Section 16 Specific Relief Act

Smt. Thakamma Mathew vs M. Azamathulla Khan And Others on 15

December, 1992
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8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the High
Court has virtually passed a decree for specific performance of the
agreement to sell in favour of the defendant in the suit filed by the
appellant and that such a relief could not be granted under Order 7,
Rule 7 CPC. Moreover, a decree for specific performance could not be
passed in the present case since the period of limitation prescribed for
filing a suit for specific performance had long expired and the
conditions which are required to be fulfilled by a person seeking a
decree for specific performance of the contract under Section 16 of
the Specific Relief Act were not satisfied in the present case. It has
also been urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the High
Court has erred in proceeding on the basis that the principle of part
performance would be attracted and a decree for possession could not
be passed in favour of the appellant against the respondent. It has also
been urged that the High Court had disposed of the appeal of the
respondent and dismissed the suit of the appellant without
considering the cross appeal filed by the appellant.
9. We find considerable force in the aforesaid contentions of the
learned Counsel. In order that decree for specific performance of a
contract may be passed it is necessary to consider whether such
a relief can
be
granted
in
view
of Section 16 of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In other words the person seeking
such
a
decree
has
to
satisfy
that Section 16 of
the Specific Relief Actdoes not bar the grant of such a relief and
the person against whom the decree is passed can show that
the relief of specific performance cannot be granted in view of the

provisions of Section 16of the Specific Relief Act. Clause (c)

of Section 16 postulates
that
the
person
seeking specificperformance of the contract must file a suit wherein
he must aver and prove that he has performed or has always been
ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contractwhich
are to be performed by him. Moreover, in view of Article 54 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit for specific performance of
contract has to be filed within three years of the date fixed for the
performance or if no such date is fixed where plaintiff has notice that
performance is refused. In the present case, the appellant by his notice
dated February 10, 1975 had clearly indicated that he had cancelled
the agreement and had forfeited the advance amount of Rs. 18,000
deposited by the defendant. By the said notice, it was clearly indicated
that the appellant was no longer willing to perform the agreement to
sell dated November 12, 1974. In the circumstances, it was incumbent
upon the defendant to have filed a suit for specific performance of
the contract within a period of three years from the date of the said
notice dated February 10, 1975 and if such a suit had been filed by the
defendant, it would have been open to the appellant to show that it
was barred by the provision contained in Section 16 of
the Specific Relief Act. The defendant did not choose to adopt that
course and remained content with defending the suit filed by the
appellant for cancellation of the agreement to sell dated November 12,
1974 and for recovery of the possession of the property. Even if it is
found that the appellant was not entitled to succeed in the said suit
and the said suit is liable to be dismissed, it would not entitle the
defendant to obtain a decree forspecific performance of the
contract in those proceedings. The High Court, with due respect, was
not right in invoking its discretionary power under Order 7 Rule 7
C.P.C. to grant such a relief to the defendant. The said power
conferred on the court does not enable it to override the statutory
limitations contained in Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
and Section 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which preclude the grant
of the relief of specific performance of a contractexcept within the
period prescribed by the section.

Section 19 Specific Relief Act

Guruswamy Nadar vs P.Lakshmi Ammal(D) Through Lrs. & ... on 1 May,
2008
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3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record. It will be relevant to mention here that the second purchase by
the appellant was on 5.5.1975 i.e. two days after the filing of the suit
for specific performance on 3.5.1975. Though the applicability
of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was not
considered by the trial court, however, the first appellate court i.e.
learned
Single
Judge
while
granting
the
decree
for specific performance found that the subsequent purchase made
by the appellant- defendant was also bona fide for value and without
notice of the agreement to sell but the said sale was subordinate to the
decree that could be made in the suit for specific performance which
was instituted prior to the sale in favour of the second purchaser. The
main argument which was advanced before learned Single Judge was
thatSection 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that a
decree for specific performance against a subsequent purchaser for
bona fide who has paid the money in good faith without notice of the
original contract can be enforced as the same is binding on the vendor
as well as against the whole world. As against this, it was contended by
the
respondents
that Section 52 of
the
Transfer
of
Property Act which lays down the principle of lis pendens that when a
suit is pending during the pendency of such suit if a sale is made in
favour of other person, then the principle of lis pendens would be
attracted. In support of this proposition a Full Bench decision of the
Allahabad High Court in Smt. Ram Peary and others v. Gauri and
others [ AIR 1978 All. 318] as well as a Division Bench judgment of the

Madras High Court was pressed into service. Therefore, the question
before us in this case is what is the effect of the lis pendens on the
subsequent sale of the same property by the owner to the second
purchaser. Section 19 of
the Specific Relief Act clearly
says
subsequent sale can be enforced for good and sufficient reason but in
the present case, there is no difficulty because the suit was filed on
3.5.1975 for specific performance of the agreement and the second
sale took place on 5.5.1975. Therefore, it is the admitted position that
the second sale was definitely after the filing of the suit in question.
Had that not been the position then we would have evaluated the
effect of Section Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. But in
the present case it is more than apparent that the suit was filed before
the second sale of the property. Therefore, the principle of lis pendens
will govern the present case and the second sale cannot have the
overriding effect on the first sale. The principle of lis pendens is still
settled principle of law. In this connection, the Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in Smt. Ram Peary (supra) has considered the
scope of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Full Bench
has referred to a decision in Bellamy v. Sabine[(1857) 44 ER 842 at
p.843)wherein it was observed as under:
4. Our attention was invited to a decision of this Court
in R.K.Mohammed Ubaidullah & Ors. v. Hajee C.Abdul Wahab (D) by
L.Rs. & Ors. [AIR 2000 SC 1658]. In this case it was observed that a
person who purchased the property should made necessary effort to
find out with regard to that property, whether the title or interest of
the person from whom he is making purchase was inactual possession
of such property. In this case, the plaintiff filed the suit
for specific performance of contract and during the pendency of the
suit, rest of the defendants brought subsequent transaction of sale by
the defendant in their favour claiming the title to the suit property on
the ground that they were the bona fide purchasers for value without
notice of prior agreements in favour of plaintiff and they were also
aware that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property as a
tenant for last several years and that they did not make any inquiry if
plaintiff had any further or other interest in the suit property on the

date of execution of sale deed in their favour apart from that he was in
possession of the property as a tenant. In that context their Lordships
observed that subsequent purchaser cannot be said to be bona fide
purchaser of the suit property for value without notice of suit
agreement
and
plaintiff
would
be
entitled
to relief of specific performance. Their Lordships after considering
the
effect
of Section 19 of
the Specific Relief Act as
well
asSection 52 of the Transfer of Property Act held that subsequent
purchaser has to be aware before he purchases the suit property. So far
as the present case is concerned, it is apparent that the appellant who
is a subsequent purchaser of the same property, he has purchased in
good faith but the principle of lis pendens will certainly be applicable
to
the
present
case
notwithstanding
the
fact that
under section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act his rights could be
protected.
" The allegation contained in para 5 of the Plaint are frivolous and
denied." Likewise, the 2nd Respondent also has not specifically
denied the above said averment in the Plaint."
Therefore, from this finding it is more than apparent that the plaintiff
while filed the suit forspecific performance of the contract was ready
and willing to perform her part of the contract. This argument was
though not specifically argued before the Division Bench, the only
question which was argued was whether the principle of lis pendens
will be applicable or Section 19 of theSpecific Relief Act will have
overriding effect to which we have already answered. In the present
case the principle of lis pndens will be applicable as the second sale
has taken place after the filing of the suit. Therefore, the view taken by
the Division Bench of the High Court is correct and we do not find any
merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed with no
order as to costs.

Section 17 and 49 Registeration Act

S.Kaladevi vs V.R.Somasundaram & Ors on 12 April, 2010

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10. Section 17 of 1908 Act is a disabling section. The documents

defined
in
clauses
(a)
to
(e)
therein
require registration compulsorily. Accordingly, sale of immovable
property of the value of Rs. 100/- and more requires
compulsory registration. Part X of the 1908 Act deals with the
effects of registration and non- registration. Section 49 gives
teeth to Section 17 by providing effect of non-registration of
documents required to be registered. Section 49 reads thus:

Section 53A and 54 TPA

Som Dev & Ors vs Rati Ram & Anr on 6 September, 2006
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3. Before proceeding to consider the question argued before us, we

think that it is proper to notice that the case arises from the State of
Haryana which was originally a part of the State of Punjab and that
the Transfer of Property Act as such did not apply to the State.
But, Sections 54, 107 and123 of the Transfer of Property Act were
made applicable to the State of Punjab with effect from 01.04.1955
vide notification dated 23.03.1955. As is clear, Section 54 of
the Transfer of PropertyAct relates to a sale of immovable property
of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards, Section 107deals with leases of
immovable property and Section 123 indicates how the transfer of
immovable property by way of gift is to be effected. It insists that for
making a gift of immovable property, the transfer must be effected
by a registered instrument singed by or on behalf of the donor and
attested by at least two witnesses. One other aspect to be noted is the
introduction
of
sub-section (1A)
of Section 17 of
the
Registration Act made prospective from the date of coming into force
of the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001
insisting that documents containing contracts to transfer for
consideration any immovable property for the purpose
of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, shall be registered if
they have been created after the commencement of sub-section (1A)
of Section 17 of the Transfer of PropertyAct.
6. We shall now advert to Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.
Sub-section (1) specifies what are the documents that are to be
registered. An instrument of gift of immovable property, an
instrument which purports to create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish, whether in present or in future any right, title or interest in

immovable property, the value of which exceeds Rs.100/-, any

instrument which acknowledges the receipt or payment of
consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment,
limitation or extinction of any right title or interest, leases of
immovable property from year to year or for a term exceeding one year
and instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of
court or any award where such decree or order or award operates to
create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in
immovable property, the value of which exceeds Rs.100/-. Subsection (1A) provides that agreements for sale to be used to claim
protection of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act entered
into after 24.09.2001 require registration. Sub-section (2) excludes
from the operation of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1)
of Section 17, the various transactions described therein under
various clauses. We are concerned with clause (vi) therein. We shall
set down that provision for convenience: "Any decree or order of a
Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise
and comprising immovable property other than which is subject
matter of the suit or proceeding". (emphasis supplied) It may be noted
that going by clause (vi), a decree or order of court need not be
registered on the basis that it comes within the purview
of Section 17(1)(b) or 17(1)(c) of theAct as an instrument purporting
to or operating to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right,
title or interest in immovable property. It may further be seen that a
compromise decree also does not require registration in terms of
clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the
Registration Act unless that decree takes in immovable property
valued above Rs.100/-, that is not a subject matter of the suit or the
proceeding giving rise to the compromise decree. In other words, only
if the compromise also takes in any property that is not the subject
matter of the suit, it would require registration. If the compromise is
confined to the subject matter of the suit, it would not. It may be noted
that Section 43 of the Registration Act of 1864 and Section 41 of the
Registration Act of 1866 provided that when any civil court should by
a decree or order, declare any document relating to immovable
property, which should have been registered, to be invalid or when any

civil court should pass a decree or order affecting any such document
and the decree or order should create, declare, transfer, limit or
extinguish any right, title or interest under such document to or in the
immovable property to which it relates, the court should cause a
memorandum of the decree or order to be sent to the Registrar within
whose district the document was originally registered. But
these sections were omitted while enacting the Registration Act of
1871. But in the Specific Relief Act, 1877, Section 39 was introduced
providing that where an instrument is adjudged void or viodable
under that section and ordered to be delivered up and cancelled, the
court should send a copy of its decree, if the instrument has been
registered under the Registration Act, to the officer in whose office the
instrument had been so registered and such officer should note on the
copy of the instrument contained in his books the effect of its
cancellation. But under the 1887 Act, decrees and orders of courts and
awards were exempted from registration. They were also not
mentioned in Section 18 which related to documents of which
registration was optional. Sargent, CJ in Purmananddas vs. Vallabdas
( ILR 11 Bombay 506) explained the position as follows:

Section 53A and 54 TPA

Commissioner Of Income-Tax ... vs Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd. Etc on 27

May, 1997
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3. Addl. C.I.T., Bihar v. Sahay Properties & Investment Co. (P) Ltd.,
144 ITR 357 (Patna).
4. Saiffuddin v. C.I.T., 156 ITR 127 (Rajasthan).
5. Madgul Udyog v. C.I.T., 184 ITR 484 (Cal.).
6. Maharani Yogeshwari Kumari v. C.I.T., 213 ITR 541 (Rajas-than).
7. C.I.T. v. General Mktg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., 222 ITR 574 (Cal-cutta).
8. C.I. T. v. Krishna Lal Ajmani, 222 ITR 653 (Patna).
Mr. H.N. Salve, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondentassessee in Tax Reference Case Nos. 9-10/86, took a different stand
from that of Mr. Sharma and contended that the word 'owner'
in Section 22 of the Income Tax Act should be understood in its
general sense and not in the sense in which it was understood by this
Court in Jodha Mal's case (supra). According to learned counsel, the
word 'owner' can only refer to the legal owner and none else, as
concept of dual ownership is unknown in Indian Jurisprudence. He
invited our attention to the language of Section9(1) of the Old Income

Tax Act which corresponds to Section 22 of the present Act and

contended that the assessment does not depend on actual receipt of
income from house property. He also submitted that the view taken by
some of the High Courts that the owners of the flats even in the
absence of any registered document of sale in their favour can be
treated as owners in view ofSection 53A of the Transfer of
Property Act is wholly wrong and unsustainable. That view, according
to him, is contrary to the well settled position in law as laid down in
several judgments of this Court. The learned senior counsel submitted
that the ownership is paramount title and it cannot be otherwise
interpreted. Mr. Salve sub-mitted that even if the interpretation
suggested by him to Section 22 results in double taxation even then
that has to be accepted as that being the correct position in law. There
is no equity in Taxation law. In support of his arguments he placed
reliance on the following judgments of this Court :
(iiia) a person who is allowed to take or retain possession of any
building or part thereof in part performance of a contract of the
nature referred to in section 53A of the Transfer of PropertyAct,
1882 (4 of 1882), shall be deemed to be the owner of that building or
part thereof;
(iiib) a person who acquires any rights (excluding any rights by way of
a lease from month to month or for a period not exceeding one year) in
or with respect to any building or part thereof, by virtue of any such
transaction as is referred to in clause (f) of section 269UA, shall be
deemed to be the owner of that building or part thereof;

"'Owner' applies to every person in possession or receipt either of the

whole, or of any part, of the rents or profits of any land or tenement;
or in the occupation of such land or tenement, other than as a tenant
from year to year or for any less term or as a tenant at will''. (Stroud's
Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn., Vol. 3, p.2060).
Thus the juristic principle from the view point of each one is to
determine the true connotation of the term "owner" within the
meaning of s.22 of the Act in its practical sense, leaving the husk of
the legal title beyond the domain of ownership for the purpose of this
statutory provision. The reason is obvious. After all, who is to be taxed
or assessed to be taxed more accurately - a person in receipt of money
having actual control over the property with no person having better
right to defeat his claim of possession or a person in legal parlance
who may remain a remainder man, say, at the end or extinction of the
period of occupation after, again say, a thousand years? The answer to
this question in favour of the assessee would not merely be doing
palpable injustice but would cause absurd inconvenience and would
make the Legislature to be dubbed as being a party to a nonsensical
legislation. One cannot reasonably and logically visualise as to when a
person in actual physical control of the property realising the entire
income and usufructs of the property for his own use and not for the
use of any other person, having the absolute power of disposal of the
income so received, should be held not liable to tax merely because a
vestige of legal ownership or a husk of title in the long run may yet
clothe another person with the power of a residual ownership when
such contingency arises which is not a case even here. A plain reading
of clause 4 of the agreement, as extracted above, clearly goes to show

that the physical possession of theproperties has passed on or is

deemed to have passed on to the assessee to have and to hold for ever
and absolutely with the power to use the same in whatsoever manner
it thinks best and the assessee shall derive all income and benefits
together with full power of disposal of the propertiesas well as the
income thereof. Can it then be said that the recipient of the income
being the assessee only having an absolute and exclusive control over
the property without any let or hindrance on the part of the so-called
vendor which, indeed, under law it was not entitled to do, as we shall
presently show, shall be immune from the taxing provision
in Section 22 of the Act? The answer in our view is clearly in the
negative. The reason is simple. The consideration money has been
paid in full. The assessee has been put in exclusive and absolute
possession of the property. It has been empowered to deal with the
income as it likes. It has been empowered to dispose of and even to
alienate the property. Reference to s.54 or, for that matter, s.55 of
the Transfer of Property Act by the Tribunal merely emphasises the
fact that the legal title does not pass unless there is a deed of
conveyance duly registered. The agreement is in writing and the value
of

the

property

is

admittedly

worth

more

than

hundred

rupees. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act would, therefore,

exclude the conferment of absolute title by transfer to the assessee.
That, however, would not take away the right of the assessee to remain
in possession of the property, to realise and receive the rents and
profits therefrom and to appropriate the entire income for its own use.
The so-called vendor is not permitted in law to dispossess or to
question the title of the assessee (the so- called vendee). It was for this
very practical purpose that the doctrine of the equity of part

performance was introduced in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,

by

inserting

s.53A therein.

the Section specifically

allows

the

doctrine of part performance to be applied to the agreements which,

though

required

to

be

registered,

are

not

registered

and

to transfers not completed in the manner prescribed therefor by any

law. The section is, therefore, applicable to cases where the trans-fer]
is not completed in a manner required by law unless such a noncompliance with the procedure results in the transfer being void.
There is, however, a distinction between an agreement void as such
and an agreement void in the absence of something which the vendor
could do and had expressly or impliedly contracted to do, and where a
vendor agrees to sell his share of property, including sir land, there is
an implied term in the contract that he will apply for sanction to the
revenue authorities necessary for such transfers and the Court will
direct him to do so. It cannot be said that such an agreement is void
because no sanction has been obtained. In the instant case, having
reference to cl. 5 of the agreement it would be seen that the option was
given to the assessee to demand at its pleasure a conveyance duly
registered being executed in its favour by the Sahay family (the
vendor) and to get its name mutated in the official records. The
assessee has not exercised its option for reasons best known to it presumably to have double weapon in its hands to be used as and
when circumstances so demanded. Can it yet be said that for the
default on the part of the assessee itself it would be entitled to say that
it is not the owner of the property for all practical purposes, receiving
the rent all the time, appropriating the usufructs for its own purposes
all the time and having no interference at the instance of the vendor?
Can that be a practical and logical approach to the true construction

and purport of the substance and spirit of Section 22 of the Act? The
answer, in our view, is clearly in the negative and against the assessee.
Having taken all the advantages and still taking all the advantages
under the contract without any hindrance or obstruction on the part
of anyone including the vendor which the vendor could not do in view
of s.53A of the Transfer of Property Act, the assessee cannot now
turn back and say that because of its default in having a deed
registered at its sweet will it was not an owner within the meaning of
s.22 of the Act. It may bear repetition to say that it was on account of
these facts that juristic principles have now emerged saying that one
of the most important of the powers of ownership is the right to
exclude others from possession and the property right is essentially a
guarantee of the exclusion of other persons from the use or handling
of the thing. In that sense, therefore, the assessee itself became the
owner of the property in question. In our view, any decision to the
contrary would not be in consonance with the juristic principle either
at common law or in equity. In either case, it would not be subservient
to the intent and purpose of s.22 of the Act, with regard to which, as
we have already stated, we can fairly look at the language used and the
tax laws have to be interpreted reasonably and in consonance with
justice. So far we have dealt with the case in this respect on juristic
principles as if it were a matter of first impression. We have, therefore,
now to refer to the case law on the subject."
"Section 22 of the Income Tax Act has created a charge on the
income in respect of annual value of the property consisting of any
buildings or lands appurtenant thereto of which the assessee is the
owner, other than such portions of such property as he may occupy for

the purposes of any business or profession carried on by him the

profits of which are chargeable to income tax under the head "income
from house property". The question, therefore, arises as to whether the
words "of which the assessee is the owner" can be applicable only to a
registered owner or also to such person in whose favour the registered
sale- deed has not been executed but a sale agreement has been
executed, possession of the property has been given and consideration
for

sale

has

been

Property Act contemplates

paid.Section 53A of
that

when

the Transfer of
any

person

contracts totransfer for consideration any immovable property by

writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary
to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable
certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the
contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or
the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession
in part performance of the contract and has done some act in
furtherance of the contract, and thetransferee has performed or is
willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that
the contract, though required to be registered, has not been
registered, or where there is an instrument of transfer, that
the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed
therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any
person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against
the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect
of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in
possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the
contract. The proviso to the aforesaid sectioncontemplates that
nothing in that section shall affect the rights of a transferee for

consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part

performance thereof. If the view that without there being conveyance,
the transferor continues to be the owner is taken, still a question
arises that the income has not been received by the owner and,
therefore, whether the assessment of thetransferee could be made by
considering that there was diver-sion of income or the transferor has
ceased to have any right in respect of the income received?
This Section debars thetransferor from enforcing his right to the
property. In the case of Hamda Ammal v. Avadiappa Pathar, [1991] 1
SCC 715, it was held by the apex court that the document after its
registration relates back to the date of execution of the sale deed.
Though under the income tax law, the benefit of ownership is
unknown, but still if the income is assessed in the hands of
the transferor who has not received the income from the property
whether such a transferor can be made liable to make the payment of
tax. Various decisions given by the different High Courts have taken
different views. The view of the Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and
Allahabad High Courts as mentioned above is on one hand, whereas
the view of the Andhra Pradesh Court in the case of CIT v. Nawab Mir
Barkat Ali Khan, (1974) Tax LR 90 and the Karnataka High Court in
the case of Ram- kumar Mills P. Ltd. v. CIT, (1989) 180 ITR 464 is
different. So far as the view taken by the apex court in the case of
Osman Ali Khan, (1986) 162 ITR 888 is concerned that was in the
context of the Wealth TaxAct where the language of the section was
different. Section 53A debars a transferor from exercising the
rights of an owner after he has received full consideration and handed
over possession under the contract. The transferor in a case where
he has executed the document and received consideration and even

handed over possession of the property, cannot exercise any right of

an owner. This Court in the case of Rajputana Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. State
of Rajasthan, (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 511 of 1989 decided on May
27, 1992), while interpreting the provisions of Rajasthan Land and
Building Tax Act, 1964, has held that the person who is entitled to
receive the rent is assessable in respect of a property even if it is not
registered in his name.

Section 202 Indian Contract Act

Shanti Budhiya Vesta Patel & Ors vs Nirmala Jayprakash Tiwari & Ors on
21 April, 2010
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34. In this regard, we wish to refer to the judgment of this Court in the
case

of Shankar

Sitaram

Sontakke

v.

Balkrishna

Sitaram

Sontakke reported in AIR 1954 SC 352 wherein this Court while

dealing with the nature of a consent decree held in para 9 as under:
35. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Loonkaran v.
State

Bank,

Jaipur reported

in

(1969)

SCR

122

where

interpreting Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act, this Court

held thus:
36. The appellants also alleged that they had revoked the Powers of
Attorney executed by them in favour of the respondent no. 9 by filing
complaints with the police. We are of the considered opinion that this
contention of the appellants is devoid of merit. Although there is no
denying the fact that three police complaints had been filed on three
different dates with the police against the alleged harassment and
threats by respondent nos. 8 and 9, it is difficult to understand how
the Powers of Attorney executed by the appellants or their
predecessor-in-interest stood revoked. The record of the case reveals
that each of the complaints was filed by a separate person - the first
complaint was filed by the appellants themselves, the second by an

Advocate and the third by one Narendra M. Patel, who is himself a

builder. It is significant to note that all these complaints came to be
filed when said Narender M. Patel came into the picture. Further, it is
important to take note of the factthat all the Powers of Attorney
executed in favour of respondent no. 9 as also all the deeds and
documents entered into between the predecessor-in-interest of the
appellants and respondent no. 9 were duly registered with the office of
the Sub-Registrar. Neither any document nor any of the Powers of
Attorney was ever got cancelled by the appellants.

Section 1A and 2 of Power of Attorney Act

State Of Rajasthan & Ors vs Basant Nahata on 7 September, 2005

Link - http://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/1422834/?formInput=powers
%20of%20attorney%20act%20section%201a%20%20doctypes%3A
%20supremecourt

Besides the Indian Contract Act, the Power of Attorney Act, 1882
deals

with

the

subject.Section 1A of

the Power of Attorney Act defines power of attorney to

include

any instruments empowering a specified person to act for and in the

name of the person executing it.Section 2 of the said Act reads, thus:
"Execution under power-of-attorney The donee of a power-ofattorney may, if he thinks fit, execute or do any instrument or thing
in and with his own name and signature, and his own seal, where
sealing is required, by the authority of the donor of the power; and
every instrument and thing so executed and done, shall be as effectual
in law as if it had been executed or done by the donee of the power in
the name, and with the signature and seal, of the donor thereof.