should be first organized
are: aircraft, submarines and surface
vessels;
The main danger comes from
bottom mines without contact because they
are, on the one hand easier to launch by
aviation, and on the other hand are more
difficult to sweep4.

communications are used by navy and are

established
according
to
various
operational goals and objectives.
Therefore, we can say that this is
very important for the security of states
and for the global community.
2.2 Choke Points
Choke points are in fact the
backbone of civilian or military marine
traffic. They are determined by the
physical geography of the seas and oceans.
They are characterized by a high-intensity
maritime traffic.
2.3 Harbors and inshore waters
Harbors and inshore waters are
extremely important to the economy of a
country. Therefore they must be
considered as important targets, especially
in asymmetrical actions. Although they
may have important capabilities Mine
Countermeasures, specific actions are
difficult to be executed in these areas,
especially in time of peace or crisis. The
intensity of the maritime traffic in these
areas, the presence of civilian ships and
recreational fishing vessels constitute the
factors favoring the subversive mining.

3. Measures to combat the threat of

mines
When there are tensions in the
security environment, due to a crisis, there
is the possibility of an increased threat of
mines. When potential enemy is known, its
possibilities and intentions can be
evaluated in order to conduct mining or
terrorist actions, depending on who
generates the crisis (State, group or
separatist terrorist group). In crisis
situations, the possibility of laying mines
increases while the crisis is intensified.
Therefore, this possibility should be
considered from the first signs of the onset
of a crisis.
However, gradually the crisis can
lay
mine
barrage
controlled
or
independent, stationary or mobile, by both
parties, with or without fully abiding the
international legal framework. Measures
must be taken in crisis situations to
maintain mine countermeasures fighting
forces to a high degree training, supervise
possible mined areas and update data
collection.

2.4 Areas with important natural

resources (biological, energy economically
important)
The economy of a country, region
or even the entire world can be severely
affected by mining these areas. Experience
gained in the mine warfare correlated with
naval mines capabilities and general
principles of naval strategy and tactics can
say that the danger of mines is higher in
areas near the coastline, in straits and the
chokepoints.
Mine warfare has a permanent
status and thus, we can say about the threat
of mine that:
it may be still in peacetime or
before the conflict during the war and held
sometimes a period after the conflict;

Marian Tnase, ,Aspecte eseniale ale fizionomiei

rzboiului cu mine navale,Buletinul Forelor
Navale nr. 20/2014,pp 45-46.
4

149

4. Mine countermeasures5

In the event of a crisis response

actions must be taken into account
considering that both parties of the conflict
can mine against each other and against
mandated task forces for actions in the
crisis. The grouping of forces involved in
this type of operations is mainly one type
multinational alliance or coalition type
A
careful
and
painstaking
evaluation, executed in time by the
efficient means of command and control is
absolutely necessary and extremely useful.
Moreover, an important aspect of the use
of mines by the parties involved is that
there can be used a variety of types of
mines, especially classical.
A significant example is the Gulf
War when 16 types of mines had been
identified, including eight types with
tripping systems influence and contacts,
which were integrated with other defense
systems. Also, mine countermeasure forces
should ensure the possibility of a quick
response to eliminate the threat of mines
and also dissuade mining shares.
In the escalation of a crisis situation
or in case of declared war, of which
Romania - individually or in alliance - is
part, the threat of mines is more complex.
The maritime theater of mining actions
will be taken by both sides. In crisis or war
it is also possible that one of the parties
should declare an area mined even if it was
not mined or minefield which is much
smaller than the declared area.
The main difference between the
mine countermeasures and other kind of
war is that mine countermeasures have a
defensive character. Once mines have been
laid or crisis escalated to a level where
mining is possible, the military actions
against active mines must begin and
continue until all targets are protected or
until it is assessed that the threat has been
eliminated. Thus, once the mine
countermeasures have begun, they
continue at a level of intensity that is
independent of other military activities.

It was found that after the World

War II the number of situations in which
there were used classic naval mines - the
execution of mining operations - in local
and regional conflicts - experienced a
continuous decline. Instead, in the same
period of time MCM, compared with either
mining or other kind of naval battles
became more present, more sophisticated,
more dangerous and more lasting, and
maritime area of its active manifestation
has expanded from coast to 300 m depth,
aimed at covering the entire range of the
threat of mines.
MCM includes all measures and
actions taken by the specialized forces
(equipped and trained) and integrated force
to prevent mining by discovering mined
areas to be destroyed / neutralized on sea
lines of communications in times of peace,
regional or international situation of crisis
and in times of war.
The wide ranges of measures and
actions to be taken have made the MCM to
become an important function in the Navy,
including NATO. In fact, the main purpose
of MCM is to allow military vessels /
merchant ships to use the sea, as a
necessary war effort and support of the
population without unacceptable damage
or loss due to mines.
This can be achieved by preventing
threat of mines situations in important sea
areas or reducing the threat of mines at a
minimum level. As you have seen above,
we can say without fail, that MCM has
both an offensive and a defensive
character.
MCMs offensive character comes
from the need to prevent the threat of
mines and the defensive character comes
from the need to reduce or eliminate it.
These two main aspects of MCMare
translated into practice the measures /
actions and operations that are done by
MCM Forces, but the commandments
5

We use the
countermeasures.

150

acronym

MCM

for

Mine

witch have the responsibility of planning,

execution and support of the maritime
operations are also involved. Thus we can
talk about offensive MCM and defensive
MCM; both have a passive and an active
component. In the offensive MCM are
contained measures and actions taken or
carried out to deter mine laid by an
opponent / enemy, to avoid surprise and to
prevent the successful lay of mines by him
in important sea areas. These include:
Keeping
under
constant
observation the potential enemies;
- Prevention of mining through
deterrence;
- Attack and neutralize the enemy's
mining capabilities in his ports and on his
sea lines of communications;
- Damaging the facilities necessary
for the support of the mining;
- Destruction of the enemy mine
laying platforms during the execution of
mine -discrimination in the maritime area
of responsibility;
- Offensive mining.
Defensive MCM are aimed to
detect, classify, localize, neutralize, and
destroy enemy mines. They consist of a
series of passive and active measures.
The passive MCM component
protects maritime traffic (civil and
military). This action has the following
main areas:
- Maintaining credible capabilities
MCM;
- Reducing physical fields of civil
and military vessels;
The
establishment
of
recommended routes and rules for their
use;
- Leading vessels and ships on
routes, channels and harbors.
The existence of an integrated
space management facilitates reducing the
impact of mines on their own forces.
Therefore it is imperative to have:
- A system for collecting and
processing information on the enemy's
warfare
(Intelligence,
Surveillance,
Reconnaissance);

- A system for observation MCM

and information on the threat of mines by
which to monitor and manage the threat of
mines, mining executed by own forces and
the enemy, actions MCM and their
outcomes.
Active defensive MCM are
designed to reduce the effectiveness of
minefield by removing mines, destroying
them in place, or neutralizing them. This is
achieved by minesweeping and/or mine
hunting. Mine hunting is not influenced by
mines fitted with sophisticated firing
circuit ship counts, or arming delays.
Minesweeping is more effective than mine
hunting if the bottom is rock, stone or
coral, mines are buried in the mud or sand,
or environmental conditions are poor.
The main purpose of minesweeping
is to clear a certain area of enemy mines
and eventually to destroy the mines.
Minesweeping techniques used today are
similar in many ways to those developed
during World War II. However, the more
advanced models of moored mines can be
laid in deep waters. This, in turn, requires
the use of special deep-sweeping
equipment. Techniques for sweeping mines
are primarily determined by the water
depth. Mines can be cleared by using
contact, mechanical, or influence sweeps.
In the mechanical sweep a wire is
towed through the water by one or more
ships to cut the mooring wires of floating
mines. If a mechanical sweep hits the
mine, the wire of the sweep rubs against
the mooring wire until it is cut. The mine is
then destroyed by gunfire or an explosive
ordnance team.
In contrast to mechanical sweeps,
influence sweeps (fool) the mines into
detonating by simulating either magnetic,
acoustic or pressure field.
A magnetic sweep generates a
magnetic field to simulate the field created
by a passing ship and thereby induces a
magnetic mine to detonate. In sweeping
magnetic influence mines, the water depth
is the only factor affecting the performance
of closed sweeps and open sweeps against

151

Combined sweeps are also used

mostly a combination of magnetic and
acoustic sweeps. Combined sweeps are
divided into jointly towed coil and acoustic
sweep barges and special minesweepers.
The combined sweep gear consists of coil
and acoustic sweep towed jointly. The
majority of influence sweeps are, however,
characterized by low effectiveness
(unreliability and low yield) even when the
minesweeping system is well chosen. They
can be used for sweeping of magnetic and
acoustic mines. The existing influence
sweeps are, however, ineffective when
used against pressure mines. Hence the
sweeping of pressure mines should be
conducted by a group of mine sweepers
and clearance divers, MCM ships that
search and destroy mines at a certain
distance from their bows, and mine
breakers.
In contrast to minesweeping, mine
hunting consists of a systematic search
and detection of individual mines and their
subsequent neutralization. The origins of
mine hunting date to World War II. The
Royal Navy was in the forefront of
developing mine-hunting techniques in the
1950s and 1960s; other navies followed its
lead. The search for enemy mines can be
conducted by mine-hunting sonars, divers,
and UUVs. Acoustic, magnetic, pressure,
and optical mine-hunting methods are
differentiated. In acoustic mine hunting,
active sonars and marine mammals are
used to find objects with mine-like
characteristics. Specialized variable-depth
sonars (VDSs) are most commonly used
for acoustic mine hunting. These shortrange and high-definition sonars can detect
mines at ranges up to 3,300 feet. A modern
mine-hunting sonar system consists of an
active sonar for detecting objects in the
water and on the sea bottom, and sonar for
classifying detected objects as mines or
nonmines. They are capable of not only
detecting enemy mines but also
determining their types. For magnetic mine
hunting, magnetic detectors are used to
find ferromagnetic mines on or buried in

the vertical component of magnetic mines.

The waters conductivity affects the
amount of current that can be used in the
open-loop sweeps.
An acoustic sweep uses various
noisemakers to generate sounds, to
simulate a ships sound signature and
thereby detonate acoustic influence mines.
Depending on the frequency range of the
simulated field, acoustic sweeps are
narrowband or broadband. They consist of
a towed buoy with a firing device
accommodated inside that sets up an
acoustic field in the water medium. There
are explosive-type acoustic sweeps
consisting of a tube lowered from the ship
into the water through which small
explosive charges are dropped. The
sweeping of acoustic-type influence mines
is similar to the sweeping of magnetic
mines. Instead of magnetized cable, the
sweeper or minesweeping helicopter tows
a mechanical or electrical noisemaker
simulating the noise level and frequency of
a ship under way. However, sweeping
modern acoustic mines is extremely
difficult. Among other things, the sweep
has to emulate the sound profile of a target.
This must be done precisely, because
modern acoustic mines have the ability to
detect errors. Also, the sweep might not be
simulating the intended target or might be
simulating a wrong target.
The most difficult mines to sweep
are pressure influenced mines. One method
is to sail an obsolescent ship or barge or
large submerged tow-bodies into the
minefield to trigger the mines. However,
surface ships must be large enough to
generate a pressure wave sufficiently
strong to detonate the pressure mine.
Submerged tow-bodies generate significant
drag and require powerful towing vessels.
The U.S. Navy uses a sled (pressure body)
towed by helicopters. This method is not
only very expensive but also not always
successful. In short, there is no satisfactory
method for neutralizing the threat posed by
enemy pressure mines.

152

the sea bottom. In optical mine hunting,

visual, optical, or electro-optical sensors
are used to find enemy mines on the
surface, underwater, and on the seabed.
Regardless of the methods used, the
final classification of a mine is conducted
by a light diver or UUV. Once a mine is
located, it is neutralized by placing an
explosive on or near it. Detection of buried
mines is effective only by marine
mammals, but at a far slower rate than is
desirable.
Mine hunting includes search of
the seabed and/or water for mines to assess
the nature of the seabed and the objects on
it. This includes the process of detection,
classification, or identification of contacts
and their positions relative to the minehunting unit, to construct a plot of the
contacts or to mark them, to convert the
relative positions of the contacts to true
positions, and to dispose of mines or
supposed mines. 244 Mine hunting is
conducted by towed mine-hunting sonar
arrays and magnetometers. Mine hunting is
slow and is the only relatively effective
method of dealing with the threat posed by
multisensory mines in relatively shallow
waters. Mine hunting requires expensive
equipment and highly skilled operators.
Like minesweeping, it is highly dependent
on the weather conditions in a given area.
In mine hunting it is inherently difficult to
detect mines in the presence of high
clutter, variability of the bottom and
turbidity, mine burial, and mine
shape/material
designed
to
reduce
6
detection by sonardelays .

satisfactory solution has been found. Mines

are probably the most effective weapons
ever devised for naval warfare. They can
be used offensively as part of ones efforts
to obtain control of the subsurface or to
deny that control. Mines can be used
defensively by both the stronger and the
weaker sides to preserve their respective
controls of the basing/deployment areas.
Mines are also among the most important
weapons for ensuring the safety of ones
commercial shipping in littoral waters.
Bibliography
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Conclusions
As in the past, mine warfare will be
extensively used by both the stronger and
the weaker sides at sea. Mines are
generally cheap. They can be produced or
acquired in large numbers. Even old mines
can be very lethal. The new smart mines
represent a growing threat for which no
6

Milan Vego, Fundamentals of Mine Warfare, The

United States Naval War College, 2012;

153

HANGANU, Marius, MORARU,

Vergil, Tradiii i actualitate n lupta
contra minelor navale, Editura
National Defence University Carol
I, Bucureti, 2006;
LEARSCHI, Sorin, Aciunile de
minare i deminare executate de
Forele Navale, Teza de doctorat,
Carol I National Defence University
Bucureti, 2007;
VEGO, Milan, Fundamentals of Mine
Warfare, The United States Naval War
College, 2012
PUICHILI, Aurel, Preocuprile
puterilor maritime pentru dezvoltarea
vntorii de mine i a dragajului prin
influen, Buletinul Forelor Navale
nr. 5/2006;
TNASE, Marian, Componentele
rzboiului cu mine navale, Buletinul
Forelor Navale nr. 18/2013;
TNASE, Marian, Aspecte eseniale
ale fizionomiei rzboiului cu mine
navale, Buletinul Forelor Navale nr.
20/2014.

TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTING

MARITIME SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (MSA)
Lorin CHIFOR
Emanuel UNGUREANU
Masters Degree Student Carol I National Defence University
lorin_rc@yahoo.com
Masters Degree Student Carol I National Defence University
manucu_75@yahoo.com
Abstract: Protecting global shipping industry against any direct or indirect threats is essential to the security of
the global economy. A picture of all aspects of the maritime domain is vital to anticipate risks and threats to
maritime security. To create a clearer picture of these aspects a large volume of data is required and
information should be analyzed and processed by information systems specialized in the field. The resulting
information can be shared, depending on the protocols, to the decision makers. Significant global systems in
support of Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) will be treated briefly in this article.
Keywords: Maritime Domain, Maritime Situational Awareness, RMP, MSSIS, MCCIS, TRITON, GCCSM.

For taking effective measures in

order
to
prevent
threats
from
groups/organizations aimed to harm
economical, financial, or moral life it is
needed to know and understand the risks
and threats and act in order to discourage
them. In this sense, the maritime situation
awareness (MSA) offers to the decision
makers the necessary information in order
to take the most effective action against all
possible risks and threats in the maritime
domain.
Conducting the NATO and EU
missions
against
piracy,
alongside
countries affected by this phenomenon, as
well as other international actors, MSA
was essential.

Context
In our times, the rise of the global
economy and thus international trade and
maritime transport in particular, requires a
good knowledge and understanding of the
maritime domain in order to prevent any
risks and threats. Globally, Maritime
Domain is one of the important strategic
areas. As a result, the littoral states have
strategic interests on identifying and
tackling security challenges related to the
sea and maritime borders management.
While increasing marine traffic, the
threats have increased on the shipments, as
well as port facilities, coastal and oil
platforms, therefore maritime security has
become particularly important. Any
disruption of maritime traffic, even on
short term, would have a serious impact on
international trade and implicitly on the
economy of states.
Protecting maritime commerce
from attack or exploitation by pirates or
terrorists is critical to the security of the
global market. Maritime security has also a
major defense dimension because military
seaborne transport will remain crucial for
future operations.

MSA Concept
MSA is an evolving concept that
emerged from the need to improve safety
and security for US citizens after
september 2001 (9/11). Initially it started
from the concept Situation Awareness that
was used by USAF aircraft, and then it was
extended to the maritime domain.
The concept developed by US is
MDA (Maritime Domain Awareness) the effective understanding of anything

154

associated with the maritime domain that

could impact the security, safety, economy,
or environment of the United States1.
From a U.S. Navy perspective,
MDA consists of what is observable and
known (Situational Awareness), as well as
what is anticipated or suspected (Threat
Awareness) 2.It occurs when these two
components are brought together to
provide a decision-maker with an
amalgamation of operational, intelligence
and environmental information. Viewed in
the light of Navys worldwide presence,
MDA means: Global Maritime Situational
Awareness (GMSA) plus Maritime Threat
Awareness.
GMSA is given by a sum of
information and integration of a
comprehensive data set, mostly data being
unclassified, which are brought by many
agencies, organizations and nations with
responsibilities and knowledge of the
maritime domain. Therefore, GMSA are
the result of combining information
provided by many areas of the world, in a
complete picture, in order to identify trends
and detect anomalies.
The complexity and depth of
information about maritime domain that
are contributing to GMSA can not be
assured only by a single nation, agency or
organization.
NATO MSA concept is an
enabling capability which seeks to deliver

the required Information Superiority in the

maritime environment, to achieve a
common understanding of the maritime
situation in order to increase effectiveness
in the planning and conduct of operations.
At the beginning, after the
emergence of the concept MDA (USA),
NATO used this term in its doctrines and
documents. Following the NATO Summit
in Riga (2006), this concept has evolved
from NATO Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA) to NATO MSA. In 2008, NATO
Military Committee approved the concept
for Maritime Situational Awareness
(MSA), where MSA definition has been
agreed to and requirements plans were
identified for its further development and
implementation within the Alliance.
At European Union level, in 2009
the European Commission adopts COM2009-0538 EU that defines the principles
and concepts of MSA, MD, CISE
(Common
Information
Sharing
Environment) and integrated maritime
surveillance purpose.
In June 2014, the European Council
adopted maritime security strategy for the
global maritime domain, the aim being to
give support to relevant maritime
authorities at national and European level
in order to develop coherent policies and
provide an appropriate response to the
maritime risks and threats from maritime
domain.

MDA

MDA
Plan

NATO
MDA MSA

Navy
MDA

NATO
MSA
Def.

UE
MSA
Def.

9/11
2001

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

SA
70-80
USAF

Figure 1. Evoluia conceptului MDA/MSA

In order to anticipate threats and
risks in the maritime domain, EU maritime
safety strategy (EUMSS) promotes a
common knowledge of the situation and a
good exchange of information. In this

***, National Plan to achieve Maritime Domain

Awareness for The National Strategy for Maritime
Security, 2005, p.3 & ***, Navy Maritime Domain
Awareness Concept, 2007, p. 6.
2 ***, Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept, 2007,
p. 4.

155

respect, it emphasizes "promoting and

developing a common and validated
maritime situational awareness"3 which is
the EU's strategic interest in maritime
security.

Systems of supporting MSA

Many civil, governmental and
military organizations possess a large
amount of data and information that can be
shared and support MSA. However, no
entity is entitled to all information
available in the maritime field.
To process the large volume of
data, automatic data processing systems
were created, which, together with other
sources of information, offer to the
decision makers a complex image of the
maritime domain in order to anticipate
early risk and threats as well as to take
decisions effectively and timely.
MSA component is essential to
create and monitor a comprehensive
picture of marine traffic and for sharing
information to NATO in order to have the
best collective and/or individual responses.
In the following we will present
four major types of systems used
worldwide in support of MSA, Triton
project and a regional system that is used
in Romania.

Creating MSA
Creating MSA depends on the
ability to monitor maritime domain
activities so that trends could be identified
as well as differentiated anomalies. Data
should be collected, condensed and
analyzed, preferably using computing
applications in conjunction with various
sources of information so that decision
makers at stretegic/operational level can
anticipate risks and threats, and they could
take the initiative to counter them.
MSA depends on the exchange
information which is in large volumes.
Then, the resulting information must be
shared according to the beneficiary,
considering that at the MSA/MDA level
there should be protocols for protecting
classified information and/or confidential
information from the private sector.
To improve the MSA, the focus on
the diversity of data sources and the
multiple information, integrating them,
then useful information can be shared to
authorities in the field, for operational
activities.
Globally, in the Maritime Domain,
there are various sources on the data
available for MSA, such as: data from
sensors (Automatic Identification System AIS, Sat-AIS, Long Range Identification
and Tracking system - LRIT, VTS coastal
radars, surveillance and HF radars, OTH
radars, Synthetic Aperture Radar - SAR,
active and passive sonars), data from
websites ports (arrivals and movement
data), data from agencies and publications
(MMSI, Lloyd's MIU, Lloyd's Register
Fairplay), and data from other sources.

MSSIS
Maritime Safety and Security
Information
System
(MSSIS)
was
conceived by the U.S. Department of
Transportation, NATO and US Navy as an
unclassified, multinational, freely shared,
AIS network. This system was designed by
Volpe (federal agency that is part of the
US Department of Transportation, which is
financed entirely from sponsorship
projects) to develop networks to support
MDA/MSA.
This project originally started in
September 2005 through a demonstration
presented to NATO and the US Navy Sixth
Fleet (C6F) representatives, in which the
utility of AIS network was shown between
ports Rota (Spain) and Souda Bay
(Greece). In September 2006, Turkey,
Greece and Spain officially joined MSSIS,

***, European Union Maritime Security Strategy,

Bruxelles, 2014, p. 7.

156

and in October 2006 USA officially joined

them.

through a comprehensive situational

awareness display of ships equipped with
AIS.
The system continues to be
nowadays an invaluable tool for security
forces globally, providing support for
international military operations and joint
exercises, search and rescue missions.
Increasing the MSSIS network to more
than 70 international participants, led to
many improvements in the display client
MSSIS - Transview (TV32), and
completed a rigorous security information
process for the MSSIS server suite and
component software applications.
Data originated from MSSIS came
to support more other complex systems of
processing
data
from
different
organizations, including NATO, the aim
being to provide a more complex and
detailed image of interested aspects to
MSA.
Trends in the future of this system
will be integrating data from multiple
sources such as AIS, radar, ADS-B6.

Figure 2. Rolul MSSIS n Operaii NATO

(la nivel global i Operaia Active
Endeavour OAE)4

BRITE
Subsequently, in March 2008, over
52 countries4 were linked to this system
including Romania, and today more than
70 countries joined MSSIS network.
Countries participating in the network
MSSIS significantly improved their
maritime safety and their economic
stability.
At the moment MSSIS is a lowcost, unclassified, near real time network
which is used to track ships as they cross
waterways in the world5; the main purpose
is to increase maritime safety and security

BRITE is a NATO system designed

for MSA, based on web interface.
This system integrates data from
other unclassified and classified systems,
and open sources, analyzes them, and then
displays them or shares them to the
beneficiaries according to existing
protocols.
Below there is an example of a
BRITE model system that supports MSA
in the Mediterranean Sea.

Volpe, http://www.volpe.dot.gov/sites/volpe.
dot.gov/files/docs/Maritime%20Safety%20%26%2
0Security%20Information%20System_Enabling%2
0Global%20Maritime%20Situational%20Awarenes
s.pdf, accessed at 28.09.2015.
5
Volpe, http://www.volpe.dot.gov/infrastructuresystems-and-technology/situational-awareness-andlogistics/maritime-safety-and,
accessed
at
28.09.2015.

ADS-B (Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast), combines GPS data with identification

information and altitude of aircraft.

157

Figure 3. MSA Architecture in Mediterranean8

BRITE7 advantage is that it relies
on hardware and software products
developed in the civil environment whose
improvement is faster than in the military
one, where the development applications
process is more rigorous.

displays the information via various C2I

(Command, Control and Information)
applications in support of decision making
and planning.
In the military field, for situational
awareness
from
maritime
domain
Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) was
built, plus other maritime domain specific
information.
MCCIS
can
support
displaying both RMP and common
operating picture (COP) which contains
specific details about action environments
of maritime, air and land forces, and
present forces regardless of their
classification.
MCCIS is a comprehensive source
of both static and dynamic information for
analysis and display in various command
and control scenarios. For supporting
MCCIS users it is used a specific
application of decision making and
information management.
In the future, the entire spectrum of
data and information sources (civil,
unclassified, classified) will be used with
operating MCCIS to effectively support the
decision making process and provide
information in order to create MSA.

Maritime Command, Control

and Information System (MCCIS)
Maritime Command, Control and
Information System (MCCIS) was
developed and maintained by NATO
members. It was designed to provide a
modern
automated
information
management system, able to support
NATOs maritime structures commanders
in planning and executing military
activities to achieve the Alliance
objectives.
This system processes electronic
data from multiple sources of information,
7

The image is given by http://tide.act

.nato.int/mediawiki/index.php/NATO and acquired
by Mariusz Kocielski in Maritime Situational
Awareness (MSA), p. 82, published http://www.
amw.gdynia.pl/title,Mariusz_Koscielski,_Ryszard_
K__Miler,_Mariusz_Zielinski,pid,1237,mid,1.html
, accessed at 26.09.2015.

158

Project TRITON

Global Command and Control System Maritime (GCCS-M)

Project
TRITON
provides
functional services for Command and
Control of Maritime Operation. First Stage
Authorisation of Project TRITON was
granted on 27 May 20148.
TRITON will provide a set of
services required to be used through
NATO Command Structures (NCS) in
peacetime, exercises, and time of crisis
(operations) in order to provide to decision
makers the necessary information to help
them in the decision making and action.
The key capabilities to be provided
through this delivery are:
- replacement of MCCIS functionality
that
supports
operational-level
Maritime C2, MSA, and RMP;
- replacement of MSA functionality for
White Shipping currently supported by
the BRITE;
- building and dissemination of White
Picture (WP) and RMP;
- using information received from
National maritime C2 systems and
commercial maritime services to build
the WP and RMP;
- The Water Space Management and
Prevention of Mutual Interference
(WSM/PMI) segment of Maritime
Operational Planning;
- interoperability with other relevant
NATO systems and Functional
Services;
- providing Deployable Kits for Afloat
Command Platforms to operate
TRITON in standalone mode for both
domains.
From an operational perspective
TRITON as against MCCIS has many
users, a better display and visualization,
providing image for MSA (including WP,
RMP, Military Picture, Maritime Info
Management), maritime alerts, and from
the technical point of view the
infrastructure is improved.

The Global Command and Control

System - Maritime (GCCS-M) is the
Navy's main Command and Control
System. This system evolved from older
versions of the US Navys command and
control systems: Navy Tactical Command
System Afloat (NTCS-A) and Joint
Maritime Command Information Strategy
(JMCIS). The system is composed of four
main
variants,
Ashore,
Afloat,
Tactical/Mobile and Multi-Level Security
(MLS) that together provide command and
control information to warfighters in all
naval environments9.
GCCS-M enhances the combat
capability of operational commands and
supports decision-making process by
receiving, accessing and displaying
information in relation to the tactical
situation. GCCS-M receives, processes,
displays, and manages data on the
readiness of neutral, friendly, and hostile
forces in order to execute the full range of
Navy missions (e.g., strategic deterrence,
sea control, power projection, etc.) in nearreal-time via external communication
channels, local area networks (LANs) and
direct interfaces with other systems10.
GCCS-M provides C4I (Command,
Control, Computers, Communication and
Information) services to Navy allowing
both United States and allied maritime
forces the ability to operate in networkcentric warfare operations. The tendency
of this system is to extend existing C4I
base
capabilities
by implementing
evolutionary and incremental hardware and
software versions. Also, GCCS-M is in
accordance with the services provided by
the global information infrastructure GIGES (Global Information Grid Enterprise
Services)
and
ensure
interoperability with other naval C4I.
9

Federation of American Scientists (FAS),

http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/gccsm.htm, accessed at 26.09.2015.
10
Idem.

NCIA,
https://www.ncia.nato.int/News
Room/Pages/140605-MISC_2014.aspx, accessed at
26.09.2015.

159

The architecture of this type of

system is in continuous evolution in the
attempt to implement technological
developments
and
to
ensure
interoperability in specific operating
environment.

same time, it is ensured cooperation with

other border institutions through SISF
(Integrated Border Security State).
Conclusions
MSSIS mainly aims to increase
maritime safety and security through a
comprehensive
situational
awareness
display of AIS equipped vessels. This
system will integrate future data from other
sources such as radar and ADS-B. Also,
the data can be integrated into systems
classified, and military, single-purpose
mechanisms (diode device) in order to
complete classified information sources
and achieve a complete view of the
maritime domain.
TRITON will replace functionality
of BRITE and MCCIS at the operational
level. As a full functionality, TRITON will
not only be a monitoring system in
peacetime, but also a robust and capable
command and control tool for maritime
operations during the crisis and even in
wartime.
The Global Command and Control
System - Maritime (SCG-M) is adapted to
support the US's maximum interests by
adecvate
dimensioning
of
transport
infrastructure of the information scale (grid).

SCOMAR
SCOMAR11 is an operational
system of surveillance based on art
technology that enables the early detection,
12

Figure 4. SCOMAR12
tracking, recognition and identification of
vessels carrying illegal traffic to the Black
Sea. Technical support provides the
transmission in real time of information
obtained from the sensors to Command
and Control Center and the necessary
dispositions for intercepting threats and
carrying search and rescue missions.
This system will ensure ongoing
monitoring of traffic on the Black Sea, the
main objective of which is to ensure
Romanian maritime border surveillance
and European Union border surveillance.
SCOMAR is an independent
system that ensures interconnection and
access to databases of institutions of the
Black Sea, as follows: Border Police
(Ministry of Interior), RO Navy (Ministry
of Defense), the Romanian Naval
Authority (Ministry of Transport). At the

Bibliography
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11

Romanian Border Police, http://www.politiade

frontiera.ro/securizare/scomar.php, accessed at
28.09.2015.
12
Mira Telecom, http://www.miratelecom.ro/ro/
securitate/proiecte-de-referinta/scomar-sistemul-int
egrat-de-supraveghere-a-frontierei-maritime.html,
accessed at 28.09.2015.

160

***, National Plan to achieve

Maritime Domain Awareness for
The National Strategy for Maritime
Security, 2005.
***, Navy Maritime Domain
Awareness Concept, 2007.
***, Strategia Uniunii Europene n
materie de securitate maritim,
Bruxelles, 2014.
http://amw.gdynia.pl
http://fas.org
http://www.miratelecom.ro
http://tide.act.nato.int
https://www.ncia.nato.int
http://www.politiadefrontiera.ro
http://www.volpe.dot.gov

THE IMPORTANCE OF MATERIAL RESOURCES IN THE MILITARY

HEALTH SYSTEM
Gabriel COJOCARU
Colonel, PhD student, National Defence University "Carol I"
gabicojocaru@yahoo.com

Abstract: Providing material resources necessary for developing a modern army is a priority of politico-military
decision makers, in order to conduct the operations of military forces. They are especially important in
developing a modern army and a health system to meet the needs of the general population, and in particular
military personnel. In the present paper we tried to emphasize the importance of material resources in the
military health system but also the importance of health research.
Keywords: Material resources, the military health system, infrastructure, health research.

and technological progress, which must

cope to and adequately determine
professionalization of the post of manager
of supply, due to both the skills and
qualities imposed for such a function and
also the value of knowledge and skills that
warrant its application with successful
results.
The
function
of
supply
management watches the capacity to lead,
to make fair, correct and efficient decisions
which concentrate into practice in issuing
purchase orders, providing transport,
storage, as well as all aspects of
commercial, port and customs formalities
under international operations.
When taking decisions, economic
order considerations have always had a
leading role, so that the manager of a
supply project must consider the costs of
goods and services purchased, taking into
account that they represent more than half
of the total costs of a project supply.
Therefore, competitive supplies determines
the financial success of a project.
The actions taken by the manager
of a project administration of resources
consist of an analysis of concrete
conditions,
both
domestic
and
international, linked to the problem of the
placements of the substantiating costs
capital for achieving each objective of the
project and systematic tracking of framing

Introduction
Loosely, material resources are
determined by the development level of the
current economies of states and natural
resource consumption. The material
resources represent the totality of goods
equipment, raw materials, fuel, energy, etc.
which can be employed / used at a time, in
a well-defined purpose.
In this context, in our view,
material resource management consists of
all activities directed towards ensuring,
development, satisfaction and maintenance
of the needs of force with maximum
efficiency in order to achieve specific
objectives to fulfill its mission and needs
of employees.
Management of material resources of
administration
Conceptualizing the notion of
management of material resources
administration of a project, as theory and
practice of management, aims primarily at
the efficiency of supply, in order to avoid
delays, purchasing goods suited for an aim
pursued and time bordering.
Increasing anticipative character of
the management, reflected by emphasizing
the importance of supply management,
mainly due to pressure from the technical

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actual expenditure in the level of the

planned costs.
The importance of efficient capital
placement resides in the fact that proper
management of resources can determine
the profitability of a proposed acquisition.
Thus, premature blocked funds by
purchasing materials does not generate
profit, even more if these funds come from
borrowed capital, bring a loss equivalent to
an interest rate, or some expenses without
coverage. On the other hand, delays caused
by the purchase could have disastrous
consequences for that lack of materials can
lead to lockouts, causing an excess in the
number of hours estimated, while the
project continues to record salaries and
costs without coverage. Overall, the whole
project has to suffer, thus endangering its
profitability.

equipment in order to get a prehospital

diagnosis on each specialty;
- Developing a priority of
compartment of functional explorations
(ultrasound,
electro
diagnostic,
scintigraphy etc) in order to meet the need
of establishing an accurate prehospital
diagnosis;
- Development, equipping and
employment of effective medical analysis
laboratories;
- Collaboration with other hospitals
in the country and abroad through
professional collaboration protocols in
order
to
provide
complex
and
complementary services for citizens.
The aim is to develop an ambient
environment respecting the standards,
through repair and maintenance of existing
infrastructure and developing new utilities
as provided in the plan regarding future
investment.

The material resources in the military

health system

Infrastructure management
in the military health system

Ensuring a high quality of medical

care, providing necessary material
resources (facilities, equipment, apparatus)
and the necessary qualified staff, adequate
funding for healthcare activities are the
most suitable solutions to ensure a quality
medical service.
Material resources - are given by
the hospital facilities when they are
performing, the strategy from the start
benefits of a good technical and
technological base of departure. The
skyrocket scientific-technical, technical
equipment usually occurs as a limiting
factor of development and efficiency.
To ensure an efficient health
system, the following are necessary:
Supporting
sections
and
departments through sufficient budgetary
allocations for the supply of medicines,
sanitary materials and equipping with
medical facilities performance;
- The efficient organization of
medical
practices
from
integrated
Ambulatory through provision of medical

Infrastructure Management enables

control of environmental conditions and
areas that impact the quality of health care
services by:
Delimitation of the following areas:
buildings
/
facilities
/
equipment;
open spaces (green areas,
circulated areas, parking);
waste disposal;
the safety of persons and
property.
Aspects
of
the
areas
administration:
classification and hierarchy of
spaces / facilities / equipment according to
their destination, risk level, etc.
data
management
on
regulations, technical, commercial data, so
that documents are regrouped, exploited,
consulted, computerized, updated;

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 security
management
of
people, users, those providing services,
visitors;
Actions taken to manage premises:
preventive actions: technical
controls, insurance of compliance, alarm
devices, control of risks (the accidental
stopping of the operation of certain
equipment, malfunctions, works in external
services, etc.);

maintenance
actions
/
maintenance;
assessment actions (operational
studies, audits of equipment / facilities,
etc.);
actions to ensure the quality,
safety and hygiene.
Methods of managing premises:
carrying out the activity in
suitable premises, that meet current legal
and regulatory requirements for the
provision of health services;
hospital premises management
considers conducting both under normal
conditions (routine appointments or
planning) the activity of providing health
services and the possibility of emergency
situations, of risk (total power failure, fire,
earthquake, etc.). In case of crisis a plan is
drawn up for the influx of victims and
permanence is provided 24/7.
Management of medical and nonmedical equipment:
the use of medical and nonmedical gear and appropriate equipment,
properly maintained to ensure the quality
of medical service provided;
defining the performances
associated (delivery, placing into service,
training users, maintenance and preventive
and corrective interventions);
control of the life cycle of
equipment and continuity of the servicing
through restrictions on installation,
maintenance, control and scrap;
compliance with laws, regulations
and practices relating to surveillance.
Managing
of
supplies
(pharmaceuticals and non-medical):

control of the purchase processes

of both the consumables as well as the
medical and non-medical equipment by
verifying products purchased from the
supplier and/or the reception to ensure that
products
comply
with
specified
requirements;
acquisitions and supplies;
quality control;
distribution and inventory
management.
Organization of medical and
paramedical staff:
identification of the expectations
and needs through analysis of job
requirements, the search and selection of
candidates for employment after the
examination of competence;
integrating new staff;
the qualification, forming and
training of staff involved in the delivery of
health services (health care performance is
characterized by a strong human
component, which includes both medical
and the paramedical staff);
security and improvement
working conditions.
Management of logistical and
technical functions by identifying support
activities to achieve health performances:
procurement and supply services;
biomedical activity;
technical services (electricians,
plumbers, stokers, carpenters, etc.);
maintenance and cleaning;
waste treatment services;
transport service.
The system of health research
The health system includes all the
organizations, institutions and resources
that are designed to produce health actions
whose primary intent is to improve health.
Health research is a driving force
for improving the performance of health
systems and health of individuals and
populations.
In order to enhance the contribution
of research for health system, a concept of

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national health research has been proposed

in order to clarify interdependencies and
common goals. The health research system
can be seen as one of the subsystems of the
health system general. Research in this
way can help stakeholders in biomedicine
and health care systems.
The research systems of the health
domain can be defined as "knowledge
production and applications to improve the
way societies organize to achieve health
objectives, including how they plan to
manage health financing activities to
improve the health system and the roles,
perspectives and interests of different
actors in this field"1 the health research
systems include research on health
policies, although this is sometimes treated
separately. This includes also research
health services, which could be seen as a
subsystem of health systems research,
focusing on providing services.
From the point of view of hospital
staff, the quality of care is not up to a
desired level, primarily because of the
level of resources to provide the necessary
material resources (equipment, drugs,
supplies, etc.) and providing the necessary
financial resources. Also, other areas that
should be improved are: improvement of
medical
staff;
development
of
organizational
culture;
providing
management;
involvement
and
participation of medical personnel ensuring
medical quality in treating.

A good state of health is a value

and a true source of economic and social
stability. This is a key factor for poverty
reduction, an element that contributes to
sustainable development, every citizen
having benefitted. Most important is the
fact that indicators of good health are no
longer the result of a single sector:
sustainable improvement of population
health with the principle of social equity is
actually a product of effective policies
promoted at all levels of government and
some collaborative efforts submitted by all
segments of society.
We consider it a priority to monitor
the amounts allocated to the military health
system to be used effectively. This requires
identifying and monitoring risks that may
negatively influence the effectiveness of
the mechanism of health services that may
generate situations where major objectives
of health facilities may remain unrealized,
and would have a negative impact on
quality of life of military personnel.
Improving the funding mechanism
of military medical institutions helps
optimize overall system health status, and
financial resources will be used
appropriately, leading to decreased
mortality, disability and military welfare.
Bibliography

1.

Conclusions

2.

We appreciate that the management

of sources and resources in the design and
development of a modern army must
resolve first the managerial mechanism
ensuring financial resources to support
ongoing real and typology of these armies.

3.

Strengthening health systems: the role and

promise of policy and systems research,http://www.
who.int/alliancehpsr/resources/Strengthening_comp
let.pdf, accessed at 21.08.2015

Strategia Naional de Sntate

2014-2020;
PROGRAMUL DE GUVERNARE
2013-2016 (http://media.hotnews
.ro/ media_server1/document-201212-20-13852506-0-programulguvernare-usl-2013-2016.pdf)
Col.dr.ing. Viorel Dumea, lect.
univ. ec. dr. Maria Constantinescu
(coord.),
Elaborarea
unor
variante de management integrat al
resurselor de aprare n acord cu
provocrile integrrii n NATO i
UE, mas rotund, Braov, 29 mai

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164

4.

5.

2008, Editura UNAp Carol I,

2008
Haraga (Baculea) S. - Alocarea
resurselor ctre spitale pe baza
costurilor standard pe grupe de
diagnostic Autoref. tezei de dr. n
economie, Bucureti, 2009
Un sistem sanitar centrat pe
nevoile ceteanului, Raportul
Comisiei
Prezideniale
pentru
analiza i elaborarea politicilor din
domeniul sntii publice din
Romnia, Bucureti, 2008

This work was possible with the financial

support of the Sectoral Operational
Programme for Human Resources
Development 2007-2013, co-financed by
the European Social Fund, under the
project number POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385
with the title Integrated/educational
network for the formation, conseling and
orientation of doctoral students for a
research career in security, defense,
public order and national security
domains - SECNETEDU.

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SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE DECISION-MAKING, ORGANIZATIONAL AND

INFORMATION SYSTEMS NEEDED
FOR AN EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF MATERIAL RESOURCES FOR
GENDARMES STRUCTURES
Gheorghe-Marius COSTACHE
Lieutenant colonel, Head of Finance Division, Romanian Gendarmerie
costache_mrs@yahoo.com

Abstract: The need to identify solutions to ensure the highest level of resources, in the context
of budgetary constraints imposed by the economic situation of Romania, has become a
challenge for commanders of Gendarmes structures. Meeting the challenges requires
conceptualization of decision-making system notions, organizational and information system
elements, essential for an efficient management of material resources in the structures of
gendarmes and their practical implementation.
Keywords: management, material resources, gendarmes structures, decision system,
organizational system, information system.
Gendarmes structures are a police
force with military status, performing
defense and public order missions, rights
and freedoms of citizens, public and
private property, protection of state
institutions and combating terrorism, as
well as other duties stipulated by the law.
Gendarmes specificity is this duality
police force, on one hand, and military
structure, on the other hand, feature that
makes the management systems applicable
to other structures of the national defense,
public order and national security
impossible to be applied in the Romanian
Gendarmerie and requires creating their
own doctrines, concepts and models in
terms of material resources management.
The material resources are one of
the central elements of planning any
activity, as they provide material support
for tasks and missions.
Material resources management is
all the evidence, organizational and
information character elements, through
which all the processes and management
relations are possible, in achieving the
tasks of the support structures for carrying
out the Romanian Gendarmeries tasks.

Features of a decision-making system to

provide material resources management
performance in gendarmes structures
Given that the work of an
organization is conducted on a large
number of decisions that are adopted at
different levels, the decision constitutes an
essential element of material resource
management, which is a rational process of
choosing an action alternative from several
possible, in order to achieve one or more
objectives, under conditions of maximum
efficiency, activity always involving at
least two people: the manager (who
decides) and a contractor involved in
implementing the decision.1
We believe that the decision in the
management
of
materials
requires
consideration of the decider for the
following
elements:
setting
clear
objectives, identifying several action
possibilities (variants) to achieve the
objectives, selection (choice) - conscious
process to decide on one of the
embodiments outlined.2
1

Vasile Deac coordinator and staff, Management,

Publishing ASE, Bucharest, 2014, pp. 201 - 202.
2
Gheorghe Minculete, Logistics management
Concepts Functions Application , Publishing
Academy for Advanced Military Studies,
Bucharest, 2003, p. 29.

166

In the management of materials,

Gendarmes structures resources, the
managerial decision can take two forms:
the decisional act (it refers to simple
situations that do not require intelligence)
or decision-making process (involving
complex
decisions,
intelligence,
3
preparation for decision etc.).
As the decision-maker has a big
influence on the quality of decision, he
should have sufficient knowledge about
the subject decision issues, have analysis
and synthesis capacity and he should
conduct a special management training, in
order
to
ensure
decision-makers
professionalism and their capacity for
collaboration with experts from the
organization.4
In the Gendarmes structures,
decision-makers can head units or one of
its
subordinates,
with
manager
responsibilities in the field of material
resources management at different levels
(Deputy Commander, Chief of Service,
Head Office, Head Department, etc).
In the Gendarmes structures, the
decision environment of the material
resources management lies in the
combination of endogen components (level
of military and specialized training,
computerization of logistics, knowledge of
the professional potential of subordinates
and ongoing collaboration with them,
directing action to achieve the objectives,
the use of maximum resource efficiency
etc.) and exogenous components of these
structures (reducing life product cycle due
to speeding up the wear of the energy crisis
and raw materials, the speed with which
changes are made in scientific research and
the introduction of technical progress,
etc.), which make up the decision-making
situation, characterized by displaying
significant direct and indirect influence on
the content and results of decision
management.5

In our opinion, to achieve a

decision-making system in order to ensure
the performance of material resources
management, Gendarmes structures needed
to implement scientific work instruments,
such as: procedures for making decisions
based on three key elements - certainty,
uncertainty and risk ; criteria for decisions
assessment etc.
We appreciate that maximizing
efficiency in the management structures of
the gendarmerie materials can only be
based on decisions that meet the following
characteristics:
be scientifically, which includes
the following: to use methods of
knowledge and realistic, scientific
approach, to take into account the legal
stipulations, proper use of techniques for
data processing and formulation of the
decision, routine, practice removal,
subjectivity and improvisation in the
decision;
to be adopted by persons who
have lawful authority, after consultation
with specialized departments;
to be clearly and concisely
formulated, in order to be received
correctly;
to correlate with previous
decisions and those that are expected to be
adopted;
to be appropriate or fall during
optimal
development
and
operationalization, in this regard a good
decision taken at the appropriate time is
preferable to a very good late decision;
to be effective (the criteria for
assessing the effectiveness of work
management).6
From our point of view, the
performance of material resources
management in the Gendarmes structures
can be provided only if adopting
managerial decision in several stages,
depending on each decision situation, as
follows:

Vasile Deac coordinator and staff, Management,

Publishing ASE, Bucharest, 2014, p. 202.
4
Ibidem
5
Gheorghe Minculete, Logistics management
Concepts Functions Application , Publishing

Academy for Advanced Military Studies,

Bucharest, 2003, p. 30.
6
Vasile Deac coordinator and staff, Management,
Publishing ASE, Bucharest, 2014, p. 205.

167

 perceived need and opportunity

to decide (conceptual phase), consisting in
the following: setting the problem to be
solved, determining the objectives to be
pursued and achieved, collection and
processing of primary selection of the
most appropriate information;
formulating action possible lines
(identifying variants share), which is
reflected in the following: goal setting
decision, setting a number of variables,
using appropriate methods to detect as
many possible action options, quantifying
the economic and social consequences for
each variant;
evaluating the benefits of each
action variant, which consists in: the
criteria of assessment and prioritization of
variants, using appropriate methods and
techniques for each type of decision to
establish advantages;
choosing the optimal stage
where you can use certain methods and
decision-making techniques.7
To create a decision-making system
capable to ensure performance of material
resources
management,
Gendarmes
structures can use a range of decisionmaking methods and techniques:
a static method of adopting a
decision: decisions under imperative
restriction, decisions under limited
restriction;
a choice of dynamic methods of
decision: decisions with installment effects
and applications (net present value method
- NPV, internal rate of return method),
unique decisions, multi-criteria decisions;
a method of choosing the
optimal variant for decisions with random
rate (with risk);
a method of choosing the
optimal variant for decisions under
uncertainty:
pessimistic
technique,
optimistic technique, Hurwitz's technique,
Laplaces
technique
(about
proportionality),
minimizing
regrets
technique (Savage);
other methods and techniques
used in the decision process: simulation in

decision making, decision table, decisionmaking techniques in a group.8

Fundamentals to achieve
an organizational system of gendarmes
structures to provide material resources
managements performance
Creating an organizational system
of gendarmes structures, able to ensure
the performance of material resources
management
must
consider
three
constituents:
structural organization: designing
all departments in an organization,
defining their positions within the structure
and regulation of organizational relations
established between them;
procedural organization: setting
and design processes needed to achieve the
organization's objectives;
informal organization: free
communication processes, derived from
informal relationships that exist between
the members, unstructured and formalized,
most of the times materialized through
parallel channels, relationships that arise
spontaneously.
According to certain papers
definitions,
organizational
entity
compartment is made up of several
workstations subordinated to the same
leading job, component that can also be
found under the name of: department,
service, office, workshop, direction, sector
etc. but the Romanian Gendarmeries
compartment is the first component of the
structural organization without a leadership
position; the organizational structure
elements provided with leadership
positions are: office, service, inspectorate,
direction etc., the only exception being the
financial departments led by the chief
accountant, who has a leading position.
Depending on the specific tasks
assigned to the Romanian Gendarmerie,
there are two categories of compartments:
functional Compartment, that is designed
to provide the necessary support for
8

Vasile Deac coordinator and staff, Management,

Publishing ASE, Bucharest, 2014, pp. 211 225.

Ibidem, pp. 208 210.

168

carrying out the basic organizations

activity, category of all the structures that
ensure the management of material
resources (compartment / office / service /
direction of logistics or communications
and IT department, procurement, etc.) and
operational departments that contribute
directly to achieving the objective of
organizations activity, category of
structures
with
specific
missions
(Missions organization and coordination,
research and documentation services,
public order subunits, security subunits
etc.).
As in any organization, in the
Romanian Gendarmerie also, the primary
entity of the structural organization is the
station, element covering the objectives,
tasks and the powers of each employee.9
In our opinion, the main
formalizing
organizational
systems
documents in the Gendarmes structures
are: organization, organization and
functioning rules and job description.
Another
formal
organization
expression is the organization proceeding,
which consists in establishing and
designing processes needed to achieve the
organization's objectives, the organization
tendency based on processes is becoming
more pronounced in management practice
of Gendarmes structures, both on
operational
missions
and
material
resources management.
We can see that among the
components
of
the
organization's
procedural and structural organization
there is full compatibility to the activities,
functions and tasks, in the sense that:
activities and tasks translate
relatively high general and specific
objectives (goals included in ROF,
usually) in the management structures and
functional and operational structures;
tasks translate individual targets
(assumed by each employee in the job
description) at the post.10

In the literature, the documents which

formalize procedural organization are:
a process map: framework
document that structures the processes
needed to achieve the organization's
objectives, while also reflecting the
relationship between them and "process
diagram"
procedure: document consisting
of formal representation of how specific
embodiment of a process or activity is;
a
process
diagram:
representation of a procedure, for the
employees understanding and easy
assimilation.11
We emphasize that in the Gendarmes
structures, the process maps and process
diagram are not used as tools.
In any organization, in addition to
work relations established formally, in the
structural and process organization arise
free communication processes, derived
from informal relationships that exist
between the members, unstructured and
formalized, most of the times materialized
through parallel channels, relationships
that arise spontaneously.12
Because
the
Romanian
Gendarmerie is a military structure where
formal organization and hierarchical
relationships are the defining elements, our
research to substantiate an organizational
system of Gendarmes structures to ensure
the performance of the material resources
management cannot focus on finding
solutions to the informal organization, but
may take some of its certain characteristic
elements into account, one of them being
"organizational culture" because, through
its forms of expression, it influences the
employees behavior and hence his/her
performance level, it determines the
managers behavior and thus the way they
predict, organize, coordinate, train and
assess employees, it influences the
language used in the communication
processes.
In our assessment, the main
documents related to the informal

Ibidem, p. 127.
Vasile Deac coordinator and staff,
Management, Publishing ASE, Bucharest, 2014,
p. 140.
10

11
12

169

Ibidem, pp. 141 146.

Ibidem, p. 147.

organization, mostly at the level of

organizational culture, are "The ethics
code" of the organization, which defines
the principles, norms, values and beliefs to
which the members of an organization
adhere and "Employees Handbook" which
is a guide to all the essential information
you need to know about an employee
organization, both of which exist in the
Gendarmes structures.13
For the purpose of our appliances,
the organizational system is the largest
concrete management component of the
Gendarmes structures system and the
existence of a defective organizational
system can cause a number of imbalances
in the management of material resources,
such
as
communication
problems
occurring in an organization / structure, its
lack of efficiency and effectiveness,
employee
dissatisfaction,
hampered
workflows, insufficient substantiation
decisions, using relevant and timely
translation etc.14

treatment information and functions at all

levels of the organization structure,
supporting both management processes
and execution processes.16
From the literature we can identify
four specific functions of information
systems:
the decision - is that the
information system is available to
decision-makers, providing the following:
necessary information to support the
smooth management decisions, how to
communicate in the process of collective
decision in order to achieve consensus,
procedures, information for selecting the
most favorable alternative circuits for
transmitting information to the operational
component of the decision, the feedback
from those who have applied the decision;
operational function - for
involving
various
informational
components in all processes taking place in
the institution, both the management and
operational,
ensuring
the
operationalization
of
the
strategy,
decisions, managerial methods and
objectives;
educational function - provides
continuous training of employees with the
necessary information and adapt them to
the requirements of internal and external
environment, using specific means of
development of some forms of learning at
the organization or at the workplace;
the documentary function it
involves the recording and storage of all
information related to the main events and
what is happening within the organization,
and use this information previously
recorded in current management or
execution processes.17
The complexity of modern
information systems and requirements that
organization leaders have towards these
supply facilities sometimes lead to
malfunctions which are manifested by lack
of information or improper decision-

The operation principles

of the information flow for an efficient
management of material resources
in gendarmes structures
As in other organizations, in
Gendarmes structures, the information
system is the management system
component which represents a combination
of elements that interact synergistically to
ensure communication between the
management and execution structures or
with external partners, and also supporting
management processes by collecting,
storing, processing, production and
presentation of information.15
The information system operates
with the following concepts and
components: data, information, knowledge,
and
information
flows
circuits,
informational procedures or methods of
13

Vasile Deac coordinator and staff,

Management, Publishing ASE, Bucharest, 2014, p.
153.
14
Ibidem, pp. 153 154.
15
Ibidem, p. 168.

16

Ibidem, pp. 168 169.

Vasile Deac coordinator and staff,
Management, Publishing ASE, Bucharest, 2014,
pp. 169 170.
17

170

makers information at various levels, the

lack of information, necessary for the
smooth
management
or
operative
processes or poor information quality
(distorted, delayed, inaccurate, etc.),
malfunction that could have the following
causes: improper information system
operation, the information system is not
suitable for the requirements and
objectives of the Romanian Gendarmerie,
human resource servicing or using
information system is not sufficiently
prepared for its exploitation, the
technology used is adapted to the
requirements of the information system,
information system architecture and size
are not correlated with the other
components of the management system
etc.18
The main shortcomings that may
occur in the information system that take
place in the management of material
resources in Gendarmes structures are:
distortion: is to change
unintended (inadvertent or partially) the
content of information (message) on the
information flow between transmitter and
receiver, because of the poor quality of
physical media storage / transmission of
information (hard disk, telephone circuits
etc.) inadequate exploitation means of
transmitting information or training
differences between people involved in
conveying information. An example could
be: a voucher for complete consumption by
managing a warehouse and sent to be
operated in accounting, the amount listed
on the ticket is not legible (negligence
transmitter) and the receiver, trying to
prompt the mentioned amount, it confuses
two figures, leading to an erroneous
recording of final stock.
filtering: is also a change message
during collection, processing or storage,
between transmitter and receiver, but the
distortion is different in that the total or
partial modification occurs in the vehicle
information intentionally. An example
might be: following an offer selection for
an IT equipment purchase, one of the
18

employees designated to carry out the

procurement procedure informs the wrong
decision-maker on a number of technical
features and reliability of one of the offers,
prompting the purchase from the supplier.
For the one who changed the information,
the decision brings an edge material from
the supplier, while the decision (untrue) to
purchase those products will ultimately
lead to a decrease in the performance of
the organization.
redundancy: is the unjustified
presence of the same information or
similar information media of various
information or repeated information
processing.
overloading information circuits:
is a general deficiency which consists in
the existence of irrelevant information in
hierarchical higher levels, in the
occurrence of unnecessary, unduly data
flow, which makes the transmission of
relevant information be made more
difficult, also for the decision-makers, who
are forced to take and process unnecessary
data. We believe that this shortcoming is
caused by irrational information flows and
certain information whose detail is
exaggerated.
the complexity of the IT solution
is not correlated with the training level of
personnel user.
some areas of information
processing are characterized by a high
volume of manual work.
low
productivity
of
the
information system.
unadjusted
information
management structure systems requirements
of the organization.
insufficient
or
incorrect
codification use or existence of an incoherent
system of coding etc.19
Alongside specific measures to
each case, there are a number of ways to
minimize the manifestation of information
systemic
deficiencies
of
materials

19

Vasile Deac coordinator and staff,

Management, Publishing ASE, Bucharest, 2014,
pp. 183 186.

Ibidem, pp. 182 183.

171

resources management in Gendarmes

structures, such as:
- Uniform encoding of components,
products and services of the organization, a
very effective method of removing
redundancy and, to a lesser extent of
screening, but sometimes it may increase
the probability of distortion;
Check
Digit
verification
mechanism, represented by a figure or
group of figures which is determined by a
calculation method of code numbers when
it is allocated first, and its attached to it, a
method that can eliminate the risk
occurrence of distortion;
- Self-correcting codes (like Gray
Code), method used to remove the risk of
distortion.20

based on scientific research in the field, to

make decisions based on scientific
methods and choice techniques of optimal
variants;
redesign
an
organizational
system to ensure performance of material
resources management must be a priority
and an ongoing challenge for the
governing structures of the Romanian
Gendarmerie and should consider the
following issues: linking structural
organization of the proceedings by
resizing logistical support structures (to
increase jobs number) and reconsidering
workload of each job with duties,
reformulate organizational goals using the
SMART criteria and the introduction of
performance
indicators
in
line
management of material resources,
introducing tools of modern and "process
map" and "process diagram", to formalize
certain beneficial elements of informal
organization and operation of the
organizational culture concept, using the
working tools "The Ethics Code" and
"Employees Handbook";
designing a modern information
system to ensure efficient management of
material resources in the structures of
gendarmes, based on the following
principles: any purchase of IT equipment
must be preceded by a process of
rationalization of processes, flows, and
information procedures (review of the
organizational
design),
the
new
information system should be functionally
and operationally integrated in the
development strategy of the Romanian
Gendarmerie, creating a new information
system must be carried out according to
the standards of safety and quality in force,
and in compliance with quality system
elements which are mandatory and
generate confidence, ensuring a system of
technical assistance of the implementers
operating throughout life, allowing its
permanent updating, as appropriate, the
provision in the job roles that each
employee has in the system, the system
design must begin with a diagnostic
analysis of all disturbances which may

Conclusion
Given the presented material, we
can say that the three systems - decisionmaking, organizational and information are essential elements of the management
of material resources which act
synergistically in support of leadership and
performance achievement, the specific of
Gendarmes structures comes from the fact
that at present, they are not conceptualized,
the
formalization
need
of
such
scientifically systems being more visible,
our proposals in this regard are the
following:
in order to ensure the
performance of the material resources
management in Gendarmes structures, the
decision making system must meet the
following characteristics: the decision
must have preparatory work involving a
large number of departments or
individuals in their interaction to make the
best decision possible, decision - makers
should undertake a special training in
management requirements area that should
ensure professionalization of decisionmakers and their collaboration capabilities
with the organizations experts, to develop
tools for decision-making and evaluation
of their decision must meet standards
20

Ibidem, pp. 186 188.

172

arise and implement measures to mitigate

their manifestation.
Bibliography
4.
1.
2.

3.

Vasile Deac - coordinating and

staff, Management, Publishing
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Management
Concepts
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Applications,
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4/2014,
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University of National Defense
"Carol I", Bucharest, 2014.
Univ. dr. Mircea Udrescu, PhD.
Sandu
Cuturela,
Some
considerations
about
material
resource management and logistics,
Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Quarter I / 2013, ISSN
1018-046x.
Diana
Nistoran,
Management
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Military,
www.scribd.
com/doc/186678601/BazeleManagementului-Militar, 2013

PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMAS CAUSES, EFFECTS

AND MANAGEMENT
Iuliana GUI-ALEXANDRU
Lieutenant colonel, Psychologist
Dr. Ion Jianu Military Emergency Hospital Piteti
e-mail: glliana@yahoo.com

Abstract: An event or a situation which produces extreme stress exceeds the persons ability to manage it and,
afterwards, the individuals subjective experience is the one that concludes whether the event is traumatic or
not. From the therapeutic point of view, we are preoccupied with identifying both the subjects who perceive
stress as a challenge, anticipating some rewards, and those individuals who perceive stress as a failure,
anticipating loss / lack of fulfillment. The diagnosis of stressors helps us focus on the coping mechanisms which
are necessary in the stressful situations at work and in everyday life. Occupational stress overload during jobspecific activities (in army, police etc.), domestic or professional repeated abuses, victimization and
helplessness feelings, all of these can generate traumatic reactions, chronic stress and eventually depression.
Moreover, due to the chronic professional stress which creates vulnerability, employers should provide to their
employees continuous psychological assistance and intervention in order to improve satisfaction and
occupational health. Traumatic life events are associated with significant neuroendocrine stress response
changes (glucocorticoid resistance, increased CRF activity, decreased hippocampal volume), closely
paralleling the neuroendocrine features of depression and, thus, increasing the risk to develop vulnerability for
depression. On the other hand, stress is a constant presence in our lives, which affects individuals health and
safety as well as organizations welfare and national economies. This daily reality creates a constant mix of
tension, strain and discomfort, which traumatically affects physical and mental health and creates
psychological vulnerability.
Keywords: occupational stress, coping mechanisms, psychological assistance, occupational health, satisfaction

long-term could be debilitating. These

consequences seem to be frequently
underestimated even by professionals in
the mental health field: "If clinicians fail
to look through a trauma lens and to
conceptualize client problems as related
possibly to current or past trauma, they
may fail to see that trauma victims, young
and old, organize much of their lives
around repetitive patterns of reliving and
warding
off
traumatic
memories,
3
reminders, and feelings."
Among the sources of trauma we
could include a wide range of life events,
with several common issues: a violation of
the individuals intimate ideas and beliefs
about his person, about his rights and

Psychological trauma definition

and causes
Psychological trauma represents a
sort of aggression to the human mind,
conscious and unconscious, which is
produced by life events with a severe
distressing
potential1.
When
an
individuals
abilities
to
manage
overwhelming
stress
are
failing,
psychological vulnerability appears and
further generates trauma.2
Single or repeated traumatic life
events
could
produce
immediate
psychological effects or these could be
delayed for a long time, related to the
persons ability to cope with these
emotional changes, but the impact on

3
1

Moroz, K.J. (2005). The Effects of Psychological

Trauma
on
Children
and
Adolescents.
Report Prepared for the Vermont Agency of Human
Services Department of Health Division of Mental
Health Child, Adolescent and Family Unit

https://www.webdex.ro

http://www.samhsa.gov/traumajustice/traumadefinit
ion/definition.aspx

174

generate a psychological trauma.8 This

apparent anomaly comes from some
peoples ability to cope with life stressful
events better than others and to develop
some protective factors by early-life stress
exposure, strength and resilience, active
seeking of help and managing problems
just as they appear.9
It is well known that early-life
traumas make individuals less resilient
and increase the risk for developing
different neuroses, affective disorders (i.e.
depression),
post-traumatic
stress
disorder (PTSD) or substance abuse in
adulthood.10

about the relationships with others, which

produces insecurity, uncertainty and
severe confusion. This could also appear
when the persons or the institutions which
should be relied on in order to ensure
survival, cheat or disappoint or violate the
persons trust.4
Psychological trauma is frequently
associated with physical trauma, which
increases the burden of the feelings of
insecurity and life-threatening issues.5
Among the most frequent causes of
psychological trauma we could mention
sexual abuse and harassment, work
discrimination,
domestic
threats, indoctrination, childhood abuses
from an alcoholic parent, aggression of
either (or the witnessing of aggression),
severe and chronic diseases with lifethreatening
potential,
long-term
medication etc.6 Traumas could also be
caused by natural disasters with
catastrophic consequences (earthquakes,
tornados, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes),
combat operations, captivity or other
mass violence, extreme poverty, verbal
abuses, situations that could exist
separately of the main traumatic process
but are still generating psychological
vulnerability.7
Different individuals will have
different subjective experiences regarding
the same stressful life event, this making
the difference between their reactions, and
not the objective facts. Under these
circumstances, experiencing a potentially
traumatic life event is not mandatory to

Understanding the neurobiological

changes in emotional and psychological
trauma
Childs brain is developing in a
hierarchical sequence of steps, with a
continuous evolution from simplicity
toward complexity. Neurons are receiving
more and more new information and they
are designed to continually change as a
response to the surrounding environment,
thus promoting the individuals adaptation
and survival.
If brain neurons are activated on a
frequently repetitive pattern, the internal
representation associated to this kind of
pattern will become more permanent and
will produce sensitization. Thus, early-life
abuses have the most long-term negative
evolution out of all the types of
psychological trauma because they

DePrince, A.P. & Freyd, J.J. (2002). "The Harm of

Trauma: Pathological fear, shattered assumptions,
or betrayal?" In J. Kauffman (Ed.) Loss of the
Assumptive World: a theory of traumatic loss. (pp
7182). New York: Brunner-Routledge.
5
http://www.helpguide.org/articles/ptsd-trauma/
emotional-and-psychological-trauma.htm#treatment
6
Whitfield, Charles (2010). "Psychiatric drugs as
agents of Trauma". The International Journal of
Risk and Safety in Medicine 22 (4): 195207.
7
Abela JRZ, Skitch SA. Dysfunctional attitudes,
self-esteem, and hassles: Cognitive vulnerability to
depression in children of affectively ill
parents. Behaviour Research and Therapy. 2006;
45:11271140.

Storr CL, Ialongo NS, Anthony JC, Breslau N

(2007).Childhood antecedents of exposure to
traumatic events and post-traumatic stress disorder.
9
Wingo, Aliza P., Ressler, Kerry J., Bradley, Bekh
(2014). Resilience characteristics mitigate tendency
for harmful alcohol and illicit drug use in adults
with a history of childhood abuse: A Crosssectional study of 2024 inner-city men and women.
Journal of Psychiatric Research. 51, 93-99.
10
Jeronimus, B.F., Ormel, J., Aleman, A., Penninx,
B.W.J.H., Riese, H. (2013). "Negative and positive
life events are associated with small but lasting
change
in
neuroticism".
Psychological
Medicine 43 (11): 240315.

175

intervene in the most critical period of

brain and psyche development.11
Stressful life events have been
consistently associated with an increase in
depressive symptoms and the onset of
major depression in both adults and
adolescents. In formulating the stress
sensitization
or
kindling
hypothesis, R.M. Post (1992) described a
process whereby the first episode of
depression sensitizes an individual to life
events, and thus subsequent episodes
require less stress to elicit a depressive
recurrence.12 This theory has been
instrumental in explaining the high rates
of recurrence and shortened intervals
between
recurrent
episodes
of
13
depression.
Moreover,
neurobiological
researches have shown that psychological
traumas are associated with significant
neuroendocrine stress response changes
(glucocorticoid resistance, increased CRF
activity, decreased hippocampal volume),
closely paralleling the neuroendocrine
features of depression and, thus,
increasing
the
risk
to
develop
vulnerability for depression. Different
adults, frequently exposed to the same
stress factor, may develop a trauma
specific symptomatology according to
early exposure, as briefly presented in
advance. Therefore, some people in
theaters of combat operations can develop
post-traumatic stress disorder and others
do not.14

Signs and symptoms of psychological

trauma
Traumatic life events or repeated
trauma could produce a large set of
emotional and/or physical symptoms. We
cannot discuss about a good or bad
way to react, feel or think about trauma
because everyones reaction could be so
different regarding ourselves or other
people.15
Basically, there are two major
types of symptoms:
1. emotional and psychological
symptoms:
shock,
consternation,
denial,
irritability, mood changes,
anger, feelings of guilt and
shame, sadness, self-blame,
hopelessness, blunted affect,
confusion,
difficulties
in
concentrating and maintaining
attention, anxiety, phobias,
social withdrawal, anhedonia;
2. physical symptoms: heart
palpitations, tachycardia, blood
pressure oscillations, insomnia,
nightmares, muscle tension and
aches, different kinds of pain,
physical and moral fatigue,
psychomotor restlessness.
These signs and symptoms last
from days to a months (or even years) and
are decreasing in intensity and frequency
as the individual manages to cope with the
trauma. Nevertheless, from time to time,
the person could experience painful
memories or feelings, with or without
relation to stressful triggers (meeting
persons, seeing pictures or hearing
sounds) that could remind him/her of the
psychological trauma.16

11

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC
3884028/
12
Post RM. Transduction of psychosocial stress
into the neurobiology of recurrent affective
disorder. American Journal of Psychiatry.
1992;149:9991010.
13
Stroud CB, Davila J, Moyer A. The relationship
between stress and depression in first onsets versus
recurrences: A meta-analytic review. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology. 2008;117:206213.
14
Mazure CM. Life stressors as risk factors in
depression. Clinical Psychology: Science and
Practice. 1998;5:291313

15

http://www.psychguides.com/guides/posttraumatic-stress-disorder-symptoms-causes-andeffects/
16
Hammen C. Stress and depression. Annual
Review of Clinical Psychology. 2005;1:293319.

176

could be used on short term and

antipsychotic drugs could be added to the
list if the person or relatives mention
delusions or hallucinations.

Psychological trauma and medical

therapy
Psychological trauma continues to
produce a lot of discussions about the best
way
of
treatment:
psychological
assistance, medication or both?
Out of the most widely used forms
of psychotherapy which were confirmed
in the treatment of trauma (EMDR Eye
Movement
Desensitization
and
Reprocessing),
Biofeedback, Family
Therapy, Somatic Experiencing, Sensor
motor psychotherapy, CBT Cognitive
Behavioral Therapy), the last one received
the largest recommendation for the
psychological treatment of trauma.17
The American
Institute of
Medicine guidelines recommends CBT
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy as being
the most effective psychological therapy
in PTSD18, especially two of these
therapies: Prolonged Exposure19 and
Cognitive Processing Therapy20.
About the medical treatment of
trauma, drugs as the SSRI anti-depressants
(sertraline,
paroxetine,
fluoxetine,
citalopram,
fluvoxamine)
have
demonstrated
their
effectiveness
especially when used in combination with
psychotherapy. If sleep disorder or
restlessness appear, benzodiazepines

Conclusions
Stress is constantly present in our
lives and affects the health and safety of
individuals, as well as an organizations
welfare and national economies. This
daily reality creates a constant mixture of
tension, feelings of inadequacy and
discomfort, affecting the physical and
mental
health
and
producing
psychological vulnerability. Stressful
situations during training or job-related
ones (for people working in the military,
police, gendarmerie, etc.), professional or
domestic repeated abuse, victimization
and feelings of helplessness can all result
in traumatic reactions, chronic stress and
possible depression. Given that chronic
professional stress produces vulnerability,
employers should provide staff with
assistance and continual psychological
intervention in order to improve the
degree of satisfaction and occupational
health.

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1.
2.

https:// www.webdex.ro
http://www.samhsa.gov/traumajustic
e/traumadefinition/definition.aspx
3. Moroz,
K.J.
(2005).
The Effects of Psychological
Trauma
on
Children
and
Adolescents. Report Prepared for
the Vermont Agency of Human
Services Department of Health
Division
of
Mental
Health
Child, Adolescent and Family Unit
4. DePrince, A.P. & Freyd, J.J. (2002).
"The Harm of Trauma: Pathological
fear, shattered assumptions, or
betrayal?" In J. Kauffman (Ed.) Loss
of the Assumptive World: a theory of

17

Schnurr, PP.; Friedman, MJ.; Engel, CC.; Foa,

EB.; Shea, MT.; Chow, BK.; Resick, PA.;
Thurston, V. et al. (Feb 2007). "Cognitive
behavioral therapy for posttraumatic stress disorder
in
women:
a
randomized
controlled
trial". JAMA 297 (8): 82030.
18
Institute of Medicine (2008). Treatment of
posttraumatic stress disorder: An assessment of the
evidence.
Washington,
DC: The
National
Academies Press.
19
McLean, CP.; Foa, EB. (Aug 2011). "Prolonged
exposure therapy for post-traumatic stress disorder:
a review of evidence and dissemination.". Expert
Rev Neurother 11 (8): 115163.
20
Resick, PA.; Galovski, TE.; O'Brien Uhlmansiek,
M.; Scher, CD.; Clum, GA.; Young-Xu, Y. (Apr
2008). "A randomized clinical trial to dismantle
components of cognitive processing therapy for
posttraumatic stress disorder in female victims of
interpersonal
violence". J
Consult
Clin
Psychol 76 (2): 24358.

177

traumatic loss. (pp 7182). New

York: Brunner-Routledge.
5. http://www.helpguide.org/articles/ptsd
-trauma/emotional-and-psychologicaltrauma.htm#treatment
6. Whitfield,
Charles
(2010). "Psychiatric drugs as agents of
Trauma". The International Journal of
Risk and Safety in Medicine 22 (4):
195207. Retrieved 5 December 2012.
7. Abela JRZ, Skitch SA. Dysfunctional
attitudes, self-esteem, and hassles:
Cognitive vulnerability to depression
in children of affectively ill
parents. Behavior
Research
and
Therapy. 2006;45:11271140.
8. Storr CL, Ialongo NS, Anthony JC,
Breslau
N
(2007).Childhood
antecedents of exposure to traumatic
events and post-traumatic stress
disorder.
9. Wingo, Aliza P., Ressler, Kerry J.,
Bradley, Bekh (2014). Resilience
characteristics mitigate tendency for
harmful alcohol and illicit drug use in
adults with a history of childhood
abuse: A Cross-sectional study of
2024 inner-city men and women.
Journal of Psychiatric Research. 51,
93-99.
10. Jeronimus, B.F., Ormel, J., Aleman,
A., Penninx, B.W.J.H., Riese, H.
(2013). "Negative and positive life
events are associated with small but
lasting change in neuroticism".
Psychological
Medicine 43 (11):
240315.
11. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/arti
cles/PMC3884028/
12. Post
RM.
Transduction
of
psychosocial
stress
into
the
neurobiology of recurrent affective
disorder. American Journal of
Psychiatry. 1992;149:9991010.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

178

Stroud CB, Davila J, Moyer A. The

relationship between stress and
depression in first onsets versus
recurrences:
A
meta-analytic
review. Journal
of
Abnormal
Psychology. 2008; 117:206213.
Mazure CM. Life stressors as risk
factors
in
depression. Clinical
Psychology:
Science
and
Practice.1998;5:291313
http://www.psychguides.com/guides/
post-traumatic-stress-disordersymptoms-causes-and-effects/
Hammen
C.
Stress
and
depression. Annual
Review
of
Clinical Psychology. 2005; 1:293
319.
Schnurr, PP.; Friedman, MJ.; Engel,
CC.; Foa, EB.; Shea, MT.; Chow,
BK.; Resick, PA.; Thurston, V. et al.
(Feb 2007). "Cognitive behavioral
therapy for posttraumatic stress
disorder in women: a randomized
controlled trial". JAMA 297 (8): 820
30.
Institute
of
Medicine
(2008). Treatment of posttraumatic
stress disorder: An assessment of the
evidence. Washington, DC: The
National Academies Press.
McLean, CP.; Foa, EB. (Aug 2011).
"Prolonged exposure therapy for
post-traumatic stress disorder: a
review
of
evidence
and
dissemination.". Expert
Rev
Neurother 11 (8): 115163.
Resick, PA.; Galovski, TE.; O'Brien
Uhlmansiek, M.; Scher, CD.; Clum,
GA.; Young-Xu, Y. (Apr 2008). "A
randomized clinical trial to dismantle
components of cognitive processing
therapy for posttraumatic stress
disorder in female victims of
interpersonal violence". J Consult
Clin Psychol 76 (2): 24358.

ROMANIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY AND MILITARYPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE COUNTRIES

OF NORTHERN EUROPE POINTS OF VIEW ON STRATEGIC
MODELS FOR GENERATING AND MANAGING NATIONAL
RESOURCES
Teodora Irina HRIB
PhD student, Carol I National Defense University
teodora.hrib@gmail.com

Abstract: We are witnessing the emergence of a new geopolitical and geostrategic barrier between the North, a
wealthy and prosperous region, and the South, economically more imbalanced. We anticipate that this barrier
will not disappear; on the contrary, it will become more powerful. We are currently witnessing this ongoing
phenomenon, which is favored by the current international security environment. Romania is at the confluence
of these two major regions and is directly affected by this phenomenon. Considering these trends, the purpose of
this research is to bring in strategic models in order to identify and manage national resources for defense.
Romania will have to find international solutions regardless of possible scenarios and given the extensive
national security concept1, which represents the milestone of the National Defense Strategy 2015-2019. The first
scenario is: Romania will have to compensate the financial incapacity to allocate 2% of GDP on defense in the
near future. The second scenario: strengthening the defense investments. Regardless of these scenarios,
Romania needs strong relationships with allies and foreign partners. The European security landscape has
changed and these are long term changes. This requires a reassessment of assumptions in relation with the
Nordic countries, in order to overcome the geographical barrier and turn it into an asset that would compensate
as far as possible the economic disparity between the North and the South.
Keywords: strategy, defense, resources, management, security.

1.

The current international

security context

the country's closeness to Russia through

the political party Syriza 2.
These challenges have emerged in
the context of the articulation of
geopolitical barriers between the Nordic
region, rich and prosperous, and the
Southern region, more imbalanced
economically.
This is an ongoing
phenomenon, with two options: the first
option is to build a geopolitical and
geostrategic wall; the second option is to
open a gate to new types of cooperation.
In this international context,
Romania needs strong relations of
cooperation with allies and foreign
partners. It requires, inter alia, a review of
the working hypotheses in relation to
Northern Europe countries, going beyond

The1international community faces

complex challenges both in the Eastern
Neighborhood of the North-Atlantic
Alliance and the European Union (such as
the crisis in Ukraine and the Russian
Federation's actions, the frozen conflicts in
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and
Kosovo)
and
in
the
Southern
Neighborhood (including jihadist group
Islamic State actions, the situation in Syria,
the crisis of migrants, the fight against
organized crime and terrorism),
the
banking and financial implications of the
crisis in Greece, inclusively in the light of

Concept set out in the National Defense Strategy

of
Romania
2015-2019
http://www.presidency.ro/static/Strategia%20Natio
nala%20de%20Aparare%20a%20Tarii.pdf, p.5

http://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/02/opinions/ashford
-greece-security-implications/, accessed at August
29, 2015.

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179

geographic barriers and turning it into an

asset.
2.

North-Atlantic
Alliance,
maintaining
neutrality.
Analysing the Foreign, Defence
and Security policies of the five Nordic
European countries we notice that they act
on several levels in the current
international context. National resources
are used for defense and security through
actions meant to counter possible sabotage
against the national infrastructure and
economy, possible terrorist attacks, cyberattacks on vital sectors, infiltration /
espionage on levels of strategic decision,
pressure on policymakers through the
media or NGOs and even possible military
attacks5.

The Nordic exceptionalism3

Hilde Selbervik and Knut Nygaard

researchers from Chr. Michelsen Institute
developed the Nordic exceptionalism
concept on development assistance policies
implemented by the Nordic countries to
beneficiary states.
In a study4 on this topic developed
during 2005, the two researchers
demonstrated that the Nordic European
countries are a major donor group in
development
assistance.
The
demonstration is still relevant today. The
analysis conducted by two Norwegian
researchers
highlighted
differences
between Northern and Southern Europe in
figures and resource management policies.
At this time, the Southern neighbours of
the EU and NATO are the development
assistance beneficiary states from the
Nordic countries. Eastern Neighborhood
countries were added to these already
beneficiary states.
The
Nordic
exceptionalism
in
development assistance is also reflected in
the security and defense policies of the
Nordic countries, based on resource
management strategies.
Northern
European
countries
complement each other into a network kind
of cooperation mechanism. Denmark is the
only Nordic country that belongs to both
NATO and the EU. Iceland, a founding
member of NATO, without national armed
forces, did not join the EU. Norway is a
NATO member but not part of the EU. By
contrast, Sweden and Finland are EU
members, but they did not join to the

3.
Points of view on strategic
models for generating and managing
national resources
One of the theories that found
applicability in the field of defense and
security is the theory of Arthur F. Lykke
Jr., professor at the US Army War College.
According to him, resources, strategic
concepts and strategic objectives represent
the three pillars of a strategy in the military
field6 and these elements are also valid in
the case of national defense and security
strategies. These pillars are interconnected
and they need to be properly formulated,
balanced and realistic in order to have an
effective final document.
The liaison element between the
risk identification and the tracing of goals
is represented by the national resources.
Their situation must be presented in a
detailed, transparent and controllable
5

Swedens Defence Policy 2016 to 2020 http://www.government.se/governmentpolicy/defence/the-swedish-defence-bill-20162020, accessed at September 3, 2015; State
Secretary ystein Bs Speech on Norwegian
Security and Defense Policy, September, 1st , 2015
de secretarul de stat din Ministerul Aprrii, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/statesecretary-oystein-bos-speech-on-norwegiansecurity-and-defense-policy-at-mspo-2015-inpoland/id2438200/, accessed at September 5, 2015.
6
LYKKE, Arthur Jr, US Army War College Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,
1989.

Concept used by Hilde Selbervik and Knut

Nygaard researches in order to present the policies
practiced by the countries of the Northern Europe
on a specific area at the superlative level.
4
SELBERVIK, Hilde i NYGAARD, Knut, Nordic
Exceptionalism in Development Assistance? Aid
Policies and the Major Donors: The Nordic
Countries, Chr. Michelsen Institute,
Bergen,
Norvegia, 2006.

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manner, within the National Defense

Strategy, a public and not classified act,
adopted by the National Parliament.
In this respect, it is necessary to
draw some strategic models for the
generating and managing of these
resources. On one hand, these national
resources are currency exchange in any
difficult situation of the country, especially
considering that there is an increased trend
of inequality in the global resources
distribution at worldwide level. On the
other hand, national resources are at the
core of stability and prosperity of a country
with a direct impact on national security
and defense.
We consider it appropriate to
mention several categories of strategic
models for generating and managing
national resources:
a. Classical resources:
- Energy resources (oil and natural
gas, coals, hydroelectric plants, nuclear
plants, wind farms or solar fields). For
managing this category it is necessary to
implement a system to increase energy
efficiency across the whole chain from
exploration to exploitation, storage,
transport, distribution and consumption.
- Raw/unprocessed materials: salt
deposits, metals, minerals and related
materials extracted by mining, rare metals,
precious metals, those essential in the
production of industrial equipment, etc.
- Water resources: rivers, lakes and
territorial waters. Managing this category
is of primary importance. Drinking water
supply for household consumers and water
supply for industrial consumers depend on
the proficiency of the general management
of these resources.
- Agricultural resources (for
household consumption and for the
livestock industry) such as wheat, oats,
barley, rye, corn fruits and vegetables, as
well as those generating biomass
resources.
- Animal resources: domestic and
wild, including endangered species. In this
category fish stocks should be included,
from freshwater and from the salted
territorial waters. The management of

these resources involves combating

poaching and uncontrolled exploitation.
- Forest resources: deforestation
and uncontrolled exploitation of wood
have an immediate negative impact on the
safety of citizens through environmental
changes that they generate and by causing
natural disasters. These situations have
also a negative long term impact on state
security, including the cartographical
modification of the national territory.
Material
infrastructure:
motorways, express roads, county roads
and utilities, urban street infrastructure,
construction,
equipment,
facilities,
transportation.
- Human resources:
civilians,
reservists, professional military personnel.
b. Social resources:
Demographic
resources.
Mortality and birth rates should be
considered; also factors regarding food
security, health insurance, housing, status
of women, education.
Educational
resources.
Inadequate management of this type of
resources could have unfavorable effects
on other type of resources, such as ethnic
and
religious
resources
with
straightforward impact on the security and
defense of the country.
Nothing is more unstable and has
a greater need for disciplined management
than many unskilled, poorly paid and
poorly educated communities of workers,
divided among themselves because of
ethnicity and religious beliefs7.
- Population health resource.
-Resource
of
the
internal
organizational infrastructure: transport
and telecommunications networks, power
systems, supply systems, systems and
environmental management, organizational
management systems
- Resource of the informational
infrastructure:
data,
information,
information system for defense, circuits,
streams, techniques and procedures,
7

KAPLAN, Robert D, Politici de rzboi De ce

necesit conducerea politic un etos pgn, Ed.
Polirom, 2002, p. 23.

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perimeter of the country9. This element

can influence the quality of interventions
in order to defend the security and integrity
of the country.
On January 13, 2015, Romanian
policy makers agreed on a political
Agreement that the defense budget will
reach 2% of GDP by 2017 and maintain
this percentage at least 10 years. This
agreement seems, at least at this point, to
refer only to providing financial resources.
Romania will have to find international
solutions either to compensate the situation
in which it will not have the financial
capacity to allocate 2% of GDP on defense
in the near future and spend considerable
sums for investment in Defense, or to
strengthen the political and military
investment in the endowment of the army,
which cannot be done without strong
relationships with our allies and foreign
partners, including those in Northern
Europe.

including communication and information

networks specific to the military field.
- Urban resource: the urban
development process has the ability to
transform state structure, from one of
predominantly rural character to one of
predominantly urban and metropolitan
nature. Back in 2002, Robert D. Kaplan
warned already about the great extent of
the state-cities phenomenon in the United
States8.
c. Contextual resources:
Geopolitical
resources:
membership
of
the
international
organizations, especially United Nations,
NATO, the European Union, Council of
Europe, Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
- Political and intellectual elites
resources.
- Legislative resources.
d.
Geo-cultural
resources:
historical resources, religious, ethnic,
scientific and technological.
The
development
of
national defense strategy should include
the acquired wisdom. In this respect, we
cannot overlook the role of the national
territory and infrastructure in preparation
of the defense, as pointed out by Carl von
Clausewitz:
..The defense benefits from the land (...)
and has a natural advantage in using those
elements that determine it, apart from the
sheer size and value of the armed forces.
It is the home field advantage, the support
of the theater of war, length, the number
and position of lines, their quality of street,
fortifications or natural barriers of roads,
fortified villages, bridges as crossing
points.
We also believe that there should
not be overlooked, in terms of natural
resources, the length of national borders,
which, according to specialists in the field,
establishes an area relatively similar to a
circle, which achieve, in military terms, a
very favorable ratio between area and

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Umane 2007-2013 Investete n OAMENI

183

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This work was possible with the financial

support of the Sectoral Operational
Programme for Human Resources
Development 2007-2013, co-financed by
the European Social Fund, under the
project number POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385
with the title Integrated/educational
network for the formation, conseling and
orientation of doctoral students for a
research career in security, defense,
public order and national security
domains
SECNETEDU.

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NATIONAL POLICIES AND STRATEGIES FOR INFORMATION

OPERATIONS
Cristian ICHIMESCU
Superior Instructor, PhD student, CaroL I National Defence University,
cristian.ichimescu@yahoo.com

Abstract: Information Operations are a force multiplier allowing us to obtain effects over the enemy. National
policies and strategies are those that define and create the proper frame for the execution of effective
Information Operations. Efficiency can be achieved by concerted actions on the Information Environment of all
capabilities, tools and techniques specific to Information Operations, by following certain principles and based
on a continuous and correct analysis of the information environment.
Keywords: information operations, target audience, effects, effectiveness, analysis of the information
environment.
Information operations are both a force multiplier
and an integrator and coordination mechanism that
helps to support commanders in achieving their
objectives and implicitly their forces in the
accomplishment of their assignments1.
Doctrine for Information Operations

Information1Operations
(hereinafter Info Ops) are a concept that
was defined by the national military
domain in 2006 on the S.M.G./F.O.P.
3.15. Doctrina operaiilor informaionale.
The concept was later improved with the
appearance in 2011 of the S.M.G./C.O.
10.0.,
Doctrina
operaiilor
informaionale. This doctrine that is still
relevant today represents the adapted
version of Romanian military experts of
the AJP-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for
Information Operations. In 2014 SMG-90
Information Operations Manual was
issued, a document that implements at
national level NATO Bi-SC, Information
Operations Reference Book.
These national documents are two
very useful tools primarily to specialists
commissioned on information operations
as well as to specialists from headquarters
and commanders. It is obvious to all these
users of the two instruments that
information operations are a set of

activities designed to produce effects on

the information environment. More than
ever, the complex challenges of the
traditional battle environment have led to
the recognition of the merits and
efficiency that information operations
have in order to obtain the desired
effects on the ability of understanding and
perception, will and capabilities of the
opponent to help us achieve military
objectives while protecting our own2.
Robert Thompson, in his reference
book Defeating Communist Insurgency:
The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam,
stated that the answer is not on the
battlefield but in the minds of men3.
Thus, by planning and executing
information operations we can see into the
minds of opponents or potential
adversaries and create conditions to obtain

Ibidem, p. 13.
Robert Thompson, apud Octavian Manea, Osama:
un
Mao
n
era
www,
http://www.contributors.ro/global-europa/osamaun-mao-in-era-www/ accesat n 30 mai 2015.
3

S.M.G./C.O. 10.0, Doctrina Operaiilor

Informaionale, Bucureti, 2011, p. 12.
1

185

the desired effect - the victory of own

forces.
The policies and strategies on
information operations are items that
commanders and specialists in this area
will permanently adapt to the battle space
reality, to the permanent changes in the
information environment and to its own
capabilities to produce effects in this
environment. To fulfill these conditions
we must define and observe the principles
of information operations and perform a
continuous and accurate analysis of the
information environment.
The purpose of this paper is to
disseminate in the academic environment
a part of the results of my doctoral
research, namely national policies and
strategies on information operations, by:
presenting the principles of information
operations in military actions and how to
understand the role played by the analysis
of the information environment from the
perspective of information operations.

decentralized execution, contribution to

joint
targeting,
continuity,
early
involvement and timely preparation,
monitoring and evaluation of effects.
The principle of comprehensive
approach to operation is a fundamental
principle of information operations. It
evolved from the principle of the effectsbased approach to operations towards the
involvement of all international actors and
encouraging their participation and
coordination of efforts in order to increase
the efficiency of information operations.
The comprehensive approach5 requires
effective coordination and cooperation
between departments, ministries or
government agencies, non-governmental
organizations, international organizations
and private sector firms that influence the
information
environment.
This
comprehensive approach acknowledges
the efforts to encourage planning and the
interaction between civilian and military
institutions for the performance of joint,
integrated
and
common
purpose
information actions on target audiences.
Information actions are based on the
comprehensive
and
systemic
understanding of information environment
by PMESII spectrum6 (Political, Military,
Economic, Social, Infrastructure and
Information).
The comprehensive approach to
information operations produces effects
on all military actions. Thus, regardless of
the type of military action, information
operations can provide an integrative role
by encouraging joint actions between
military and civil structures by focusing
on the cause effect relationship which is
detrimental to the impact destruction
relationship.
Another principle is the guidance
and personal involvement of the
commander which is essential for the
successful execution of information

Application of the principles

of information operations in military
actions
The policies and strategies for
information
operations
consist
of
comprehensive plans that focus on
achieving a goal. They represent the art of
using all available means to ensure
success in combat. For the strategies and
policies to be relevant in the information
environment and for the plans that result
to be viable, they must follow some
principles.
The principles4 underlying the
planning, conduct and evaluation of
information operations are the following:
the comprehensive approach to operation,
the guidance given by the commander and
his/her personal involvement, close
coordination
and
permanent
synchronization, accurate intelligence
support,
centralized
planning
and
4

AJP-3 (B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct

of Operations, 2011, p. 1-1.
6
Ibidem, p. 4-4.

S.M.G./C.O. 10.0., op. cit., pp. 16 - 20.

186

operations. Leaders must be able to filter

and absorb complexity and ambiguity to
produce clear and coherent direction7.
By establishing his intention, the
commander submits to the staff his goal,
the key tasks and the final state, which are
the basic elements for setting the effects
necessary for planning information
operations. The commander is the one
who will decide, by mixing leadership,
control, decision making and risk
assessment, what results he/she wants
from the military action it leads. These
results will determine the desired effects
that the commander wants to obtain by
using the key areas of Info Ops:
psychological
operations,
presence,
posture and profile of troops, operation
security, information security, deception,
electronic warfare, physical destruction,
key leaders engagement, computer
network operations and civil-military
cooperation.
Coordination and synchronization
is another principle of information
operations. In the introduction of the book
Lost Victories, Erich Von Manstein states
that there must be a balance between
desires and reasons of politics and military
methods and procedures, but they are
anything but easy to synchronize8. The
nature of military organization, designed
to operate under conditions where no
other organization can function normally,
i.e. in war, is to carry out coordinated and
synchronized actions. It is only through
the coordination and synchronization of
all plans, concepts, and effects on target
audiences that orders will generate, from
the strategic to the tactical level,
information operations consistent with the
other military activities.
The accuracy of intelligence
support is vital for the implementation of
correct, consistent Info Ops and

conducive to the achievement of the

desired end state of the commander9.
This principle will focus on relevant
intelligence, verified, timely produced and
transmitted by the Info Ops structures
about the opponent, other audiences, and
the information environment. Intelligence
support will be extremely important both
by the initial intelligence that it will send
to the Info Ops specialized structure on
the basis of requests for intelligence and
the intelligence that will arrive while
carrying out and assessing information
operations. It is only together that we will
see, in evident synergy, information
operations and intelligence support.
Central
planning
and
decentralized execution is another
principle of information operations, a
principle that characterizes modern
military actions. Joint planning between
all the structures at strategic, operational
or tactical level creates consistent orders
which can then be implemented by
structures that have the freedom to do on
the spot what they know best - to execute
orders. The structure of information
operations can be useful depending on the
mission,
strategic
capabilities
for
executing information actions (e.g. the use
of Special Forces for the physical
destruction of a command and control
capability of the opponent). In these
specific instances execution is centralized
in order to achieve the desired effects on
targets.
Contribution to the joint targeting
process is another very important
principle in the modern battle space.
Depending on the objectives set by the
commander, Info Ops structures will
determine the weight of types of influence
activities, activities against leadership and
command capabilities and activities of
information protection. By aggregating

The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst,

Developing Leaders A Sandhurst Guide, Pilot
version Easter 2012, p. 9.
8
Erich Von Manstein, Lost Victories, Zenith Press,
2004, p. 8.

Cristian Ichimescu, Information Operations in the

current security environment, Strategies XXI,
Editura Universitii Naionale de Aprare Carol
I, Bucureti, volume 3, 2015, p. 22.

187

these actions a number of effects will be

obtained which must be cumulated and
integrated to the effects obtained from
classic military actions. The lists of
important targets, nominated targets,
banned and restricted targets will be the
common products of all structures
involved in the target management
process. By acting on target with
information actions we can generate
effects on that target, but also on other
elements present in the information
environment. These elements should be
monitored and controlled so as not to be
influenced in a manner different from
what we have planned.
The principle of early involvement
and timely preparation refers to the
participation of information operations
structure to the planning of military action
as early as the initial phase of the complex
process of planning. The involvement in
the planning process, from the beginning
to the end, enables the development of
specific products bearing the imprint of
information operations as mandatory
elements accompanying the strategy of a
military action.
The continuity of information
operations throughout the peace, crisis,
conflict and post-conflict cycle is another
principle. The benefit of continued action
on target audiences must be doubled by
the simultaneous action of several specific
types
of
information
operations
capabilities to increase the desired effects.
Thus, in Afghanistan, during patrol
missions in the area of responsibility,
influencing activities were being carried
out through PSYOPS, by the engagement
of the old man of the village, who is the
key leader of the community, concurrently
with humanitarian support actions through
CIMIC.
Another principle of information
operations is monitoring and evaluation.
The use of MOP (Measures of
Performance) and MOE (Measures of
Effectiveness) can help information
operations structure to monitor the

evolution of the effects of informational

actions on target audiences and the partial
and final assessment of the progress in
fulfilling
objectives.
Intelligence
structures play an important role in
gathering information that is relevant in
terms of Info Ops. Thus, during the
mission in Afghanistan, any intelligence
on the attitude of the local population, the
political and religious leaders, changing
techniques and tactics of the insurgents
were extremely important. By obtaining
this intelligence, the Info Ops structure
could monitor and assess to what extent
the effects of information activities met
the mission and objectives set by the force
commander.
The principles described above
should be regarded as elements underlying
information operations. Following such
principles and involving the information
operations structure in all activities
specific to the military organization will
generate the desired effects, will lead to
the objectives set and ultimately to
achieving the desired end state.
Commanders and staffs must be aware of
the procedures and requirements to
integrate information activities into
planning and conducting operations, the
effects of those operations on the
information environment, and the negative
consequences of not doing so10.
Analysis of the information
environment in terms of information
operations
Policies
and
strategies
on
information operations should focus on
the quality and professionalism of
conducting the analysis of the information
environment.
The
efficiency
and
effectiveness of performing information
operations able to respond to the mission
entrusted depend on how the analysis of
the information environment is made.
10

MC 0422/4, NATO Military

Information Operations, 2012, p. 7.

188

Policy

on

Analysis of the information

environment will focus on the following
elements11: collecting general intelligence
and
analyzing
the
information
environment in terms of information
operations.
These
elements
were
described in detail in a previous article.
During the 2008 crisis in Georgia,
Russian elements cyber-attacked the
Georgian military and civilian computer
networks produced significant effects on
military activities and the supply of water,
electricity and gas. Also, the propaganda
battle waged by both sides in the
traditional media and the Internet has
created special effects particularly on their
own population for Russia and on their
own population and the population in
European countries and the USA for
Georgia. Regarding the conflict in
Afghanistan, Osama Bin Laden said that
we must understand that the media has a
huge part in this battle, and cable
channels today play a more important role
than the old poets12. These examples
prove the importance of the analysis of the
information environment which can help
achieving the complex process of
estimating, planning, performing and
assessing information operations.
Specialists
in
information
operations are part of staff regardless of
the operating echelon. The activities of the
Info Ops specialist should include the
evaluation and interpretation of the results
of the specific analysis described above
and participation in planning, execution
and evaluation of military operations.
The evaluation and interpretation
of the results of the analysis of the
systems related to the information
environment will include: conclusions on

the information environment, to what

extent the elements of the information
environment will produce effects on ones
own forces, the adversary and other target
audiences; new demands of intelligence
for the analysis of certain elements which
remained unknown or are little known; the
establishment of diagrams of relationships
among the main actors in the information
environment, the assessment of the main
vulnerabilities, threats and opportunities
in the information environment.
The participation in the planning,
execution and evaluation of military
operations will include: presenting the
situation, the possible effects and the
development
of
the
information
environment, formulating objectives for
information operations of our own forces
and producing assessment matrices for
Info Ops based on effectiveness
assessment criteria / indicators (MOE) and
performance
assessment
criteria
/
indicators (MOP); coordinating all
military and civilian participants leading
Info Ops in the area of operations; setting
common objectives and evaluating them
based on actions carried out jointly and on
the effects produced in support of the
mission; participating in all the activities
of staff for the planning, implementation
and evaluation of military operations and
determining how information operations
can support them.
Conclusions
The policies and strategies of the
commander in the battle space of the
future
must
integrate
information
operations into military action. Info Ops is
a modern concept directly related to the
manner of analysis, planning, evaluation
and integration of information activities
and it consists of three types of activities,
i.e. influence activities, activities against
leadership and command capabilities, and
information protection activities. The nine
principles described above are elements
whose observance leads to the planning

Cristian Ichimescu, Mediul informaional n

contextul globalizrii, Tactic i art operativ,
Fore terestre, TAOFT 2015, Editura Universitii
Naionale de Aprare Carol I, Bucureti, 2015,
pp. 198-199.
12
Octavian Manea, Osama: un Mao n era www,
http://www.contributors.ro/global-europa/osamaun-mao-in-era-www/ accesat n 30 mai 2015.
11

189

and execution of successful policies and

strategies based on a continual and
accurate analysis of the information
environment. Information operations
specialists will perform the evaluation and
interpretation of the results of the
information environment analysis and will
participate in the planning, execution and
evaluation of military operations by
integrating the key areas of Info Ops.
The policies and strategies on
information operations are items that
commanders and specialists in this area
will permanently adapt to the battle space
reality, the permanent changes in the
information environment and their own
capabilities to produce effects in this
environment.

8.

9.

10.

11.

Bibliography
12.
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

7.

AJP-3 (B), Allied Joint Doctrine for

the Conduct of Operations, 2011;
AJP-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for
Information Operations, 2009;
MC 0422/4, NATO Military Policy
on Information Operations, 2012;
NATO
Bi-SC,
Information
Operations Reference Book, version
1, 2010;
S.M.G.-90, Manualul Operaiilor
Informaionale, Bucureti, 2014;
S.M.G./C.O. 10.0., Doctrina
Operaiilor
Informaionale,
Bucureti, 2011;
S.M.G./F.O.P. 3.15., Doctrina
Operaiilor
Informaionale,
Bucureti, 2006;

C.,
Ichimescu,
Information
Operations in the current security
environment,
Strategies
XXI,
Editura Universitii Naionale de
Aprare Carol I, Bucureti,
volume 3, 2015;
C., Ichimescu, Mediul informaional
n contextul globalizrii, Tactic i
art operativ, Fore terestre,
TAOFT 2015, Editura Universitii
Naionale de Aprare Carol I,
Bucureti, 2015;
R., Thompson, apud O., Manea,
Osama: un Mao n era www,
http://www.contributors.ro/globaleuropa/osama-un-mao-in-era-www/;
The Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst, Developing Leaders. A
Sandhurst Guide, Pilot version
Easter 2012;
E., Von Manstein, Lost Victories,
Zenith Press, 2004.

This work was possible with the financial

support of the Sector Operational Program
for Human Resources Development 20072013, co-financed by the European Social
Fund, under the project number
POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385 with the title
Integrated/educational network for
the
formation,
counseling
and
orientation of doctoral students for a
research career in security, defense,
public order and national security
domains - SECNETEDU.

190

APPROACHES REGARDING THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT

OF INTERNAL AUDIT IN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
(VISION, OBJECTIVES, DEVELOPMENT)
Radu-Viorel MARCU
Major, PhD student, Internal Audit Directorate
marcuraduviorel@ymail.com

Abstract: The paper presents some aspects regarding the history of the internal audit in the Ministry of
National Defense, respectively the setting, evolution, role and significance of the Internal Audit Directorate. It
starts from the establishment in 2000 of the internal audit department by transforming the former financial
control management structure. It identifies the evolution of the internal audit department, from the initial
approach essentially performing compliance audits, up to carrying out, with significant results, highperformance audit missions. The analysis performed takes into account a comparison between the
representative departments of internal audit at public entities in Romania. An SWOT analysis is conducted onto
the Internal Audit Directorate of the Ministry of National Defense.
Keywords: audit, Internal Audit Directorate, Ministry of National Defense, risk management, assurance,
corporate governance.

Conceptual demarcations

interfered with the entry into force of Law

no. 191/2011 for amending and
supplementing Law 672/2002 on internal
audit.
However, although for our country
the implementation of the internal audit on
public sector meant a significant step
forward in the evolution of public
institutions, in our opinion, the internal
audit is not perceived yet at its real value,
being still assimilated to an activity of
checking the accounting and/or former
financial control management structures
and not, as it actually is, a vector of
increasing managerial performance.
To
eliminate
the
frequent
confusion between internal audit and
external audit or financial management
control, the following table briefly
presents the main elements of these forms
of control4.

In Romania, the internal audit was

implemented
by
the
Government
Ordinance no. 119/1999 on internal audit
and preventive financial control, which
stipulated the organization of internal
audit independently at the level of each
public institution in the form of a
specialized department.
Later on, to facilitate the
understanding of the specific activity and
given the good practices in the field, a
regulatory document was approved that
would regulate only the internal audit
field, an option materialized in Law no.
672/2002 on internal audit. We mention
that, when drafting the legislation on
internal audit, Romania received the
support1 of the IFACI2. Significant
changes3 in the law on internal audit
1

To develop Law no. 672/2002 on internal audit

and General norms regarding the performance of
the internal audit by the GD no. 1086/2013;
2
Institut franais des auditeurs et contrleurs
internes - French Institute of Audit and Internal
Control;
3
Sizing the internal audit department;
implementation of internal audit committees; the
introduction of the certificate of public sector
internal auditor; implementing multi-annual internal

audit plan; clarifying system audit and performance

audit; delineation types of audits; simplify risk
analysis; establishing permanent file; definition of
terms/phrases;
4
Taken and adapted from, www.iia.org.uk https://www.iia.org.uk/about-us/what-is-internal-audit/,
accessed on 19 July 2015;

191

Indicators

Internal Audit5

External Audit6

Addressee
/information user

- Management of the
organization

- External
environment

Objectives

- Improving the
management of public
entities.

- Adds credibility
and reliability to
the financial
statements or to
their components;

Coverage

Responsibilities
for improvement

- All activities of the

public entity in pursuing
its objectives, including
the assessment of CI/M8
system.
- improvement is
essential for the purpose
of internal audit. It is
done by counseling /
facilitating the
understanding, not
undermining the
responsibility / authority
of the management

Imposes
- no
sanctions
As it can be seen from the table
above, making "confusions" regarding
the function of internal audit can only
be either because some people remain
dependent "on the past of internal
audit" (built on the former financial
management control structures) or
because they are not "familiar" with
this activity.

- Financial
reports; financial
reporting risks.

FMC Financial
management control7
- Management of the
organization
- Ensures the integrity
of the patrimony;
- Obeys legal
provisions and internal
regulations, incident to
economic and financial
activity;
- Enhances the
efficient use of
allocated resources.
- Economic
and
financial activities;
- accounting.
- conformity

- none; however,
there
is
an
obligation to report
problems.

- no

- yes

The Evolution of Internal Audit in the

Romanian Army
The birth of internal audit in the
Romanian Army is the Government
Emergency Ordinance no. 74/2000 on the
organization and functioning of the
Ministry of National Defense (MoND)
when the Internal Audit Directorate was
nominated as the central structure of the
ministry. The co-signing, in a republican
act of the sphere of activity/ attributions of
this structure was done through the
Government Emergency Ordinance no.
14/2001 on the organization and
functioning of the Ministry of National
Defense, which established that Internal
Audit Directorate "is a specialized
structure intended to execute endogenous

Law no. 672/2002 on internal audit, including

subsequent amendments and additions;
6
Government Emergency Ordinance no. 75/1999
on financial audit, republished, including
subsequent amendments and additions;
7
Government Resolution no. 1151/2012 for
approving the Methodological Norms on
organizing and exercising financial management
control;
8
CI/M - internal control management;

192

and ex post checks on property

management and use of public money on
criteria of efficiency, effectiveness and
economy."
At present, the Internal Audit
Directorates
sphere
of
activities/attributions is recorded in the
Law no. 346/2006 on the organization
and functioning of the Ministry of
National Defense, including subsequent
amendments
and
additions
which
stipulates that Internal Audit Directorate
performs audits on property management
and use of public funds in the Ministry of
National Defense, in accordance with the
legal provisions.
The regulation of the Auditing
department activity was initially done
through IA-1, Methodological Norms on
the organization and functioning of the
internal Audit in MoND, approved
through the Order of the Minister of
National Defense no. M. 81/2000, which,
with the entry into force of Law no.
672/2002 was replaced with PIA-1,
Standards regarding the activity of public
internal audit in MoND, approved
through the Order of the Minister of
National Defense
no. M.87/2003.
Currently, due to changes in the
regulatory framework at the level of the
MoND, Methodological Norms regarding
the public internal audit in the Ministry of
National Defense are applicable, approved
through Order of the Minister of National
Defense no. M.67/2014.
Regarding
the
organizational
structure, the parents of Internal audit in
the Romanian Army were subject to
approval from the Ministry's management
of a structure of the dimension of
"directorate", on former structure of the
former General Inspectorate of MoND
formed, on the principle of territorial
performance of audit.
Regarding
the
areas
of
competence, please note that the
components of Internal Audit Directorate

are structured according to the data posted

on the institutions website9, as follows:
- Specific activity management Internal Audit Directorate chief, deputy,
chief legal adviser, chiefs of subordinate
sections;
- Performance of the activity of
internal audit Internal Audit Department
(central agencies), 8 sections of territorial
internal
audit,
legal
department
(counseling);
- Assessing the specific activity
and providing methodology - Methodology
Section.
In our opinion, the internal audit
applied in the MoND was directly
influenced mainly by the following major
factors:
- Developments in the audit
function, since 2000 until now, both in the
international/ reference states in the field
and in the Romanian society;
- Structural
evolution
and
conceptual reference elements in the
army;
- Political, economic and social
developments of the Romanian society
and the manifestation of the financial
crisis in our country.
In parallel, the Romanian Army
began a comprehensive restructuring
process, especially due to requirements
related to the integration processes and
accession to the European Union (EU) and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). The programmatic document
that included the main elements in the
evolution of the Romanian Army for the
next 25 years is constituted by the
Transformation Strategy of the Romanian
Army. The transformation process is a
comprehensive and dynamic one, which
requires the functional elements in
connection to adapt and change, as it is
the case of internal audit.
Thus, from the functioning point
of view, the internal audit in the MoND
9

http://www.mapn.ro/structuri/dai/ organigrama.
htm, accessed on 19.08.2015;

193

has the following modifying elements

generated by the transformation of the
power structure:
- Theoretical foundation and
implementation of new forms of audit:
patrimonial liquidation;
transformation;
delivery and reception of
important/significant
functions in MoND.
- Structural remodeling according
to the resize of the supported power
structure. Thus, in 2007, Internal Audit
Directorate reduced its size, the positions
being reduced by approx. 25%.
The MoND management expresses
its rigorous attitude towards certain
processes also through the need to receive
information, in a short time, in terms of
their development and at the same time, to
get some reasonable assurance that these
processes are conducted in conditions of
legality and normality.
As the main instrument for
checking the existence of such a
relationship to legislation and good
practice, Internal Audit Directorate has
assumed the auditing of certain processes,
during their development, without
interfering with them, as it is the case of
public procurement audit, audit of sales of
goods, audit of rental property in the
public domain etc. I would like to
underline that this type of audit is
exercised only within the MoND and
requires a high degree of precision in
carrying out missions, a rigorous control
over the proper performance and neutral
act of audit and at the same time, it is the
generator of increased security against
errors, the act of corruption or fraud.

degree of assurance and implementation

of the methodological and procedural
framework. The reference system for this
analysis will be the constituent elements
of the Reports of internal audit in the
public sector prepared by the Central
Harmonization Unit for Public Internal
Audit11,
which
includes
detailed
information on the departments of internal
audit (PIAD) established in all public
entities.
A. The
stage
of
the
organization and performance of
internal audit:
- The organization of Internal
Audit Directorate ensures compliance
with the legal requirements in force12,
conditions for auditing all activities
undertaken at the MoND, fulfilling the
general objectives of the audit;
By comparison, at the national
level, the internal audit was organized
only in 6.53013 public entities (out of
11.190 public entities in 2013), which
corresponds to a degree of assurance of
approx. 58% of the organizational
framework;
Internal Audit Directorate is
one of the strongest structures within
PIAD in the public sector, taking into
account the fact that it is organized at the
level of directorate. Please note, that out
of the 1.684 PIAD inside the public
entities, only 16 are organized at the level
of directorate (16 directorates, 63 services,
87 offices and 1.518 departments).
It is significant that less than
0.5% of PIAD are organized as mixed
structures, similar to Internal Audit
Directorate (central and territorial
specialized structures).

Evaluation of Internal Audit

Directorate10

11

Reports of internal audit in the public sector

prepared by the Central Harmonisation Unit for
Public
Internal
Audit
(2004-2013)
http://www.mfinante.ro/ucaapi.html?pagina=domen
ii, accessed on 18.08.2015
12
art. 11 of Law no. 672/2002 and standard 16
Internal Audit of OSGG no. 400/2015 for
approving Internal Control/managerial Code of
public entities;
13
Assured through its own departments by the
superior hierarchical body or in cooperation system;

Below, the research will consider

the analysis of the organization and
functioning of the internal audit and the
10

Evaluation of the organization and functioning of

the internal audit; Evaluation of the degree of
assurance and implementation of methodological
and procedural framework of internal audit;

194

1%

4%

our opinion, the findings of Central

Harmonization Unit for Public Internal
Audit reveals, once again, the adequacy of
Internal Audit Directorate dimension to the
real needs of the Ministry.
C. Status and independence of
the internal audit department
- Internal Audit Directorate is
organized and functions at a hierarchical
level that allows it to perform its special
attributions in conditions of legality,
efficiency and effectiveness.
The
positioning of Internal Audit Directorate
under the Ministry of National Defense
provides the premises for performing an
independent and objective function.
comparison there were some
aspects identified at the national level
which,
according
to
Central
Harmonization Unit for Public Internal
Audit, have affected the independence of
internal audit regarding the mandate of
audit teams to achieve control/inspection
activities and/or use auditors to carry out
some activities that do not correspond to
the specific duties of internal audit.
D. Status and competence of
public internal auditors
- At the level of Internal Audit
Directorate the approval of appointing the
chief of the structure was secured and at
the same time the procedure for
nominating the internal auditors was
followed;
- The Internal Audit Directorate
has collective competence (knowledge,
skills, qualifications) necessary for the
performance of specific activities; in
terms of specialized studies held by the
internal auditors within Internal Audit
Directorate, one can notice an adjustment
to the real needs of the ministry, the
structure is as follows: 56% economists,
24% engineers, 13% lawyers and 7%
other specialties. However, the analysis
revealed an acute shortage of specialists in
IT&C, although, in our opinion, internal

5%

90%
Directorate
Office

Service
Department

In our opinion, the form of

organization of Internal Audit Directorate
leads to the reduction of hierarchical
levels as well as an increase in the degree
of flexibility.
B. Ensuring the functional
frame of the internal audit
- the organization of Internal
Audit Directorate facilitated, year after
year, the total achievement of the
provisions of audit plans, including ad-hoc
missions ordered by the minister in terms
of legality, independence and objectivity
which demonstrate the degree of
appropriateness of the audit structure to
the real needs of the ministry;
by comparison at the national
level, the degree of performance of the
audit function was only approx. 42% (it
was done in only 4.775 entities out of
11.190 in 2013).
Moreover, according to the Report
of Central Harmonization Unit for Public
Internal Audit on internal auditing in the
public sector in 2013, only "to a limited
number of public entities, the current size
of the internal audit department provides
the necessary conditions for auditing all
activities performed in the central
organization and fulfilling the general
objectives of the audit, namely: MoND,
MIA, MPF, MH, NHIH, RIS and STS14". In

14

Ministry of National Defence, Ministry of

Internal Affairs, Ministry of Public Finance,
Ministry of Health, National Health Insurance

House, Romanian Intelligence Service, Special

Telecommunications Service;

195

- When identifying/selecting the

trainers, the type and form of appropriate
training was taken into account for each
established training topic;
- The topics supported by the
representatives of Central Harmonization
Unit for Public Internal Audit or The
National Regulatory and Supervisory
Authority for Public Procurement for the
training activities organized at Internal
Audit Directorate played an important role
in the training of auditors;
comparison there were some
problems identified at the national level
that made the development of the
auditors trainers quite difficult, such as:
budget constraints, limited number of
auditors
(limited
attending
of
lectures/meetings),
reduced
time
allocation, limited offer of training
courses (mainly theoretical courses general
competencies
rather
than
skills/practical skills) etc.
F. Assurance/appropriateness
of the methodological and procedural
framework
- Due to the changes made to the
regulatory framework by the Law no.
191/2011 and the approval of General
norms regarding the performance of the
internal audit by the GD no. 1086/2013,
Internal Audit Directorate has gone
through a long process of development/
promotion of the departmental regulatory
framework.
Significant in this regard is the
approval by the Minister of the
Methodological Norms regarding the
exercise of internal audit in the MoND, by
Ordinance no. M.67/2014. We would like
to mention that at this time, the
elaboration
of
the
Departmental
Regulatory framework of Internal Audit
Committee is envisaged.
- practice guidelines for the
performance of the audit, as well as
specific operational procedures have been
developed and implemented.

audit must approach in the future, in

tandem with the global trends, the IT
systems audit (the complexity of current
systems presents risks with big impact that
will amplify in the future);
- The Internal Audit Directorate
staff seniority in the specific activity shows
the maturity of the audit function, ensuring,
in our view, the increase quality of the
audit activity;
comparison at the national
level, there is a polarization of public
internal auditors around the economist
profession, the structure is as follows:
85% economists, 6% lawyers, 5%
engineers, 4% other professions. We
would like to mention that, nationally, the
percent of internal auditors whose basic
profession is computer expert is only
0.57%.
- Although there was a relative
stability regarding the framing of internal
audit function we believe that attracting
auditors is a done with difficulty, this
position not being, in my opinion,
rewarding enough from a financial point
of view. We would like to mention that
the current legal framework envisages in
certain situations an increase of only 4
classes (10%) for these positions. Thus,
given that the audit must attract the best
specialists, requiring good practice in the
audited entities, it is unlikely that this goal
will be achieved without an appropriate
financial "stimulus".
E. Ensuring
training
for
internal auditors
- The Internal Audit Directorate
assured, on average, a total of 25 training
days per internal auditor in a year, above
the minimum limit required by the
legislator (minimum 15 days/person/year);
- The major methodological or
procedural
issues
regarding
the
performance of the internal audit were
addressed by organizing at "Carol I"
National
Defense
University
a
postgraduate continuous
professional
development course in the field of
reference;

196

G. Performing audit tasks

- Within
Internal
Audit
Directorate there are performed assurance
tasks (mainly regularly) and advisory and
evaluation tasks. Also, at the Ministers
order ad-hoc audits are conducted;
comparison - regarding the
performance of system and performance
audits, it should be noted that Internal
Audit Directorate/MoND, together with a
similar structure from the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, have assumed the role of
pioneer in this field, being the only
structures that, according to Central
Harmonization Unit for Public Internal
Audit, held such missions annually. In
fact, in 2014, at Internal Audit
Directorate/MoND a number of 3 system
audit tasks were completed, and in 2015,
other three tasks of this kind will be run.
H. Monitoring
the
implementation of recommendations
- Within
Internal
Audit
Directorate it was decided to monitor the
implementation of the recommendations by
performing
follow-up
audit
tasks
(intervention on the spot);
- The degree of implementation of
the recommendations formulated by the
auditors is within the national limit shown
by Central Harmonization Unit for Public
Internal Audit in the annual reports (on
average,
approx.
50%
of
the
recommendations are implemented during
the year they were formulated);

comparison - regarding the

recommendations made by internal
auditors at the national level during
assurance tasks, it was noticed that, in
2013,
a
number
of
48.516
recommendations were formulated. Thus,
on 31.12.2013, out of the 48 516
recommendations, 28 722 (59%) are
implemented,
8.431
are
partially
implemented (17%) and 11.363 are not
implemented (24%).

14%

19%
8%
19%
11%

48%
Implemented

Partially implemented

not implemented

within the time limit

out of limit

The comparative analysis of data

arising from the Reports regarding the
internal auditing in the public sector
drawn up by Central Harmonization
Unit for Public Internal Audit reveals
that the Internal Audit Department of
the Ministry of National Defense is a
structure of "power", providing
pioneering and therefore expertise in
some areas of internal audit in
Romania.
Vision and perspectives
Regarding
the
development
perspective of internal audit in the MoND,
please note that the programmatic
document Vision and objectives in 2026
on public internal audit in the Romanian
Army was elaborated, which consists of
ensuring and advising the management of
MoND and the structures they are made
of, having mainly performance, system
and consulting audit. To achieve this goal,
the following strategic objectives were
established
within
Internal
Audit
Directorate:
- Increasing economy, efficiency
and effectiveness in MoND activities by
conducting performance audits;
- Supporting military leadership in
the decision-making process by conducting
system tasks that are focused on the activities
and areas considered a priority within the
military organization;
- Increasing the value brought so
that the audit can become a function of
strategic importance;

197

EXTERNAL ORIGIN
(attribute of the environment)

INTERNAL ORIGIN
(attribute of the organization)

HELPFUL
HARMFUL
to achieving the objective
to achieving the objective
STRENGTHS:
WEAKNESSES:
- Valuable team of auditors, with - Limited financial resources;
significant experience in the fields of - Lack of dedicated software for the
interest, who can carry out a wide range audit activity;
of tasks;
- The perception by some managers of
- Collective assurance of the audit the internal audit as a management
competence;
financial control structure;
- the existence of internal audit - Limited use of computer network
postgraduate course at "Carol I" National INTRAMAN to collect information;
Defense University;
- Limited numbers of auditors who
- Ensuring pioneering in system and hold
internationally
recognized
performance
audit
in
Romania; certifications;
conducting such tasks every year;
- The system provides "limited"
- Providing
assurance
to
the possibility of finding out information
management regarding the carrying out about the identified dysfunctions, with
of purchasing procedures;
negative impact on the implementation
- Existence of an efficient training plan of the lessons learned at the level of
of auditors;
the audited structures;
- Carrying out mixed audit tasks together - Lack of specialized auditors in
with similar structures from other information systems.
countries;
creating
exchange
of
experience with internal audit structures
from other armies;
- Having strategic importance for the
functioning of the Romanian Army.
OPPORTUNITIES:
THREATS:
- Exploiting to the full the audit - Difficulty in attracting the staff;
capacities by the MoND management;
- Dependence in some local structures
- Making the most of the gained in some areas of activity, on "unique"
experience (maturity in the act audit);
auditors (only specialized in one area);
- Increasing system and performance - Limited staff, as compared to the
audit tasks in the fields/activities of growing need of military organization
interest;
management;
- Maximizing
the
professional - Maintaining the independence and
experience of the auditors, in order to functionality structure;
reduce the period of specific tasks;
- Starting late the activity of certifying
- Making use of IT solutions;
the internal auditors by the Central
- Introducing efficiency, effectiveness Harmonization Unit for Public Internal
and economy in the audit activity;
Audit.
- Integration / takeover in coordination
of prevention and investigation of fraud
structure, consistent with the practice of
developed countries.
- Reducing internal audit period by
- Building a valuable team of
using information technology;
auditors through attestation/certification of
- Improving the information flow;
internal auditors;

198

- Improving
the
auditors
competences which should allow them to
perform a wide range of tasks;
- Increasing its presence and
visibility within the MoND.
Even though audacious, the objectives
proposed to be implemented by 2026 are
feasible if, by that date, as I detailed
above, Internal Audit Directorate has
acquired a valuable team of internal
auditors. In our opinion, the only limits to
achieving these targets are the financial
and material resources and the open
attitude of management entities towards
the audit act.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Conclusions
9.
Instead of a conclusion, we will
realize a SWOT analysis of the Internal
Audit Directorate within the Ministry of
National Defense, which in our view can
project an overview of the audit function
in the Romanian Army, regarding the
factors that support or those which
jeopardize the achievement of specific
objectives.
Based on this analysis, we consider
that we can envisage within the vision,
other objectives that contribute mainly to
the efficiency of the internal audit activity.

10.

11.

Bibliography
1.

2.

3.

4.

Law no. 672/2002 regarding the

public internal audit, republished,
with subsequent amendments;
Law no. 346/2006 on the
organization and functioning of the
Ministry of National Defense;
Government
Ordinance
no.
119/1999 regarding the internal
audit and the preventive financial
control, version of the publishing
date;
Government
Emergency
Ordinance no. 75/1999 on
financial
audit,
republished,
including subsequent amendments
and additions;

12.

13.

14.

199

Government
Emergency
Ordinance no. 74/2000 on the
organization and functioning of
the Ministry of National Defense;
Government
Emergency
Ordinance no. 14/2001 on the
organization and functioning of
the Ministry of National Defense;
Methodological
Norms
on
organizing and exercising financial
management control, approved by
the Government Resolution no.
1151/2012;
The general norms for the exercise
of the internal audit activity,
approved by the Government
Decision no. 1086/201;
Internal Control/managerial Code
of public entities, approved
through the Order of the
Government General Secretariat
no. 400/2015 for approving;
IA-1, Methodological Norms on
the organization and functioning
of the internal Audit in Ministry of
National Defense, approved
through the Order of the Minister
of National Defense no. M.
81/2000;
PIA-1, Standards regarding the
activity of public internal audit in
Ministry of National Defense,
approved through the Order of the
Minister of National Defense no.
M.87/2003;
Methodological Norms regarding
the public internal audit in the
Ministry of National Defense are
applicable, approved through
Order of the Minister of National
Defense no. M.67/2014;
Ghi, Marcel, Sprncean, Mihai,
Internal audit in the public system,
Economic
Publishing
house,
Bucharest, 2006;
Public internal audit Course,
"Carol I" National Defense
University Publishing House,
Bucharest, 2012;

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Report regarding the activity of

internal audit in the public sector
(2004-2013), published by the
Central Harmonization Unit for
Public
Internal
Audit,
http://www.mfinante.ro/ucaapi.ht
ml?pagina=domenii;
www.eca.europa.eu;
www.theiia.com;
www.aair.ro;
www.mfinante.ro;
http://www.mapn.ro;
www.iia.org.uk;
www.ifaci.com.

This work was possible with the financial

support of the Sector Operational Program
for Human Resources Development 20072013, co-financed by the European Social
Fund, under the project number
POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385 with the title
Integrated/educational network for the
formation, counseling and orientation of
doctoral students for a research career in
security, defense, public order and
national
security
domains
SECNETEDU.

200

TARGET ANALYSIS SPECIFIC TO THE VERTICAL COMPONENT OF THE

BATTLESPACE

Lucian MOLDOVAN
Ph.D. candidate, Major, Chief of Training and Operations, 3rd Air Defense Battalion
"POTAISSA", Turda
luci_moldo@yahoo.com
Abstract: The volume of the air operations conducted by a hypothetical air enemy and the performance of the
new technologies have imposed a targeting process which should contain the integration and the
synchronization of the air defense structures firings with the maneuver of the defended forces, as part of the
group of activities conducted by the commander and his staff. "This involves the continuous conduct of a cycle
consisting in the following functions: decide, acquire, engage and assess- functions which, correctly applied,
provide the timely engagement of air targets with the most efficient fire system and with minimal resources."1
The targeting structure specialized in engaging air targets has the responsibility to actively participate,
alongside other structures, in the management, planning, coordination and synchronization of actions during the
operation planning, contributing with activities specific to the targeting process. The air threat targeting process
is an ongoing, dynamic and iterative process, which takes place at all levels, based on the operational
assessment and the apprehension of the situation.
Keywords: targeting, vertical component, air target, air threat, course of action.

cooperation and the coordination between

the air defense forces and the defended
forces in terms of maneuver and target
engagement, the targeting process specific
to the air threats, namely the process of
identifying and selecting them, begins at
the same time with the process of planning
the operation and it is continued by
identifying the targets and allocating the
engaging assets. The stage of planning the
engagement is carried out by means of
intelligence,
surveillance
and
reconnaissance in order to identify and
track the priority targets, and the actual
engagement consists in identifying and
selecting the targets, by using intelligence,
surveillance
and
reconnaissance
equipment, and the deployment of targets
and the actions carried out by them. For
this process to be efficient and benefic for
the operation, it is necessary to provide a
continuous information flow regarding the
coordinates of the targets and their
activities and the intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance capabilities must be
employed during this stage and also for
collecting the data and information
required to assess the effects on the target,

1. Introduction
The1friendly forces, by their land,
air and sea components, use the airspace to
fulfill certain purposes that include
reconnaissance and surveillance, fire
direction, maneuver, transport and combat
control. Thus integrating the operations
conducted by the force components with
those performed by air and air defense
assets in air space defense operations
contributes to achieving and maintaining a
certain degree of control over it, the air
protection of forces, winning the
information warfare, the synchronization
of the land and naval operations with the
air operations being fundamental to the
success of operations. The land operations
are supported by the air defense forces by
reconnoitering, detecting and engaging the
air enemy. Synchronizing and integrating
the efforts of the air defense forces with
those of the combat forces are achieved
within a unique concept for conducting the
operation. Thus, in order to attain the
1

FM 3-60, The Targeting Process, November 2010,

Headquarters, Department of the Army, p.2-1.

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which is achieved by means of

intelligence,
surveillance
and
reconnaissance following the employment
of the engaging assets. Based on the results
of the outcome assessment it is determined
whether a new intervention of the
intelligence,
surveillance
and
reconnaissance capability is required for
the same target or not, thus the attack
coordination matrix being constantly
updated. The optimum selection of air
targets at the right time and in the
appropriate place and the assignment of the
most appropriate engaging system to
destroy the target, involves a process of air
threat analysis and subsequently a
decision-making process, which we will
further present in the paper.

consists of detecting the threat, identifying

its doctrine or its operating methods and
determining the enemys likely courses of
action. The result of the threat estimate can
be a presentation or a series of
presentations showing the deployment and
the tactics corresponding to each course of
action, the attack formation and the
positioning of the units in the operation.
Collecting and processing data
related to the air enemy threat doctrine
involves a set of questions required to be
answered during this sequence, including
the intentions, the principles and the
commanders requirement for critical
information as well as the requirement for
priority information, such as: What are the
major strategic, operational and tactical
objectives of the enemy air operations,
Which of these objectives become targets
required to be destroyed or neutralized,
Which is the priority of the own air
defense units within the enemys
objectives, whether they should be
destroyed or neutralized so that the
enemy's plan would be achieved, these
problems causing changes in the air
avenues of approach; Which may be the
enemys order of air operations and how
are his capabilities structured, knowing the
enemys mode of organization and who is
in charge of the operational command of
the area of operations, etc. The answers to
the above questions allow us to put
together a permanent and adjustable
documentary basis, based on the use of
computer network products unfolding at all
levels. The process of developing a
documentary database supports the entire
process of planning and conducting
operations and subsequently the targeting
process. An essential role in facilitating the
targeting process is played by the existence
and the permanent updating of the
integrated database concerning the targets
which includes information on all the
potential targets in the area of information
interest, a database which is being
developed in the second phase of the
targeting cycle, namely the selection,

2. Air Threat Assessment

The stage decide is the first step of
the targeting process and is the decision
made to engage a certain target, being
correlated with the second and third steps
in the targeting cycle, namely the selection,
validation, nomination and prioritization of
targets and the analysis of the air enemys
capabilities. This stage requires special
attention because the priorities for
collecting information necessary for
planning the attack are set here.
The targeting process begins with
the air threat assessment, which is an
important sequence and represents a
detailed study of the enemy's air
capabilities,
its
organization
and
operational doctrine. During the threat
assessment, the following sequences are
covered, such as: collecting and analyzing
data related to the threat doctrine, the
analysis of the enemys air capabilities and
the coordination of target assessment.
The main purpose of the threat
assessment is to identify the opponent's
likely course of action, irrespective of the
terrain and weather conditions, such as the
enemys means of action considering the
doctrine, the procedures, the tactics and the
combat experience. The threat assessment

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validation, nomination and prioritization of

the targets.
The air targets lists are compiled
by analyzing the database containing
targets for that specific operation which, in
turn, is extracted from the integrated
database. The lists are analyzed and
tailored to the commanders intent and are
constantly updated based on the
information obtained during the course of
the operation. According to the Joint
doctrine for targeting, the following types
of lists of targets are established2: at the
operational level: the list of targets, the list
with the target prioritization and the list of
targets which must not be hit. At the
tactical level, the following types of lists
are drawn up, such targets: the list of
selected targets, the list of restricted
targets, the list of high pay-off targets and
the list of important targets. At the tactical
level of operations, the purpose of the
information cycle is the production of the
necessary information for apprehending
the air situation by describing the
composition,
the organization, the
deployment, the endowment, the types of
air platforms and weaponry, the intensity
of the attack and the methods of action, as
well as the identification, the detection, the
selection of targets and the timely and
accurately transmission of the deployment
data on high pay-off enemy targets, so that
these targets can be selected and engaged
effectively with appropriate firing systems
or with electronic warfare equipment.
Based on the table with the
important targets, during the war game, the
air defense coordinator will prioritize these
targets in terms of the order of their
engagement, to determine which the most
dangerous targets are. In the joint forces,
the lists will be supplemented with other
targets classified as important for the land
component and will be assigned to the air
defense coordinator and the airspace
control authority.

The analysis of the enemys air

capabilities includes a wide range of
operation orders and capabilities of the
enemy, including the land units and the
electronic warfare threats to the air
defense. They also evaluate the answers to
various questions specific to each air threat
system, such as: the capabilities of the
manned aircraft, the UAV capabilities, the
capabilities of the ballistic missile systems
and the cruise missiles capabilities.
3. Determine the air enemys likely course
of action
Determining the likely course of
action of the air enemy takes place in the
process of the intelligence preparation of
the battlespace and involves the integration
and the processing of the air threat, being
the most important stage of the targeting
process. Threat Integration involves
combining the results of the battle space
assessment with the likely courses of
action and with other presentations
developed during the threat estimate. The
threat integration process is done in three
stages, as follows:
In the first stage of this sequence all
the information obtained in the previous
sequences are centralized in order to
develop the air situational template. The
situational template (SITEMP) is a
standard concept of action drawn up on the
map or on a blueprint in connection with
the constraints imposed by terrain,
weather, organization and the enemys air
attack doctrine. The air situational template
is adapted to fit the restrictions of the
combat space factors such as terrain,
climate, infrastructure, protected areas and
other relevant factors. Based on the
estimate of the objectives, the tactics of the
opponent, the deployments, the decisionmaking points and the vulnerabilities, a
presentation of each likely course of action
of the enemy is developed, showing the
tactical situation adjusted to the terrain
along the mobility corridors and the access
routes.

S.M.G./C.O.9.0., Doctrina pentru managemenul

ntrunit al intelor, Bucharest 2011, p. IV-7.

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The next stage of the sequence is to

complete the air situation with the land
operational template received from the
operations module of the joint forces,
resulting in the air operational event
template (EVENTEMP). This template
includes the areas or the terrain points that
can confirm or rule out the air enemys
course of action, called named areas of
interest and form the basis for the targeting
process, the basis of target selection and
especially the basis for the data collection
plan. In the operational template, for the
named areas of interest /NAI the height
and the alignment of each area of interest
are estimated, which will be analyzed and
monitored by the reconnaissance structures
of the air defense system. The operational
template must also include the stages of
the operation, the significant alignments,
the action of the land forces in space and
time on courses of action and the necessary
response in the key decision points. Based
on the operational template of the military
action, the air defense coordinator
establishes those areas or points that can
confirm a particular course of action of the
air enemy called named areas of interest.
Therefore, the areas of deployment of the
aircraft and helicopters, of the launch
rocket systems, become named areas of
interest for the reconnaissance and
engagement by own aviation or artillery
assets. The hydrographic network, the
terrain features, the forward posts of the
helicopters, the holding and firing
positions become named areas of interest
for radar reconnaissance and air defense
artillery engagement. Due to the fluidity of
the air actions, the time available for
identifying and responding to an air attack
is reduced, and hence, in the targeting
process for acquiring air targets, the
staging of the operation according to the
air operational model is not required as for
the fighting forces.
The stage decide of the targeting
process continues with the final step of
integrating the air threat, shown in the
decision support template. During the war

games, the targeting team will develop the

decision support template, an element
which shows graphically, similar to the
operational template, the options of the
friendly forces for conducting the
operation, including here both the targets
to be engaged and the own decision points
and
coordination
alignments
for
synchronizing the actions. The decision
support template is an estimate of the
information related to the operations plan
and graphically pictured in a chart, where
the targeting team analyzes the mode in
which the application of each own course
of action affects the identification and the
engagement of the targets, establishing the
effects to be achieved on them and the
moments in combat when these effects
should be achieved to ensure the success of
the own course of action. The decision
support template contains the critical
events related to location, time and current
tactical situation that require tactical
solutions called decision points. The
decision support template rather identifies
the moment when the tactical decisions
should be made and represents the means
of synchronizing the joint action in these
points. The particularity for the air defense
is that the air decision point may or may
not correspond to the land one. For the air
defense coordinator, the decision point is
the moment when he alerts the subunits
and assigns the missions, known in the
jargon as the final assigning mission
alignment. In addition to the decision
points, the template covers the previous
named areas of interest, and subsequently,
based on these named areas of interest, on
the maneuvers of the supported forces and
on terrain analysis, the target areas of
interest/TAI are identified. The target areas
of interest are those areas where the
friendly aviation and the air defense
artillery systems by firings, maneuvering
or jamming, may hinder the enemys air
operation or they may determine him to
use an increased resource of assets for
continuing the operation. The target areas
of engagement correspond generally to the

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named areas of interest but, depending on

the situation, other areas or distinct zones
can be identified. After determining the
decision points and the target areas of
engagement, they will be represented on
the decision support template. From a
procedural point of view, we must
understand that this process is carried out
continuously during the planning and the
execution of the operation, within the
targeting process, and the decision support
template is constantly updated depending
on the situation changes and the newly
obtained information. The updating is done
on the one hand by the chief of operations,
who updates the decision support template,
and on the other hand by the chief of
intelligence who repositions, if necessary,
or generates new NAIs to include certain
indicators of the opponents action and to
locate high value targets (HVT), while
updating the plan of collecting information
with the new changes, while the targeting
team will fill in the target synchronization
matrix with the elements set during the war
games.
Once the war games completed, the
matrix of comparing the courses of action
is developed and the commander selects a
particular course of action for his own
forces. The decision making practically
completes the stage "DECIDE", the effort
of the targeting process shifting to the next
stage, moving on to execution, namely to
the actual detection of the indicators
specific to various enemys courses of
action, by the action of the data collection
teams in the NAIs assigned to them
according to the ISR synchronization
matrix.
Once the decision support template
is completed, or even while preparing it,
the targeting team will also fill in the
blanks in the targeting synchronization
matrix which is actually the end product of
the targeting process, a work document
comprising all the four steps of targeting.
Also, the matrix will include the high payoff target list (HPTL), the information
collection plan (ICP) and the attack

guidance matrix (AGM). Also, when

making the decision, the targeting team
will fill in the columns "DECIDE" and
"ACQUIRE" in the target synchronization
matrix, thus making the latest amendments
to the data collection plan and completing
at the same time the high pay-off target
list. Subsequently, with the support of the
fire support element (FSE) and the aviation
liaison officer (ALO), the targeting team
will fill in the column "ENGAGE" by
assigning an appropriate firing system to
each target, so that, finally, together with
the chief of information, the FSE and the
chief of operations to fill in the column
"ASSESS" by assigning tasks to assess the
effect on the target caused by the firing
systems or the data collection equipment,
ensuring that these latter tasks are
contained in the data collection plan.
Based on the work documents
received from the upper echelon, the staff
draws the OPORD/FRAGO, making sure
that the tasks from the target
synchronization matrix will be reflected,
therefore, in the text of these documents or
in
their
annexes.
Once
the
OPORD/FRAGO is issued, we move on to
the actual operational stage, conducting the
stage "ACQUIRE". Thus, the data
collection elements will proceed to
acquiring the targets to be engaged, and,
depending on the specifications set out in
the war games, regarding the immediate
engagement of targets or tracking and
engaging them under certain conditions, in
certain locations and at well established
moments, they will report to the
intelligence department the identification
of those targets and, if necessary, they will
proceed to acquiring other targets or will
continue to monitor the former targets.
It should be noted here that the
decision support template and therefore the
targets synchronization matrix provide
options which allow the forces to counter
all the opponents courses of action, but,
once the data collecting plan is being
conducted, the various sensors used
therefore will provide information to

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confirm or refute certain courses of action

so that, normally, at the time when the
action begins, the maneuver forces and the
fire support forces will bring their fire to
bear on countering the real course of action
of the opponent, thereby further existing
options to cover the initially set variants.
The conditions for the execution of
the stage "ENGAGE" are created; the
targets will be engaged by the preset firing
systems assigned for each of them in the
war games, according to the target
synchronization matrix, or, in special
cases, the targets can be engaged by assets
established on the spot. Regardless of the
manner and means used for engaging the
targets, once the action against each of
them is completed, the stage "ASSESS" is
executed, which refers to using the
intelligence-gathering elements or even the
firing elements to assess the actual effect
on the target. When the actual effect on
target is different than what it was planned,
or when a certain target cannot be located
and hit by various reasons, and this was
not stipulated and discussed in assigning
the own decision points, this last stage
enables the reassessment of the situation
and the assignment of new tasks, through
the conduct of new targeting sessions, this
time at a reduced scale, without
significantly changing the own course of
action, but creating the conditions for
issuing a FRAGO to remedy the created
malfunction, by assigning the newly
identified tasks for engaging the targets.
Without being complicated, the targeting
constructively integrates the work of the
maneuver elements and the fire support
elements with the military intelligence
system, by exploiting the analysis,
prediction and data collection capabilities,
allowing the target acquisition in
accordance with the optimal scenario set
during the war games, in a way that has
fully proven its efficiency both in
conventional military operations, and in
the stability and support operations.

As a conclusion, we can say that

the targeting process specific to air
targets is a process which leads to the
identification, the selection and the
assessment of air targets and the
assignment of an appropriate engagement
system to counter them. This process
actually involves determining the targets
with a particular importance in the
operation, the place and time when they
act, and assigning the firing system to
engage them. The analysis and the precise
identification of this category of targets,
which represent the facilities that the
opponent or own commander considers to
be important for the successful fulfillment
of his mission, allow the air defense
coordinator to anticipate the air enemys
course of action and gain the initiative in
combat.
Bibliography
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

F.T.-6, Manualul sprijinului prin

foc n operaiile gruprii de fore,
Bucharest 2012.
F.T./ A.A.-1.2, Proceduri de control
al spaiului aerian n operaiile
forelor terestre, Bucharest 2006.
Ghidul funcional de planificare
pentru planificarea operaiilor
aeriene, Bucharest 2013.
F.T./
A.A.-1.1,
Manualul
operaiilor de aprare antiaerian i
antirachet n cadrul forelor
terstre, Bucharest 2005.
F.T./ A.A.-3.1, Manualul pentru
lupt al divizionului de rachete
antiaeriene/artilerie antiaerian din
cadrul forelor terestre, Bucharest
2007.
F.T.-7,
Manualul
aprrii
antiaeriene n operaiile forelor
terestre, Sibiu 2010.
S.M.G./C.O.9.0.,Doctrina
pentru
managemenul ntrunit al intelor,
Bucharest 2011.

Proiect cofinanat din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operaional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor
Umane 2007-2013 Investete n OAMENI

206

8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

FM 3-60, The Targeting Process,

November 2010, Headquarters,
Department of the Army.
AJP 3.9, Allied joint doctrine for
joint targeting, May 2008.
http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Integ
rated_air_defense_system
http://www.wikipedia.com
http://www.airdefenseartillery.com

This work was made possible through

financial support provided through the
Sectoral Operational Program Development
of Human Resources 2007-2013, cofinanced by the European Social Fund, in the
project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with
the title Security through knowledge
Integrated/educational
network
of
training, counseling and guidance of PhD
students for a career in research of
security, defense, public order and national
security - SECNETEDU.

Proiect cofinanat din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operaional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor
Umane 2007-2013 Investete n OAMENI

207

IMPROVING COMMAND AND CONTROL

IN ALLIED JOINT OPERATIONS
Ioan NEGRU
Florian TUDORACU
Commander, Masters Degree student, Navy Department,
Carol I National Defence University
negruioan2005@yahoo.com
Commander, Masters Degree student, Navy Department,
Carol I National Defence University
florianmake@yahoo.com

Abstract: Allied joint operations have become an example for Romanian Army Forces, and in the current geopolitical context and following the Summit in Wales in September 2014 we should recognize and emphasize the
importance of such military actions that can take place even in Romania. As a result, military leaders will face a
number of challenges. Examining these challenges, command and control (C2) is one of the main tools for
success in joint and allied operations. This article highlights aspects of command and control (C2) in the allied
joint operations providing ideas and concepts to improve command and control of such operations.
Keywords: command and control, command arrangements, allied joint operations.

Many publications look for

providing a vision of command and control
during allied operations involving more
than one of armed services. Essential for
command and control in current allied joint
operations
is
the
concept
of
Auftragstaktik, which subsumes all the
following concepts: individual initiative,
independent decisionmaking, and thinking
leaders reaching tactical decisions on their
own accord. In short, a commander would
specify to subordinates what to do, not
how to do it. Auftragstaktik represents a
capstone command and control doctrine in
the German armed forces dating back to
the early 19th century. Its origins can be
found in the Prussian military reforms
beginning in 1808, following Prussia's
disastrous defeats by Napoleon [1].
Following heavy defeats in 1806 at the
twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt
substantial effort was expended by the
Prussians in rethinking their approach to
military operations especially their
philosophy of command. It was observed
that, compared to their own centralized,
process-oriented, command and control
system, the French achieved high tempo

through
rapid
communication
of
Napoleons intentions and rationale.
Perhaps most important, the exercise of
initiative by junior officers was tolerated.
Napoleon was able to communicate very
rapidly with the Marshals because they
shared a basic operating doctrine, and he
explained his intentions as well as what he
wanted them to do. He expected them to
use their initiative and act without orders in
line with his intentions. They did. The
result was an operational tempo which left
the incredulous Prussians bewildered.[2].
Nevertheless, it should not be supposed
that this philosophy was universally
applied at all levels in the Prussian Army;
decentralisation was focused on the higher
levels of command. Notable contributions
were made by von Clausewitz and von
Moltke. In 1832, von Clausewitz published
On War, a collection of ideas that were
influenced by his experience of the
Napoleonic campaigns, notably the idea
that war is chaotic and frictional and that
this is likely to undermine pre-existing
plans and arrangements. This observation
was key in an era where military forces
were growing and subdividing into

208

separate, permanent, formations that could

be manoeuvred separately away from the
battlefield and concentrated rapidly in an
attempt to force decisive battle on an
opponent. In such an organisation,
geographical distribution made it essential
that authority for the exercise of command
initiative should be delegated to the
formation commander with a view to
exploiting opportunity and managing
surprise. The key of the concept is very
simple:
centralized
planning
and
decentralized execution.
Decentralized execution requires
extensive education and training of junior
personnel. Their levels of knowledge of
tactics, techniques and procedures within
their specialist domains need to be high.
They need the ability to diagnose
situations, and to formulate, implement,
and monitor the plans they devise for
dealing with those situations within
commanders intent. Thus, selection and
promotion systems need to be efficient in
placing personnel with the appropriate
aptitudes. According to the words above
we should find some form of command
and control in order to meet some demands
of the situation with a view to balancing
risk and opportunity, moreover we should
develop new concept that, on one hand,
would enable some independence of action
while, on the other, would preclude
misguided action by lower-level leaders.
These requirements (centralized
planning and decentralized execution)
present military leaders with a unique set
of challenges and demands. They include
building relationships, trust, cooperation,
and cohesion; overcoming language and
cultural barriers; developing common
procedures or norms; and establishing
effective means of communication,
technical as well as procedural. Getting
this right will ultimately lead the true
interoperability among the members of a
allied force. While many of these tasks are
difficult to accomplish even in a national
setting, they become extraordinarily
difficult in a allied environment.

Multinational
operations
are
operations conducted by forces of two or
more nations, usually undertaken within
the structure of a coalition or alliance. An
alliance is the relationship that results from
a formal agreement between two or more
nations for broad, long-term objectives that
further the common interests of the
members [3]. Joint operations are a general
term that describes military actions
conducted by joint forces or by Service
forces
employed
under
command
relationships [4]. An examination of
multinational operations illustrates that the
foundation for allied operations is based on
trust, cooperation, and cohesion. It also
reveals command and control (C2) as the
crucial primary tool needed to ensure
success in allied operations. This paper
examines the various aspects of and
challenges to command and control (C2) of
allied joint operations, and offers ideas and
concepts for facilitating this vital function
in the difficult environment of allied joint
operations.
Command of allied forces is the
most contentious and challenging aspect of
allied operations. Two contentious issues
which must be resolved are: "Who will
command the allied force'?" and, "What
authority will the commander have?
These issues create tension because all
contributors to allied forces, even in well
developed alliances, struggle with the
scope of command authority over their
forces granted to another nation's
commander. This tension is exacerbated by
the natural desire of nations to control the
employment of their own forces. It is wellknown that nations rarely relinquish
national command of their forces. As such,
forces participating in an allied joint
operation will always have at least two
distinct chains of command: a national
chain of command and an allied chain of
command. No single command structure
meets the needs of every allied command,
but there is one absolute: political
considerations will heavily influence the
ultimate shape of the command structure.

209

The NATO military structure

allows for 3 command models. Each model
offers a command and control (C2) option
that may be appropriate to specific
operations [5]:
a) Fully Integrated. This model
integrates forces on the basis of
proportional shares. This may result in a
bi- or multi-national construct for
operational
and
component
level
headquarters. The working language and
procedures are agreed by the contributing
nations.
Commanders
of
such
multinational formations are usually
appointed on a rotational basis.
b) Lead Nation. This model sees
one nation assume responsibility for the
planning and execution of an operation.
The commander, staff, command and
control (C2) capability, information and
communications capacity, doctrine and
logistic3 coordination of the force is
provided by one nation (the lead nation).
Other nations can assign contributions to
this force, and fill staff positions within the
Lead Nation headquarters.
c) Framework Nation. This
model sees one nation provide the
command and control (C2) framework.
The key elements of the staff and the
headquarters support come from the
framework nation. The working language
and procedures however are based on
Alliance standards.
According to US joint publication
JP3-16 Multinational Operations, the basic
structures for multinational operations fall
into one of three types [6]:
a) Integrated
Command
Structure. A good example of this
command structure is found in NATO
where a strategic commander is designated
from a member nation, but the strategic
command staff and the commanders and
staffs of subordinate commands are of
multinational makeup.
b) Lead Nation (LN) Command
Structure. An LN structure exists when all
member nations place their forces under
the control of one nation. The LN

command structure can be distinguished by

a dominant LN command and staff
arrangement with subordinate elements
retaining strict national integrity.
c) Parallel Command Structures.
Under a parallel command structure, no
single force commander is designated.
Nonetheless, because of the absence of a
single commander, the use of a parallel
command structure should be avoided if at
all possible.
During WW-I, General Pershing
recommended to the War Department:
The principle of unity of command is
undoubtedly the correct one for the Allies
to follow. I do not believe that it is possible
to have unity of action without a supreme
commander. We have already experienced
enough in trying to coordinate the
operations of the Allied Armies without
success. There has never been Real Unity
of
action."[7].
General
Pershing
understood the importance of unity of
command and the difficulty in achieving
that goal in allied operations, especially
that not involving high intensity conflict. It
is very difficult for an allied joint
commander to understand and mesh
national contingents capabilities, personal
and
professional
habits,
training
backgrounds,
relevant
national
characteristics and national goals.
An examination of these shows that
command and control (C2) is the critical
primary tool needed for success in allied
joint operations and that commanders must
actively
build
relationships,
trust,
cooperation, and cohesion; overcome
language and cultural barriers; develop
common procedures or norms; and
establish effective communication means,
technical as well as procedural; ultimately
leading to true interoperability among the
members of a multinational force.
Leadership is the key, A leader is the man
who has the ability to get other people to
do what they dont want to do, and like it,
Harry Truman said. While the tenets of
allied joint operations cannot guarantee
success, ignoring them may lead to mission

210

failure due to a lack of unity of effort. The

tenets are respect, rapport, knowledge of
partners, patience, mission focus, and trust
and confidence. After World War II,
General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that
mutual confidence is the one basic
thing that will make allied commands
work.
Successful execution of allied joint
operations requires the establishment of
procedures and effective integration of
systems. The critical components of
effective control include communication
systems, language, common terms of
reference,
interoperability,
an
understanding of each nation's doctrine,
and standardized procedures. The best way
to achieve the highest level of control in a
allied joint force is to achieve a level of
interoperability. To achieve some measure
of interoperability, national and allied
force commanders must address the Four
Pillars of Interoperability: Training,
Communication,
Doctrine,
and
Comparable Structures. [8].
Commanders are able to command
and control resources more effectively with
assistance from Joint staffs. Specialist or
liaison/staff officers, as well as the
commanders of subordinate, supporting or
higher elements may provide military
advice. Political-military advice may also
be provided by the respective national
contingent commanders appropriate to
their force contribution or contingent
capabilities. There are 2 models commonly
employed in NATO operations [9]:
a) Component Method. For most
Allied Joint operations, force elements
provided by nations would be grouped
under component commanders subordinate
to the Joint Force Command who would
exercise authority over these elements
through Component Commands.
b) Direct Method. For small-scale
operations, a JFC may exercise command
authority directly. When he does so, he
should be provided with an appropriate
allied joint staff.

Key aspects to improve command and

control in allied joint operations
In order to improve command and
control in allied joint operations nations
should face a set of challenges and
demands.
They
include
building
relationships, trust, cooperation, and
cohesion; overcoming language and
cultural barriers; developing common
procedures or norms; and establishing
effective means of communication,
technical as well as procedural. Getting
this right will ultimately lead the true
interoperability among the members of a
allied force. Interoperability presents the
best alternative, and to achieve it we must
address the four pillar of interoperability:
a) Training: Train as You
Fight has served as an axiom for US
forces and many of our allies [10], and the
same rule should also apply to allied joint
operations.
b) Communications: the ability
to communicate is essential and revolves
around three key elements: common or
understandable language, common terms
of reference (i.e. doctrine or operational
concepts), and a common or interoperable
means to deliver the message from the
commander to the executing unit or
between units.
c) Doctrine: provides a frame of
reference for military forces, and therefore
provides the starting point for any
understandings between allied partners.
Doctrine provides the context for
understanding
a
nation's
forces,
organizations, capabilities, and operational
concepts. Allied forces "must understand
one anothers doctrine, and doctrines
cannot be too dissimilar.
d) Compatible Structure: it is
clear that great operational benefits could
be derived from allied forces with the same
or similar organizational constructs. These
benefits would allow member forces to
easily understand their partners forces and
would facilitate interoperability, especially
for command and control (C2).

211

Technological shortfalls, combined

with the inaccessibility of cutting edge
technologies to many of our allied partners,
will force leaders to use innovative, lowtech solutions for effective command and
control (C2) of allied joint operations. To
redress this imbalance between allied
forces and us, the Romanian Army Forces
should
use
three
approaches:
a
technological approach, a procedural
approach, or a combination of two in order
to eliminate the technological gap.
The complexity of allied joint
operations requires extra effort to prepare
our leaders and forces. Future success
requires a three pronged approach. First,
leadership training should incorporate the
development of the critical skills required
for successful leadership in an operational
environment. These skills should be
developed from the earliest point in officer
education since operations today can have
strategic implications at the lowest tactical
level. Second, a concerted effort must be
made to afford Romanian forces with
every opportunity for engagement with
forces throughout the world. Current and
previous operations clearly demonstrate
the vital role engagement plays in
establishing the basic requirements for
understanding and working with allies
around the world. Third, we must develop
new technology to
improve the
coordination and thereby control between
allied forces.

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

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THE BLACK SEA AND NAVAL FORCES CONTRIBUTION

TO ENSURING EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY IN THE AREA
Ioan NEGRU
Florian TUDORACU
Commander, Masters Degree student, Navy Department,
Carol I National Defence University
negruioan2005@yahoo.com
Commander, Masters Degree student, Navy Department,
Carol I National Defence University
florianmake@yahoo.com
Abstract: As a neighboring country, Romania has both a direct national interest to protect and secure the ports
and maritime areas under its jurisdiction, as well as other responsibilities along with its allies from NATO and
the EU. Taking into account the geostrategic importance of The Black Sea, we meet here a confluence of
interests: NATO, EU on one hand and the Russian Federation and Turkey on the other. According to interests of
Romania on the Black Sea, it must assess the risks and to counter possible threats from his own address security
in the area. In relation to this matter should be reconsidered the role of Naval Forces in providing security in
the euro-Atlantic area.
Keywords: security; Romanian Navy; Black Sea; Black Sea Harmony; maritime security.
Romnia are interese maritime i atrage atenia
asupra necesitii includerii n orice fel de
calcule geostrategice a dou poziii cheie:
sistemul strmtorilor, considernd c ce sunt
strmtorile, altceva dect prelungirea gurilor
Dunrii? i peninsula Crimeea, care, prin
raporturile naturale, prin cetile ei din
timpurile cele mai vechi, prin bastionul maritim
naintat pe care-l reprezint n Marea Neagr
este evident o poziie stpnitoare peste tot
complexul maritim.
Gheorghe I. Brtianu

This medium sized waterbed,

enclave in Eurasia, was in the midst of
tumultuous historical events for three
millennia. This great sea was coveted as
nostrum sea by the Greeks, Romans,
Byzantines, Genoese, Turks and Russians.
Thus, according to the Pontic domination
over the area, the Black Sea was called in
turn: Byzantine lake, Ottoman lake
(Turkey) and a good part of the last
century, Russian lake.
Black Sea which is located at the
confluence of two important areas of the
world Europe and Asia, the first two
world religions Christianity and Islam as
well as three families of peoples IndoEuropean,
Uralian
and
Caucasian

The geopolitical importance

of the Black Sea
The Black Sea or the Euxin Pontus
appears almost like a lake on the world
map, and it is related to the Planetary
Ocean just by the Bosporus. By its
position, the Black Sea is a typical large
continental sea communicating through the
Bosporus Strait to the Marmara Sea and
through the Dardanelles Strait to the
Aegean Sea. Black Sea area is 411,540
square kilometers, comprising together
with the Sea of Azov, 462,535 square
kilometers and it has a maximum depth
located in its geometric center, of 2,245 m.

214

determined the geopolitical importance of

it and influenced the strategy of major
world powers, especially in the last two
centuries. In this regard, Gh. I. Brtianu
said in his work on the Black Sea: theater
offered by the Black Sea favors, more than
others, considerations that exceed regional
issues and it relates to the forces from the
field of world history1.
Due to the geographic approach,
the Black Sea has been inextricably linked
to the straits (including Constantinople,
called Istanbul from 1930) and to the lower
Danube (particularly in the large river
mouths) since ancient times.
The competition for the Black Sea
has considered especially the opposition of
open sea concepts and the limited access
of the war fleets, especially those of nonriparian states, which, in a logical
progression, led throughout history, to so
called Byzantine, Genoese, Ottoman and
Russian
lakes.
Imperial
peace
represented also attempts to exclusive
domination of the Black Sea.
Being an area of competition rather
than cooperation, after the implosion of the
USSR and with it the end of the Cold War,
the Black Sea has become an area of
cooperation for the littoral states and not
only.
Due to its geographical position
(the Black Sea and Danube), Romania was
following "open sea" that would facilitate
access to other seas and especially to the
Planetary Ocean through straits and the
Danube River.
Although it is a small player
compared to the other three powers
(Russian, Turkish and Ukrainian) but,
becoming NATO and EU membership,
Romania's role in the Black Sea increased
due to the support of the two organizations.
Romania contributes to promoting
regional security and stability through the
wide range of both internal and external
missions involving Romanian Navy in

Ponto-Danubian space, in cooperation with

the Black Sea countries and NATO.
Since ancient times the Black Sea
was a transit zone of economic, political
and strategic interests. Its importance in
geopolitical,
geo-economic
and
geostrategic relied primarily on the role
that the region played at the intersection of
former powers and empires (Greek,
Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, and Russian).
It was simultaneously a bridge and a
border, a buffer zone and a transit between
East and West, between North and South.
In addition, the Black Sea was and is a
connecting point for marketing channels
and regions rich in energy resources. The
area prospered most during those periods
when it was not isolated but anchored in
world trade.
After the fall of communism and
hence, collapses of the USSR, the
independence of several countries of the
former ex-Soviet bloc, i.e. after 1991, six
countries were to have direct access to
Black Sea: Russia, Ukraine, Romania,
Bulgaria, Turkey and Georgia. For four of
them Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and
Georgia "the way of the Black Sea" is the
only maritime access. Due to the Danube,
Black Sea is the gateway to World Ocean
for further six countries Germany,
Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia and
Serbia and Montenegro. Even Moldavia is
considered by others a Black Sea country,
thanks to maritime Danube, which has a
length of 0.8 km on its border. In fact,
Moldavia is a Pontic state not only by
virtue of geography, but also by its history.
In addition, Belarus, the largest European
country without a sea outlet has an opening
to the Black Sea through the Dnieper.
From a geopolitical perspective, the
Black Sea together with rivers flowing into
it comes to an inseparable whole.
Geopolitical and geo-economic value of
this sea has always depended on its
tributary major rivers and vice versa, the
geopolitical value of these rivers was
upheld by the Black Sea. The evolution of
geopolitics and security in the Black Sea

Gheorghe I. Brtianu, Marea Neagr, vol. I, Ed.

Meridiane, Bucureti, 1988, p. 76.
1

215

region, its geographical location, the risks,

the existing threats and benefits on
economic,
political
and
military
cooperation have attracted more interest
from
European
and
transatlantic
organizations, resulting in a more careful
approach to problems facing this space.
The Final Declaration of NATO Summit in
Bucharest recorded in paragraph 36:We
reaffirm the continued importance of the
Black Sea region for Euro-Atlantic
security. In this regard, we welcome the
progress in consolidation of regional
ownership, through effective use of existing
initiatives and mechanisms. The Alliance
will continue to support, as appropriate,
these efforts guided by regional priorities
and
based
on
transparency,
complementarity and inclusiveness, in
order to develop dialogue and cooperation
among the Black Sea states and with the
Alliance.
Romanian foreign policy has
among its priorities those related to the
Black Sea, which is considered a
particularly important issue and of national
interest.

the
emergence
of
unconventional
phenomena that are caused by non-state
actors and supported by the policies of the
problem-states or by a precarious
statehood.
Terrorism development, weapons
proliferation
and
organized
crime
transferred the embankment policies to a
new configuration of technologies and
military instruments. Other threats and
challenges should be: the increasing
pollution of the Black Sea, accentuation /
maintaining of the ethnic-separatist
conflicts (Transnistria, Abkhazia, Adjaria),
export of instability, promoting Islamic
fundamentalism and interests of Islamic
countries to southeastern Europe by the
existence of compact ethnic groups in
adjacent areas (Turko-Tatars of Crimea,
Gagauz of Moldavia, Turks in southeastern
Bulgaria etc).
It is to note that, in comparison
with those sources of instability from
classic landing, those ones listed above
present a special feature given by the fact
that their consequences are not confined to
a particular (political, economic, social)
level but, they are felt at all levels what
makes them be considered major sources
of instability and having repercussions on
national, regional and implicitly on global
security.
That factors that may result in risks
to regional security of the Black Sea, with
extension to the global level, should be2:
Terrorist elements and organized
crime transit to Central and Western
Europe through the Black Sea region;
Massive migration flows from
Africa to Asia and Central and Western
Europe;
Close proximity to the Caucasus
and the Balkans - areas characterized by
tensions and conflicts;
The existence of the region
historical mistrust relations between the
countries o (e.g. between Greece and
Turkey);

Regional risks and threats

The Black Sea region has entered
the Euro-Atlantic goal after 11 September
2001, when the United States revised its
policy towards international terrorism. The
Black Sea Basin Area has achieved special
significance for US and the states in this
region should play an important role in the
fight against oriental threats.
Due to the changes happening in
the Euro-Asian security in the national,
zonal and regional environment and due to
reconfigurations of the large institutions,
the Black Sea is the main target of all these
processes underway and therefore, risk
assessment, asymmetric risks, dangers and
threats to regional security are the starting
points for formulating regional policies for
supra-state players.
Currently, security risks and threats
are not caused by the states, but rather by

Alexandra Sarcinschi, Cristian Bhnreanu, Op.

Cit., pp. 27-28..
2

216

 Islamic pressures on one of the

most important country of the region:
Turkey;
Lack of compatibility between
military and civilian solutions for solving
existing conflicts, such as the northern
Caucasus, where the military logic requires
that civilians be treated as enemies, while
international law condemns this approach;
The absence of international law
instruments recognized by all countries in
the region needed peaceful calls for
autonomy or sovereignty resolution of
local ethnic minorities;
Russia's desire to restore
hegemonic order that had been before the
end of the Cold War;
The traditional battle for
leadership in the Black Sea between
Turkey and Russia;
Games of interest and pressures
on Moldova and on the northwestern shore
of the Black Sea;
Disinterest in environmental
degradation
caused
by
excessive
industrialization of the former communist
countries.
The threats to regional security are
mostly of a military nature. The scale of
this type of threat occurs without a
predetermined order, to strengthen or give
rise to generally accepted regulations on
the use or threat of use of military force. In
this context, it is to note that regional
security is threatened not only by internal
factors but also by external ones, as well 3:
Unwanted Russian military
presence in Chechnya;
Conflict in Ukraine
South Ossetia conflict;
Transnistrian conflict;
Conflict between Azerbaijan and
Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh enclave;
Unfinished conflict in BosniaHerzegovina
The campaign against terrorism in
Afghanistan;
Iraq war;
Underground economy, corruption
etc.
3

Taking into account the complexity

of their nature it is very difficult to be able
to tell how to address risks and threats to
regional security. Overall, the Black Sea
area security prospects are determined on
the one hand by the domestic success of
the transition countries in the region, and
on the other hand by the inclusion in EuroAtlantic security complex given at the
same time, the influence and authority of
Russia and its relationship with NATO.
Black Sea countries are part of
international organizations such as NATO,
EU, OSCE, Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe, CIS, GUAM, BSEC,
SECI, SEDM etc., which officially aim
peacekeeping and stability. However, with
the new political, economic, military
changes, the legal regime of the Black Sea
is not changing, being governed mainly by
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(1982).
The role of the Romanian Navy
Navy aim is to defend and promote
Romanian interests and sovereign rights at
sea and river, alone or with other forces in
the framework of the NATO or EU. This
role is fulfilled in a new security
environment in the interest area of the
country. The main features of the security
environment are:
After Romania and Bulgaria
joining to NATO, three of the six riparian
states are members of NATO;
increased interest of NATO for
the Black Sea region as a Wing of the
Alliance and the obligation of Romania to
promote the interests of this organization
in the area;

increasing interest of the

European Union for the Black Sea region
since 2007 when it moved its border on the
Black Sea coast of Romania and Bulgaria,
and in the future Turkey is expected, which
began accession negotiations;
defining specific position of the
three littoral states which are not members
of NATO: Georgia participating in the
Partnership for Peace and being the target
of Turkish influences, US and Russia,

Ibidem, p. 30

217

Ukraine and Russia are in special relations

with the Alliance, established through
specific agreements;
considerable decrease in risk of
a major military confrontation in the
region, following the development of
political dialogue and cooperation between
littoral states in economic, naval, security
and trust;
emphasizing the concerns of
Western states to exploit the hydrocarbon
resources of the Caspian seabed and of the
possibility of environmental disasters
which could affect marine, river and
coastline;
possible adverse developments
in the sub-regional level in the field of
democratization, in the respect for human
rights and economic development that
could generate crises, with destabilizing
effects;
the asymmetric risks and threats
proliferation.
Romanian
Navy
Area
of
Responsibility is represented by the
exclusive economic zone, territorial sea
and adjacent coastal area, the Danube
River and the Danube Delta and by any
place in the world where Romanian
maritime interests must be defended.

interdict illegal trafficking of dangerous

goods, etc .;
transport
missions
for
evacuation by sea of Romanian citizens
abroad or from high-risk areas;
naval surveillance using the
coastal system and ships as well as early
warning of hazards;
ensure the Romanian coastline
in respect to hydrographic and safety of
navigation.
In order to defend Romania and
its allies against terrorist actions, naval
forces are used in:
protection of maritime and river
communication routes, ports and ships to
transport significant cargoes;
ensuring the functioning of
offshore oil platforms and utilization of the
biological resources in maritime exclusive
economic zone;
annihilation of the terrorist
actions at the seaside, in the Danube Delta
and on the river;

combat surface warships,

submarines and the other forces, for
collective defense of a NATO Member
State.
In order to promote regional and
global stability, naval forces execute the
following missions:
to participate in crisis response
operations, peacekeeping and humanitarian
assistance missions through the force
projection, the distribution of the of sea
and river conflict areas, and professional
assistance;
the joint intervention with the
naval forces of other countries for search
and rescue, mutual exchange of
information on the situation, mine warfare,
humanitarian assistance, protection of the
marine environment, in the context of
regional initiatives in the naval field and of
cooperation with other States navies;
being aware of the Black Sea
countries activities, carrying reciprocal
visits, observation of the main activities of
the other training at sea, in the framework
of measures to increase Confidence and

Romanian Navy missions

Navy will execute specific missions
within some joint operations type with
forces belonging to other ministries in
order to carry out the tasks set out in the
Army Military Strategy of Romania. As
stated in the Doctrine for operations, in
relation to their nature, Navy missions are
military and non-military missions.
For its contribution to the
security of Romania in the peacetime,
Navy executes the following missions:
discouraging illegal actions at
the sea and river by the active presence of
military vessels on the high risk routes and
maritime areas;
naval communications surveillance
and intervention in support of national
authorities, at the sea and the river, IOT
counter naval terrorism, piracy, and to

218

joint Bulgarian - Romanian exercises (BUN

RON). In addition, in recent years Romanian
naval forces participated in NATO or national
exercises in Turkey (TURKISH MINEX,
DOGU AKDENIZ), and in other exercises
with US forces or NATO naval groups.
Romanian Navy participates in the
activities of BLACKSEAFOR Naval
Group (temporarily suspended) with two
activations per year, one in April and one
in August, using frigates, corvettes or
minesweepers and also in the operation
Black Sea Harmony(initiated by Turkish
Navy).

Security Building Measures in the Black

Sea region CSBMs.
Types of naval forces military action
The evolution of the security
environment and the development of
specific risks and threats, including naval
ones, require changing the value and type
of operations in Navy military actions.
This reduces the number and size of
possible classic confrontations (where the
opponents are naval and air forces), in
favor of military and non-military actions
in which the naval forces and structures are
employed from outside the military branch.
IOT neutralize some actions whose authors
are often, individuals, groups and nonmilitary organizations or civilian ships.
The main military actions that Navy
can perform are:
Vessel traffic control in
preventing and combating terrorist
activities and illegal trade in dangerous
goods;
Protection of ports, important
maritime transport on the river or sea and
economic objectives in the area of
responsibility;
Support the transit of forces and
military equipment through Romanian
ports;
Execution of shipping to theaters
outside the Black Sea;
Search and rescue of sea or air
disasters survivors;
Execution of peace-support
actions and humanitarian assistance in
disasters;
Participation in the execution of
collective defense operations and for the
defense of national territory against
aggression from the sea.
Romanian Navy participation in
regional exercises helped stability, peace and
security in the Black Sea region. The
exercises conducted by the Black Sea riparian
navies in which Romania participated are:
BLACKSEA PARTNERSHIP exercises in
Turkey, SEA BREEZE exercises in Ukraine,

Conclusions
As mentioned, the main element
that increases the geopolitical importance
of the Black Sea at the beginning of the
third millennium is to achieve the two
strategic flows: the first one is about
energy and the second is security flow. The
maritime power of littoral states also
influences the geopolitical developments in
the region and the most dynamic element
of it is navy. In this respect, Romania
wants to promote its own naval interests,
which are determined by:
its maritime power;
its bordering on sea;
sharing of maritime borders and
river length;
external supply of raw materials
on the sea lines of communication or river
communications;
exploitation of seabed and its
development prospects;
other economic activities which
are carried by sea and river shipping,
exploitation of marine resources, tourism,
shipbuilding;
promoting its image in the world
and knowledge of the presence of the
national flag on the globe;
the Euro-Atlantic involvement in
the wider Black Sea region.
Romania's maritime interests are
part of the national interests from the
economic, politic and military point of

219

 ensuring freedom of movement

on river and maritime communications;
defending coastal infrastructure;
Sea, Danube and Danube Delta
environmental protection;
participation in allied naval
military actions.

view. They evolve over time, based on

maritime power and political situation of
the state.
The Navy performs defending
naval interests, which must be able to
project power on the high seas in order to
protect
economic
and
naval
communications objectives and to do that
wherever their interests or those of the
Alliance require.
Navy
Operations
Doctrine
emphases the fact that Romania is most
interested in:
preserving its territorial integrity
within the borders of land, sea and river;
preserving safe its exit to the
Black Sea via the Danube river branches,
and the Danube Black Sea Channel;
ensuring the conditions for
imposing and maintaining maritime areas
of interest in order to operate unhindered
economic and conduct of activities in these
areas;
ensuring stability in the area;

Bibliography
1.

2.

3.
4.

220

Gheorghe Marin (coord. pr.), Marea

Neagr spaiu de confluen a
intereselor
strategice,
Editura
Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei,
Bucureti, 2005.
https://andreivocila.wordpress.com/20
12/02/05/rolul-fortelor-navale-si-alnato-in-mentinerea-unei-situatii-desecuritate-in-marea-neagra-video/
accesat 16.09.2015
http://www.safn.ro/publicatii/bfn/BFN
8_08.pdf - accesat 19.09.2015
http://www.safn.ro/publicatii/bfn/BFN
19_13.pdf - accesat 20.09.2015

CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE INCREASE

OF THE MAINTENANCE STRUCTURES OF GROUND FORCES
OF NATO STATES IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL-MILITARY
CHALLENGES
Adrian NOUR
PhD student, Carol I National Defence University
e-mail: adriannour@yahoo.com
Abstract: The transformations of NATO ground forces targeted, besides structural, doctrinal and procedural
changes, military equipment changes. One of the most important factors of the military equipment is their
availability status. Extending the availability status of military equipment is the main objective of the
management and execution structures of maintenance from the logistics of the ground forces. The developments
in recent years that involved ground forces also meant major changes for maintenance system on the structures,
relations with the other logistic domains, human resources and materials, as well as the appearance of new
concepts regarding maintenance activities.
Keywords: logistics, maintenance, repairs, military equipment, availability.

of the Warsaw Treaty Organization were

marked up until the 90s by supporting
large enough armies that had massive
amounts of human resources and military
equipment, supported by a centralized
economic system
with significant
budgetary efforts. In these countries the
logistic structures have evolved over the
past quarter century together with the
transformations of the combat forces and
with the need to adapt to the requirements
of
integration
into
Euro-Atlantic
structures. Also, the logistic system has
always adapted to the requirements of the
operational space simultaneously with the
evolution
of
economic
operators,
materials
and
services
providers,
considering the decreases of the budget
allocations due to the global economic
crisis. The need to reduce land, air and
navy forces, with the adoption of a new
security system in the most powerful
political and military alliance in the world,
imposed to the logistic military system
from ex-communist countries reduction
measures and professionalization of the
specialized staff. Also, the progressive
change of the weapon systems and the
development of their technological
complexity imposed significant changes in

Introduction
The current structures of NATO
military logistics system and of the
logistics systems from the armies of the
member states are the result of the
successive transformations of the entire
Alliance military system. The changes
were needed to ensure an efficient logistic
support of the combat forces and of the
combat support forces that had many
stages of evolution since the end of the
Cold War. Maintenance, as a logistics
functional area, had a very important role
in the change of the logistical systems of
NATO countries and it also suffered its
own transformations.
Developments in the logistics structures
of maintenance from NATO ground
forces
European
military
systems
transformations of the late twentieth and
early twenty-first century focused on
military structures of the former
communist countries and those of the
former NATO countries that have
gradually adapted to the new structures of
a larger Alliance. The logistical systems

221

all fields of training and education, human

resources, procedures, repairs and
maintenance systems etc.
The maintenance system, as a
matter of logistics, permanently evolved
simultaneously with the logistical support
needs, adapting its organization and
procedures to the needs of power
structures and to the resources allocated to
this activity. Like other functional areas of
logistics, the maintenance system in the
former communist countries has evolved
differently from the maintenance systems
in the countries that were already parts of
NATO. The need for achieving
interoperability within NATO imposed to
the candidate countries the gradual
withdrawal of Soviet weapons systems
and the acquisition of military equipment
compatible with NATO systems. However
these requirements have imposed to the
operators of national defense industries
significant changes in the production lines
and giving up significant capacity,
involving big costs and reductions of the
economic efficiency. The evolution of
national defense industries has resulted in
the last quarter century in the
disappearance of important manufacturers
of military equipment and major changes
in the global hierarchy of countries
providing weapons systems.
The changes within this interval of
the national armaments industries had an
effect on the maintenance systems of the
former communist countries. They were
forced to give up large quantities of
components and parts kept in storage for
items of military equipment which have
been damaged and they had to purchase
components for technical systems
supplied by other manufacturers or to
assimilate in manufacturing frames for
their own maintenance often with lower
quality parameters. These difficulties in
procuring spare parts have overlapped
with the need to integrate in the repair and
maintenance process of the new weapon
systems. However, during the preadherence period, some equipment was

purchased without taking into account the

conditions of maintainability and without
the purchase of repair technologies, which
resulted in additional unjustified expenses.
In addition, some of the equipment
remaining in service could not perform
maintenance activities under outsourced
providers, according to the technical
documentation issued by producers
because of disappearance from the market
of businesses specializing in these
services. These led to the significant
lowering of the technical coefficients and
to the rising of the cost for maintaining in
operation such equipments.
Maintenance structures of logistics
land forces of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization countries have undergone
significant transformations along with
combat forces and combat support forces
for which these structures provided
maintenance services. New principles
were experimented and implemented on
the criteria of the activity of technical
insurance. They dropped the system of
repairs and maintenance in large repair
productive bases, in military equipment
repair sections/workshops, in different
laboratories
and
experimentation
polygons. Along with the mass layoffs in
the military system imposed by treaties
and agreements, a significant amount of
highly specialized and experienced human
resources from these repair bases was
dismissed.
The massive staff reductions from
military structures of the countries that
have emerged from Soviet tutelage
significantly diminished the capabilities of
execution of maintenance activities
through the attraction exercised by the
civilian working environment of the
highly qualified military system workers.
In all these countries this fact led to the
registration of some extremely low
technical coefficients for most of the
military equipment which had not gone
through the full volume of maintenance.
The immediate effect was a significant
decline of the defense capabilities of those

222

countries, and they highlighted the need

for concluding alliances or accession to
NATO to ensure the national security.
The period of over two decades of
transformations in the maintenance
systems of land forces logistics was
characterized mostly by significant cuts in
technical services from tactical echelons
managing equipments and by weakening
the number of specialists in each branch
with an important role in monitoring the
evolution of the technical state of the
types of weapons. In recent years, the
marked deterioration of the technical
condition of the weapon systems and the
emergence of new threats on the eastern
flank of the Alliance focused the attention
of political and military leaders on the
importance of the maintenance system.
During this period, the importance of
ensuring the availability of existing and
new equipments became extremely
important, availability mainly affected by
the
delayed
implementation
of
maintenance interventions due to the long
period of underinvestment in this sector.
The conclusions from the analysis
of the low availability status of military
technical equipment led to the decision to
increase the financial allocations for
rebuilding the maintenance systems,
decision supported at the NATO Summit
on 4-5 September 2014 in Newport,
Wales. In order to ensure a high
availability of weapon systems in Eastern
European countries, there have been
adopted lately modern ways of tracking in
service of equipment and new procedures
have been implemented for diagnosis and
self-diagnosis, repairs and maintenance,
already adopted by western countries from
NATO. They introduced the concept of
Integrated Logistic System (ILS) of
monitoring the equipment life cycle and
new parameters of economic efficiency of
the maintenance activity were pursued.
They adopted management informatics
systems and the concept of reliability
centered maintenance was introduced.
Also, they created modern structures of

management and execution of the

maintenance activity with specialized staff
and modern training methods were
implemented in the education institutions
with technical profile.
In this period, in the countries
already members of the Alliance, the
maintenance systems had a much easier
development related only to the evolution
of the army systems and to the
modernization
of
maintenance
management. Since these NATO member
states formed their own maintenance
structures along with the evolution of the
Alliance principles and policies, they had
to change their weapon systems, their
maintenance system organization and
procedures. Due to the continuing
operation of the same categories of
military equipments provided by their
operators, the maintenance structures in
these countries suffered minimal changes
regarding procedures and command and
execution structures of maintenance and
repair activities. In addition, being part of
the developed economies and benefiting
from significant budgetary allocations, the
opportunities for the replacement of
obsolete equipment were superior to the
candidate countries for accession to
NATO. Also, benefiting from strong
national defense industries, the spare parts
needed for the maintenance process could
be easily provided and so it happened with
the easy maintenance execution in
externalized regime which complemented
very well the military maintenance
structures. All these factors contributed to
the registration in these countries of some
high technical coefficients of the military
equipment.
In NATO, the logistic system
changes had an impact on the organization
of maintenance. Structures have been
established for management and execution
of maintenance of weapon systems in
accordance with the policies established
by the military command structures
(NATO Command Structure) which, over
time, have adopted different forms of

223

organization, depending on the nature of

existing threats. The measures adopted by
the NATO structures of maintenance from
land forces logistics targeted the judicious
planning of the maintenance activity, the
efficient supply, the professional training
of personnel, the use of modern
equipment for diagnosis and support, the
configuration of management, the use (in
common) of the data bases on technical
information,
the
facilities
and
infrastructure
development,
the
modernization of the procurement and
distribution of parts and materials needed,
the monitoring of the exploitation
behavior of the equipment lifecycle.
From the disappearance of Cold
War threats, during the 25 years of
successive transformations, the system of
maintenance and repairs of weapon systems
had as leading elements different
organizational structures. By repeated
changes, at present, the main management
organization of the maintenance activity for
the equipment of NATO armies is NSPA
(NATO Support and Procurement Agency).
This agency was formed on 1st July 2012 as
a result of the unification of three NATO
logistics support agencies, the NATO
Maintenance
and
Supply
Agency
(NAMSA), the Central Europe Pipeline
Management Agency (CEPMA) and the
NATO Airlift Management Agency
(NAMA). The objective of this agency is
the management of the logistics support
based on modern principles of providing the
full spectrum of capabilities needed to
logistics support and procurements. NSPA
provides to NATO and/or partner countries a
complete range of services from design,
procurement, logistics, weapons systems in
five distinct areas: Lifecycle management
and procurement systems; Operations and
exercises support; Strategic transport and
storage services; Logistics and project
management services; Fuel management1.
NSPA is the lead organization for
NATO which, through its structures, in

addition to other logistics activities,

coordinates and provides maintenance
support for all Alliance members. It is based
on each contributing nations support and it
coordinates their efforts of transformation to
fulfill the conditions for interoperability, to
introduce advanced technologies and to
implement NATO concepts regarding the
maintenance activity. These concepts aim to
achieve aid from "Smart Support" by
implementing integrated logistics support
(ILS Integrated Logistic Support) to
increase the visibility and availability of the
equipment while reducing the life cycle cost,
aimed at lowering the logistics footprint of
military actions. The structures used in the
execution of maintenance operations are
structures belonging to NATO member
countries. The execution of domain-specific
maintenance
activities
are
national
responsibilities coordinated within the
multinational logistics support units (MILU Multinational Integrated Logistic Support
Units) by the nation leader responsible for
organizing repairs2.
NSPA coordinates the logistic
support of multinational forces acting in
theaters of operations under NATO
command thereby ensuring through its
structures the link between the military
structures of management and execution of
logistics support with suppliers of goods as
well as services accredited in the area of
operations by contracting that allows the
access to local materials, services and
resources. To do this, the sizing of the
maintenance execution and management
structures and of the relationship diagram is
done taking into consideration the logistical
structures which they are part of. The
maintenance structures from the strategic
level logistics generally include leadership
structures of a complex level maintenance
that provides specialized support through
joint efforts of political and military leaders
of national/international organizations,
military national/international organizations,

Doctrine for modal multinational logistic support

operations NATO, the EU or in coalition,
Bucharest, 2015

Document available on https://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/NATO_Support_Agency,
accessed
on
05.09.2015

224

companies in the defense industry or civil

industry. For logistics operative level, the
management and execution of maintenance
including relationships between them focus
on establishing and maintaining the flow of
specific activities especially for maintenance
support given to military effectives from the
area of Joint Operations (JOA - Joint
Operation Area) while ensuring the
connection between strategic and tactical
level maintenance. Maintenance structures
(management and execution) belonging to
the tactical logistics support the units to
ensure technical condition and the
availability of equipments necessary for the
tasks entrusted consisting of formations like
squad, platoon, company.
The coordination by NSPA of the
logistic support to multinational forces
involves the coordination of the transfer of
authority (TOA) on redeployment of
equipments and materials used in
maintenance activities toward the appointed
multinational force commander. This, as
agreed earlier, it receives the authority to
redistribute funds to support maintenance
needs in the operational field without taking
over the funds used in operations belonging
to the contributing states.

execution of the maintenance activities

were made in all the countries which were
able to cooperate efficiently in
multinational coalitions under NATO
command.
The evolution of these structures
in the last quarter century meant
significant efforts in terms of adapting the
organization systems, the relationships
with other parties, the human resources,
the procedures, the doctrines and the
systems of education, aimed at creating
reliable maintenance structures to ensure
the highest possible availability of weapon
systems used by combat forces.
Bibliography
1.
2.
3.
4.

L 11, Army Regulation equipments

maintenance in Romanian Army,
Bucharest, 2009
SMG / L-1, Joint Operations
Logistics Doctrine, Bucharest, 2008
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_
Support_Agency,
accessed
on
09/05/2015
Doctrine for modal multinational
logistic support in NATO, EU
operations, or in coalition, Bucharest,
2015

Conclusions
The evolution of the logistics
maintenance system of ground forces
pursued the continuous adaptation to the
needs to ensure the availability of military
equipment
concurrently
with
the
transformations undergone by the combat
and support forces from all NATO
countries. Although the ground forces and
their equipment had different evolutions
in the new members of the Alliance, not
resembling what had happened in the
countries that were part of NATO before
the 90s, by successive changes and
efforts of ensuring the interoperability,
modern structures of leadership and

This work was possible with the financial

support of the Sector Operational Program
for Human Resources Development 20072013, co-financed by the European Social
Fund, under the project number
POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385 with the title
Integrated/educational network for the
formation, counseling and orientation of
doctoral students for a research career in
security, defense, public order and
national
security
domains
SECNETEDU.

225

MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS

AND THE ROLE OF COMMANDER DECISION IN THIS PROCESS
Carol-Teodor PETERFI
Phd. Candidate University of Tartu, Estonia
Inspector (Chemical Weapons Munition Specialist), Organization for Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, Netherlands
carolpeterfi@yahoo.com

Abstract: In this paper I present a model of military making decision process as a crucial pillar in preparing,
organizing and conducting military operation. Numerous works have been recently published on the subject but
I will focus on the role of the commander in this process and how his decision and vision can influence the
outcomes of the process. Most authors address this from the military perspectives and few were concerned on
how an individual decision can influence the troops. My goal is not only to present the role of the commander
into military making decision process but also to add to that discussion a voice from the perspective of
psychology. I begin with a brief summary of the basic concepts regarding the decision process, role of
commander in it and afterwards a short analysis of how individual decision in its psychological framework that
can influence both the process and its outcomes.
Keywords: Commander, Command and Control (C2), Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).

The result in war is never final1.

Therefore I will start to frame and define
this concept in order to facilitate the
understanding of decision in the context of
a military operation.
Lets start with the operational
environment. As a military concept this
can be defined as a composite of the
conditions, circumstances, and influences
that affect the employment of capabilities
and bear on the decisions of the
commander. An operational environment
includes physical areas (air, land,
maritime, and space domains) and
cyberspace. It also includes the
information that shapes conditions in those
areas as well as enemy, adversary,
friendly, and neutral aspects relevant to
operations. An operational environment is
not isolated or independent but
interconnected by various influences (for
example, information and economics) from
around the globe2. From the decision
making standpoint we can easily observe

1.
Fundamentals of Military
Decision Making Process (MDMP)
In this first part of my essay I will
present few key element of the Military
Making Decision Process which in my
opinion will support further and deeper
understanding of the commander role in
this process and how his individual
decision can affect the outcome of the
planning of military operation and also will
bring many different consequences for the
troops involved in execution of the plan.
Also, an important element which has to be
brought in the limelight is that of the
contemporary operational environment
with its characteristics. Inter alia, some can
be acknowledge as extremely influential
for decision makers, namely the
uncertainty of military operation and their
consequences (all military operations are
waged and full of uncertain conditions,
actions and results), different factors which
are beyond human control (weather, time,
moral and psychological factors, morale,
etc.), the complex ever-changing cultural
environment in which the war is carried
out, post-modern era characteristics and so
on so forth. In short, as Clausewitz said

Michael I Handel, Masters of War, Frank Cass &

Company, 1992, pp. 145.
2
FM 5-0, The Operation Process, Headquarters,
Department of Army, March 2010, pp. 1-1,
Washington

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that this environment is considered as one

of the most uncertain one with a lot of
interconnections and influences between
its systems and a decision maker hardly
can predict the events or rest his decision
on a certain facts. Accordingly he has to
make a lot of assumptions that will be
confirmed or denied by the course of
events and therefore his decision can be
also a good one or very wrong driving his
forces to not achieve the mission or task or
worst to a catastrophe with huge causalities
and damages. Bearing in mind the huge
responsibility which emerges from the
consequences of commander decision, he
is always under the pressure due to a sum
of factors as mainly time pressure, likely
level of casualties, degree of assumed risk
and achievement of the mission. All these
factors not only influence his correctness
of decision but also put a lot of
psychological pressure on his mind that
without proper training can lead to a real
disaster with unimaginable consequences
and collateral damages.
Another element is uncertainty. It is
what is not known about a given situation
or a lack of understanding of how a
situation may evolve. Effective leaders
accept that they conduct military
operations in operational environments that
are inherently uncertain. They realize that
concrete answers or perfect solutions
usually do not exist and this makes his
mission more difficult and far more to
make an acceptable decision. But still in
this situation the commander has a broadly
and historically accepted solution,
intuition. This personal trait helps
commander to anticipate events in battle
and to exploit all the fleeting opportunities
to achieve assigned mission and finally the
end-state of operation. Although this trait
in specific literature along the history
remains obscure recently some researcher
try to give scientific explanations to
intuition and to unravel the aura of mystery
on it. John Adair3 defines intuition as a
power or faculty of immediately

apprehending that something is the case,

without a reasoning process. In this case is
no deductive or inductive step-by-step
reasoning of decision and no conscious
analysis of the situation. It is a sort of
automatic inside thinking and a geniuss
spark which can make the difference
between loose and win. But in a short
empirical analysis can be said that this
intuition is coming not from nothing but
through a long accumulated experience
and knowledge which are differently and
creative interrelated. As the result decision,
at the first glance empirical, has a reach
personal background to rest on and an
unusual sense of rightness which can not
be scientifically explained. The object of
intuition, also called the sixth sense, is
truth in some form or other4. The
commander mind simply discerns the truth
and correct approach about a situation or a
person quickly without a long deliberate
effort5. Two of the most well known
military thinkers, Antoine-Henry Jomini
and Sun Tzu identify intuition as one of the
most paramount of a general trait. Much
more the latter highlighted that education,
training and experience is enough for being
a good soldier but not for being and
excellent general and /or leader. Intuition
and genius makes the difference and can
propel a general as being required for
effective command.
Clausewitz analyzed that a
commander cannot grapple with the chaos
on the battlefield unless he depends on his
coup d'oeil.6 He defined it as the quick
recognition of a truth that the mind would
ordinarily miss or perceive only after long
study
and
reflection.
Clausewitz
recognized that circumstances vary so
enormously in war, and are so indefinable,
that the man responsible for evaluating
4

John Adair, Management Decision Making,

Gower Publishing Company, 1985, pp. 92.
5
S. K. Saini, Role of Intuition in Military
Command, Journal of defence Studies, Winter
2008, pp. 75.
6
Michael I Handel, Masters of War, Frank Cass &
Company, 1992, pp. 145.

John Adair, Great Leaders, Talbot Adair Press

1989, pp. 89.

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them has to use intuition to perceive the

truth at every point. The problem is further
accentuated due to uncertainty created by
the lack of accurate and timely
intelligence7.
Command and control (C2) is
another element which mainly facilitate the
commander decision and its implementation
and can be defined as the exercise of
authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of a
mission. Commanders perform command
and control functions through a command
and control system. Throughout the conduct
of full spectrum operations, commanders
exercise C2 to integrate the other warfighting
functions (intelligence, movement and
maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment)
to synchronize the activities of forces in
time, space, and purpose. Being focus of C2,
commanders combine the art of command
and the science of control to accomplish
missions. Through it commanders assess the
situation, make decisions, and direct actions.
Because commanders cannot exercise C2 as
such alone, except in the smallest
organizations they have to rest on the
facilities offered by a C2 system to
coordinated all resources offered by
personnel, information and knowledge
management system, procedures, equipment
and other essential facilities to conduct (plan,
prepare, execute, and assess) military
operations. But what does it means in term
of decision making? Simple said this
complex system is built mainly to
synchronize and support the commander in
making the most appropriate decision in a
usually uncertain environment. Even if it
offers such kind of facilities it can not
replace the role of the commander and his
intuition and experience in making right
decision. The system is nothing but a
facilitator of decision but decision as such, in
this case is a very personal (although with

Understanding
Judgment

Knowledge
Analysis

Information
Processing

Data

Figure 1. The cognitive hierarchy

the large participation of the staff) action and
the commander is the single one who bear
the responsibility for it and undertake the
consequences, doesnt matter which these
are.
C2 aims to enhance the
commanders ability to make sound and
timely decisions. As such, C2 must first
support the commander in understanding
the
operational
environment.
Understanding is more than awareness of
information
or
the
immediate
surroundings. In the context of the
cognitive hierarchy, understanding is
knowledge that has been synthesized and
had judgment applied to it in a specific
situation to comprehend the situations
inner relationships8.
Situational understanding is the
product of applying analysis and judgment
to relevant information to determine the
relationships among the mission variables
to facilitate decision-making9
Now, lets see what military
understand by decision making. To achieve
the proposed goals and to be successful in
8

FM 5-0, The Operation Process, Headquarters,

Department of Army, March 2010, pp. 1-4,
Washington
9
FM 3-0, Operations, Headquarters, Department of
Army, February 2010, pp. 5-4, Washington

S. K. Saini, Role of Intuition in Military

Command, Journal of defence Studies, Winter
2008, pp. 76

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operations demands timely and effective

decisions based on applying judgment to
available information and knowledge,
according with commanders level of
understanding and experience gained in
this process. Commanders and staff
members make countless decisions
throughout an operation under constantly
changing conditions. Usually and due to
the quantity of decisions which is made
for running an operation, commanders
delegate some decisions to the staff while
reserving the most important ones for
themselves. Commanders are aware that,
once executed, the effects of their
decisions are frequently irreversible.
Therefore, they anticipate actions that
follow their decisions and try to visualise
in which direction the effort goes and with
which price. On the other hand, decisions
are the means by which the commander
translates his vision of the end state into
action. Here is a double ways
interpretation and both work as a
reciprocal.
Decision making process in
military style is about tree elementary

things: knowing if to decide, then when

and what to decide. It includes as I
aforementioned
understanding
the
consequence of decisions. Decisionmaking is a cognitive process means that it
happens in the minds of individuals and is
accordingly very powerful hallmarked by
each of them personality and character.
Individuals receive information and
process it differently based on their
intellect, education, culture, and past
experiences. Depending on the situation,
leaders may rely heavily on intuition to
inform their decision-making. In other
situations, leaders may take a more
deliberate approach when arriving at a
decision. The primary difference is
awareness of ones knowledge on which
leaders draw to make judgments and
decisions. Sometimes that knowledge
appears as immediate knowing or feeling
(intuition). Other times, cognitive effort is
put forth in a more deliberate process but I
will not develop here this process being
not the topic of this essay.
Paraphrasing some classic military
thinkers knowing how to wage wars and

Figure 2. Military Decision-Making Process

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decision making is both science and art.

Many aspects of military operations
movement rates, fuel consumption,
weapons effectsare quantifiable and,
therefore, part of the science of war. Other
aspectsthe impact of leadership,
complexity of operations, and uncertainty
regarding enemy intentionsbelong to the
art of war. In this respect, later on I will
analyse resting on knowledge gain during
Significant Decision course at Tartu
University how his skills, rules,
knowledge, signals, signs, symbols and
other
distinctions
in
his
human
performance inflict with decision process
and influence the outcomes.
The
military
decision-making
process is an iterative planning
methodology that integrates the activities
of the commander, staff, subordinate
headquarters, and other partners to
understand the situation and mission;
develop and compare courses of action;
decide on a course of action that best
accomplishes the mission; and produce an
operation plan or order for execution10. In
other words the military decision-making
process is an analytical tool developed to
support military analytical approach to
problem solving. Using this tool
thoroughly the commander and his staff
examine the battlefield situation and
accordingly reach logical decisions. The
process helps them apply thoroughness,
clarity, sound judgment, logic, and
professional knowledge to reach a
decision.
The simplified sketch of MDMP is
shown below.

The commander is in charge of the

military decision-making process and the
most important participant in the MDMP
and he decides what procedures to use in

each situation according with his

experience, personality traits, leadership
skills and knowledge. The planning
process hinges on a clear articulation of his
battlefield visualization. Commander is
personally responsible for planning,
preparing for, and executing of military
operations. From the beginning to the end
of process, the commanders personal role
is central and crucial being charged not
only with decision power but also with
responsibility of the consequences of his
decision. His participation in the process
provides focus and guidance to the staff
during planning and execution of
operation.
However,
there
are
responsibilities and decisions that belong
to the commanders alone as shown in
Figure 2. The personal contribution and his
direct involvement are driven by the time
available, his personal preferences, and the
experience and accessibility of the staff
which assist him as decision shapers.
This is usually met in decision making in
social or group environments11. In the
military environment, the less time
available, the less experienced the staff,
and the less accessible the staff, generally
the greater the commander involvement.
While unable to devote all their time to the
MDMP, commanders remain aware of the
current status of the planning effort,
participate during critical periods of the
process, and make sound decisions based
on the detailed work of the staff.
The MDMP stipulates several
formal meetings and briefings between the
commander and staff to discuss, assess,
and approve or disapprove planning efforts
as they progress. However, experience has
shown that optimal planning results when
the commander meets informally at
frequent intervals with the staff throughout
the MDMP. Such informal interaction
among the commander and staff can
improve understanding of the situation and

10

11

2.

Roles of the commander and staff

FM 5-0, The Operation Process, Headquarters,

Department of Army, March 2010, pp. B-1,
Washington

Robert Jacobs, Bayesian Decision Theory,

Department of Brain & Cognitive Sciences,
University of Rochester, pp. 2

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ensure the planning effort adequately

reflects the commanders visualization of
the operation12.
At the lower levels of command,
commander implements the Principles of

to his subordinate commanders; and he

directs their efforts during execution14.
After consideration in the time
available the commander reaches and
formulates a decision which he alone

Figure 3. Staff inputs and outputs

Mission Command13 through four interrelated activities: he decides his tactical
concept; an overall concept that he divides
into a series of complimentary missions for
the different elements of his formation; he
delegates responsibility for these missions

takes. He sets out the objective together

with any parameters for action and his
priorities. The important issue is the
outcome of the decision its quality,
timeliness, and the way it is understood by
subordinates. The outputs (oral orders,
overlays, written plans) are merely means
to achieve the outcome, and should not be
treated as measures of success. The
process by which the decision is made is
entirely subordinate to the outcome.
Shortly, the incomes and outcomes from
MDMP are presented below.

12

FM 5-0, The Operation Process, Headquarters,

Department of Army, March 2010, pp. B-2,
Washington
13
Mission Command is a style of military
command, derived from the Prussian-pioneered
Mission-type tactics doctrine, promoting relatively
decentralised subsidiarity of command, freedom
and speed of action, and initiative, within certain
constraints. Subordinates, understanding the
commander's intentions, their own missions and the
context of those missions, are told what effect they
are to achieve and the reason why it needs to be
achieved. They then decide within their delegated
freedom of action how best to achieve their
missions. Mission Command is closely related to
civilian management concept of empowerment. It is
advocated, but not always used by the Chain of
command in the United States, Canadian, Dutch
and the British Army.

Accordingly,
army
doctrines
espouse commonly understood decisionmaking methods and techniques, to enable
commanders and staffs to work together
effectively. These should be treated simply
14

This method was advocated in Fighting

Instructions, Maj Gen R A Smith, June 1992,
United Kingdom Army

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as aids to decision-making, to be employed

as tools by the commander and staff when
they consider it appropriate. The actual
process employed is affected by a number
of factors: the nature of the decision, the
complexity of the issue, time available, and
the experience and style of commander and
staff. The focus, however, should always
be on outcome, not process.
The
most
important
factor
contributing to quality and timeliness of
decision is the formation commanders
personal ability to make decisions. Staffs
assist through provision, analysis, and
presentation of information, but it is the
tactical commander who focuses their
work so they provide relevant, analysed
information in a form that allows him to
recognise the problem so he can see a
potential solution. Such expertise in
decision-making can be developed through
training of commanders, allowing them to
make better and quicker decisions.
For mission command to be
effective, and for a formation to obtain
superior tempo over an enemy,
commanders throughout the formation
need to be expert decision-makers. All
levels of command need to be responsive
and rapid decision makers. Otherwise,
seemingly small tactical opportunities will
not be taken at lower levels, denying the
higher formation the chance to achieve
wider
exploitation.
The
formation
commander will therefore wish to train
both himself and his subordinate
commanders as decision-makers, in
peacetime and during preparation for war.
Such training should be based on:
frequency, so that commanders build a
large repository of potential solutions to
problems; breadth, so they can cope with
the range of tactical problems they may
come across; complexity, in order to build
self- and mutual confidence progressively;
and allow for feedback with time for
reflection.

3.

Commander decision some

philosophy
Now, once we clarified the
meaning of the operational concept about
MDMP and we understood the role of the
commander in this process, lets see how
the commander and his skills, in a
psychological framework can influence the
outcomes of the process and implicitly the
consequences of it.
First point in our discussion here
would be the relationship of different
theories regarding human performances
and the commanders thinking and role as
decision maker.
Humans
are
not
simply
deterministic input-output devices but
goal-oriented creatures that actively select
their goals and seek the relevant
information. The commander as a human
being is subject of the same laws of
behaviour and paraphrasing Rosenbluth
and Wiener has a teleological behaviour
which is modified during its course by
signals from the goal15. Although
teleological behaviour is not understand as
dependent on the feedback during its
course, in case of the commandant this
works as a adaptive behaviour that is based
on means for selection and regeneration of
successful patterns of behaviour for use in
subsequent situation.
In military realm and particularly at
the operational level where the war is more
art than science, such kind of behaviour is
counterproductive by simple motive that
once the enemy understood the
commander patterns become a matter of
time the day of defeat. This happened to
Napoleon at Waterloo battle that put an
end his rule as Emperor of the French. The
reason for this was very simple.
Napoleons tactics became routine ones
and expectable for his former enemies and
also the arrival of a very skilfully
combined prosaic general Gebhard
15

A. Rosenbluth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow,

Behavior, purpose and teleology, Phil. Sci., vol. 10,
pp 18-24, 1943
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Leberecht von Blcher, and the false

movement that favoured this arrival.
Psychologically this can be
explained by the reasoning of the actions.
Napoleon was in a familiar environment
and therefore his activity was not goalcontrolled but rather oriented towards the
goal and controlled by a set of rules which
has proven successful previously. Rest on
this rationale, the contemporary military
exercises for decision are calibrated in a
very unfamiliar environment and situation
where proven rules are not available. In
this case the commanders behaviour may
be goal-controlled in the sense that
different attempts are made to reach the
goal and a successful sequence is than
selected.
Now lets go further and to analyze
these in the framework of Jens Rasmussen
article Skills, Rules, and Knowledge;
Signals, Signs, and Symbols, and Other
Distinctions in Human Performance
Models. According him, there are three
types of human behaviours which in fact
represent different ways of performing in a
deterministic environment or system.
These types of behaviour are skill-based,
rule-based and knowledge-based.
The
skill-based
behaviour
represents sensory-motor performance
during acts or activities which, following a
statement of an intention, take place
without conscious control as smooth,
automated, and highly integrated patterns
of behaviour16. This type of behaviour has
a very less influence on decision making
process due to the fact that is appropriate
for routine tasks as assembly or drawing
tasks.
At the next level of rule-based
behaviour, the composition of such a
sequence of subroutines in a familiar work
situation is typically controlled by a stored
rule or procedure which may have been

derived empirically during previous

occasions, communicated from other
persons know-how as instruction or a
cookbook recipe, or it may be prepared on
occasion by conscious problem solving
and planning17. In this type the
performance is goal-oriented but it is
structured by "feed forward control"
through a set of well defined stored rules.
Control in this case is teleological because
the rules are selected from the previous
ones which were successful in a similar
situation. But in the case of military
decision making process these type of
commanders behaviour is the most
dangerous and usually leads in a fight
situation to defeat. The staff and
subordinate commanders may feel
comfortable with this type of command
because their tasks became routine ones
and the creative thinking is put away. Such
situation has to be avoided and although
the situation seems to be similar with a
previous one therefore it can have the same
solution, a multitude of unpredictable
factors acts differently and the result is
always different. In this case is
recommended for commander to apply
another solution following the results of
factors analysis done by his staff and
himself. This process of de-learning is
very difficult and therefore the commander
should be aware about this mechanism of
making decision rest on rule-based
behaviour and to avoid applying it during
MDMP. If still this behaviour is used by
commander than for sure he will loose the
agility and surprise that are essential for
victory.
In the case of the third level,
knowledge-based behaviour, the goal is
explicitly formulated rest on a broadly
developed analysis of the environment and
those factors which matter and influence
the current military situation. This is in
essence the case of the MDMP as a
planning tool. I will not develop here more

16

Jens Rasmussen, Skills, Rules, and Knowledge;

Signals, Signs, and Symbols, and Other Distinctions
in Human Performance Models, IEEE Transactions
on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-13,
no. 3, May / June 1983, pp. 258

17

Idem, pp. 259

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advanced by K. Khalili Damghani18. I his

opinion19 modelling for decision making
involves two distinct parties, one is the
decision-maker and the other is the modelbuilder known as the analyst. In military
structures first represent the commander
and second the staff. The analyst is to
assist the decision-maker in his/her
decision-making process and therefore, the
analyst must be equipped with more than a
set of analytical methods20. Lets see what
happen when the decision is made in
uncertain conditions.
Talking about the failure and
wrong decision we should have a look to
the conditions which drive to this. Earlier I
have spoken about the uncertainty, leak of
information and how these conditions are
encountered and solved during MDMP.
In decision making under pure
uncertainty, the commander as supreme
decision-maker (but not only him, his staff
also) has no knowledge regarding any of
the states of nature outcomes, and/or it is
costly or impossible to obtain the needed
information21. In such cases, the military
making-decision process depends merely
on the decision-maker's personality type
and his/staff assumption regarding missing
information. All these assumptions are
considered as true during the plan building
and are replaced with facts as soon as they
are proved or replaced by other if they are
proven as false. These assumptions have a
crucial importance because let the process
run for reaching a timely decision which in
military case, although is not the best one

because I have done this in the previous

chapter.
The second point in our discussion
is about organisational factor and how this
is or can be used by commander to avoid
ill results of military making decision
process. In this respect is known that in
case of accidents or in our case defeat, is
definitely attributed to the human factor.
But either in this case we should make the
difference between a mistake done by
commandant and those done by the staff.
As I stated before the commander bear the
burden of responsibility but the staff
undertake the role of decision shaper and is
the structure which feeds up the
commander with the results of different
factorial analysis in order to facilitate the
decision. In these cases we have to face
with both sharp end and blunt end failures.
But in real life the things are not so simple.
In the case of decision which leads to
defeat (disaster or accident) which type of
failure can be considered as being, sharp or
blunt end. Practically is a blended type.
The failure can be attributed to the
commander and in this case we have a
sharp end. But in this case on whom
analysis and information commander rest
on? It is not a blunt end type of failure?
Yes, it is and therefore the organisational
factor has a vital importance in MDMP.
For diminishing these ill situations,
the MDMP is run in headquarter (HQ)
which has a very clear structure and
strictly internal rules. But in the same time
the rules are flexible enough and the
commander has the possibility to reshape
the HQ and to adopt its structure to his
need and/or situational demands. This
flexibility allow a better understanding of
situation and facilitate the decision process
transforming it in a more decentralised and
participative one than is usually. The
responsibilities are shared and decision is
adopted in a small group of people usually
representing the heads of different HQs
structural entities. This is closely related
with civilian concept of modelling

18

Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of

Engineering, Islamic Azad University, Science &
Research Branch from Tehran, Iran
19
K. Khalili Damghani, M. T. Taghavifard, R.
Tavakkoli Moghaddam, Decision Making Under
Uncertain
and
Risky
Situations,
http://www.ermsymposium.org/2009/pdf/2009damghani-decision.pdf, pp. 2
20
Arsham H., A Markovian model of consumer
buying behaviour and optimal advertising pulsing
policy, Computers and Operations Research, 20(2),
35-48, 1993
21
apud, Biswas T., Decision Making Under
Uncertainty, St. Martin's Press, 1997

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is better than a perfect one but not timely

adopted. The main sources of errors in
such decision-making problems for the
commandant are: false assumptions, not
having an accurate estimation of the
situation (staff estimate), relying on
expectations which are not in accordance
with the capabilities under his command,
difficulties in measuring the utility of
combat function, forecast errors, morale
and other unpredictable enemy action, etc.
And this is not all. The uncertainty is
doubled by risk that implies a degree of
uncertainty and an inability to fully control
the outcomes or consequences of such an
action. Risk or the elimination of risk is
another effort for which commander
employ so called risk assessment
procedures. However, in some instances
the elimination of one risk may increase
some other risks. Effective handling of a
risk requires its assessment and its
subsequent impact on the decision process.
In this case decision analysis in
general assumes that the commandant
faces a decision problem where he must
choose at least and at most one option from
a set of options. In some cases this
limitation can be overcome by formulating
the decision making under uncertainty as a
zero-sum two-person game. In decision
making under pure uncertainty, the
commandant has no knowledge regarding
which course of action is "most likely" to
happen. He is probabilistically ignorant
concerning the courses of action therefore
he cannot be optimistic or pessimistic. In
such a case, the commandant usually
invokes consideration of security and force
protection which in fact is his first concern.
Notice that any technique used in decision
making under pure uncertainties, is
appropriate only for the private life
decisions. Moreover, the commander has
to have some knowledge of how the
courses of action were developed (to
participate actively in the process) in order
to predict the probabilities of their
occurrence. Otherwise, the commander as
decision-maker is not capable of making a

reasonable and defensible decision for

employing his forces in operation and
achieving the objectives and mission22.
Another very interesting approach
toward decision-making in military field
would be the cultural one. This is
extremely important particularly in the
peace support operation missions that are
mainly conducted in a multinational
framework, oversees in a different cultural
environment. Beside, the officer who
usually fill the position in such HQs are
from different nations and in spite of all
established internal agreed standing
operating procedure still pay tribute to
their native culture, norms, customs and
national stakeholders. In this respect, not
too many authors have discussed or
advanced some decision-making models
that incorporate culture and other specific
elements such as ethics, moral, and,
stakeholders. Some American authors for
example, proposed a decision-making
model represented by a knowledge-based
approach to policy governance for the
American
Society
of
Association
Executives23. According to them, the
model is a system that leads to what the
called consultative leadership. Although
this method makes information available
for individuals and groups to make
decisions, there is a strong ethical analysis
that needs to be done before any decision
can be made. The same happened in those
multinational HQs which although should
be an impartial ones, a lot of national
caveats are put into force and therefore the
decision is at most times delayed or
partially implemented.
The ability to deal with real-life
ethical dilemmas is necessary in the
complex military operational environment
and seems to be much more important now
22

apud, Beroggi G., Decision Modeling in Policy

Management: An Introduction to the Analytic
Concepts, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1999
23
Tecker, G., Bower, C., & Frankel, J., ASAE's new
model
of
decision
making,
Association
Management, 1999, pp. 51, 43-48.

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a day as it was in the past due to the

increased multinational structures. In this
respect, another important contribution in
terms of dealing with cultural-ethical
issues in decision making was made by
Meneghetti and Seel24. They have
proposed a decision model that helps to
deal with ethical dilemmas. Ethical
dilemmas may contribute to the possibility
of making wrong or right decisions. Their
model offers a non-prescriptive four-step
process for analyzing an ethical dilemma
and making an ethical decision. The
authors also recommended that the terms
values, ethics, and morality be well defined
before analyzing the model. According to
them, value is a strong held belief and
attitude about what is wanted. There are
two types of values: Those that are private
and called moral values and those that are
public and termed ethical values. Moral
values have a primary impact on peoples
personal lives and are influenced by
culture, religion, and family. For example,
a moral value could be what people think
about drinking alcohol. Ethical values are
universally accepted beliefs about right
and wrong. For instance, an ethical value
could be what people consider honesty.
Cultural diversity is not a transitory
condition that enables the planning on the
assumption of mutual understanding. Conversely, a number of studies have shown
that cultural diversity is a continuous phenomenon that occurs when people from
different cultures think, communicate, and
behave based on their core values. Culture
is also a complex intermix of determinants.
Although the so-called national culture
influences people's behaviours, other
strong elements such as family, gender,
profession, religion, and so forth help to
meld an individual's cultural profile.
The current
literature have
supported the premise that culture dictates

the way individuals and groups solve their

problems because it influences how people
think, behave, and communicate. Each
culture has its own set of core values and
basic assumptions, which compound a
framework of cultural orientations.
However, to deal with cultures and
stakeholders differences effectively, it is
necessary to acquire cultural competence,
which is a concept that helps overcome the
natural barriers imposed by the explicit
components of a culture in order to
comprehend
its
underlying
basic
assumptions. Once cultural competence is
learned, it is possible to reconcile the
stakeholders potential cultural differences.
However, to understand a groups
culture and predict its behaviour, it is
imperative to comprehend its deeper issues
as they represent the dimensions of a
culture and are what make it
distinguishable from other cultures.
Several studies25 provided conceptual
models that elucidate the essential
components of a culture and propose
cultural orientations to business practices.
However, the decision-making science
lacks a reliable theoretical model that
elucidates a potential central role of culture
in the decision-making process. In
addition, current decision-making models
that embrace culture do it only marginally
by highlighting a few cultural aspects such
as ethics and values.
4.

Conclusions

Most people often make choices

out of habit or tradition, without going
through the decision-making process steps
systematically. Decisions may be made
under social pressure or time constraints
that interfere with a careful consideration
of the options and consequences. Decisions
may be influenced by one's emotional state
at the time a decision is made. When
people lack adequate information or skills,

24

Menehetti, M. M., & Seel, K., Ethics and values

in the nonprofit organization. In T. D. Connors
(ed.), The nonprofit handbook: Management, 2001,
pp. 579-609, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

25

Adler, 1991; Brake, Walker & Walker, 1995;

Hofstede, 1997; Schein, 1992; Trompenaar, 1994

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they may make less than optimal decisions.

Even when or if people have time and
information, they often do a poor job of
understanding
the
probabilities
of
consequences. Even when they know the
statistics; they are more likely to rely on
personal experience than information about
probabilities. The fundamental concerns of
decision
making
are
combining
information about probability with
information about desires and interests.

7.
8.

9.

Bibliography
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Arsham H., A Markovian model of

consumer buying behaviour and
optimal advertising pulsing policy,
Computers
and
Operations
Research, 1993.
Beroggi G., Decision Modeling in
Policy
Management:
An
Introduction to the Analytic
Concepts,
Boston,
Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1999.
Biswas T., Decision Making Under
Uncertainty, St. Martin's Press,
1997.
FM 3-0, Operations, Headquarters,
Department of Army, February
2010, Washington.
FM 5-0, The Operation Process,
Headquarters,
Department
of
Army, March 2010, Washington.
Jens Rasmussen, Skills, Rules, and
Knowledge; Signals, Signs, and
Symbols, and Other Distinctions in
Human Performance Models, IEEE
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10.
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Cybernetics, Vol. SMC-13, no. 3,

May / June 1983.
John Adair, Great Leaders, Talbot
Adair Press 1989.
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Making,
Gower
Publishing
Company. 1985.
K. Khalili Damghani, M. T.
Taghavifard,
R.
Tavakkoli
Moghaddam, Decision Making
Under Uncertain and Risky
Situations,
http://www.ermsymposium.org/200
9/pdf/2009-damghani-decision.pdf.
Michael I Handel, Masters of War,
Frank Cass & Company, 1992.
S. K Saini., Role of Intuition in
Military Command, Journal of
defence Studies, Winter 2008.
12. Robert Jacobs, Bayesian Decision
Theory, Department of Brain &
Cognitive Sciences, University of
Rochester.
13. Tecker, G., Bower, C., & Frankel,
J., ASAE's new model of decision
making, Association Management,
1999.

This work was made possible through

financial support provided through the
Sectoral Operational Program Development
of Human Resources 2007-2013, cofinanced by the European Social Fund, in the
project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with
the title Security through knowledge
Integrated/educational
network
of
training, counseling and guidance of PhD
students for a career in research of
security, defense, public order and national
security - SECNETEDU.

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THE MANIFESTATION OF HYBRID THREAT IN CONTEMPORARY

MILITARY ART
Dan-Lucian PETRESCU
MAJ, PhD student, Specialist officer in Scenarios and own forces operations Bureau
Simulation Training Center/ Carol I National Defense University
dan_petrescu1@yahoo.com

Abstract: Military-political developments of the last decades have been marked by profound
changes in the approach to the conflict by participating actors. The fulminating dynamics of
technology development with significant effects in the equation of modern conflict, the
changes in preparing and conducting the combat and the combat power imbalance on the
parties to the conflict have led to the need to adapt the concepts and statements representing
the content of contemporary military art. In this article I intend to define the concept of hybrid
threat and to highlight the expression of this phenomenon at military art levels: strategic,
operational and tactical. In essence, the major objective of this paper is to identify and define
the effects of hybrid threat in the context of contemporary operational environment at
strategic, operational and tactical dimension, including and the causal links among them. The
proposed hypothesis is focused on the assertion that the effect of cumulated threats that
compose the hybrid threat is much greater than the cumulated effects of the same components.
In other words, the threats resultant effect is greater than the threats effects resultant. This
is the relationship of effects that contemporary military art must take into account in the
process of continuous adaptation to the realities of modern operational environment to secure
the success of current and future military actions.
Keywords: threat, hybrid, military art, military conflict, operational environment
Military art is an important branch
of military science which includes all
scientific aspects of the principles,
procedures, methods and rules for
preparing and conducting military actions
as a whole and those carried out for each
category of forces and branches
composing the military instrument, for all
forces participating in military conflict. In
essence, the military art is the specialized
field of preparing and waging armed
combat.
Besides
the
principles,
procedures, methods and rules of
preparing and waging military actions, the
military art also includes personal skills
necessary
for
commanders
and
subordinate forces to obtain and secure
success.
Since the most remote times,
military theorists have identified the fact
that military art involves two sides with a
high degree of interdependence: a

theoretical and a practical one. Although

most of them thought that practice is
superior to theory in importance, we
should not minimize the significance of
the theoretical concepts of military art. It
should be taken into account that the two
are totally dependent on each other and
complement each other, even if there is a
temptation to emphasize a clear boundary
between them: Where the logician draws
the line, where the premises stop which
are the result of cognition - where
judgment stops, there Art begins []
where the object is creation and
production, there is the province of Art;
where the object is investigation and
knowledge Science holds sway.1 From
1

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Chapter III, part 2

available
at
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1946/1946h/1946h.htm

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these words, we might be tempted to think

that von Clausewitz takes military art
outside the military science, "drawing a
line" between the two, because their
results are different in nature. However,
when carefully analyzing what the two
constituent parts of military art involve,
we can conclude that although the "art"
term implies a dynamics which results in a
product, it also infers a series of scientific
notions which, undoubtedly, serve to
provide the theoretical foundation of art,
to direct its profound applicative aspect so
that the final product would be one of
exceptional quality. Another angle of the
military art concept analysis is developed
by the fact that, generally, the art is
associated with talent, being attributed, to
the extreme, to a genius. "A military
genius creates, does art; a military
commander except the genius, skillfully
uses the methods of combat and military
science principles inferred by the practice
of war, in other words he does military
science(:). In the absence of a genius,
leadership of war will henceforth need
judgment (intelligence) and science.
Science gives us knowledge and reasoning
(intelligence) provides the means to use
this knowledge to the execution of the war
(knowing what to do is one thing, be able
to do it is another). For military geniuses
do not come when called, we will have to
make do with the abilities formed by
science."2 In other words, we can say that
the successful military actions are the
expression of brilliantly applying the
system of knowledge that is theoretical
content of military art. On the other hand,
all theoretical knowledge is in a
continuous process of refinement and
adjustment, as a result of the findings and
lessons learned from the practice of war.
In conclusion, we must mention
that the two aspects of the military art,
theory and practice, exist and are closely
interlinked. The outcome of military art
which is success in military action can be

outstanding only through the combined

contribution of the two. A commander, no
matter how talented he might be, has
noticeable and enduring results only if he
achieves complete and sound knowledge
of military action. Conversely, a
commander, no matter how much military
knowledge he might have, cannot achieve
and secure success without the talent (and
luck...) to make use of them.
The facet of scientific theory of
military art has a complex structure and
consists of the following components
which are hierarchically arranged levels:
strategy, operational art, and tactics.
Military strategy is the highest
level of the military art and involves a
system of principles and knowledge about
leading a war, military campaigns and
strategic operations undertaken to achieve
the strategic goals and through them, the
pursued political outcomes. The subject of
military strategy is structured in several
directions, among which the most
important relate to the character of future
war, to preparing the country and the
military forces for waging it, to planning
for the war, to the permanent adaptation
of the armed forces capabilities in order to
use them in a future war, to procedures
and forms of conducting the combat.
Military strategy is the most important
part of the military art which defines the
relationship between the political and the
military side of the war, it sets at the
highest level how to integrate the armed
forces into the instruments of force
destined to achieving the goals of the war.
Its role in the military art is to guide and
direct the operational art and tactics,
placing them in a unique design in order
to fulfill the strategic military objectives
and, thereby, leading often decisive
actions to achieving the general, the
political aim of the war.
Operational art is a relatively new
area of military art which establishes the
link between military strategy and tactics.
Romanian Army Doctrine defines
operational art as "the skillful engagement

Constantin Hrjeu, Pregatirea armatei pentru

razboi. Studiu de organizare, de psihologie si de
instructiune militara, Bucharest, Graphic workshops
SOCEC, 1921, p.191.

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of the military instrument in order to

achieve strategic and/or operational
objectives, by design, organization,
integration
and
management
of
campaigns, operations, battles and
fights."3 By setting military operational
objectives, the initiation of specific
actions and the planning of resources are
performed in order to obtain and secure
the success in the military campaign. The
operational art subject covers theoretical
and practical aspects of conducting
military campaigns and operations of all
categories of forces that make up the
military instrument. The principles,
procedures and rules of preparing and
waging military campaigns are developed
in line with the laws and principles of
armed combat, with the modern
capabilities generated by technical means
as well as with the features of
contemporary operational environment.
In operational planning process,
operational art expresses the ability
(enhanced by creativity, imagination and
intuition) to plan and execute deployment,
use of force and extraction, with the joint
capabilities integration, together with
other means, in a set of military actions
undertaken in space and time, in order to
achieve military objectives set and the
desired end state. During planning and
conducting
military
campaigns,
commanders and staff must understand
that
major
joint
operations
are
combinations of simultaneously executed
tasks that change often during the
campaign and are in close causal
relationship.
Consequently, we can say that
operational art requires from commanders
the ability to anticipate future actions in a
broad vision and to understand the
connection between the goals, ways and
means. The operational art is based on the
commander and staffs skills and abilities
to resolve complex problems that occur in
the theater, through processes specific to
3

operation management and operational

design. The latter defines the situational
environment and relates to the formulation
and development of general idea and the
commander intention on how to execute
the operation, based on situation general
assessments and mission analysis.
Tactics is placed at the base of
the military art hierarchy and contains
principles, forms, methods and procedures
of preparing and waging armed combat.
Tactics subject covers military actions
conducted in the operational environment
by tactical units of the armed force. The
role of tactics is to establish tactical
military objectives, to initiate actions and
to direct the use of resources at this level
for the benefit of the structures involved
in achieving success in military actions.
Although distinct areas, the three
levels of military art are closely
correlated, so that they form a whole. In
summary, while the strategy is meant to
define principles of conducting strategic
operations
and
overall
warfare,
operational art studies the principles of
preparing and waging military campaigns
and operations carried out in the theater of
operations and tactics determines the
rules, principles and procedures related to
preparing and conducting armed combat
carried out by armed forces tactical units.
The idea that an actor can
generate throughout the operational
environment a threat that combines
conventional forces governed by the
military traditional rules and standards
with unconventional forces running
irregular operations has existed for a long
time. Throughout history, it often
happened that an actor with less military
power to target the stronger opponents
vulnerabilities and to take advantage of
the means available in order to achieve
strategic goals. Next we conceptually
analyze the hybrid threat, starting from its
definition and going further by identifying
its constituents so that, at the end, we can
display the characteristics of posing this
type of threat and those of the resulting

*** Romanian Army Doctrine, Bucharest, 2012.

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effects.

superior capabilities of some military

actors has led to diverse endeavors
undertaken by some potential opponents
to identify certain niche abilities and
capabilities, specific combination of
technological measures and new tactics to
eliminate this imbalance of forces and to
gain advantage at strategic, operational or
tactical level. These attempts have led to
the hybrid threat that generates the hybrid
war. The concept of hybrid war emerged
and was developed in the last decade by
American military specialists6 to highlight
the need to continuously adapt the US
military forces to the realities of modern
operational environment. The initiators of
the concept development established a
group in US Marine Corps, led by James
N. Mattis and Frank G. Hoffman.7 In
2005, the two published the article "Future
Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars"
showing that the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq have decisively influenced the
balancing of US strategic thinking that
now takes into account some more viable
ways to answer towards the wide range of
threats to US interests. Returning to the
concept of hybrid threat, it can be defined
as a state or non-state type of opponent
employing in adaptive and concerted ways
political, military, economic, social or
informational
means
in
certain
combinations of conventional and
unconventional action methods, in order
to achieve the desired objectives. The
term hybrid threat is an interesting and
valuable expression since the concept has
to achieve the following goals:
- providing a description of the
evolving nature of modern conflict;

Contemporary
operational
environment displays a composite system
of actors, conditions and circumstances,
placed in a well-defined space and which
directly affects the use of military
capabilities, based on the decisions of
commanders. It includes, on one hand, all
enemy, allied or neutral forces and
systems participating in the full spectrum
of conflict, and, on the other hand, the
physical and information environment, the
factors of governance and political
decision, the level of technology, the local
resources and culture. The actors
participating in conflict fall within a wide
range of categories, from regular forces,
belonging to a state or alliance, to specific
structures of non-state actors, as well as to
governmental
or
non-governmental
organizations or groups. Adding to all
these various terrorist and/or organized
crime organizations, we complete the
picture which frames the environment for
conducting military actions. All actors,
allies or enemies, state or non-state,
regardless of technological and military
capabilities, will likely use every political,
economic, psychological, information,
military tool available to achieve their
objectives. In this context, the existing
threats are extremely varied and complex
and can be applied simultaneously,
resulting in the hybrid threat. In the
military field, the term of hybrid threat
was introduced4 to characterize the
complexity of future threats throughout
the operational environment, reflected by
the diversity of actors involved and the
weapons and technical means employed in
an innovative mix of tactics, techniques
and procedures in order to achieve the
desired goals5. Engaging in a conflict the

Lt. Col. Frank G. Hoffman was working for

Centre for Emerging Threats and Opportunities,
Quantico Virginia. General James Mattis was the
commander of Marine Corps Combat Development
Command, Quantico Virginia.
7
Frank G Hoffman, James N. Mattis, Future
Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Proceedings
Magazine, vol. 132/II/1,233, US Naval Institute,
November 2005, at http://milnewstbay.pbworks.
com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf

Frank G Hoffman, James N. Mattis, Future

Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Proceedings
Magazine, vol. 132/II/1,233, US Naval Institute,
November 2005, at http://milnewstbay.pbworks.
com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf
5
Ibidem. The hybrid war concept emerged in
2005.

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- changing the traditional thinking

and impelling military analysts in their
effort to find new ways and means of
action and organizational adaptation to the
challenges of contemporary operational
environment;
- highlighting the challenges that
modern conflicts generate on a more
complex perspective than the disparate
applying of single threats;
- stressing the need for raising
awareness of the potential risks in the
future operational environment.
When analyzing the ways of
applying the hybrid threat we must keep in
mind that in the contemporary operational
environment it expresses in at least two
ranges: configuration and action. In
configuration range, the hybrid threats are
used by state actors as much as by nonstate
ones.
Regardless
of
their
organizational structure, the configuration
of forces applying these threats is the one
that has the hybrid characteristics. Most
often, these forces are constituted as a
more or less organized mixture of
regular forces, irregular forces and special
forces, individuals or groups with
expertise in special areas such as
psychological operations, information
operations (mass manipulation, espionage
etc.), influencing political or economic
decision etc. Related to the modus
operandi, the aim is achieving the
objectives set by using any method or
means of action, of both conventional and
unconventional nature. The transition
from conventional to unconventional is
fast, depending on the situation (opponent,
environment,
vulnerabilities,
time
available etc.).
Another aspect of applying
hybrid threat refers to the set of criteria
used when assigning this nature to
operational environment threats. These are
the ways of action and force structure,
simultaneity, fusion and multimodality.
The ways of action and force structure these criteria give rise to the following
issues: can a threat be considered as

hybrid by the criteria of the ways of

combat or taking into consideration the
force structure? Is it enough to meet a
single condition or both are needed? We
believe that the hybrid aspect of the threat
is granted primarily by the way of
threatening, so it is enough when the
aggressor employs conventional and
unconventional methods at once to
achieve the objectives. The threatening
force has the structure imposed by the
situation. Simultaneity - can the threat be
considered
hybrid
whether
it
simultaneously comprises the definition
presented types or it is enough that they
emerge successively throughout the
conflict? We believe that the threat has a
hybrid aspect when it simultaneously
involves aggression in at least two of the
listed areas. Fusion - can the threat be
considered hybrid if regular and irregular
forces act together or if they act in
different areas? And when they act in
different areas, the actions of the two
types of forces should be coordinated or
not? Regardless the operating area or the
coordination level achieved, the condition
to be fulfilled is that the objective set for
the two types of forces is common.
Multimodality - can the threat be taken as
hybrid if it uses all four types of threat or
is using two or three of them enough? An
actor who uses hybrid threats will include
as many types of actions, depending on
available
resources
and
opponent
vulnerabilities. We believe that two or
more types of threat, employed in a
combined manner, leads to a hybrid
resultant.
In order to have a structured
approach to how the hybrid threat applies
to military art levels, we will present the
typology of threats that may arise in
contemporary operational environment
and which constitute the components of
the hybrid threat. As we mentioned, we
will specify their mode of expression at
the levels they apply and the effects each
of them generates towards other levels
which are not, however, subject to direct

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action.

term quad chart that defines the four

types
of
threats:
traditional
(conventional),
irregular
(unconventional),
catastrophic
and
disruptive. The enemy can employ two or
more types of threats in consecutive sets
or simultaneously to achieve the
objectives set. This results in the
expression of the hybrid threat. The
concept of an actor involved in the
conflict is using hybrid threat is related to
a combinative exploiting of technology
and/or methods of carrying the fight to
counteract or even to cancel the opponent
military superiority. This idea was echoed
in the US Military Defense Strategy and
also in the US Military Doctrine which
specifies that the most complex type of
threat is a simultaneously applied
combination of all four. Traditional
threats are usually applied with
conventional capabilities. The forces on
the both sides, whether regular forces or
special operations forces, are well defined,
employ tactics, techniques and procedures
present in their doctrines and use
conventional weapons systems aimed
primarily to target the opponent military
force. Confrontation means conducting
the armed combat through military actions
of aggression, carried out at all levels of
military art, in compliance with
international treaties and rules of
international humanitarian law. The aim
of actions undertaken at a certain level is
meeting the objectives accordingly, so
that they contribute to the achievement of
those specific to the higher levels.
Normally, in conventional conflicts,
achieving the strategic level is the
decisive factor in creating the conditions
that describe the desired end state and the
ultimate goal of the war. Irregular threats
are generated by an opponent who uses
unconventional means, most often in a
context of asymmetric conflict, to offset
the superiority of conventional force. A
weaker actor uses irregular threats to draw
the opponent into a protracted war
subjecting its forces to high degree of

For the analysis presented below

it is important to consider the following
characteristics of the hybrid threat: the
hybrid threat can be employed by state
and non-state actors; some elements of the
hybrid threat can be applied on a state
actor involved in a hybrid conflict at one,
two or all three levels of military art:
strategic, operational and tactical;
although they occur in direct action at one
or two levels, most hybrid threat
components can produce notable effects at
other levels of military art; as inferred
from the definition of hybrid threat, the
comprising elements apply on an actor
simultaneously, affecting in synergy as
many power sources as they can, thus
leading to diminishing its combat power
and finally to destroying the center of
gravity; in hybrid threat, employing
conventional methods and procedures of
combat, in terms of classical armed
combat, is in the background or is missing
altogether, being reduced only at the show
of force in order to produce the
psychological effect of deterring the
opponent; habitually, the structures
applying the types of threats that make up
hybrid threats are extremely versatile,
having, most of the time, a superior ability
to adapt the methods and procedures
employed. Therefore, developing tactics,
techniques and procedures to counter the
hybrid threat becomes a serious challenge.
We start from the fact that threats
are acts carried out by states, nations,
organizations, individuals or groups or
stand as conditions that may endanger life,
vital resources or institutions. Preparation
and application of these threats involves
the use of all available instruments of
power that can affect the operational
environment, particularly those situated in
the political, economic, military and/or
information areas. Nathan Freier was one
of the originators of the hybrid threat
concept when working on the National
Defense Strategy in the US Office of the
Secretary of Defense. He introduced the

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attrition resulting in diminishing or losing

its will to fight and thus its combat power.
Threats of irregular type include
terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare,
piracy, extremism, the actions undertaken
by groups of partisans (resistance),
organized crime and subversive actions,
mostly in economic and political
environment.
Of these, terrorism has the largest
share, scourge which, although is
characterized by spatially limited actions,
it creates devastating effects which are
perceived even at the strategic level by
influencing political decisions. Terrorism
involves violent acts or threats of violence
conducted by individuals or groups
particularly constituted and organized, in
order to influence a group of people or
targets beyond the immediate victims.
Terrorists use techniques and tactics of
asymmetric warfare and unconventional
means to achieve, through violence or
sabotage, political, ideological, ethnic and
economic or other objectives. The effect is
paralyzing psychologically, through fear
and intimidation, being carried out and
completed by imposing, through pressure
put on the targets, the conditions that
make them act according to the aims
pursued. The same mechanism (but with
lower intensity effects) is triggered by
subversive and insurgent actions and also
by piracy, but each of them shows some
differences. If terrorism involves usually a
direct action against civilians, insurgent
actions are mainly directed against the
instruments of state power to replace or
overthrow the political system from a
certain area or against the occupying
armed forces. In this way, the actions of
insurgency is executed directly at the
tactical level to influence the political
decision and thereby the strategic level.
Partisans and guerrilla warfare
involve direct action at tactical level,
targeting the moral and physical attrition
of the enemy by causing human or
material
losses
without
direct
confrontation. The tactics used are based

on superior knowledge of the environment

and on the support of the local population.
They are mostly high mobility actions
such as ambushes, bombings, incursions,
sabotage and raids or surprise attacks on
vulnerable targets of the enemy. The
effects can be felt at strategic level by
influencing political decisions to the
extent that the actions performed aim
specific objectives such as obtaining
certain rights, local political regime
change, territorial separatism, state
autonomy or independence.
It is worth mentioning that if the
insurgency, guerrilla warfare or partisans
actions are increasing, especially by the
amount of power they carry, they can
degenerate into direct action even at
operational level, to be seen in major
armed
confrontation
followed
by
corresponding effects.
Subversive actions are those
carried out at the tactical level but
especially at the political level by state
actors or non-state actors that lead to the
collapse of the government, the economy,
the existing political system or are
undertaken in a conspiracy against the
social and political order. This type of
action is based mainly on corruption or
manipulation (through blackmail, threats,
violence etc.) of decision makers from the
respective area either in order to produce
damage or to obtain political, economic or
other advantages. This type of threat is
directed specifically against state actors
and leads to diminishing the political,
military and economic power, situation
which generates effects at the strategic
level.
According to the law, organized
crime involves the activities of any group
consisting of at least three people, among
which there are hierarchical or personal
relationship, allowing them to become
extremely rich or to control internal or
foreign territory, markets or sectors of
economic and social life, by using
blackmail, intimidation, violence or
corruption, pursuing committing crimes or

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infiltrating their agents into the real

economy. All these consequences create
effects at the strategic level by reducing
the combat power that can be generated
by a state actor. Catastrophic threats
typically involve the use of weapons of
mass destruction chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (WMDCBRN).
This type of weapon, if used, provides a
potential enemy the ability to generate
strategic and operational level effects.
Even when not used, the mere possession
of these weapons may cause such
psychological effects, of strategic impact,
that could discourage a possible opponent.
Disruptive threats are a type of threat that
involves most often the use of high-end
technology or highly sophisticated
methods to reduce the opponents
advantage in key areas. One category of
this area is mainly related to cyberspace,
including communications, information
collecting (sensors), processing and
dissemination capabilities, the ability to
manage different types of automated
systems or armaments etc. This category
of threats aimed at the strategic and
operational level and can generate effects,
especially at the strategic level, which can
temporarily paralyze or can seriously
affect military actions in some areas of
operations or the activity in certain sectors
of strategic importance for an actor.
Another category of disruptive
threats is made up of those pertaining to
the informational and moral domain. Here
are information operations (INFOOPS)
and psychological operations (PSYOPS).
They occur at all levels: strategic,
operational or tactical, and can lead to
manipulation of both military personnel
acting in an area or in a theater of
operations and the civilian population in
the area or international public opinion.
Overall, disruptive attacks may
use technological means and methods to
generate such a degree of confusion that
the target does not understand the nature
or the source of the threat, situation that
significantly delays the implementation of

countermeasures.
In conclusion, we can say that the
hybrid threat occurs at all levels of
military art (strategic, operational and
tactical) and the ways of expression and
the consequences on a state actor are
interdependent, both those within the
same level and from one level to another,
this situation leading to exponential
amplification of the resultant effect. In
this manner, the analysis of the effect
generated by the hybrid threat proves that
it is holistic and much more serious than
the sum of the effects of threats that
compose it.
Analyzing the hybrid threat leads
to the conclusion that the spatial
dimension of the operational environment
in which these kinds of conflict are carried
out extends far beyond the area of
operations and even the theater of
operations. Depending on the environment
in which they occur, certain components
of hybrid threat and their effects can be
localized right in the geographical area of
the state/states generating the military
force, even if the area of deployment and
development of military actions is at great
distance from it. Therefore, the hybrid
operational environment, as a framework
for the conduct of modern warfare,
presents a complex geometric layout with
areas concentrated around certain
objectives considered as targets by the
enemy employing the hybrid threat. If
analyzed using conventional conflicts
laws and principles, the arrangement of
these goals may seem to be rather chaotic.
Actually, for the opponent employing the
hybrid threat, the objectives are arranged
in a network configuration, the effects
obtained by neutralizing a target being
used in attacks on other targets.
Essentially, the main goals
intended in applying the hybrid threat of a
conflict are affecting the defense
capability and the potential to engage the
military effort, which will depress the
combat power that the target actor can
generate. It is important to specify that

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these goals can be achieved even without

engaging forces in major combat
operations, which are intensive resource
consumers and, moreover, can be proved
and sanctioned as such by international
security organizations.
Specialists in military art have
concluded that in modern conflicts, the
high-end technology and complex
weapons systems are no longer the
sufficient condition for success. To
counter the hybrid threat, most often, the
most important step is to determine who
the opponent is, such as an individual, a
group or a network of interconnected
groups. Subsequently, the focus falls on
the force. This must be designed so as to
exploit the hybrid opponent weaknesses,
to be able to engage all its components,
maintaining continuity and the increased
tempo of operations. This way, success
will be the result of men, of applying
creative thinking and of taking the
initiative to use a variety of tactics and
means.
Modern armed forces must be
able to perform a large variety of missions
within a joint and multinational frame, in
an uncertain and complex operational
environment, in frequently changing
situations, characterized by a wide range
of threats and types of actions taking place
simultaneously and generating concerted
effects. The chances of success in
confronting a hybrid opponent are
significantly augmented by employing all
instruments of power - political, military,
information, economic and legislative and by identifying and exploiting its
vulnerabilities.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.
12.

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2.
3.

*** Romanian army doctrine,

Bucharest, 2012
Carl von Clausewitz, On war
Constantin Hrjeu,
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organizare, de psihologie i de

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instruciune militar, Bucharest,

Graphic workshops SOCEC, 1921
Costic
ENU,
Lucian
STNCIL,
Constantin
POPESCU,
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militar, Curs, National Defense
University Publishing House,
Bucharest, 2010
Murean
Mircea,
Vduva
Gheorghe, Rzboiul viitorului,
viitorul
rzboiului,
National
Defense University Publishing
House, Bucharest, 2004
Petre Duu, Ameninri asimetrice
sau ameninri hibride: delimitri
conceptuale pentru fundamentarea
securitii i aprrii naionale,
National
Defense
University
Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013
Valeric Cruceru, Theory and
practice in modern guerilla
warfare (Short review), National
Defense University Publisher
House, Bucharest, 2013
Frank G Hoffman, James N.
Mattis, Future Warfare: The Rise
of Hybrid Wars, Proceedings
Magazine, vol. 132/II/1,233, US
Naval Institute, November 2005
Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid
Threats: Reconceptualizing the
Evolving Character of Modern
Conflict, Institute for National
Strategic
Studies,
National
Defense University, Strategic
Forum No. 240, April 2009
Frank G Hofmann, Hybrid vs.
Compound war, 1 October 2009
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*** JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed
Forces of the United States, 2013
*** AJP 01(B), Allied Joint
Doctrine, 2002
*** AJP-01(D) Allied Joint
Doctrine, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization,
NATO
Standardization Agency (NSA),
December 2010
*** AJP-3.4.4, Allied Joint
Doctrine for Counterinsurgency

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(COIN), North Atlantic Treaty

Organization, NATO
Standardization Agency (NSA),
2011

Fund, under the project number

POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385 with the title
Integrated/educational network for the
formation, counseling and orientation of
doctoral students for a research career in
security, defense, public order and
national
security
domains
SECNETEDU.

This work was possible with the financial

support of the Sector Operational Program
for Human Resources Development 20072013, co-financed by the European Social

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247

SOME CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING ECONOMIC SECURITY

AND FINANCIAL STABILITY OF THE ROMANIAN BANKING
Eduard Paul PETRESCUL
Mkt. Specialist, B.C.R.
eduard.petrecul@yahoo.com

Abstract: The economic security of a country is given the stock of resources and level of development which
must be seen in close connection with national security and national interest, economic policy promoted
interests in the medium and long term, the degree of participation international economic circuit .Economy and
finance economic potential of a country is influencing the military potential of public order and security , so
security .
Keywords: security / economic insecurity; national security objectives; the economic dimension of security;
threats, risks, vulnerabilities; strands.

economic environment providing

a powerful, dynamic and competitive and
entrepreneurial investment plan and the
financial stability of the state budget

Brief introduction
National Defence Strategy aims to
establish strategic steps necessary to
strengthen the credibility of Romania,
promoting continuity and predictability
that deriving from membership of NATO
and the European Union. At the same time,
necessary expansion and consolidation of
strategic partnership with the United States
and other strategic partnerships and
cooperative
relations
with
other
international actors .Strategia relate
primarily to the Constitution according to
which Romania is a national, sovereign,
independent and indivisible. Hence, there
are natural national interests, including
security, to promote and defend, by
legitimate means, the values by which the
Romanian state guarantees the existence,
identity, development and stability, under
which builds its future international
security.
Promoting
national
security
interests as shown in the National Defence
Strategy is achieved through the effort to
establish guidelines state, embodied in
national security objectives:
increase national defense aimed
at ensuring the territorial integrity ,
sovereignty and independence of Romania
and the Romanian people's security

Elements known economic insecurity

Always, economic power generates
security and poverty produces uncertainty,
anxiety and insecurity. But security is not
just system of protection against evildoers
and insecurity is not confined to the
absence of such protection system.
Security is an important function of system
and process, a condition of the operation
and maintenance of a dynamic equilibrium
necessary coexistence in a complex
environment, always changing, tense
competition,
with
complicated
developments and often unpredictable.
As perspective, in operational
terms, the economic dimension of security
can be analyzed taking into account the
following indicators, along with the
specific area or region analyzed:
At national level, the state's
ability to manage problems such as
inflation, unemployment, quality of life,
unbalanced balance of payments, lack of
economic opportunities, the increased
protectionism, foreign dependence on
natural resources;

248

 the ability of states to maintain

independent production economically
military, reflecting the relationship
between economic and military power
Accepting economic security as a
public good , are where the most important
concepts and values they operate in
economic science underpinning current
growth paradigm. The reality of the
financial
crisis, the manifestations
measured by economic indicators,
solutions applied and qualifications
integrative - political crisis, crisis of
morality, systemic crisis - brought to our
attention with even greater force, but
through the compliance by topic economy,
man.

The main risk factors are:

misuse of the financial system to
channel funds of illegal origin (money
laundering through bank accounts)
increased corruption
reactions sometimes inefficient
state institutions to deepening the
phenomenon of money laundering
The risk itself has a variable character
and variables, either by themselves or in
combination with others, may increase or
decrease the potential risk presented
thereby influence the level of preventive
measures deemed appropriate, such as
measures of customer due diligence.
Therefore, there are situations in which it
would be applied to the enhanced due
diligence and the like may be appropriate
to the precaution simplified.
Vulnerabilities are consequences of
dysfunction or systemic weaknesses that
can be exploited or contribute to a threat or
hazard. Corruption vulnerabilizeaz state
generates harm the economy and affect the
country's development potential, good
governance, the decision for the benefit of
citizens and communities, as well as trust
in the judiciary and state institutions.
Externally, the persistence of corruption
has a negative impact on the credibility
and image of our country.
The main vulnerabilities are:
bank financial system's inability to
adapt to rapid economic requirements
transactions with large sums of
money that are not consistent with the
client's economic profile
requests from customers or their
representatives to conduct transactions
with large sums unjustifiably using cash or
payment instruments inconsistent with
usual practice and the nature of the
transaction.

1. Threats, risks and vulnerabilities

Threats are capabilities, strategies,
intentions or plans that may affect values,
interests and national security objectives.
Threats in regard to the phenomenon of
money laundering are:
design and enforcement schemes of
money laundering
discrete mixture of permanent and
illegal capital to have ensured their
integration into the formal economy
ensuring full anonymity and security
of persons and entities involved in money
laundering
hide the true origins of the financial
product and the exact identity of
individuals and groups receiving large
criminal money laundering operations
Risk is the probability of manifestation
of an uncertain event, with direct or
indirect impact on naionale security.
Achievement Romania's development
objectives can be generated by persistent
economic difficulties, the proliferation of
shadow economy and corruption, tax
evasion, precarious infrastructure, but also
of factors and external perpetuate the
development gaps at EU level and low
level of resistance to major turbulence in
foreign markets, particularly the banking
and financial area.

249

Romania is appreciated as having,

particularly at regional level, an important
geostrategic location, it is on oo route
commonly used by criminal organizations
to introduce contraband into the European
Union, cigarettes, alcohol, counterfeit
currency, drugs. The concept of economic
security is useful as long as it has a direct
practical implementation.
STRENGTHS
WEAKNESSES
well-developed political
corruption
decisions
updating the legislative
reactions
framework
inefficient state
institutions
resizing economic
lack of a proper
policies
economic
strategy
economic matters
destabilization
inclusion in the national
defense strategy

Romania's National Security

Strategy identified inefficient reactions
of governments in the face of deepening
economic crime, corruption and
proliferation emphasizing economy, as
vulnerabilities in the country's internal
situation, the impact on national
security
SWOT analysis
Threats
Risks
eastern
underground economy
neighborhood
proliferation
devising schemes
proliferation of
for money
corruption
laundering
concealing the true
proliferation of tax
origins
evasion
organized crime

precarious
infrastructure

potential damage external factors (offsets

to economic
at U.E)
development
2. Connections of other dimensions of
economic security with national security
In a world divided or perceived, in
a denouement conflict is even assumed
option is to configure the priority of a
security strategy military is subordinated to
an economic security led specifically to
satisfy it unconditional first - defense obviously an important constituent of
integrated national security. Such an
approach implies, as history and even
present examples shows, deprivation and
serious consequences for individuals and
the human community.
In the second aspect, a world in
which prevails diplomacy policy and
invests trust her especially through
multilateral treaties, so commitments to be
met, should be a primary concern for
economic security as a public good, given
the center the individual and resources
transformed by knowledge and his work,
which requires appropriate economic
policies of government a progressive
qualitative economic growth.

Any action that undermines

economic security, undermine the other
dimensions of national security. Instability
and economic insecurity is a symptom for
other security issues and can be a
fundamental issue for other forms of
insecurity (panal dismantling of social
unrest policy), which in turn increases
military risks. Meanwhile, a market
economy can not function without an
adequate legal system without developed
capital markets without a safe banking
system.
The economic security of the
nation depends not only on internal factors
but also external ones, including the
inevitably a regional economic and
geopolitical framework.
Money laundering
Transparency and health of the
financial markets are key to the efficient
functioning of economies but may be
jeopardized by money laundering . Getting
,, black money " , mainly in the informal

250

economy and corruption, is generally an

activity universally condemned in all
countries, but recycling funds through
harmless appearance puts you may escape
the attention especially on the background
tough competition in the market for
international capital.
Money laundering is a complicated
process that involves several steps and
many people and institutions. Recycling of
funds is a complex activity that revenue
from criminal activity are transported,
transferred, processed or mixed with
legitimate funds in order to disguise the
origin or ownership of those profits .
The fight against money laundering
has a double motivation. On the one hand,
the motivation to combat organized crime
and its expansion worldwide . On the other
hand, preserving the integrity of financial
markets and the market economy

goal of many criminal activities is to

generate profit for the individual or group
who commits the offense .
Money laundering is the processing
of the results of the crime in order to
disguise the origin of them illegal. This
process is critical because it gives the
offender the opportunity to enjoy the
proceeds of crime without revealing their
origin. Increased integration of global
financial systems and the removal of
barriers placed in front of the free
movement of capital have increased the
ease with which black money can be
washed and complicates the tracking of
money. Recent developments have shown
that money launderers increasingly
directing its efforts to hire more non-bank
intermediaries and non-financial. The fight
against money laundering invests its trust
in the awareness of a wide range of legal
persons that are not only the banking or

Source: http://voiculescuadevaruldespreica.ro/ce-este-spalarea-de-bani/

financial sector.
Using bank financial systems for
money
laundering
undermine
the
individual financial institutions and
ultimately the entire financial system .
If not controlled, the money
laundering can undermine the efforts for
the existence of open and competitive
markets, affecting the development of a

The need to combat money laundering

In recent years there has been any
recognition of the increasingly high that it
is essential to fight organized crime, the
criminals must be stopped, whenever
possible, from legitimizing the results of
their criminal activities by converting
funds from " Dirty " funds " clean " . The

251

 identifying and countering the

activities of the network of transnational
organized crime and dismantle criminal
groups
preventing and combating tax
evasion and other forms of economic and
financial crime
The soundness, integrity and
stability of credit institutions and financial
institutions and confidence in the financial
system as a whole could be seriously
jeopardized by the efforts of criminals and
their associates either to disguise the origin
of criminal proceeds or to channel lawful
or unlawful purposes terrorist.
Focusing on prevention and
preventive mechanisms in the sphere of
national security and defense of the
country,
that
better
anticipation,
knowledge and achieving a response
capability integrated, balanced, flexible
and agile. In the current context, in
addition to knowing the risks and threats in
all sources, manifestations, means,
techniques
anticipation
capacity
development, knowledge and education is
fundamental.
Prevention of threats to economic
security: The state provides a clear legal
framework and expertise to his business, a
stable banking system and over, a system
of effective and appropriate credit and a
favorable investment environment placing
local and foreign investments. At the same
time, ensure adequate monitoring of
payments and trade balance of the country
with opportunities to counter the unilateral
control of national resources by foreign
countries or by foreign corporations.
The changing nature of the threats
posed by money laundering and terrorist
financing, favored by the constant
evolution of technology and the means
available to offenders, requires rapid
adjustment and permanent legal framework
regarding third countries with high risk, in
order to address risks effectively and to
prevent new ones. International effort to
combat corruption also justifies the need to
pay special attention to these persons and

healthy economy. Economies with

growing
financial
centers
or
in
development, but with inadequate control
systems are particularly more vulnerable
than stable financial centers of countries
implementing effective policies to combat
money laundering. Differences between
national systems for combating money
laundering will be exploited by criminals,
who tend to move their networks to
countries and financial systems with weak
or ineffective countermeasures.
Developing economies to protect
themselves against money laundering both
inside and outside. The inner struggle
against money laundering fight against
graft, privatization fraud, bank fraud and
tax evasion. Developing countries must
also avoid being placed on the FATF list of
"uncooperative jurisdictions" and be
subject to economic and political
sanctions.
3. Courses of action to implement the
measures envisaged economic security
and financial stability Banking
According to the national defense
strategy action areas are:
providing the competition and
competitiveness by reducing factors that
affect the smooth functioning of the
business environment;
identifying interference liable to
affect the economic and financial decision
of strategic and combat acts of evasion of
scale;
identifying and countering crossborder organized crime performing highrisk activities with economic, social and
preventing access their mechanisms in
state and national economic resources;
knowledge of the objectives,
resources and directions of development of
clandestine
weapons
programs
conventional or weapons of mass
destruction and carrier vectors and
countering illegal shipments of strategic
goods.

252

to apply appropriate enhanced customer

due diligence in respect of persons who
hold or have held important public
positions internally or abroad and in
respect of persons of high rank in
international organizations .

refuse the account opening minimum,

postpone and / or refuse to perform
transactions in case of finding some
suspicions, including failure to submit
certain information and report to the client
ONPCSB about its operations .
As stated including paper title: " Some
considerations
concerning
economic
security and stability of the Romanian
financial-banking ' objective is to present a
personal opinion on current economic
security vulnerabilities and possible
address for Romania.
I started this work in developing
the "National Strategy for the period 20152019 Defence", presented during its few
elements of economic insecurity; threats,
risks and vulnerabilities but components
that were contained in a brief SWOT
analysis . We also made some connections
with other dimensions of economic
security and provision of national security
several courses of action to implement the
measures envisaged economic security and
financial stability Banking.

4. Money laundering
Money laundering and terrorist
financing are international problems and
the effort to combat them should be global.
In the bank's internal control system are
organized risk management function,
compliance function and internal audit
function. The risk management function is
comprised of the risk control function of
each business line. These functions are
organisationally independent of each other
so as and to the business lines they monitor
and control .
To have an effective risk-based
approach the customer, the risk-based
approach should be incorporated into the
bank's internal control system
Internal control procedures in
question should contain the following, but
not limited to:
Identification
and
Risk
assessment risks of money laundering and
terrorist financing by customer, product,
service and business also risk value and
risk assessment procedure.
Minimize risk - set and use
special tools to minimize the risks and
vulnerabilities identified;
Monitoring riscurilor- adoption
of information systems for the collection,
analysis and data renewal of customer risk
profile;
Documentation and banks need
to
adopt
policies
raportareadocumentation to identify, assess and
eliminate the risk of money laundering and
terrorist financing, and that reporting, bank
management.
Banks must take measures to
prevent involvement in processes of
money laundering and terrorist financing.
Actions taken must allow their banks to

In conclusion
The collapse of the national
economy has very serious effects on all
levels, from the economic security of the
individual and his family and continuing
with diminishing economic security of the
state, the action potential and response in
case of a conflict, and gain political
vulnerability, economic, military and
social state; economic security is more
than just a component of national security.
The economic security of a country
is given the stock of resources and level of
development, which must be seen in close
connection with national security and
national
interest,
economic
policy
promoted interests in the medium and long
term, the degree of participation
international economic circuit.
Economy and finance economic
potential of a country is influencing the
military potential of public order and
security, so security.

253

Achieving all these objectives

involves joint efforts of the political class
and civil society and the effective use of
human, material and financial resources
available to our country . I wanted so
taking the political class interests and
objectives
expressed
through
the
transparency of decisions and judicious use
of public funds and involvement of civil

society in developing safety culture and

open discussion of security issues.
Bibliography
1.
2.
3.

254

National Strategy for the period

2015-2019 Defence
ONPCSB- National Office Against
Money Laundering
www.fatf-gafi.org.

CHANGES IN CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING SECURITY POLICIES

IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION
Cristian RUSU
PhD student, Carol I National Defence University
cristian1977rusu@yahoo.com

Abstract: Security policy is based on a series of decisions and strategies through which an international
organization or a state guarantee the security of its members or citizens. The security policy must be supported
by all those involved, in order to be seen as an expression of common political interests. It is superior to all the
other policies, to the military doctrine and security strategy, which tackle security only from the perspective of
certain issues. Security policy is also different due to a much broader range of topics it covers.
Keywords: security policies, national security, freedom and security, globalization, circumstances affecting
security.

arguments in the democratic countries

when the security policy is established.
The populations of the states agree
to concede, by the assumed security policy,
part of their rights and freedoms in
exchange for the protection provided by an
international organization, which has a
duty to maintain a defense system to
protect all its members; but in order to
prevent violations of the rights and
freedoms by these institutions, citizens
subject their activity to mechanisms of
civil control.
Security policy is centered on
determining
potential
risks
and
establishing real or possible opponents,
states, non state actors, or prevention of
adverse contexts caused by: diminishing
energy resources, social and ethnic
conflicts, mass migration, terrorism,
international criminal activities, food
shortages, pollution, climate change, etc. It
needs to adapt to these new threats, to
ensure the development of response
capabilities against these threats, to
promote the fundamental interests of the
state following the principles of
international law, through dialogue with all
international organizations and other states
interested in achieving worldwide stability.

Introduction
Security is one of those concepts
having a different meaning in each
historical era and it represents a rather
complex topic which exceeds the idea of
defense by using only military means. This
term can be found not only in the
discourses of politicians and staff from
institutions of public order, defense and
national security, but also in the
vocabulary of journalists and scientists
for each of these categories the term
security having a different meaning.
It has always been regarded as
being essential for a viable society and
most people would define it as a state of
facts which protects any state or human
collectivity against any risk of external and
internal threat. Security is a complex
socio-political process maintained through
political, economic, social, information,
legal, ecological and military approaches
whose goal is the security status based on
the rule of law.
The approach of defining the
concept of security is a difficult one in the
current era, given its many dimensions and
diverse dangers of the contemporary
world. It is delineated by two variables: for
whom the beneficiary and against
whom the disruptive factor; these
variables produce tensions and strong

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international organizations, states or

private persons from other areas as well.
Globalization favors the remarkable
progress in the economic, cultural and
social fields, unlimited access to
information, strong transfer of technology
and cultural products, as well as the
proliferation of threats to security that are
becoming increasingly difficult to predict
and control.
The world is constantly changing.
Alongside developed and economically
prosperous areas, characterized by stability
and respect for human values, there are
also vast poor and unstable regions on the
verge of disintegration, which are the
favorite place for preparing terrorist and
criminal groups, capable of producing
destabilization, insecurity and uncertainty.
One of the explicit trends in the
current international security environment
is the dominance of diffuse threats largely
imbedded or which potentiate each other,
usually ranked under the category of low
intensity, but with a huge psychological
impact.
The changes undergone lately by
the physiognomy of the world are essential
and profound. Alongside traditional states,
non-state structures emerged, which do not
fall within the historically set organization
and operation rules and principles of states.
At the same time, there has been a
development of mafia organizations, drug
or human trafficking cartels, events which
have
imposed
adjustments
and
restructuring at the level of both national
and
international
security
policy
organizations.
The
emergence
of
new
vulnerabilities and challenges to national
or international security, the outbreak of
new crises and conflicts have resulted in
widening the area of insecurity, at the same
time increasing the risk of the use of
military means to resolve some of these
crises and conflicts. The instability has
spread to countries in Asia and Africa,
where conflicts have become explosive,
generating a wide range of internal crises

Evolution of international security

environment
Security provision is a prerequisite
of economic development, of asserting the
collective and national interests, which is
increasingly dependent on the existence
and quality of relations between states, the
effectiveness of the political dialogue and
the level of involvement in dispute
settlements of international organizations
and most developed states, which will
always have a great responsibility in crisis
management, in compliance with and
enforcement of international law.
Domestic
and
international
realities, derived from the mutations
produced in the political, military,
economic, social, cultural, ecological
environments, mutations that took place at
global and regional levels, require
appropriate interventions for identifying,
recognizing, combating threats and
challenges to security, and reducing
vulnerabilities in relation to them.
Insecurity
has
as
main
reason
confrontations of powers seeking a higher
place in global hierarchy which would
ensure access to and control of strategic
resources and of decisions for establishing
global security policy.
Globalization, European and euroAtlantic integration, Russias concerns to
acquire a role in the international decisionmaking process, the stronger rise of Asian
countries in world politics, the increasing
tensions between the countries holding
nuclear weapons, all these aspects
characterize trends in the current security
environment.
The problem of international
relations can no longer be tackled without
having to take into account the effects of
these phenomena and their positive or
negative consequences, and the problems
that they create. The process of
globalization demonstrates that the events
taking place in some parts of the globe
have major repercussions on the

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and inter-state rivalries with social,

economic, ethnic, and religious character.
The increase in non-military areas
of
confrontation
prompted
a
reconsideration of the concept of power,
thus military power allowing political and
economic power to take over. We are
witnessing a re-evaluation of the military
factor, as a vehicle of politics, under the
terms of the transfer of roles between
military and non-military means which
tend to become a priority. Under these
circumstances, the use of the armed forces
in the settlement of crisis situations
remains the last option of the political
decision-makers.
The new wars are physically
located in some areas, but they involve a
variety of actors and transnational
relations, for example: international
television crews, foreign advisers, U.N.
delegates
and
non-governmental
organizations. These conflicts occur in
places where the states legitimacy no
longer exists, where there are criminality,
corruption, and conflicts between members
of civil society. These wars avoid
widespread confrontations, belligerent
groups trying to achieve their goals
through political control over the
population by sending off and attacking
those who are regarded as foreigners.
During these conflicts there has been an
obvious increase in the number of refugees
since the civil population became their
target.
During the wars between the nation
states, the war economy was centralized
and hierarchical, while the new war
economy is decentralized, the conflicting
parties being supported by foreign
governments, drug trafficking, illegal
weapon trade or fraud.
The aim of the parties involved is
political control, and the tactics used are
intimidation and terror. These wars are
local and global alike, due to the presence
of
various
external
groups
and
organizations.

The solutions negotiated between

warring groups raise many issues, because
negotiations may depend on individuals
accused of war crimes, and the belligerent
groups have a limited capacity to
implement the agreements they had made,
because their power is not based on
legitimacy.
Current security policies
A states security policy represents
a set of concepts, legal norms and actions
oriented towards the protection of the
interests of individuals, states or regions,
on the basis of which, using the most
effective instruments, the state achieves
knowledge, prevention, eradication and
combating threats, vulnerabilities and risks
impacting security.
Security policy defines the lack of
dangers, being expressed through the
following indicators: sustainable economic
development and prosperity for the
citizens; preventing and countering
aggression; the unhampered exercise of
rights and freedoms; balance and sociopolitical stability; freedom of decision and
action. It is aimed at achieving, through all
the security actors, the safety of
individuals by substantiating some major
objectives, drafting some strategies and the
allocation of the necessary resources. It
must take into account the distinct
dimensions - social, economic and security
- of each international organization or of
each state.
A problem in defining a realistic
security policy is the perception of the
citizens, especially when linked with the
lack of understanding the geo-strategic
environment. Security policies are
different from one organization to another,
from one member state to another, but they
must treat the following fundamental
aspects: the role of organizations or states
within the international system, their
obligations,
whether
favorable
or
unfavorable situations in which they need
to intervene.

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They are drawn up with the

participation of all structures with
responsibilities in the field of security,
bringing together the contributions of the
experts involved in their preparation
according to the extent of the threats to
which they relate. The development of
security policies must include all points of
view, because it will lead to a clearer
understanding and harmonization of their
final form.
The security policy is dependent on
the ideologies which build the political
system or regime, it outlines the mode of
action of the international organization, of
that state, and includes the sum of concepts
and guidelines which determine the
directions of internal and international
action, as well as the necessary resources
to protect, defend and promote the security
interests.
In order for the effectiveness of
security policy to be complete, it must be
established both through public debate and
through the contribution of experts in the
field. Due to these aspects, some
organizations or countries use vague terms
in its content, resulting in a diminished
effectiveness, while other organizations or
countries adopt both public versions and
classified versions of these documents.
Sometimes there is a conflict
between the leaders possibilities for action
and their obligations, which is why some
documents will make references to certain
issues rather than to who causes them;
however if the security policy should send
a clear signal to a certain entity, this entity
may be named.
The need to review the security
policy must be assessed according to the
costs, both human and material. These
revisions are necessary when significant
changes occur in the international security
environment or when it is established that
this is no longer appropriate. They should
not be made too frequently, because this
may require excessive use of resources,
mostly because it requires the participation

of all actors that are involved in its

implementation.
The implementation is carried out
through diplomatic, economic, military,
legal, information, scientific, cultural,
demographic, and ecological measures,
which are initiated and carried out by the
legislative and executive powers, in time
of peace, war or other special
circumstances. The security policy uses all
the resources of the international
organization or of the state, in comparison
to the defense policy that only uses its
military means.
In the context of globalization, the
distinction among these concepts has been
reduced considerably, new concepts have
emerged, and international relations have
evolved at the same time with security
policies depending on the following:
- the statute of the organization or
of the state in the international system. It is
very important to determine what type of
power that actor is: a superpower, a major
power, a regional or minor one;
- the international relations
subsystem which the international actor
belongs to; it is essential for the analysis of
the security policy to know the character of
the subsystem: multi polar - dominated by
several major powers, bipolar - structured
around two major powers or hegemonic dominated by a single power.
The security policy has evolved in
recent years to meet the current
requirements of the society. Traditional
dimensions, prevalent up to the end of the
cold war, which aimed at building safety
against possible military, political or
economic aggression coming from other
states, have altered due to changes
occurring in the international environment
that has adapted to cope with new threats
and risks. States and international
organizations have switched from a
defensive security policy, where the main
defensive methods consisted in increasing
internal capabilities to deal with these
aggressions or forming alliances that
opposed the common opponents, to a

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security policy that prevents threats and

risks.
Nowadays, the new vision on
security policy throws into the background
the possible conventional aggressions
between rival organizations or states and
classical security threats - those in political
and military sphere - losing first place and
being replaced by economic, social,
ecological, or ideological security threats.
The contemporary dimension of
international
organizations
security
policies, namely the states of North
America and Europe is aimed at defending
common security values and avoiding
unconventional aggressions, especially the
terrorist ones.
The security policy of small states,
whose interests and capabilities of
protection extend just at the subsystem
level of international relations which they
are part of, and which may not have global
policies to project their strength and
interests in remote areas, can be
characterized by the adoption of the
following positions on the international
stage:
- of survival, in the case of obtaining
independence. The fundamental
feature is the defense against a
possible aggression from the
former state actor that it has been
subjected to;
- of minor ally of regional alliances.
The fundamental feature is to
prevent the materialization of
irredentist aspirations of neighbors;
- of preserving territorial integrity.
The fundamental feature is defense
against possible aggressions due to
the low involvement of the major
powers in the region of that state;
- of survival. The fundamental
characteristic is the obedience
towards a hegemonic position of
another
state;
under
these
conditions national interests lie in
one of the following situations:
they can remain under internal
political control in terms of

organization,
but
they
are
subordinate to the interests of the
hegemonic state; national interests
can be totally subjected to the
interests of the hegemonic state;
national interests are organized on
two levels of defense against the
former hegemonic state and the
coalitions organized by opponents
of the former hegemonic state;
- of survival. The fundamental
feature is defense against possible
aggressions, due to the fact that in
its area there is no political-military
alliance and the security guarantees
are vaguely supplemented by some
international security organizations;
- of member of an international
security
organization.
Its
fundamental feature is joining this
organization. From the time of
accession, that state is secured in
the conventional sense, classical
aggressions can no longer be
considered a fundamental problem,
as in that event, the state has the
support
of
the
respective
organization.
Membership to an international
security organization compels the state to a
redefinition of its entire defense strategy.
By joining this organization, the state
should assume its values and it needs to
change its security policy that ought to
become fit for the goals of the international
organization.
The security guarantees and the
power relations involved in the
membership of these organizations make
the conventional threats against that state
be limited or improbable. From the
moment of admission, one does not make a
clear distinction between national interests,
the internal means to defend them and the
interests of the international security
organization. The security policy of the
state should concentrate on aspects which
can make an important contribution to the
organization, so its policy can no longer
turn to internal considerations. Due to the

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security umbrella of the organization, it

must be adapted to its members trends.

reject this wave of migration towards rich

countries might prove ineffective. They
will need to adopt measures to help poor
countries economically and to open up
markets for their products. Due to these
new and different developments, to the
technical-scientific pressure, to social or
national antagonisms, to the actions of
multinational companies upon states, to the
competition for more destructive and
harmful weapons, there is the possibility of
a special situation to emerge at
international level.
Building new security policies
based on trust and international
cooperation, democracy and modern
economy, ensuring and respecting human
rights become a very important process,
even if it requires specific political steps,
the use of some important economic and
financial resources over a period of time
much longer than was originally planned
in order to strengthen the new security
architecture.
Nowadays all states need to rethink
their security policies; they have a duty to
transform international obligations into
national laws, and to establish functional
domestic institutions to apply those
obligations.
The evolution of security policies
requires playing a more active role by the
civil societies and private sector in the
context of security systems. Reshaping
security policies should also include the
development of an appropriate culture of
security.
The impact of the world system on
national states will be felt in all areas of
security policy. The influence of external
factors on these national policies will not
diminish, but it will increase in the future.
In a globalized world, all problems
get over the state borders no matter if they
refer to terrorism, proliferation of weapons
of
mass
destruction,
diseases,
environmental degradation or economic
crises, none of these issues can be
addressed without significant coordination
and cooperation among several countries.

Evolution of the security policy

The global threats did not diminish,
but changed successively; the danger of a
major war was replaced by a variety of risk
factors, whose importance varies from one
region to another, the place of this danger
being taken by possible local, zonal,
continental conflicts of high or medium
intensity.
The realities of international life
deriving from the structural changes of the
political, military, economic, religious,
cultural and social environment, the
circumstances created in the strategic plan
globally, continentally and regionally
require adaptation measures of the security
policies.
The
supranational
integration
process will be the dominant phenomenon
of the 21st century, and the new economic
and political unions that will be formed
will engage in an aggressive competition
on the global market. Regional economic
zones will try first to strengthen
themselves continentally in order to deal
with the competitions between the
organizations integrated around the main
centers of power: the USA, Europe.
The 21st century will witness the
emergence of a new type of labor forces,
industries that use a lot of employees will
face bankruptcy, the work force will be
greatly reduced and other jobs will not be
created because current technologies
replace workers almost instantly. Even in
the event of economic recovery, the
unemployed have reduced opportunities to
be re-employed, since their positions just
disappear.
The dynamics of the fight for
global supremacy will lead to certain
neglect and marginalization of the poor
and underdeveloped states, which will
enhance the dimensions of migration from
poor countries to the rich ones. It is
possible that administrative measures to

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Although the economy, culture or

information have globalized, the security
policy remains linked to the state, even
though it has become less capable to
unilaterally resolve most of the current
security problems. The state remains the
main object of this policy, since policies
benefiting the entire population are
formulated and implemented at this level.
Security policies can be varied
depending on the action of various
geopolitical, economic, military, and
cultural factors. There are countries that
are not able to ensure their protection or
that of their citizens or of collective values
of their nations - these are weak states.
They have nothing to protect, the idea of
nation is frail, the socio-political cohesion
is weak, and its leadership is questioned.
Many of these states are a major danger to
their own citizens who become victim to
serious abuses, since they are not internally
protected by laws and strong institutions.
These countries that should be the
guarantors of security become major
sources of insecurity. Their security
policies reflect the narrow interests of
some of their leaders and their circle of
friends. These policies will aim to maintain
the internal status-quo and to find allies to
contribute to the suppression of internal
resistance.
In the case of democratic countries,
difficulties in establishing security policies
are of a different kind they have to
persuade citizens to support weak states to
overcome difficult situations, sometimes
even through wars that its own citizens do
not perceive as being necessary or
inevitable. The populations of these states
find it hard to accept the rigors and specific
sacrifices of war.
Tensions between states and
individuals often become visible because
the state, which is considered the guarantor
of defense against external threats, is
forced to impose certain costs on its
citizens, but there is also a major difficulty
for the political elites in developing a
strong culture which enables the

attainment of security objectives at a

tolerable cost level for the population.
International security organizations
intend to achieve unity between the
security policies of member countries in
order to promote common interests, in
order to facilitate economic and social
progress. The defense and the promotion
of these fundamental values are no longer
a direct problem for the governments of
the countries; they have become a
collective responsibility of all the states
concerned.
Conclusions
Reality requires new approaches to
political and diplomatic dialogue at
international level within the framework of
the security organizations in order to
establish appropriate security policies for
the conjugation of efforts to control threats
specific to the beginning of the
Millennium. The conditions of the present
security environment are favorable to relief
and cooperation on a worldwide scale,
which involves most of the worlds states.
However, there are enough threats that can
worsen the security status locally or
regionally.
International security organizations
have appropriate tools and strategies to
manage conflicts, new crisis arising, and to
rebuild failed states, but do not have
sufficient resources to change all weak
states and to rebuild them as strong ones,
on short and medium term. They will also
face the security policies of those states
that can become unpredictable, nontransparent or generating conflict and
instability.
The European Union has proposed
and failed to apply a security policy
allowing the states that are near its borders
to become well governed countries,
prosperous and animated by good
intentions. As well, NATO has found itself
an important role in the reconstruction of
failed states and turbulent regions, difficult
to rule. Their member states are trying to

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revive international security institutions

that already exist, to redirect them or create
new ones in order to resolve new arising
conflicts peacefully and durably.
The contribution and participation
of each international security organization,
the individual or collective endeavor for
finding and applying the most appropriate
and effective ways of settling crises remain
the guarantee of global and regional
stability. Legislative harmonization and
democratic control hold an important role
in enhancing security policies.

8.

9.

10.

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This work was possible with the financial

support of the Sector Operational Program
for Human Resources Development 20072013, co-financed by the European Social
Fund, under the project number
POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385 with the title
Integrated/educational network for the
formation, counseling and orientation of
doctoral students for a research career in
security, defense, public order and
national
security
domains
SECNETEDU.

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CYBERATTACK- RISK FACTOR

FOR FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
Mircea Constantin CHEAU
Gerald DINC
PhD student, BCR
mirceascheau@hotmail.com
ARB
gerald.dinca@gmail.com

Abstract: The entire transaction chain from swiping a card to a banks ability to process a transaction has now
become the main focus of cybercriminals. In order to infiltrate or gain access to this type of data exchange, they
have developed new attack vectors for delivering malicious payloads, aimed at compromising one of the parties
engaged in a transaction. Since the weakest link in the security chain is often human component, cybercriminals
often exploit human curiosity or lack of knowledge, as to infiltrate, steal, and manipulate online transactions.
Keywords: malware, cyber attack, vector of infections, financial institution, vulnerability.

1.

Viruses - Theory and Experiments4that

under theoretical ideal conditions, it is
virtually impossible to detect malware.
However, their presence may be indicated
because of the effects they have on
infected systems, although this involves
the emergence of possible losses from the
time of infection until the implementation
of response solutions. Attackers often
access the same resources as professionals
working in the security industry. They can
test the exploits5 and the malware versions
and can make the necessary changes for
avoiding the alerting of the security
solutions in order to attack the target
aimed.
In over 60% of the security
incidents 6, the attackers have succeeded to

General frame- introductory

notions

The process through which a

malware1 is implanted to infect a system
for storing, processing and transmitting
information, is called vector of infection2,
and it differs depending on the
transmission channel used and the victim
profile. While a malware is the malicious
software, the vector of infection is the
method used to propagate the malware or
to infect other information systems.
Fred Cohen3, known as the founder
of defense techniques against attacks by
viruses, says in the article Computer

Malware malicious program used for perturbing

the activity of a computer , for collecting
information or get unauthorized access to private
information systems, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Malware, accessed on 09.08.2015
2
Vector of infection method by which an
application or a malicious code is used to spread or
infect a information system, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Vector_(malware), accessedon 09.08.2015
3
Fred Cohen - American researcher born in 1957,
known for defining the techniques for combating
viruses, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fred_Cohen,
accessed on 09.08.2015

Fred Cohen, Computer Viruses Theory and

Experiments, Computers and Security, vol. 6, pp.
2235, 1987
5
Exploit sequence code, data, or sequence of
orders which take advantage of a vulnerability or an
error to cause an unforseen behaviour in another
application, hardware component or any other
computerized
electronic
system,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exploit_(computer_se
curity), accessed on 09.08.2015
6
Verizon, 2015 Data Breach Investigations
Report, 2015

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Figure 1. Deficit of detection7

compromise the organisations systems in
only a few minutes , depending on the
timeallocated
to
investigate
the
infrastructure in order to successfully
intrude. The number of security breaches
discovered within only few days from the
event is much smaller than the time
attackers need to compromise an
infrastructure. In the graph in figure no. 1
there can be noticed the deficiency of
detection regarding the number of attacks
and the ability to identify them as soon as
possible.
2.

part of the penetration process of the

security systems. We will try to introduce a
malware classification which will lead to a
more accurate understanding of the
phenomenon.
Viruses can be regarded as code9
sequence
which
infects
various
applications and spreads in all files10 in a
computer. If one of the infected files is
copied on another PC, the virus will
continue its course on the new host. Due to
the particular dynamics of the cybercrime,
the best protection method against these is
to install a security measure which benefits
of daily updates, corroborated with the
increasing attention when receiving via
email or any other communication channel
executable files (e.g.: .exe11, .bat12, etc.)
2.1. Spyware are usually
applications used by hackers to spy the
activity of the users and extract credentials
(e.g.: passwords, user names, etc.), the
most collected data being the information

Types of malware

The7general term of malware is a

short form for malicious software8 and
can comprise more types of online threats:
viruses,
spyware,
worms,
adware,
ransomware, etc. Their purpose is to seep
out data, disturb the good functioning of
terminals, take control over a system, or do
any other malicious activity programmed
by an aggressor on a victim. The malware
represents an important stage in the typical
chain attack-vector of infection, being

A series of text lines which contain instructions of

a program.
10
Computer collection of sheets organized in a
certain way according to DEX
11
Marks the executable files for the operation
systems Windows type.
12
Marks the executable files for operation systems
Windows, DOS, OS/2 type.

Adaptation after Verizon, 2015 Data Breach

Investigations Report, 2015
8
Malicious software

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bruteforce16 attackstype which have as

purpose to get by successive attempts,
some access credentials (passwords)
necessary for unauthorized authentication.
The servers Command & Control (C&C)17
type are the ones used by the criminals to
transmit orders to the infected victims.
The botnet type networks can be
used in order to create false traffic on
different websites (click fraud18) in order
to generate profit for the criminal or to
multiply virtual coins (e.g.: bitcoins 19).
According to a report issued by UPI20, one
of the biggest botnet networks infected up
to 15 million victims only in 2009.
2.3. Trojan is installed very
many times even by the user apparently
under a legitimate application or,
automatically installed with another
application. They can be used to change or
erase files on the terminal victim, to
corrupt data stored, or to collect banking,
financial data (e.g.: user name, passwords,
etc.).
2.4.
Macro-Exploit/Macro-Virus
traditionally the files that process text or
spreadsheets were used to deliver viruses
created with the help of functions type
Macro21. When the file is opened, the
respective instructions will automatically
be executed and will corrupt some files or

in the banking-financial systems (e.g:

accounts, credit cards, internet banking,
etc.). The spyware can be uploaded in
legitimate applications or in malicious
websites in order to get personal
information, monitor the actions of the
users in the browser, collect online
authentication credentials (banking) ,
change where possible the configuration
of the connection to the internet of the
infected terminal or to change some data
on the infected terminal. For the financial
institutions, in parallel with the installation
on all terminals in the local network of the
security solutions which allow the
identification of these types of malware it
is recommended to use a firewall13 capable
to block by blacklisting14 the access of
the users to websites known as delivers of
such threats.
2.2.
Bot / Botnet used to take
and exercise control from distance over a
PC by an attacker in order to make
different repetitive actions or to achieve
some objectives, the most common ones
being the spam sending and DDoS
attackstype
(Distributed
Denial
of
15
Service)
to different targets (e.g.:
websites, some governmental or financial
institutions services, applications, etc.).
The term is used in general with a negative
connotation as a computer can be
transformed in a bot by infecting it with
a certain type of malware, the collective
power of processing the terminals in a
networl of botnet type which can be
exploited to decrypt passwords or to lead

16

Method by which there is a systematic try of all

possible versions to solve a problem,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brute-force_search,
accessed on 09.08.2015
17
This makes reference to an infrastructure formed
of servers used to control a botnet net,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Command_and_contr
ol_(malware), accessed on 09.08.2015
18
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Click_fraud,
accessed on 09.08.2015
19
The term was introduced on 3rd January 2009 by
Satoshi Nakamoto and it represents a payment
system by which the virtual coin is generated
depending on the processing power volunteered by
each user, in order to check and record the
transactions in a public register, https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin, accessed on 09.08.2015
20
UPI, Virus strikes 15 million PCs, 26th
January, 2009
21
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macro_
(computer_science), accessed on 09.08.2015

13

The term appeared in the 1980s. This represent a

system for net traffic monitoring and control based
on some security rules, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Firewall_(computing),
accessedon
09.08.2015
14
It is a control device through which access to
some resources is restricted (e.g. links, email
addresses)
explicitly
defined
https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Blacklist_(computing), accessed
on 09.08.2015
15
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_
attack, accessed on 09.08.2015

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the installation of additional components,

without the consent or knowledge of the
victim. The spreading method is most of
the times via email attachments or portable
devices connected by USB. The new
applications of text processing or
spreadsheets have the option to
automatically run the macro type functions
disabled.
2.5.
Worms22- this type of
malware has the ability to replicate itself
on all PCs connected in a local network,
exploiting vulnerabilities in the operation
systems. The simplest method to deliver it
remains still via email, being infected also
other terminals which are in the same
network with the victim receiver of the
message.
According to a study made by
George Garza23, beginning with 6thMay
2000, only in 24 hours of activity, a
classic worm24 infected over 45 million
PC and caused financial losses estimated
between 5.5and 7.7 billion dollars.
2.6. Rootkit/Botkit threats of
this type are used to hide the presence of
other types of malware an infected system.
Because of the fact that they run with
root25privileges at a kernel (Ring 026) level,
this can aggravate or completely remove
the well-functioning of a security solution.
Their purpose is to hide other malicious
components, in order to make their
presence less intrusive.

2.7. Ransomware restricts the

access to files on the infected system and
asks for their repurchase. The encrypted
files can be decrypted only after paying the
claims to the criminal, who eventually
delivers the victim the private key for
decrypting. Being a polymorphic27
malware, it is hard to be detected and
removed as, for each victim, there is
another infected file generated. More
exactly, to avoid the classic detection
based on signatures28 by the security
solutions, the malware ransomware
changes its shape in order to make this
method ineffective. According to a study
made by a security company29those who
develop this type of malware and deliver it
on the black market can earn over 30,000
dollars each day.
2.8. RATs
(Remote
Access
Tools) can infect the targets via
attachments in emails, malicious files
copied from the internet delivered by the
peer-to-peer (P2P)30networks type and can
indefinitely take control over any
PC/laptop/server. As functionalities, they
can disable the security solutions and the
firewall type services installed , they have
the capacity to install other applications
malware type, to erase/rename/copy files,
can record typed commands and
sometimes can even destroy hardware
components by overloading them.
2.9. Bugs, vulnerabilities and
exploits are errors in operation systems

22

27

The term was introduced in 1975 by John

Brunner, in the short storyThe Shockwave Rider,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_worm,
accessedon 09.08.2015
23
George Garza, Catalogs.com, Top 10 worst
computer viruses, 17th February 2008
24
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ILOVEYOU,
accessedon 09.08.2015
25
The term refers to privileged accessuser rights,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superuser, accessedon
09.08.2015
26
The term refers to a hierarchic restriction system
of access over the resources of an operation system,
ring 0 being the most privileged access level to
system
resources,
https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Protection_ring, accessedon 09.08.2015

The term was introduced in 1967 by the British

researcher Christopher Strachey, in his work
Fundamental
Concepts
in
Programming
Languages,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Polymorphism_(computer_science),
accessedon
09.08.2015
28
A signature represents an unique raw of
characters by which a singlefile is identified,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antivirus_software#S
ignature-based_detection, accessedon 09.08.2015
29
Symantec, Ransomware: A Growing Menace,
8th November 2012
30
Represents a net architecture in which the tasks
are distributed equally among the participants,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer,
accessedon 09.08.2015

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or applications which an attacker can use

to compromise an informatics system,

acquired for some very important sums of

money which depend both on the gravity

Figure 2. The price of selling the exploits36

being the main reason of the most recent
security breaches. The vulnerabilities
represent the intersection of three
elements: a system susceptible of an error,
an attacker who makes use of vulnerability
and the ability of the attacker to exploit the
vulnerability where the exploiting of the
vulnerability consists in delivering a
malware via a discovered vulnerability.
According to an IBM31 report published in
2015, the number of vulnerabilities has
increased considerably each year, in 2014
being reported approximately 30,000
vulnerabilities being possible, according to
Forbes32, the developing of a black
market33 of transaction34. As shown in
figure no. 2, such vulnerabilities are

and the popularity of the application where

the vulnerability was found.
There is a hierarchy (classification)
of malware at this moment established
according to the popularity it enjoys
among criminals, the presented report in
figure no.3 being as eloquent as possible.35
We36may consider
that the
propensity for a certain type of aggression
and control instrument is directly
proportional to the capacity of handling
and exploiting it by the attacker. The report
time - exposure- benefits have to be taken
into account, which is a motivating factor
in choosing the methods and programs on
which the strategy of penetrating the
security systems is based on. The market
begins to be segmented taking shape in
two levels one of a producer with
abilities and informatics special knowledge
and one of consumer with abilities to put
into practice the acquisitions in order to
reach his goal. Pyramidal, the first
category is in the top of those who know
how to exploit the vulnerabilities.

31

IBM, IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence

Quarterly, March 2015, http://www.essextec.com/
sites/default/files/IBM%20XForce%20Threat%20Intelligence%20Quarterly%20
Q1_2015.pdf, accessedon 30.08.2015
32
Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/
sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/23/shopping-for-zerodays-an-price-list-for-hackers-secret-softwareexploits/, accessed on 12.09.2015
33
http://www.trendmicro.com/cloudcontent/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/whitepapers/wp-russian-underground-101.pdf, accessed
on 31.08.2015
34
https://www.mitnicksecurity.com/shopping/absolu
te-zero-day-exploit-exchange, accessed on
31.08.2015

35

https://securityintelligence.com/tinba-trojan-setsits-sights-on-romania/, accessed on 31.08.2015

36
Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
andygreenberg/2012/03/23/shopping-for-zero-daysan-price-list-for-hackers-secret-software-exploits/,
accessed on 12.09.2015

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should first of all undermine the router

used by the customer to connect to the
internet and as a rule, the public networks
Wi-Fi type are the most exposed. There
are, of course cases when switches and

3. Types of attacks
They represent methods by which
the criminals intercept, change or collect
information, differing according to the

Figure 3. Classification depending on popularity

final purpose of the attackers (e.g.:
collecting
credentials,
intercepting
communications, disturbing the activity of
services or applications, etc).
3.1. Man-in-the-Middle37
One of the biggest threats regarding
the online transactions is the attack manin-the-middle
type.
One
of
the
particularities of this type of attack is that
it does not require the installation of a
malware (proxy38) on the PC of the victim.
But, it can run on the communication
channel. In exchange, the attack can take
place on the communication channel. The
criminal can intercept the data packages at
net
level,
can
manipulate
the
communication between the two parts
without being noticed by the two entities
and can divert the actions done by the
emitter and the answers of his receiver.
For example, for an aggression like
this to take place successfully, an attacker

unsecured
routers
or
improperly
configured can be compromised from a
distance, the attacker being able, besides
the diversion of some actions of those
involved in communication, to deliver
malicious data.
Although at first it may seem that
only thedomestic clients can be exposed,
this technique is used also for collecting or
intercepting the transactions of traders who
use PoS (Point-of-Sale)39 type terminals
connected to unsecured nets. In the case of
financial institutions ,if the criminal
intercepts sensitive information he then
takes the role of one of the parties engaged
in communication, and the repercussions
can become very important.
3.2. Drive-by40
These types of attacks exploit
vulnerabilities in browsers to inject and run
39

Trend Micro Incorporated, The Evolution of

Point-of-Sale (PoS) Malware, 11thDecember, 2014
40
The term represents either the explicit copy by
the user of some malicious applications from the
internet without understanding the associated risks,
or the involuntary copy and without the users
agreement of some malicious applications

37

A type of attack in which the aggressor intercepts

for personal purpose communication between an
emitter and a receiver
38
A type of application which functions as
intermediary between a customer and a server

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Figure 4. The process by which an attacker delivers malicious advertisements

to legal websites, by means of advertising services 45
malicious code without the knowledge of
the user, most of the times. Depending on
the delivered malware capabilities, an
attacker can explore the network and its
typology lateral movement41 - in order to
identify the critical points where data is
stored (e.g.: server FTP42 type) and for
choosing the targets of interest.
A very common practice has
become what in the security industry calls
malvertising43. The attackers use the
delivery services with advertising content
(e.g.: ads, banners, etc.) which are on a
great number of legitimate websites, in
order to inject malware/viruses. An user
can get infected by a simpleclick on a
malicious advertisement which redirects
the traffic to a script44 which executes

itself locally. The scripts can also

download other malicious components,
exploiting vulnerabilities in the browser,
operating system, etc.
This45kind of attacks are more
effective if the users who navigate online
use the operation system with privileges
for administration (accounts administrator
type) and not with user rights which gives
only reading and writing privileges
(without the right to edit, erase or install
files). In case of financial institutions the
undermining of the system of an employee
in the local network can create an access
point in the infrastructure of the institution.
3.3. Man-in-the-browser46
This type of attack means a
component locallyinstalled on the PC of
the victim with the aim, among others, to
redirect the whole traffic of the user to a
third party. In this case, phishing or
spearphishing emails are the ones most
commonly used to infect a greater number

41

Technique used to scan the net in order to identify

the local servers, to look for vulnerabilities in the
applications and operation systems used in the local
net and to take actions man-in-the-middle type
42
Locations where the sensitive materials are stored
which can be accessed only by the help of
credentials.
43
Using the delivery services with advertising
content for injecting malware
44
Computer programmes in order to automatize
different actions, sequential or repetitive

45

Adaptation after Bromium Labs

It is a type of malware which infects the victims
browser and act as a proxy,intercepting and
eventually redirecting the activities performed by
the victim
46

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presentations52 which warns on the

possibility that these attacks may be
repeated.
Another type of financial Trojan
which functioned the same way as man-inthe-browser, injected dynamically HTML53
code in the pages visited by the users, in
order to change the content. Although the
connection between the user and the
financial institution was perfectly legal
(there was no man-in-the-middle), the
pages shown were changed locally by the
malware in order to hide illegal
transactions. More exactly,the malware
made transactions (legal) in the name of
the user, but it changed the information
displayed on the screen in order to hide the
operations, thus the customers needed to
call the financial institution for checking
the exact current balance. According to
FBI, infecting more than 1.4 million PCs,
the financial losses caused were estimated
to over 3.2 million dollars in only 6
months of activity54.
The steps an attacker makes to
launch such an attack are the following:
- Place aTrojan which installs
itself at the level of operation system of the
PC of the victim;
- Malware code or Trojan installs
at its turn an extension of the victims
browser so that its facilities may be
available (start) once with the browser;
- After the infection moment, the
victim starts the favourite browser and
once with it starts the extension that allows
the launching of the attack;
- The extension code allows the
transmission to the attacker of the
information processed during this session;
- The attacker is practically
allowed, by means of this extension, to
successfully authenticate to the legal site

of victims. In general, such emails pretend

to come from some financial institutions or
online transactions processors and try to
convince the user to browse on a website
especially created to exploit vulnerability
in the browser or execute a malicious
attachment.
One of the most famous
financial47 Trojans was delivered via
drive-in attacks type or via phishing the
keys (keyboard) and was used as
distribution platform for otherTrojans
(e.g.: ransomware, adware48). Even when
used on a mobile terminal as a second
authentication factor for authorizing
payments by sending mTAN49 codes, there
was a special version created for Android
which redirected the SMSs to the attacker,
erasing any trace on the infected terminal.
According to Wired50, the financial losses
registered in a single operation caused by
this malware were estimated to a minimum
of 70 million dollars. At the end of year
2014, a specialised security company
discovered a new Trojan type51 which
aimed the financial institutions from
Romania, which proved the adapting and
innovating ability of the criminalgroups.
Zeus AES was used for encrypting, a
virtual machine with the one used for
ZeusVM and KINS, and the Andromeda
downloader. According to a study of same
company , in 2015 were affected during
a Man-in-the-Middle attack 12 banks from
Romania by a Trojan with In-the-browser
abilities, subject approached again in other

47

Zeus Trojan spread first time in March 2009, it

reappeared again under changed versions
48
Aggressive advertisements which have as purpose
to generate profit for the attacker by forcing the
victim to make as many clock as possible on the
displayed advertisements
49
Codes used in different online transactions as a
second factor of authentication
50
Wired, 5 Key Players Nabbed in Ukraine in
$70-Million Bank Fraud Ring, 10th January 2010
51
http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2014
/Kaspersky-Lab-Discovers-Chthonic, accessed on
31.08.2015

52

https://securityintelligence.com/tinba-trojan-setsits-sights-on-romania/, accessedon 31.08.2015

53
Term appeared in 1993. Language used at
creating websites
54
FBI, Botnet Bust. SpyEye Malware Mastermind
Pleads Guilty, 28th January, 2014

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(e.g.: the application electronic banking of

the victims bank);
- When
the
respective
page
(parameterized at the level of the malware
type application) was open, each
information necessary to the attacker for
launching the attack (e.g.: account balance)
is sent to him;
- When the victim tries to make a
payment, he will see all details known
(including account of the receiver and the
amount) and when he signs the payment
order (when the payment is authorised) on
the answer session of the bank,
thereceiveraccount is changed by the
criminal so that the payment will be done
to a completely different account than the
one chosen by the victim, and the money
reaches the attackers account.
- If such a malware installs itself
successfully directly on the terminal of an
employee of a financial institution, this
could change the content of the pages
displayed on the victimsscreen in order to
initiate transactions to the criminals
accounts, the damages being very
important.
3.4.Pharming55
This type of attack changes
thehosts56 files from the victims PC for
redirecting the traffic of a website to an
illegal website held by an attacker. By
undermining the DNS (Domain Name
Server)57 serverstype the whole network of
computers administrated by these servers
can be redirected to malicious websites, the
procedures being known under the name of
poisoning58.
Even if such attacks aim in general
the common users, there were cases when
DNSservers used by the site of a financial

institution wassuccessfully undermined.

At the end of year 2012 the paying system
administrated by a very important financial
institution 59 was penetrated, the users
being redirected to the IP address of HTTP
server owned by the attackers. This
method allowed hosting a fake file
JavaScript60 type instead of the original
one, on the bank website, which led to a
change of the behavior of the targeted
page, the bank and the customers were not
aware that they were manipulated. After
the name of the aimed website, the
operation was known under the name of
Boleto fraud.
The impact on the financial
institutions can be greater the more the
undermined DNS servers remains active
for a longer period of time, the final result
being quantified in potential losses for
customers but especially for the bank.
3.5. Watering Hole61
The victim of such attacks is, in
general, a public or private organization.
The attacker/attackers study which are the
most accessed websites in which the
institution trusts and try to infect them with
malware in order to penetrate the security
systems. The employees of the financial
institutions may easily become victims if
they dont respect the intern security
protocols. According to a report issued by
RSA62, such an attack was identified in
2012. Over 32,000 individual terminals
visited the undermined websites and
financial institutions from Massachussetts
and Washington DC and were affected.
An incident which registered the
same type of attack took place in July
59

RSA, DNS Poisoning Used inBoleto Fraud, 9th

February, 2015
60
Programming language used for browsers which
facilitates the interaction between the user and the
content displayed in the browser
61
The term appeared on 20th July2012, in the work
Lions at the Watering Hole The VOHO
Affair, RSA. Source: https://blogs.rsa.com/lionsat-the-watering-hole-the-voho-affair/, accessedon
26.08.2015
62
RSA, Lions at the Watering Hole The
VOHO Affair, 20th July 2012

55

It is a type of attack by which the traffic of a legal

website is redirected to an illegal one
56
Term appeared in September 1982, RFC 971. It
refers to any terminal connected to a net
57
Hierarchic system distributed to address
resources, systems or services connected to a local
or public net
58
Manipulation of DNS server to redirect the traffic
to another IP address

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201563 on an aeronautic company ,

affecting a great part of its customers. The
purpose of the attackers was to infiltrate a
big number of terminals and collect data
about the undermined systems (e.g: the
operating
system
version,
the
administration rights of the current user,
etc.).
3.6. Denial of Service (DDoS)
Strictly referring to the financialbanking
domain,
before
initiating
unauthorised operations or after these were
finalised, the attackers choose to run such
attacks DDoS type whose purpose is to
distract the banks attention as much as
possible regarding the transactions which
are to be done or the already done ones. By
means of a botnet, the public website of
the bank or of other URLs which belong to
the bank can be attacked in order to
significantly disturb the activity. There is a
series of good practices recommended by
FBI64 just for preventing such special
situations.

3.7. APT (Advanced Persistent

Threats)
Such attacks are initiated by
criminal groups, governments armies or
religious organizations which have the
ability to attack a protected computer, a
well-secured structure or even a critical
infrastructure at national/international
level, using cyber means. All APTs use
exploits and vulnerabilities in order to be
persistent and undetected. In 90% of cases,
the undetected malware is delivered via the
browser and the infected machines have
almost anytime installed a security
solution. But, what is very worrying,
according to a report issued by a
specialized security company65, the APT
type attacks are detected in about 243 days
after the attackers have penetrated the
security systems of the target organization.
One of the most known attacks of
this type was initiated via the malware
named Carbanak66, specially developed for
the
financial-banking
institutions by a group of
attackers,
apparently
placed
in
Russia,
Ukraine and China.
In most of the cases, the
malware was installed in
the undermined systems
with approximately 2-4
months
before
the
67
effective release of the
attack. In all this time,

Botnets & Rentals

Crimeware Upgrade
Modules
CAPTCHA Breaking
Malware spreading
Inter-Carrier Money
Exchange
& Mule services

the attackers studied the

behavior of the victims
and
learned
their
profile. They got access
to the authentication
data of the systems (as a user with
privileged rights such the administrators)

Figure 5. The impact of cyber threat at international level67

63

65

PaloAlto Networks, 20th July 2015

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Financial
Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(FS-ISAC), Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3),
Fraud Alert Cyber Criminals Targeting Financial
Institution Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire
Transfer Fraud, 17th September 2012

Trend
Micro
Incorporated,
Russian
Underground 101, 2012
66
Kaspersky, CarbanakAPT The Great Robbery,
February 2015
67
FORTINET 2013 CYBERCRIME REPORT,
Cybercriminals Today Mirror Legitimate Business
Processes

64

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Figure 6. Necessary steps in planning and running an attack APT69 type

and to the used applications, collecting
information regarding the methods to
authorize the transactions. The statistics
after the attack reveal an average of 10
million dollars as prejudice for each
aggression of this type. The attackers in
this case were extremely familiarized with
the bank products, with the topology of the
net, with the net architecture and the
methods of securing of the services offered
by it.
3.8. Radio waves and thermal
radiations
Recent works prove that any
informatics system can be undermined,
even if they are isolated by connection to
the internet or make part of segregated
nets. After Mordechai Guri, Gabi Kedma,
Assaf Kachlon, Yuval Elovici presented in
the study AirHopper: Bridging the AirGap between Isolated networks and
Mobile Phones using Radio Frequencies,
201468 how can a system be controlled by

means of radio waves, a new group of

researchers, this time composed by
Mordechai
Guri,
Matan
Monitz,
YisroelMirski and Yuval have launched in
the volume Covert Signalling Channel
between69Air-Gapped Computers using
Thermal Manipulations, 26th March
201570a very interesting idea regarding the
control over a system by means of thermal
radiations.
The first experiment appeals to
radio waves for sending data from a
system not connected to the internet to a
mobile terminal. The attack takes place in
four steps:installation of the malware on
the isolated computer, installation of a
malicious code on oneor more mobile
wired.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/11/airhopper-malware-final-e-141029143252conversion-gate01.pdf,accessedon 12.09.20153A
69
Adaptation after Wikipedia, https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_persistent_threat,
accessedon 09.08.2015
70
Mordechai Guri, Matan Monitz, Yisroel Mirski,
Yuval Elovici, Covert Signalling Channel between
Air-Gapped Computers using Thermal
Manipulations, 26th March 2015, http://arxiv.org/
ftp/arxiv/papers/1503/1503.07919.pdf, accessedon
12.09.2015

68

Mordechai Guri, Gabi Kedma, Assaf Kachlon,

Yuval Elovici, Air Hopper: Bridging the Air-Gap
between Isolated Networks and Mobile Phones
using Radio Frequencies, 2014, http://www.

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phones, creation of a command and control

channel with the infected mobile device
and transmission of the signals from the
isolated computer to the attacker. The
malware which is installed on the mobile
phone uses the radio receiver RM of the
phone for intercepting the modulated
signals with sensitive information which
were sent by the malware from the
computer without internet connection.
Once the data is sent to the phone, these
can be resent to the attackers by means of a
data connection or by means of messages
SMS type.
The experiment with the thermal
radiation involved the use of two
informations systems from which only one
was connected to the internet. After both
systems had been infected, it was proved
that the secured device without internet
connection can be instructed to generate
heating models of the central processor
(CPU) or of the graphic processor (GPU).
The computer connected to the internet,
found in the neighbourhood of the
secured one, can monitor the temperature
fluctuations using internal sensors and can
interpret them as data packages. Using the
modulations of the heat generated by the
system connected to the internet, the
experiment emphasized the fact that there
can also be sent orders from the connected
computer to the unconnected system found
in its neighbourhood. So, the malware is
capable to use models of heat as data
channel. Although the transfer rate
between the computers connected to the
internet and those not connected is not
very big ( about 8 bytes per hour) most of
the times it is enough to send passwords
and text files. As the data theft takes place
over the heat signals (invisible from
informatics point of view at this moment)
it is very hard to detect the intrusion
elements.
The information presented above
proves that the implications can become
factors of high risk for a financial
institution which doesnot adapt in real time
the security systems to the new criminal
conducts.

4. Suggestions to improve the general

existing defense methods
of the financial institutions
4.1. Removing the malicious
content in case of active infection
detection:
- Carefully locate the active
malware in the files and directories of the
infected PC or the affected website. A
special importance should be given to the
files with exe extension;
- After the malware was identified
, this can be removed. Most of the times , a
returning to a state considered as being
sure (previous save) has an increased
effectiveness. ;
- Installation of the most recent
version of operating/application system
according to the recommendations of its
producer;
- Running a disinfection process
with an utility type anti-virus updated with
the newest possible signatures;
- Checking all the computers and
devices attached in order to detective
malware in the net;
- Changing all passwords with
more complex ones.
4.2.
Suggestions to improve the
activity
- Increase the IT budgets in order to
maintain the norms of security and
performance and adaptation to the new
criminal conducts;
- Cooperation
with
external
providers
of
innovating
security
technology;
- Implementing a cloud71 model
which satisfies both the processing
methods and the security ones on medium
and long term;
- Implementing security policies on
all informations systems and setting levels
of accessto confidential data;

71

A model of infrastructure which facilitates the

access to information of a wide range of consumers,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cloud_computing,
accessedon 09.08.2015

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- Investing in security solutions

which can monitor and analyze security
incidents (e.g.: SIEM72 type solutions);
- Adopting firewall73 type solutions;
- Implementing
some
solutions
which monitor the traffic from the local
network and the activities carried out
inside the network in order to identify the
breaches in the security policies (e.g.:
IDS74 type solutions)
- Testing the infrastructure and the
security services with the help of teams of
dedicated specialists to identify the
potential vulnerabilities and eliminate
them before becoming the target of some
attackers
(the process is called
pentesting75);
- Implementing some solid practices
of authentication based on more factors for
the access to the operational systems;
- Physical securing both of data
storage devices and of the access to them;
- Employing qualified staff and
applying strict access policies for the
employees temporarily employed or
probationers;
- Educating
and
testing
the
employees regarding the internal security
policies.

attacks becoming more and more subtle

and elaborated. The dynamics of the cyber
threats, the increase complexity of
concerted actions of criminal groups, the
increase of automation level and the
increase of technological level of the state
attacks recommend the immediate
adoption of the security standards, serious
investments in defensive systems and the
training of employees together with the
experts. Awareness of the necessity of
strengthening all wings, in generaland
protecting the financial system in
particular, represents one of the steps
which should be taken with maximum
speed. The professionalism of the
specialists can make their effort visible if it
is really supported by decision makers. All
these should be corroborated with an
increase in the level of culture of the wide
public One of the pillars of the defense
strategy is based on the ability to answer
the aggressions. The common effort can
make that the barriers in front of the
attackers diminish the general losses.
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This work was possible with the financial

support of the Sector Operational Program
for Human Resources Development 20072013, co-financed by the European Social
Fund, under the project number
POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385 with the title
Integrated/educational network for the
formation, counseling and orientation of
doctoral students for a research career in
security, defense, public order and
national
security
domains
SECNETEDU.

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SECURITY OF CYBER INFORMATION - THREATS,

VULNERABILITIES AND RISKS IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Lucian SCRTOCEA
PhD. student, ,,Carol I" National Defence University
lucian.scirtocea@yahoo.com

Abstract: The information era is a phenomenon and a consequence of globalization, which generates new means
and ways to combat them. The developments in the technology of information are offering an unprecedented
increase of human abilities to access critical information that rules every area of activity. Romanian society is in
the middle of deep political, economic, social and cultural transformations. This set of changes is affecting each
of our lives. , Knowledge as such, will become a weapon of defense against risks and new vulnerabilities that
will surely appear in the next decades. In this scientific work I will summarize that the vulnerability of the cyber
information in terms of adopting a new political doctrine in Romania, the one of the information society and a
knowledge society.
Keywords: data security, vulnerability, networks, cyber security, risk.

Cyber Security has become one of

the major components of networks in
general and the internet in particular.
Analysts of this concept have noticed a
contradiction between the need for
communication, on the one hand, and the
need for information security, on the other
hand.
Both
systems
and
the
communications are under threat. They
may be well-intentioned people who are
operating errors or malicious individuals
who sacrifice time and money to penetrate
computer systems. Among the factors that
allow fissures in security techniques may
be some errors of software for processing
and/or communicating and certain defects
in
computing
or
communications
equipment. At the same time, the lack of
safety culture of the manager, operators
and users of systems increases the
likelihood of security breaches.

The chaos theory[1] shows that

nothing is certain in this world, that
systems and processes evolution depends
on the change in the initial conditions,
unpredictable and untaken into account.
Vulnerabilities of information are a
component of security[2] generated by the
status quo, processes or phenomena of the
internal life of the national community,
which diminishes the response of society
to existing or potential risks of any kind,
including information or favoring the
emergence and development, with
consequences on the achievement of
national security. In general, the greater the
vulnerabilities are, the more complex the
information networks and structures are,
more difficult to optimize, manage and
protect.
The main vulnerabilities of
information infrastructure could be the
following:
- possibilities for interception of
information
from
communications
networks and computers by both the user
and the opponents;
- large volume of information
handled in information systems that can be
subject to attack by the opponent,
destroyed, falsified or stolen;

Threats and vulnerabilities

Optimizing the operation of
information systems must ensure the
continuity and sustainability of leadership
and increase their capacity to avoid
disruption and chaos.

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- use of technical equipment,

software and standard database (identical)
in all computer networks, possibly in the
communication;
- the possibility of incorporating
(hide) in the computer equipment by the
companies providing the equipment, of
modules of malicious software, which can
be activated by opponents at times
determined by them, thus creating chaos
on information networks;
- the existence of information
networks with large numbers of nodes with
a broad connectivity, hard to sync and
manage, allowing access to fraudulently
capture individual equipment or nodes in
full, interception or interruption of
important information flows and/or placing
false information affecting the decisionmaking processes;
possibility
of
physical,
electromagnetic or cyber attack against
information and information systems;
possibility of using by the
potential opponent of the war against radio
electronic means of the main electronic
communications systems;
- interception by the enemy of
radio communications and decryption of
the information transmitted by them in a
timely manner, the use of non-performing
cryptographic systems;
- insufficiently studied measures to
ensure
communications
security
(COMSEC), computers (COMPUSEC)
and
other
electronic
equipment
(TEMPEST) used in information systems;
- suppression of internet access or
use for terrorism, disinformation and attack
on critical national security information
infrastructure;
inadequate
infrastructure,
informational and technical redundancy
having reduced excessively centralized and
low possibilities of replicating the existing
information in the database.

Information Security Threats

The threats of information security
defining the state of potential danger that
may occur or not, within a period of time,
created by hostile forces attitudes and acts,
which create balance and informational
instability or otherwise, with impact on
national security.
External threats on the security of
information
External threats include all actions
executed by opponents (hostile forces) to
prohibit or hinder enforcement of decision
and execution functions of central and
local governing bodies of state security and
national defense structures, departments
and companies etc. and creating a state of
disorganization and chaos across the
country.
According to the findings of the
literature[3] the main threats facing the
security environment could be:
- physical attack on producing,
collecting, processing and disseminating
information;
- electronic
attack
(electromagnetic) against the means of
collection, transmission, storage and
processing systems;
- cyber
attacks
against
information systems (information systems,
communication networks and computers)
of the central bodies, departments and
economic;
- software piracy;
- attack
against
national
structures, information and decisionmaking (information centers, places of
disposition of the leadership, command
points);
- psych attack.
Referring to bringing forward a
large-scale military conflict through
informational aggression, some military
experts[4] state that "cyber attacks kill the
nerve centers of the enemy, like
communications and computer networks

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which direct and organize to a large extent

the modern life. Within minutes, phones
and computer networks are thrown into
chaos and logic bombs "fry" immediately
the offices of the railways, air traffic
control networks and systems for maritime
navigation, which is considered the first
steps of the war."
Electronic attack on the means of
collection, transmission and processing
information[5] relies on the use of high
electromagnetic energy (lasers, radio
frequency weapons, microwave weapons,
etc.) to neutralize or destroy electronic
main means of the national territory
(radars, sensors, radio stations, radio links,
satellite terminals, computers) used in
information systems.
The cyber attack is probably the
most important external threat, which
considers the ,,cyberspace" aimed at
internet and computer systems (software,
protocols and databases) used in
communications and computer networks
for national security. It is an open
confrontation and permanent security and
insecurity in network information systems,
carried out with software tools and specific
products without rules and regulations, to
destroy, neutralize or operate with errors,
especially
computer
networks
or
computers with functions determined from
different sectors (energy, environmental
protection, etc.) and information theft.
From all the types of destructive
software currently used, we mention
viruses and worms, logic bombs and
Trojans, known in literature[6]. These
could be placed from before into computer
networks and could be operated by various
processes, such as software fraudulently
installed on different computers and
controlled by electromagnetic pulse
sequences programs or data structures
viruses introduced into computers form
direct messages or by electronic mail
records taken from the internet.
The cyber attack follows the
introduction of false programs to be used
in decision-making on the management of
state or the economy, the provision of false
solutions, hard to find or guess.

Internal threats on the security

of information
Analysis carried out shows the
following internal factors may be threats to
national security information:
- the influence of environmental
conditions (electromagnetic) from the
territory on their movements by collecting
information and communications networks
and equipment;
- unsuitable
organization
of
databases, existence of bad software
products for managing, processing and
displaying of information, lack of concern
for the use of artificial intelligence;
- poor training and low staff
experience in providing information
systems function and operation of national
security;
- lack of loyalty of the person
operating the technical equipment of
information systems or the persons who
are involved in analyzing and processing
information;
- inappropriate
choice
of
companies providing communications and
computing equipment and the lack of firm
contractual conditions regarding reliability,
security, compatibility and correct
operation of the equipment.
Risk analysis of information security
Risk analysis methods
There are several approaches to
risk. Among these are the following:
- quantitative analysis;
- qualitative analysis;
- workstation analysis.
Determining
vulnerabilities
involves establishing threats to the assets
and the frequency with which these threats
may occur. By estimating the probability
of occurrence the probability of occurrence
of an incident in one time is determined.
The analysis will identify measures
to control the threat that produces the
highest values of its corresponding
estimated annual losses. It will identify
measures that can reduce vulnerability.

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Implications and characteristics of risk

analysis

Exposure = Probability x Impact

After identifying and prioritizing
risks based on the exposure security plans
are to be achieved. They contain proactive
measures aimed at reducing exposure to
risk. In some instances, proactive measures
cannot be implemented or the costs of
implementing such measures exceed the
impact. In this case, reactive measures
plans that aim to reduce the impact once
the risk has occurred have to be done.

Risk analysis has the following

implications:
- avoids putting a nonsense in
place - the protection of all values against
all risks;
- avoids over-protection values;
- avoids neglecting protection for
other values;
- identifies the values that we are
trying to defend and assesses the
consequences of their loss;
- evaluates internal and external
threats on the size and physical location
information;
- assesses the likelihood of damage
that may occur due to inconsistencies
between knowledge workers and security
system needs expressed by rules and
procedures;
- highlights the vulnerability of
human nature expressed through habits,
attitudes, relationships, etc;
- highlights the allocation of
institution resources for security in relation
to the operational situation.
Features:
dynamic character analysis of
risks is valid for limited time;
strong
environmental
compartments depend on the situation of
conflicts of technology;
highlights
the
attackers
resources;
highlights defense resources;
analysis is measured in financial,
functional and image costs.

Proactive measures plans

- secure servers and stations to
reduce the attack surface;
- security patch management to
eliminate known vulnerabilities;
- securing
the
network
perimeter;
- implementing
antivirus
software;
- monitoring and examination of
critical systems;
- applying security policies with
Group Policy and Active Directory;
- creating security policies and
procedures for users and administrators.
Reactive measures plans
- plan to produce incident
notification
- restoring data (back-up is
proactive)
- further plans of the operation
- disaster recovery
Conclusion
Avoiding
surprise
in
the
information field will be one of the
dominant trends in the coming years.
Mastering information means real power.
In this context, national security policy is
required to take into account this reality.
Although cyber war started long time ago,
detrimental effects have not yet occurred.
Limiting them further to minor losses can
only be achieved through a proactive
attitude oriented towards maintaining the
development of the defensive measures at

Action Plan
The first step in evaluating security
risks is to identify resources who protect
and their assessment in terms of
importance and value. Identification
methods are the most varied, from typical
risk checklists and
ending with
brainstorming. For each of the identified
resources you can simply calculate the risk
exposure as the product of probability and
risk impact.

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the same intensity as the development of

methods of attack.
Given the current initiatives both
nationally and within NATO, to develop
the field of cyber defense and the urgent
need to protect information systems and
communications belonging to the MOD,
we have the following conclusions:
- treating cyber attacks must be
centralized on a unified concept, integrated
in NATO cyber defense policy;
- contributing to developing cyber
defense strategy both on decision and
executive structures at all levels and in all
areas, taking into account the new
coordinates of cyber war;
- it is necessary to implement a
balanced set of security measures to
protect against the costs of systems and
operational requirements.

4.
5.
6.

References

9.

7.

8.

[1] Muresan M, widow Gh., Futures war, wars

future, Publisher National Defense University
Carol I,, Bucharest, 2006, p.67-68
[2] National Information Security Doctrine, 2004,
p.15
[3] Gansler ST, H. Binnendijk H, Information
Assurance: Trend in Vulnerabilities, Threats
and Internet Technologies 2003
[4] Weinberger C., P. Schweizer, Ibid, p. 311, 313.
[5] Gansler S.T., Binnendijk H., ibid, p. 63, 70.
[6] Roceanu I., Buddies and enemies about viruses
and antivirus software, Publisher Academy for
Advanced Military Studies, Bucharest, 2000,
p. 7-11.

10.

Bibliography
1.

2.

3.

www.sri.ro
www.certmil.ro
Smith, Edward Allen, Effects
Based Operation: Network Centric
Warfare Applying for Peace, Crisis
and War. CCRP Publications
Distribution Center 2002.
Cebrowski,
AK,
The
Implementation of Network Centric
Warfare, US Government Printing
Office, Wasington DC, 2005, p. 4648.
Conf.
Prof.univ.dr.ing.
Gelu
Alexandrescu, LTC. Lecturer. PhD.
Ion Calin, lt. col. PhD. Costinel
Nitu, Security and Defense in the
European Union - XXI Strategies,
vol. I, Publisher National Defense
University Carol I, Bucharest,
2008, p. 9-16, 222-228, 339-347,
359-364.
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Prof.univ.dr.ing.
Gelu
Alexandrescu, LTC. Lecturer PhD.
Ion Calin, lt. col. PhD. Costinel
Nitu, Security and Defense in the
European Union - XXI Strategies,
vol. II, Publisher National Defense
University Carol I, Bucharest,
2008, p. 71-84, 244-252, 274-279.
Challenges to security and strategy
at the beginning of XXI century
(Scientific
Session
with
international participation 14-15
April 2005) Publisher National
Defense University Carol I,
Bucharest, 2005, p.142-147, 186 190.

This work was possible with the financial

support of the Sector Operational Program
for Human Resources Development 20072013, co-financed by the European Social
Fund, under the project number
POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385 with the title
Integrated/educational network for the
formation, counseling and orientation of
doctoral students for a research career in
security, defense, public order and
national
security
domains
SECNETEDU.

David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka

and Frederick P. Stein, Network
Centric Warfare: Developing and
Leveraging
Information
Superiority.
Global Command and Control
System Common
Operational
Picture Reporting Requirements.
CJCSI 3151.01A. US Defense
Department.
National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace The US, in 2003.

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PRINCIPLES OF ELABORATION OF A SECURITY POLICY

Laura-Ina-Veronica BOGDAN (SRBU)
PhD candidate, Carol I National Defence University
laurainavero@yahoo.com

Abstract: The security issue has preoccupied humanity throughout its existence. Theoretically, the obligation to
ensure a constructive life, material and spiritual progress, emerged when man was concerned to ensure his
security, shelter or food. Without the need of human security, of prosperity and calm, all efforts made in a system
both institutional and juridical, receive a variable character, changeable depending on the risks that may arise
in the political, military, economic, or any other environment. During history, man has always felt the need of
security, stability and always was concerned to secure his food, his fortune and his own life. Therefore, towards
this reality, the only concept which can respond to these demands of security and stability - is the concept of
security.
Keywords: security, global security, security policy, security risk, collective security.

Achieving security is a matter of

strategy, namely: the prioritization
regarding the geopolitical context, resource
defense, alliances between state and
loyalty to allies, organization, and
management of government.
In order to achieve security strategy
governments commit through security
policy - the legal system, material
resources, institutions and human
resources - to satisfy the whole range of
issues related to national security.

values against actual or potential

adversaries.1
Security relates first of all to the fate
of human societies and only secondly to
the personal safety of individual human
beings.2
It is interesting to follow the
evolution of the security term. Therefore in
the Roman Empire, the goddess that
provides the lull in the empire was
Securitas. As seen on the reverse of a
medal in the 250 d.Hr of Emperor
Hostilian, its meaning being "freedom
against the threat." Modernism brought to
the security term the meaning of "state
of necessity" whereby the government
reserves legal conjuncture giving the right
to invoke special measures to guarantee the
security of the state and coming from the
old term "raison d'Etat" translated as
"rationale State ".
In other studies we find that "security
is not a fixed concept. It is one of those
notions that relate at the same time to a
thing itself or a state and a process or

Definitions of the security concept

Security is defined by the perception
of safety and tranquility which is provided
by the absence of any danger. A definition
of security can refer to all stages and
dimensions of political, economic, social,
diplomatic, military, administrative and
legislative types, which ensure essential
privileges and freedoms of citizens.
Frank N. Trager and F.N. Simony
offered the following definition: "National
security is that part of government policy
which aims to create political conditions,
national and international, favorable to the
protection or extension of vital national

Frank N., Trager, Frank N., Simonie, Introducere

n studiul securitii naionale, University Press of
Kansas, 1973, p. 36.
2
Barry, Buzan, Popoarele, statele i teama O
agend pentru studii de securitate internaional n
epoca de dup rzboiul rece, Editura Cartier,
Chiinu, 2000, p. 30

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of processes".3 Thus we learn that" security

is the condition or state in which an entity
is safe to its survival".4
The two terms "national security"
represent "the fact of being protected from
any danger; feeling of confidence and
tranquility that the absence of any danger
gives to anyone"5, and "collective security"
refers to "the state of relations between
states created by taking measures to treat
about common defense against of a
aggression".6 Thus, the British used the
expression "security and protection
system" by which they meant all funding
targeted at protecting people and properties
against a broad spectrum of events, crime,
fire, accident, espionage, unpredictable.
"National security" is defined in art.
1 of Law 51/1991 on Romania's national
security as "state of legality, balance and
social stability, economic and political
existence and development required by
national Romanian State, as sovereign
state, unitary, independent and indivisible,
maintaining the rule of law as well as the
climate of unrestrained exercise of rights,
freedoms and fundamental duties of
citizens' right of democratic principles and
norms settled by the Constitution".7
The concept of "national security" is
actually appropriate with respect to the
definition and development of Romania's
Security Strategy, and developed the way
of collaboration among institutions which
are able to achieve it. This is due to
reformulating the concept, stabilizing
democracy, state institutions and society
development, respecting the rights and
civic freedoms.

Security intelligence doctrine gives

us the following definition of national
security "state of the nation, social
communities, citizens and the state, based
on economic prosperity, legality, balance
and socio-political stability, expressed by
the rule of law and ensured through actions
like economic, political, social, legal,
military, information and others, in order
to exercise unrestricted rights and
freedoms, the full manifestation of
freedom of decision and action to the state,
its fundamental attributes and quality of
subject of international law".8 Following
this definition, national security is the
fundamental factor of the nation and the
Romanian state, having as main strategic
components public order, national defense
and national security.
Security strategy reflects that system
which has the principal objective of
protecting citizens, ensuring their rights
and freedoms, supporting and defending
national interests according to the
principles of international law - territorial
integrity, state sovereignty.
Security Strategy is realized in
principle by methods of political,
diplomatic, economic, social and military
organizations; in collaboration with the
states and security organizations of the
European region, Euro-Atlantic and
international space.
This security strategy is the
document that defines the security
character of a state.
National Defence Strategy, "defines
the interests and objectives of national
security, presents an assessment of the
security environment, identifies the main
threats, risks and vulnerabilities to
Romania's fundamental interests and
formulates the main action directions to
ensure national security."9
National security gathers measures
from all spheres of dimensional security, as
well as the political ones, economic, social,

Luciana, Alexandra, Ghica, Marian, Zulean

(coord.), Politica de securitate naional: concepte,
instituii, procese, Editura Polirom, Iai, 2007, p.
78.
4
Ibidem, p. 79.
5
Dicionarul explicativ al limbii romne, Editura
Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 1998, p.969
6
Dicionarul explicativ al limbii romne, Editura
Univers Enciclopedic, Bucureti, 1998, p.969
7
Legea nr. 51 din 1991 privind sigurana naional
a Romniei, publicat n Monitorul Oficial nr. 163
din 7 august 1991 http://legislatie.resurse-pentrudemocratie.org/legea/51-1991.php i https://www.
sri.ro/fisiere/legislatie/Legea51.pdf

https://studiidesecuritate.wordpress.com/
category/securitate-europeana/page/4/
9
Strategia Naional de Aprare a rii 2015-2019
O Romnie puternic n Europa i n lume,
Bucureti 2015, p. 6.

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informational, legal, environmental, social,

military, and has the final aim of ensuring
the state of security based on the rule of
law.
National security defines the lack of
risks and threats to the nation, social
communities, the nation state and its
citizens, manifesting itself "through the
following indicators: sustainable economic
development and prosperity for citizens;
preventing and deterring socio-political
aggression; exercise unlimited rights and
liberties; legal, socio-political balance and
stability; freedom of decision and action of
the state".10
Following the terrorist attack in the
US in September 2001, the main problem
grinds on what security analysts call the
fight against terrorism. It is a new model of
conflict, "atypical", "asymmetrical" totally
different from past conflicts, involving a
new vision, a new perspective, a new
strategy, a comprehensive strategy,
involving several nations and directed
multiple dimensions with the aim of
echoes.
In this international context, of major
importance is that the factors responsible
in this field, have rethought security
strategies, whether military, economic and
social, ecological and cyber. With this
reformulation, they aim at achieving a
more intense and effective cooperation,
both domestically and internationally,
cooperation that is based more on
prevention than on reaction.
Under the new security strategies
adjusted structures have resulted, as well
as the preparation, organization and
approaches to military actions in the
surrounding reality; the main idea, being
that no country can defend itself any
longer on its own, this being possible only
through
extensive
international
cooperation.
Thus, "international security mainly
refers to how human communities relate to
each other when it comes to threats and
vulnerabilities, even if sometimes refers to

how these communities relate to threats

from the natural environment."
Thus, "international security mainly
refers to how human communities relate to
each other when it comes to threats and
vulnerabilities, even if sometimes refers to
how these communities relate to threats
from the natural environment."11

10

11

Security policy - origin of the concept

The way in which a state maintains
its own security and its citizens is
described in national security policy. This
is achieved through a unique, well defined
act, which is called security plan, strategy,
concept or doctrine of security.
National Security Policy defines the
essential objectives of the nation and sets
the action needed to meet current and
future threats and manages positive
developments.
Security
policy
encompasses many subjects which are
addressed in the effort to define internal
and external threats.
National Security Policy wishes to
unify the contributions of all institutions
responsible for national security, according
to current or potential major threats and
coordinate their actions.
In some cases, this policy is based
on defense policies or white charter that
focuses only on national defense, but there
are situations where these are not
published.
In the Security Policy certain terms
are used as follows: Security - is a special
form of politics. Security policies may be
of
national
state,
an
institution
international concerns on security of a
military-political alliances or associations
between states.
Establishing the specific security
policy representative of the security
environment requires analyzing very
closely the main geopolitical and
geostrategic indicators thereof. In this way,
the dangers and threats are analyzed over
Barry, Buzan, Ole, Wver, Jaap, de Wilde,
Securitatea: un nou cadru de analiz, Editura CA
Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, p. 26.

https://studiidesecuritate.wordpress.com/category/s
ecuritate-europeana/page/4

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their own security, and also the ways and

possibilities for ensuring it and the specific
purposes of organizations and institutions
with decision-making attributes in the
security field.
Security policy is a component of a
powerhouse government, a state, a
political-military alliance or an alliance of
sovereign
democratic
or
security
organizations. This policy has important
implications towards social organizations
in order to identify and guide ways and
means to ensure the basic needs of
existence, for affirmation in order to
protect state security and defense.
"Romania's security policy follows
the policy of Euro-Atlantic security
community and is based on a consistent set
of principles, priorities for action and ways
of achieving the strategic objectives of
Romania's National Security Strategy to
promote national interests."12
Methodology development for
security policy is complex, involving
processes, mechanisms and actors that be
must inter-related.
This policy can be defined as "a
dynamic process that establishes strategic
goals and allocates resources in order to
achieve the security of the majority of
citizens."13
This sums up all concepts,
principles and guidelines, based on which
governance processes are decided upon,
departments and international operations,
using the resources for protecting,
defending and supporting the interests of
security.
This security policy reflects
government efforts in order to ensure
security. These actions reinforce the public
debate of national or international security
issues, the most important being their area

problems and environments security,

conflict management and international
terrorism.
It was shown that after each change
of administration, there were extensive
public discussions and debates on security
models and variants proposed by the new
administration. Therefore it can be said
that the security policy of a state depends
on the notions, concepts and principles on
which the political system is built.
Security policy is integrated by
several means, such as:
diplomatic means;
economic means;
legal means;
informational resources;
military means;
scientific means;
ecological means.
These are implemented and put into
practice by state powers: legislative,
executive and judiciary in any situation
threatening security.
If they fulfill the needs of
institutional policies, public and social, the
security policy is sustainable and matters
of common interest are addressed in
national and regional framework. This
compels all states, governmental or nongovernmental, organizations or civic,
political heads and heads of delegations to
respond directly for common security.
Security policy is understood as
something different from a regular policy
mainly due to its significant consequences
over the state and society,14 and Buzan,
Wilde and Waever define the security
policy as: "a special part of politics or
above"15.

12

http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/heztimzv/carta-alba-asecuritati-si-apararii-nationale-a-guvernului-din13052004
13
Luciana, Alexandra, Ghica, Marian, Zulean
(coord.), Politica de securitate naional: concepte,
instituii, procese, Editura Polirom, Iai, 2007, p.
39.

14

Ionel, Nicu, Sava, Studii de securitate, Editura

Centrului Romn de Studii Regionale, Bucureti,
2005, p. 200
15
Barry, Buzan, Ole, Wver, Jaap, de Wilde,
Security: A new framework for analysis, Editura
Lynne Rienner, Londra, 1998, p. 23.

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To understand the need to make a

national security policy public, we must
pursue areas of interest in which the
following occur:
general interest - all the shared
interests of citizens, as social beings;
legitimate interest - referring to
individuals and legal persons, supported
and protected by law;
public interest - all interests of
whole society;
political interest - that the
advantages or benefits that motivate the
national movement or party or social
group, form of application of the political
system or in relation to it;
professional interest - related to
the occupations of population.
Consequently, the security policy
does not have to be a secret policy, made
in small committees that decide behind
closed doors and neither should it be
hidden from the public.

The objectives of a national security

policy
In some countries, national security
policy, reflected in the National Security
Strategy, presents a balance between being
public and classified, having both public
choices and some secrets. Other countries
are trying to avoid this problem by using
vague terms called "strategic ambiguity",
but can result in reducing the efficiency of
the document.
This policy must achieve a balance
between public discussion and input of
experts. Public debate may offer solidarity
regarding national security policy, but its
effectiveness would suffer if it is
understood as a manifestation of political
interests.
The viability and effectiveness of a
national security policy are conclusive
only if they answer the following
questions:
What is the definition of national
security?
When and who should participate
in its realization?
Has a monitoring team been
appointed to revise this policy?
What institution coordinates the
contributions of various organizations and
workshops on national security policy?
What are the current and possible
future risks and threats facing national
security?
What tools are currently available
to the national security and what new tools
would be needed in the future?
In what way do they address the
problems of the balance between
transparency and the need to maintain
confidentiality in key areas of national
security?
What measures should be taken to
make the public opinion of national
security policy known and to inform
citizens about its content?
However, the security policy is
sustainable only if it reunites the interests
of individual and collective expression.

Application methods and implications of

national security policy
National security almost invariably
is regarded as the main occupation of any
state, and has national survival as the
ultimate, maximum goal and the main
purpose of the security policy of any
nation. The concept of national security
involves preserving the way of life of the
respective nation, the independence and
integrity of the territory of the State in the
absence of intervention from the outside or
when it is undermined, so that the nation
can benefit from the moral, cultural and
material standards suggested even by itself
and retaining its position on the
international stage.
"At the beginning of the
millennium, the world entered a new phase
of development, marked by the coexistence
and confrontation of major positive trends
with others that generate risks and threats.
The old world order based on bipolar logic
- characterized by rivalry and capability to
annihilate one another of states and

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political-military blocks - disappeared, and

the post-bipolar transition was completed,
while the germs to build a new global
security architecture are increasingly the
most important concerns in the
international community. "16
The National Security Policy is a
component meant to support regional
policy and regional security in the situation
when the national state joins the militarypolitical alliances or becomes an ally of
other democratic and sovereign state.
At this juncture, the security policy
is subordinated to the need to preserve the
integrity,
sovereignty,
unity
and
independence, to ensure economic,
political and social development of the
people and to participate in ensuring
security and stability in the area of
strategic interest.
National security policy rarely offers
well defined solutions on security issues,
because this document is less rigid or
insufficiently detailed to work in any
circumstance.
Therefore,
following
approval, any actor is responsible for
applying the security area of national
security policy, which will require detailed
examination and verification capabilities of
each institution policy.
In general, a public policy is a set
of political decisions for implementation of
projects and social programs. The ultimate
goal of public policy is to produce 'public
goods', and national security and defense
are considered to represent public goods.17
The implementation of national
security policy can be maintained by
organizing groups to follow the way in
which this is done. These groups whose
role is to assess the security policy must

take into consideration the opportunities

and risks estimated.
In some countries, the task of
assessing the security policy belongs to an
institution such as the National Security
Council; in other countries, provided
interdepartmental gupuri that meet
regularly to review its order. The
composition of the monitoring institutions
and their work is necessary to follow the
same values of representation, dialogue
and transparency which are accepted and
reviewed by the security policy
committees.
Some
surveillance
organizations may propose executive
verification and revision of national
security policy when deemed to be
necessary.
Thus we consider the conclusion
that "the national security policy can be
defined as a set of decisions on structuring
a vision of national security and national
interests, determining strategic objectives
and the development of national strategies,
and implementing and evaluating those
strategies"18 - as Marian Zulean defines
national security policy.
Samuel P. Huntington says that
"national security can be ensured by
improving the safety of social institutions,
economic and political rights of the nation
against threats from other independent
states."19 "Starting from this assumption,
Huntington identifies three sets of security
policies, manifested both at the operational
level - the immediate measures taken to
prevent security threats, and institutional the manner in which security policy is
formulated and performed at the
operational level: - military security policy
that establishes and coordinates activities
to reduce or neutralize the attempts to
weaken or destroy a certain nation through

16

Strategia de Securitate Naional a Romniei Romnia European, Romnia Euroatlantic:

pentru o via mai bun ntr-o ar democratic,
mai sigur i prosper , Bucureti, 2007, pp.9-10.
17
Luciana, Alexandra, Ghica, Marian, Zulean
(coord.), Politica de securitate naional: concepte,
instituii, procese, Editura Polirom, Iai, 2007, p.
33.

18

Luciana, Alexandra, Ghica, Marian, Zulean

(coord.), Politica de securitate naional: concepte,
instituii, procese, Editura Polirom, Iai, 2007, p.
41.
19
Huntington, Samuel, The Soldier and the State:
The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations,
New York: Belknap Press, 1957, p. 99.

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armed attack outside the institutional and

territorial; - internal security policy,
centered on the threat to the state,
produced by forces acting within its
institutional and territorial boundaries; Situational Security Policy, concerned with
the risk of a erosion resulting from longterm changes in political, economic, social
and demographic changes that tend to
reduce the state. "20
In order to achieve national
security, the state must manage the sources
of insecurity, conventional threats,
violence and social or political and
political or military aggressions. In this
direction, it must adapt the possibilities of
perception and action, to identify areas of
prevention and annihilation and to
participate effectively in order to ensure
the security status of the state with the
values and security interests protected and
defended.
Simultaneously, the defense of a
nation's political and military aggressions
are assigned to the institution with
dedicated functions in this regard, bearing
the generic name of the armed forces.
Nations have no longer expansionist
tendencies, but it will always be necessary
to protect countries against the political or
military aggressions of some centers of
power, which emerge with the intention to
benefit from or to appropriate resources.
In conclusion, the beneficiary of a
national security policy must be the
citizen. From this position, any person who
was born or naturalized in the respective
state deserves to enjoy all civil and
political rights, benefits and protection
provided by state laws.
In this regard, the rights of citizens,
in the relationship between them and the
State, are fundamental rights, essential to
life, such as their liberty and dignity,
necessary for the development of human

personality; these rights being established

by the Constitution and guaranteed by the
Constitution and laws.

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Bucureti, 2005.
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Romniei - Romnia European,
Romnia Euroatlantic: pentru o
via mai bun ntr-o ar
democratic,
mai sigur i
prosper , Bucureti, 2007.
Huntington, Samuel, The Soldier
and the State: The Theory and
Politics of Civil-Military Relations,
New York: Belknap Press, 1957.
Alexandra, Sarcinschi, Constantin,
Motoflei, Militar Nonmilitar n
Securitatea Naional. Dilema

15.

Armatei, n Studii de Securitate i

Aprare, Editura Universitii
Naionale de Aprare, Bucureti,
2005.
Henri
Cathala,
Epoca
dezinformrii, Editura Militar,
Bucureti, 1991.

This work was possible with the financial

support of the Sector Operational Program
for Human Resources Development 20072013, co-financed by the European Social
Fund, under the project number
POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385 with the title
Integrated/educational network for the
formation, counseling and orientation of
doctoral students for a research career in
security, defense, public order and
national
security
domains
SECNETEDU.

Proiect cofinanat din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operaional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor
Umane 2007-2013 Investete n OAMENI

290

TARGETING, TARGET ACQUISITION

AND THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS
Niculae SMEU
Cosmin DOBRESCU

Masters Degree Student, Carol I National Defence University

Masters Degree Student, Carol I National Defence University
Abstract: Targeting is the part of the military decision making process used to focus battlefield operating
systems (BOSs) to achieve the commanders intent. The methodology used to translate the commander's intent
into a plan is decide, detect, deliver, and assess. The functions associated with this methodology help the
commander decide what to attack, how to acquire those targets, and when those targets are acquired, how to
attack them in a way that disrupts, delays or limits the enemy's ability to achieve his objectives. Simply stated,
targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of
operational requirements and capabilities.
Keywords: focus battlefield operating systems, D3A, limits the enemy's ability, matching the appropriate
response.
Motto
Not only strike while the iron is
hot, but make it hot by striking.
Oliver Cromwell

This article provides an overview

of targeting fundamentals, field artillery
target acquisition processes, and target
acquisition integration into the military
decision making process (MDMP). Target
acquisition, by nature, is an integral part of
the targeting process and requires the
interaction among many groups within a
given organization. Field artillery target
acquisition plays a key role in the targeting
process. Without accurate targeting data,
indirect fire systems are of limited value.
Targeting is a command responsibility that
requires the participation of key members
of
maneuver
and
field
artillery
coordinating and special staffs. It is a
critical component of the MDMP in order
to achieve the commander's intent. As
such, the targeting process focuses on
mission requirements. The mission,
commander's intent and guidance drive the
targeting process. These inputs allow unit
personnel to determine the targets to be
engaged, how to locate and track the
targets, when and how to engage the
targets, along with determining if, when,

and how target assessment will be

accomplished. The methodology used to
drive the targeting process is Decide,
Detect, Deliver and Assess (D3A). This
article discusses D3A, the role of target
acquisition (TA) and how TA fits into the
MDMP process.
Targeting Principles and Philosophy
According to joint publication (JP)
3-60, a target is an entity or object
considered for possible engagement or
other action. Targets also include the wide
array of mobile and stationary forces,
equipment, capabilities, and functions that
an enemy commander can use to conduct
operations. Targeting is the process of
selecting and prioritizing targets and
matching the appropriate response to them,
considering operational requirements and
capabilities (JP 3-0). The emphasis of
targeting is on identifying resources
(targets) the enemy can least afford to lose
or that provide him with the greatest
advantage.

291

believed to be essential for the enemy

commander to accomplish his mission. As
the MDMP continues friendly COAs are
developed and wargamed. As a result of
wargaming, HVTs whose loss to the
enemy will contribute to the success of the
friendly plan are identified. These targets
are high payoff targets (HPT). Effective
engagement of HPTs is essential to the
successful execution of the friendly COAs.
The inability to acquire or achieve the
specified effects against a HPT always
requires a reassessment of the friendly
COA to make adjustments based on a
changed enemy situation.
Several products are developed
during the decide phase of targeting.
These products are:
High-payoff target list (HPTL)
a prioritized list of HPTs.
Intelligence collection plan
(ICP) - answers the commander's priority
intelligence requirements (PIR) and
intelligence requirements (IR). This
includes HPT designated as PIR.
Target
selection standards
(TSS) designated target location
accuracy, target posture and time
requirements that must be met before
attacking a target. Targets not meeting TSS
requirements are considered target
indicators and aren't attacked.
Attack guidance matrix (AGM)
document addressing which targets will
be attacked, how when and the desired
effects.
The commander approves this
product. In addition, other products are
developed or refined during the decide
phase.
They include, but are not limited to:
Targeting
synchronization
matrix (TSM).
Combat
assessment
(CA)
requirements.
Target
nominations air
interdiction (AI), Army Tactical Missile
System (ATACMS), electronic warfare
(EW) etc.
As a result of the decide function,
the targeting team will determine which
targets will be acquired and attacked to

Targeting methodology
Targeting is a combination of
intelligence functions, planning, battle
command, operational execution and
combat assessment (CA). The D3A
methodology facilitates the attack of the
right target at the right time with the most
appropriate asset. Integral to this process is
target tracking. Tracking is essential to the
detect and deliver functions. Tracking also
impacts the ability to assess a target and
implement subsequent reattack decisions.
Targeting is a continuous process that
maintains pace with the dynamics of an
ever-changing battlefield situation. In
addition to the enemy situation, the inputs
that drive this process come from higher
headquarters'
plans
and
orders.
Specifically, they are the mission, intent,
and specified/implied tasks.
Decide
The first and most important step in
the targeting process is the decide
function. Deciding the targets to be
attacked provides the overall focus and
sets priorities for intelligence collection
and attack planning. Targeting priorities
must be set for each phase or critical event
of an operation. Successful targeting is
directly related to the commander's battle
plan. Therefore, the targeting team must
understand the unit's mission. This
understanding starts with mission analysis.
Once the commander and staff complete
the mission analysis, the commander
issues the restated mission. The restated
mission is the starting point for the
targeting process.
Key to the decide function is the
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB). During this process, situational
templates and event templates are
developed and used to ascertain suspected
enemy locations and movements for
targeting purposes. IPB identifies the
enemy courses of action (COA) and
subsequent high value targets (HVT) are
identified from a target value analysis
(TVA). HVTs are those targets or assets

292

meet the commander's intent; when and

where (time and space) they may be found
and by whom; how the targets will be
acquired and attacked; assessment
requirements; and the synchronization of
sensors and attack systems with the
scheme of maneuver. This results in the
tasking of TA assets. The targeting
synchronization matrix identifies targets
designated for acquisition by field artillery
TA assets.

Once detected, targets are passed to

the fire support element (FSE) for
engagement. The FSE passes the target to
the appropriate command or asset for
execution. HPTs may be passed directly
from a sensor to a firing unit when
authorized by the maneuver commander.
This is accomplished by establishing a
sensor-to-shooter link. This is a useful
technique for engaging critical targets with
a short dwell or target decay time.
Targets and suspected targets may
be passed to the targeting team by a
number of means. It is essential that the
proper information be passed to facilitate
analysis and attack. As a minimum, target
reports should include:
Reporting agency.
Date-time group (DTG) of the
sensor acquiring the target.
Description of the activity.
Size and orientation of the
target.
Target location and altitude.
Target location error (TLE).
Dwell time.
Target posture (stationary or rate
and direction of movement).
The information from the target
report is compared with the TSS. If the
TSS requirements are met, the target is
attacked.

Detect
Detect is the next critical function
in the targeting process. The detect
function translates target priorities
developed during the decide function into
the ICP and TA tasking contained in the
operations order (OPORD). The G2 or S2
is the primary staff section directing the
effort to locate and identify HPTs. The
collection manager oversees this effort and
directs the tasking of acquisition assets
against appropriate targets. Since there
aren't enough assets to detect all targets,
prioritization is essential. Therefore, radar
schedules and zones are established to
support the detection effort with focus on
PIR and HPTs. It is essential that all
acquisition assets be used effectively and
efficiently. Duplication of effort must be
avoided unless it is required to confirm a
target. At the division, the analysis and
control element (ACE) manages the
collection plan to avoid duplication. The
analysis and control team (ACT) manages
the collection plan at the brigade.
HPTs must be detected in sufficient
time to synchronize their attack with the
commander's battle plan. Precise taskings
must be given to acquisition systems
designated to detect a specific target.
Mobile targets must be detected and
tracked until they are attacked. Further,
tracking of mobile targets must be planned
in sufficient detail to allow the handoff of a
target from one collection asset to another
when required. Tracking priorities are
based on the commander's concept of the
operation and targeting priorities.

Deliver
The deliver function of the
targeting process executes the target attack
guidance supporting the commander's
battle plan. The attack of targets must
satisfy the attack guidance developed
during the decide function.
Successful target attack implements
tactical and technical delivery decisions
and supporting actions. The attack of a
target starts with the review of the attack
guidance. Initially, the target to be attacked
is validated. Validation includes reviewing
the acquisition system and its associated
accuracy, time of acquisition, and target
posture. The validated target is passed to a
designated delivery unit/system for attack.
Depending upon the delivery system, other

293

factors warrant consideration. These

include weather, Class III and V
availability,
planning
time,
risk,
coordination requirements, fire support
coordinating measures (FSCM), and
notification of unit/system conducting
battle damage assessment (BDA).

differences are the time focus, the number

of targeting team members, and the
available assets. The basic procedures for
conducting targeting meetings are the
same.
The targeting meeting brings the
targeting team together to synchronize the
targeting process and obtain approval for
and/or changes to the targeting products. It
focuses and synchronizes the unit's combat
power and resources toward finding,
tracking, attacking and assessing HPTs.
Purposes of a targeting meeting include:
Verifying and updating the
HPTL
Verifying and updating available
assets for each HPT
Allocating delivery systems to
engage each target
Identifying target for attack by
division or joint assets
Synchronizing lethal and nonlethal assets
The timing of the targeting meeting
is crucial. It must be effectively integrated
into the unit's battle rhythm and nested into
the higher headquarters' targeting cycle to
ensure that the results of the targeting
process can be implemented. Each
representative must come to the meeting
prepared to discuss available assets,
capabilities, limitations and assessment
requirements related to their staff area.
This means participants must conduct
detailed prior coordination and be prepared
to bring inputs and/or information with
them. This preparation must be focused
around the commander's intent and a solid
understanding of the current situation. At
the maneuver brigade, the following are
typical inputs by targeting team members:
N2/ S2:
Current enemy situation;
BDA for targets engaged
since last meeting;
Enemy courses of action;
N3/S3:
Current friendly situation;
Maneuver assets available;
Current combat power;
Requirements from higher
headquarters;

Asses
Physically
assessing
effects
resulting from the application of military
force is a necessary task. Assessment is
conducted either by direct observation or
estimating damage based on the munitions
delivered, target characteristics and target
location error (TLE). Damage assessments
provide the commander with information
that expresses target damage on the basis
of overall mission accomplishment. CA is
used to determine the success of force
employment during military operations.
The requirements for CA are identified
during course of action development and
wargamed to ensure they can be executed.
CA consists of three elements:
BDA.
Munitions
effects assessment
(MEA).
Re-attack recommendation.
Results from the assess function
often require changes to plans and
decisions. This may result in the update of
several products from the decide phase.
These include:
IPB products;
HPTL;
TSS;
AGM;
Intelligence
collection plan
(ICP).
Targeting meetings
The targeting meeting is a critical
event in a unit's battle rhythm. It should be
the minimum length required to present
targeting information, situation updates,
provide recommendations and obtain
decisions. The purpose of targeting
meetings is the same regardless of the level
at which they are conducted. The major

294

 Changes

to

commander's

Once all targeting decisions are

made and the commander's approval is
obtained,
new
fragmentary
orders
(FRAGO) and tasking are prepared and
disseminated.

intent;
Changes to task organization;
Planned operations;
Targeting Officer:
HPTs that have been attacked
and associated BDA;
Radar status.
Table 1 shows an agenda with the
information covered by core targeting team
members.

Relationship of targeting to MDMP

Targeting is a commander-driven
process and starts with the receipt of the
mission. Initially, the decide function

Table 1. Targeting Meeting Agenda

AGENDA

WHO

WHAT

S2 Representative

- Weather
- Enemy situation and decision points
- BDA for targets engaged since last meeting
- Analysis of enemy most likely and dangerous COAs
- Recommended changes to PIR

S3 Representative

- New requirements from higher HQ

- Summarizes current situation
- Provides status of combat power
- CDRs guidance and intent
- Planned OPS during the focus period

Targeting Officer

- Briefs HPTs that have been attacked and associated BDA

- Provided radar status and active radar zones
- Briefs counterfire situation

EW Officer

- Brigade EW plan

Once everyone understands the

enemy's COA, the state of current
operations in relation to the plan, and the
targets recommended as HPT, the XO
leads the team through the D3A process for
that time period. This includes:
Deciding and prioritizing which
collection asset will detect and trigger the
target attack.
Determining which system will
attack the target and the effects to be
achieved.
Deciding when and where the
target will be attacked.
Determining
assessment
requirements.
Determining re-attack criteria.

coincides with the MDMP from the

mission analysis. The detect function starts
with the commander's approval of the plan
or order and is accomplished during
execution of the plan or order. Once
detected, targets are attacked and assessed
as
required.
After
an
operation
commences, the targeting process becomes
cyclic with all the functions happening
simultaneously. Figure 1 shows the
relationship
between
the
D3A
methodology and the MDMP along with
products generated during the targeting
process.

295

Figure 1. Relationship between the D3A methodology and the MDMP

anticipated enemy actions that may require

special consideration.
This identifies the amount of
available time and the specified, implied
and essential tasks.

Target acquisition integration

into MDMP
The target acquisition planning
process must be integrated into the fires
planning process and the MDMP if TA
assets are to be effectively employed. TA
planning starts when the mission is
received and continues throughout the
entire D3A process. The targeting officer
must be focused on the requirements for
TA systems throughout this process.

Course of action development

The targeting officer participates in
COA development. This ensures that FS
planning, and ultimately TA planning, is
fully integrated into the maneuver MDMP.
As a result of the COA development
process, Essential Fire Support Tasks are
developed to support each COA
developed.
These
determine
the
requirements for radar coverage, zones,
and radar position areas. This information
is incorporated into the COA sketch. The
commander issues his guidance and
adjustments are made to each COA

Receive the mission/Mission analysis

The targeting officer starts his
mission analysis as soon as the initial
warning order is received. The targeting
officer gathers all the information pertinent
to TA assets for incorporation into the fire
support
estimate.
This
happens
concurrently with the mission analysis. TA
information contained in the fire support
estimate includes a detailed status of all
radars, strikers, reconnaissance and
surveillance assets.
This information is updated
throughout MDMP process.
During mission analysis the
targeting officer reviews the order based
on the commander's intent, concept of
operation, areas of operations and interest,
tasks,
limitations,
constraints,
and

Course of action analysis (wargaming)

During wargaming, each COA is
analyzed independently to determine if
they are executable. Every individual
EFST is analyzed and decision points
determined. Wargaming often results in
adjustments to the COA. During the
wargame, every task assigned to a TA
asset is analyzed for feasibility. TA tasks

296

and actions are modified, if required, and

recorded on the synchronization matrix.

completes the initial MDMP. TA plan is

continually updated throughout the
operation as part of the D3A process.
As we highlighted earlier, there are
a lot of functions that must be incorporated
and synchronized in effective targeting.
These include intelligence, command and
control, fire support (weapons), execution,
and assessment. The way to link these all
together is through a methodology. D3A
was ingrained in everyone and why not it
worked.

Course of action comparison

and approval
After completion of COA analysis,
each COA is compared against a
predetermined set of criteria designed to
identify which COA best accomplishes the
mission. The COA that best accomplishes
the mission becomes the basis for
recommending a COA to the commander
during the COA decision brief. Once the
commander makes his decision and issues
his guidance, the staff makes any
adjustments to the COA that might be
required. The targeting officer then makes
any required adjustments to TA
requirements. A final the information (TA
plan) from the MDMP process is used in
the development in the operations order or
plan and is sent to subordinates. The TA
plan developed during the MDMP
becomes part of the fire support annex.
The publishing of plans and orders

Bibliography
1.

*** Doctrina pentru managementul

ntrunit al intelor, ediie 2011.
2.
Field Manual FM 3-09.12
3.
Battle Staff, Doctrinal Guide to
Military Decision Making and
Tactical Operations
INTERNET:
4.
https://www.justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Joint_Chi
efs-Joint_Targeting_20130131.pdf
5.
http://www.globalsecurity.org

297

TENDENCIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF SUBMARINE

Niculae SMEU

Cosmin DOBRESCU

Masters Degree Student, Carol I National Defence University

Masters Degree Student, Carol I National Defence University

Abstract: Often the first arrived and the last gone in the operating theatre, the submarine follows one principle:
Only one chance, only one attack.
Keyword:Owning the water space.

Owning the water space.

Submarine market requirements
and technical solutions

rising importance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific

region and the ongoing development and
deployment of capabilities that challenge
global maritime access. This environment
is also challenged by the continuing threats
arising from expanding and evolving
terrorist and criminal networks, the
increasing frequency and intensity of
maritime territorial disputes and threats to
maritime commerce, particularly the flow
of energy. This represents a clear contrast
to our perception of the world four years
ago.
Today we again face the regaining
and rebuilding of strong military positions
with the already known players in the
Indo-Pacific, but also in Asia with Russia
as a strong military nation which is being
reinforced by its current government,
whilst the asymmetric threats are still
there. For Navies and their submarine
forces this has serious implications: The
development of new capabilities to respond
to asymmetric threats remain unquestioned
but the importance of the classic role and
operational value of the submarine in the
operational theatre has never been greater.

Todays
global
security
environment is characterised by volatility,
complexity and interdependencies. The
armament dynamics in the Asian Pacific
region are accelerating. The world is again
looking at conflicts provoked by
governments that question the territorial
integrity of established countries like
Ukraine. The battle for energy and raw
materials
is
underway
and
will
dramatically influence the maritime
domain. Russia for example will
strengthen its focus on the Arctic and
Atlantic regions. Two thirds of the worlds
trade uses sea lines of communication.
Safeguarding these economic lifelines is
crucial to the security and wealth of
countries in a globalized world and a
growing modern community of nations. So
the classical Anti Access/ Area Denial
scenarios are back in the theatre and the
submarine force will play an important role
in the related strategic planning.
Owning the water space

Technology roadmap
Sensor-driven developments

This small and outstandingly

powerful force is able to restrict access to
huge areas and potential battlefields.
Todays water space is the most
critical part of the defence security
environment. It is characterized by the

Short term
The tactical situation in classic
warfare scenarios is different from antipiracy threats. In asymmetric fields of
operation we are facing an unknown

298

opponent. This specific threat is not

technologically driven it uses the effect
of surprise: the unexpected.
In the classic fields of operation we
have parties with cutting edge technology.
The differentiator will be the most
effective technical solution together with
the best trained soldiers. In the maritime
domain the key drivers of technological
development are stimulation on the one
hand and response on the other. It is a
dialogue, even a race, between the two,
with the only goal, to own the water
space. In the issue at hand this constant
challenge exists between the submarine
and its opponent. The submarine designer
strives to give the operator the
technological edge to maintain the upper
hand in the future battle space.
Considering the timeline up to the
2030s, there is a general perception that
Anti-Submarine Warfare capability will be
enormously enhanced on the sensor side.
Satellite-based Synthetic Aperture Radar
(SAR) will be ready to control the Sea
Lines of Communication (SLOCs) from
outer space and will gather high-resolution
pictures of the ocean. Low Frequency
Towed Active Sonar (LFTAS) will open
up a wide field of opportunities in ASW
scenarios with its high detection ranges.
On the hunting side, variable depth sonar
systems complete the field of active means.
Therefore, on the submarine side,
stealth will be more than ever the
determining factor. Conventional dieselelectric submarines need to surface
periodically to run their diesel-powered
generators in order to recharge their
batteries. This is the moment a submarine
becomes most vulnerable to detection and
possible attack. The air-independent
propulsion system (AIP) was and still is a
game changer in modern submarine
operation. AIP in this case only serves one
purpose: To remain undetected or in other
words to be stealthy. The operationally
proven HDW FC AIP technology of
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has set the
standard already in the past. Now this will

be taken even further with the Methanol

Reformer System, which will significantly
increase the submerged time, setting a new
benchmark for conventional submarine
operation.
The maximized endurance of
submarine operation achieved by these AIP
technologies
will
be
optimally
complemented by the high energy density
ranges of lithium-ion batteries. This pushes
energy management on board towards
better operational profiles with regard to
maneuverability and speed.
Other innovative aspects of stealth
development such as Active Noise
Cancelling will optimize the already
outstanding acoustic footprint of the HDW
Class
submarine
designs.
While
submarines are now sneaking as quietly
as possible in the vastness of the deep
oceans, someone in the future will switch
the light on.
Mid-term
On the surface sensor side big steps
are envisaged:
SQUID
sensors
or
Superconducting Quantum Interference
Devices, which will be ready to sense
extremely low magnetic anomalies. Such a
powerful sensor mounted on a Maritime
Patrol Aircraft will represent a tremendous
threat to a submarine. Bi- or multi-static
sonar operations from two or more surface
vessels provide advantages like enlarged
detection areas and increased probability of
detection. In a longer perspective these
sensors will possibly also be mounted on
submarines and be a significant game
changer in the modern maritime theatre.
Fitting effectors are currently under
development by various countries in the
form of a Long Range Anti-Submarine
Missile, which will be a significant threat
to the submarine.
In order to get the magic hood (of
invisibility) back on again, stealth
capabilities are again imperative!
The above mentioned sensor
developments in the field of magnetic
signatures lead us to a fundamental

299

question: Since the early 1960s the

German Defence Science and Technology
Organization (WTD71), together with the
industry, have jointly developed a nonmagnetic material
for submarines,
basically because of the mine threat during
the Cold War scenario. Until today
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems holds a
worldwide unique capability in reducing
magnetic signatures. Compared to a
ferromagnetic design the level of signature
of a non-magnetic hull for example is
reduced by a factor of ten. Is there a need
to rethink the choice of material for other
nations as well?
As described, the signature
footprint of our submarine designs has
been reduced by using cutting edge
technology.
In
view
of
recent
developments in active sonar technology, a
very important factor on the way to
remaining undetected and to holding the
lead in stealth technology is to reduce the
target echo strength (TES). Due to the inhouse development by ThyssenKrupp
Marine Systems of coating materials and
methods to shape future submarine designs
to be optimized for TES, it will be possible
to reduce the signature significantly. This,
for sure, demands close collaboration with
submarine contractors and suppliers in
order to optimize components outside the
pressure hull as well.
Long term
Looking even further down the
road, a wide array of unnamed systems
will most likely be introduced into the
marine scenario. They will not be used as a
substitute for todays already known
systems like submarines or frigates, but
will be used to widen the spectrum of
opportunities: in swarm above the water
and beneath the surface, in Anti-Submarine
Warfare, in Anti-Surface Warfare, in
gathering information or other tasks. To
achieve these goals, fields of development
are: autonomy, energy storage and
communication just to highlight the
important ones. On the submarine side
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems R+D

departments are currently working on these

scenarios, together with partners from the
German submarine enterprises.
Weapon-driven developments
Another key design driver is the
development of new weapons. Where does
it come from? Recent history and crises
show that there is a strategic need to act
from sea to land, in other words to have a
land strike capability. These missions are
the most effective, the more unpredictable
they are. Operating a missile launch from a
submarine is the most effective and the
safest engagement from an operational risk
point of view.
Beside the land strike capability
there is another crucial point for future
trends in submarine weapons against
surface targets, the classical ordnance on
board is a torpedo. In that category of
weapon the Atlas Elektronik DM2A4 is
probably one of the most outstanding
torpedo developments worldwide. The
drawback of this category of weapon is
that its effect will always be a unit kill.
Derived from todays conflict scenarios
there is an essential need to also have a
mission kill capability on board. Whilst
one could argue the latest version of the
successful Harpoon Anti Surface missile
and the promising developments with the
Norwegian Naval Strike Missile could
represent an answer, there is still justified
reason to believe that also the IDAS
missile system will have a role to play in
that regard. The IDAS missile has all the
potential to become the game changer it
was conceived as, when it comes to the
ASW helicopter threat.
Key factors to own the water space
As stated before from a technical
point of view one of the outstanding key
design drivers is stealth technology. The
unpredictable characteristics of the
submarine force are the differentiator to
promote owning the water space. But there

300

are also others. Human factors for example

a not to be underestimated if not the most
important criterion for a successful
operation. The fields to be highlighted in
this area fall into two categories:
a) design factors such as sea
keeping, accommodation, air condition
facilities, food; in short: the living
conditions on board and
b) the operational preparation of the
humans such as through training. The best
submarine is worthless without wellprepared crew mentally, physically,
technically
and
operationally.
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has a wellestablished track record when it comes to
system training. But the training concept
should not only contain the technical
training on board but go together with
operational
and
tactical
training.
Operationally ready submarines should be
used by operationally ready crews, so that
availability of the submarine force goes up.
The German Submarine Training Centre
has
shown
its
outstanding
and
internationally well recognized capabilities
with several international submarine
courses, fulfilling exactly that task.
Another factor is interoperability
not only between the navies, but also in
international
industrial
cooperation.
Industrial cooperation has to go hand in
hand
with
the
navy-to-industry
relationship.
ThyssenKrupp
Marine
Systems as the design house for most
NATO operated conventional submarines
sees itself at the forefront of such
development and currently has a strong
focus on standardization and processes.
The company is working on an in-house
development called Sub Flex. The goal is
to optimize the overall business processes
in accordance with DIN ISO 15288
Systems Engineering. The program also
contains international standard aspects like
sub safe and proves rules and regulations,
the German regulations for building
submarines. At the end it will optimize
the products and the interrelation between
contractor, customer and end-user.
Availability is an important factor
in owning the water space. With spiraling

unit costs resulting from evolving sets of

requirements, the operational availability
of the equipment plays an ever-rising role.
This operational availability is no longer
solely contributed by being there but by
being in real operation. For its surface
assets the German Navy has developed a
so-called Intensive User Concept.
Several Crews will in future be rotating
over the ships currently under production
at ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. The
ships are staying in theatre for a period
of up to two years. ThyssenKrupp Marine
Systems is working side by side with the
German Navy in this ambitious endeavor.
It can be anticipated that once matured,
this crewing concept might also translate
towards submarine operations.
Operational availability is, of
course, not only related to the submarine
force quantity, but also to technical
availability of the platform. One of the
crucial points is the delivery time of
components when carrying out corrective
maintenance. Long lead items will play an
important role in the game to decrease
docking phases. Due to the fact that HDW
Class designs have a wide range of
commonalities in components and systems,
operational availability can increase
significantly by being part of the HDS
Submarine Users Club. Operational
availability is undoubtedly an imperative
requirement for the life cycle of the
submarine.
In the same way, service to the
customer is one of the critical
differentiators in the Navy-Industry
relationship.
ThyssenKrupp
Marine
Systems has redefined Services, making
it one of the three operational pillars of the
company with the aim of giving naval
customers a choice of service options to
tailor support to the Navys specific needs.
The market situation
for submarines
Currently 22 submarines of
different classes are under construction
until 2022 with ThyssenKrupp Marine
Systems. This is a clear sign that customers

301

are satisfied with the products offered. At

the same time for new projects in the
market two drivers have been identified:
the aforementioned changes in submarine
scenarios and the fact that many
submarines are reaching their lifetime
limits. At the same time, ever present
limitation of military funds leads to a
decreasing number of platforms and
significant efforts to reduce costs. The
nearest conclusion could be to team up
with another nation for a customized
design in order to share project costs, but
this might lead to operational compromises
and
increased
organizational
and
contractual complexity. ThyssenKrupp
Marine Systems as the leading submarine
system house intends to support and
supplement these endeavors by providing
smart preconfigured modular designs that
can be theoretically tailored by a larger
number of customers.
In Asia Pacific as well as in Europe
several ambitious naval procurement
projects of a different nature can be
identified:
Several of the projects showcase
operational requirements that fit the
improved
and
carefully
evolved
performances of HDW Class 209
submarines.
AIP powered submarines with
additional
requirements
e.g.
for
interoperability or extended transit
capabilities are perfectly addressed by
HDW Class 214, which has already
reached a level of maturity that makes it
ready for adaptation to meet these specific
customers needs,
At the customization and in this
case also operational top end, the HDW
Class 216 was developed on proven design
principles and already existing systems as
an ideal solution for expeditionary navies.
How can the industry further open
the way for an international development?
The reason for the success of the HDW
Classes is the outstanding submarine
enterprise foundation, which performs joint
developments together with partners in all

kinds of systems and in a wide field of

technologies. National industries cannot
survive by supporting them with national
projects only. ThyssenKrupp Marine
Systems is open to future joint
developments. This will ensure the
customers submarine capability incountry; this will create taxes that will pay
back the procurement costs.
Conclusion
Owning the water space is a
challenging requirement for Governments,
Navies and as a result of that especially for
industry. It has a wide range of demanding
dependencies. It reflects stealth concepts,
cutting edge technology; it comprises
training concepts, logistical considerations,
in-country
industrial
strategy
and
international navy partnership for the
complete submarine life cycle.
Own the water space!
HDW Class 216 submarine
The spectrum of covertly operating
vehicles has changed significantly since
the end of the Cold War. Changes in the
degree, location and complexity of
conflicts make new and additional
demands on the submarines of today
tomorrow and following generations. New
major powers are arising in India and
China, as demonstrated by the growth of
their armament budgets. Countries such as
Japan, South Korea and Australia are
building up their defence forces and
focussing on new submarine programs.
Where 25 years ago the emphasis was
primarily on denial of strategically
important sea areas and on tying down the
antisubmarine forces of potential superior
opponents, always with the option of
escalation through the deployment of
heavyweight torpedoes and mines, today
the focus is more on surveillance and
reconnaissance. This is an extremely
diversified scope of tasks that includes
reconnaissance, classification, surveillance,
intelligence gathering and communication

302

of the results of this work, all involving

submarines, UAVs or Special Forces.
The feasibility study for HDW
Class 216 reflects the results of the
following generic demands on a submarine
design:
High endurance;
High capacity for SOF and
additional staff or equipment;
Extended AIP range;
High transit speed;
Long range of operations;
High degree of crew confort;
Variable scale of response to
different targets;
High flexibility to accommodate
mission-suitable payloads.
In order to ensure a manageable
level of risk with regard to a new design,
the concept for the HDW Class 216 largely
derives from proven and tested systems
used on recent designs. From a technical
point of view, the performance levels of
some equipment and systems have to be
adapted, adjusted for scale or modified.
For many years the shipyard has operated
in-house R&D activities and all new
systems must have attained a defined stage
of technical maturity and acceptance
before they are taken into consideration for
installation on board submarines. This
interplay between experience, existing
components and thoroughly risk-assessed
innovations is essential to achieve a
balanced design with reliable input factors
for cost assessment, feasibility, production
times and final capabilities.
Giving due consideration to these
initial parameters results for the HDW
Class 216 in a displacement of 4,000 t at a
length of approx. 90 m and hull diameter
of 8.1 m. The design is intended to appeal
to navies that operate' submarines far away
from their own home bases.

The aim was to map out new dimensions in

transit capabilities in comparison with the
existing HDW submarine classes. The
extremely long range of 10,000 nm can be
achieved at a speed of advance of 10 KN.
The low indiscretion rate of approx. 5% for
silent running is achieved by the
installation of four diesel generator sets
and concentrated energy storage in two
lithium-ion partial batteries. The future
generation of diesel generators as well as
new developments in lithium-ion batteries
has a significant impact on maintenance
intervals and on reducing maintenance
requirements.
In addition to the diesel-electric
propulsion system, the air-independent
propulsion system with the PEM Fuel Cell
completes the propulsion system concept.
Two methanol reformer systems replace
the hydrogen storage cylinders used until
now, and provide the fuel cells with the
necessary hydrogen in the quantity
required for operation.
Oxygen is carried on board
cryogenically in liquid form. Carbon
dioxide from the reforming process is
passed overboard to the sea and
compensated by seawater. The boat can
operate deep submerged in silent running
mode for up to 4 weeks without the need to
penetrate the water surface at all.
The sectional integration of the AIP
system allows for the integration of a
Closed Cycle Diesel system as an
alternative to the Fuel Cell and methanol
reformer system. The CCD system
provides electrical energy via a special
diesel generator in which the exhaust gases
are recycled through an exhaust gas
scrubber and returned to the combustion
process.
The
maximum
speed
of
approximately 20 kn is reached by the
electric motor without the need to switch
between drive speed ranges. This
permanent magnet motor is still
undergoing development but it is
technologically based on the principle of
the motors in use on HDW Class 212A and

Platform technology
One of the major size-determining
factors is the propulsion system with
associated energy storage requirements.

303

214 submarines, with upscale inverters. In

spite of its dimensions, the submarine
design
features
impressively good
maneuvering
and
course-changing
capabilities as well as suitability for
operations in shallow waters, which are
specific advantages over nuclear powered
boats.

pressure facility. The boats own noise level

is recorded by sensors analyzed and
displayed on the consoles in the CIC to
ensure quiet operation. A degaussing
system reduces the magnetic field of the
pressure
hull,
superstructure
and
equipment to a minimum.
Habitat

Signatures

With regard to life on board, the

entire design was rethought and is distinct
from previous HDW designs. The reason
for this is primarily the very long sea
endurance of up to 80 days and the
associated physical and mental strain. The
crew concept is based on a three-watch
routine with a regular crew of 34. Up to 55
persons can be comfortably accommodated
on board in 10 cabins separated by rank
and sex. Adequate sanitary facilities, a
fitness room and several mess areas are
incorporated in the design. The crew mess
can be rapidly cleared and adapted to
provide a classroom for training purposes
or a cinema. In the vicinity of the galley
there are plenty of storage areas for dry
provisions, cold storage and deep freeze
facilities. The pressure hull diameter
allows for two transitable deck levels and
optimal task coordination.
Drinking water is provided through
two reverse osmosis systems, while the
waste water is treated in a sewage
treatment plant on board so that during the
mission only filtered grey water is expelled
over board. The filtered matter is disposed
of in harbor when the mission is over.
Rubbish on board is treated in the same
way to ensure that it can be stored in a
biologically inactive state. Breathing air is
permanently monitored and adjusted via a
regenerative carbon dioxide adsorbing
system. Carbon dioxide is removed from
the boat's atmosphere, pressurized and
dissolved in seawater prior to being
disposed of into the surrounding seawater.
The oxygen required to regenerate the
boat's atmosphere is supplied from the
LOX tank.

Covert operations demand a

balanced signature concept and good
signature management. This applies in
particular to a relatively large boat, which
just because of its size has a higher
signature level than a small one. Stealth
characteristics are promoted by the shape
of the superstructure and by sonar coating.
Transmission loss coating on the bow and
stern and anechoic coating on the
cylindrical part of the pressure hull have
been subjected to rigorous testing in recent
years and can effectively reduce target
strength.
The propeller is made of a special
composite material with high damping
characteristics and turns with higher
revolution speed in order to avoid
cavitation. Pre-swirl X-rudders save energy
by homogenizing the wake to reduce the
flow noise.
To reduce the acoustic signature all
power plant elements are on elastic or
double elastic mountings and an active
mounting system can provide further
reductions in noise and vibration. In line
with the concept for the HDW Class 212 A
submarine, the engine room is unmanned
and encapsulated, ensuring low airborne
noise. Critical pumps located outside this
room are equipped with their own noiseabsorbing insulation or encapsulation.
Equipment and machinery are controlled
by synchronic motors to ensure that they
always run under optimal operating
conditions. Liquids in the trim, bilge and
compensating systems are transported by
pumps to keep the acoustic signature low;
there is also a redundant back-up air

304

An integral part of the rescue

concept is a pressure-tight bulkhead
between the working and recreational
areas, that separates the pressure hull into
two pressure-tight compartments. Tower
escape can be performed from each
compartment or a deep sea rescue vehicle
can dock onto the SRV flange. Alarm and
countermeasure systems are also provided
in case of a gas leak or fire.

based signal inputs converge in the Radio

Room. Depending on the signal
classification, communication activities
can also be monitored from the CIC.
The CIC is designed with a view to
flexibility and spaciousness, which is
achieved not least by its not being a transit
area. The operators can form task-related
teams and have access to the necessary
pre-processed data via all seven
multifunction consoles. A centrally
positioned large screen enables the data on
ship's technical systems and the results of
sonar data analysis to be viewed as an
overall situation report to facilitate
decision-making on the part of the
commanding officer. In front of this screen
is adequate space for adhoc briefings with
the crew. Two workstations for technical
operators are located on the Engineering
Monitoring and Control Console, one on
the steering console and a workstation for
the Chief Engineer is situated just aft of the
CIC so that visual and vocal contact
between technicians and tacticians can
support coordination. In an emergency
such as fire on board or damage to the
boat, the two areas can be rapidly
separated to ensure that internal measures
to combat the emergency do not interfere
with continuing data input from outside
sensors and pursuance of the mission.
Immediately next to the CIC the multipurpose room provides a flexible space
that can be used as required as additional
accommodation, sick bay, storage, SOF
office, enhanced ISR or ESM capability
office.
With a view to further promoting a
multi-mission role the design features a
high degree of flexibility in its capabilities
for reconnaissance and effectiveness. The
classical weapon stowage has space for up
to 18 spare weapons, which can equally
well be heavyweight torpedoes, mines or
missiles. Up to 8 divers can disembark
through the divers' lock in the access trunk
within one flooding cycle. On the upper
deck two modular platforms can
accommodate mission-specific equipment

Command
and Weapon Control System
The concept of the Command and
Weapon Control System provides for
efficient processing all the way from data
collection to weapon deployment. The
weapon payload is extensive and extremely
flexible.
A network of highly sensitive
acoustic sensors consists, among other
equipment, of the conformal array in the
bow which joins up laterally with the
enhanced flank array sonar (EFAS). The
rear sector is covered by the aft looking
array, while support for low frequency
detection is provided by the towed array
sonar. Underwater acoustic equipment
such as the mine and obstacle avoidance
sonar, bottom navigation sonar, underwater
telephone and broadband active operating
sonar transmit active sound waves into the
surrounding environment. Open structures
simplify the integration of all intelligence
gathering and processing sub-systems of
the integrated navigation, sensor and
weapon control system.
Awareness of the situation is
completed with data input from the surface
sensors, in particular the communication,
ESM antennas and the two optronic masts.
Altogether nine hoistable masts, of which
three are dedicated to communications,
provide a wide spectrum to cover a range
of frequencies from VLF to SFfF satellite
communication. To enable communication
even
when
deep
submerged
a
communications buoy is incorporated in
the upper deck. All analogue, digital and IP

305

such as a torpedo countermeasure system,

diver support and equipment facilities or
modules for unmanned maritime vehicles.
A multi-purpose hoistable mast can take a
variety of payload modules such as a
machine gun, three unmanned aerial
vehicles, and a laser ranging device or an
ESM antenna.
The core component of the flexible
payload equipment concept is the vertical
multi-purpose lock. In preparation for the
mission, this vertical lock can be equipped
with one of five different modules:
Missile launching system;
Mine laying system;
Diver lock;
Additional fuel supply;
Docking station for unmanned
vehicles.
The design can be provided with up
to three vertical multi-purpose lock
sections.

Today ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems

offers different types of submarines with
fuel cell based AIP solutions, e.g. in the
HDW Class 212 A or HDW Class 214. All
these submarines are based on HDW fuel
cell systems with hydrogen fed from metal
hydride storage cylinders.
Until about two decades ago nonnuclear submarines were based on dieselelectric propulsion with lead-acid batteries
for submerged operation. Improvements to
these systems have been made gradually
since WW II, small steps leading to
improvements mainly in the field of
signatures of the submarine. But still,
snorkel operation to recharge the batteries
at least every few days is mandatory,
rendering
this
elderly
submarine
generation susceptible to detection.
In
comparison,
submarines
equipped with fuel cells offer remarkable
operational advantages. ALP-equipped
submarines can stay submerged during
operations for much longer than before at
similar performance regarding noise level,
since fuel cells produce electrical energy
without any moving parts, similar to
battery power.
In addition to the extended
submerged operation range the advantages
of the HDW fuel cell based AIP system are
as follows: high efficiency with low heat
discharge to sea:
low noise level
low magnetic signature
small size
low weight
low effort for maintenance / no
extra crew.
Fuel cells have been under
development by Howaldtswerke-Deutsche
Werft (HDW), the forerunner in Kiel,
Germany, of ThyssenKrupp Marine
Systems, for more than 25 years. In 1988,
first sea tests were performed with an
HDW fuel cell plant in the submarine Ul.
So far contracts for more than 35
submarines equipped with an HDW fuel
cell AIP system have been concluded with
eight navies. Compared to other

Conclusion
The main advantages of nuclearpowered submarines are, without a doubt,
their air-independent propulsion, and fast
transit speed and thanks to their high
displacement, high combat strength.
Among
the
principal
virtues
of
conventional submarines are their much
lower purchase and operating costs and
their excellent shallow water capabilities
coupled with low signatures. The HDW
Class 216 submarine unites the advantages
of both types of submarine within a single
diesel-electric design. The increased transit
range, ATP range, good maneuvering
capabilities and high payload make the
design particularly attractive for navies that
operate submarines "out of area"- far from
their home bases.
Methanol reformer the next
milestone for fuel
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems
leads the market in the field of
conventional submarines equipped with
air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems.

306

System configuration
At
the
beginning
of
the
development the requirements for the
reformer were defined. A major
requirement was operation based on the
existing and proven fuel cells operating
with pure hydrogen. Furthermore the
exhaust gas (C0 ) pressure of the reformer
should be high enough to enable the
discharge of exhaust gas into the
surrounding seawater without the need for
an additional exhaust gas compressor. Of
major importance was the overall system
efficiency.
Based on these requirements the
choice was a methanol steam reformer
system operating at elevated pressure.
Hydrogen purification is per formed with
membrane purification units. The required
thermal energy is produced in a highpressure burner, operated with oxygen.
The methanol is mixed with water,
evaporated and fed to the steam reformer.
The reforming reactor is heated by a
boiling water cycle operating between 60
and 100bar. The methanol water mixture is
converted into a hydrogen-rich gas mixture
at a temperature between 250-300 C. This
reformate gas is further processed in a gas
purification unit based on fraction of
hydrogen passes through the membrane
and can be fed directly to the fuel cell. The
rest of the reformate gas is burned with
pure oxygen in the burner, under the
addition of methanol, to provide the
required heat for the reforming process.
The only product gas from the reformer is
C0 . The H 0 in the exhaust gas is
condensed and reused internally.
The reforming reaction takes place
on a commercial catalyst with copper as
the active metal. The main reaction that
takes place is: CH OH + H 0 3H + C0
The methanol conversion rate
achieved is in principle the equilibrium
rate. Selectivity to H is very high as
secondary reactions are minimized because
the reaction temperature is relatively low,
resulting in low CO production.

applications, fuel cells' in submarines are

successful due to the enormous benefit
they offer.
Proven AIP technology
The system installed on board the
HDW Class submarines today consists of
the components shown in Figure 1.
The fuel cells deliver the electrical
energy for the boat's power network
system via a DC/DC converter. The waste
heat from the fuel cell is used to release the
hydrogen from the metal hydride storage
cylinders and to evaporate liquid oxygen
for the operation of the pure H /0 fuel
cells. The reaction water is collected on
board to prevent the need for weight
compensation with seawater. For the HDW
Class 214, the FC system has a maximum
power output of240kW. In total, the AIP
system has a very high electrical efficiency
of approx. 60% and offers many benefits
regarding specific submarine requirements.
2

On-board hydrogen production

by methanol reforming
Although the existing HDW fuel
cell system based on hydrogen storage in
metal hydride offers many advantages, for
submarines with a displacement larger than
approx. 2,500 tons and with a higher ATP
power demand a new solution is required.
Due to the high weight of the hydrogen
storage cylinders the amount of hydrogen
stored on board is limited. The alternative
solution is to produce hydrogen on board
by reforming of a liquid fuel. In general,
liquid fuels have high volumetric and
gravimetric energy content and are easy to
handle. These advantages in combination
with fuel cell performance motivated
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems to initiate
the development of a reformer system for
on-board hydrogen production. The choice
was to use methanol due to the high yield,
high efficiency and low reforming
temperatures. Methanol reforming is a
well-known process with a proven
commercial catalyst available.

307

Status of development
Reformer
development
at
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems' Operating
Unit "Submarines" started many years ago.
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems built a full
size functional demonstrator and operated
it for several years in their test facilities in
Kiel. The functional demonstrator was
initially set up with Commercial Off-TheShelf (COTS) components - so most of the
components were not suitable for the
submarine environment. Therefore a major
effort has been made in recent years to
redesign all components to be "submarine
suitable".
Since 2010 the reformer has been
successfully coupled with the SIEMENS
fuel cell FCM120. No difference in fuel
cell performance can be observed. The
hydrogen produced by the reformer fully
fulfils the purity requirements of the fuel
cell (99.999%). Furthermore the DC/DC
converter has been adapted to enable load
control of the entire system.
For development of the additional
peripheral systems required for the
operation of a methanol reformer,
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has signed
an agreement with the Spanish engineering
company SENER. While ThyssenKrupp
Marine Systems takes care of the methanol
reformer and the fuel cell system, SENER
is responsible for the exhaust gas treatment
system, the oxygen supply system and the
methanol and product water tank system.
In 2013 the methanol reformer was
coupled with the exhaust gas treatment
plant developed by SENER, showing that
the discharge of C0 into the seawater is
done without any influence on the
signature of the submarine.
In the meantime the functional
demonstrator
has
been
operated
successfully for more than 1,500 hours,
enabling the engineering team of
ThyssenKrupp
Marine
Systems
to
investigate performance and operation in
detail and to develop advanced solutions
for its submarine suitable successor.

Additionally all other peripheral

systems were built and installed in 2014/15
and coupled to the methanol reformer fuel cell system to operate all subsystems
in an integrated test facility, which also
proves the very high efficiency of the
entire system: It was measured to exceed
90%.
Integration on board a submarine
To meet the requirements for onboard operation, a special safety concept
featuring an encapsulated reformer system
has been developed by ThyssenKrupp
Marine Systems.
Inside the reformer enclosure a
dedicated internal ventilation system is
installed for cooling purposes. The
enclosure is continuously monitored for
leakages of harmful substances like
hydrogen, methanol, carbon dioxide or
oxygen. In the unlikely event of detection
of any of these substances, a special air
purification device with catalytic oxidation
is operated to convert these substances to
harmless gases. The escape of these
substances into the submarine's atmosphere
is effectively avoided. With the emphasis
on system safety the entire development
process of the methanol reformer (ranging
from basic design considerations via
construction and fabrication to verification
by means of appropriate test procedures)
has been realized with the support of a
renowned classification society. The
methanol reformer system itself is installed
on an elastically mounted platform inside
the submarine. The LOX tank is located
below this platform. Generally the size of
the LOX tank is the dominant factor for the
submarine design, whereas methanol as a
liquid energy carrier can be stored on
board in tanks which are part of the ship's
structure.

Outlook
After the reconstruction period in
2014/2015, the series type methanol
reformer unit has been prepared for longterm tests in the shipyard test facility. The

308

complete system consists of the reformer

unit, coupled to two FC modules, the
methanol storage system, the reformer
oxygen supply system, the C0 purge gas
system and the C0 exhaust gas dissolution
system. This will give customers the
chance to "look and feel" that the process
and the plant are an excellent choice for
increased AIP energy demands.
With
this
technology
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems is able to
offer an additional improved option for
HDW fuel cell based ALP systems for
submarines.

the last couple of decades, the ASW

paradigm is today characterized by a
massive advantage for submarine offence.

Proliferation of submarine and

torpedo technology
Since the close of the 1980s the
proliferation of mature submarine and
torpedo
technology
has
massively
increased the extent and quality of the
underwater threat.
Conventional submarines (SSK)
can adapt their tactical behavior to ensure
virtual invisibility to passive sonar. The
2006 surfacing of a Chinese "Song" class
SSK within the USS "Kitty Hawk" Carrier
Battle group demonstrated this very
publicly. New submarine technology like
air independent propulsion (AIP) and
advances in submarine sonar like ATLAS
ELEKTRON-IK's Expanded Flank Array
Sonar (EFAS) further reinforce the natural
detection advantage enjoyed by the
submarine. Low frequency active sonar for
ASW can help surface ships to regain some
of the balance but faces environmental
limitations in the littorals. The state of the
art of the primary submarine effector, the
HWT, has been advanced with digital
sonar, long range wire guidance, extended
range, endurance and speed as well as
mature logic-based Counter CounterMeasures (CCM) and secondary wake
detectors. Legacy torpedo defence based
on soft kill technology like decoys and
jammers with evasive maneuvering lost
almost all effectiveness against this
modern threat. But many aspects of the
modem HWT, especially the wake
detector, also serve to make older and
widely proliferated torpedoes resistant to
soft kill technology and tactics.

Seaspider Anti-Torpedo Torpedo

The sinking of the South Korean
corvette RoKS "Cheonan" by a
heavyweight torpedo (HWT) brought
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) and
Torpedo Defence back into the focus of
international navies. New underwater
threat scenarios in the littorals were finally
acknowledged as a serious and current
concern. Robust and effective torpedo
defence became accepted as a necessary
capability without which naval operations
under torpedo threat would only be
feasible while incurring massive and de
facto intolerable risks. In the intervening
years this determination has resulted in
new and adapted procurement and force
planning.
With the Sea Spider Anti-Torpedo
Torpedo ATLAS ELEKTRONIK can
provide the key component for a torpedo
defence, which is effective even under the
difficult conditions of close and confined
littoral waters. Sea Spider can effectively
and efficiently protect all types of
platforms against the threat posed by all
types of torpedoes.
Following the end of the Cold War,
ASW in all navies was subject to the
"peace dividend" inspired defence budget
cuts. These cuts ultimately led to loss of
capabilities and to a practical stop in
technological and doctrinal development.
Faced with a submarine threat which saw
massive changes in extent and locality over

Torpedo Defence and littoral

warfare
Wake homing torpedoes can reach
almost 100% probability of hit, especially
at the short engagement ranges prevalent in
the littorals. Due to the short firing
distances from small coastal and midget

309

submarines, which are difficult to detect in

shallow waters despite their low
technology level, any wake homing
torpedo fired from these platforms will
have sufficient endurance to reach any
evading target with the maximum speed
setting. The warning and alert times and
distances reliably achievable even with
newly developed Torpedo Detection
Classification and Localization (TDCL)
systems under difficult littoral conditions
do not suffice for successful initiation of
soft kill effector deployments and evasive
man oeuvres. This is already true for fast
and nimble combatants and even more so
for auxiliaries and amphibious warfare
ships.
The ever-growing post Cold War
focus on the littorals greatly enhances the
value of the German Navy's experience in
the confined and shallow waters of the
Southern North Sea and the Western
Baltic. Local oceanography conditions
vary greatly all over the world. But the
very difficult sonar conditions found in the
German Navy's "home turf" area have
always led to special requirements for
technical solutions in ASW, which were
developed and produced by ATLAS
ELEKTRONIK and its predecessors.
This explains why the German
Navy, more so than more traditional
originally blue water focused navies,
focused the development of torpedo
defence systems right from the start on the
worst case shallow water and littoral
scenarios.

close-in torpedo defence of surface ships

and submarines. Further examination of
different hard kill alternatives like machine
cannon bursts of supercavitating rounds,
mortar thrown depth charges and steered
supercavitating rockets lead to the
realization that- only a homing kill
vehicle., the Anti-Torpedo Torpedo (ATT),
could fulfill the mission. This ATT could
not be derived from any existing vehicle
but had to be specifically designed for the
mission.
The Sea Spider effector system
At the core of the Sea Spider
system lies the independently horning
ATT. The development process lead to a
uniquely affordable, compact and nimble
design destined to become the standard
effector for torpedo defence on surface
ships and submarines. From the beginning
Sea Spider avoided complicating factors
like overly complex tactical doctrines,
reliance on beneficial environmental
conditions or legacy design elements
stemming from requirements competing
with the ATT mission. As such Sea Spider
today represents the most mature and
promising approach to the ATT mission.
The Sea Spider sonar features a
planar array to control cost. Homing is
done by simultaneous active-passive and
passive sonar as well as, especially in
submarine torpedo defence, by intercept.
This generates good performance against
HWT both with loud and quiet propulsion
signatures. The high frequency of the
active sonar is deliberately chosen to
maximize penetration of the attenuation
area in a ship's wake and combat wake
homing torpedoes. Intercept horning is
important for quick three-dimensional
homing against air-dropped Lightweight
Torpedoes (LWT) in defence of
submarines. The warhead is designed for
omnidirectional blast effect.
It is in propulsion where the Sea
Spider design diverges most from
conventional torpedo design. A simple and
affordable solid propellant rocket motor

German
Torpedo
Defence
development
Multinational NATO studies and
bi-national US-German activities in the
1980s and 1990s formed the basis for the
German Navy to develop an understanding
of torpedo defence. The realization that
conditions in home waters did not permit
sufficient
torpedo
detection
and
classification ranges for successful soft kill
torpedo defence led to the national
decision to develop a hard kill system for

310

Sea Spider project status

Due to defence budget funding
constraints no full scale product
development procurement is currently
ordered by the German Ministry Defence.
Remaining needs are the full development
and qualification of the prototype into
combat capable series production ATT and
an exercise ATT as well as development of
the
system
periphery
(launchers,
electronics, mission software, workshop
infrastructure etc.).

provides instantly available high thrust

suitable to shallow water operation.
Another advantage of this design choice is
the capability of using unspent rocket fuel
to enhance the warhead blast for additional
effect on target.
To achieve easy and safe handling
and storage Sea Spider will be delivered in
a canister, which doubles as the launching
tube. The dedicated above water launcher
is planned for low ship infrastructure
requirement. For submarines below-casing
launchers are foreseen as the ideal solution.
But sub-caliber inserts for HWT and LWT
torpedo tubes will also be available.
Designed for rapid reaction close-in
defence the Sea Spider ATT leverages the
instantly available rocket thrust for quick
run out of the safety zone around the
launching platform and alignment on the
search bearing. While homing in on the
threat torpedo in three dimensions it
leverages the active sonar to generate a
proximity fusing solution. Detonation upon
reaching the closest point of approach is
designed to achieve mission kill level or
higher effect on the threat torpedo.
The development of the Sea Spider
ATT' followed the technological research
model with the requirement foci switching
between submarine and surface ship
torpedo defence over the course of the
project. After the initial exploratory
development phase a first development and
testing campaign focused on the prototype
ATT vehicle's rocket propulsion, guidance
and stabilization while ensuring beneficial
self-noise characteristics. A second
campaign integrate d the homing sonar into
the rocket propelled' prototype vehicle and
culminated in Eckemforde Bay, Germany
in firings with closed loop homing of the
free running Sea Spider ATT prototype
into an operationally representative closest
point of approach (CPA) of a free running
DM2A4 type heavyweight torpedo. The
successful demonstration of this capability
in an integrated prototype within a relevant
environment constitutes "technological
readiness level 6.

The digitalization of submarine

development
The demand for submarines, both
nuclear powered and conventional, has
never been greater as nations around the
world seek affordable and reliable designs
that meet national defence require - SB
ments. However, the |Si cost and
complexity of I modern submarines are not
compatible with most country's defencebudget projections. Thus, submarine
developers are seeking technology
solutions that will enable shipyards to
build these crucial assets on budget and on
time with the operational performance and
lifecycle durability and availability to
satisfy acceptable total ownership cost
(TOC) goals.
The
integrated
product
development environment (IPDE) has
emerged as the solution to this vexing
challenge for many of the leading
submarine shipyards. The IPDE is a highly
integrated and synchronized environment
that can be used to establish harmony and
fidelity among a vast community of
designers and engineers as well as
production operation planners, purchasers
and suppliers. Thus, diverse and dispersed
teams can work in parallel with the
confidence that they have the correct
system and component requirements and
are working on the latest design and
configuration changes. Moreover, 3D
models of every compartment and system
are available for production teams to
optimize material flow through the

311

shipyard as well as assembly, initial system

light-off and sea trials.
The IPDEs that are being
implemented for submarine development
are far more sophisticated than their
predecessors, having been validated in the
most
challenging
automotive
and
aerospace environments, in order to offer
shipyards unprecedented breakthroughs in
efficiency as well as submarine
performance. In the future, these benefits
will be extended across the entire supply
chain and drive down the total cost of
ownership of these crucial strategic assets.

debuts

participate in programs that supported

national defence.
SECOND GENERATION
1990s:
Providing
more
comprehensive solutions
In the 1990s, a new generation of
software emerged with broader and more
comprehensive solutions and the first
versions of commercially developed
product development management (PDM)
systems were implemented. The first PDM
systems offered a more disciplined and
automated solution to change and improve
configuration management, which was
exactly what the shipbuilding and
aerospace industries needed as the scale
and complexity of new designs, was
growing exponentially and there was no
end in sight to the relentless flow of design
changes. No longer was it reasonable to
assume that this could be coordinated and
synchronized across a major enterprise
without the help of software to control and
manage the process.
The 2D CAD systems were
gradually replaced by 3D systems, which
enabled the digital mock-up (DMU) of
complex ship models as well as the digital
simulation of material flow and assembly
processes throughout a shipyard. Digital
simulations of existing shipyard workflows
and processes produced double-digit
improvements in existing shipyards and
even greater improvements in new
Greenfield shipyards in which processes
and workflows could be simulated and
optimized before the shipyard was even
built.
There was some improvement in
performance for submarine programs that
depended on this generation of new
software technology, but there was still
room for improvement. It was clear from
lessons learned in other industries that for
shipyards to achieve transformational
results, the next generation of software
technology for shipbuilding would have to
be more than an information technology
(IT) project. It would require the

FIRST GENERATION
1980s: Computer-aided software

In the 1980s, the first generation of

computer-aided software entered the world
of submarine development and offered
designers and systems engineers 2D
images of submarine arrangements,
systems and structures. Concurrently,
computer-aided software engineering tools
offered specific disciplines tools to
automate repetitive analyses: hydrostatic,
hydrodynamic, stability, finite element
analysis, etc. Each tool set offered teams
the ability to improve their productivity
and optimize their processes, but
multidiscipline engineering and operational
alignment were labor intensive and paperbased, and drawings were still the medium
for transferring design intent to production
teams and suppliers. These improvements
in productivity in design and engineering
did not preclude the need for large, high
quality organizations to constantly check
and recheck production plans and decisions
with drawings, while a continuous stream
of changes was being processed throughout
the detailed design and production phases.
Further challenging this already
demanding environment were countries
that wanted to build a modern submarine
fleet and jointly produce them in a local
shipyard to ensure homegrown companies
could provide complete lifecycle repair and
support, and enable their citizens to

312

dedication and commitment of all levels of

shipyard leadership.
But change was a prerequisite for
satisfying future requirements and budgets,
and there were encouraging examples from
other industries that were realizing
significant breakthroughs in productivity
with a new generation of software
technology, process improvements and
team training.

international co-production of complex

aerospace and shipbuilding programs. The
digitalization of this program has ushered
in a new wave of leading digital shipyards
in Korea, Europe and the United States.
These digital shipyards have been enabled
with a new generation of software
technology that offer an open, scalable and
modular portfolio that can be used to
readily and rapidly transform an existing
infrastructure to improve design and
engineering productivity. They can also be
used to enhance production, construction
and sea trials productivity for the original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) as well
as members of their supply chain. The
result is a highly integrated enterprise that
is better aligned and more efficient and
capable of producing better submarines;
for example, vessels that are on time, on
budget and on performance, the holy grail
of any naval program.
This generation of digital shipyards
has achieved substantial improvements in
productivity with a far more versatile work
force in which teams can design naval and
commercial ships almost simultaneously,
providing a single source of ship class and
hull
number
knowledge/technical
definition.
Processes
are
digitally
simulated, thereby optimizing performance
and eliminating costly errors.
In the 2000s, it is also worth
mentioning examples of fleet in-service
configuration management initiatives that
were implemented to improve safety or
service and support productivity. This
trend is growing in importance as fleet
owners and operators seek to reduce the
cost of ownership of current and future
fleets.

THIRD GENERATION
2000s: Taking a completely
different approach
In 2001, the United States
Department of Defense launched the
largest program in history to concurrently
develop three versions of the next
generation of advanced supersonic multirole aircraft for the Air Force, Navy and
Marine Corps as well as potentially 30
allies around the world. This programme
would be led by an international coalition
with three primary partners, numerous
secondary partners and a global supply
chain of up to 600 companies. Before they
were awarded the contract, the leadership
of this programme decided that this would
require a completely different approach to
the way that they would design develop,
produce and sustain a fleet that could
ultimately approach more than 4,000
aircraft. For this programme, secure,
global, efficient
collaboration was
paramount. Automated configuration,
change and effectivity management for
each aircraft serial number was crucial.
Major modules would be assembled in
several locations and final assembly and
testing would be at sites in the United
States, Europe and Asia. Finally, the
coalition would be responsible for
sustaining the fleet while meeting stringent
new performance-based logistics metrics.
Today that coalition has an integrated
product
development
environment
composed of 30 project teams at 140 sites
in nine countries.
The IPDE for this seminal program
has become the standard for complex,

FOURTH GENERATION
2010s: PLM comes aboard
The emergence of product life cycle
management (PLM) portfolios that are
tailored to the unique challenges of
developing advanced submarines, both
nuclear and conventionally powered, are
transforming the most advanced shipyards

313

in the world so that future fleets of

submarines
are
more
affordable,
sustainable and reliable. The productivity
projections from these new portfolios are
crucial to meeting the constraints of
current budgets, plus the commissioning of
each new submarine is linked to the
decommissioning of an existing submarine
so that overall fleet readiness is not
adversely affected.
The most comprehensive PLM
portfolios for shipbuilding also have a new
array of engineering software technology
to analyze and improve the acoustic
signature of submarines to satisfy crucial
stealth requirements and composite
software tools to suppress self-generated
machinery noise.
The next step in the evolution of the
submarine IPDE will be the extension of
this digital platform to all partners,
members of the supply chain and fleet
support teams to maximize total enterprise
productivity and reduce the total ownership
cost. This trend is already underway in
some leading shipyards.

Additionally,
in-service
lifecycle
performance such as mean time between
failure, system reliability metrics and
related data will be carefully documented
for all systems and components by class
and hull number so that future fleets can
benefit from lessons learned and many
systems will not need to be re-engineered
for future classes of submarines.
Today you can make the case that
there are many major shipyards in the
world that have undergone a significant
digital transformation, at least two in each
of the major markets: Asia Pacific, the
Americas and Europe. In every instance
the shipyard was already recognized as a
world leader in specific classes of ships,
and in several cases, the shipyards were
highly diversified; for example, building a
wide variety of ships for commercial,
naval: both surface ships and submarines
and private yacht owners. But the leaders
of these shipyards recognized that they
needed to continue to innovate and
improve if they were going retain their
leadership position that resulted from the
digital transformation that is underway. It
would be safe to say that the number of
shipyards that achieve a significant
digitalization in the next decade will
double or triple worldwide as other
shipyards seek to emulate the performance
that the first seven shipyards have already
achieved.

FUTURE NOW
Tightening enterprise integration
Future IPDE solutions will enable
shipyards to more tightly integrate the
complete enterprise with particular
attention to the supply chain and service
lifecycle management, both top priorities
today. Strategic partners will continue to
collaborate and share data through a highly
secure private network with International
Organization of Standardization (ISO)
standards such as the JT data format to
enable the building of 3D multi-computeraided design (CAD) models. A cloudbased solution will offer the rest of the
supply chain access to the information and
data that they need from the master data
file to be an efficient yet virtual member of
the team. In a similar manner, service
lifecycle management will be coordinated
and managed by the lead shipyard or the
overall service provider with supply chain
members and fleet support staffs.

Owning the wather space with

permasyn propulsion
What does this year's SubCon
motto "owning the water space" mean? It
most likely means that a certain nation has
full control over a defined area of interest
at different levels of engagement. It may
just be information gathering (intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance) through
open or covert operations or it may also
be sea control or sea denial for certain
areas.
It is obvious that submarines have
an essential role to play when it comes to
all these different approaches to "owning

314

Maximum silent acceleration by

automated cavitation avoidance
Propeller cavitation is the formation
and collapse of vapor-filled cavities or
bubbles in low-pressure regions in the
surrounding water. Implosion of the
bubbles causes strong pressure impulses
and therefore significantly increases the
water-borne noise level. For submarines it
is therefore of the utmost importance to
avoid propeller cavitation, as this
significantly increases the betrayal range.
It is usually a contract requirement
for cavitation to be avoided during
constant velocity at specified depths on a
straight-ahead course and in steady
operation. This is accounted for by an
optimized propeller design. Sometimes the
contract requires avoidance of cavitation
also in unsteady operation, such as during
acceleration.

the water space". In order to enable

submarines to play such a substantial role
in the strategy of almost every navy, a
silent, reliable and efficient propulsion
system is a must for submarines both today
and in the future.
This article talks about the
Permasyn motor as it is the benchmark and
the most frequently sold permanent magnet
propulsion motor for submarines to date. It
will highlight the development path from
K when this motor was first developed in
the early 80s; it then emphasizes the design
principles of this innovative motor and
finally takes a look at the potential for
further developing or up scaling existing
motors of this type for future submarines.
Permasyn development path
In the late 50s Siemens reengaged
in the domain of submarine technology and
since then has equipped more than 170
submarines with propulsion motors and
other equipment
such as
power
distribution, automation and PEM fuel cell
modules for AIP.
But of course over the years the
requirements placed on submarine
propulsion grew, and the time came for
transition from proven and mature DC
propulsion to a very new, promising and
even better technology especially in terms
of signatures, reliability and efficiency. As
a consequence, in the early 80s Siemens
started to work on permanent magnet
technology as the core technology for new,
innovative submarine propulsion.
The first prototype was installed in
the "Schwedeneck", a surface vessel, in the
mid 80s. Although the inverter modules
were not integrated in the motor, they were
installed in one physical compartment.
This meant that there was no need for long
cable connections between the motor and
some external inverter cabinets as is
frequently the case today for some other
permanent magnet propulsion systems for
submarines.

Motivation
In certain situations during
submarine operations it is necessary to
achieve maximum acceleration from silent
operation to maximum velocity or to crash
stop the boat. Manual avoidance of
cavitation is not possible during such
maneuvers, as there are multi-dimensional
interrelationships
between
propeller
characteristics, the boat's wake, diving
depth, rudder positions, angles of trim and
yaw and the resulting local inflow
conditions.
During unsteady operation, even an
experienced submarine commander has
only very restricted possibilities in order to
achieve maximum possible acceleration,
free of cavitation at the current depth, by
demanding a specific increase in
revolutions. Avoiding cavitation during the
entire maneuver can therefore empirically
only be obtained by maintaining a larger
safety margin to the estimated limits of
cavitation inception. This leads to a
considerable delay in the maneuver in
comparison with optimal performance.

315

The problem at issue

The local inflow to a propeller
blade at a tangential position is the result
of water flow around the submarine's
geometry and the momentary propulsion
point. Due to turbulence, separation and
the effectiveness of the propeller, the
propeller inflow is a time-dependent
dimension. During acceleration, in addition
the global dimensions of turning rate,
thrust, torque and mean flow velocity are
also time-dependent. Furthermore, the
global change in thrust deduction and wake
number during the acceleration process
causes permanent changes to the boundary
conditions, which alter the corresponding
operation point of the propeller in relation
to its cavitation inception limits.
The appearance of cavitation
phenomena in different regions of the
propeller blades and in the propeller wake,
on the other hand, is dependent on the local
inflow of blade geometry and the wake
field of the submarine. The diving depth
and water quality also play a role in
cavitation behavior. With due allowance
for the effects of scale, model tests can
reliably give the limits of inception of
various types of cavitation during a
maneuver.

cavitation limit and therefore optimizing

the acceleration maneuver. The method
can be used in the same way to provide
cavitation-free deceleration with positive
and negative turning rates. This method
can be integrated into new submarines or
installed in existing ones.
The method is based on a so-called
cavitation inception diagram, shown here
as an example. It illustrates the nondimensional cavitation number s and the
thrust coefficient K for each operating
condition in relation to the cavitation
inception point. The cavitation number
used in the algorithm is dependent on the
turning rate and on ambient pressure,
which depends on the current diving depth.
The thrust coefficient and cavitation
inception point depend on the propeller
geometry.
All operation points must lie within
the cavitation-free area and above the
cavitation incept tion limit, respectively.
Until now, this has usually been achieved
by determining a constant increase in
revolutions (blue curve), that ensures the
avoidance of cavitation at a specific
minimum diving depth. However, even
with the highest possible constant increase
in revolutions the curve is largely within an
area that fails to make use of the maximum
thrust coefficient that cavitation-free
operation would allow. At different diving
depths the cavitation number changes and
requires adaptation of the increase in
revolutions. These processes mean that
possible propeller thrust is not being made
use of although it would improve
acceleration of the submarine.
When the revolutions are governed
by the Cavitation Controller (green curve)
the operation is maintained close to the
cavitation inception point at every diving
depth and makes full use of the cavitationfree area to such an extent that on average
considerably higher thrust values are
achieved and the total acceleration time
can therefore be significantly reduced as
shown in the diagram below. For example,
in this case the green velocity curve shows
T

Cavitation controller
The Cavitation Controller (CC)
serves to avoid cavitation at the propeller
during
unsteady
operation.
The
implementation of this kind of propulsion
control gives the submarine commander an
important operational advantage due to the
ability to withdraw rapidly and covertly
from a critical situation. The controller
allows the required turning rate to be
reached in a very short time while
constantly keeping the operation point
clear of cavitation inception.
Mode of operation
The method described here can
provide the submarine CIC with a mode of
operation
that
ensures
maximum
cavitation-free acceleration, allowing the
maneuver to take place very close to the

316

Availability
The practical implementation of the
CC has already taken place and has been
successfully tested. The newly developed
CC can not only be integrated on board
new submarines, it is also eminently
suitable for installation on already
commissioned submarines. This new
function can be used on submarines with
DC and Permasyn* motors.

that the required velocity is achieved after

less than 140 seconds, while the blue
velocity curve with constant increase in
revolutions takes almost 240 seconds to
reach the same required velocity.
The velocities shown in this
diagram refer to a constant diving depth.
At greater depths the green curve
automatically shows faster acceleration.
The dimensions shown in the two
diagrams depend directly or indirectly on
the following parameters:
Boat
velocity or rate of
acceleration;
Diving depth;
Turning rate or rpm acceleration;
Propeller thrust;
Propeller torque;
Water
quality
(density,
temperature, viscosity, air content,
salinity);
Rudder position;
Angles of trim and yaw;
Possible motor power;
Moment of inertia and losses in
power train.

Potential further developments

To further develop the Cavitation
Controller it would be advisable to extend
the standard algorithm described above to
include parameters that will ensure
avoidance of cavitation during typical
unsteady course changes. This would lead
to a considerable reduction in the boat's
acoustic
signature
during
such
manoeuvres, while improving the boat's
cavitation-free
manoeuvrability. This
could, for example, take the cavitation
inception points depending on rudder
position and angles of trim and yaw into
consideration. A further improvement of
the CC could be achieved by incorporating
motor power data, as it would then be
possible to determine the operation point
with greater precision. These input data
would indirectly provide information on
hydrodynamic parameters in unsteady
conditions, which have so far been
considered constant values for reasons of
simplicity.

Adjustment
The initial values for cavitation
inception originate from cavitation tests in
model scale. To adjust the CC the real
cavitation inception points for the propeller
are determined by means of the acoustic
evaluation obtained during full scale
propeller operation by the boat's on-board
hydrophones and its analysis systems. The
program used for this purpose is coupled
with the propulsion system control and it
displays the current operation points in
relation to the cavitation inception limits
determined in advance. The parameters of
the limits of cavitation inception
determined for the full-scale propeller are
then transmitted to the propulsion control
system via the same program, so that the
CC automatically adjusts the current
changes in tinning rate during boat
operation and prevents these limiting
values from being reached.

Modern communication technologies for submarines

Over the years, the utilisation of
submarines has undergone a significant
shift from anti-surface ship warfare and
land attacks towards more strategic usage.
Today's vessels have turned into multi-role
platforms providing crucial information for
modern intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR). In order to
incorporate a submarine as an ISR resource
as well as an effector, its communication
systems must support network-enabled
capabilities (NEC).

317

As a result of advanced operational

scenarios,
the
requirements
for
communication lines of submarines in
combined joint and combined operations
have multiplied. Interoperability and
compliance with national and international
standards became the main challenges for
the design of Integrated Communication
Systems (ICS).
In contradiction to surface vessels
submarines provide less space for antennas
and even the communication equipment
itself. These constraints require innovative
solutions.

Voice;
MSK reception;
Military Message Handling e. g.
ACP 127, ADafP-3, STANAG 4406/ ACP
142;
HF email (STANAG 5066);
Tactical data LINK (e. g. LI 1/22
and L16);
SubNet Relay;
Automatic Link Establishment
ALE 2/3 G.
For
INMARSAT
and
SHF
SATCOM dozens of applications for
messaging and information exchange are
available and can be implemented as
individual solutions according to the
operational
requirements.
Hagenuk
Marinekommunikation supports such
communication requirements with their
SEICAM*
product
family,
which
distributes and makes all related services
available throughout the platform.
The data and audio distribution
networks are the heart of integrated
communication systems and provide the
interfaces to legacy as well as modern
equipment and can establish the necessary
communication circuits. The integration of
crypto devices divides these networks into
a Black (cyphered area) and a Red section
(plain area) and ensures that no plain
message or unencrypted voice messages
are transmitted through an external
communication line.
These communication networks
also integrate time critical applications
including those for data link services.
Tactical internal communication is realised
via Voice-over-IP (VoLP) technology.
Telephony can be realised by connecting a
conventional telephone system or by
means of a telephony service implemented
in the tactical user stations.
Applications via INMARSAT are
operated as stand-alone units to avoid a
possible breach of Red/Black separation.
Due to its bandwidth SATCOM
dominates the communication between
submarines and other units. However, with
limited availability of military SATCOM

Requirements for submarines

In
general
the
following
requirements have to be fulfilled by an
integrated communication system for
submarines:
Communication from VLF to
SHF band;
Space-saving design;
Low noise emission;
Anti-magnetic design;
Dismountable racks/consoles for
implementation through the hatch;
Minimum power consumption
when submerged;
External communication when
submerged (as deep as possible).
Space constraints in the sail of the
submarine and a resulting low number of
antennas limit the extent of simultaneous
communication
lines.
Hagenuk
Marinekommunikation GmbH has a
patented design for dismountable racles
and a self-developed intelligent power
management, which de-activates all
devices that are not used during submerged
operation and hence minimises the power
consumption of the entire system.
Communication during submerged
operation can be done by hull mounted
magnetic VLF antennas, buoyant wire
antennas or combined radio buoys.
For communication in all requested
radio bands the following communication
procedures and standards may have to be
supported:

318

 Special requirements for stowage

of weapons and explosive ordnances;
Possibility
for briefing and
debriefing in isolation;
- Integration of SOF equipment
inside and outside the submarine in wet
and dry stowage options, e.g.:
Swimmer Delivery Vehicles;
Unmanned
Underwater
Vehicles;
Special equipment.
Early consideration of related
requirements during the design and
construction phases offers possibilities for
flexible use of foreseen space for Special
Operation Forces equipment.

lines and cost-extensive civil satellite

communications, FLF communication
attracts more and more users.
The development of IP services for
HF like HF email, STANAG 4406 military
messaging,
XMPP
chat
and
SubnetRelay offer alternative and costeffective services.
Current HF communication is
performed at 19.2 kbps. The next step
towards future developments is the
ratification of the broadband HF
communication standard MIL-STD 188110C, which specifies bandwidths up to 24
kHz, allowing data transfer rates up to 120
kbps. This requires a new generation of HF
radios, which is under development at
Hagenuk Marinekommunikation and will
be made available soon.

Definition of mission profiles

Special Operation Forces are an
important part of coastal warfare. With
their abilities they cover several types of
missions like e.g. performance of
intelligence,
surveillance
and
reconnaissance
[ISR]
activities
or
preparation of landing zones and protection
of crucial objects (e. g. ships or harbours).
Further, they can conduct combat search
and rescue missions, sabotage actions, preamphibious land surveys or boarding
operations.
Covertly operating submarines are
an ideal platform to deploy and recover
Special Forces in coastal areas. With a
focus on the coastal area in circumstances
like shallow water and monitored areas,
smaller conventional submarines are
therefore more convenient for these types
of missions than large nuclear powered
submarines [SSN] in order to enter these
areas without being detected.

Integration of special forces

equipment on HDW Cass submarines
For modern submarine navies
Special Operation Forces [SOF] have
become a regular part of their missions.
Therefore the challenge of taking SOF
requirements into consideration in
submarine design is becoming more and
more important. Conventional submarines
completely fulfil the requirements of
moving into enemy territories without
being
recognised
by
antagonistic
reconnaissance forces. Thanks to this
ability modern submarines are capable of
transferring Special Operation Forces to
their operation areas.
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems
designs submarines to support SOF
missions by considering the demands for
integration of persons and their individual
and general equipment in the general
layout early in the design phase. To ensure
that the submarine is capable of supporting
Special Operation Forces the following
topics have been examined:
Additional
bunks
for
accommodation;
Capability of air cleaning for
more people than a standard crew during a
mission;

Definition of operational areas

In general, when there is a decision
about the ability of a submarine to perform
lockout procedures for Special Operation
Forces, a distinction must be made
between the different types of operational
areas, where the riverine or fluvial area
encompasses rivers and their navigable
branches
including
riverbanks.
Subsequently the brown water area extends

319

from coastal areas up to one hundred

nautical miles from shore. Adjoining the
brown water area the green water area
extends from the outer edge of the brown
water area to cover a one thousand mile
zone from shore. And finally the blue
water area extends from the outer edge of
the green water area to the global deep
ocean.
As shown in Figure 1, the
intersection of the operational areas of
conventional submarines [SSK] and
Special Operation Forces is in the
riverine/fluvial and brown water regions.

places for stowage of SOF equipment,

including the potential for refit solutions
for submarines in service.
Shown here in the aft area under the
casing, an elevating platform lifts a
stowage box with an interface solution for
Swimmer Delivery Vehicles [SDV] or
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles [UUV]
for charging activities or mission
information. Depending on the stage of
development of the submarine or the space
foreseen for future growth this elevating
stowage box can be installed inside the
superstructure.
A system with a proven design
status is the pressure-tight container
solution. Basic and proven solutions are
the integration of SOF containers under the
casing or port and starboard of the pressure
hull. Furthermore several places are
feasible for new submarines or refit
solutions.
After opening the pressure-tight
container a pallet for stowage of equipment
can be brought out. The container is
variable in size and grade of automation,
e.g., for flooding and venting from inside
the pressure hull or monitoring the water
level inside the container.
In case of installation outside the
casing several investigations have to be
performed to verify the influence on
performance like e.g. T get Echo Strength,
acoustics or hydrodynar influences.

Cooperation between submarines

and special operation forces
Covertly operating submarines are
able to transfer SOF to a defined distance
from a coast that can be covered by a
conventional Swimmer Delivery Vehicle.
This cooperation between the submarine
and the Special Operation Forces can be
divided into the following steps: After a
mission briefing there might be a
modification or preparation of the
submarine in harbour phase or at sea; but
for this a modularity of the submarine is
required or at least helpful. Once prepared
for the mission, the submarine will ferry
the SOF via transit to the mission area
where they will be locked out in
submerged operation.
After this point of separation the
submarine
is
able
to
ensure
communications between SOF and the
submarine itself and additionally provides
support through surveillance of the
environment up to the coast or the mission
area of the SOF. Finally after successful
completion of the mission the submarine
ensures the recovery of the SOF and brings
them out of enemy territory.

Modifications for transfer of

special operation forces
To enable a submarine to support
Special Operation Forces several aspects
have to be considered during submarine
design, like e.g. additional bunks for
accommodation or consideration of
provisions for additional persons on board
by limiting the current mission profile.
In addition the capability of a
cleaning for more persons than a standard
crew during a mission has to be ensured.
Additional special requirements for
stowage of weapons and explosive
ordnances may occur and have to be
considered. For mission preparation a
room for briefing and debriefing in

Integration of special operation

forces equipment on submarines
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems
offers several concepts for integration of
SOF equipment forwet or dry stowage
inside and outside the pressure hull. Next
to the classic stowage and lockout via a
weapon tube there are various reasonable

320

isolation has to be provided, but this

requirement might be met through the
temporary use of technical areas or messes.
The VMPL allows up to four divers
to be locked out at one time. This ensures
the shortest possible time for the
submarine to have to wait during the
lockout phase. The divers are able to enter
the trunk during transit and the pressure
inside the lock is equalised close to the
point where the submarine stops to open
the diver lock.
In keeping with the requirements of
asymmetric warfare scenarios, cooperation
between submarines and Special Operation
Forces is becoming more and more
important for naval missions.
Due to their capability for covert
operations, submarines play a key role in
the deployment of SOF as close to the
coastal area as possible without being
detected. Modularity in submarine design
offers the best flexibility for future
requirements regarding the integration of
SOF equipment or other additional
equipment.
HDW Class submarines are able to
be adapted with concepts for the
integration of several types of SOF
equipment. However, it is wise to respect
the following guideline: The earlier the
integration is considered in the design, the
better the concept for integration will be!
Therefore ThyssenKrupp Marine
Systems is continuously elaborating on its
concept for the integration of SOF
equipment.

Although in the real world the significance

of reliable hoistable masts that work
infallibly whenever the need arises is as
crucial as any other system on the
submarine. With reliable technology the
various missions of all submarines can
keep going on and the latest requirements
mentioned above can be fulfilled anytime.
Hence our motto can be seen as:
"GABLER Masts keep your mission
running".
Advanced technology
Gabier is one of the world's leading
manufacturers in hoistable masts for
conventional submarines, especially for the
HDW Classes 209 and 214. Gabier has
produced masts for more than 150
submarines operated by more than 20
navies worldwide. Regarding the newest
submarines for the German Navy, the
HDW Class 212A Submarine, 2 Batch,
Gabier is the OEM for all hoistable masts
with rectangular trunk including the
"CALLISTO System" that is shown in
Figures 4 and Figure 8. Further
developments during the last decade
include the Pressure Safety System that
allows permanent testing of pressure
tightness of each of the connections,
extended functionalities and increased
capabilities. The masts have been tested in
long-term operations, which have shown
them to be very stable and reliable, while
their ingenious shaping in addition to
coating with radar-absorbing material
makes them very difficult to detect. Thus
these tailor made masts fulfil the latest
requirements and increase the overall
capability of each submarine significantly.
With regard to dimensions Gabier
hoistable masts are the smallest ones in
length, width and cross section. For
instance the 2 stage of the communication
mast is the smallest HF whip antenna
available. Furthermore the masts combine
minimal power consumption with the
largest possible stroke for a given length.
This achievement is just part of an ongoing
development progress. A fully electrically
driven hoistable mast is already under
development and a working prototype has
already been tested. As a result the
nd

Increasing submarines' capabilities

with innovative hoistable mast solutions
The motto of this SubCon is
"owning the water space". To own the
underwater space today's requirements of
submarines are improved reconnaissance
abilities, improved command abilities,
additional effectors and modularity.
Commonly,
when
talking
about
submarines, the hoistable masts are not
considered a major topic. They most likely
are not even mentioned at all. There are
other systems that are considered to be
more significant compared to the simple
electro hydraulic lifting equipment.

nd

321

company will be able to supply fully

electrical masts in the near future.

flotilla and helps to keep down overall

investment and life cycle cost.

Mast family
In principle hoistable masts can be
built as telescoping or penetrating masts, as
shown in Figure 2. Depending on the
platform design and the possibilities in the
sail configuration either a bridge mast or a
hull penetrating mast is of advantage.
Conventionally for small sensorshoistable
masts are shaft guided, which means that
the sensor to be hoisted is guided within a
circular shaft. The shaft guided masts need
less space inside the submarine's sail and
can be arranged closely side by side.
If bigger and heavier sensors or
even multiple sensors are to be integrated
on one mast, a column guided construction
is the preferred solution. Column guided
masts are able to carry heavier or multiple
sensors (e.g. multiband-antenna plus HFantenna), the columns can be arranged near
to arbitrarily, provided that they are able to
cope with the loads. This allows the masts
to be arranged so that they are nested
inside the bridge fin. It must be taken into
account that the cable trunk, which is not
an integral part of the shaft guided or the
column guided mast, has to be placed near
to the respective mast.
The Gabler periscope hoisting
devices
and
optronic
masts
are
characterised by precise, easy and near to
vibration free movement at all speeds.
They have been tested in long-term
operations that have shown them to be very
reliable, while their ingenious shaping in
addition to coating with radar-absorbing
material makes them very difficult to
detect.
Gabler hoistable masts are fully
able to meet the technical and tactical
requirements of naval customers and
comply with the latest developments in
technology.
The standard mast with a
rectangular cross section can accommodate
different types of sensors during the life
cycle of a submarine or to install different
sensor types e.g. in new submarines. This
increases the overall capability of the

Modularity benefits
Depending on the quantity of
submarines in the respective fleets of the
navies worldwide the question of
modularity gains significance. Additionally
the different mission modules to be
fulfilled by the submarines will require
different sensors and capabilities on top of
their hoistable masts. Hence exchange
should be easy for the commanding officer
and the crew, so that other mast
configurations can be implemented with
other sensors in accordance with the
mission. The latest developed mast system
from Gabler gives the commanding officer
the best variety and modularity. The mast
can be exchanged in a short period of time
in the shipyard or the naval arsenal. The
new concept is also an advantage with
regard to maintenance work whenever
necessary. In case a navy decides to have a
complete set of masts as a "Repair by
Replacement" set the timeframe can be
shortened tremendously.
The CALLISTO System a
modular sensor float for deep
submerged submarine operations
The innovative CALLISTO system
developed by Gabler Maschinenbau GmbH
in cooperation with ThyssenKrupp Marine
Systems and BAALNBw comprises a
repeatedly retractable tethered antenna
float and enables submarines to
communicate from a deep submerged
position. The system can also be used as a
simple communication mast by being fitted
into the CALLISTO mast with a raised
high power multiband antenna with
antenna applications such as: uTIF/VHFLOS, UHF-Satcom, HF reception, IFF and
GPS. To use the antenna frequencies in
deep
submerged
conditions
the
CALLISTO system is released as an
optimally streamlined float from a
hoistable mast so that it ascends to the
water surface on the end of a towing cable.
The buoyant body can be released and
retrieved
repeatedly
for
different
operations. Automatic adjustment of the

322

cable length allows the submarine to

maintain speed and depth as desired. The
towing cable transmits all communication
data through fibre optical waveguides. This
enables other sensors or functions to be
inte grated in the buoy, as shown in Figure
4. With the above mentioned capability the
submarine is able to be fully integrated into
Network Centric Operations without the
need to leave its deep submerged position.
The system functionalities can be increased
by the addition of a radar early warning
antenna, cameras or video recording
equipment. This extends the functionality
by adding a viewing system which is not
only a safety factor for the float and
submarine but also increases the capability
of optical reconnaissance. Next to the
CALLISTO Mast solution the CALLISTO
system can also be integrated in different
locations in the submarine. It can be
installed in the upper deck and as a
mounting system in the sail. Thereby the
system is not only applicable for new
projects but also for refit and
modernisation projects. The CALLISTO
system can be considered as a solution that
increases the submarine capability in
general. Two CALLISTO systems have
been contracted for the HDW Class 212A
2 Batch submarines U3 5 and U36 of the
German Navy.

and protected against seawater and outside

water pressure. The container with a resealable cover is about four meters in
height, depending on the height of sail of
the submarine into which it is to be
integrated. The cross section can be scaled
to the necessary and available space; a first
demonstrator with an interior diameter of
800mm has already been built and
successfully tested down to at least 50 bar
outside pressure.
The system is designed to be
operated at periscope depth, i.e. there is no
need for the submarine to surface as this
would increase the risk of detection
considerably. This is shown in Figure 6.
There is also no need for the payload to be
pressure proof. The different sensor and
effector modules can all be remotely
operated from the submarine CIC.
Modules of TRIPLE M
In cooperation with different
specialist partners in the industry a number
of payload modules for the TRIPLE M
system are being developed.
Fire Fish module Armament for
graduated reaction
If helicopters or maritime patrol
aircraft detect a submarine, at this time
there is no alternative but to flee and/or
hide. This module enables submarines to
play their part in scenarios where they need
weapons which can be deployed "on an
escalating scale" of reactions against
unarmed or lightly armed combatants. This
module provides light armament for the
submarine by means of a near to recoilless
machine gun.

nd

TRIPLE
M

Modular
Multipurpose Mast in a pressure proof
container
The
other
system
recently
developed by GABLER (in cooperation
with the former HDW and BAALNBw) is
the Modular Multi-purpose Mast, TRIPLE
M. The modular system is designed to
carry a range of different payloads
sensors and effectors, as shown in Figure 5
each to fulfil new or enhanced capability
requirements so that the submarine is
equipped to meet the demands of any
mission. A standardised interface enables
them to be exchanged rapidly.
TRIPLE M consists of a two stage
hoistable mast either a standard mast or a
column guided one carrying a pressureproof container in which the different
payload modules can be accommodated

PHOCA module Direction

finding R/C-ESM antennas
Intelligence,
Surveillance
and
Reconnaissance (ISR) in the field of
electronic communications is becoming
increasingly important in and across all
branches of the armed forces. The TRIPLE
M concept will enable the integration of
comparatively big antennas on board a
submarine.

323

VOLANS module Optical

reconnaissance with aerial support
This system enables UAVs to
operate from a submarine and to obtain
optical reconnaissance data, i.e. video
images of a bird's eye view transmitted in
real time to a submarine. This requirement
determines the basic configuration of the
system, which consists of a UAV equipped
with reconnaissance sensors, a launching
system and radio communication abilities
for data transmission purposes. At the end
of the mission, the UAV is not recovered
by the submarine but lands away from the
operational area or is crashed intentionally.

approach for the anti-ship weapon system.

This state-of-the-art, multi-mission weapon
system
provides
combat-proven
performance in open ocean engagements
with up to 8 waypoints and improved
capabilities in littoral engagements.
The HARPOON Block II missile
The Harpoon Block II missile has
been designed to be compatible with and is
operational on air, surface, sub-surface,
and land-based launching platforms. The
surface and land-based configurations
consist of five easily supported major
sections: Guidance, Warhead, Sustainer,
Control, and Booster. An Exercise Section
replaces the Warhead Section for exercise
firing. Our fully developed and qualified
HARPOON Block II.
For anti-ship missions, the Global
Positioning
System
(GPS)
greatly
improves the missile guidance to the target
area. This is achieved by updating the
missile's Inertial Navigation System (INS)
with GPS position data both prior to and
after launch. The accurate navigation
solution provided by the GPS, coupled
with the AHWCS provided World Vector
Shoreline Data Base, US Government
supplied and customer editable Obstruction
Data Base allows users to discriminate
target ships from islands or other nearby
land masses, obstacles or other ships. The
HARPOON Block II Weapon System
maintains a high hit probability even
against enemy ships very close to land.
Harpoon has a demonstrated success rate
of greater than 90% as proven through
more than 1000 launches in training and
exercise activities.

Conclusion
Gabler with its expertise in
hoistable masts is continually working
towards better products to ensure mission
success. Hoistable masts are an extremely
significant addition to the platform of the
submarine. The innovation in the design
principle of hoistable masts like the socalled standard mast and mast types
CALLISTO and TRIPLE M shows that
hoistable masts play a central role in
enabling submarine communication and
the fulfilment of existing and future tasks.
"GABLER Masts - keep your mission
running.
Encapsulated
HARPOON
Weapon system
The Boeing Company offers the
HARPOON Block II Weapon System
(HWS) as our non-developmental solution
for the Next Generation Joint Anti-Ship
Missile for Armed Forces. The HWS has
been developed as "Total System" solution
including the missile, the command and
launch systems, and the logistics support
elements. These elements have been
developed in parallel in an integrated team
environment to ensure that the full
capabilities of the system are available as
soon as possible.
For integration onto submarines,
the HARPOON Block II submarine
launched missile combined with the
Advanced HARPOON Weapon Control
System (AHWCS) Version 2, and
associated support elements is our

Advanced HARPOON Weapon

Control System shipboard integration
Since 1975 Boeing has been
involved in the installation of HAFiPOON
capability on over 26 classes of submarines
for 14 navies worldwide. As capabilities
have been added to the HARPOON
missile, the HARPOON Command and
Launch Systems have been improved to
exploit technology improvements and to
counter increased threat sophistication.
These improvements have evolved to

324

provide effective engagement planning

capability
in
cluttered,
littoral
environments with minimal required
operator interaction. Advanced planning
algorithms
provide
the
user
an
automatically generated, optimized flight
plan that maximizes the use of the missile's
capabilities while still allowing manual
control and modification of engagement
plans. The user can launch multiple
missiles against multiple targets.
Our approach to integration of the
HARPOON Weapon System aboard
submarines centers on the Advanced
HARPOON Weapon Control System
(AHWCS). AHWCS is the latest in
HARPOON launch control system
evolution, offering greater flexibility in
platform integration and considerable
growth potential. AHWCS takes maximum
advantage of the performance of current
low cost open architecture hardware and
software standards to provide processing
capability never before available for
HARPOON engagement planning and
launch control. The clear, full-color
Windows-based user interface minimizes
operator workload. The modular system
design provides a logical low-risk path to
capitalize on anticipated improvements in
computing
and
communications
technology
and
simplifies
system
maintenance. The AHWCS network
interfaces provides versatile integration
options
with
the
ship's
Combat

Management System (CMS) LAN and

simple interface with the ship's Standard
Operating Common Consoles and MultiFunction Displays (MFDs) that require no
HARPOON-unique interface software.
Future capability
Boeing and the US Navy continue
to investigate options for enhancing the
HARPOON Weapon System. The potential
areas of improvement being considered
consist of Seeker enhancements, Range
extension,
Warhead
improvements,
Mission Planning and Vertical Launch.
Updates to the HARPOON Weapon
System have historically been offered as
retrofit to the existing customer inventories
as well as new production. This policy will
be followed for future enhancements
whenever possible.
Conclusion
The Harpoon Block II Weapon
System is our non-developmental solution
to meet the Next Generation loint AntiShip Missile requirements for submarine
application.
Bibliography
1.

325

MAGAZINE NAVAL FORCES,

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR
MARITIME POWER, Special ISSUE
2015, Vol.XXXVI,ISSN 0722-8880.

STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANIFESTATION FORMS

OF THE HYBRID WAR
Daniel-Cornel TEFNESCU
PhD student, Carol I National Defence University, Bucharest
stefanesco_d@yahoo.com

Abstract: In an international environment characterized by border conflicts, this paper highlights the
development of the hybrid war after the Second World War. Hybrid war combines conventional and
unconventional, military and non-military tactics, guerrilla and terrorism. Military operations are conducted by
unmarked, well trained armed forces, and armed troops, supported in the operations area by the local
population. Additionally, they lead intense campaigns of misinformation and misleading, as well as cyberattacks. The hybrid war aims at recovering discrepancies with regard to the technical, tactical and doctrine
asymmetry, thus providing success to the actors of a hybrid war.
Keywords: hybrid war, terrorism, hostile actions, special forces, guerilla.

In a world confused by the rhythm

of time and space changes, by the silent
fight, yet with tough actions sometimes, a
world found between the globalization
trend, supported by powerful and rich
nations and the attempt of maintaining the
national identity, supported by small and
medium-size states, the great powers try,
whereas applying the "chaos theory" at
global scale (of the "order in disorder"), to
preserve the hegemony and their extension
in their areas of influence.
The
current
international
environment is characterized by: ethnic
and
religious
disputes,
significant
economic weaknesses, border tensions, as
well as a fragile peace on the European
continent.
New types of conflicts, in which
adversaries are no longer separated by the
contact line on tens and hundreds of
kilometers distance, have demonstrated a
limited capacity of the armies structures
based on Clausewitzian concepts to meet
them. The new face of war requires
rethinking the structure of the armed forces
and their continuous adjustment to the
evolution and current demands of the
battlefield.
Currently there are views that the
future war will be nameless, against an

enemy that cannot be defined and

recognized, or will be a "hybrid" (i.e., a
combination between the classical warfare
and the unconventional one, so as to
embarrass the armies of powerful states
that cannot be defeated in classical
confrontations, fought by the laws of war).
"Hybrid war" is a new concept
whose definition has not appeared yet in
military doctrines. "Hybrid Wars" are wars
undeclared by states, namely, those
conflicts where the military component is
not assumed explicitly and, in any case, is
not unique.
In a hybrid war, the aggressor tries
to exploit both the military weaknesses of
its opponent and especially its non-military
(societal) weaknesses: ethnic or religious
tensions, corrupt institutions, economic
and energy dependence. Based on these
weaknesses, a hybrid war implies various
actions, ranging from terrorism to media
propaganda and military actions that are
erratic and not assumed.
Based on NATO concepts, a
"Hybrid war" is that war in which the
armed force is only a small part, hostile
actions being executed as part of a flexible
strategy with long-term goals.
Hybrid war thus represents "a
combination
of
symmetrical
and

326

asymmetrical armed conflicts, in which

traditional military operations conducted
against military and enemy targets, while
simultaneously acting decisively to get
control of the indigenous population of the
area of operations by stability operations1.
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Nemeth, of
the US Marine Corps, defined the hybrid
war as a "contemporary form of
guerrillas", which "uses both modern
technology and modern methods of
mobilization"2.
David Kilcullen, in the book "The
Accidental Guerrilla - Fighting Small
Wars in the Midst of a Big One", states that
a "hybrid war is the best explanation for

complex way, although it is not yet clear

how they are going to use them.
Challenges will come from states (groups
of states) that choose, among the entire
arsenal at their disposal, technologies and
tactics strategically suited to their
geographies and cultures4.
In the hybrid war, the opponents
(states, movements supported by states or
independent) will unlock access to modern
military capabilities and support terrorist
and criminal movements, as well as
intervention of countries that combine
high-tech military capabilities, with
terrorist actions and cyber warfare
operations against financial targets5.

modern conflicts, but stresses that it

includes a combination of irregular war,
civil war, insurgency and terrorism"3.
Frank Hoffman, in his work of
2007 - "Conflict in the 21st Century. The
Emergence of Hybrid Wars"- presents the
"new" adversaries who train and employ
various innovative capabilities and
asymmetric methods. Consequently, future
conflicts will not be classified as
conventional or irregular because the most
capable opponents will aim to combine
their capacities and capabilities in a

Hybrid Wars incorporate a variety

of ways of fighting a war, including
conventional capabilities, irregular tactics
and formations, terrorist and criminal
disorder. These actions will be carried out
so as to obtain synergistic effect at one or
all levels of war. Essentially, opponents
leading hybrid wars "seek to obtain victory
by the merger of irregular tactics and the
most lethal means at hand in order to
attack your opponent and to fulfill their
political objectives"6.
Col PhD Valeric Cruceru, About conceptual
hybrid war in American military thinking, National
Defense University Bulletin Carol I, Bucharest,
2014, p. 30, apud Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in
the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington
Virginia, December, 2007, p. 27;
5
Ibidem, p.30
6
Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century:
The Rise of Hybrid Wars, op.cit., p. 29;
4

Colonel John J. McCuen, USA, Retired, Hybrid

Wars, Military Review, March-April 2008, United
States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, pp. 107 - 108
2
www.armedforcejournal.com/2009/10/4198658,
"Hybrid vs. compound war";
3
David Kilcullen, The accidental guerrilla Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,
Oxford University Press, 2009

327

Republic, Romania and Turkey, and as

soon as the NATO invited Ukraine and
Georgia to join the Alliance, during the
NATO Summit in Bucharest, in April
2008. At that time Vladimir Putin
rhetorically threatened the Ukraine's
territorial integrity. The Western Europes
offer for Ukraine's integration in the EU
and NATO was considered, by Moscow
and the Russian and Russian-speaking
population of Ukraine, not as an extension
of democracy, but as a threat.
The events in Ukraine between
2013 and 2014 were conducted in three
distinct phases: Euromaidan, increased
protests in the south-eastern part of the
country and the escalating conflict
generated: the pro-Russian president,
Viktor Yanukovych's impeachment (he
took refuge in the Russian Federation,
together with his family), armed
confrontations between protesters and the
military (some of the soldiers were part of
a detachment for special operations,
Berkut, deployed from the pro-Russian
regions Donetsk, Crimea and Cernikov)
resulting in casualties, the approval of
Vladimir Putins request8 addressed to the
Russian parliament (Duma) to use force in
Ukraine, in order to protect the interests of
Russia, the rise of disputes between ethnic
groups in Ukraine (Crimean Tatars began
to demonstrate against the split of Ukraine,
whereas pro-Russians protesters demanded
the annexation of Crimea to Russia).
Armed people in uniforms without
insignia (perhaps members of the
intelligence services or of the Russian
special troops) took control of some points
of strategic importance in Crimea,

The war in Ukraine

Constituted as a country after the
First World War, after the disappearance of
the Russian Empire and the AustroHungarian Empire, located at the contact
line between two geopolitical blocs, Russia
and Western Europe, Ukraine has borders
with Romania and Moldova - to the
southwest, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary
to the West, Belarus - to the North,
Russia - to the Northeast, the Black Sea
and Azov Sea - to the south. Ukraine's
area, without the Crimea Republic and the
city of Sevastopol, is 576,683 km2, and has
a
total
population
of
7
44,429,471inhabitants .
After the collapse of the former
Soviet bloc and its separation from the
Soviet Union (1991), Ukraine tried, like
other former Soviet republics, to regain
identity. It failed, however, and quickly
became a "pawn" in the permanent dispute
between Russia and Western Europe.
In 2013 the Kiev leaders manifested
a pro-western openness, even if the power
was held by a pro-Russian majority, led by
Victor Yanukovych. In response to
Ukraine's desire to join the European
Union, which would have removed it from
the Russian sphere of influence, Russia
announced a strategic movement during
the negotiations for the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement. Although the
conflict was limited to economic hits, its
targets were geostrategic. Among the most
harmful economic hits was blocking
Ukrainian exports of steel products to
Russia.
The rivalry between the West and
the Russian Federation on the Ukrainian
issue began in 2008, with the proposal of
extending the NATO in the Black Sea
region and the Caucasus. Moscow
threatened to use preventive measures.
Disagreements became more acute once
the US missile defense and radar
surveillance systems were deployed in
countries such as Poland, the Czech
7

"Taking into account that the ongoing

extraordinary situation in Ukraine threatens the life
of Russian citizens and that our armed forces are
conducted in compliance with an international
agreement on Ukrainian territory (Autonomous
Republic of Crimea), pursuant to Art. 102 para. (1)
g of the Constitution of the Russian Federation
Council of the Russian Federation I request
permission to use the Russian Armed Forces in
Ukraine to normalize the socio-political situation in
this country. "-Vladimir Putin;

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine;

328

Vladimir Putin claiming that armed men

besieging Ukrainian forces in Crimea are
not Russian troops, but local selfdefending forces. They did not act
randomly, but according to a strategic plan
very minutely designed, proving a very
good military training and appropriate
means (armored, efficient artillery, antiarmor and anti-aircraft ammunition,
communications,
logistics
support)
necessary to cope with a serious armed
confrontation.
On March 6, 2014, the Crimean
parliament voted a declaration to join the
Russian
Federation, establishing
a
referendum on the future status of Crimea
(16 March). Although the West held
massive protests against this fact, on
March, 7, Russia announced that it will
support the Crimea if the region votes in
favor of its separation from Ukraine.
Consequently, on March, 8, France and the
US threatened Russia with sanctions.
The results of the referendum
showed that 97% of the voters wanted
Crimeas separation from Ukraine and it
joining the Russian Federation. Although
the European Union and the US imposed
bans for several officials from Russia and
Ukraine, on March, 18, the Russian
President, Vladimir Putin, was taking side
of Moscow's actions in Crimea in the
Duma. Then he signed a bill on absorbing
the peninsula into the Russian Federation,
which was ratified by the Duma on March,
20. As a result of Crimeas annexation, the
Russian Federation was excluded from the
G8; moreover, the G8 summit that
supposed to take place in Sochi, in June
2014, was canceled.
On March, 24, the United Nations
condemned the annexation of Crimea to
Russia9, and the NATO ceased all
cooperation with Russia.

On March, 31, the Russian

President, Vladimir Putin, ordered a partial
withdrawal of Russian troops gathered at
the border with Ukraine. The number of
people who lost their lives in this absurd
war is, at present, over 3000, according to
UN data, which includes the 298 people
aboard the Boeing 777 of the company
Malaysia Airlines, flight MH 17.
The hybrid war from Ukraine
reminded
of
other
similar
manifestations around the world:
a) The
1963
war
between
Indonesia and Malaysia
Malaysia, a country located in
Southeast Asia, comprises two distinct
areas: the south (Malaysia Peninsula and
adjacent islands) and the north of the island
of Borneo.
After
Malaysia
gained
its
independence, in 1963, it was attacked by
the procommunists from Indonesia, who
had pursued their occupation in Eastern
Malaysia, without any declaration of war.
It was the first unreported "hybrid war" in
modern history.
The communist
President of
Indonesia - Sukarno - proclaimed the
slogan "Indonesian land assembly" (similar
to that announced by Vladimir Putin "gathering Russian lands").
The war was not declared; it was
supposed to be waged in secret, with the
help of fighting partisans and propaganda.
Fighting with troops holding unmarked
membership (as in Crimea), the Indonesian
military, several times stronger than the
Malaysian one, presented its armed forces
as "local militias" / "rebels" fighting on
their own initiative against the "junta" of
Malaysia (another similarity with the
Russian propaganda, which spoke about
on March, 2, 2015, following the online link
http://www.google.ro/url?sa&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&s
ource=web&cd=4&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0
CEAQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.reford.or
g%2Fpdfid%2F534502a14.pdf&ei=CGyVU7rxOua
f7ga2h4GoAw&usg=AFQjCNGNPDyrPpClqdqQD
OtK2Vkv5GDesg.

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on

27 March 2014, without reference to a Main
Committee (A/68/L.39 and Add.1), 68/262.
Territorial integrity of Ukraine, United Nations
General Assembly, United Nations Document A/
RES/68/262(2014), April, 1, 2014." Last accessed

329

the government in Kiev using the term

junta).
The ruling class in Indonesia, using
propaganda and citing the Malaysian
"atrocities", caused an explosion of
nationalist feeling within society. Their
undeclared aggression was justified in
terms of a repatriation of ancestral lands,
whereas Malaysia was said to be a
"nonsensical country, a "puppet of the
West", etc.
The West reacted to this undeclared
aggression and imposed sanctions against
the aggressor, sanctions that proved
insufficient to stop Indonesia.
Malaysia requested support from
the UK, initially materialized in receiving
advisers and trainers to reform the army
and state sectors. Thus, a small contingent
of the British Army (Regiment 22 SAS
members) and other special forces, along
with reformed Malaysian military, using
the tactics of concealed patrolling,
developed a network of information, and
then, using raids of sabotage and sudden
attacks against the aggressor units inflicted
heavy losses on the enemy.
Because of the losses experienced
by the invaders, the war became unpopular
and the aggression in eastern Malaysia was
stopped. While in Malaysia a rapid reform
was taking place, Indonesia soon sank into
crisis.
After three years of war, victory
was impossible and the economic crisis
and international sanctions favored the
collapse of the Indonesian political regime.
After the overthrow of Sukarno, the
relations with the West were restored so as
to have their sanctions lifted. However,
President Sukarno was not accused of
corruption, nor was he tried until his death,
4 years after the war; he lived in complete
isolation from the outside world.
b)The Vietnam war (1959-1975)
It is considered the most painful
memory of the American history after the
Civil War, one of the great failures of the
American foreign policy. The war was
between the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam (North Vietnam), supported by

China and the Soviet Union and the
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam),
supported by the United States. It was a too
long and pointless war, resulting in many
casualties on both sides. The conflict ended
with the defeat of South Vietnam and the
unification of the country under the
communist rule.
In the first part of the war, the
South Vietnamese troops, trained by US
military counselors, tried to eliminate
guerrillas hiding in the rural areas and in
the system of underground channels, but
because of chaos and political oppression
in the South, the number of guerrillas
increased, instead of decreasing. Vietcong
troops were seven times less numerous
than the troops of Diem, but they held very
important advantages: a rich experience
gained in guerilla warfare, the desire to
fight to death for the revolution, the aid
they received from the rural population and
the Norths support, which supplied
weapons and combatants via the so-called
"Ho Shi Min trail" (Laos and Cambodia).
If until 1960 the American support
for the South Vietnam consisted of nearly
1,000 military advisers and weapons,
starting with 1961 (after the failure in
Cuba) President Kennedy increased his
country's involvement in the conflict.
Moreover, representatives of the President,
sent to Vietnam for documentation,
General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow,
recommended the sending of land troops
and the use of US air force in support of
the South Vietnam.
After the "Tonkin Gulf incident", in
August 1964, when the USS Maddox
destroyer, on one of its reconnaissance
mission along the north coast of Vietnam,
was attacked and damaged by several
torpedoes, the US Congress approved of
the military intervention in the region and
the sending of 15,000 military advisers and
support units. Nevertheless, the South
Vietnamese army could not defeat guerrilla
fighters of the Vietminh's while the
Americans believed that their weapons and

330

their technology, together with the South

Vietnamese forces would defeat the
"peasant army" of Ho Chi Minh. In
response to the continuous US bombing
with napalm bombs, defoliants, "antipersonnel" bombs and "aerosol bombs"
over the North Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh
intensified guerrillas actions. Hundreds of
thousands of victims failed to destroy
Hanois will to resist.
US targets in the South Vietnam,
formulated by John McNaughton (US
assistant secretary of defense for
international security issues) were the
following:
- 70% - to avoid a humiliating defeat;
- 20% - to maintain the South
Vietnamese territories outside the Chinese
control;
- 10% - to offer the South
Vietnamese people a better and free living.
American involvement in the
region increased from 50,000 troops, in
1965, to more than 700,000 troops, in
1968, and American generals were
demanding more combatants. The US Air
Force launched many more bombs than the
allied troops did in the Second World War.
From a contingent of about 5,000
people in early 1959, toward the end 1964,
Viet Cong's troops increased in number to
about 100,000. Between 1961 and 1964
their army increased from about 850,000 to
nearly one million people10.
On January 30, 1968, during the
most important Vietnamese holidays, the
North Vietnamese Army, supported by the
National Liberation Front, began the Tet
Offensive during which they attacked by
surprise all the large cities in the South
Vietnam. Although the proposed target
was not reached (the challenge of a general
revolt throughout the South Vietnam), the
amplitude of the attack managed to
convince many Americans that there was

no hope for winning the war. It was the

first time in this war when American
soldiers faced a visible enemy, dressed in
uniforms and not guerrillas wearing
civilian clothes and mingling among
civilians.
The withdrawal of the US troops
began in June 1969, communist forces
becoming stronger and threatening to
completely overthrow the Saigon regime.
The destruction of the communist
sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia and the
return to aerial bombardment made the war
become increasingly fierce.
In March 1972, now without the
support of China and the Soviet Union,
120,000 North Vietnamese soldiers broke
into the South Vietnam. American and
South Vietnamese troops were taken by
surprise. Neither the massive bombing of
North Vietnam, nor of Hanoi and the
Haiphong port could change the fate of
war. The collapse of the South Vietnamese
army and the occupation of Saigon by the
North Vietnamese ceased the war. North
and South were reunited and the result was
Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
According to the Paris Peace
Agreements,
between
the
North
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Le Duc Tho
and the US Secretary of State, Henry
Kissinger, US military forces were
withdrawn from South Vietnam and
prisoner exchange took place. The North
Vietnam was allowed to continue
providing material to the communist troops
in the South Vietnam, but only for
replacing the consumed materials. Also in
that year, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were
awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace, but the
Vietnamese negotiator declined it, saying
that true peace did not exist yet.
President Nixon claimed that he
finally obtained the "in honor peace". "Our
Times", wrote that the honorable peace
was obtained at the end of the longest war
ever carried out by Americans, following a
military defeat in front of a small and
technologically inferior country.

10

Demma, Vincent H. "The U.S. Army in

Vietnam." American Military History(1989), online
access:
http://www.Ibiblio.org/pub/academic/history/marsh
all/military/vietnam/short.history/ chap_28.txt

331

deserted16. In 1977 President Jimmy Carter

guaranteed the latters unconditional
forgiveness17.
On 2 July 1976, the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam appeared, as a result
of the reunification of the South Vietnam
with the North Vietnam. The unification
could not yet re-establish peace in
Vietnam.
c) The Russian Afghan war
(1979-1989)
Afghanistan is a landlocked country
located in the south of the Central Asian,
with 75% of the territory covered with
rugged mountains, the Hindu Kush
Mountains, the second largest mountain
range in the world. It is situated in an area
of influence of great powers: Russia, to the
north, China, to the east, India, to the south
and south-east, the Arab countries, to the
south-east and east and Europe, to the
west. Added to these neighboring powers
is the USA. Furthermore, Afghanistan is
located at the confluence of the world's
major religions: Buddhism, Christianity
and Islam (the religion in Afghanistan).
The Afghan people are very religious,
saints and divine characters having a great
influence on the political and spiritual way
of Afghans thinking.
In December 1979, the U.S.S.R.
invaded Afghanistan and triggered a long
and painful civil war (1979-1989), during
which there were registered 1,200,000
victims, of which 90% civilians, 5 to 6
million people emigrated (to Pakistan,
Iran) living in wretched conditions, and
another 2 million Afghans took refuge
inside the country. The given reasons to
justify the Soviet invasion were:

As a consequence of the war, in

1973, the US gave up conscription. The US
expenditure on the war in Vietnam was
estimated to rise to between 140-180
billion dollars. It was considered that, from
the military perspective, the US achieved a
tactical success and a strategic defeat in
Vietnam.
Between 1965 and 1975 the US
spent 111 billion dollars11 for the war, thus
creating a large budget deficit. Over 3
million Americans were involved in the
war in Vietnam, of which 1.5 million were
involved in active fight12. James E.
Westheider wrote that, in 1968, the peak
year of the American intervention in
Vietnam, there were 543,000 troops on the
front, but only 80,000 were considered to
be part of the combat troops13. By the end
of the war, the American casualties
amounted 58,220, more than 150,000
troops were injured and at least 21,000 had
suffered
permanent
disabilities.
Approximately 830,000 American veterans
suffered from post-traumatic stress
syndrome14. About 125,000 Americans
fled to Canada15 to avoid enlistment, and
50,000 Americans in military service
11

Stephen Daggett (24 iulie 2008). CRS Report to

Congress : Costs of Major U.S. Wars. Foreign press
center, US Department of State. (Order Code
RS22926, page 2/5)
12
"Echoes of Combat: The Vietnam War in
American Memory". Stanford University
13
James E. Westheider (2007). "The Vietnam War".
Greenwood Publishing Group. p.78
14
From the Americans combatants, 14% had
psychiatric disorders or acute reactions of common
response. Common responses following exposure to
traumatic events included: an unusual feeling of
being challenged; difficulty falling asleep or
maintaining sleep; nightmares or flashbacks;
difficulty concentrating attention; indifference in
achieving objectives; irritability or outbursts of
anger, loss of religious faith and revolt against
divinity; Frequent family and professional conflicts;
unusual fatigue, emotional callousness; recurrent
anxiety for personal safety; loneliness; excessive
sadness and depression; feelings of helplessness,
guilt and self-blaming.
15
War Resisters Remain in Canada with No
Regrets. ABC News. November, 19, 2005.
Accessed on February, 26, 2010

16

Vietnam War Resisters in Canada Open Arms to

U.S. Military Deserters. Pacific News Service. 28
June 2005
17
Proclamation 4483: Granting Pardon for
Violations of the Selective Service Act. Accessed
on June, 11, 2008. By The President Of The United
States Of America, A Proclamation Granting
Pardon For Violations Of The Selective Services
Act, 4 August 1964 To 28 March 1973. 21 January
1977

332

- to support the socialism established

in Afghanistan;
- to stop the advance of the Islamic
fundamentalism promoted by religious
leaders of the Iranian Islamic revolution
(fundamentalism was promoted by
mujahedeen) in the Soviet republics where
large numbers of Muslims lived (which
would have generated a strong internal
instability in the USSR);
- to test the performance of
conventional weapons available in the
USSR;
- to control the rich resources found
in the Afghan underground, consisting of
deposits of chromium, gold, silver, sulfur,
talc, magnesium, uranium, marble and
lapis lazuli and huge natural gas deposits
identified in 1957 by Russian geologists
while they were investigating the natural
gas reserves near the Amu Daria river. The
Afghan soil also holds important deposits
of natural asbestos, nickel, zinc, mercury,
bauxite, potassium graphite, tourmalines,
emeralds, sapphires and rubies. But the
vast underground wealth of Afghanistan
lies in its deposits of iron of unmatched
purity (62% pure iron).
But
Moscow
justified
its
intervention by the desire to preserve
calmness in Central Asia and the
communist regime in Afghanistan.
Although planned to be a classical
short-termed military operation, the
conflict turned into the long and painful
war, to which the USSR attended, a war
with outstanding casualties and costs. The
classical war turned into a hybrid war.
Immediately after the Soviet
intervention, the Mujahedeen opposition in
the mountainous part of the country
announced the transition to guerrilla
warfare, supported by a large part of the
regular army of Afghanistan, the US, UK,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, with stateof-art armament and financial resources.
Iran and many other Muslim states backed
the Islamist mujahedeen in Afghanistan by
sending volunteers (Osama bin Laden,
considered an "Arab-Afghan"). They

would later on fight both in Islamic

guerrilla wars in Algeria, Egypt, Bosnia,
Tajikistan, Chechnya, and in attacks on US
and other Western targets.
The Soviet troops (OKSV - 30,000
soldiers) could not meet the Mujahedeen
retaliation; accordingly, their number was
increased to 120,000 soldiers. The Soviet
armys aggression provoked a strong
emotion in the umma assembly and many
Islamists penetrated the country to
organize the Afghan resistance (Algerians,
Filipinos, Saudis, Palestinians, Egyptians),
supported and funded, among others, by
the CIA.
Moscow's priorities in Afghanistan
were:
- the organization of the Afghan
army (200,000 soldiers) and their training
to fulfill combat missions in mountainous
and difficult to access terrain;
- the equipping of the Afghan army
with modern Soviet weapons: planes,
tanks, artillery, armored vehicles;
- the guidance and coordination of
the Afghan military units by a Soviet
military adviser, who usually led military
operations;
- the organization of the Afghan
Security Service (HAD) after the Soviet
model, under the KGB officers
coordination;
- the schooling of HAD future
officers in the USSR (30,000 in ten years).
In support of Afghans, the US
decided to recruit, train, equip, finance and
deploy in the area an army of mercenary
volunteers, made up of Muslims from
around the world, including African
Americans. Recruitments were made with
the endorsement of the CIA, their training
and education being made by members of
the CIA or Pakistani military intelligence
officers (trained in the US).
At the beginning of the war, the
Afghan resistance was weak and Soviets
missions were limited to defending their
own barracks and installations of major
importance, to performing incursions
(aggressive patrolling) to prevent and / or

333

reduce the force of attacks that guerrillas

had begun to carry out against Jalalabad
and Kandahar airports.
As time passed, the actions of
Mujahedeen increased in scale, became
increasingly well-planned and coordinated,
and due to modern weapons received
(Stinger missiles) they manage to cause
great losses to the Soviet army which, in an
unconventional (hybrid) warfare, had
deployed tanks and mechanized units
prepared for another type of war, and had
followed totally inadequate relief tactics
and antiguerrilla struggle principles.
Soviet armored vehicles proved
useless in Afghanistan, the mountainous
terrain having made impossible for tanks,
combat vehicles and carriers to be
deployed in the tactical field of the invaded
country.
Furthermore, the Soviet soldiers
were mainly conscripts and reservists,
barely motivated and trained to fight an
always invisible enemy, relentless when
attacking and disappearing before any
coordinated retaliation could annihilate it.
Aviation and artillery strikes executed
were imprecise, carried out too late and
without the desired effect on the Afghan
guerrillas, which finally led to impeding
the involvement of guerrillas in a
conventional war.
Since 1983, when the situation
became more critical, the Soviets revised
their war strategy by withdrawing armored
divisions from combat and by replacing
them with airborne and airmobile troops
and special forces (Spetsnaz). There were
only two mechanized brigades and several
independent units of mountain troops,
already adjusted to this type of conflict (to
fighting in hilly areas and mountain
terrain).
In cooperation with the pro-Soviet
Afghan militias, villages and isolated
towns considered safe by the mujahedeens
were attacked, mines were dropped from
helicopters on the supply roads or routes of
infiltration, while villages suspected of
helping the guerrillas were destroyed.

Spetsnaz soldiers - disguised as

mujahedeen fighters - burned mosques and
food warehouses to increase tensions
between Mujahedeen factions.
Airborne detachments were landed
in the enemy battlefield, in the back of it or
sideward, under the cover of own artillery
fire, so as to isolate and destroy their bases
and communication lines, to block their
retreat.
In 1986, the radical Karmal was
replaced from the Afghan administration
with Gen. Mohammad Najibullah, the
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
recognizing that fighting in Afghanistan
was a lost cause for the USSR and
presenting this conflict as a "bleeding
wound". The moment coincided with the
secret negotiations between the Soviet,
Pakistani, American and Mujahedeen
Governments
In 1988, as a result of the Geneva
agreement, the USSR agreed to withdraw
troops from the Afghan front by February
15, 1989. The last Soviet soldier who left
Afghanistan was Lieutenant General
Anatoly Malinkov who chose to walk over
the Afghan-Soviet border.
Conclusion
Hybrid
war
will
be
the
manifestation of future confrontations of
the 21st century. Secret service agents (who
train and advise the local people),
volunteers and mercenaries, propaganda,
corruption, all can contribute substantially
to the rapid escalation of a low intensity
conflict and to its transformation into a
war. Because of the confrontation with an
unseen enemy, both the regular and the
special forces lack proper reaction, not
being prepared for this kind of war.
The hybrid battlefield is non-linear;
therefore, preparation of fighters may
generate opportunities for decisive
maneuvers.
The main objective in hybrid
warfare is a target population. The
adversary tries to influence powerful

334

people (i.e., key decision makers) by

combining military operations with
subversive efforts. The aggressor often
uses clandestine actions in order to avoid
attribution and retribution.

5.

6.
Bibliography
1.

2.

3.

4.

CRUCERU, V., About conceptual

hybrid war in American military
thinking,
National
Defense
University Bulletin Carol I,
Bucharest, 2014;
HOFFMAN, F.G., Conflict in the
21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid
Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy
Studies,
Arlington,
Virginia,
December 2007;
KILCULLEN, D., The accidental
guerrilla - Fighting Small Wars in
the Midst of a Big One, Oxford
University Press, 2009
MCCUEN, J., Hybrid Wars,
Military Review, United States
Army Combined Arms Center, Fort

7.
8.

Leavenworth, Kansas, March-April

2008;
TURNER, F., Echoes of Combat:
The Vietnam War in American
Memory, Doubleday; 1st Anchor
Books ed edition , October 1, 1996;
WESTHEIDE, J.E., The Vietnam
War,
Greenwood
Publishing,
September 30, 2007;
www.armedforcejournal.com
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Ukraine

This work was possible with the financial

support of the Sector Operational Program
for Human Resources Development 20072013, co-financed by the European Social
Fund, under the project number POSDRU/
187/1.5/S/155385
with
the
title
Integrated/educational network for the
formation, counseling and orientation of
doctoral students for a research career
in security, defense, public order and
national
security
domains
SECNETEDU.

335

HEALTH AND SPORTS

Maximilian-Paul TOFAN
Lieutenant, Technical Military Academy
maximilianpaul@yahoo.ro

Abstract: Practicing systematically and continuously physical exercises represents a basic coordinate of modern
mans existence who is aware of their usefulness. Physical and mental health are given by every persons
capacity to understand the beneficial effects on multiple levels of practicing physical exercises as well as in
every institutions capacity to support and encourage a healthy lifestyle.
Keywords: health, sports, physical exercise

Health and sports are two words

meant to be heard, understood and valued.
That is the reason why we must know what
they mean and who they address. At the
same time, health and sports are two
fundamental notions of life, closely
connected to each other, their domain and
sphere of activity being closely connected
to everyday life of the modern man.
In the modern frame, health is
considered a state, a condition that has
several components: physical, social, and
psychological; at any time of a persons
life, each of these components can be
characterized as having a positive or
negative level. It is important that each of
the components of health physical,
social, and psychological be at its
positive pole and the individual as social
entity be characterized by his/her capacity
to enjoy life, to solve current problems and
surpass the possible obstacles which
appear in the way of personal fulfillment.
It is clearly proven and universally
accepted at present that physical activity
can obviously help us, no matter the age,
gender, and other characteristics, to reach
such a beneficial quality of living.
As far as the health notion is
concerned, we consider that the best
definition is the following one: Health is
that perfect state of wellness in which an
individual can be found organically,
spiritually and socially1.

Physical health means the good

functioning of the human organism
brain, organs, systems which results in a
state of vitality, interior strength, clarity of
thinking, attention, awareness.
Mental health represents having an
open mind to everything that is new and
truly useful for creating a harmonious life.
It means being open to read, to see, to
discuss, to understand, to apply ideas and
information that have proven useful in time
or which have been discovered recently
all of them to the purpose of continuously
improving ones life.
Emotional health means good
management of interior states that we
experience every day, emitting to ourselves
and towards the outside world the
emotions we consider positive. In means
first and foremost acceptance, care,
compassion towards ourselves at first and
then towards everything surrounding us.
Spiritual health is a conjunction of
the three types mentioned above and it is
also the capacity to set and reach the
highest goal of your life; understanding the
nature of the internal and external worlds
(both yours and of the environment you
live in); the ability to decipher and create
for yourself the meaning of your own life:
faith in God, at it is understood by
everyone.
Health is the key factor of our true
age, the biological health. Unfortunately,
nowadays we notice that most of the times
health becomes important for us only when
it is not there. As long as a person
considers himself / herself healthy from

Definition of health acvcording to World Health

Organization.

336

the point of view of the medical pattern

(that is, as long as he/she does not feel
there is something wrong with their
bodies), he/she has the tendency to ignore
all the good ideas that might help him/her
keep their health on long term.
It is common knowledge that sport,
by its means of action, physical exercises,
has favorable effects upon every
individuals as well as societys health.
And this has been discovered as true not
recently, but for hundreds and even
thousands of years. Physical exercise, any
form of body movement generally
speaking has accompanied mankind along
its existence and has been always regarded
as a main means of manifestation in
performing the actions necessary for
survival and then as a means of
demonstrating physical abilities during
sports competitions but also as an
instrument of preserving ones physical
and psychological state. Once industrial
revolution had set in, machines replaced
the hard work that used to be done by
people at other times by hand. As time
passed, people became less and less active,
losing resistance and the natural movement
instinct. In order to maintain a good state
of health, taking physical exercises is
absolutely essential. Regular physical
activity, in the right rhythm and with
appropriate intensity and duration, is
instrumental for maintaining an optimal
health state. The beneficial nature of
physical exercise is true and admitted as
such, no matter the age. In the latest
decades there have been more and more
scientific proofs that demonstrated the
positive influence of physical effort over
various organs, systems, and functions of
the human body.
In developed countries, sports has
become a real state policy, a criterion of
performance and viability of the social
body and at European and even global
levels, preoccupations, efforts and
accomplishments in this field are more and
more numerous and consistent.
Thus, within the European Council,
the Committee for the Development of
Sports is one of the most dynamic and
visible organisms, its activity being

directed towards a democratization of

sports, which must become accessible to
each citizen from this continent and, at the
same time, contribute to a faster and more
solid unification of Europe.
The European sports charter
defines it as all the types of physical
activity which, through individual or
organized participation aims at attaining
the following: expressing or improving the
physical shape and the mental state of
wellness; creating social connections and
obtaining results in various sports
competitions at different levels.
The very existence of the European
sports charter and the definition it contains
proves the fact that, just as it happens with
other domains of activity, we can talk
about a European dimension in sports.
First of all we are talking here about
promoting health and a state of wellness,
and we are talking also about its role of
ensuring citizens social integration. At the
same time, for only a few individuals of
the whole global population, sports is that
type of activity in which individuals
compete against one another to measure
their strength in sports competitions and
everything related to this type of activity:
sports performance, fame, material and
money gains.
Practicing physical exercises and
keeping an appropriate diet are very good
for maintaining an optimal health state. All
scientists agree that the regular practice of
physical exercises leads to a delay in
getting old (physically and mentally);
maintaining an optimal weight; improving
the cardiac rhythm, breathing, muscle
slimness and elasticity and joint stability;
getting a state of wellness manifested
through physical and mental strength,
optimism and self-confidence.
That is why, it is not important
whether the person practicing sports wants
to become an athlete in the full sense of the
word (that is, to obtain great sports
results); the important thing is to become
aware that systematic practice of physical
exercises contributes to maintaining an
optimal state of health. Nowadays more
and more people admit this and participate

337

in more and more varied types of sports

events.
The route to good health starts from
each individual way of living. Maintaining
and strengthening peoples health by
practicing in a scientific, conscious, and
systematic manner physical exercises is a
responsibility that must be assumed by the
individual, but an important role is played
by state institutions which have trends set
in this respect.
Performances related to movement
which are developed and kept as closely as
possible to the superior limit of biological
adaptability requires an instructiveeducational process, well goal-oriented,
organized and conducted on scientific
principles. The harmonization of bodily
proportions can be obtained and
maintained easily by practicing physical
exercises. Resorting to taking slimming
drugs or keeping strict diets in order to
keep ones figure up to very old ages is not
good at all because of negative secondary
effects. We can enumerate a few of these
unwanted effects: losing a significant
amount of muscular mass and the capacity
of burning fats; increasing the risk to have
a heart attack all patients that are known
to suffer from coronary illnesses must not
make excessive physical effort because of
the lack of adjustment of coronary arteries
to the increased need of oxygen of the
myocardium (there are notorious examples
in which professional sports people died on
the field because of too much effort); the
lower immunity for any days after a
marathon, runners seem to be affected by a
higher rate of colds and other ailments,
while, on the contrary, athletes running on
average distances are able to dose their
effort in a better manner and their
immunity even grows; infertility this is a
temporary effect in women, with
menstruation and ovulation problems as
well as in men by decreasing the number
of spermatozoids; osteoporosis and bone
damage the loss in bone matter for
women who make too much physical effort
is close to that determined by menopause
(this bone demineralization can be
irreversible if it is not associated with a
diet containing adequate caloric and

mineral
substance);
acute
nervous
overexcitement a degree of exaggerated
tiredness induced by the divergence
between excessive demand and the
reduced possibilities of reaction from the
body (which appears at less trained
individuals, those that are recovering after
illness or those who want to get in shape
after a long interval of pause); neurosis of
sports physical effort called overtraining
for a long time a chronic type of
pathological tiredness (appearing because
of incorrect dosage of effort, but which can
also have as causes the frequent change of
dynamic
stereotypes
within sports
activities and agitated lifestyle having as
main characteristics the following:
exaggerated biochemical and blood vesselrelated reactions, tachycardia, delayed
cardiac
frequency,
dystonic
tense
reactions, modifications of parameters of
pulmonary ventilation, blood vessel
problems with deficiencies in thermoadjustment; the person suffering from
neurosis always complains of tiredness,
feeling that he/she has not had enough rest;
during the day any physical or intellectual
effort aggravates the capacity of
concentration and decreases the physical
and psychological efficiency); dehydration,
which may result from losing a high
quantity of water by perspiration and
inadequate hydration (not enough liquids
are drunk); exhaustion due to heat, shock
and dehydration may appear in case of
doing physical exercises in a space with
high heat and humidity; lesions due to
over-effort appear in joints or muscles;
asthma induced by physical exercise may
occur in people who have never had an
asthma attack; exhaustion may occur in
case of too much physical effort.
In conclusion, physical exercises
must be practiced in a scientific manner,
under a specialists supervision, so as to
offer benefits to the people practicing it
and not add negative effects upon the
body. The trend in competences (profiles)
that specialists in physical education and
sports have to follow is to pay special
attention to promoting health through
movement, within specialized programs,

338

offered by the community or corporatist

environments.
Practicing sports regularly and
taking physical exercises in general offer
the most positive outcomes in point of
ones health, contributing to the
prevention,
improvement,
or
even
elimination of cardio-vascular diseases
which are the main cause of death.
Keeping ones health in todays
geo-atmospheric, economic, cultural, and
socio-professional circumstances has to
become a basic condition of everyones
existence as well as of the community and
society we live in.
In conclusion, mental and physical
health lie in everyones capacity to

understand the multiple beneficial effects

of practicing physical exercises but also in
every institutions capacity of sustaining
and encouraging a healthy, balanced life
style.
Bibliography
1.

2.
3.

339

Andrei, I. - Influena educaiei fizice

i sportului asupra capacitii
operaionale a structurilor militare,
Teza doctorat, U.N.Ap. Carol I,
Bucureti, 2009.
Drgan, I. - Medicina Sportiva,
Editura Medicala, Bucureti, 2002.
*** Carta european a sportului,
1992.

PHYSICAL TRAINING IN MODERN ARMIES

Maximilian-Paul TOFAN
Lieutenant, Technical Military Academy
maximilianpaul@yahoo.ro

Abstract: Physical training is the practical component of military physical instruction which is truly useful in the
educational process of the modern soldier. The role and the position occupied by physical training in modern
armed forces are established by its very character as being one of the main subjects of instruction of the troops.
This reality is supported by laws, rules and regulations adapted to each army as such but generally having the
same objectives and identical characteristics.
Keywords: physical training, army, soldier.

The development of physical and

psychological qualities is absolutely
necessary to the soldier (understood here
as a generic term designating professional
troops). The physical and psychological
qualities needed by the soldier are
developed by modern armies in the system
of physical education, system stemming
form national traditions, combining the
spontaneous individual activities involving
physical effort with activities performed in
voluntary organizations of physical
education and sports.
In a larger sense, physical
education is a constant physiological
activity done consciously by the human
body conducted by teaching methods,
aimed at maintaining the health state and
increasing the biological potential of the
individual in order to increase his / her
social efficiency. It is strictly connected to
intellectual, moral, and aesthetical
education, depending on the former and
influencing the other two1.
From the military point of view,
physical training is a fundamental part of
the process of instruction / training, which
builds upon all the types of collective or
individual activity undertaken in order to
create, develop, and maintain the dynamic
capacity requested at peace, and in crisis
and war situations, contributing to the

improvement of the mental and physical

health of armed forces personnel2.
The area covered by military
physical education includes multiple
teaching activities, which are actually the
theoretical side of the process. The
practical component which is truly useful
for the modern soldier is physical training.
The role and position of physical training
in modern armed forces are established by
its statute as being one of the main subject
matters of troops training. This state of
facts is certified by laws, rules, and
regulations adapted to each army
separately, but having established basically
the same objectives and identical
characteristics. In modern armies, it has as
a main goal the development of soldiers
strength and effort capacity. Another
important fact is that by this type of
training stress factors can be eliminated
from the military system.
As
fundamental
objectives3,
physical training should contribute to
creating a very well prepared fighter,
capable to resist tension and combat stress,
to determine a maximization of the moralvolitional and physical components of
combat capacity, to contribute to the
improvement of the troops general mental
and physical health, to develop resistance
to tiredness, hunger, panic, but also to a
multitude of factors of physical and
2

Vezi, Concepia de educaie fizic i sport n

Armata Romniei, Bucureti, 2001, p.5.
3
Ibidem 2, p.6.

Vezi, Kiriescu C., PALESTRICA, Editura Uniunii

de Cultur Fizic i Sport, Bucureti, 1964, p.19.

340

The characteristic features5 of

military physical training are the
following: it is part of the process of
military training and education and the
dynamic and physiological basis of the
other categories of instruction; it is a
compulsory activity for all categories of
personnel; it is done regularly for a long
period of time necessitating setting stages
with rigorously determined objectives; it
implies energy consumption up to the limit
of body adaptability in order to reach the
performance requested from the modern
fighter; it shapes competitive spirit and
team spirit among militaries; it is a means
of social integration at national and
international levels; it constitutes an
essential side of integral and permanent
education within the system of military
training; it is the domain with the most
efficient means of physical and
psychological recovery of military
personnel; it has clear and precise aims of
developing the dynamic capacity of
soldiers, necessary for the efficient
accomplishment of the missions assigned.
In the process of physical training,
the outcome is the intentional development
of various elements of the structure of
soldiers physical training, that is: dynamic
capacities; special dynamic skills; physical
strength and resistance; mechanisms of
psychological adjustment.
Physical training is able to ensure
the development of the psychological and
physical abilities necessary to the fighters
acting on the battlefield of the future.
Nowadays, in all armies, the
process of physical training is conducted
by specialists in the field. This type of
training was given a special role in the
development of soldiers from modern
armed forces. These consider the activities
of physical training as being a real priority
for attaining success in the battlefield of
the future.
According to the analyses
performed periodically at the level of the
international Council of Military Sports,
organization which the Romanian armed
forces have also adhered to, there is a

psychological effort in combat, to develop

the fighting spirit, the courage and
cohesion within the group. Appropriate
physical training leads to increasing the
power to survive in unfavorable combat
circumstances and contributes to rapidly
solving the various problems encountered
during missions. The main goal of physical
training is to permanently improve general
physical qualities (force, speed, resistance,
coordination) through specific means and
methods.
The specific objectives4 of military
physical training refer to the training
requested by the specific traits and
peculiarities of each branch. In other
words, they aim at the following issues:
increasing the capacity to act fast, using
the armament and technique available in
combat, during deployment and when
stationed; learning and developing the
needed self-defense technique and close
combat in difficult circumstances; creating
and developing resistance to prolonged
physical effort, while marching or riding
transportation means in difficult terrain
and weather conditions, as well as
increasing the capacity to longer withstand
static positions and positions of reduced
mobility; developing physical strength for
loading and unloading materiel from
vehicles and ships; increasing the reaction
and execution speed, the neuro-dynamics
coordination in handling armament and
technique; adapting and increasing
physical resistance to sudden changes of
temperature and pressure; adapting rapidly
and efficiently to the particular physical
and psychological requirements of the
battle field; increasing the capacity of
resistance to long efforts and of rapid
recovery
of
strength;
preventing
sicknesses, accidents, and eliminating the
negative effects of military service
(professional diseases); improving the
exterior look.

Vezi, Loghin M., Pregtirea fizic, condiie i

premis de cretere a capacitii de lupt a
armatei, Editura Printech, Bucureti, 2001, p. 5455.

341

Ibidem 4, p. 55.

series of conclusions from which we can

clearly outline the role and importance of
physical training in the development of the
military system. From the existence of
specific training institutions to the length
and level of studies regarding specific
training, the allotted time, as well as an
adequate sports field and financing,
everything is carefully monitored so as
physical training as such and everyone
involved in it may contribute to increasing
the efficiency of military action6.
As for the existence of military
institutions to train specialists in this field,
except for Luxemburg, all other armies
from NATO member states have schools
or special centers for training military
personnel in the field of sports and
physical education.
All activities specific to sports and
physical training are only conducted by
specialists in the field. We should
emphasize that officers and civilian
personnel with a bachelor degree obtained
in civilian institutions have to take a course
at the school or center of physical training
in the army. The length of training in the
armys institutions of sports and physical
training for obtaining the necessary
qualification differs from one country to
another. In order to become an instructor
for physical training or sports, the
schooling period lasts between four weeks
(Canada and Germany) and 12 months in
most countries. We should mention that
over half (60%) of the military personnel
that take these courses have the basic
occupation of specialist in physical
training and sports, while the others
(40%) cumulate this position with another
related one.
The total volume of compulsory
training time during working hours is an
average of 60 minutes daily for physical
training and 3 hours per week for sport.
Most institutions that create
specialists in the fields, as well as the units
from NATO member armed forces receive
from the armed forces the base and

concrete means they need. This is

materialized in physical training bases
which include: stadium, fully equipped
sports hall, professional swimming pool,
fitness center (equipped for practicing
body building exercises and self-defense
practices), obstacle track, training ranges
for
physical
and
psychological
strengthening, sports equipment and
materiel. Financing the activities related to
physical training and sports in all NATO
member countries is ensured by the army
and in some countries subsides are also
accepted.
Analyzing all the above, we infer
that the development of both military and
civilian personnel working in the field of
physical training and sports is undertaken
or concluded in special institutions of the
army. Thus, they ensure the specialists
needed competences for developing the
dynamic qualities specific to military
personnel in general and fighters in
particular, contributing to improving their
health and recovering their capacity of
effort in the shortest time possible. At the
same time, special attention is given to
strengthening the cohesion within military
communities and the connections with
civil society through sports.
At the same time, the licensed
specialists in these countries are those
who, starting from experiments and
research studies, establish laws, principles,
means and methods, procedures, standards
and ways of reaching them. The specific
norms are included by them in rules,
regulations, orders, instructions, manuals
and
textbooks.
The
undergraduate
specialists (basic courses and courses of
development in military physical training
and sports) are those who run in a direct
manner all the activities in the field,
included in the programs of instruction of
all categories of military personnel7.
In conclusion, we can state the
following: the instruction process is run in
most cases by specialists in physical
training and / or sport; specialists are
trained in specific institutions (most of
them in military institutions); there is an

Vezi Ceascai V., Introducere n istoria educaiei

fizice militare, Editura Universitii Naionale de
Aprare Carol I, Bucureti, 2010, pp. 127-128.

342

Ibidem 6, p.129.

enormous importance given to activities of

physical training and sports for health, rest
and recuperation and, of course, for
personal training at the level requested by
each
position
separately;
sports
competitions are means of creating and
developing qualities specifically needed on
the battle field: will power, courage,
initiative, team spirit and so on; the
organizational framework has to rely on
adequate support.
The desire for continuously
increasing the professional character of the
Romanian armed forces as well as
acceding to the standards in the other
modern armies, members of the same
military alliance, has to determine decision
makers to pay special attention to the way
in which the physical, moral, intellectual,
psychological, and functional profiles of
the fighter are managed, as well as those of
professional military personnel in general
and the management of these parameters
can only be attained by very well prepared
specialists.
Physical training by the available
means and by these we mean physical
exercises and the multitude of their types
demonstrates the important role it holds in

maintaining the level of skills and

especially the soldiers health, so as at any
moment to be able to successfully
accomplish their specific missions. A
crucial factor in the instructionaleducational process, physical training
shows its usefulness by the curricula
applied, the ways to achieve them, the
specialists in the field and their training,
the material means, the motivation, and
last but not least the results obtained.
Bibliography
1.

2.
3.

4.

343

Ceascai, V., Introducere n istoria

educaiei fizice militare, Editura
Universitii Naionale de Aprare
Carol I, Bucureti, 2010.
Kiriescu C., PALESTRICA, Editura
Uniunii de Cultur Fizic i Sport,
Bucureti, 1964.
Loghin, M., Pregtirea fizic,
condiie i premis de cretere a
capacitii de lupt a armatei,
Editura
Printech,
Bucureti,
Bucureti, 2001.
*** Concepia de educaie fizic i
sport
n
Armata Romniei,
Bucureti, 2001.

THE EURO-ATLANTIC ADAPTION OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

STRATEGIES TYPE HARD TO SOFT COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
IN PREVENTING AND MANAGING CONFLICTS
Oana Mihaela VLADU
Associate Researcher, International Maritime Geostrategic Observatory, Paris,
Phd student, Carol I National Defence University, Bucharest
oana vladu 20@yahoo.com
Abstract: This article is a brief introduction on the international Euro-Atlantic vision and the way in which it
manages crises and conflict from the soft coprehensive point of view. We will analyze the current security
challenges that require the need for close cooperation at both national and international level, those that will
combine civilian and military resources, in order to coordinate the measures that are to be taken. The effective
implementation of the Euro-Atlantic strategies require cooperation and contribution of actors, with a shared
sense of openness and determination.
Keywords: Euro-Atlantic strategy, military intervention, comprehensive approach, prevention and management
of conflicts.

The
comprehensive
approach
involves applying a metodology that aimes
at the implementation of some shared
principles and processes of collaboration
that amplifies the perspective of good
results on long term over the domaines of
politics, security, diplomacy, economy,
justice and human rights, in the borders of
the EU and beyond it. Actors like UN and
EU play a key part in future crises
management. likewise other european
bodies and NATO must focuse on the
development of the relations between
institutions. This means more tightened
bonds and continuing cooperation at
several levels of operational strategy.
NATO has proven itself as a key part actor
in the UN and EU operations and it seems
like in the future its role will be bigger .

Today's security challenges require

cooperation at national and international
level to combine civilian and military
resources, and coordinated measures. The
efficient application of this comprehensive
approach requires the cooperation and
contribution of all actors, with a shared
sense of openness and determination. The
international organizations involved in
some complex missions in the recent years
have tried to rethink the balance between
military and non- military instruments as a
result of learned lessons in operations such
as the ones conducted in Afghanistan,
Kosovo and Iraq.
The
origin
of
NATO's
comprehensive approach is due to the big
experience that the organization has and
shows that conflict management requires
the application of all elements of national
power and international such as political,
diplomatic,
economic,
financial,
informational, social, cultural, commercial,
and military.
Recognizing this challenge, NATO
has taken the first step towards a
comprehensive approach that allows
collaboration between all elements, both
civilian and military, and has developed an
action plan for its implementation. Many

Generalities
The term of comprehensive
approch has been spoken in scientific
terms and has been theorized for the first
time at a NATO summit at the proposal of
some allied members coordinated by
Denmark.
Today the actors of the
international environment can apply it.

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countries have rallied and have undertaken

major efforts to achieve this objective,
based on the experiences and lessons
learned.
Multinational actors (such as the
UN, NATO, EU) and national states try to
develop new concepts for a comprehensive
approach to crisis management. I mention
here common concepts and models, of
which the most important are the
comprehensive approach MNE5,, (EBAO)
"and the ,, concept of integrated missions"
of the UN. An example of this is the
comprehensive approach action plan
adopted at the NATO Bucharest Summit in
April 2008 where it was stated that,,
security threats nowadays can not be
managed successfully by NATO acting
alone" . Instead, the Alliance should
realize,, a broad partnership based on
shared sense of openness and cooperation"
. Furthermore the NATO leaders have
promoted a vision that underlined that the
experiences in Afghanistan and the
Balkans demonstrate the importance of
cooperation of the international community
must work together and take a
comprehensive approach in order to
successfully cope with the security
challenges of today and tomorrow . The
effective
implementation
of
a
comprehensive approach requires the
cooperation and contribution of all major
actors, including local NGOs and local
bodies. For this purpose it is essential for
all international actors to act in a
coordinated manner and to apply a wide
spectrum of both civil and military
instruments. In Bucharest, NATO leaders
approved an Action Plan because they
believe that the comprehensive approach
on long-term will give the Member States
the chance to submit pragmatic proposals
based on four pillars: (1) planning and
conducting operations; (2) lessons learned,
training, education and exercises; (3)
strengthening cooperation with external
actors; and (4) public messages. From the
perspective of NATO this is not a
discontinuity factor because after the Cold
War, NATO has constantly changed its
structure and missions in order to meet the
security interests of members with the

purpose of collective defense. NATO has

been continuously involved in crisis
management operations, at first in the
Balkans and after that in the Mediterranean
Sea, Africa and Afghanistan and now
between Ukraine and Russia. In these
critical operations at sea and air
participated thousands of troops that were
dislocated beyond NATO borders. These
operations had given NATO the expertise
in strategic sustainability and in the
architecture of complex multinational
command and control operations. In short,
NATO has multinational military resources
for crisis and conflict prevention while it
maintains the commitment to territorial
defense in acordance with the Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty, as demonstrated in
September 2001. NATO can not go back.
The Alliance must continue to adapt both
politically and institutionally as a transforce action when crises or conflicts
threaten the collective interests. It must
become a credible player, because it has
been working within the comprehensive
approach to the conflict in the Balkans,
Afghanistan, Ukraine and Russia. The
Alliance gained sufficient experience since
1995 to operate more efficiently within the
comprehensive
approach
to
crisis
management.
At the European Union level,
national initiatives for cooperation between
military and civilian actors have exceeded
early stage of development. The need for
cooperation, information sharing, finding
long-term solutions and a shared vision are
acknowledged. The European Union, like
other actors in the field of crisis
management, is faceing the global problem
of how to generate greater coherence
between civil and military actions. The EU
developed the concept of coordinating
arrangement (CCA) for emergency and
crisis, which refers to the internal
processes of EU civil military policy in the
European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP), as well as civil-civil processes of
the common foreign and security policy
(CFSP) and the Commission's powers.
This, according to several authors,
is a series of distinct challenges: How to
better coordinate civilian and military

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crisis management instruments the in EU

through the CFSP; which is the way to
achieve greater coherence between ESDP
and activities that are planned and
implemented by the Commission; how to
align EU Member States; national
perspectives and how to improve
cooperation between the EU and other
actors such as the UN, OSCE and NATO.
In addition, in the context of CFSP / ESDP
EU developed the concept of Civil Military
Cooperation (CMCO) which addresses the
need for effective coordination of actions
of all relevant actors in the EU involved in
planning and subsequent implementation
of ESDP operations.
At the level of action - the case of
EU force in Chad is probably the best
example of CA. This EU operation is
conducted in close cooperation with the
UN operation MINURCAT, and is mostly
financed by the Commission Instrument of
Stability. EUFOR Chad / RCA is a
multinational EU operation conducted in
Africa and its main goali is to protect the
refugee camps near the border of Sudan /
Darfur. Regardless the success of EUFOR
Chad / RCA, the EU will need time to
develop its capabilities further. The major
advantage is given by bringing together the
necessary tools and elimination of the last

stakeholders. The culture of cooperation

should be based on communication at
institutional and personal levels. Adopting
a new culture of security is also a key
objective in crisis management training.
Current training methods do not
create a sufficient volume and further
progress is still needed, especially in civilmilitary training. The focus should be
primarily in the future on training,
cooperation, practice, common culture and
teaching methods. The EU has started
developing systematic methods for
engaging
with
NGOs
in
crisis
management. On regular basis are held
informal exchanges between NGOs / CSOs
and the appropriate bodies of the Council,
in particular the Committee for Civilian
Aspects of Crisis Management. The factfinding and pre-planning of the missions
must take into account, where appropriate,
the expertise of NGOs and CSOs. Liaison
officers between NGO / CSO must be
identified within the Council Secretariate
with the aim to strengthen the capacity of
dialogue with civil agencies, NGOs and
CSOs.
The five dimensions of the
comprehensive approach clearly reflect
these trends showed in the theoretical
approach presented below:

remains of internal institutional rivalries.

The premises are in the background of the
progress and in the culture of cooperation
and information / exchange between

For every mission that is carried

out, it is vital to secure a political
agreement concerning the strategic

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objectives. For example, there are some

operations like ISAF in Afghanistan in
which mechanisms were established for
determining
objectives,
roles
and
contributions (North Atlantic Council and
Council) that were implemented from
beginning in the theater of operations, but
which should be well used. It is very
important that NATO and other
organizations clarify the distribution of
tasks when they are working together in
order to manage conflict situations. The
Alliance should develop and cooperate
with neighboring countries and regional
institutional frameworks.
I consider that it is necessary to
present the partnership created between
NATO and Ukraine, initiated in 1997. The
Charter on a Distinctive Partnership is the
formal basis of these relations and it was
established by the NATO-Ukraine
Commission (NUC) and the Declaration
supplementing the Charter (2009). In
September 2014 a meeting was held where
the NATO-Ukraine Commission met. The
heads of state and government of NATO
met with Ukrainian President P.
Poroshenko.
Here a joint declaration was agreed
that reaffirms allied support for Ukraine's
sovereignty and territorial integrity and for
its internationally recognized borders. It is
also illegal and illegitimate and
condemned the annexation of Crimea by
Russia and the action / actions of Russia
that are persistent and deliberate to
destabilize eastern Ukraine, which
constitutes a violation of international law.
Allies had pleged to support the efforts of
the Ukrainian government, that without
external interference, are engaging in a
political way to fulfill the aspirations of the
population in all regions of Ukraine.1
Within NATO-Ukraine Partnership,
the Allies have committed to support the
consolidation of the security and defense
sectors through an Annual National
1

http://nato.mae.ro/node/269,
7.06.2015, ora 10.00

accesat

Programme and to develop programs and

the building of capabilities. In this context
NATO-Ukraine Partnership is lunching
some new programs in the fields of
command, control, communications and
computers
(C4),
logistics
and
standardization, cyber defense, transition
from a military career / retraining of
military
personnel
and
strategic
communications. NATO will assist
Ukraine for restoration of injured military
personnel. At the same time, the Alliance
will increase the number of experts that are
at NATO offices in Kyiv.2
Ukraine, a former republic of the
USSR, has had a total dependence on
Russian gas which did not succeed to solve
major economic imbalances and failed to
reduce widespread corruption. ,, The
"federalization of Ukraine and annexation
of Crimea to Russia, the pro-Russian
nostalgia for the old structures of the
former Soviet Union and the Russia's
ardent desire to gain access to Black Sea
made possible the occupation of Crimea
without a fight. The desire of the proRussian population for separation from the
Ukrainian state, combined with the mixture
of Russian President Vladimir Putin into
Ukraine, directly or through oligarchs,
managed to destabilize its economy faster
than it can stabilize the US, EC IMF
Poor military capability (and the
number provided), poor military support,
direct or indirect involvement of
separatists and Russian intelligence
services made possible occupation of part
of Ukraine; The numerous attempts to
mediate the conflict in a comprehensive
approach note and the dialogue between
the belligerents led to the Agreement from
Minsk in February and to the following
developments.
In an attempt to restore the old
borders and its zones of influence, to
regain the lost influence with the Cold War
plus major concern about the desire of
Ukraine and Georgia to be accepted as

astazi
2

Ibidem 5

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members of NATO, its objections against

the economic sanctions imposed by the
West as a result of the occupation of
Crimea, NATO actions to place the missile
shield not far from its borders in Romania
and Poland, conducting military exercises
in the Black Sea with the participation of
forces from various countries of the
Alliance, Russia is now forced to look for
new alliances with China, Iran, India. In
addition, Russia hopes the forces opposing
the union of the Republic of Moldavia to
Romania play a greater role in the politics
of this country. Unprecedented deployment
to Russia's borders make it to be
increasingly more worried evidenced by
accusations brought against Romania,
Moldova, Poland and Bulgaria. Regaining
influence and power will alow Russia
again to be a major player in international
relations and to play an important role in
the new world order.
EU, NATO, US condemns Russia's
actions to seize new territories of the
former Soviet states by imposing economic
sanctions. Surprisingly unpleasant for the
Russian people is the boomerang effect on
the Russian economy made by the
destabilization carried out by Putin,
corroborated with the economic sanctions
and the extended collapse of the oil market
made a very important downturn and a
depreciation of the ruble, which led to
falling foreign exchange reserves of the
Russian Central Bank, from about $ 600
billion to less than half. Besides we can
add the current state of the naval base in
Crimea
which
requires
significant
investments in modernizing and bringing
to its current technological level.
Russia considers Romania, as a
result of its position and actions that
basically, it is a gradual transformation of
it into a support pivot for NATO and the
US near Russian borders, as stated by
spokesman Russian Foreign ministry,
Alexander Lukashevich. He warned that
there is a tendency to conclude that the
current authorities in Romania for the sake
of increasing importance in the eyes of

policy makers in other parts of the world

are willing to sacrifice maintaining
stability in the Black Sea region for tactical
reasons"
forgetting
that
attaching
themselves to Crimea they have attempted
to maintain this stability. NATO rejects
Russian accusations assuring, through the
voice of Carmen Romero, NATO
spokesman, and give guarantees that
Romania will be defended against any
threat, as a partner within NATO.
The situation in the Ukraine,
Russia, Moldova and Romania area is
tense and requires great diplomacy from
countries that are condemning Russia's
attitude and further efforts to restore a state
of normality in this part of the world.
Future developments
The major security crises that we
are witnessing today are merely symptoms
of the new era where we have just entered:
one of that is characterized by a major
power shift. First, the financial and
economic crisis led to a policy of austerity
and a group of countries want
reconfiguring of the power relations and on
the other side we have the group composed
of Member States of the European Union.
History teaches us that such an era goes
hand in hand with a series of conflicts.
There are not just some "events", but the
evolution of a system of international
relations crystallized. This geopolitical
return promises to us decades of turmoil
and even war. It seems that the only way
out is all the more structured international
cooperation. A return to a concept of
national state sovereignty versus forging
ad-hoc coalition will not generate any
result and will create geopolitical
conditions for the division of the continent.
Today, actors can solve tense situations
and geostrategic problems and this has
become a prerogative for countries the size
of a continent or political construction
which represents a continent. Therefore,
"Towards an even closer union" no longer
sounds like a fiction but rather as an

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imperative. It is a call for realism and a

pragmatic approach to create a unity of
effort.
Globally the focus is on strategic
partnerships. The US security concept
approach is characterized by continuity. In
the National Security Strategy published in
2015, we find the following phrase: "trade
power, increasing interdependence ... ..
power struggle underway in several
regions." They can be interpreted as the
US ambition to remain primus inter pares:
military, political and economic. But the
US do not want to be alone, and the US
call for partnerships with other countries
and allies and Europe is no longer seen as
"indispensable partner" in Asia. USA "is
and will remain a power in the Pacific" and
will continue to look at Asia region for
future opportunities without ignoring the
risk of escalating tensions in Asia Pacific.
After all, the global economic
center of gravity is moving away from
Europe. However, Europeans can enjoy a
privileged relationship with the US. NATO
is still considered by the US as a tool
which contributes to national security.
Now that the Alliance is once again
focused on collective defense, it recently
gave "reassurance" for its commitment to
Article 5 of us Europeans (and, indirectly,
to its partners in Asia).
For collective defense, NATO is
indispensable to the US and vital for
Europeans. As regards to crisis
management, it is clear that the US will
act, but selectively. US have no intention
of trying to solve all the problems of the
world. This is true for the Middle East,
Africa and even for some of Europe's
problems. Through NATO, USA are
looking at European countries to
participate
in
crisis
management
operations.
Indeed,
through
its
partnerships, the Alliance provides a
unique forum to create interoperability
with a number of countries around the
world.
However,
such
a
network
partnership could well open the way to

systematically establish ad hoc coalitions

outside NATO. This is not without
precedent. NATO is now at a moment of
transition from an Alliance to an
instrument?
Military operations and civil
missions
involving
CSDP
only
occasionally
generated
sustainable
solutions. As regards to the military
operations, field military objectives were
achieved every time, which is unique in the
world. However, the lack of a
comprehensive approach, especially the
lack of economic follow-up once the
military phase ended, explains the lack of
lasting results. Regarding civilian missions
or civil-military missions, especially those
aimed at reforming the security sector have
been generally limited to administering a
homeopathic doses when in fact it took a
complex of real actions and the results are
known. From a politic point of view this
gives the impression that the CSDP acting
on a (well-intentioned) boy-scout approach
as opposed to a global strategy. The direct
result is a feeling of frustration from the
Member States that remain unable to solve
shortcomings in military capabilities
usually associated to an inability to be able
to develop an appropriate cost-sharing
mechanism. Other complaints are that the
Member States are still unable to solve the
identified shortcomings usually military
capabilities, from not being able to develop
a mechanism of cost sharing practices, and
the inability of the EU to act preventively,
due to lack of planning capacities and
inadequate arrangements to set up a
headquarters.
A persistent lack of consensus
among Member States on the use of force
is often invoked as grounds for any further
development of CSDP like unnecessary.
However, convergence is ongoing. At first,
the so-called neutral countries, CSDP has
always been considered to be complete in
accordance with their policy. These
countries, with their experience in UN
operations - peacekeepers have made
contributions to the CSDP operations right

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from the start. Germany, one of the largest

Member States, within a relatively short
time has had historical initiatives, starting
from the limitation of operating only under
Article NATO 5 to take part both in
operations
for
crisis
management
conducted by NATO and EU. Currently,
Germany is in a position to take the lead in
some projects designed to improve defense
cooperation through the concept of a
multinational framework. The key to
understand this concept is to ensure that
when it comes to action will involve all
nations..
An important step to integrate the
entire spectrum of internal and external
dimensions of security and defense was
taken. Together with the EDA, the
Commission should develop policies to
support European defense industry. With
regard to dual-use systems in the future,
the Commission may often be a client,
among others. Specific programs to
address shortcomings strategic capabilities
will now be discussed by heads of state
and government. In short, the process
began with defense issues, and it will
affect the integration process of the
European Union.

suggestions described in this chapter. The

ultimate goal is to work together in all
phases of response. This will mean closer
and continuous ties at several levels of
operational strategy. NATO has emerged
as a major contributor to UN operations
and a strong partner in operations of the
EU; the trend is that this cooperation will
continue in the future and may also
increase.
NATO's comprehensive approach
and its practical implementation in peace
operations from Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc.,
have become an integral part of crisis
response strategy of the Alliance. We must
be aware that the use of weapons leads to
irreversible damage in areas of conflict
which requires continuous development of
cooperation between all international
actors. Therefore comprehensive approach
may become also central to future
cooperation between the international
communities.
Bibliography
1.

2.

Conclusions
The
comprehensive
approach
includes today's international environment
actors in crisis management and conflict.
Today's security challenges require close
cooperation at both national and
international level in order to combine
civilian and military resources and
coordinating measures that are to be taken.
The effective implementation of this
comprehensive approach requires the
cooperation and contribution of all major
actors, with a shared sense of openness and
determination.
Others, such as UN and the EU are
already playing an important role in
responding to future crises. NATO must
focus on developing relationships with
these institutions above all, from the

3.

4.

Daniel Hamilton, Charles Bazzy

'Alliance Revives: An Atlantic
Compact for the XXI Century "
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
consists of twenty-six NATO
members and twenty-four partner
countries:
Albania,
Armenia,
Austria,
Azerbaijan,
Belarus,
Bosnia and Montenegro, Russia,
Serbia,
Sweden,
Switzerland,
Macedonia,
Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan,
Ukraine,
and
Uzbekistan.
In 1994 NATO dialogue with the
NATO Mediterranean countries are
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Mauritania, Tunisia.
Berlin Plus Agreement, which was
established in the EU-NATO
Declaration on the European
security and defense policy in
December 2002, built on prior

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5.

This work was made possible through

financial support provided through the
Sectoral Operational Programme Human
Resources Development 2007-2013, cofinanced by the European Social Fund, the
project HRD / 159 / 1.5 / S / 138822,
entitled
"Transnational
Networks
Integrated Management Doctoral Research
and postdoctoral studies in the field of
Intelligent Military Science,, ",, and
information Security" and,, Public Order
and National Security "- training program
for elite researchers -,, SmartSPODAS '."

decisions of NATO, the European

Defense Initiative 1996 Berlin and
1999 Summit in Washington
NATO and made possible the use
of NATO assets by the EU and vice
versa.
Hans Binnendijk and Patrick
Cronin, eds, civil Surge: ,, The key
complex operations "(Washington,
DC: National Defense University
Press, 2008).

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THE LEGITIMACY OF PREVENTION AND EURO -ATLANTIC

INTERVENTION ETHICS IN CRISIS AND CONFLICT SITUATIONS
Oana Mihaela VLADU
Associate Researcher, International Maritime Geostrategic Observatory, Paris,
Phd student, Carol I National Defence University, Bucharest
oana vladu 20@yahoo.com

Abstract: New crises affecting global security environment and in particular the refugee crisis raised a number
of questions on how European agenda adapts in order to prevent humanitarian crisis and how Europe is
involved in crisis and conflict prevention. From this perspective a number of measures that the European Union
has taken so far are reviewed and analysed and briefly described a series of short-term effects that may appear
at the level of national states.
Keywords: refugee crisis, legitimacy, humanitarian intervention.

The European Union is constantly

confronted with the issue of the legitimacy
of its actions because the principles that
guide it are democratic. European leaders
must obtain the consent of all members in
decision making and in developing
strategies in the short, medium and long
validation process of internal procedures.
Some situations allow timely decisions
without full consensus, but the majority of
its members.
The late conflict occurring in Syria
is now ongoing since five years and
generating an overwhelming humanitarian
crisis. Millions of people need emergency
assistance, such as medical care, food,
water and shelter. The European Union has
been actively intervening in the region to
allow humanitarian organizations to reach
war-affected victims. Treatment and
evacuation of wounded is a priority and
civilians managed to escape from the
conflict area are in need of emergency
assistance
and
protection.
Beyond
subsistence needs, there are all kinds of
shortcomings affecting the civilian
population, including the lack of fuel.
The continuous flow of Syrians
seeking safety in neighbouring countries
brought in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq,
Egypt and North Africa region a large
number of refugees reaching to dangerous

levels of saturation. These neighbouring

countries need support to maintain open
borders and to provide emergency
assistance to refugees. UN estimated 12.2
million of persons need humanitarian aid
inside Syria. From those, 4.6 million
persons are in hard accessible and/or
sieged areas, 7,600,000 persons are
estimated by the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA), are internally displaced.
Also, the number of registered refugees or
under registration process is 4,088,099,
from whom: in Lebanon 1,113,941
persons; Turkey 1,938,999 persons,
Jordan 629,266 persons, Iraq 249,463
persons, Egypt and North Africa 156,375
persons1. There are estimates over 300,000
refugees arrived only in Germany and their
number will increase in the next period.
Through its partners, the European
Commission is involved in helping
refugees humanitarian programs that
provide food and drinking water, non-food,
shelter, emergency medical care and
protection. EU calls for respect of
international humanitarian law (IHL),
protection of civilians, particularly
1

Syria crisis, European Commission, 14.09.2015,

available
at:
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/
aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf#view=fit,
accessed on 15.10.2015.

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diplomatically2.To protect what? To

protect the core values that rank jus
cogens3. Are not right to life, physical
integrity, the prohibition of torture covered
of jus cogens rules? They have an
unquestionable status, so much so that
international instruments on human rights,
European Convention on Human Rights
i.e. protects them through surrender clause
(power suspension in case of war of all
human rights, except the right to life4 and
integrity of the individual). Thus, they are
absolute rights, for which they conclude
that belong from jus cogens. Thus,
according to the data of ICJ solution on
where Yugoslavia invoked art. 36,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, Art. 9 of the
Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of
violations of the obligation not to use force
and the Convention on Conciliation and
Arbitration
between
Belgium
and
Yugoslavia signed in 1930 against
Belgium and other NATO member states
that participated in the bombings, the
Court rejected the request for establishing
peremptory measures by 12 votes 4
against5. So, NATO legality of the use of
force was justified as an intervention to
protect the fundamental values enshrined
in jus cogens and prevent an impending
disaster.
So, to summarize, whether it is
floods in Macedonia (FYROM), the

children and women, and condemn all

indiscriminate attacks on civilians by all
parties to the conflict. The EU also calls
for all parties to the conflict to allow
unimpeded
humanitarian
access,
depending on the lines of conflict and
border to ensure the safe delivery of
humanitarian aid and achieving health care
for all people in need.
The EU is the main donor
involving in response to the crisis in Syria
more than 4,2 billion of the total budget
mobilized collectively, by the Commission
and the Member States for humanitarian
aid, development assistance and economic
stabilization. The Commission has
announced that it will increase the
humanitarian assistance given the crisis in
Syria, Iraq to 200 million , to meet the
needs inside Syria and Iraq, and to meet
the needs of the Syrians and Iraqi refugees
and the host communities neighbouring
countries. This additional funding will go
towards covering the deficit of funds to the
Syrian crisis and providing immediate
resources for humanitarian organizations
operating inside Syria and in neighbouring
countries.
Syria is not the only conflict in
which the EU was involved but this time
addressing a shift from hard to soft
approach although a different approach
was also possible. The legal bases of this
type of crisis intervention were clarified
recently by the International Court of
Justice. Initially, Belgium was the only
member NATO Operation Allied Force
claimed it was a legitimate one initiated by
exercising a customary right of
humanitarian intervention.
NATO was acknowledged in the
Security Council resolutions that felt
obliged to intervene in Kosovo to prevent a
humanitarian catastrophe underway in a
territory that more than a year unfolding
struggle and international efforts failed in
attempt
to
solve
the
conflict

The Kosovo Air Campaign (Archived),Operation

Allied
Force,
13.10.2015,
available
at:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49602.ht
m, accessed on 15.10.2015.
3
Peremptory
norm,
available
at:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peremptory_norm,
accessed on 15.10.2015.
4
Art. 2, Convenia european a drepturilor omului,
amendat de Protocoalele nr. 11 i 14, nsoit de
Protocolul adiional i de Protocoalele nr. 4, 6, 7, 12
i 13, actualizat la 1 iunie 2010.
5
Supplement to the application of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia against kingdom of Belgium
for violation of the obligation not to use force,
available
at:
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/105/13593.pdf, accessed on 15.10.2015.

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earthquake in Chile, free access to conflict

areas in Syria and Ukraine, the assistance
provided to children affected by Ebola in
Africa, the peace process in South Sudan6,
EU one that implies to protect life.
Furthermore, the EU focuses on those
immigrants
who
arrived
on
its
territory.European Agenda for Migration7
was launched in May 2015 and aims to
showcase the need for comprehensive
approach to migration management:
addressing the immediate crisis, actions
inside and outside the EU to reshape how
the organization fulfils its obligations
towards those who need protection to help
the most affected Member States to
enforce the obligations of international and
EU asylum to help return those who do not
need protection in their home countries, to
manage external borders and to address
root causes on people's motivation to
engage in dangerous journeys to Europe
and establish long term and the degree of
need for labour supply from Europe via
legal migration.
Implementation of Agenda began
by re-locating 160,000 people who needed
protection to other European countries. EU
funds have been mobilized to support
Member States most affected by the
allocation of more than 75 million in
emergency funds and multiannual funding

allocated in 2014-2015 to support efforts in

the field of migration, refugees and border
management.
On June 22, 2015, a crisis
management operation (EUNAVFOR
MED)8 was launched to fight against
human trafficking activities in the southern
Mediterranean. On September 14, 2015,
the Member States agreed to move to the
second phase operation9, after a first phase
of data collection. This transition will
allow the EU to launch major naval
operation aimed at tackling, search, seizure
of offshore vessels suspected of being used
for human trafficking or other forms of
trafficking as defined in international law.
Over 22,000 people who are still outside
the EU will be relocated in Europe, to
mention here the case of Ireland which will
receive an additional 2,900 refugees10
under agreements and negotiations.
EU Civil Protection Mechanism
was amended and now allows the
cooperation in case of emergency of 33
European countries (28 EU Member
States, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway,
Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia) and also allowed accession
and countries outside Europe. Turkey
recently signed the agreement to officially
8

EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA, available

at:
http://eeas.
europa.eu/csdp/missions-andoperations/eunavfor-med/index_en.htm, accessed
on 14.10.2015.
9
EUNAVFOR Med: Council adopts a positive
assessment on the conditions to move to the first
step of phase 2 on the high seas, 14.09.2015,
available
at:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/ 2015/09/14-eunavfor-medcouncil-adopts-positive-assessment-on-conditionsto-move-to-first-step-of-phase-2-on-high-seas/,
accessed on 14.10.2015.
10
Communication to the European Parliament, the
European Council and the Council Managing the
refugee crisis: immediate operational, budgetary
and legal measures under the European Agenda on
Migration, 23.09.2015, p. 4, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-wedo/policies/european-agenda-migration/ proposalimplementation-package/docs/communication_on_
managing_the_refugee_crisis_en.pdf, accessed on
15.10.2015.

Tipurile de ajutor oferite de UE prin Comisia

Europan sunt cele prezentate la: Humanitarian Aid
and
Civil
Protection,
available
at:
http://ec.europa.eu/geninfo/query/index.do?filterNu
m=1&queryText=floods&query_source=ECHO&s
ummary=summary&more_options_source=restricte
d&more_options_date=*&more_options_date_fro
m=&more_options_date_to=&more_options_langu
age=en&more_options_f_formats=*&swlang=en,
accessed on14.10.2015.
7
Communication from the Commission to the
European
Parliament,
the
Council,
the
EUROPEAN economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, European Agenda
for Migration, Bruxelles, 13.05.2015, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-wedo/policies/european-agenda-migration/
background-information/docs/communication
_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf,
accessed on 14.10.2015.

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join the mechanism. These participating

countries jointly discuss resources which
may be available to them in other countries
around the globe. European Commission
manages the Mechanism through the
Centre of emergency coordination. The
United Nations and some international
organizations such as the International
Organization for Migration may also
activate the mechanism to require
assistance in non-EU countries. In 2015,
this mechanism has been activated twice to
at the request of Hungary and once of
Serbia. EU Member States may require the
deployment of Rapid Border Intervention
Teams - RABIT to provide immediate
support in case of migration to the border
police. It is important to note that this
mechanism has been activated only in
2010 by Greece.This initiative is linked to
the reintroduction of border control
between Schengen states and a diplomatic
initiative on the role of the EU External
Action Service on the refugee crisis in
Europe11.
Relevant activities on the subject of
migration are Valleta Summit on
Migration (November 11 to 12, 2015) with
a role in managing Europe's relationship
with Africa and October 8, 2015
Conference on migration routes of the
Western Balkans that aims tackling illegal
immigration. Other concerns of the EU on
migration issues are related to increase the
funding for emergency most affected
Member States with 100 million in 2015
and are following also other support
measures to take place in the next six
months. EU prepares for emergency
funding increased the most affected
Member States and funding for
FRONTEX, EUROPOL and EASO with
600 million for 2016. Moreover, 200
million of EU funding for humanitarian
aid will be mobilized in 2015 for direct
support of refugees and the Fund will seek
financial support for Syria to over 500
million from the EU budget, the amount
11

covered by the Member States while

revising / allocation of EU funds (up to 1
billion euros) for refugees in Turkey. It
also provides for the mobilization of 17
million for Serbia and the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Conclusions
Short-term measures needed to
tackle the immediate crisis is not a long
term solution. For that very reason, the
Lisbon Treaty provided the development
of a common asylum system. Now it must
be implemented not only for the purposes
of measures that states have already
agreed, but also to speed up work on the
remaining components to create a truly
European system.
The policies needed to achieve a
successful migration management are
inextricably linked. The shortcomings in
the management of external borders
produce pressure on the asylum system.
Deficiencies in identifying and registering
immigrants block migration system as a
whole. Low success rate in the return of
migrants who are not eligible to remain in
the EU creates tension on the amount of
decisions on asylum and frustration in
member countries. There is an inability to
address the root causes of migration and to
alleviate the pressure from outside the EU
which creates major problems for the EU.
Therefore, action is needed in the
following fields:
- Ensuring that the common
European asylum system is a guarantee
that Europe has an obligation to help
people who need international temporary
or permanent protection, and that the
fundamental rights of migrants are
respected. It must remain at the heart of
what we are trying to achieve. However,
the pressure on the system this year has
shown the need to review the EU's Dublin
Regulation no. 604/2013 of 26 June 2013
establishing the criteria and mechanisms
for determining the Member State
responsible for examining an application

Idem.

Proiect cofinanat din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operaional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor
Umane 2007-2013 Investete n OAMENI

355

for international protection lodged in one

of the Member States to a third country or
a stateless person12, and to ensure its full
implementation;
- Achieving an ordinated and
balanced system to allow asylum seekers
to work in the Member States;
- Setting up an EU system for the
recognition of safe countries of origin in
asylum procedures, following the model
proposed by the European Commission for
the countries of the Western Balkans and
Turkey;
- Issuing an amendment to
establish a mechanism to allow the
resettlement of persons in need of
international protection clearly in crisis
without jeopardizing the application of the
Dublin system. In this regard, the
following measures are envisaged:
- To establish of a European
coastguard;
- To extend the mandate of
FRONTEX (December 2015);
- To elaborate the Legal Migration
Package, inclusively to revise the Blue
Card (March 2016);
- To continue the reform of Dublin
Regulation (March 2016);
- To propose the achievement of a
system structured on resettlement (March
2016);
- To update the Strategy of human
being trafficking (March 2016).
We can say that Europe recognizes
the issue of migration and system
developments was fast and efficient to a
point. The comprehensive approach
includes international environmental actors
which should be involved in activities in
crisis management and conflict and must
provide a coherent response to security
challenges. It also requires close
cooperation at national and international
level, combining civilian and military

resources and coordinate measures taken.

In the future, the effective implementation
of this comprehensive approach requires
the cooperation and contribution of actors
with a shared sense of openness and
determination.
Bibliography
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
12

Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European

Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013,
available
at:http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/RO/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0603&
from=RO, accessed on 14.10.2015.

European Convention on Human

Rights amended by Protocols 11
and 14, with the Additional
Protocol and Protocols 4, 6, 7, 12
and 13, updated in June 1, 2010.
Supplement to the application of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
against kingdom of Belgium for
violation of the obligation not to
use force.
Communication
from
the
Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the
European economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, European Agenda for
Migration, Bruxelles, 13.05.2015.
Communication to the European
Parliament, the European Council
and the Council Managing the
refugee
crisis:
immediate
operational, budgetary and legal
measures under the European
Agenda on Migration, 23.09.2015.
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of
the European Parliament and of
the Council of 26 June 2013.
Official
site
of
European
Commission: http://ec.europa.eu
Official
site
of
NATO,
www.nato.int
Wikipedia
site,
https://en.wikipedia.org
Official site of External European
Action
Service,
http://eeas.europa.eu
Official site of European Council,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu.

Proiect cofinanat din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operaional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor
Umane 2007-2013 Investete n OAMENI

356

This work was made possible through

financial support provided through the
Sectoral
Operational
Programme
Human Resources Development 20072013, co-financed by the European
Social Fund, the project HRD / 159 /
1.5/S/138822, entitled "Transnational
Networks Integrated Management

Doctoral Research and postdoctoral

studies in the field of Intelligent
Military Science,, ",, and information
Security" and,, Public Order and
National Security "- training program
for
elite
researchers
,,SmartSPODAS'."

Proiect cofinanat din Fondul Social European prin Programul Operaional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor
Umane 2007-2013 Investete n OAMENI

357

DETERMINING FACTORS IN PLANNING THE COMMUNICATIONS

AND INFORMATION SYSTEM IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
Petric-Marinel VOICU
PhD Student, Carol I National Defence University
marivoc@hotmail.com

Abstract: Only through detailed knowledge of planning elements and data communications system and its
determining factors, can one achieve the communications and IT support needed for performing the command
and control of the joint forces engaged in operation. In order to ensure the interoperability of forces
participating in such missions, in training for mission particular emphasis should be placed on training the
planning staff and the communications and IT personnel with responsibilities in planning and organizing the
communication system specific to the respective operation.
Keywords: interoperability, communication and information system, training, planning, determining factors.

doctrine,
operating
standards
and
willingness to provide information which,
in an operational environment, can cause
confusion and interoperability issues.
Once JFC establishes the specific
organization of C2 for a multinational or
joint operation, information exchange
requirements (IER) are established
together with the beginning of the
planning process of the communications
and IT system.
The
planning
requirements
include:
electromagnetic
spectrum
management, equipment compatibility,
procedural cryptographic compatibility
and information security (INFOSEC),
identification as friend or foe, as well as
data transmission protocols.
In establishing the architecture for
combined (multinational) communications
and IT system, commanders at all levels
and planners must take into account
several factors1, such as:
immediate identification of
common mission, when and with
who; adapting networks to meet the
dynamic information exchange in

Aspects regarding planning in the

communication and information system
in multinational operations
Information assurance (IA)
involves activities of protection, detection,
response, restoration, as well as
capabilities of reaction specific for
protecting and preserving specific
information and the infrastructure through
which it moves the communication and
information system. Computer Network
Defense (CND), designed for IA, is
focused on action and protection,
monitoring, analysis, detection and
response to unauthorized access to DOD
computer networks. Planning CNDs is a
vital part of the strategy of defense and is
extremely important for the success of the
mission.
Operation
of
multinational
communications and IT system
This system can be achieved by
allied partners and/or coalition. Coalitions
may be composed of various security
groups and information exchange
media. Multinational forces may face
problems regarding constructive and
compatibility
differences
of
the
communications and IT systems, with
respect
to
language,
terminology,

Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communication

System, 2010, accessed on http://www.dtic.
mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp6_0.pdf, on 15/08/2015
23.20, p. III-8.

358

operation in unknown combat conditions,

in a multinational environment;
understanding the mission,
intent and concept of the commander of
the operation; different phases of a
multinational operation require different
levels of support from the communication
and information system;
acquiring detailed knowledge of
the multinational structure and the
relationships among its components.
Considering the fact that
communication and information system
planning is part of the Joint Force
planning, commanders at all levels and
planners must be able to2:
understand the phenomenon,
wait, anticipate and be prepared to cope
with changes in its dynamics;
know in detail the capabilities
and limitations of system resources and
data communications at strategic,
operational and tactical levels;
identify the communications
and IT system requirements that exceed
the capabilities of the Joint Force and
coordinate
their
insurance
(electromagnetic spectrum, equipment or
connection) through appropriate ways and
channels of connection when required by
the host nation;
make sure of the acquisition of
communication and information systems
capacities, namely of the operating
procedures;
employ compatible operating
systems to ensure interoperability; United
States are ready to provide technical
resources for coalition partners to achieve
this status;
establish and manage an
interface between incompatible data
communications systems through a
combination of hardware, software and
TTP so as to ensure interoperability;
establish basic communication
links (voice and / or data) and ensure unity
of effort by using TTP and couriers.
2

Determining factors in communication

and IT system planning
J-6 must be engaged even from the
beginning of the overall process of
planning the operation of communications
and information. They must understand
and assimilate in detail the concept of the
operation, and when the situation requires
it, they must be able to advise JFC during
the entire period of the planning process.
Feasibility and appropriateness of
the plan to meet the information
requirements of JFC are also important
factors for planning a communication and
information system. The most important
step is to constantly assess the plan of
achieving the communication and
information system for the entire duration
of the planning process, in order to bring
the necessary adjustments and to reach the
principles and needs of the connected
system.
Although communication and
information system planning is conducted
in the same place with the planning staff
of the other elements of the Joint Force in
reality communication and information
system planners must anticipate user
requirements in all phases of joint
operations. Every aspect of joint
operations depends on the direct
knowledge and understanding of the
special task. Plans and support through
communication and information system
should develop gradually, in a continuous
way, and be operated to meet the JFC
mission in its evolution continues.
Other factors that are considered
during the process of planning
communication and information system
are the following:
The organic communication and
information system resources. Just like
units, they are assigned to the mission,
which implies a rapid assessment of
available
resources
and
data
communications system according to the
organic requirements. The objective is to
maintain communication and information

Joint Publication 6-0, op. cit., pp. III-9.

359

system organic resources intact, although

there are situations in which such an
objective
is
impossible
to
be
reached. Throughout the planning process,
the planner must pursue communication
and information system resources
organically from each unit and staff (HQ).
In a certain scenario in which a
commander of the Joint Force component
is designated JFC, the organic resources
of the data communication system of this
component will be augmented by other
components of the Joint Force in order to
facilitate the establishment and satisfying
of common requirements.
The practical support system
developed by communications and
computer science. As far as possible, to
support mission SIC planners should rely
on joint standards and TTP (tactics,
techniques and procedures). In a complex
networking environment, unexpected
changes and new approaches can have
significant consequences if not planned
and fully tested. Training, exercises,
demonstrations, lessons learned from
experience and results are some of the
elements that identify what works and
what does not work. As for current
operations planning, conservative results
brainstorming,
exercises,
drills,
demonstrations and experiments, they are
capitalized in accomplishing the current
mission.
The flow of forces and dynamics
while implementing data (TPFDD). JFC
prioritizes the flow of units dynamics in
theaters of operations. Communication
and information system planners should
monitor and prioritize the flow of
structures that are designed to carry it out,
as well as the personnel and equipment for
C2 support of forces in the area of
operations.
Reception, simulation, forward
movement and integration (JRSOI).
Planners must organize communications
and support during JRSOI. The limited
organic resources of communications and
IT system will be used during this phase.

Joint Force planners will coordinate with

their components to provide the required
support of communication and IT.
The gradual increase in the
capacity of communication and IT
(incremental building). Since military
operations rarely occur in the same
location with respect to the preponderance
of military forces, JFC planners must
claim the gradual building of CIS. For the
transmission of information between
commanders and staffs (HQ), most
operations are based initially on the
SATCOM and, subsequently, in order to
ensure C2 capabilities, planners provide
voice, data and video services. As
operations go on and grow in complexity
DISN connections and commercial
networks are becoming more extensive
and robust. Also, with the completion of
the operation, the communication and IT
system must be uninstalled / redistributed
gradually.
Modular packages. Starting from
the mission, the commanders intention,
the OPLAN, the capacities, limitations
and availability of equipment, as well as
from the communication infrastructure in
the area of operations, planners can build
modular
packages
to
meet
the
communications needs of the commander.
Depending on the existing conditions and
the link, planners can manage these
packages so as to adapt and connect the
modules of individual communications
systems in a common communication
system.
Interoperability
should
be
achieved primarily through a similarity of
equipment, software, communications and
computing systems, respectively. Planners
must know the capabilities and limitations
of other components of CIS resources and
be able to integrate them into the common
planning, communication and informatics
system. Common guidelines for the use of
electronic communications (CEOI) and
communications security (COMSEC)
should be coordinated with CEOI Service
or instructions for the transmission of

360

signals and COMSEC must also be

coordinated.
Standardization should be evident
in the communication and information
system planned. Planners must make sure
that the full range of equipment and
system configurations are standardized
throughout the area of operations. System
requirements of JFC communication must
not be compromised by an uncontrolled
and widespread use of systems of
standards, protocols, procedures and
terminology.
Internal and external change
impacts on C2. Planners must be able to
anticipate changes and to ensure timely
response to changes in the planning,
organization and operation of the original
mission, and for this SIC should be given
a variety of resources. Any connectivity
between SIC users must be accompanied
by routes and methods related to ensuring
alternative connection requirements. A
variety of systems and alternative routes
will contribute to SIC flexibility, to a
better reaction capacity and increased
reliability.
Commercial capabilities. Planners
must consider and be prepared to make
plans for the use of commercial systems.
The availability of commercial resources
and data communications system is an
alternative in providing the necessary
communications for JFC, there by
reducing the number and size of SIC
deployed modular packages. Resident
commercial capabilities in the area of
operations can provide planners with
solutions to overcome the lack of tactical
SIC resources and to provide early
information requirements needed for the
joint forces deployed. However, if
planners do not have a sufficient number
of interconnecting capabilities for
interfacing with commercial systems, the
use of the latter will be constrained, and
planners will find it very difficult to
achieve the desired communication and
information system. Also, commercial
capabilities could significantly contribute

to ensuring the redistribution requirements

and
tactical
communication
and
information system, imposed by the JFC.
Training. The training level of
managers and operators is crucial in
addressing the planning, organization and
implementation
of
communication
system. Of particular importance is the
training of individuals able to integrate
and operate JFC capabilities and
networks, be they commercial or
organic. In addition, the staff involved in
ensuring communication and information
management system must have adequate
language skills to work with the host
nation and multinational forces. Language
courses should be available both before
deployment and in the area of operations.
Discipline. Because the SIC
resources are usually limited, JFC should
ensure that information forwarded through
this system supports the actions necessary
for decision-making and the overall
execution
of
the
mission.
The
commanders mission and intention are
the factors to be taken into account in
deciding on the distribution of information
to the joint force. The commander must
provide further guidance on the
information to be "pushed" and "pulled"
into/from GIG for joint forces.
Procedures, as short and to the point as
possible, should be used to promote
discipline and augmented communications
beyond the control of traffic flow
registration messages (e.g. VTC, e-mail
attachment size, slides and other
information).
Opportunity. The purpose of the
communication
system should
be
insurance, processing, storage, transport,
control and presentation of information in
real time, when they occur. JFC should
identify
all
critical
information
requirements and, on this basis, develop
priority
lists
allowing
the
production/recovery
of
critical
information exactly when needed.
Planning simultaneously. Planners
must attend each of the many stages of

361

Joint Force planning. Some of these steps

are planning guidance character, specific
to
future
operations,
information
operations (IO) and others. The planning
process for each of these steps must be
continuous and iterative. SIC planners
conduct a high-level planning (in detail) to
develop comprehensive estimates the
design,
technical
instrumentation,
implementation
and
ensure
its
maintenance. Activation of links and
networks and computer communication
system occurs when an OPORD is
executed. During an execution phase of an
operation, planners must consider the next
phase of JFCs operational concept and
plan for the necessary communication and
information support.
Operational Limitations
Connectivity. CIS should establish
a robust level of connectivity that
enables communication with the
joint force, its subordinate forces,
its high level staffs and with any
supplementary
"reachback"3
capabilities when necessary. To the
maximum
possible
extent,
hardware and software interfaces
must be visible to system
users. The continuous flow of
information should not depend on
the action of an intermediate
operator;
Deployment area. This is a
connecting factor in hubs and
networks. Equipment capabilities
and the distance between the nodal
points should be considered;
Environment. CIS must be adapted to
the environment, its planning being
performed by taking into account
hydrographic, weather, cultural, land,
vegetation and manmade (particularly
infrastructure) characteristics, that
determine rules for use of frequencies
on
the
power
transmission
equipment and field placement of
CIS resources;
Collaborative capabilities.
3

Planners must consider that a fully

functional environment of collaborative
requirements requires more than specific
capabilities to provide participants with
some information and knowledge. A
second component of this environment is
the existing infrastructure in the area of
operations, that is, the various information
systems and networks linking these
systems together. C2 systems, networks
and collaboration tools require procedures
based on accepted theory and practice,
established to meet the communications
needs of the Joint Force. The full benefit
of this capability is only achieved with a
fourth component the users who are
trained and qualified to use the tools and
systems to understand the advantages and
power of a collaborative information
environment.
Bibliography
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

*** NATO Handbook, published by

Office of Information and Press,
NATO - 1110 Brussels Belgium,
2001
*** Allied Joint Doctrine for
communication and information
Systems AJP-6, April 06, 2011.
*** Joint Publication 6-0, Joint
Communications System, June 10,
2010
www.nato.int
www.rft.forter.ro
www.mapn.ro

This work was made possible through

financial support provided through the
Sectoral Operational Program Development
of Human Resources 2007-2013, cofinanced by the European Social Fund, in the
project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with
the title Security through knowledge
Integrated/educational
network
of
training, counseling and guidance of PhD
students for a career in research of
security, defense, public order and national
security - SECNETEDU.

Joint Publication 6-0, op. cit., pp. III-28.

362

ACTIVITIES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

OF COMMUNICATIONS AND IT MILITARY PERSONNEL IN NATO
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
Petric-Marinel VOICU
Gheorghe BOARU
PhD Student, Carol I National Defence University
marivoc@hotmail.com
Professor, PhD, Carol I National Defence University
boarugheorghe@yahoo.com

Abstract: Considering the generally recognized rule "train as well as you would fight" the new characteristics
of multinational operations within NATO impose requirements for preparing the communication and
information structures to ensure interoperability and properly accomplished responsibilities, respectively
standardized performance of activities specific to ensuring support communications for the forces engaged in
the operation.
Keywords: training, interoperability, training requirements, responsibilities, activities, communication and
information support.

and resolve GIG issues arising between

services and member agencies.
In terms of supporting the Joint
Force under the authority directing CJCS
and subject to supervision and guidance of
Director of Joint Staff (CDS), the director,
through J-6, normally has the following
responsibilities1:
- allocates CIS resources to CJCS,
controlled for its operation during real
world operations and assists non-DOD
users in gaining access to military
resources satellite (SATCOM);
- makes recommendations to DJS and to
the Joint Staff Operations Directorate (J3) on communications and system
availability necessary to commanders of
combat units to execute the tasks assigned
and, in case of deficiencies, proposes and
facilitates
the
implementation
of
corrective actions;
- performs feasibility assessment of
operational communications and adequate
support for the current war plans met, any
emergencies and OPLANs submitted by

Activities and responsibilities

of the personnel involved
in multinational operations under
NATO
Commanders of combat units
(CCDRs) must be familiar with the
guidelines of the Department of Defense
Instruction or
network
operations
(NETOPS) Global Information Network
(GIG).
The director of command, control,
communications and computers system
(head of Communications and Informatics
Joint Staff) provides advice and
recommendations to the Chief of Joint
Staff (CJCS) on issues of communication
and information system (CIS).
In accordance with the master
instructions of Heads of Joint Staff
(CJCSI) 8010.01A, the Chief of joint
community of information officers, chief
J-6 of the Joint Staff, performs the
functions of chief information officers
(CIO).
As Chairman of the Military
Committee
for
Electronic
Communications (MCEB), the director,
through the J-6, uses MCEB to coordinate

Joint publication 6-0, Joint Communication

System,
2010,
accessed
pe
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/ jp6_0.pdf,
la data de 09.08.2015 21.20, p. II-13.
1

363

DOD
agencies,
and
international
organizations fighting unit commanders in
theater, and when the situation requires it,
initiates corrective actions;
- assesses the effectiveness of CIS NMC National Military Command System and
commanders in combat units coordination
with USJFCOM - Joint Forces Command
United States and USSTRATCOM - US
Strategic Command of America; together
with J-3 and Director of Operational Plans
and Joint Force deployment requires or
recommends new procedures, programs or
systems to achieve enhanced capabilities;
- supports J-3 by ensuring the
augmentation of forces and means of the
CIS, in crisis or emergency;
- analyzes the CIS requirements presented
by CCDRs and ensures the consistency of
their
settlement
correlation
and
operational and logistical plans in the
short and long run, however in
coordination with J-3, Directorate for
Logistics (J-4) and Planning Department
of the Joint Staff;
- makes sure, in coordination with the J-3
and Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Networks and Integrated Intelligence
(ASD [NII]), that the lifecycle
management of joint C2 systems has the
capacity
to
provide
support
communications and the President, Office
of the Secretary Defense (OSD), Joint
Staff, services, commanders of combat
units, DOD agencies and any other entity
that may be committed in the execution of
joint operations;
- in coordination with the J-3, J-4 and
ASD (NII) / DoD CIO, provides program
management oversight and technical
systems group within the Global
Command and Control System (SCG)
Joint Support System for Global Fight
(GCSS-J) to ensure effective functioning
of the CIS for the users;
- makes recommendations on protection
of CIS Joint and multinational hostile
activities against the opponent;
- acts as the primary point of contact of
Joint Staff to print one direction and

centralized management for nuclear

communications system;
- identifies military positions problems for
command, control and communications of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(including long-term program of DOD,
problems
of
rationalization,
standardization
and
interoperability,
architecture and C2) that could affect
certain areas of the communication
system;
- in coordination with the J-3, it supports
the implementation of collaborative
capabilities
and
environments
for
transmitting information to facilitate the
exchange of information;
- in coordination with CCDRs, it identifies
NETOPS capabilities needed to support
joint operations, multinational and other
missions with allied partners.
Communications and Informatics
Directorate (J-6) of the Joint Staff, in
general, is responsible for2 the following:
- ensuring personnel and equipment
required for CIS COMSEC of JFC;
- coordinating activities with CJCS CIS,
USSTRATCOM, cyber command of the
US
(USCYBERCOM),
Defense
Information Systems Agency (DISA),
services, commands combat units, forces
and other similar components;
- preparing CIS policies and directives to
allow subordinate forces to execute
specific activities within a joint command
structure;
- ensuring compatibility and facilitating
the subordinate CIS.
CIS of JFC:
- ensures global management, which
ensures compatibility and protection of
CIS
Joint
Force
communications
components;
- disseminates plans, annexes and
instructions in support of the mission
received and coordination plans prepared
by subordinate commanders;
- at the request of subordinate forces
directly asks CJCS mobile communication
2

364

Joint publication 6-0, op. cit, p. II-14.

means, to include elements of USJFCOM

joint communications support in those
already
implemented
(JCSE). Compartments / services orders
components
generally
have
the
responsibility
of
providing
communication and information support
for their forces unless it is otherwise
ordered. JFC may order or assign
responsibility to subordinate commands
support communications and appropriate
and / or CIS resources available. In the
active network, the tactical CIS resources
component is intended for joint use must
conform to JFC requirements;
- free access to information between the
Joint Force and mission partners, which
could include multinational forces,
government agencies and NGOs, to the
extent permitted by legal, strategic,
operational and tactical considerations.
J-6 of Joint Force is responsible
for JFC structure3:
solving CIS problems and
coordinating all the procedures used in
communications. This
includes
developing CIS architecture plans and
policies, directives and instructions for
integrating and installing an operational
CIS. J-6 supervises the personnel of all
elements of the CIS in operation, such as
the mobile CJCS system, automated
information
systems,
collaborative
capabilities information, tools and support
environments, COMSEC and networks
necessary for carrying out the mission of
Joint Force on the whole;
checking
the
components
subordinated to the General Staff (HQ) on
installing control centers and network
management. J-6 lays down rules for
reporting on safe routes between control
centers
and
communication
channels. Each element of Joint Force
must have clearly defined missions and
control areas of the network;
coordinating the agreements on
the provision of services between the Joint
3

Staff, component planners and operations

control center (NETOPS) of joint network
(JNCC). J-6 establishes and monitors
JNCC operations to support higher-level
network control. JNCC manages the
connectivity among strategic and tactical
communication systems, according to the
joint operational architecture;
revising all the plans developed
by
CIS
subordinate
component
commanders. J-6 facilitates the execution
of all operations of the CIS to obtain
maximum support of JFC and avoid any
conflicts.
Elements
associated
to
communications
JCSE is a joint tactical
communication unit, highly deployable,
attributed to USJFCOM Joint Force in
order to provide communication in crisis
and emergency situations. JCSE is
composed of active and reserve forces,
equipped with a wide range of tactical
communications
and
commercial
equipment. JCSE supports operations with
little time to react.
Information Management Cell of
the Theater of Operations
The reports of the TIM cell are
meant for the operation community
including data on the implementation of
dissemination policies for the commander
(CDP) in accordance with CCDRs
intention. TIM cell operates non-stop
within the Joint Operations Centre (JOC)
of the CCDR. TIM cell members follow
CDPs guidelines in a permanent
combination
with
the
latest
operational/intelligence information and
the information regarding the state of
network architecture, communications
respectively. TIM cell works closely with
the control center (TNCC) theater network
operations (NETOPS), in coordination
with the potential changes in global radio
emissions program (GBS) or DISN
network, changes to bring the latest
updates on the commanders requirements
of disseminating information.

Joint publication 6-0, op. cit, p. II-15.

365

The liaison officer of the Defense

Information Systems Agency (DISA-LO)
serves as the main interface between the J6 and DISA Joint Force HQ. DISA
Liaison Officer of J-6 assists in the
coordination, planning, execution and
evaluation
of
computer
and
communication
components
of
GIG. DISA supports the connection of
communication and information resources
to designated access ways and expands
DISN services to tactical networks. Plans
of emergency and support of DISA can
provide ways of submitting requests and
terminating DISN services in the tactical
environment. The nearest operation center
and DISA regional security supervises the
allocation, routing, and the restoration of
circuits and channels to provide positive
DISN support to the forces deployed.

Deputy Director for information

management of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) provides advice and
recommendations CJCS by J-2 defense on
the information being transmitted /
received by CIS. It can be equated with
the chief information officers (CIO)
General Information Programme of
Defense Intelligence Information System
which includes the Department of Defense
(DODIIS).
Requirements regarding the training of
military personnel participating in
multinational operations under NATO
Obviously, the experience gained
in theaters must be taken into account.
Still, knowledge in the field of
communications and new regulations on
training in the branch requires focusing on
developing the necessary skills for the
planning, organization and operation of
communications and computer systems
closer to real conditions of carrying out
operations. Thus, it becomes more
obvious that there is a need to identify, in
peacetime, possible assignments in the
multinational operations in order to find
optimal solutions to successfully solve
different issues. These solutions will be
standardized for use in process
instructions.
General and specific requirements
Combining their experience with
the armies of NATO member countries,
the current teacher training system in
communications has to ensure effective
correlation between the theoretical and the
practical side in their training.
A decisive role in this preparation
process is the preparatory stage the
individual binding phase which forms
the basic skills and fighting qualities
needed for soldiers to survive on the
battlefield and act individually or in
teams.
Using the process, instructors
coming from operational units which
conducted missions in multinational

The liaison officer of the Regional

Center of Satellite Communications
(RSSC-LO) serves as the primary point of
contact to coordinate and resolve all
satellite communications requirements of
mobile data Ground Forces Joint Force
Support, and of course JFC requirements
of system development with satellite
capabilities when the situation requires it.
Detachment
of
frequency
management usually comes into being,
usually with joint forces. The element of
spectrum management met (JSME)
coordinate, manage and settle conflicts
regarding the allocation of frequencies
and with Intelligence Directorate (J2), J-3,
J-6 of CCDR the Joint Staff and the Host
nations
communications
authorities
provides information systems support /
operational/communications,
including
electronic warfare (EW).
Operations officer with the J-6 is
usually assigned to the Joint Operations
Center of JFC and advised to assist in
problem
solving
and
computer
communications line.
J-6 Cooperation with Information
Operations Cell ensures resolution of all
aspects of information assurance (IA) in
information operations (IO) defensive.

366

theaters or attended drill4 type courses

in other armies can be considered
important elements that characterize the
immediate perspective of the Romanian
process of preparing the military
professional
communication
and
5
information .
We
believe
that
special
consideration should be given to particular
training activities carried out in
commands meant to achieve unity of
thought and action of their components so
as to obtain a better efficiency of
leadership forces in communication and
information and in order for the training to
be carried out under conditions as close as
possible to battlefield reality.
Regarding
the
collective
instruction which puts together the
instruction of forces and commands, it
aims at training the skills needed for
collective action to achieve the cohesion
of communication and information
structures and it is performed from
group/section level up to and including the
battalion/similar unit level.
After finishing their collective
training period, the communication and
information structure is able to pass to the
fulfillment of a mission independently.
The training of communications
and IT military personnel will be planned,
organized, executed and evaluated in a
standardized manner, depending on the
mission, according to the List of Essential
Requirements of the Mission LCEM, or
Programs of Training for the Mission PIM.
Operational requirements
The standardization of each
training activity depending on operational
requirements is the basic condition that

needs to be fulfilled in order to be able to

make a realistic assessment of the
respective structure of communication and
information.
Given the dynamics and specific
features of multinational operations, we
believe that in order to accomplish
military tasks in theaters, communications
and IT staff training should be conducted
in a standardized manner based on the
following requirements:
- Increasing the interoperability of
forces that use the same as or similar
standards particularly to the armies of
NATO member states;
- Including and putting to good use
what is most valuable at the national and
the Alliance levels, in training, the
standards being developed by the most
experienced staff in the field;
- Addressing shortcomings that
occur within un-standardized training,
when needing to shift / move an element /
module from a structure to another;
- Increasing homogeneity, capacity
for action and cohesion of structures
(echelons)
which
are
constituted
temporarily by eliminating the differences
between the procedures, rules, techniques
and equipment used during instruction;
- Substantially reducing the time
needed by commanders, planners and
trainers for preparing training activities
only standard documents will be used;
- Facilitating the adjustment of
responsibilities in personnel receiving
instruction by preparing rapidly, as
standardized documents are characterized
by brevity and clarity;
- Identifying rapidly and with
relative easiness the specific training
needs of each military structure and the
tasks which its personnel must be trained
for;
- Simplifying the assessment of the
level of education attained and increasing
objectivity in this activity;
- Determining, with greater ease
and accuracy the resources necessary for

drill training.
I. Ciobanu, Study on specific operational
standards in communications and computer
training. Views on the implications of actions and
information systems on the organization and
conduct of modern military action, accessed August
08,
2015,
on
http://www.cissb.ro/Revista_
comunicatiilor/2009/1/Revista.
4
5

367

instruction and ensuring their controlled

and effective use;
- Simplifying the analyses
regarding training and rapidly introducing
the lessons learned and the results coming
from the exchange of experience with
other armies.
As the Alliance is determined to
take further steps in order to achieve
interoperability in concepts and actions as
close as possible to the maximal
standards, it attaches a lot of importance
to the training of communications and IT
staff or similar structures.
The method of ad-hoc task groups
is widely used and it allows NATO
nations that agree to support and execute
the training proposed, to exchange
experience, and to coordinate the updating
of CIS training sources.
The purpose of the action was to
provide training in communications for
Alliance members and partner nations in
an effort to provide unitary training in the
field of communications in order to
establish a common communication
system between different nations deployed
in combined operations.
The needs for communications
training levels were found to be: platoon,
company, battalion and platoon HQ and/
or transmission platoon, company HQ/
brigade.
Certain elements of the types
identified for training courses can also be
used for training the management
personnel. The requirements for training
in communications structure were
identified to cover training soldiers and
instructors.
The
four
courses
in
communications and IT identified and
prepared, that are based on these
requirements, cover the training cycle
from basic soldier training to training
specialists/trainers and training the
communications officers at battalion and
brigade levels.

The training which was identified

and carried out covered the following
topics:
soldiers basic training in the
use of means of communication (the CIS
1) run in the first period of active duty;
soldier training courses in the
use of means of communication (the CIS
2) - which is covered after the soldiers
basic training;
basic training of specialists/
communications trainers which is
carried out within a national training
course for preparing NCO fighter students
and is based on CIS courses 1 and 2. For
this course they do not prepare
specifications, but take them over from 1
to 3 courses;
training NCOs and junior
officers fighters in communications (the
CIS 3) which is taken by NCOs fighters/
junior officers belonging to all categories
of armed forces, who will occupy a
position
of
NCO/officer
with
communications
or
communications
trainer;
training senior officers and
NCOs specialists in communications (the
CIS 4) which is attended by specialists
and senior NCOs belonging to all
services,
which
will
occupy
a
communications position at battalion or
brigade levels/platoon leader or platoon
communications staff of the company
brigade staff.
Regarding the training of trainers
from among the NCO fighters, the
responsibility rests with partner nations,
initially assisted if necessary by NATO
instructors. It is recommended as a basis
for training future trainers in CIS courses
1 and 2.
Analyzing the CIS presented in
this chapter, we consider that the simple
structural model of these CIS courses can
and should be implemented in our
army. We also believe it is necessary to
accelerate and intensify participation in
NATO training of personnel officers and
noncommissioned
officers

in

368

communications and from all walks of our

armed forces.
In all the schools of the branches,
some modern training modules must be
experimented and generalized (e.g. basic
training courses) and as a condition for
taking these NATO CIS courses, future
students must accelerate their acquiring of
English skills and NATO working
procedures.
In conclusion, the activities and
responsibilities of personnel engaged in
communications
and
multinational
operations generate their specific training
requirements that essentially need a
standardization of the educational process
and reaching goals on this line,
respectively attaining interoperability with
similar structures of the armies of NATO
member countries.
Secondly, in the domain of forces
training, there is a clear need for adjusting
the whole training process to the one
undertaken in other NATO member
states armies, as well as reaching the
operational capacity of forces according to
the available resources and the training
level it starts from.

Bibliography
1.
***
Romanian Army training
doctrine, 2006.
2.
*** Romanian Armed Forces
Transformation Strategy, Bucharest, 2007.
3.
*** NATO Handbook, published
by Office of Information and Press, NATO
- 1110 Brussels Belgium, 2001.
4.
*** Allied Joint Doctrine for
communication and information Systems
AJP-6, April 06, 2011.
5.
*** Joint Publication 6-0, Joint
Communications System, June 10, 2010
6.
www.nato.int
7.
www.rft.forter.ro
8.
www.mapn.ro
9.
http://www.cissb.ro
This work was made possible through
financial support provided through the
Sectoral Operational Program Development
of Human Resources 2007-2013, cofinanced by the European Social Fund, in the
project POSDRU/187/1.5/S/155385, with
the title Security through knowledge
Integrated/educational
network
of
training, counseling and guidance of PhD
students for a career in research of
security, defense, public order and national
security - SECNETEDU.

369

INDEX OF AUTHORS

ANDREI Elena-Adelina, 121, 127

PETERFI Carol-Teodor, 226

ALEXANDRU-GUI Iuliana, 174

PETRESCU Dan-Lucian, 238

BACCELA Marius-Sebastian, 134, 144

PETRESCUL Eduard Paul, 248

BAHACIU Marian, 134, 144

POPA Corneliu, 104, 114

BOARU Gheorghe, 363

RUSU Cristian, 255

BOGDAN (SRBU) Laura-Ina-Veronica, 283

SCIPANOV Mdlina, 83, 89

CEASCAI Viorel, 75, 79

SCRTOCEA Lucian, 278

CHIFOR Lorin, 147, 154

SMEU Niculae, 291, 298

COJOCARU Gabriel, 161

STAN Ioan-Constantin, 49

COLESNIUC Dan, 42

STANCIU Cristian-Octavian, 70

COSTACHE Gheorghe-Marius, 166

STEFAN Andra Sybil, 94, 100

DINC Gerald, 263

CHEAU Mircea Constantin, 263

DOBRESCU Cosmin, 291, 298

TEFNESCU Daniel-Cornel, 326

DRAGOMIRESCU Valentin, 21

UTEU-DAN tefan-Antonio, 54,60

HRIB Teodora Irina, 179

TOCIL Doru-Constantin, 49

ICHIMESCU Cristian, 185

TOFAN Maximilian-Paul, 336, 340

MARCU Radu-Viorel, 191

TUDORACU Florian, 208, 214

MARTIN Iulian, 13, 42

UUIANU Diana Elena, 28, 36

MOLDOVAN Lucian, 201

UNGUREANU Emanuel, 147, 154

NEGRU Ioan, 208, 214

VLADU Oana Mihaela, 344, 352

NOUR Adrian, 221

VOICU Petric-Marinel, 358, 363

371

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