Round 2NegKansas State KS

1NC

T
Interpretation and violation---the affirmative should defend the desirability of
topical government action.
Jon M Ericson 03, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts California Polytechnic U., et
al., The Debaters Guide, Third Edition, p. 4
The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they
have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---The
United States in The United States should adopt a policy of free trade. Like the object of evaluation in a proposition
of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb shouldthe first part of a verb phrase that urges
action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a
program or policy into action through governmental means . 4. A specification of
directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the
topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce.
Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred.

The entire debate is about whether

something ought to occur . What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient
and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.
B. Vote neg
1. Prep and clashpost facto topic change alters balance of prep, which
structurally favors the aff because they speak last and use permskey to engage a
prepared adversary.
2. Limitsspecific topics are key to reasonable expectations for 2Nsopen
subjects create incentives for avoidancethat overstretches the negative and turns
participation.
The first impact is deliberation
Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialoguemonopolizing strategy
and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role
Galloway 7 professor of communications at Samford University (Ryan, Dinner And
Conversation At The Argumentative Table: Reconceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative
Dialogue, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)
Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position.
Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing.
The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently
resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point
of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic
consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the
arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced
argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also

undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the
other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A
pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be
fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from
being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand
to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation,
research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness
norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the
argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to

understand what went on and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh
Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other
because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound
decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among
free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we
reach agreement which binds us to a common causeIf we are to be equalrelationships among
equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).
Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that
maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an
affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle
East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the
arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically
or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange
of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role
to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective counter-word and undermining
the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for
topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.
Topic relevance isn't enoughonly a precise and limited rez enables deliberation
Steinberg & Freeley 8 *Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal,
personal injury and civil rights law, AND **David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication
Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision
Making pp45Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of
interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for
debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to
attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about
this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas,
proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce
effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be
answered . For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal
immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration
and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from
American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the
responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should
they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal
immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human
beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families
impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we

build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers?
Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be
addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this
"debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful
without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in
the controversy . To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague
understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions , frustration, and emotional
distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the
immigration debate during the summer of 2007.

Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially
disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded,
and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain
order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision,
such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned

citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their
frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their
discussions , they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding
points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise
question is posedsuch as "What can be done to improve public education?"then a more profitable area of
discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution
step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for
parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government
should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a
school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for
debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points

of difference.
To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing
limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk
about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an
interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument . For example, the statement
"Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much
basis for clear argumentation . If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical
force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific
purpose.
Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad , too loosely
worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned withpoems, novels,
government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context?
What kind of physical force is being comparedfists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question
might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain
crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the

United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates
might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to
say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by
advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the
controversy ; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging . The point is that
debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference ,
which will be outlined in the following discussion.
An ethos of deliberation is key to solve all social and existential problems
Doug Schuler 8, Instructor @ Evergreen State College, CULTIVATING SOCIETYS CIVIC
INTELLIGENCE: PATTERNS FOR A NEW WORLD BRAIN, Information, Communication &
Society 4:2 2001 157181
In a recent issue of Wired Magazine, consummate computing pioneer Bill Joy (2000) unveiled a trio of apocalyptic scenarios that he believes could be
unleashed in the not-too-distant future. These unpleasantries, resulting from unrestrained, unprincipled and unregulated genetic engineering, nanotechnology and robotics (GNR), can be added to the list of big

nightmares of the twentieth century (such as environmental

disasters , nuclear and bacteriological warfare which may yet plague us. Each of these
technologies, according to Joy, could abruptly unleash problems on so vast and unprecedented a scale
that any of humankinds responses would be completely overwhelmed . That such a notable
priest had so seriously challenged the central teachings of the technological (and economic) church was not missed by the US media where the story
was featured on the front page of the New York Times and other prominent newspapers. Ironically, computers are at the forefront of the problems Joy
describes; without them those catastrophes would be inconceivable. Computers are, in fact, the only indispensable element in each of three problems.

Joys scenarios centre on technological development outstripping humankinds ability to control it. Our fail safe point may have been passed according
to Joy. A variant on Malthusian predictions (much disparaged but impossible to disprove) may be finally bearing the bitter fruit that Malthus foresaw.

The planets burgeoning population and its deteriorating environmental condition ,

coupled with humankinds propensity towards disagreement and strife, its disregard for nature and its
penchant for exploiting her innermost secrets may provide an ideal set of preconditions for a sudden and profound
technological ambush. Joy, of course, is not alone in his warnings. Indeed, our era could be characterized as the age of such warnings. Many
scientists have documented the monumental changes that humankind is currently loosing upon
the natural environment. In another recent article scientists concluded that the human- originated changes currently being wrought on
the planet have attained the magnitude of a geologic force (Karl and Trenberth 1999). Nobody knows the consequences of ignoring these changes. Yet it
is a matter of obvious importance to the inhabitants human and otherwise of the earth. A cavalier disregard

may be
catastrophic . Anticipating and possibly averting ecological and other nightmares would probably
require changes to our ways of thinking and acting ; changes which, depending on their scope and severity, are likely to be
extremely difficult to enact. People are loath to change habits developed, cultivated, and rationalized over a lifetime. Humankind, similarly, is unlikely
to modify cherished habits to avert problems of the future based on contested evidence of new circumstances, especially ones that may not seem to

human extinction within a

generation is possible . Assuming that his predictions have even a germ of possibility, the obvious question is what
can be done to understand the situation, avert potential disasters and develop a more sustainable
relationship with our social and natural environments. The equally important but less obvious issue is
identifying the underlying conditions that would help make even a partial resolution of the
problems become conceivable. This paper is an attempt at describing these conditions and how the idea of a civic intelligence might
appropriate to their lives. Joys predictions border on the apocalyptic; in his mind

play a useful role. THE WORLD BRAIN AND OTHER UTOPIAN VISIONS Joys concerns, and others like his, were formerly found only in science
fiction for it is in that genre that technological and social possibilities are most creatively explored. For that reason I would like to invoke the memory of
H.G. Wells, the English science fiction writer, historian, generalist and visionary, who did not live to see the Internet or other recent technological
achievements. Wells was not just a science fiction writer who integrated technological scenarios with social issues and outcomes; he was also a historian
who searched for broad historical patterns: I dislike isolated events and disconnected details (Wells 1971). Wells was also deeply concerned about the
human condition and devoted considerable thought to the prospects of enlightened social amelioration. He discussed, for example, in the 1930s a
number of collective problems that would become increasingly apparent in the following seventy or so years (including environmental problems and
weapons of mass destruction). Wells believed that there was a conspicuous ineffectiveness of modern knowledge and . . . trained and studied thought
in contemporary affairs. As a collective body, we are failing to address collective problems in spite of immense individual talent and specialized knowledge. In
his quest for possible antidotes, he dismisses all types of ideologies and religions as unsuitable. He also rejected rule by some sort of elite, in which the man of
science and the technician will play a dominating part. Joy, of course, would be a member of such a group, even though that group is responsible to some
degree as the perpetrator of the challenges that Joy warns about. Wells places his faith in science and not men of science. Science, in his view, should
enlighten and animate our politics and determine the course of the world. To this end he asks, Is there any way of implementing knowledge for ready
and universal effect? His answer is a world encyclopedia which would provide an intellectual backbone for the human race,
aworldbrainthatwoulddojustwhatourscatteredanddisorientedintellectual organizations of today fall short of doing. It would hold the world together
mentally. Wells placed his faith in the establishment of a world encyclopedia, a single artefact packaged as a series of bound volumes which would
apparently be so accurate, that people would have little choice but to make the right collective decisions based on diligent study. Unfortunately very few
people could afford to purchase this set of volumes and fewer still would read them in their entirety and absorb the knowledge therein. Nor is the
existence of facts tantamount to the existence of objective interpretations of the facts or obvious policies or courses of action based on those facts.
Facts have meaning only when interpreted and they have power only when they have consequences. Without saying so directly, Wells suggests that
society becomes more intelligent by making its citizenry more mindful of the facts. Perhaps the most ambitious project along these lines was the one
proposed by the German philosopher Leibniz. Leibniz was an advocate for artificial intelligence some 300 years before its official inception. He
conceived of an invention that would be a type of artificial patriarch, almost a god. He immodestly proclaimed in 1679 that his invention uses reason in
its entirety and is, in addition, a judge of controversies, an interpreter of notions, a balance of probabilities, a compass which will guide us over the
ocean of experiences, an inventory of all things, a table of thoughts, a microscope for scrutinizing present things, a telescope for predicting distant
things, a general calculus, and innocent magic, a non- chimerical Cabal, a script which all will read in their own language; and even a language which
one will be able to learn in a few weeks, and which will soon be accepted amidst the world. The system had two extremely powerful components: a
universal represen- tation system; and a universal calculus for ratiocinating over the facts in the systems vast information stores. Leibniz anticipates
Joys concerns but, unlike Joy, appears to be an uncritical promoter at least of the particular manifestation that he envisions. He presupposes that some
type of ultra-rational system could actually be constructed and that it could and would be used for decision making that was best for all; the idea
that the system could be somehow subverted or misused was not considered. History has indeed furnished us with a host of projects that would
enlighten us in some near-mechanical fashion. These include Bacons House of Solomon, Otlets Office of Documentation and Palais Mondial. Some
years later, in 1888, the prominent American pragmatist, John Dewey, also believed that what was wrong with society was a failure of intelligence and
information. Dewey, along with support from Franklin Ford, a financial journalist planned to offer his own version of a world brain in the form of a
weekly newspaper entitled Thought News. This ill-fated idea was universally panned and Dewey and Franklin failed to produce a single issue of the
Thought News. THE PROJECTS UNRAVEL BEFORE THEY BEGIN Schemes like those advanced

by the visionaries above always

fall short of their utopian objectives ; they usually fail to recognize one or more fundamental barriers that stand in the way.
Their projects are often disconnected from social realities . Some of the projects, Wellss world encyclopedia,

for example, would depend on the ability to mobilize large numbers of people in the development of some single artefact. On top of that, there is little or
no social or cultural desire demonstrated for the product nor evidence that it would be used at all, much less with the utopian results envisioned by the
encyclopedias prime advocate. What many visionaries fail to notice is that a

grand idea, how ever obvious to the

perpetrator as a solution, must be coherently embedded in a system of existing social
forces, institutions and conceptualizations . While we ultimately will discuss some ideas for a world brain that
avoids the undoings of the other utopian projects, we will first examine two additional arguments why establishing a world brain or other utopian
scheme is difficult. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEMOCRACY The

co-operation of the people is likely to be necessary for

any required changes in our techniques for addressing the problems that Joy and others have

presented. Co-operation that is willingly embraced through non-coercive means is more reliable and more easily
sustained. For those reasons, it appears that democracy in one form or another may be necessary . In addition, the
potential reach and malleability of the Internet and other new communication technologies further suggest that it may be possible to devise
applications, services and institutions within the evolving world communication network that would support and strengthen these democratic

approaches. Communication, certainly, is key to any effective democratic system . Projects along these lines, while
reminiscent of Wellss world brain visions, would need to be more aligned with the preconditions that support conceptual and technological innovation
if they are to be used and useful. Democracy, as nearly everybody knows, is highly awed in practice: the wrong people can become elected for the
wrong reasons and do the wrong things once in of ce. Candidates can be favoured for their tousled hair, their dimpled smile, their lineage, the slogan
du jour. Once in power, elected of cials may acquiesce to special interests (Greider 1993) or be undermined through media-induced scandal (Castells
1998). Running for of ce (in the USA) is so costly that only the very rich have any chance of getting elected (it was estimated that the New York state
Senate race would probably cost over one hundred million dollars). The role of the media, lobbyists, rich patrons, professional public relations
campaigns and dirty tricks further frustrate any attempt to understand or to participate meaningfully in the democratic process. The task of collective
self-rule democracy has been called an impossible task. Indeed, its impossibility can even be proved, in much the same way that engineers had
proved that bee ight is impossible. The task of democracy if its done remotely well (so the story goes) is so exacting, so all-encompassing, yet so
frustrating and ultimately unpredictable, that its been called an impossible enterprise. Lippman (1925), in particular, was sceptical of the idea of an
omnicompetent citizen who possesses sufficient knowledge to participate effectively in the political process. Lippman notes that even though civic
affairs was his professional avocation, he was unable to monitor the relevant data, initiatives and ideas that he believed would minimally be necessary
for him to sustain competence in this area. To be minimally competent in the area that this paper addresses, for example, a person should be well
acquainted with democratic theory, world systems, communication technology, political economy, public policy, environmentalism and the state of the
world, and many other topics. Each of these areas is characterized by shifting opinions, initiatives and discourses, in
additiontoanoverabundanceofempirical,veriabledata(whoseinterpretations are then disputed). (Interestingly, as Wells points out, our elected leaders
themselves are far from omnicompetent. Their chief skills, campaigning and political manoeuvring, are, in large part, responsible for their success,
while their competency in other matters may be underdeveloped.) Asimilarcriticismcan,ofcourse,bedirectedtowardsanyelitebody,however humanely
and well disposed they are towards governing the rest of the citizenry. But does Lippmans critique render democracy impossible or merely the idea of
omnicompetence and its purported indispensability. I would claim the latter. Reality is unfathomably complex and we are each incapable of knowing
even one aspect in its totality. But, impossible or not, democracy or some approximation of democracy

is not optional; decisions have to

have no choice but to cultivate systems of governance that can help us constructively
engage with our collective concerns . Lippmans critique is valuable, but not to support the conclusions for which it was
be made. We

originally marshalled. Lippman demonstrates the fallibility of basing a system of governance on the idea of omnicompetency. Indeed, any system of
governance should assume the impossibility of omnicompetence and the inescapable reality of imperfect competence, while not allowing ourselves to
be defeated by it. This means, in software parlance, turning a bug into a feature. It may be, in fact, the impossibility of omnicompetence that makes

democracy the only viable choice for a system of governance. DUMBING DOWN THE CITIZEN In the early 1970s Harry Bravermans Labor
and Monopoly Capital (1998) demonstrated

how the process of dumbing down workers, primarily through severely

management control and,
hence, profits to the advantage of capital. Since the idea of civic intelligence will soon be discussed here, we may hypothesize brie y
about whether these ideas may also have some applicability outside the workplace . Is it possible that
the citizenry is being dumbed down in similar ways? And, if so, can we run the processes in reverse to
undo the damage? The key to Bravermans analysis is the decomposition of broad workplace responsibilities
by management into discrete constituent parts, which are then used to force workers to perform within circumscribed
ranges. This process, often in the name of efficiency, dramatically lessens the scope and
directionality of worker power . How could this process be replicated in realms outside of the workplace? The first
responsibility to be jettisoned (as outside their primary work responsibility) in the civic sphere under such a
redefinition would be the consideration of issues relating to general social implications . Thus
workers and labour unions should focus exclusively on jobs and job security (and not, for instance, the social consequences of the jobs); artists
should explore and express their individual feelings ; scientists and researchers should pursue what is
reducing their on-the-job responsibility, exibility, and autonomy (often called de-skilling) increases

fundable within a narrow, specialized niche computer science, physics and other technical disciplines would expel implications of their subject
matters from the curriculum, while measuring success purely in terms of monetary return on investment. Citizens, of course, would spend much of
their non-working life shopping, buying items that will maximize their individual comfort and status while keeping the economic machine running at

This general process removes the politics of labour , leisure and learning; indeed it
naturally results in the de-skilling of the citizen. Economists are the pioneers in this process by adapting and
advocating the use of an economic calculus as the sole determinant for all of our decisions . This is
the ultimate dumbing down; it reduces human aspirations and agency to that of a greedy and unthinking
automaton. The media de-skill the citizenry in several ways as well, according to a variety of scholars. Castells (1997), for example, shows how
maximum capacity.

the medias xation with political scandal encourages cynicism and political disengagement on the part of the citizenry. The media often promotes the
spectacle (Garber et al. 1993) at the expense of the intellectually taxing. The ill effects of money on the media, politics and elections also further
increase the distance between citizens and public affairs (Schuler 2001). Furthermore, Robert Putnam shows convincingly that, at least in the USA, the
virtually overnight spread of commercial broadcast television was a primary culprit in the steady degradation of US civic life over the last several
decades (Putnam 1996). One can only wonder what effects this new electronic opiate of the masses will have as it continues its spread on cultures
outside the USA. The questions as to whether and to what extent citizen de-skilling has been orchestrated, and by whom, will not be discussed in
depth in this paper (although the transformation of the USA from a country of citizens to a country of consumers is certainly an appropriate and
provocative topic to contemplate in this regard). It is sufcient to say that civic

de-skilling is likely to dampen civic

intelligence by influencing the content of, and the conditions under, which issues are placed on the public

agenda, and by trivializing and polarizing discussion and deliberation on important

public matters. Certainly each de-skilling step introduceschangesinbothinstitutionalization,theprescribedprocessesthrough which actions are
advanced and validated, and in conceptualization of what everyday life entails; each step helps erect the ordinary and the extraordinary barriersto civic
intelligence. WHO OR WHAT WILL GOVERN? If the dire scenarios that Joy describes (or even the less dramatic, but no less worrisome,
environmental catastrophes that atmospheric and other scientists warn us about) have even a minuscule chance of occurring, an urgent need to
consider ways to avert them arises. Since

solutions to these problems are likely to be protracted and multi-pronged, and

involve large segments of the citizenry, a correspondingly urgent need to analyse the
preconditions underlying the development and successful implementation of these
solutions also arises. What environments social and technological would be hospitable to the satisfactory resolving of these

problems? If we could imagine humankind finding better responses to our myriad problems, old and new, what circumstances and resources need to be
in place and what steps could be taken that would support these new responses? These

preconditions and steps we can call civic

intelligence or perhaps a world brain. What choices face us in the design of this civic intelligence? What attributes could it have? One
hypothetical expression of civic intelligence would be a massively complex computer system which would make intelligent decisions on societys
behalf. This option would be a twenty-rst century manifestation of Leibnizs dream, a terrifying cybernetic Frankenstein-on-a-chip from the same
cupboardofnightmaresthatJoyopenedinhisWiredarticle.Thelimitationsofthis approach are manifold but are worth mentioning briey. The
impossibility of accurately, adequately and comprehensively representing infinitely complex situations with discrete computer logic comes to mind, as
do the problems surrounding the implementation of the decisions. Would police or other armed organizations receive their instructions from such an
intelligent system? The problem of the biases and assumptions of the systems creators becoming embodied (forever?) in such a system is also a
sobering and disturbing thought. Imagine an International Monetary Fund (IMF) expert system free to impose
economicrestructuringonhaplessregionsaccordingtothearcanetheoremsof economists!
Otherapproacheswhichrelymoreheavilyonintelligenceofthenon-articial variety include having a small elite group making the decisions, nobody
making decisions (let the free market reign, for example), or a system in which citizens play a strong role. Political scientist, Robert Dahl (1989),
suggests that these three systems dictatorship, anarchy and democracy, as well as polyarchy, a hybrid of the others constitute the entire list of
possibilities. Wells suggested that scientists (at least in his day) would sometimes yearn for a society that would apply their (eminently reasonable)
principles and clamour for their leadership and Lippman believed that an elite group should govern because of the impossibility of omnicompetence.
What Lippman didnt acknowl- edge was that omnicompetence is impossible for small groups as well as for individuals. Americas best and brightest,
for example, engineered Americas tragic war with Vietnam. Regardless of the role of an elite, the non-elite citizenry will necessarily also have a strong
role to play. If an elite group, for example, devises solutions or sets of solutions theyd then have the thankless and potentially impossible job of
convincing (through rational appeal, propaganda or force) the rest of us to accept their jeremiads and prescriptions. A democratic approach, on the
other hand, would be to enlist the aid of the citizenry at the onset as part of the overall project. The population or at least a large majority may need to
buy in and adopt without coercion or deception ideas and actions that would be unacceptable without suitable participation in the process
(Pateman 1970) that developed those ideas and actions. A

more radically democratic view (and the one that might ultimately be seen
that the often neglected, sometimes dumbed down citizenry might provide the
intelligence, creativity, energy and leadership that is needed to recognize, formulate and
reconcile the problems that we are faced with . As we have seen governance shouldnt be entrusted to an
as the obvious choice) is

omnicompetent elite or an infallible computer system; both are impossible to achieve. Nor should governance blind luck through the fantasy that the
status quo and/or the free market will miraculously solve current problems and avert future ones through benign and unanticipated side effects. A
democratic system of governance, then, is the only viable alternative and civic intelligence that is strongly democratic in spite of the problems
previously discussed shows the greatest promise for an effectiveandequitablesystemofgovernance. This approach increases distribution of creativity
and attention while, at the same time, reducing concentration of power away from those people with vested interests in maximizing their gain (often
short-term) over the (often long-term) gain of the larger population. There is mounting evidence that this democratization is occurring. As McKibben
(2000) points out, the vast majority of Seattles anti-WTO protesters were demonstrating on behalf of somebody else, an impossibility according to
homo economicis. Keck and Sikkink (1998) report that advocacy networks often involved individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily
linked to a ratio- nalist understanding of their interests. An

effective and equitable system of governance would

help promote the creativity of the civic sector which is, as Castells (1997) and others remind us, responsible for
launching the major social movements of the last century , including the environmental,
civil rights and the womens movement. CIVIC INTELLIGENCE: TOWARDS A WORLD BRAIN Civic intelligence, as I

propose it, is relatively prosaic: it refers to the ability of humankind to use information and communication in order to engage in collective problem
solving. The term has nothing to do with the metaphysical musings on global consciousness, hyperintelligence and the like, which are expected, by
some, to emerge spontaneously at some time in the not too distant future ushered in by global communication networks. Like the intelligence of an
individual, civic intelligence is a relative form that can be less or more effective and creative. Thus it can be developed incrementally through human
effort, not through sudden inexplicablerevolutionanticipatedbyfaithorspirituallonging.Civicintelligence extends the notion of social capital (Putnam
2000) to include an agenda, an orientation towards action in addition to one of observation and study. By transcending the individual, civic intelligence
adds another level to the idea of intelligence. Civic

intelligence is a form of collective intelligence . It is a premise of

this chapter that this type of intelligence, probably to a much higher degree than an individuals
intelligence, can be improved and made more effective . And how people create, share and act upon
information is crucial to that. Intelligence implies an orderly process for assessing situations, ranging over possible responses and determining and
enacting appropriate actions. It also implies looking into the future insofar as that is possible, and making decisions in the present that will help make
future situations advantageous at best, tractable at worst. Sometimes, of course, this will mean some postponing of expected bene t. Another
important element of intelligence is the ability to acknowledge changingcircumstancesandtoadaptappropriately.Plansandothertemplatesfor action are
indispensable; unfortunately they are not infallible. Intelligence is the latent capability to interpret, respond and survive. Its reference point is human
and the seat of intelligence is the human brain. The human brain is, of course, a remarkable organ, one whose complexity is unmatched in natural or
human-made products. The brain stores information in the form of memory and in reflexive and habitual patterns of responses. It takes in information
about the environment in a variety of forms from low- level sensory data to highly symbolic and abstract conceptual information. It integrates all of
this information, helps to regulate all the systems and functions in the body and is largely responsible for the bodys thoughts and actions. Although the
brain (and the nervous system) is the organ where thought and decision occurs in the human body, it is certainly not in charge of everything; it cant,
for example, decide to deprive the left foot of nutrients. This contrasts with social systems
whicharemorerecongurable;atleastintheory.Thegovernment,forexample, can decide to stop funding health care programmes or subsidies to weapon

developers. It is also important, for communication in the human body and for our analytic purposes, to realize that although the collection of systems
that constitute the human body (or even the brain) is an integrated whole, the

relationships of its subsystems arent wholly

co-operative; there are conflicting needs and requests that cant all be met. Conflict and the
need to resolve conflict is crucial in both individual and collective intelligences .
Second, topic education
The devil is in the details---activists need to challenge particular and complex
instances of presence to effectively create change
Erik Leaver 7, Carol and Ed Newman Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, policy outreach
coordinator for Foreign Policy In Focus, Shock but No Awe Congress, Bush, the peace
movement and Iraq, 4/13/2007, https://peaceblog.wordpress.com/2007/04/17/shock-but-noawe-congress-bush-the-peace-movement-and-iraq/
As the Iraq War and U.S. occupation began their fifth year on March 19, few Americans were paying attention to what was going on in Iraq. Instead the nations eyes were riveted on the halls of Congress as the

Democrats waged a battle to pass a bill setting a timetable for the withdrawal of combat troops.

The bill was a political victory for the country and indeed the globe. For the first time in more than four years of war, the debate moved from the question of if the U.S. should leave to when the U.S . should leave.

the devil is in the details . Upon closer inspection, the politics might be right but the
actual policy within the bill is a far cry from what both Iraqis and the U.S. public wants. And while the

But

debate lingers as the President has vowed to veto the bill and Congress ponders the next steps, Bushs surge continues, bringing 30,000 more U.S. soldiers to Baghdad while the violence continues and soldiers
and innocent civilians perish. A Democratic Congress: An Opportunity for Change? The 2006 Elections The mandate from the 2006 mid-term elections has widely been interpreted as a mandate for changing
U.S. policy toward Iraq. But the shift in campaign rhetoric around Iraq wasnt a central Democratic strategy. Indeed, it was Ned Lamonts successful primary challenge to Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) that
moved the debate. Until Lamont succeeded in his primary bid based around the central message of bringing the troops home, Democrats were taking the trajectory of simply criticizing the Presidents conduct of
the war. Lamont changed that dynamic, forcing candidates across the country to define their position on troop withdrawals. Putting the Iraq issue front and center in the campaigns, Democrats took narrow
majorities in the House and much to the surprise of pundits (and the party itself) the Senate. January 2007: Democrats Take Charge While Democrats came to power their narrow majorities injected caution
into the Party who (like the Republican Party) is more concerned about holding office than implementing sound policy. The election also resulted in a wider divide of values across the party. Anybody but Bush
voters elected many Democrats in traditional Republican strongholds while progressives were able to gain ground with their Bring home the troops message in solid blue states. Both poles of the Party (left and
right) became stronger making it more difficult to forge consensus. Hence, it was not surprising that the first seven legislative issues for the Democratic congress did not include Iraq. However, Iraq quickly
moved on to the agenda with Bushs announcement on January 10, 2007 that he would send an additional 20,000 troops to Baghdad in a surge aimed at quelling the violence. Bush also sent Congress two
spending requests for the war: $93 billion for the rest of the 2007 fiscal year and $140 billion for the 2008 fiscal year. Democrats jumped on Bushs announcement and shortly began debating resolutions opposing
the escalation and started a flurry of hearings on Iraq in virtually every congressional committee. But momentum for change stalled as the Senate failed to pass a resolution opposing the escalation. And fearful of
being labeled weak on defense, Democratic leadership penned talking points underscoring that they would not cut off funds to troops in the field. It became unclear how or even if the Democrats would challenge
the Presidents funding request. The Rubber Hits the Road: The War Supplemental Bush officially asked Congress for $93 billion on February 5, 2007 for the remainder of fiscal year 2007. These funds were on
top of the $70 billion Congress approved last year for fiscal year 2007, bringing the years total to $163 billion. With the nation largely opposed to Bushs escalation and in favor of a timeline for withdrawal, the

Instead of directly challenging Bush on his

funding request, some Democrats sought to dodge responsibility altogether. Presidential hopeful, Joe Biden, questioned
debate around the spending bill should not have become about the money, it should have focused on the policy.

whether Congress had the legitimate constitutional authority to defund a military action against the Presidents wishes. Ironically it was Bushs latest Supreme Court nominee, Justice Alito, who stated to Senator
Biden during his confirmation hearing (t)he constitution gives Congress the power of the purse, and obviously military operations cant be carried out for any length of time without Congressional

Conservatives such as Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) openly challenged Democrats to pass a bill
If you think supporting the troops is bringing them home , then why not pass a
bill that does that? In asking this question, Graham aptly pointed out the Democrats main weaknessthe lack of consensus within
the Democratic Party on what an alternative Iraq policy should look like . Fumbling for a Strategy: Murtha All eyes focused on the office of Rep. Jack
appropriations. Seeing weakness from the Democrats,
opposing the president,

Murtha (D-PA), the architect of the spending bill that would reach the House floor. A long time critic of the war, and author of a bill calling for an immediate redeployment of the troops, many expected Murtha to
write a bill that would effectively end the war and present a clear strategy for the Democrats. But instead of taking Grahams challenge head on, Murtha sought to stop the war through slight-of-hand maneuvers
such as holding back troops that were not combat ready, ending stop-loss policies, and cutting funds for military contractors. While cleverly putting Democrats on the side of the troops, Murthas strategy didnt
adequately engage other members of congress, resulting in severe backlash from more conservative Democrats. His strategy, though not the policy, was also openly attacked by Republicans. And Murtha lacked
popular support as his back door maneuvering removed public opinion and the grassroots from the debate. The Democratic leadership, slow to devise an initial strategy, quickly moved in to take control over the
process in an attempt to resuscitate the bill. A Weak Foundation: Pelosis Compromise Congressional analysts were quick to point out that the funding bill became House Speaker Nancy Pelosis first major
challenge. Many argued that if she failed to pass a bill, it would show great weakness in the Democratic leadership. Democrats rose to answer this conservative framing instead of putting the pressure back on the
President who was driving the country in the exact opposite direction than the voters expressed. Instead of asking the question if the country should pony up an additional $93 billion for war, the question became,
can Pelosi (D-CA) pass a bill? With a diversity of opinion within the Democratic Caucus, the focus became on what compromise could be hashed out between the conservative Blue Dogs and Progressives. There
was never a fight about the overarching Iraq policy. Instead, the biggest brawl the public saw was between House Appropriations committee Chairman David Obey (D-WI) and the mother of a Marine and an antiwar activist, Tina Richards. Responding from Richards plea to stop the war Obey screamed, We dont have the votes. But it was never clear that Obey and others were in fact seeking the votes to end the war.
Instead they were seeking the votes for what ended up being a weak compromise. The Result: A Political Victory but Bad Policy With narrow majorities the House and Senate both passed the emergency

Headlines across the nation portrayed the bills as major challenges to the White House, setting
deadlines for the withdrawal of combat troops. However, little attention was paid to the actual content of the
bills . A Bad Policy Much attention has been paid to the waivers granted to the President in the bills to allow non-combat troops to be sent into battle. But the larger policy question, that of withdrawals,
spending bills.

has largely been overlooked. The withdrawal of combat troops is not well-defined in the legislation, potentially leaving 40-60,000 troops in Iraq when the March or August 2008 deadlines arrive (March is the
Senate deadline and August is the House deadline). Both versions authorize three main categories of troops that can remain: Trainers: Current levels are approximately 6,000. But the Iraq Study Group
recommended 10,000-20,000. Potentially the President could use the ISG numbers. Counter-terrorist forces: Marine Colonel Peter Devlin, stationed in Ramadi, Iraq, wrote a detailed and recently updated
classified memo in August 2006 on the situation in al-Anbar province, State of the Insurgency in Al-Anbar. He concluded that an additional division (15,00020,000 troops) would be required to defeat the
terrorists. The bill only provides for forces to attack al-Qaida but the definition of terrorists could easily be expanded by the President. Protection for Embassy/Diplomats: The intent in the language is unclear but
at a minimum this would mean leaving protection for the Embassy in the Green Zone. It would likely include leaving protection for the Baghdad airport and the road between the airport and Green Zone. A larger
troop presence could be larger if they are protecting outlying areas where the provincial reconstruction teams are located. Force protection for these scenarios could range between 5,000-20,000. None of these
projections include estimates for the number of military contractors that would be in support of the operations. The bill language does not have any restrictions on contractors who currently number between
75,000-150,000 The bills are also weak on providing measures that are needed in tandem with a drawdown. The bills make economic aid dependent on the performance of the Iraqi government. Tying the aid in
this manner presents a similar dynamic to the sanctions era, where the population was punished for the actions of the Iraqi leadership. More importantly, cutting aid deprives the population that the U.S. needs
support from to reduce their tendency to engage in terrorist/insurgency activities. To be sure, there is some good language on regional diplomacy, veterans health care, and active duty health care but overall
these measures are a weak band-aid for a bill that will continue the U.S. military presence & occupation and generate the same problems for years to come. The policies outlined in the bill largely follow the
bipartisan Iraq Study Groups (ISG) recommendations from their November 2006 report. But the ISG recommendations were aimed at bridging a political impasse between the President and the public, i.e. they
were aimed at providing the political cover needed for the President to change his policynot for putting forward the best possible policy. And with Bush standing steadfast against even the modest ISG reforms,
lawmakers should be pressing for the best policy. The Impact on the Anti-War Movement While the change in tenor on Iraq was a great success for the anti-war movement, the supplemental debate caused a
serious dilemma within the movement. The vote forced organizations to pick supporting politics vs. opposing a bad policy. David Sirota, co-chairman of the Progressive States Network, argued in favor of the bill,
anticipating that if the bill failed, that House Democratic leaders would have come back to write a clean supplemental billone that funds the war but does not include the binding legislation to end it. He
concluded, As long as binding language ending the war was in these bills, voting yes was clearly the way to bring the country closer to achieving the anti-war movements goal. Criticizing those in the movement
who supported the bill, historian Howard

Zinn wrote, When a social movement adopts the compromises of legislators,

it has forgotten its role, which is to push and challenge the politicians, not to fall in meekly behind them. But Zinn
likely overlooked the lobbying efforts many groups have undertaken for the last four years.
Grassroots have continuously challenged those in Congress and in doing so, gave progressives in
Congress a much stronger hand in the negotiations around the spending bill. Public opinion, while widely against the
conduct of the war is not for the immediate withdrawal that the anti-war movement wants. And Sirota missed the huge loopholes that exist in the bill, allowing the war to continue even after the deadlines are

neither side in this debate seems to understand the value in the other

met. Oddly enough,

, nor how the outcome actually
increased the strength of the anti-war movement. Passage of a bill that calls for bringing many of the troops home in an 18-month timeframe is a victory given the narrow Democratic majorities in Congress and
with a President who has vowed to stay in Iraq even if his only supporters are his wife and his dog. Given these challenges, a victory was achieved but it has to be seen as part of a larger strategy over the course of

pointing out the large

deficiencies in the bill , it provides leverage for future concessions and a way to end the war
sooner. The Aftermath: What Next Shortly after the bill passed, the President held a news conference announcing that he would veto the bill. This news conference was followed by two weeks of veto
this year where there are votes on the Defense Authorization bill, and Defense Appropriations bill, along with another supplemental. By

threats from the White House along with an invitation for Democrats to visit Bush for a lecture on why they should support his escalation and never ending war in Iraq. With this showdown looming many are
asking what the next steps will be. Options Overriding a veto is impossible given the close passage in both chambers of Congress. And failing to pass any bill, effectively cutting the funds off isnt politically
feasible given that the Democrats fell prey to the White Houses framing of funding as the only way to support the troops. Assuming that the House and Senate will pass the compromise report reconciling the
two different versions of the bill the following options exist for the next steps: 1) A Worse Bill: A new bill that would keep the same conditions and waivers but would make the dates for withdrawal goals instead
of deadlines; 2) Pass the same bill again but without the congressional pork barrel projects; 3) A Short-term Funding Bill; 4) A Stronger Bill: A new bill to provide funding to bring all the troops home.
Passage of a weaker bill is unlikely given that lawmakers have taken a strong stand and are strongly supported by the public. A similar bill without the pork would be welcome but could easily be cast as a political
stunt given the veto of virtually the same bill. Many Democratic lawmakers are eyeing the possibility of a short-term funding bill. Given that the presidents war request was $93 billion and Congress passed a
$121 billion bill, but the Congressional Research Service just released a report that the Pentagon has funding for the war until July, a short-term bill would only need to provide $30 billion (current spending is $10
billion per month and the 2007 fiscal year ends on Sept 30). Beyond the faulty math problem, the short-term solution simply continues the larger policy problem and Congress and the President would have the
same confrontations in the Defense Authorization bill, Defense Appropriations bill, and the FY2008 supplemental. The best option is to take up Sen. Grahams challenge and present a stronger bill that would
provide funds to bring all of the troops home. It is clear that Bush is out of step with the American public and has no desire to resolve the conflict nor negotiate a compromise so any of the first three options will
likely fail. A clean bill to bring the troops home would empower the grassroots and allow citizens across the country to get involved in the debate. It would also allow for the voices of Iraqis to enter into this onesided discussion as tens of thousands of Iraqis demonstrated on April 10th against the occupation. This type of bill would also put the most pressure on Republicans and conservative Democrats who would be
needed to override a veto. Role of the Anti-War Movement Over the next short period there are three primary tasks for the anti-war movement. Pressure Republicans and conservative Democrats, shore up

Congress is not comprised

of peaceniks , but also that political compromises will be made along the way. Constant pressure from both sides will be needed.
In the long process to end the Vietnam War, over 30 votes were taken on various pieces of legislation. Public
pressure was the key to moving legislation and changing lawmakers positions . That same pressure is needed now.
Progressives, and conduct massive public education on why funding withdrawal is the right policy. The anti-war movement must realize that

Thats the only effective challenge to militarismthe aff is moralizing

disengagement
Mellor, 13Ph.D. candidate, Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute
(Ewan, Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs,
http://www.academia.edu/4175480/Why_policy_relevance_is_a_moral_necessity_Just_war_
theory_impact_and_UAVs, dml)
This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy
debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the
just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsays conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael
Walzers understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of

practical discourse which is concerned with questions of how we should act . 37

Kelsay argues that:
[T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide

a framework for structured participation in a

public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express
commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to
influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and
fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that good just war
thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation , in the sense that one attends to
all the standard criteria at wars inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the
conflict.39
This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing
operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a
particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance
with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war . Without an
engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it , it is
impossible to engage with the moral reality of war , 40 in terms of being able to discuss it
and judge it in moral terms.

The
as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices.
In the same way that the social critics distance from his or her society is measured in inches and
not miles, 41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language
through which war is constituted , interpreted and reinterpreted .42 It is only by
understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social
critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the
gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of
values and principles and, as argued by Cian ODriscoll, constitutes a language of engagement to
spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of our common heritage, the
product of many centuries of arguing about war.45 These principles and this language provide the terms
Kelsays description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzers more general description of social criticism.
just war theorist,

through which people understand and come to interpret war ,

not in a

deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral

understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force. 46 By
spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that
occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account
on this basis.
Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is , as Clausewitz stated, a
continuation of policy . War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political
choices and these political choices can , and must , be judged and critiqued .47
Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is
disengagement and moral quietude , which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship. 48
This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and
will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers , however this

does

not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the

face of power . By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or
otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their
decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson,
that the public cannot be made part of the debate and that [w]e are necessarily committed into
the hands of our political leadership,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the
public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account . To
accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit
the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of
intellectual irresponsibility . As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is our country that we are especially
obligated to criticise its policies. 51

CASE
Rejecting US dominance causes war with China and prolif
Brands, 15Associate Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University (Hal,
THE LIMITS OF OFFSHORE BALANCING,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1291, dml)
That country, obviously, is China. Today, China still falls well short of the level of power needed to assert regional dominance even in
the absence of U.S. presence.113 Moreover, it is not clear that China will aspire to such regional dominance as its power increases.
Yet a

peaceful rise cannot be guaranteed , either, and Chinas ability to pursue regional primacy
could increase markedly in the decades to come. Explosive economic growth and a longterm military buildup have already had a pronounced impact on the military balance vis-vis neighbors like Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan. If Chinese economic growth
continues apace, and if Chinas defense budget continues to register annual increases of 10
percent or more, then other East Asian countries will eventually confront enormous
difficulty in balancing Beijings power even if they overcome collective action problems
and their own historical antagonisms to cooperate in that undertaking. This prospect is one that is clearly
recognized even by some leading proponents of American retrenchment. As one offshore balancer puts it, The United States
will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong
enough to do it by themselves.114
Yet if this assessment is accurateand there is every reason to think that it isthen offshore balancing becomes a
highly risky and potentially counterproductive course of action. As noted, some analysts have
argued that adopting that strategy would actually improve Washingtons ability to counter
Chinese power, by strengthening U.S. flexibility, better leveraging the capabilities of local actors,
and divesting America of distracting onshore commitments in other regions. But here again, this analysis
glosses over a range of more worrisome possibilities . As mentioned earlier, U.S.
retrenchment could motivate exposed local actors like South Korea or Japan to pursue
their own nuclear arsenals , thereby impelling regional arms races and heightening
tensions further . Or, perhaps more dangerously still, a U.S. pullback might facilitate the very outcome
that offshore balancers aim to avert . As Robert Gilpin wrote in his classic work, War and Change in World Politics:
Retrenchment by its very nature is an indication of relative weakness and declining power , and
thus retrenchment can have a deteriorating effect on relations with allies and rivals . Sensing
the decline of their protector , allies try to obtain the best deal they can from the rising
master of the system. Rivals are stimulated to close in, and frequently they precipitate a
conflict in the process.
Retrenchment can be carried out successfully, Gilpin acknowledges, but in a charged geopolitical environment it is usually a fraught
and perilous path.115 This

warning has particular salience in the East Asian context. In that region,
U.S. allies as well as formally nonaligned countries count on American support and
presence to help them manage their relationships with an increasingly powerful , and
increasingly abrasive , Beijing. As analysts like Zachary Selden have observed, these countries seek
visible U.S. backing and reassurance precisely because they fear that they could not
otherwise balance a rising China . America is now an alternative to China, said one
Vietnamese observer as early as 2000. To counter the Chinese threat we must lean toward the West.116 Similar comments have
become ubiquitous in the years since then.
In these circumstances, and contrary to what offshore balancers expect, a significant American retrenchment

might not have the desired effect of compelling these countries to resist more
determinedly and successfully potential Chinese expansion. Instead, it might incentivize them to
acquiesce to , or perhaps bandwagon with , an assertive Beijing if they calculated that the

odds of effective resistance were declining as Washington pulled back. If U.S. presence in Asia were
weakened, one Thai commentator has predicted, Asian countries would have to conclude that the region will
no longer be a place where only one major power plays a dominant role, and hedge their
bets accordingly . Likewise, one analysis of U.S. security relationships concludes that while reducing the American military
presence in the Pacific might bring some budgetary savings, in Vietnam, Australia, or the Philippines . . . such a
shift could prompt a wholesale reevaluation of national defense policy and have costly
implications .117 In sum, if one expects that Asian countries will have great difficulty checking
Chinese power without U.S. assistance, then reducing Washingtons role in the area could
actually discourage local balancing and pave the way for Beijings ascent .118
Offshore balancing could plausibly encourage this undesirable outcome in other ways, as well. As Gilpin notes, when
retrenchment is viewed as weakness or lack of commitment , it can cause revisionist
powers to push harder against the contours of the existing order. This danger cannot be
ignored in the Asia-Pacific. There is evidence to suggest, as offshore balancers argue, that a desire to
counteract U.S. presence and security commitments in the region has been an important
motivator of Chinas post-Cold War military buildup.119 Yet there is also evidence to suggest that
U.S. presence and commitments nonetheless have had an overall tempering effect on Chinese
behavior, by limiting opportunities for intimidation and expansion, and by raising the
likely costs of aggressive or destabilizing behavior.120 If the United States were to now
begin reducing that presence , it might logically undercut the tempering effect in the
process, for a U.S. retrenchment would have the practical consequence of accentuating
the growing power disparity between Beijing and its neighbors, and creating greater
uncertainty in Chinese minds as to whether Washington would actually come to those countries
defense in a crisis. The upshot could be to incentivize precisely the sort of expansionist
behavior that would challenge the regional order.121
Finally, if an offshore balancing type approach might therefore encourage adverse shifts in the regional equilibrium, it would equally
complicate U.S. efforts to respond to those shifts. Offshore balancing assumes that the United States would be

able to intervene adeptly to prevent such changes (or to reverse them if they did occur), and that
retrenching from other regions would provide greater flexibility and leverage in addressing
adverse events in the Asia-Pacific. But the crucial flaw in the logic of retrenchment is that going offshore
generally makes it harder rather than easier to affect the regional equilibrium.122 Right now,
U.S. forward presence affords America a number of critical advantages that it can draw on
in shaping the regional climate in East Asia and responding to crises should they emerge:
strong and deeply institutionalized alliances ; established patterns of basing,
logistics, and access; high degrees of interoperability that come through near-continual
training with friendly militaries; and others. These assets not only help check Chinese
power and hedge against unwelcome developments in peacetime. They would also serve
as the indispensable foundation of Washingtons response should the region nonetheless
descend into conflict, providing a preexisting framework and infrastructure for largescale U.S. intervention.
Were these assets to be devalued or liquidated via retrenchment , however, then the United States
would face a far greater challenge . In peacetime, it would possess fewer of the instruments and
arrangements that have long allowed it to influence the behavior of allies and
adversaries, and head off unfavorable events before they occur. In wartime, the
disadvantages would be greater still . The United States would face the daunting
prospect of assembling the necessary coalitions, access, and basing agreements on the fly . It
would confront the problems inherent in working with foreign governments and militaries with
which it had less familiarity and fewer ongoing ties. It would have to overcome the

considerable logistical challenges of moving a greater proportion of the required forces

into theater, and perhaps fighting its way back into a region after an adversary had exploited
U.S. absence to stake out a more formidable position there. And, of course, it would have to do all of this amid
the intense pressure of a brewing or ongoing conflict . Getting out of the marginal seas might be easy, two
experts on naval strategy conclude. Getting back in would be a different proposition entirely.123 Or, as another leading scholar
appropriately puts it, Beefing up a preexisting presence in an emergency is easier than re-establishing one from scratch in a
crisis.124
Offshore balancers would do well to keep these warnings in mind. The strategy they recommend promises to preserve regional
balances at reduced costs. But instead, it might well

heighten the risk of dangerous developments in

a key region like East Asia, while simultaneously exacerbating the hazards and difficulties of an
American response.125
That outweighs
Keck, 14Managing Editor of The Diplomat (Zachary, Americas Relative Decline: Should We
Panic?, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/, dml)
on balance , the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly,
its hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power
Still,

America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they
incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half
a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor,
Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. Its

difficult to imagine China defending a rulebased , open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to
uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world .
Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its
relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, hegemonic transition
periods have historically been the most destabilizing eras in history . This is not
only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign,
peaceful intentions , the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the rules of the
road. This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of
the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states.
We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the AsiaPacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has
unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense
of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers
have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation
grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in
other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead.
All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has

asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus
its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time,
Americas preponderance of power has prevented a great power war , and even
restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years
havent seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the
unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of great power conflict and especially major
regional wars rises dramatically . The world will also have to contend with
conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against
their newly empowered rivals.
But even if the transitions caused by Chinas and potentially other nations rises are

managed successfully, there

are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In todays globalized world,

it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved
through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include climate change, health pandemics, organized crime
and terrorism , global financial crises , and the prolif eration of weapons of mass
destruction, among many others.
A unipolar system, for all its limitations, is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on
these transnational issues. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative
and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipoles preponderance of power
lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no
shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has
been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War .
The rise of China and potentially other powers will create a new bipolar or multipolar order. This, in
turn, will make solving these transnational issues much more difficult . Despite the optimistic
rhetoric that emanates from official U.S.-China meetings, the reality is that Sino-American competition is
likely to overshadow an increasing number of global issues in the years ahead. If other countries
like India, Turkey, and Brazil also become significant global powers, this will only further dampen the
prospects for effective global governance.
Therefore, many of the benefits that Kenny predicts will accompany the rise of developing countries may not occur, at least in as dramatic a fashion as

American
exports might at the same time be constrained by a far less open global trade environment in a
multipolar world. Things we take for granted today, such as freedom of navigation and airflight, could very well be
much less assured in a bipolar or multipolar future. Theres also the possibility that the world
will divide into spheres of influence, in which regional hegemonic powers demand highly
preferential access to markets in their home regions. Similarly, the decline of the U.S. dollar and
greater international competition could also result in far more unstable international financial
markets that also inhibit trade.
one might think. For instance, theres no doubt that a richer developing world should result in more American exports. However,

Prolif escalates, nuclear war

Tan 2015 - Associate Professor At the University of New South Wales
Andrew T.H., Security and Conflict in East Asia, p. 31
East Asias arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which a state that
is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results
in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict, thereby
destroying the very security that arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asias sustained
economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many
into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo
2013: 47-48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have
remained. Japans imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account for its past
continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea . In additions, t he
divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as strong as intractable as
ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula . The situation is compounded by
the weakness or absence of regional institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate
relations, build trust and confidence- and security-building measures which were in pace in Europe during
the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia. Within East Asia itself, the Six-Party
Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Koreas open
brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again. The arms race in East Asia is
dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception .
Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism
(Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there is also a perception within China that given its growing

strength, it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the
East and South China Seas. Thus, Chinas nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory

emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The

consequences of conflict between China and Japan,

on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional. As a key player in East Asia,
the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea, residual commitments to
Taiwan, and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western Pacific, will be drawn in.
The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long . In fact ,
it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key
players, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons.
Structural violence framing is analytically useless cant distinguish war from
other types of violence the move to conflate the two makes politics ineffective
Thomas 11 (2011, Claire, Professor of International Politics at Sheffield University, Why
dont we talk about violence in International Relations? Review of Intl Studies 37 p. 18291831)
the attractiveness of this idea of structural violence is that it broadens the remit of security
studies, or of research into violence. Thus, economic issues and the damage done by poverty and so on become just as important as the damage done by direct, physical
violence. Authors who work with the concept of structural violence aim to highlight the hidden structures in order to work towards their transformation.63 The
problem with this is that it is defining a concept dependent on what we want to be able to study
within its remit. A concept should not depend for its meaning on how we want to study it, but rather on
what the concept means. The concept of structural violence is performing a similar role to the debate about broadening the definition of security. Within the
Much of

security debate we are used to people posing the challenge of securitisation that people call something a security problem in order to make it sound more urgent, more policy
relevant and so on. One can pose the same challenge to structural violence. Rather than having a clear academic reason for stretching the concept of violence to incorporate

other social ills cause as much or more damage than the

damage caused by violence. This may well be the case, and these issues should have urgent
academic and policy attention. However, re-defining a concept like violence to incorporate these
issues in order to gain that attention is a poor way of achieving this. A clear argument that states
the reasons why wider social ills are more worthy of our attention does not need the further
argument that we should also call them violence. So, by calling something violent, or designating it as an issue of security, an author is
other, equally bad, social ills, the main reason proposed is that these

claiming a certain importance for the issue, escalating it up the policy agenda, and allowing for extraordinary reactions. For example, by saying that extremists use violence, one
designates it as a significant and bad problem, which allows an exceptional response of violence (called military force) to counter it. The aim of calling something violence in
order to push it up the policy agenda, meaning it requires special, urgent action, can also lead to dealing with these issues in a different, exceptional way, outside the realm of

similar move is made by iek

when he claims that alongside subjective violence (direct, intentional violence), there is also objective
violence, one form of which is systemic violence the damaging consequences of the normal functioning of the system. This systemic violence must be
ordinary politics. This may or may not be beneficial in dealing with the issue in question, or for our politics in general.64 A

taken into account, according to iek, in order to make sense of subjective violence.65 He argues that this systemic violence needs to be given prominence, despite the urgency
attributed to direct violence which fights for our attention.66 Again, this argument is valid in that systemic problems cause more suffering in the world than direct violence. But
there has to be a further reason to also call this violence. After all, the argument can be made without the need to label something as violence. One could argue that seeing as our
concepts are important because they change the way we think about the world, and change the way we act in it, a definition of violence that incorporates these other social ills

If we conceive of all these things as

equally violent, in order to see them as equally important, there is an implication that we are
also going to tackle the issues as problems of violence. Issues of poverty are not helpfully
tackled in the same way as issues of direct violence. The concept of structural violence is
problematical as it means that the definition of violence becomes linked to the result of an act (or
influence), and not to the intention or actual action of the actor . This illustrates a key difference in the way violence is conceived: one
would be valuable. However, broadening the concept in this way also has the potential for being damaging.

way sees violence from the perspective of the perpetrator, and sees it as intentional, destructive force; the other way sees violence from the point of view of the victim, and sees it
as a form of violation.67 Bufacchi points out that these two concepts of violence stem from the Latin roots of the term. The root of the word violence is violentia, meaning a
passionate and uncontrolled force, but the meaning is often conflated with violation, from the Latin violare, meaning infringement.68 Although the definition of violence is
partly contingent on the result of an act, in that it requires that the intention is to physically harm the victim, it is also necessary for that result to be a means to an end, not an
end in itself. Because the result of many different acts or situations is physical harm or death (or unequal power or life chances), many things become incorporated into the
definition of violence if the concept of intention is not used, and if the instrumental nature of violence is ignored. Roberts goes some way to improving on the debate about
structural violence by pointing out that structures are created by people, and thus structural violence can be prevented and does have responsible actors. He also operationalises
it by referring to specific acts of structural violence, looking at avoidable civilian deaths. He argues that his way of looking at human insecurity enables the analysis of structures,
institutions and human agency, but without the problems caused by broadening the debate to include Galtungs concept of realising full human psychosomatic potential.69 But

structural violence still refers to anything an author wants it to

this does not prevent the problem that

. Interestingly, many of
Roberts choice of examples can be incorporated under the title of direct violence in any case (they are preventable female deaths: infanticide, maternal mortality, intimate
killings (normal domestic murder, dowry murders and honour killings), lethal female genital mutilation; and avoidable deaths in children under five).70 Some caution is
needed in this approach, however. It is easy to think of examples where violence is not intentional, for example a natural disaster, or bombing an empty building that

The
point here is to discuss that violence which is most relevant for the study of international politics .
accidentally harms someone nearby. We have already recognised that the concept has fuzzy boundaries, and thus we can recognise that some violence occurs naturally.

This is not the same as accepting that everything that causes harm in some way can be captured within the term violence. It is also not going so far as to say that accidental acts
of violence are not violence at all. Collateral damage is still violent. The point of including the idea of intentionality in the definition of violence is that it ensures the violence we

are discussing in international politics has an actor and does not end up including indeterminate ideas like a state of violence. It does not just happen on its own. It is also an
action that is done with the intention of harming, unlike acts such as a doctor causing some pain in order to heal.

No risk of endless warfare

Gray 7Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the
University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute
for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, The Implications
of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf)
7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the

In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention

could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with
its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the
executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences
reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority
is disciplined by public attitudes . Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the
possibility of misuse.

people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and
nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might
argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam
Husseins Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly
contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at homenotwithstanding 42 years of nuclear

we ought not to
endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option
because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as
well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in
a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a
global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In
other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policys military means. This argument has
circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the
claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for
total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons
why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile
and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option.
Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite
among preventions critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a
debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be
nothing if not pragmatic.
danger, and a high level of gun crimeis vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But

Every central premise in their criticism of deterrence is wrong---sustaining

deterrence is key to long-term feminist goals of eliminating militarism and
oppression. Even if violence exists on a continuum, the difference between war
and its absence is still highly salient. And their approach utterly fails to provide a
strategy for dealing with the possibility of conflict
Lucinda Joy Peach 4, Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at American
University, 2004, A Pragmatist Feminist Approach to the Ethics of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives,
ed. Hashmi, p. 436-441
The pragmatist feminist perspective that I develop in this chapter is deeply indebted to and affirms in many
respects the antiwar feminist approach outlined by Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick in the preceding
chapter, but with some marked differences . These differences, I argue, reveal more completely both the
promise and the limitations of antiwar feminism.
At the outset, it is important to note that there is neither a single "feminism" nor a single "pragmatism" with which it might be
aligned. Instead, there are multiple feminisms, just as there are multiple pragmatisms. The "pragmatist feminism"

developed in this essay draws on several elements from American Pragmatism, a philosophical school
developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most prominently by Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey,
and George Herbert Mead.

Despite the many differences among the pragmatists, they tend to share

several features. Perhaps most salient to the

their presumption "that human agency in all of its higher manifestations has evolved
from ... concrete circumstances in which a vulnerable organism is confronted , often (if not usually) in
concert with other organisms of the same species, with possibilities of both injury and fulfillment ."' It is the
continuous reminder of "human fallibility and finitude"' that constrains pragmatists from
positions such as foundationalism and dogmatism and thus against ideologies that encourage the use of armed
force, and especially of WMD, in all but the most extreme circumstances. It is also a reminder that
armed conflicts are composed of embodied human beings, each of whom has the capacity
for suffering as well as happiness, a point stressed by feminist analyses of armed conflicts.
subject of this volume is

There are several significant points of commonality or intersection between pragmatism and feminism.3 Perhaps most important for
thinking about the ethics of weapons of mass destruction is that both are actively engaged in attempting to solve social problems.
The early pragmatists viewed the purpose of philosophical reflection to be "the intelligent overcoming of oppressive conditions."
Dewey, for example, recommended the criticism of beliefs underlying society that have led to "unsatisfactory conditions in order to
radically reconstruct our society according to non-oppressive and cooperative standards."5

Feminist goals of liberating women from oppression thus echo pragmatist ones . While most often
feminist movements have been focused specifically on ending the male domination and oppression of women, a more
inclusive feminist vision has as its object the elimination of all hierarchical and oppressive
relationships, including the oppression of so-called third world or developing nations (especially of the Global South) by those
of the so-called first world or industrialized nations (especially of the Global North), of ethnic, cultural, racial, or religious minorities
by majorities, homosexuals by heterosexuals, the poor by the wealthy, children by adults, and so on.
In addition, pragmatists advocate the elimination of sharp divisions between theory and practice,

reason and experience, and knowing and doing.8 Pragmatists focus much more on
consequences rather than on a priori abstract conceptualizing, captured in the phrase that pragmatists
assign value on the basis of "what works" or what provides "emotional satisfaction."9 From a pragmatist perspective, the most
important questions are practical ones.

Pragmatists consider moral agents to be actors within a concrete particular context that
both influences what is experienced and is influenced by those experiences . The inextricability of the
perceiver from what is perceived means that action , whether in the context of armed conflict and the use of
WMD or otherwise, must be situated within the larger context of which it is a part. Since
every decision to enter or engage in an armed conflict and every decision to deploy WMD, of whatever type,
must be considered within the full context of other relevant actors, agencies, and term
strategies or results ,12 a pragmatist perspective is unlikely to result in the kind of abstract
thinking that antiwar feminism criticizes in dominant just war and realist approaches.13
Feminism also shares pragmatism's rejection of traditional rationalist and empiricist approaches and its commitment to the
inseparability of theory and practice.14 Both believe that reason must be grounded in experience and requires being supplemented,
at least in particular circumstances, by emotion.15 In this respect, feminists also favor a posteriori rather than a priori forms of
knowledge, those that develop on the basis of experience rather than those that are posited prior to it.16
In sum, both pragmatism and feminism accord a central place to the particular, the concrete, and

the factual elements of experience, as opposed to the universal, the generalizable, and the
abstract.17 This opposition to abstraction is apparent, for example, in feminist understandings of women's "different voice" and
Dewey's views about the importance of the qualitative background of situations. In contrast to mainstream philosophy, both feminist
and pragmatist perspectives focus on everyday life and emphasize respect for others and the constitutiveness of community. The

pragmatists' sensitivity to the social embeddedness of persons led them to understand the "I"
"only in relation to other selves, so that the autonomy of individual agents needed to be
integrated with their status as social beings" existing in community . 18
This common conception of the "relational self" suggests that both pragmatists and feminists
will resist turning others into "the Other," who can then be demonized and made into "the
enemy," suitable to be killed. The feminist commitment to the well-being of others, in both the
local and the global community, is well illustrated by Carol Cohn's and Sara Ruddick's contribution to
this volume. However, this commitment also provides the basis for the pragmatist feminist position
articulated here that refuses to categorically rule out the moral legitimacy of any
resort to armed force or war , since such resort may be morally imperative to protect
innocent others .

In addition to these marked similarities, it is also important to acknowledge how a pragmatist feminism differs significantly from
American Pragmatism. Perhaps most important is pragmatist feminism's attention to the gendered character of the social world and
gender's impact on the formation and maintenance of male and female identities. These subjects largely were ignored by the
American Pragmatists19 but influence the analysis of the ethics of WMD outlined here. In addition, feminists tend to give greater
import to the cognitive aspects of affect than pragmatists, even though, as already discussed, pragmatists recognize the importance
of emotions to agency and cognition.
Despite its differences from more mainstream strands of feminism, pragmatist feminism shares the goals of many

strands of feminism to make gender a central consideration of the analysis (here of armed
force and WMD)20 and to eradicate (patriarchal) oppression and domination. These goals result in a
strong presumption against the use of any weapons , not only WMD, since they are in their
very inception designed as tools for domination and suppression of others designated as "the
enemy." This opposition to the use of armed force is related to feminist observations of the
patriarchal and hierarchical, male-dominated and -controlled character of the military and the
oppressive effects of war and militarism around the world, especially on women and children. In addition, the
pragmatist feminist view described here affirms much in the "constitutive positions" of antiwar feminism articulated by Cohn and
Ruddick,21 especially its observation of the gendered character of war and militarism, its suspicion of masculinist approaches to war
and conflict resolution, and its critique of the dominant tradition for its focus on the physical, military, and strategic effects of these
weapons separate from their embeddedness in the rest of social and political life.
With this brief overview in mind, in the following section, I describe how a pragmatist feminist perspective compares with the
antiwar feminist position outlined by Cohn and Ruddick in Chapter 21 with respect to the specific issues addressed by this volume.
SOURCES AND PRINCIPLES
Although pragmatist feminism itself does not directly provide general norms governing the use of weapons in war, it does so

feminism does
not categorically rule out the use of armed force or engagement in war. Its pragmatist
perspective steers in a different direction from the antiwar feminists' "practical" opposition to
war. Whereas the realist tradition has been unduly pessimistic in its assumption that war and armed conflict are necessary, certain,
and inevitable, on a pragmatist feminist view, antiwar feminist thinking tends to be unduly optimistic
about the human capacity to transcend the use of violent methods of resolving disputes, given the
indirectly through its affirmation of elements of justwar theory, as descri

bed below. Pragmatist

consistent and continual resort to such means throughout most of human history.
From a pragmatist feminist perspective, the historical and contemporary

experience of the
repeated resort to violence and the inability of humanity thus far to develop alternative
mechanisms for resolving large-scale disputes suggests the likelihood of future wars and armed
conflicts. In light of this history, overcoming the "war culture " that antiwar feminists view

so unfavorably can be possible only outside the immediate situation of armed

conflict . Once the aggressor has struck or threatens to do so imminently, it is too late
to change our societies and ourselves in order to avoid war . Rather, it is then
necessary to act in order to avoid annihilation in one form or another.
Given its view that some wars and some opposition to war and armed conflicts are morally necessary to protect ourselves and others
from harm, pragmatist feminists seek to impose moral limits on the harm and suffering to the minimum necessary. Despite an
awareness of its limitations,22 a pragmatist feminist perspective considers just war theory to provide a flexible and modifiable set of
criteria for attempting to act morally and in accordance with principles of justice, both in entering into an armed conflict (jus ad
bellum) and in the actual engagement of that conflict (jus in bello). In particular, pragmatist feminism shares just war's starting
premise of a strong presumption against the legitimacy of the use of armed force and violence to resolve conflicts.

A pragmatist feminist perspective thus rejects Cohn's and Ruddick's contention that
justwar theorists "implicitly accept war as a practice even when condemning particular
wars ."23 Recognizing the historical and global reality of war making and armed force as means of
resolving conflicts and adopting strategies to maximize justice and minimize
immorality when such means are adopted is not the same as "implicitly accepting the
practices of war ," at least in the absence of demonstrably effective means of eliminating
such conflicts . To ignore the reality of the continuing resort to war and armed force is itself to
revert to abstraction rather than offering a practical method for eliminating the
human suffering and incalculable damage caused by war and armed conflict.
Here Colin and Ruddick reveal (intentionally or otherwise) their situatedness as citizens of a war-making
state, one that has had the choice in many, if not all, instances since the mid-twentieth century, at least, of deciding whether or not

to go to war. Just

as Cohn and Ruddick criticize just war theory for failing to explore nonviolent alternatives once
their antiwar feminist approach fails to offer concrete
suggestions for avoiding armed conflict when a nation or people is confronted with armed
aggression or assault by others, the situation where the options boil down to " fight or die ." This
perspective fails to look at war from the point of view of the aggressed-against , when
armed conflict becomes a necessity in order to retain national and/or cultural and/or ethnic identity from subjugation
by the aggressor(s). In such circumstances, the moral necessity of armed force looks quite different .
And in such circumstances, the threatened use of WMD can be seen as less evil than the
alternatives , such as doing nothing and being conquered or fighting a conventional war
and faring poorly .
a just cause is determined or war has begun,

Rather than reverting to abstract thinking about war, pragmatist feminism affirms just war theory's casuistic approach to particular
armed conflicts as well as its position that such means are sometimes morally justifiable or even morally obligator)' in order to
protect oneself (individual or nation) or innocent third parties. Further, pragmatist feminism affirms just war thinking's

attention to particular conflicts rather than war in the abstract and its stance of
moderation and of imposing the minimal suffering necessary to accomplish the objective of restoring the
peace.24 Thus, with respect to the military response of the United States to the September 11 terrorist attacks, a pragmatist feminist
application of just war criteria yields the conclusion that the jus ad bellum principles of "last resort" and "proportionality," as well as
the in hello principles of "proportionality" and "discrimination," were not satisfied.
A second difference in the two feminist perspectives emerges out of the antiwar feminist observation that

war and militarism are not separate from everyday life but integral aspects of it.25 While this is an
extremely important insight into the underlying conditions of war and militarism, it needs to be joined with
alternative proposals for addressing the "large-scale military conflict ." There has
been scant attention to this issue in antiwar feminist scholarship. Even if one assumes, as antiwar
feminists do, that war is a "presence" in everyday life and not merely a discrete "event" that occasionally
"erupts,"26 it is nonetheless the case that " war" is more damaging and harmful, and
creates greater suffering in a multiplicity of ways , than the absence of war.
Pragmatist feminist thinking about the ethics of WMD is attentive to how such differences in
consequences differentiate war from everyday life.
A third significant area of difference between the two types of feminist theories concerns responses to the causes of war. Whereas
pragmatist feminists agree with antiwar feminists that wars are partially a mutual construction, they also insist that some wars have
much more to do with unjust aggression for which opposing sides do not share equal responsibility. Antiwar feminism fails to accept
that some wars are not only necessary as a matter of prudence, but also morally justifiable on feminist grounds, for example,
humanitarian intervention to end the severe oppression of innocent victims.

For a pragmatist feminist, the current state of international affairs unfortunately requires

consideration of the circumstances in which the threatened or actual use of such

weapons for defensive or deterrent purposes may be morally allowable or even morally
necessary . Given these circumstances, pragmatist feminism considers the just war tradition to provide a morally useful
source of norms relating to the use of weapons in war.

2NC

T
MP requires physical stationing of armed forces
Degang Sun 13, Ph.D. in International Affairs from Shanghai International Studies University,
senior visiting researcher at Middle East Centre of St. Antony's College, University of Oxford and
Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, associate professor of Political Science and a senior
researcher at the Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University, The
Strategic Evolution of US Military Presence in Iraq,
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/184516/ichaptersection_singledocument/203
d394c-0bcc-4350-8b67-c39f73e87668/en/7.pdf
In this chapter, foreign military presence refers to an area on land or on sea beyond a sovereign states jurisdiction,
where a certain number of armed forces are stationed and which has military activities, organized
institutions, and military facilities.7 It is by nature the geographical and functional extension of a countrys domestic military
deployment.

The topics negative state actionthey have to explain how saying the military is
bad always displaces their aff
Saul Newman 10, Reader in Political Theory at Goldsmiths, U of London, Theory & Event
Volume 13, Issue 2
There are two aspects that I would like to address here. Firstly, the notion of demand: making certain demands on the
state say for higher wages, equal rights for excluded groups, to not go to war , or an end to draconian policing
is one of the basic strategies of social movements and radical groups. Making such demands does not
necessarily mean working within the state or reaffirming its legitimacy . On the
contrary, demands are made from a position outside the political order, and they
often exceed the question of the implementation of this or that specific
measure. They implicitly call into question the legitimacy and even the sovereignty of the
state by highlighting fundamental inconsistencies between, for instance, a formal constitutional
order which guarantees certain rights and equalities, and state practices which in reality violate
and deny them.
hierarchal exclusions arent a product of the rez or topical focusrather, assuming
the resolution as a starting point for developing provisional consensus through
fallible argumentation is a better method of exposing how those exclusions
functionhowever, the process of challenging those requires the deliberative
norms they critique
Dahlberg, 14Centre for Critical and Cultural Studies, University of Queensland (Lincoln,
The Habermasian Public Sphere and Exclusion: An Engagement with PoststructuralistInfluenced Critics, Communication Theory Volume 24, Issue 1, pages 2141, February 2014,
dml)
Normatively then, the Habermasian (or deliberative)4 public sphere

refers to the communicative space

constituted through rational-critical deliberation over practical problems , deliberation
that leads to critically (in)formed public opinion , which in turn enables the democratic
scrutiny and guidance of official decision-making processes . The criteria for rationalcritical deliberation are understood to involve inclusive , reasoned , reciprocal , reflexive ,
sincere , and coercion-free argumentation (Habermas, 2005, 2006). Communicative rationality
is supported by open information flows (publicity), motivated by the aim of reaching understanding
and agreement (public opinion), and moved toward this end by the forceless force of the better

argument (Habermas, 2005, p. 384). Claims and agreements are here contingent since every
claim can be met by a no and every deliberatively achieved agreement can be challenged
and potentially undone. It is important to note that public here refers to the mode, rather than the
content or place or medium, of communication. Thus, the public sphere may come into existence,
for instance, through face-to-face or technologically mediated argumentation between individuals and
within informal groups, or through the more organized discussions found in civil society associations and
explicitly political organizations, or through the reflection and debate engendered by the whole range of mass media forms and
contentsnews, reports, commentaries, scenes and images, and shows and movies with an informative, polemical, educational, and
entertaining content (Habermas, 2006, p. 415; see also Habermas, 1996a, pp. 373374).
Habermas does not see rational-critical deliberation, which he also refers to as communicative rationality, as

some sort of metaphysical ideal, but rather argues that it can be identified as an idealization implicit in
the inconspicuous daily routines of asking for and giving reasons : It is built into communicative action
(Habermas, 2006, p. 413). In other words, the set of public sphere criteria listed above are, and must be, tacitly
presupposed by anyone engaging in any practical argument . As such, these criteria are
conditions of possibility for such engagement, constitutive of the game of argumentation
(Habermas, 2005, p. 385). These presupposed criteria, Habermas (1984) argues, can be rationally reconstructedusing the
presuppositional analysis of formal pragmatics5from out of everyday arguments, illuminating a universal public sphere norm
that sets out nonarbitrary standards for the identification of communication pathologies (Habermas, 2006, p. 416). That is, the

implicit idealization provides a critical ideal by which to evaluate the deliberative

quality of actual public sphere communication and thereby identify communicative distortions or
deviations and associated moments of inertia, the latter resulting from a scarcity of those
functionally necessary resources on which processes of deliberative opinion - and will-formation
significantly depend (Habermas, 1996a, p. 326, drawing on Bernhard Peters' work). Such identification of limits in
turn provides the basis for reflection on the cultivation of more rational-critical
deliberation . The aim of such reflection is not to set out strict procedures for deliberation,
as is required in formal decision-making (on this see Habermas, 1996a, pp. 302308), but to identify the functionally
necessary sociopolitical resources (or positive conditions) needed to enhance in quality and quantity
rational-critical deliberation in everyday practical argumentation (Chambers, 1996; Habermas, 1996a, p.
325). Specific resources will depend on context, but according to Habermas (1996a, 2006; see also Carleheden & Gabrils, 1996)
they will, in general, include: (first) a mass media system regulated in relation to the idealized criteria, (second) a network of
autonomous civil society associations supporting communicative reasoning and public opinion formation, the emergence,
reproduction, and influence of which depend on (third) a liberal-egalitarian political culture sensitive to problems affecting society
as a whole (Habermas, 1996a, p. 488), which, in turn, requires (fourth) social rights to the provision of sustainable living
conditions, and (fifth) a population accustomed to (universal) freedom and versed in critique.
This deliberative public sphere norm, as already noted, is reconstructed from presuppositions of actual argumentation. However,
there is always a gap between idealization and practice: due to their idealizing content, the universal presuppositions of
argumentation can only be approximately fulfilled (Habermas, 1996a, p. 178, see also pp. 323326). As an idealization, rationalcritical deliberation (communicative rationality) is not burdened by the demands and impediments of everyday communicative
practice, which means the latter always falls short of the idealized presuppositions that are made. Habermas accepts the
impossibility of realizing the always-already-presupposed idealization of communicative rationality: the public sphere ideal

is not perfectly reachable (Habermas 1992b, p. 477). This impossibility is not just due to empirical
distortions (which will be discussed further in the next section), but also to logical limits: Responding to his critics,6
Habermas has, particularly in recent times, argued that communicative rationality, and thus the deliberative
public sphere norm, cannot be understood as an end state, a final stage which can be realized in
time (Habermas as cited in Carleheden & Gabrils, 1996, p. 10), because if realized it would make all further communication
superfluous (Habermas, 1996b, p. 1518). In other words, the full realization of communicative rationality

would mean the end of communication, and human history, as it would eliminate those negative
social conditions that make communication in social life necessary , conditions such as inadequate
information, interpersonal misunderstandings, lack of insight, and so on (Cooke, 2004, p. 417, referring to Albrecht Wellmer's
work). By blocking the realization of fully rational-critical deliberation, these negative social

conditions ensure that no actual deliberation or agreement can ever be fully rational, which
invites challenges to any democratic process and agreement (including over deliberative criteria),
and calls for ongoing argumentation. Thus, in parallel with Derridian logic, the unavoidable moments of
inertia (Habermas, 1996a, p. 326) of everyday communication, along with the idealized criteria of

communicative rationality that they limit, are conditions of possibility and impossibility of fully
realizing in actual argumentation the deliberative public sphere norm.
This deliberative conception of the public sphere is seen by advocates as radically democratic in the sense of being
based solely on the will of those affected by a disputefor a number of reasons: First, because it conceives of a rationalcritical public and associated public opinion that can scrutinize , inform , and hold publicly
accountable political decisions; second, because it sees all instituted processes and decisions as
open to contestation by any excluded voices ; and third, because it understands the criteria
for guiding and judging the deliberative practice of participants as immanent to these
practices .
However, poststructuralist-influenced critics, including those focusing on contemporary communication systems (e.g., Nguyen &
Alexander, 1996; Poster, 1997), see the Habermasian public sphere conception failing to be as radically democratic due to its not
taking full account of exclusion, both exclusion in everyday deliberative practice and exclusion resulting directly from the
conception's formulation. I will now outline this critique, and examine how Habermasians have responded and might further
respond to it.
The Habermasian public sphere conception and exclusion
Poststructuralist-influenced critics, generally speaking, argue that by promoting a universal rational norm as

the basis for public sphere communication, Habermasians make (at least) two fundamental mistakes with respect to
exclusion. First, they assume the possibility of the eliminability , or near eliminability, of exclusions in actual
argumentation, so that given the right conditions we could approximate (if not fully reproduce) communicative rationality,
which underestimates the pervasiveness of power and the extent of exclusions in everyday
communicative interaction (e.g., Flyvbjerg, 2000; Shabani, 2003). Second, and more widely articulated than the first
critique, the Habermasian public sphere norm is itself seen as exclusionary , despite its democratic
aims. Poststructuralist-influenced critics, paralleling feminist concerns (e.g., Dean, 1996; Fraser, 1997; Gould, 1996; Young,
2000) and rhetorical studies critique (e.g., Huspek, 2007a; Phillips, 1996), argue that the deliberative public sphere
criteria, which are supposed to define democratically legitimate communication and to differentiate
between reasoned argumentation and coercion, actually support domination and exclusion (e.g.,
Coole, 1996; Devenney, 2009; Lyotard, 1984, pp. 6566; Mouffe, 1999, 2000; Rabinovitch, 2001; Villa, 1992). In order to be
considered legitimate deliberators, subjects must come to internalize the rules of the particular
form of communication deemed to be the universally valid form of democratic engagement or be
excluded from the public sphere. As such, the Habermasian public sphere conception is seen as an exemplary form of
what critical theorists would refer to as ideology (a universal claim obscuring its particularity) and of what Foucault showed to be the
operation of modern disciplinary powerthe deliberative public sphere norm relying on the subjugation of selves through
subjectivation, a normalizing that constitutes subjects as rational-critical communicators (Villa, 1992, p. 715). As a result,

participants who have internalized modes of communication closer to what is determined valid
are advantaged over others. That is, in order to be equally included, some participants must be disciplined more than

othersthose more accustomed to rational-critical deliberative forms of communicationso as to be capable of reproducing the
idealized deliberative mode, disciplining that involves the exclusion or suppression of those voices judged illegitimate (irrational,
strategic, private). The problem for poststructuralist-influenced critics here is not with exclusion per se, as they see norms as
necessarily exclusionary, but with such exclusion being unaccounted for in relation to democratic communication and in fact
obscured by the claim to universality.
I will briefly outline how Habermas and Habermasians have responded and might further respond to these two interrelated lines of
critique. In response to the first line of critiquethat the Habermasian public sphere conception does not

adequately account for exclusions in practiceI have already noted how Habermas not only understands the
public sphere norm, despite being reconstructed from everyday communicative interaction, as being logically
impossible to fully realize in practice but sees moments of inertia as ever-present and necessary
features of actual deliberation: They block the full realization of communicative rationality and
yet make communication necessary in the first place. These moments of inertia include
illegitimate exclusion: Any deliberative practice will involve exclusion, not just legitimate
exclusion of undemocratic elements but exclusions defined as illegitimate with respect to the idealization of
communicative rationality. Such illegitimate exclusions result from: unequal distribution of attention,
competencies, and knowledge (Habermas, 1996a, p. 325); strategic manipulation of various sorts, including bribes, threats, or
violence (Habermas, 1996a, pp. 307308); and systemic coercionstate and corporate interests and their instrumental media
of money and power colonizing more and more areas of life including those that should, for a healthy democratic society, be
coordinated by public opinion derived from rational-critical deliberation (for an overview of the forms of distorted communication
identified by Habermas, see Huspek, 2007b, pp. 827830). In relation to systemic coercion, Habermas has been particularly critical

of the instrumentalization of communication media: How the potential of the mass media to support rational-critical deliberation,
with maximum inclusion of voices, is continually thwarted by system colonization, and particularly the intrusion of the functional
imperatives of the market economy in the internal logic of the production and presentation of messages (Habermas, 2006, p. 422).
As well as exclusion resulting from such explicitly distorted communication, Habermasian theory also considers the exclusionary
effects of culturally specific (lifeworld) contexts. The interpretation and application of public sphere criteria

as well as the validity and strength of arguments will always be contextually affected and
historically specified (Habermas, 1992b, p. 477; 1996a, p. 324). As a result, what comes to be defined as
legitimate deliberation will be colored by taken-for-granted meanings, leading to some voices
being illegitimately (according to the deliberative public sphere norm) valorized over others, with the illegitimate
marginalization or exclusion of these other voices.
Thus Habermas (2006) and adherents

are fully aware of how public spheres in practice are dominated

by the kind of mediated communication that lacks the defining features of deliberation (p. 414),
the kind of political communication we know goes against the grain of the normative requirements of deliberative politics (p. 420).
However, as we have seen, for Habermasians it is not just culture and power that determine communicative practice, as some
poststructuralist-inspired critique suggests. Rather, presuppositions of communicative rationality are understood

implicit in every argument , providing a countervailing force to distorted

communication and the basis for a postmetaphysical critique of exclusion and a potential for selfas

transformation (Habermas, 1992a, pp. 419429; 1992b, pp. 476479; 1996a, p. 374, 2006, p. 419; see also Benhabib, 1996;
Chambers, 1996; Cooke, 1994). We can see this historically in the labor and women's movements, as Habermas (1996a) points
out, which have

been able to draw on the rights to unrestricted inclusion and equality built into liberal
public spheres . . . in order to shatter the structures that had initially constituted them as
the other of a bourgeois public sphere (p. 374). The central purpose in reconstructing the public sphere idealization of rationalcritical deliberation, as already outlined in the previous section, is to illuminate this basis for critique and transformation. Yet,

poststructuralists see such a universal norm as in itself producing exclusions , exclusions that are
not only unaccounted for but are, in fact, obscured by the claim to universality. This is the second line of critique outlined above.
In reply to this second line of critique, it must first be noted that Habermasians

accept that there is a necessary

constitutive exclusion involved in the deliberative public sphere conception. In fact, any
conception of democracy must involve normative claims about what democracy is and is not,
including what is acceptable as democratic communication and what is not, drawing a
line between reasoned argumentation and coercion, democratically legitimate and illegitimate exclusion. It
is simply not possible to call on democracy and escape invoking a norm of democratic
communication with associated exclusions . The question is then whether we can, as Habermas
claims, reconstruct from everyday communicative practice a universal norm of the public sphere that distinguishes
between democratically legitimate and illegitimate exclusion.
According to Habermas (1992a), not only can we reconstruct such a norm, but the public sphere norm
thus identified is not normalizing in the disciplinary and exclusionary sense suggested
by the poststructuralist critique. Of course, any norm will require certain behavior from
participants, and thus the constitution of subjectivity in particular ways . But
Habermasians do not see such requirements and constitution as necessarily
antidemocratic . More specifically, they do not see the deliberative public sphere norm as having
to be internalized in a disciplinary and exclusionary fashion . Rather, they see it as an
always already presupposed communicative structure that can be explicitly
reconstructed as a critical ideal by which to illuminate illegitimate exclusion
within deliberation specifically, and society more generally, and enable reflection upon
possibilities for greater freedom and equality (Habermas, 1996a; Markell, 1997). As Chambers (1996)
argues, rational-critical deliberation here is about the endless questioning of codes, the
reasoned questioning of normalization and thus of exclusions (pp. 233234). Through
deliberation, participants presuppose themselves as rational-critical subjects (and in the process
are constituted as such), able to reflexively interrogate all aspects of their situation, including the
particular deliberative rules applied in practical disputes. Of course, as critics point out, subjects

whose everyday communicative practice is already more in line with the deliberative public
sphere norm will be advantaged over others in becoming such rational-critical interlocutors. However, for
Habermasians, it is not the reconstructed norm that should be seen as at faultseeing the
reconstructed norm marginalizing or excluding voicesbut the uneven distribution of the
sociocultural resources necessary for engaging in rational-critical deliberation (that fall
under the five general positive conditions of the public sphere listed in the previous section). This unevenness, which is in fact
highlighted by the Habermasian public sphere norm in its critical role, indicates the need to provide for these
resources so as to enhance and extend communicative rationality . That is, we are faced here with
a sociological problem, one that the Habermasian public sphere norm illuminates and demands be addressed for the advancement
of democracy, rather than a problem internal to the character of the norm.

Using a ballot as currency model fails community change is put solely in the
hands of the judge in a debate round which is in no way visible to the public
excludes those who want to participate in the struggle that arent debatersprefer
qualified ev on this claim from
Brendon Goddamn Bankey 13 (BRENDON BANKEY A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of WAKE FOREST
UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS
Communication August 2013 Bankey holds an BA from Trinity and now holds an MA from Wake Forest. This thesis was approved by: Michael J.
Hyde, Ph.D., Advisor; Mary M. Dalton, Ph.D., Chair; R. Jarrod Atchison, Ph.D. THE FACT OF BLACKNESS DOES NOT EXIST: AN EVOCATIVE
CRITICISM OF RESISTANCE RHETORIC IN ACADEMIC POLICY DEBATE AND ITS (MIS)USE OF FRANTZ FANONS BLACK SKIN, WHITE
MASKS From Chapter Two footnoting Atchison and Panetta and consistent with Bankeys defense of an aspect of their position
http://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/bitstream/handle/10339/39020/Bankey_wfu_0248M_10473.pdf)
For Atchison and Panetta , the ballot a judge casts at the conclusion of a debate should signify nothing more or less than that persons decision to vote for the team that does the best debating. This understanding encourages judges to limit their analysis of a
debate to the arguments presented within each team s allotted times to speak. It would exclude decisions focused on resolving external abuses such as: determining the appropriateness of statements or events between a team or program that occurred outside of the

some
non traditional teams interested in challenging
policy debate have begun to
advocate
a ballot as currency model
While the specific terminology is not
universal employed,
a non traditional teams ability to accumulate wins is a referendum on the perceived acceptableness
of their bodies for academic spaces Beyond structural factors that limit the visibility
of any individual debate
asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem with very few participants
places the course of community change on the shoulders of those who
judge debates between traditional and non - traditional teams
it excludes those who might want to contribute to community conversation,
but are not directly involved in competition
the ballot as currency approach fails to
recognize that debate community is broader than the individual participants of a given debate
The result is that a very narrow set
of judges, usually those that often judge Framework debates, are granted the authority to
determine the outcome of communal change.
immediate debate; challenging a schools succ ess at recruiting minority participants; criticizing the civil rights legacy of participants academic institutions; or increasing the presence of underrepresented bodies in elimination debates. By contrast,
-

the marginalizing effects of

what I call

ly

formats

for judges to evaluate debates.

the ballot as currency approach establis hes that a judges ballot signifies what bodies and practices she deems appropriate for policy debate. Within this model,

the

, Atchison and Panetta identify two problems with the ballot as currency method for evaluating debates. First, the ballot as currency approach presents the dilemma of

(generally the other

people in the room) allowed to take a stake in the process. This

and excludes those coaches and directors who are not preferred judges and, therefore, do not

have access to many debates. Furthermore,

. Prioritizing

and risks the creation of an insulated community that has a ll the answers without ever engaging those concerned individuals who do not attend every competition.

21

1NR

CASE
Extinction risks are underestimatedtrumps everything else
Bostrom 12 - Professor of Philosophy at Oxford
(Nick, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, Interview with Ross Andersen,
correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, We're Underestimating the Risk of Human
Extinction, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/wereunderestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/)//BB
Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human

extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated

by society. Some of
these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to
Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency
over the next century. Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In
fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself,
through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in
order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular
probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with
Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and
centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them. Some have argued that we ought to be directing our
resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly

existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant

moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? Bostrom: Well suppose

improbable. You have responded by suggesting that

you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it
doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a
fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because
you move them to the moon or to Africa or something.

A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of

future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark
existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much
anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into
existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years,
view that

implication that

our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist

even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this

enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or
curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.
currently. Therefore,

No linkreps about China dont spur rivalry but theyre key to avoid
disaster
Friedberg 1Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs
Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Commentary, Vol. 111, No. 2,
February 2001, p. https://lists.lsit.ucsb.edu/archives/gordon-newspost/2001May/001274.html
Is it possible, finally, that merely by talking and perhaps even by thinking about a
full-blown Sino American rivalry we may increase the probability of its actually
coming to pass? This is the clear implication of Michael Swaine s letter. Mr. Swaine
worries that ordinary observers, unable to distinguish between descriptions of
present reality and hair-raising scenarios of the future, will conclude that an
intense geostrategic rivalry is virtually inevitable, and . . . respond accordingly.
While I am flattered by the thought that my article could somehow change the
course of history, I very much doubt that it, or a hundred more like it, will have any
such effect. On the other hand, I am disturbed by the suggestion that we ought to
avoid discussing unpleasant possibilities for fear that someone (presumably our
political representatives and ordinary fellow citizens) might get the wrong idea.
Acknowledging real dangers is a necessary first step to avoiding them, as
well as to preparing to cope with them if they should nevertheless come to pass.

Refusing or neglecting to do so, it seems to me, is a far more likely formula

for disaster .
View the debate through a lens of specificity rigid rejection of China
threat gets warped into a new orthodoxy and fuels extremism.
Recognizing plural interpretations and linkages is more productive.
Callahan 5 (William A., Professor of Politics University of Manchester, How to
Understand China: The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power, Review
of International Studies, 31)
Although China threat theory is ascribed to the Cold War thinking of foreigners who suffer from an enemy deprivation syndrome, the use of containment
as a response to threats in Chinese texts suggests that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union,
which was the key threat to the PRC after 1960. Refutations of China threat theory do not seek to deconstruct the discourse of threat as part of critical
security studies. Rather they are expressions of a geopolitical identity politics because they refute Chinese threats as a way of facilitating the production
of an America threat, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on. Uniting to fight these foreign threats affirms Chinas national identity. Unfortunately, by

the China threat theory texts end

up confirming the threat that they seek to deny: Japan, India and Southeast Asia are
increasingly threatened by Chinas protests of peace .43 Moreover, the estrangement produced and circulated
in China threat theory is not just among nation-states. The recent shift in the focus of the discourse from
security issues to more economic and cultural issues suggests that China is
estranged from the international standards of the international community . After a long
refuting China threat in this bellicose way that is by generating a new series of threats

process of difficult negotiations, China entered the WTO in December 2001. Joining the WTO was not just an economic or a political event; it was an issue
of Chinese identity.44 As Breslin, Shih and Zha describe in their articles in this Forum, this process was painful for China as WTO membership subjects the
PRC to binding rules that are not the product of Chinese diplomacy or culture. Thus although China enters international organisations like the WTO based
on shared values and rules, China also needs to distinguish itself from the undifferentiated mass of the globalised world. Since 2002, a large proportion of
the China threat theory articles have been published in economics, trade, investment, and general business journals rather than in international politics,
area studies and ideological journals as in the 1990s. Hence China threat theory is one way to differentiate China from these international standards,
which critics see as neo-colonial.45 Another way is for China to assert ownership over international standards to affirm its national identity through
participation in globalisation.46 Lastly, some China threat theory articles go beyond criticising the ignorance and bad intentions of the offending texts to

those who promote China threat must be crazy: There is a consensus within
mainland academic circles that there is hardly any reasonable logic to explain the
views and practices of the United States toward China in the past few years. It can
only be summed up in a word: Madness .47 Indians likewise are said to suffer from
a China threat theory syndrome.48 This brings us back to Foucaults logic of rationality being constructed through the
exclusion of a range of activities that are labelled as madness. The rationality of the rise of China depends upon
distinguishing it from the madness of those who question it . Like Joseph Nyes concern that warnings of a
China threat could become a self-fulfilling prophesy, China threat theory texts vigorously reproduce the
dangers of the very threat they seek to deny. Rather than adding to the debate,
they end up policing what Chinese and foreigners can rationally say . Conclusion The argument of
conclude that

this essay is not that China is a threat. Rather, it has examined the productive linkages that knit together the image of China as a peacefully rising power

It would be easy to join the chorus

of those who denounce China threat theory as the misguided product of the Blue
Team, as do many in China and the West. But that would be a mistake, because
depending on circumstances anything from rising powers to civilian aircraft can
be interpreted as a threat. The purpose is not to argue that interpretations are false
in relation to some reality (such as that China is fundamentally peaceful rather than
war-like), but that it is necessary to unpack the political and historical context of
each perception of threat. Indeed, China threat has never described a unified
American understanding of the PRC: it has always been one position among many in
debates among academics, public intellectuals and policymakers . Rather than inflate extremist
and the discourse of China as a threat to the economic and military stability of East Asia.

positions (in both the West and China) into irrefutable truth, it is more interesting to examine the debates that produced the threat/opportunity dynamic.

Preventing nuclear war is a prerequisite to positive peace

Jerry Folk 78, Professor of Religious and Peace Studies at Bethany College, Peace Educations
Peace Studies: Towards an Integrated Approach, Peace & Change, volume V, number 1,
Spring, p. 58

Those proponents

of the positive peace approach who reject out of hand the work of researchers and
the perspective of negative peace too easily forget that the prevention
of a nuclear confrontation of global dimensions is the prerequisite for all other
peace research, education, and action. Unless such a confrontation can be avoided
there will be no world left in which to build positive peace . Moreover, the blanket
condemnation of all such negative peace oriented research, education or action as a reactionary
attempt to support and reinforce the status quo is doctrinaire. Conflict theory and resolution,
educators coming to the field from

disarmament studies, studies of the international system and of international organizations, and integration studies are in
themselves neutral. They do not intrinsically support either the status quo or revolutionary efforts

to
change or overthrow it. Rather they offer a body of knowledge which can be used for either purpose or for some purpose in
between. It is much more logical for those who understand peace as positive peace to integrate this knowledge into their own
framework and to utilize it in achieving their own purposes. A balanced peace studies program should therefore offer the student
exposure to the questions and concerns which occupy those who view the field essentially from the point of view of negative peace.

their threshold for acceptable scholarship is self-serving and impractical

Valbjrn 4 [Morten, PhD Poli Sci. @ Aarhus, Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern
Conflicts in International Relations, in Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict, p. 67-8]
As mentioned before, the relational perspective is a critique of both the neglect of the issue of Otherness by the IR mainstream and the way in which
proponents of an essentialist approach relate to the Other. For this reason, it would be natural to assume that proponents of this second attempt to
"culturalize" the study of international relations would be particularly keen to address the question of how to acknowledge cultural diversity without

Said is stressing in the introduction to Orientalism: The most important

task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how
committing the sins of orientalism. Indeed, this is also what

one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or nonrepressive and non-manipulative perspective. (1995: 24) However, he then goes on to

these are all tasks left embarrassingly incomplete in this study" (Said, 1995: 24). Looking at
other analyses based on a relational conception of culture, it becomes apparent that the latter remark is
very telling for this kind of understanding of culture as a whole (e.g. Doty , 1993: 315).
Despite a blank rejection of the universalism of IR mainstream and, at least in principle, a
recognition of the existence of different Others who are not only projections of own fantasies and desires, in
practice, proponents of this alternative approach nonetheless usually leave the question of how to
address and approach the actual cultural Other unanswered. This might very well be an unintended outcome of the
previously mentioned radical constructivism associated with this approach. Thus, by stressing how the representation of
the Other is intimately related to the construction of identities or a subtle way of performing power, one
risks being caught in a kind of epistemological and moral crisis, characterized by a
nagging doubt about whether it really is possible to gain any knowledge of Others or if
we are just projecting our own fantasies, and by a pronounced fear that our representations are
silencing voices so that we unwittingly are taking part in a subtle performance of power
(Hastrup, 1992: 54). In merely dealing with the relationship between the representer and his
representations, these dilemmas can be "avoided ." However, at the same time one
writes off the opportunity to relate to cultural diversity as anything but discursive
products of one's own fantasies and projections . This is precisely the critique that supporters of the relational
understanding of culture have been facing. From this perspective, it appears less surprising that Said has had so
much more to offer on the dynamics of Western representations of the Middle East
than on real alternatives to the orientalist depiction of the region. Unfortunately, this second bid for
add that "

a culturalistic approach to the study of international relations is not only aligned with a number of very welcome critical qualities that may enrich the study

It is also related to a problematic tendency to overreact when it comes

to addressing the prevalent Blindness to the Self within IR mainstream and among subscribers to the essentialist
conception of culture. Thus, aspirations of promoting a larger self consciousness in the study of international
relation end up becoming self-centeredness , just as the attempt to promote a larger
sensitivity toward the Other in reality becomes oversensitivity to saying anything
substantial when it comes to actual Other. This is problematic, partly because we are left without any real idea as
to how to approach actual Middle Eastern international relations rather than
Western representations of these; and partly because there is the risk of losing sight of the
material and very concrete consequences that specific representations may
of international relations.

engender (Krishna, 1993). Also, the proponents of this second "culturalistic" alternative seem to be better at asking important and critical
questions than at offering attractive answers.