Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Granada, JD - I
Agullo vs. Sandiganbayan, July 20, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner, Elvira, was charged with malversation from an audit done on July
14, 1986 by Ignacio Gerez. A PHP 26,000 cash shortage was discovered on
petitioners accountability. During the pre-trial, petitioner Agullo conceded and
admitted the findings in the Report of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in
the Letter of Demand. Still, petitioner insisted her innocence of the charge and
denied having malversed the public funds for her own personal use at all stages of
the proceeding. With petitioners admission though, the prosecution rested its case.
The defence, to hurdle over the presumption of malversation and destroy the prima
facie evidence of conversion, offered the testimony of several witnesses. Striking
down the defense as incredible and without basis, the Sandiganbayan rendered
its assailed decision, convicting petitioner Agullo of the crime of malversation,
stating that no evidence has been presented linking the loss of the government
funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the accused (herein petitioner).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan disregarded certain evidence of
substance, depriving the petitioners constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
RULING: The Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain
evidence of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the
adjudication of petitioners guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence
adduced by both prosecution and defense, petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily
overcome and rebutted by competent proof that the prima facie evidence of
conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this end,
petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of
the missing funds was used for her own personal benefit or gain. The
Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more on the flaws and
deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength and
merit of the prosecutions evidence.
People vs. Bato, January 16, 1998
FACTS: Sergio and Abraham Bato were found guilty of murder by a lower court.
Both accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On January 26, 1994, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the guilt but increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Appellants raised the defense of denial. They maintained that their identification as
the alleged perpetrators of Ernestos murder is merely an afterthought, necessitated
by a death of strong evidence on the part of the prosecution.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a quantum of proof required to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
RULING: In pursuance to the doctrine that appeals involving reclusion perpetua are
subject to a review de novo, this Court pored over the entire records of both lower
courts and concluded, after careful deliberation, that the appellant is entitled to an
acquittal. The circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution fails to evoke
moral certainty that appellants are guilty. The totality of the prosecution evidence
does not constitute an unbroken chain leading beyond reasonable doubt to the guilt
of the accused. The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Where the State
fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
presumption, the accused is entitled to an acquittal regardless of the weakness or
even the absence of his defense. By constitutional fiat, the burden of proof is
accordingly vested on the prosecution. In acquitting the herein appellant, this Court
is not decreeing that he did not participate in the killing. It is merely ruling that the
state failed to present sufficient evidence to overturn the constitutional presumption
of innocence.
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense.
court rendered judgment against him, which judgment was promulgated one day
after he filed his memorandum. The decision rendered by the trial court gives a
clear account of the facts and the law on which it is based. It discusses in full the
courts findings on the credibility of both the prosecution and defense witnesses and
its evaluation of the evidence of both parties. Citing the case of People v. Mercado:
. . . A review of the trial courts decision shows that its findings were based on the
records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes during the trial. The
speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to
the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to
study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of
diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long before the deadline
set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day period between
the filing of accused-appellants memorandum and the promulgation of the decision
was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the
decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of
justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to
task for rendering his decision with due dispatch.
People vs. Alcanzado, May 20, 2004
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision issued by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 66) of Makati City
finding accused Oscar Alcanzado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
However, a careful examination of the records reveals that the assailed decision will
have to be set aside and the records remanded back to the RTC for reception of
evidence for the defense. The RTC committed a very serious error in promulgating a
decision after denying the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant upon prior leave
of court, without first giving appellant the opportunity to present his evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right of the accused
to be heard on his defense.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that contrary to the RTCs assertion in its
decision that the demurrer to evidence was denied, the records of the case do not
reveal that there was any prior order denying appellants demurrer to evidence
before the rendition of the assailed judgment. Evidently, the trial court violated the
aforequoted provisions of Section 15, Rule 119. Appellant had filed a motion for
leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted by the RTC and therefore
upon denial of his demurrer, if indeed it was denied, the trial court should have
given appellant the opportunity to present his evidence. Equally astonishing is the
fact that appellants counsel did not raise said irregularity as an issue in the RTC or
in this Court. In effect, appellant has not been accorded due process. Due to the
procedural unfairness and complete miscarriage of justice in the handling of the
proceedings in the RTC, [9] a remand of the case for reception of defense evidence
is warranted. The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense has
been violated. So that appellant may be spared from further delay, the Court deems
it necessary to treat the herein assailed judgment as a mere resolution denying the
demurrer to evidence and ascertain whether the RTC has committed grave abuse of
discretion in not granting the same. Consequently, for purposes of determining
whether the demurrer to evidence should have been granted, the connection
between the service gun and appellant as the perpetrator of the shooting, without
any countervailing evidence, had been sufficiently established. Thus, the RTC did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence BUT
it committed grave abuse of discretion in outrightly convicting appellant of the
crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua when appellant
has not been given the opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, pursuant to
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
strength and dwelling may not be appreciated to convict the brothers. Further,
should there be a finding of treachery, then abuse of superior strength is absorbed
by the former.
At the outset, nocturnity is discounted as an aggravating
circumstance since in this case, the darkness of the night was not purposely sought
by the offenders to facilitate the commission of the crime nor to ensure its
execution with impunity.
on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration
that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting
President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate
President Pimentel on the same day.
ISSUE: Whether or not petioners prosecution should be enjoined on the ground of
prejudicial publicity.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that as of the issue of prejudicial publicity, this
would not apply to the present case. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial
and the free press are incompatible. Theyre essentially unrelated. Also, since our
justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court
also said that petitioner did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity
given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform.
Finally, the Court said that the cases against petitioner were still undergoing
preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no
permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned
with justice and less with prosecution.
Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, December 17, 2004
FACTS: Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife,
Teresita Z. Teves seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan
convicting them of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing
direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Valencia.
Upon their arraignment on May 12, 1997, the petitioners pleaded not guilty. On 23
February 1998, the petitioners filed their Comment/Objections to the evidence
offered by the prosecution and moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to
evidence. On July 29, 1998, the Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits A to S of the
prosecutions evidence but rejected Exhibits T, U, and V. It also denied
petitioners demurrer to evidence, as well as their motion for reconsideration. On
July 16, 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision. The petitioners assert
that the Sandiganbayan committed serious and palpable errors in convicting them.
In the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves in
his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft Law. But they were convicted of having a direct financial or pecuniary
interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center prohibited under Section
89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially different from the offense with which
they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was transgressed
because they were never apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan that they were being charged with, and arraigned and tried for,
violation of the LGC of 1991. The variance doctrine invoked by the respondent is
but a rule of procedural law that should not prevail over their constitutionallyguaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan violated the petitioners'constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that petitioners can be convicted of second mode
of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited
interest considering that it was not charged in the information.
In Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
both read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is
a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in
the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part
of those constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second
elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the
offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense
charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved. The
variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby warranting the
conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.