Civil Procedure Midterm Cases Batch 2

Civil Procedure
WMSU LLB2A 2015

Atty. Floriza P. Sales
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES MIDTERMS

(BATCH 2)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sweet Lines Inc., vs Teves; GR No. L-37750.................................................................................................................. 2
Arquero vs Flojo; GR No. L-68111 ..................................................................................................................................10
Executive Secretary vs Gordon; GR. No. 134171 ......................................................................................................14
SAMMA-LIKHA vs SAMMA Corp.; GR No. 167141....................................................................................................20
Maranaw Hotels vs CA, et al.; GR No. 149660 ............................................................................................................32
Sto. Tomas University Hospital vs Surla; GR No. 129718 .....................................................................................38
Manchester Devt Corp. vs CA; GR No. 75919 ............................................................................................................45
Sun Insurance Office vs Asuncion; GR No. 79937-38..............................................................................................50
Sweet Lines Inc., vs Teves; GR No. L-37750................................................................................................................58
Mijares vs Ranada; GR No. 139325 ................................................................................................................................66
Macasaet vs Co; GR No. 156759 .......................................................................................................................................85
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SWEET LINES INC., VS TEVES; GR NO. L-37750
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37750 May 19, 1978
SWEET LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO TEVES, Presiding Judge, CFI of Misamis Oriental Branch VII, LEOVIGILDO
TANDOG, JR., and ROGELIO TIRO, respondents.
Filiberto Leonardo, Abelardo C. Almario & Samuel B. Abadiano for petitioner.
Leovigildo Vallar for private respondents.
SANTOS, J.:
This is an original action for Prohibition with Pre Injunction filed October 3, 1973 to restrain
respondent Judge from proceeding further with Civil Case No. 4091, entitled Leovigildo D.
Tandog, Jr. and Rogelio Tiro v. Sweet Lines, Inc." after he denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss
the complaint, and the Motion for Reconsideration of said order. 1
Briefly, the facts of record follow. Private respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro,
a contractor by professions, bought tickets Nos. 0011736 and 011737 for Voyage 90 on
December 31, 1971 at the branch office of petitioner, a shipping company transporting interisland passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents were to board petitioner's
vessel, M/S "Sweet Hope" bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the
vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers were bound for Surigao, private
respondents per advice, went to the branch office for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town".
Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree "to hide at the
cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." Private
respondents alleged that they were, during the trip," "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun
and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits," and that the tickets they bought at
Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay for
other tickets. In view thereof, private respondents sued petitioner for damages and for breach
of contract of carriage in the alleged sum of P10,000.00 before respondents Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental. 2
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Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. This motion was
premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets, i.e., Condition No. 14, which reads:
14. It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the
conditions and provisions of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall
be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu. 3
The motion was denied by the trial court. 4 Petitioner moved to reconnsider the order of denial,
but no avail. 5 Hence, this instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction, 'alleging
that the respondent judge has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
preoceeding" and "had acted without or in excess or in error of his jurisdicton or in gross abuse
of discretion. 6
In Our resolution of November 20, 1973, We restrained respondent Judge from proceeding
further with the case and required respondent to comment. 7 On January 18, 1974, We gave due
course to the petition and required respondent to answer. 8 Thereafter, the parties submitted
their respesctive memoranda in support of their respective contentions. 9
Presented thus for Our resolution is a question is aquestion which, to all appearances, is one of
first impression, to wit Is Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's passage
tickets purchased by private respondents, which limits the venue of actions arising from the
contract of carriage to theCourt of First Instance of Cebu, valid and enforceable? Otherwise
stated, may a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru condition printed
at the back of passage tickets to its vessels that any and all actions arising out of the ocntract of
carriage should be filed only in a particular province or city, in this case the City of Cebu, to the
exclusion of all others?
Petitioner contends thaty Condition No. 14 is valid and enforceable, since private respndents
acceded to tit when they purchased passage tickets at its Cagayan de Oro branch office and took
its vessel M/S "Sweet Town" for passage to Tagbilaran, Bohol that the condition of the venue
of actions in the City of Cebu is proper since venue may be validly waived, citing cases; 10 that is
an effective waiver of venue, valid and binding as such, since it is printed in bold and capital
letters and not in fine print and merely assigns the place where the action sing from the contract
is institution likewise citing cases; 11 and that condition No. 14 is unequivocal and mandatory,
the words and phrases "any and all", "irrespective of where it is issued," and "shag" leave no
doubt that the intention of Condition No. 14 is to fix the venue in the City of Cebu, to the
exclusion of other places; that the orders of the respondent Judge are an unwarranted
departure from established jurisprudence governing the case; and that he acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction in is the orders complained of. 12
On the other hand, private respondents claim that Condition No. 14 is not valid, that the same is
not an essential element of the contract of carriage, being in itself a different agreement which
requires the mutual consent of the parties to it; that they had no say in its preparation, the
existence of which they could not refuse, hence, they had no choice but to pay for the tickets
and to avail of petitioner's shipping facilities out of necessity; that the carrier "has been exacting
too much from the public by inserting impositions in the passage tickets too burdensome to
bear," that the condition which was printed in fine letters is an imposition on the riding public
and does not bind respondents, citing cases; 13 that while venue 6f actions may be transferred
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from one province to another, such arrangement requires the "written agreement of the
parties", not to be imposed unilaterally; and that assuming that the condition is valid, it is not
exclusive and does not, therefore, exclude the filing of the action in Misamis Oriental, 14
There is no question that there was a valid contract of carriage entered into by petitioner and
private respondents and that the passage tickets, upon which the latter based their complaint,
are the best evidence thereof. All the essential elements of a valid contract, i.e., consent, cause
or consideration and object, are present. As held inPeralta de Guerrero, et al. v. Madrigal
Shipping Co., Inc., 15
It is a matter of common knowledge that whenever a passenger boards a ship
for transportation from one place to another he is issued a ticket by the shipper
which has all the elements of a written contract, Namely: (1) the consent of the
contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger boards the ship
and the shipper consents or accepts him in the ship for transportation; (2) cause
or consideration which is the fare paid by the passenger as stated in the ticket;
(3) object, which is the transportation of the passenger from the place of
departure to the place of destination which are stated in the ticket.
It should be borne in mind, however, that with respect to the fourteen (14) conditions one of
which is "Condition No. 14" which is in issue in this case printed at the back of the passage
tickets, these are commonly known as "contracts of adhesion," the validity and/or enforceability
of which will have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and
the nature of the conditions or terms sought to be enforced. For, "(W)hile generally, stipulations
in a contract come about after deliberate drafting by the parties thereto, ... there are certain
contracts almost all the provisions of which have been drafted only by one party, usually a
corporation. Such contracts are called contracts of adhesion, because the only participation of
the party is the signing of his signature or his 'adhesion' thereto. Insurance contracts, bills of
lading, contracts of make of lots on the installment plan fall into this category" 16
By the peculiar circumstances under which contracts of adhesion are entered into namely,
that it is drafted only by one party, usually the corporation, and is sought to be accepted or
adhered to by the other party, in this instance the passengers, private respondents, who cannot
change the same and who are thus made to adhere thereto on the "take it or leave it" basis
certain guidelines in the determination of their validity and/or enforceability have been
formulated in order to that justice and fan play characterize the relationship of the contracting
parties. Thus, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and
Rock Insurance Co., 17 and later through Justice Fernando in Fieldman Insurance v.
Vargas, 18 held
The courts cannot ignore that nowadays, monopolies, cartels and concentration
of capital endowed with overwhelm economic power, manage to impose upon
parties d with them y prepared 'agreements' that the weaker party may not
change one whit his participation in the 'agreement' being reduced to the
alternative 'to take it or leave it,' labelled since Raymond Saleilles 'contracts by
adherence' (contracts d' adhesion) in contrast to those entered into by parties
bargaining on an equal footing. Such contracts (of which policies of insurance
and international bill of lading are prime examples) obviously cap for greater
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strictness and vigilance on the part of the courts of justice with a view to
protecting the weaker party from abuses and imposition, and prevent their
becoming traps for the unwary.
To the same effect and import, and, in recognition of the character of contracts of this kind, the
protection of the disadvantaged is expressly enjoined by the New Civil Code
In all contractual property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance indigence, mental
weakness, tender age and other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his
protection. 19
Considered in the light Of the foregoing norms and in the context Of circumstances Prevailing in
the inter-island ship. ping industry in the country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14
printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the
following reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship. ping industry, it is
not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the
passage tickets, on which Condition No. 14 is Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No.
14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same
will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers in different s of the country who,
under Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.
1. It is a matter of public knowledge, of which We can take judicial notice, that there is a dearth
of and acute shortage in inter- island vessels plying between the country's several islands, and
the facilities they offer leave much to be desired. Thus, even under ordinary circumstances, the
piers are congested with passengers and their cargo waiting to be transported. The conditions
are even worse at peak and/or the rainy seasons, when Passengers literally scramble to
whatever accommodations may be availed of, even through circuitous routes, and/or at the risk
of their safety their immediate concern, for the moment, being to be able to board vessels
with the hope of reaching their destinations. The schedules are as often as not if not more so
delayed or altered. This was precisely the experience of private respondents when they were
relocated to M/S "Sweet Town" from M/S "Sweet Hope" and then any to the scorching heat of
the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits, " because even the latter was
filed to capacity.
Under these circumstances, it is hardly just and proper to expect the passengers to examine
their tickets received from crowded/congested counters, more often than not during rush
hours, for conditions that may be printed much charge them with having consented to the
conditions, so printed, especially if there are a number of such conditions m fine print, as in this
case. 20
Again, it should be noted that Condition No. 14 was prepared solely at the ms of the petitioner,
respondents had no say in its preparation. Neither did the latter have the opportunity to take
the into account prior to the purpose chase of their tickets. For, unlike the small print provisions
of contracts the common example of contracts of adherence which are entered into by the
insured in his awareness of said conditions, since the insured is afforded the op to and co the
same, passengers of inter-island v do not have the same chance, since their alleged adhesion is
presumed only from the fact that they purpose chased the tickets.
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It should also be stressed that slapping companies are franchise holders of certificates of public
convenience and therefore, posses a virtual monopoly over the business of transporting
passengers between the ports covered by their franchise. This being so, shipping companies, like
petitioner, engaged in inter-island shipping, have a virtual monopoly of the business of
transporting passengers and may thus dictate their terms of passage, leaving passengers with no
choice but to buy their tickets and avail of their vessels and facilities. Finally, judicial notice may
be taken of the fact that the bulk of those who board these inter-island vested come from the
low-income groups and are less literate, and who have little or no choice but to avail of
petitioner's vessels.
2. Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. For, although
venue may be changed or transferred from one province to another by agreement of the parties
in writing t to Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such an agreement will not be held valid
where it practically negates the action of the claimants, such as the private respondents herein.
The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of
the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote 21 the ends of justice. Considering the
expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim
in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will
thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has
branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of
these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the
instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice, petitioner.
Public policy is ". . . that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully
do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good ... 22 Under
this principle" ... freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the good of the
public. 23 Clearly, Condition No. 14, if enforced, will be subversive of the public good or interest,
since it will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions of passenger cants outside of Cebu City, thus
placing petitioner company at a decided advantage over said persons, who may have perfectly
legitimate claims against it. The said condition should, therefore, be declared void and
unenforceable, as contrary to public policy to make the courts accessible to all who may have
need of their services.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DISMISS. ED. The restraining order issued on
November 20, 1973, is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner.
Fernando (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
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BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur in the dismissal of the instant petition.
Only a few days ago, in Hoechst Philippines, Inc. vs. Francisco Torres, et al., G. R. No. L-44351,
promulgated May 18, 1978, We made it clear that although generally, agreements regarding
change of venue are enforceable, there may be instances where for equitable considerations
and in the better interest of justice, a court may justify the laying of, the venue in the place fixed
by the rules instead of following written stipulation of the parties.
In the particular case at bar, there is actually no written agreement as to venue between the
parties in the sense contemplated in Section 3 of Rule 4, which governs the matter. I take it that
the importance that a stipulation regarding change of the venue fixed by law entails is such that
nothing less than mutually conscious agreement as to it must be what the rule means. In the
instant case, as well pointed out in the main opinion, the ticket issued to private respondents by
petitioner constitutes at best a "contract of adhesion". In other words, it is not that kind of a
contract where the parties sit down to deliberate, discuss and agree specifically on all its terms,
but rather, one which respondents took no part at all in preparing, since it was just imposed
upon them when they paid for the fare for the freight they wanted to ship. It is common
knowledge that individuals who avail of common carriers hardly read the fine prints on such
tickets to note anything more than the price thereof and the destination designated therein.
Under these circumstances, it would seem that, since this case is already in respondent court
and there is no showing that, with its more or less known resources as owner of several interisland vessels plying between the different ports of the Philippines for sometime already,
petitioner would be greatly inconvenienced by submitting to the jurisdiction of said respondent
court, it is best to allow the proceedings therein to continue. I cannot conceive of any juridical
injury such a step can cause to anyone concerned. I vote to dismiss the petition.
Separate Opinions
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Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 2.
2 Id, P. 12, Annex "B",
3 Id., p. 18, Annex "C".
4 Id., p. 20, Annex "D".
5 Id., pp. 21 an d 26, Annexes "E" and "F"
6 Rollo, p. 5; Petition, paars. 8, 9 &10.
7 Id., p. 30.
8 Id., p. 47.
9 Id., pp. 66 and 76.
10 Manila Company vs. Attorney General 20 Phil 523; Central Azucarera de
Tarlac vs. de Loon, 56 Phil 129; Marquez Lain Cay vs. Del Rosario, 55 Phil 622;
Abuton vs. Paler, 54 Phil 519, De la Rosa vs. De Borja, 53 Phil 990; Samson vs.
Carra 50 Phil 647, See Rollo, p. 77.
11 Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. de Leon, supra; Air France v C , 18 SCRA,
(Sept. 28, 1966), p. 155, Id, pp. 77 and 80.
12 Rollo, pp. 81-81, Memorandum of Petitioner.
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13 Shewaram v PAL Inc., G.R. No. L-20099, July 7, 1966, 17 SCRA 606-612;
Mirasol vs. Robert Dollar and Company, 53 Phil 124, See Rollo, p. 79.
14 Rollo. pp- 66-70, Memorandum of Respondents, citing Polytrade Corporation
v. Blanco, 30 SCRA 187-191.
15 106 Phil 485 (1959).
16 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Seventh ed., Vol. 1, p. 80.
17 98 Phil 95 (1955).
18 L-24833. 25 SCRA 70 (1968).
19 Civil Code, Art. 24.
20 Condition No. 14 is the last condition printed at the back of the 4 x 6 inches
pa tickets.
21 See Nicolas v. Reparations Commission et al G. R. No. L-28649 (21 May 1975),
64 SCRA 111, 116.
22 Ferrazini v. Gsell, 34 Phil 711-712 (1916).
23 Id., p. 712.
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ARQUERO VS FLOJO; GR NO. L-68111

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68111 December 20, 1988
BERNOLI P. ARQUERO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE NAPOLEON J. FLOJO, Presiding Judge, Branch VI, Regional Trial Court, Second
Judicial Region, Aparri, Cagayan and RADIO COMMUNICATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(RCPI), respondents.
Hermenegildo G. Rapanan for petitioner.
Treas, Pagada & Associates for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
On November 27, 1983, the petitioner and private respondent Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI), entered into a contract for services for the transmission of a telegraphic
message thru RCPI's branch office in Aparri, Cagayan to Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan at his office
address in Quiapo, Manila. The text of the telegram contract form for transmission (as well as
the telegram itself) reads:
Send the following message subject to the condition that the RCPI shall not be
liable for any damage howsoever same may arise except for the refund of
telegraphic tolls. The sender agrees that as a condition precedent for a cause of
action against the RCPI any complaint relative to the transmittal of this telegram
must be brought to the attention of the company within three months from
date, and that venue thereof shall be in the courts of Quezon City alone and in
no other courts.
ATTY. CALASAN
ROOM 401 PAYAWAL BLDG.
709 PATERNO, QUIAPO, MANILA
CONGRATULATIONS PREPARE ONE XEROX COPY DECISION SEE YOU BONI'S
BIRTHDAY.
BERNOLI
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(Annex "D", P. 16, Rollo)

Atty. Eleazar S. Calasan received a copy of the telegram the next day but he was made to pay
the sum of P 7.30 for delivery charges. Thereafter, on November 30, 1983, at the birthday party
of Asst. Fiscal Bonifacio Sison in Quezon City, Atty. Calasan confronted and censured the
petitioner anent the said telegram. Despite the petitioner's explanation that the telegram had
been duly paid for he was branded as a "stingy mayor who cannot even afford to pay the
measely sum of P 7.30 for the telegram," (p. 2 Memorandum; p. 55, Rollo) in the presence of
many persons.
Thus, the petitioner filed an action for damages against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri, Cagayan. RCPI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, contending
that pursuant to the service contract, the parties had agreed that the venue of any action which
may arise out of the transmittal of the telegram shall be in the courts of Quezon City alone.
On February 13, 1984, the trial court dismissed the case and denied the motion for
reconsideration re said dismissal.
Hence, the instant petition. Citing the case of Sweet Lines, Inc. v. Bernardo Teves, et al., 83 SCRA
361, the petitioner claims that the condition with respect to venue appearing on the ready
printed form of RCPI's telegram for transmission is void and unenforceable because the
petitioner had no hand in its preparation. The Court there held that contracts of adhesion,
where the provisions have been drafted only by one party and the only participation of the
other party is the signing of his signature or his adhesion thereto, are contrary to public policy as
they are injurious to the public or public good.
WE DISAGREE.
The agreement of the parties in the case at bar as to venue is not contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals or good customs.
The parties do not dispute that in the written contract sued upon, it was expressly stipulated
that any action relative to the transmittal of the telegram against the RCPI must be brought in
the Courts of Quezon City alone. We note that neither party to the contract reserved the right to
choose the venue of action as fixed by law (i.e., where the plaintiff or defendant resides, at the
election of the plaintiff [par. 'b'], Section 2, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court), as is usually done if
the parties purported to retain that right of election granted by the Rules. Such being the case, it
can reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to definitely fix the venue of action, in
connection with the written contract sued upon, in the courts of Quezon City only. Section 3,
Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court sanctions such stipulation by providing that "by written
agreement of the parties the venue of action may be changed or transferred from one province
to another." (Bautista vs. de Borja, 18 SCRA 474). As aptly held in the case of Central Azucarera
de Tarlac vs. De Leon, 56 Phil. 169,
By said agreement the parties waived the legal venue, and such waiver is valid
and legally effective, because it was merely a personal privilege they waived,
which is not contrary to public policy or to the prejudice of third persons. It is a
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general principle that a person may renounce any right which the law give
unless such renunciation is expressly prohibited or the right conferred is of such
nature that its renunciation would be against public policy.
In Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, et al. supra, the Supreme Court, in declaring the stipulation which
limited the venue of actions as void and unenforceable held:
By the peculiar circumstances under which contracts of adhesion are entered
intonamely, that it is drafted only by one party, usually the corporation, and is
sought to be accepted or adhered to by the other party, in this instance the
passengers, private respondents, who cannot change the same and who are
thus made to adhere hereto on the 'take it or leave it' basiscertain guidelines
in the determination of their validity and/or enforceability have been
formulated in order to insure that justice and fair play characterize the
relationship of the contracting parties.
It is a matter of public knowledge, of which we can take judicial notice, that
there is a dearth of and acute shortage in inter-island vessels plying between
the country's several islands, and the facilities they offer leave much to be
desired. Thus, even under ordinary circumstances, the piers are congested with
passengers and their cargo waiting to be transported. The conditions are even
worse at peak and/or the rainy seasons, when passengers literally scramble to
secure whatever accommodations may be availed of, even through circuitous
routes, and/or at the risk of their safety. ... Under these circumstances, it is
hardly just and proper to expect the passengers to examine their tickets
received from crowded/congested counters, more often than not during rush
hours, for conditions that may be printed thereon, much less charge them with
having consented to the conditions, so printed, especially if there are a number.
of such conditions in fine print, as in this case.
It should also be stressed that shipping companies are franchise holders of
certificates of public convenience and, therefore, possess a virtual monopoly
over the business of transporting passengers between the ports covered by
their franchise. This being so, shipping companies, like petitioner, engaged in
inter-island shipping, have a virtual monopoly of the business of transporting
passengers and may thus dictate their terms of passage, leaving passengers with
no choice but to buy their tickets and avail of their vessels and facilities. Finally,
judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the bulk of those who board these
inter-island vessels come from the low-income groups and are less literate, and
who have little or no choice but to avail of petitioner's vessels.
In the instant case, the condition with respect to venue in the telegram form for transmission
was printed clearly in the upper front portion of the form. Considering the petitioner's
educational attainment (being a lawyer by profession and the Municipal Mayor of Sta. Teresita,
Cagayan), he must be charged with notice of the condition limiting the venue to Quezon City,
and by affixing his signature thereon, he signified his assent thereto. Thus, the ruling in Sweet
Lines, Inc. vs. Teves, et al., is not applicable in this case.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrrera (Chairperson), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento J., is on leave.
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS GORDON; GR. NO. 134171

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 134171 November 18, 1998

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, petitioners,
vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, ANACLETO M. DIAS, and ORLANDO E. MENDIOLA, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to declare respondents Richard J. Gordon, Anacleto M. Diaz, and Orlando E.
Mendiola in contempt of court. Respondents Diaz and Mendiola are the counsels of respondent
Gordon in G.R. No. 134071, entitled "Richard J. Gordon v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, Felicito
Payumo and Senior Superintendent Arturo C. Lomibao." The petitioners in this case are the
respondents in that case.
The aforesaid case was filed on June 29, 1998 because of respondent Gordon's apprehension
that he would be removed and replaced as chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA) upon the change of administration from President Fidel V. Ramos to President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada. The petition was for prohibition to prevent Gordon's ouster as chairman of the
SBMA on the ground that he had a fixed term of office of six years which would not expire until
February 10, 2004.
As respondent Gordon apprehended, upon assuming office on June 30, 1998, President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 1, "recalling, withdrawing, and canceling the
appointment of Richard J. Gordon as Chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority for a
term of six (6) years, dated February 10, 1998, by former President Fidel V. Ramos."
On July 1, 1998, instead of pressing his motion for a temporary restraining order, respondent
Gordon fried a "Notice of Withdrawal of [his] Petition." This was done at 9:21 in the morning. At
11:30 A.M. of that same day, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 255-0-98.
The filing of the case in the Olongapo court gave rise to the present petition to declare
respondents in contempt of court filed by Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora and Arturo C.
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Lomibao. The petition is filed against respondents Richard Gordon and his counsel Anacleto M.
Diaz and Orlando E. Medina, the latter having filed the case in the Olongapo City Regional Trial
Court after filing a notice of withdraw the case pending in this Court. Petitioners charge that
"the act of respondents in filing two (2) petitions involving the same issues before this Court and
the Regional Trial Court at Olongapo City, both pending, constitutes forum-shopping and
contempt of court."
Petitioners cite the following provision of Rule 7, 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as basis for
their action:
Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim
for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same
or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or noncompliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
This provision applies to petitions for certiorari and prohibition.
In its resolution of July 7, 1998, this Court granted respondents' prayer for leave to withdraw
their petition in G.R. No. 134071, without prejudice to the disposition of the present petition for
contempt.
Respondents deny the charge against them. They contend that they in fact complied with Rule
7, 5 of the Rules of Court by disclosing in the certification of non-forum shopping attached to
their petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, the
existence and subsequent withdrawal of their petition for prohibition before this Court. They
argue that, as held in PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 1 it is neither forum-shopping nor defiance of a
court's authority for a party to file a case in the lower court, even after applying for a similar
relief in the Supreme Court, where such party had first sought the withdrawal of the case before
the Supreme Court in order to seek recourse before the lower court.
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We find for respondents.

Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
Thus, it has been held that there is forum-shopping
(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, 2 or
(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the
Court of Appeals since in such case he deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one
case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy)
would still be open," 3 or
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to
obtain the same from the original court. 4
In Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 5 the Court, summarizing the rulings on
the issue of what constitutes forum-shopping, stated:
Forum-shopping or the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable)
opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special civil action
of certiorari), or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition, has been characterized as an act of
malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as trifling with the Courts and
abusing their processes. It constitutes improper conduct which tends to degrade
the administration of justice. It has also been aptly described as deplorable
because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily burdened dockets of
the courts.
Conversely, since a party resorts to forum-shopping in order to increase his chances of obtaining
a favorable decision or action, a party cannot be said to have sought to improve his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision has ever been rendered
against him in any of the cases he has brought before the courts. 6
In the case at bar, although respondent Richard J. Gordon filed a petition for prohibition before
this Court and, after two days, filed substantially the same petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City, the fact remains that (1) before filing his petition in the Olongapo court
he first flied a notice of withdrawal of his petition which this Court later granted and (2) he
withdrew his petition in this Court for the following reason:
Due, however, to the present policy of the Court requiring parties and their
counsel to adhere strictly to the hierarchy of courts and in order to obviate any
technical objection on this ground, petitioner has deemed it fit to withdraw, as
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he hereby withdraws, the instant petition so that it may be filed in the proper
court where it can be ventilated on its merits.
No adverse decision had been rendered by this Court against respondent Gordon for
which reason he thought it proper to institute the second action in the trial court. The
situation he found himself in is similar to that in which a party, after filing a suit, realizes
he made a mistake because the court in which he has brought the case has no
jurisdiction. He, therefore, withdraws his action and refiles it in the proper forum. For,
indeed, the policy of this Court respecting the hierarchy of courts and consequently
prohibiting the filing of a petition in this Court in view of the concurrent jurisdiction with
the lower courts has been consistently observed in the absence of any compelling
reason for departing from such policy. It is clear from respondents' actions and
explanation that they had no intention of disregarding court processes. They in fact
complied with Rule 7, 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
This case is distinguishable from E. Razon, Inc. v. The Philippine Port Authority. 7 In the E.
Razon case, petitioners, after filing a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order in the Supreme Court, filed an hour later a similar petition before
the Regional Trial Court and, having been assured of a favorable action by the latter court, then
sought the withdrawal of the petition in this Court. Petitioners were found guilty of forumshopping. "The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-shopping an act of
malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes," it was held.
In contrast, in the case at bar, respondent Gordon filed a notice of withdrawal of his petition
before this Court prior to the filing of his petition in the Regional Trial Court as the appropriate
forum. While it is true he and his counsels did not wait for this Court to act on the "Notice of
Withdrawal of Petition" filed by them before filing substantially the same petition in the
Regional Trial Court, the Court understands their situation. They were faced with a predicament:
Administrative Order I ousting respondent Gordon from the chairmanship of the SMBA had
been issued and was in fact about to be enforced hence a writ of preliminary injunction had to
be obtained if respondent Gordon was to remain in office.
A similar predicament confronted the parties in PCGG v. Sandiganbayan (Minute Resolution,
G.R. Nos. 105808, 105809, and 109592, July 22, 1997), cited by respondents. There, as found by
this Court
As regards TMEE's lawyers, they obviously believed that under this Court's
dispositions just reviewed, it was their client, instead of the PCGG, that had the
right to vote the sequestered shares, prior to the determination by the
Sandiganbayan of whether or not there would be dissipation, loss or wastage of
corporate assets if TMEE were permitted to vote said shares. They wished their
client to exercise that right to vote at the stockholders' meeting of January 10,
1997; but PCIB was adamant in its position that it should be the PCGG which
should be accorded the right to vote. Time being of the essence, said lawyers be
took themselves to this Court; on December 23, 1996, they filed here an
"Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order."
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A few days' reflection, however, apparently made them doubt that the Court
would act on their motion because in its Resolution of December 3, 1996 it had
said "that no further motion for reconsideration or clarification of the issues
treated or, of the dispositions herein made, will be entertained." They thus
decided that relief should properly be sought in the Securities & Exchange
Commission which in their view had "jurisdiction to act on the subject matter
(which) refers to the corporate acts of PCIB and its corporate officers (Garcia Jr.
vs. Sandiganbayan 237 SCRA 552) (their cause) not being directly aimed at the
PCGG as an entity, but at a private corporation (Holiday Inn [Phils.] vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al. 186 SCRA 447]." But first they had to withdraw their
motion for TRO before this Court. This they sought to do by filing on January 9,
1997, a "Notice of Withdrawal of 'Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Restraining
Order.'" That done, they filed the corresponding petition with the Securities &
Exchange Commission to stop the PCIB stockholders' meeting scheduled the
following day, as above narrated.
This Court considered the parties' predicament with understanding and overlooked their lapse:
The Court sees no reason to reject this explanation of the TMEE lawyers, or to
doubt their good faith. Their explanation is not on its face implausible; it is in
truth consistent with the admitted facts on record. Considering that
condemnation for contempt should not be made lightly, and that the power to
punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, the Court finds no difficulty whatever in reaching the
conclusion that there was no willful disregard or defiance of its orders, or
forum-shopping, by the TMEE lawyers or, through his permissiveness, by the
SEC Hearing Officer.
By no means does the Court by the present decision wish to convey the impression that it will
tolerate any act of disrespect or discourtesy. To be sure, respondents could have apologized at
the very least for the time of the Court which they had taken and made an effort to explain why
they have to refile their case without awaiting the Court's resolution on their notice of
withdrawal of the petition. But, exercising restraint lest a contrary action be seen as mere peeve
or petulance, and considering this case instead with compassion, bearing in mind that the
purpose of contempt is preservative rather than punitive, this Court has chosen to overlook
respondents' lapse.
WHEREFORE, the petition for contempt is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Purisima
and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., took no part.
Martinez, J., is on leave.
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Footnotes
1 G.R. Nos. 105808, 105809, & 109592, Resolution of July 22, 1997.
2 First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 256 (1996);
Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan; 252 SCRA 641 (1996); Washington Distillers, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 821 (1996); A Prime Security Services, Inc. v.
Drilon, 246 SCRA 439 (1995); Chemphil Export & Import Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 251 SCRA 257 (1995).
3 Borromeo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 255 SCRA 75 (1996).
4 Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 614
(1996).
5 251 SCRA 257, 291-292 (1995).
6 International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA
389 (1995).
7 151 SCRA 233 (1987).
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SAMMA-LIKHA VS SAMMA CORP.; GR NO. 167141

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167141
March 13, 2009
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG KAPATIRANG

HALIGI NG ALYANSA (SAMMA-LIKHA), Petitioner,
vs.
SAMMA CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 of the August 31, 2004 decision2 and February 15,
2005 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77156.
Petitioner Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng
Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) filed a petition for certification election on July 24, 2001 in the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office IV.4 It claimed that: (1) it was a
local chapter of the LIKHA Federation, a legitimate labor organization registered with the DOLE;
(2) it sought to represent all the rank-and-file employees of respondent Samma Corporation; (3)
there was no other legitimate labor organization representing these rank-and-file employees;
(4) respondent was not a party to any collective bargaining agreement and (5) no certification or
consent election had been conducted within the employer unit for the last 12 months prior to
the filing of the petition.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition arguing that (1) LIKHA Federation failed to
establish its legal personality; (2) petitioner failed to prove its existence as a local chapter; (3) it
failed to attach the certificate of non-forum shopping and (4) it had a prohibited mixture of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees.5
In an order dated November 12, 2002, med-arbiter Arturo V. Cosuco ordered the dismissal of
the petition on the following grounds: (1) lack of legal personality for failure to attach the
certificate of registration purporting to show its legal personality; (2) prohibited mixture of rankand-file and supervisory employees and (3) failure to submit a certificate of non-forum
shopping.6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration on November 29, 2001. The Regional Director of DOLE
Regional Office IV forwarded the case to the Secretary of Labor. Meanwhile, on December 14,
2002, respondent filed a petition for cancellation of petitioners union registration in the DOLE
Regional Office IV.7
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On January 17, 2003, Acting Secretary Manuel G. Imson, treating the motion for reconsideration
as an appeal, rendered a decision reversing the order of the med-arbiter. He ruled that the legal
personality of a union cannot be collaterally attacked but may only be questioned in an
independent petition for cancellation of registration. Thus, he directed the holding of a
certification election among the rank-and-file employees of respondent, subject to the usual
pre-election conference and inclusion-exclusion proceedings.8
On January 23, 2003 or six days after the issuance of said decision, respondent filed its comment
on the motion for reconsideration of petitioner, asserting that the order of the med-arbiter
could only be reviewed by way of appeal and not by a motion for reconsideration pursuant to
Department Order (D.O.) No. 9, series of 1997.9
On February 6, 2003, respondent filed its motion for reconsideration of the January 17, 2003
decision. In a resolution dated April 3, 2003, Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas denied the
motion.10
Meanwhile, on April 14, 2003, Crispin D. Dannug, Jr., Officer-in-Charge/Regional Director of
DOLE Regional Office IV, issued a resolution revoking the charter certificate of petitioner as local
chapter of LIKHA Federation on the ground of prohibited mixture of supervisory and rank-andfile employees and non-compliance with the attestation clause under paragraph 2 of Article 235
of the Labor Code.11 On May 6, 2003, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this
resolution.12
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari13 in the CA assailing the January 17, 2003 decision and
April 3, 2003 resolution of the Secretary of Labor. In a decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA
reversed the same.14 It denied reconsideration in a resolution dated February 15, 2005. It held
that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 which required the filing of a certificate of non-forum
shopping applied to petitions for certification election. It also ruled that the Secretary of Labor
erred in granting the appeal despite the lack of proof of service on respondent. Lastly, it found
that petitioner had no legal standing to file the petition for certification election because its
members were a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.15
Hence, this petition.
The issues for our resolution are the following: (1) whether a certificate for non-forum shopping
is required in a petition for certification election; (2) whether petitioners motion for
reconsideration which was treated as an appeal by the Secretary of Labor should not have been
given due course for failure to attach proof of service on respondent and (3) whether petitioner
had the legal personality to file the petition for certification election.
Requirement of Certificate
Of Non-Forum Shopping
Is Not Required in a Petition
For Certification Election
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In ruling against petitioner, the CA declared that under Administrative Circular No. 04-94,16 a
certificate of non-forum shopping was required in a petition for certification election. The
circular states:
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the
original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or
complaint-in-intervention, petition, or applicationwherein a party asserts his claim for relief.
(Emphasis supplied)
According to the CA, a petition for certification election asserts a claim, i.e., the conduct of a
certification election. As a result, it is covered by the circular.17
We disagree.
The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-claims,
cross-claims, petitions or applications where contending parties litigate their respective
positions regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A
certification proceeding, even though initiated by a "petition," is not a litigation but an
investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character.18
Such proceedings are not predicated upon an allegation of misconduct requiring relief, but,
rather, are merely of an inquisitorial nature. The Board's functions are not judicial in nature,
but are merely of an investigative character. The object of the proceedings is not the decision of
any alleged commission of wrongs nor asserted deprivation of rights but is merely the
determination of proper bargaining units and the ascertainment of the will and choice of the
employees in respect of the selection of a bargaining representative. The determination of the
proceedings does not entail the entry of remedial orders to redress rights, but culminates solely
in an official designation of bargaining units and an affirmation of the employees' expressed
choice of bargaining agent.19 (Emphasis supplied)
In Pena v. Aparicio,20 we ruled against the necessity of attaching a certification against forum
shopping to a disbarment complaint. We looked into the rationale of the requirement and
concluded that the evil sought to be avoided is not present in disbarment proceedings.
[The] rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum shopping is to apprise the
Court of the pendency of another action or claim involving the same issues in another court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation.
Filing multiple petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to
degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds
to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. Furthermore, the rule
proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote candor and transparency among lawyers and their
clients in the pursuit of their cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration of
justice, prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time of the
courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more courts or agencies
rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the same issue.
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It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification against
forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem that the scenario sought to be
avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely
happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either "taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person." Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a
certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action against the
same respondent may still be ascertained with ease.21 (Emphasis supplied)
The same situation holds true for a petition for certification election. Under the omnibus rules
implementing the Labor Code as amended by D.O. No. 9,22 it is supposed to be filed in the
Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer or where the
bargaining unit is principally situated.23 The rules further provide that where two or more
petitions involving the same bargaining unit are filed in one Regional Office, the same shall be
automatically consolidated.24 Hence, the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting
decisions will rarely happen in this proceeding and, if it does, will be easy to discover.
Notably, under the Labor Code and the rules pertaining to the form of the petition for
certification election, there is no requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping either in
D.O. No. 9, series of 1997 or in D.O. No. 40-03, series of 2003 which replaced the former.25
Considering the nature of a petition for certification election and the rules governing it, we
therefore hold that the requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping is inapplicable to
such a petition.
Treatment of Motion for Reconsideration as an Appeal
The CA ruled that petitioners motion for reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal by the
Secretary of Labor, should not have been given due course for lack of proof of service in
accordance with the implementing rules as amended by D.O. No. 9:
Section 12. Appeal; finality of decision. The decision of the Med-Arbiter may be appealed to
the Secretary for any violation of these Rules. Interloculory orders issued by the Med-Arbiter
prior to the grant or denial of the petition, including order granting motions for intervention
issued after an order calling for a certification election, shall not be appealable. However, any
issue arising therefrom may be raised in the appeal on the decision granting or denying the
petition.
The appeal shall be under oath and shall consist of a memorandum of appeal specifically stating
the grounds relied upon by the appellant with the supporting arguments and evidence. The
appeal shall be deemed not filed unless accompanied by proof of service thereof to
appellee.26 (Emphasis supplied)
In accepting the appeal, the Secretary of Labor stated:
[Petitioners] motion for reconsideration of the Med-Arbiters Order dated November 12, 2002
was verified under oath by [petitioners] president Gil Dispabiladeras before Notary Public
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Wilfredo A. Ruiz on 29 November 2002, and recorded in the Notarial Register under Document
No. 186, Page No. 38, Book V, series of 2002. On page 7 of the said motion also appears the
notation "copy of respondent to be delivered personally with the name and signature of one
Rosita Simon, 11/29/02." The motion contained the grounds and arguments relied upon by
[petitioner] for the reversal of the assailed Order. Hence, the motion for reconsideration
has complied with the formal requisites of an appeal.
The signature of Rosita Simon appearing on the last page of the motion can be considered
as compliance with the required proof of service upon respondent. Rosita Simons employment
status was a matter that should have been raised earlier by [respondent]. But [respondent] did
not question the same and slept on its right to oppose or comment on [petitioners] motion for
reconsideration. It cannot claim that it was unaware of the filing of the appeal by [petitioner],
because a copy of the indorsement of the entire records of the petition to the Office of the
Secretary "in view of the memorandum of appeal filed by Mr. Jesus B. Villamor" was served
upon the employer and legal counsels Atty. Ismael De Guzman and Atty. Anatolio Sabillo at the
Samma Corporation Office, Main Avenue, PEZA, Rosario, Cavite on December 5,
2002.27 (Emphasis supplied)
The motion for reconsideration was properly treated as an appeal because it substantially
complied with the formal requisites of the latter. The lack of proof of service was not fatal as
respondent had actually received a copy of the motion. Consequently, it had the opportunity to
oppose the same. Under these circumstances, we find that the demands of substantial justice
and due process were satisfied.
We stress that rules of procedure are interpreted liberally to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action. They should not be applied if their application serves no
useful purpose or hinders the just and speedy disposition of cases. Specifically, technical rules
and objections should not hamper the holding of a certification election wherein employees are
to select their bargaining representative. A contrary rule will defeat the declared policy of the
State1avvphi1.zw+
to promote the free and responsible exercise of the right to self-organization through the
establishment of asimplified mechanism for the speedy registration of labor organizations and
workers associations,determination of representation status, and resolution of intra and interunion disputes.28 xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Legal Personality of Petitioner
Petitioner argues that the erroneous inclusion of one supervisory employee in the union of rankand-file employees was not a ground to impugn its legitimacy as a legitimate labor organization
which had the right to file a petition for certification election.
We agree.
LIKHA was granted legal personality as a federation under certificate of registration no. 92-1015032-11638-FED-LC. Subsequently, petitioner as its local chapter was issued its charter certificate
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no. 2-01.29 With certificates of registration issued in their favor, they are clothed with legal
personality as legitimate labor organizations:
Section 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization or workers association shall be
deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of
registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be
questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.30
-0Section 3. Acquisition of legal personality by local chapter. - A local/chapter constituted in
accordance with Section 1 of this Rule shall acquire legal personality from the date of filing of
the complete documents enumerated therein. Upon compliance with all the documentary
requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau of Labor Relations shall issue in favor of the
local/chapter a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor
organizations.31
Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned
only in an independent petition for cancellation of certificate of registration.32 Unless
petitioners union registration is cancelled in independent proceedings, it shall continue to have
all the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to petition for certification
election.
Furthermore, the grounds for dismissal of a petition for certification election based on the lack
of legal personality of a labor organization are the following: (a) petitioner is not listed by the
Regional Office or the Bureau of Labor Relations in its registry of legitimate labor organizations
or (b) its legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality in accordance with the
rules.33
As mentioned, respondent filed a petition for cancellation of the registration of petitioner on
December 14, 2002. In a resolution dated April 14, 2003, petitioners charter certificate was
revoked by the DOLE. But on May 6, 2003, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this
resolution. Neither of the parties alleged that this resolution revoking petitioners charter
certificate had attained finality. However, in this petition, petitioner prayed that its charter
certificate be "reinstated in the roster of active legitimate labor [organizations]."34 This cannot
be granted here. To repeat, the proceedings on a petition for cancellation of registration are
independent of those of a petition for certification election. This case originated from the latter.
If it is shown that petitioners legal personality had already been revoked or cancelled with
finality in accordance with the rules, then it is no longer a legitimate labor organization with the
right to petition for a certification election.
A Final Note
Respondent, as employer, had been the one opposing the holding of a certification election
among its rank-and-file employees. This should not be the case. We have already declared that,
in certification elections, the employer is a bystander; it has no right or material interest to assail
the certification election.35
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[This] Court notes that it is petitioner, the employer, which has offered the most tenacious
resistance to the holding of a certification election among its monthly-paid rank-and-file
employees. This must not be so, for the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole
concern of the employees. The only exception to this rule is where the employer has to file the
petition for certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because it was
requested to bargain collectively, which exception finds no application in the case before us. Its
role in a certification election has aptly been described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, as that of a mere bystander. It has no legal standing in a
certification election as it cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiter's orders related
thereto. . .36
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Let the records of the case be remanded to the
office of origin, the Regional Office IV of the Department of Labor and Employment, for
determination of the status of petitioners legal personality. If petitioner is still a legitimate labor
organization, then said office shall conduct a certification election subject to the usual preelection conference.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO*
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO**
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION***
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Per Special Order No. 584 dated March 3, 2009.
**
Per Special Order No. 583 dated March 3, 2009.
***
Per Special Order No. 570 dated February 12, 2009.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices

Eugenio S. Labitoria (retired) and Fernanda Lampas Peralta of the Special Fourth Division
of the Court of Appeals.Rollo, pp. 25-37.
3
Id., pp. 45-47.
Docketed as case no. RO400-0107-RU-006; id., p. 26.
Id., p. 84.
Id.
Id. Captioned "In Re: Petition for Cancellation of Charter/Union Registration of

Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma (Samma-Likha), Samma Corporation,
Petitioner, versus Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma (Samma-Likha),
Respondent," docketed as RO400-0212-AU-002; id., p. 62.
8
Id., pp. 80-82.
Id., p. 27.
10
Id., pp. 77-79.
11
Id. pp. 62-76.
12
Id., p. 28.
13
Under Rule 65; id., p. 25.
14
Id., p. 37.
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15
Id., pp. 6-12.
16
Made effective on April 1, 1994; Pena v. Aparicio, A.C. No. 7298, 25 June 2007, 525
SCRA 444, 451.
17
Rollo, p. 32.
18
Association of the Court of Appeals Employees v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 94716, 15

November 1991, 203 SCRA 597, 605, citing Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. FerrerCalleja, G.R. No. 85085, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 127, 130-131.
19
Bulakea Restaurant & Caterer v. CIR, 150-A Phil. 445, 453 (1972), citing LVN Pictures,
Inc. v. Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW) and CIR, L-12582 and Sampaguita Pictures, Inc.
v. Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW) and CIR, L-12598, decided jointly on 28 January
1961, 1 SCRA 132, 135-136.
20
Supra note 16.
21
Id., pp. 454- 455, citations omitted.
22
Before they were amended by D.O. No. 40-03, series of 2003.
23
Section 2, Rule XI of the implementing rules as amended by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997.
24
Id.
25
Id., Section 4; Section 4, Rule VIII in D.O. 40-03. Section 4 of Rule XI of the
implementing rules as amended by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997 states:
Section 4. Form and contents of petition. - The petition shall be in writing and
under oath and shall contain, among others, the following:
(a) The name of petitioner, its address, and affiliation if appropriate, the
date of its registration and number of its certificate of registration if
petitioner is a federation, national union or independent union, or the
date it was reported to the Department if it is a local/chapter;
(b) The name, address and nature of the employers business;
(c) The description of the bargaining unit;
(d) The approximate number of employees in the bargaining unit;
(e) The names and addresses of other legitimate labor organizations in
the bargaining unit;
(f) A statement indicating any of the following circumstances:
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(i) That the bargaining unit is unorganized or that there is no

registered collective bargaining agreement covering the
employees in the bargaining unit;
(ii) If there exists a duly registered collective bargaining
agreement, that the petition is filed within the sixty-day
freedom period of such agreement; or
(iii) If another union had been previously certified in a valid
certification, consent or run-off election or voluntarily
recognized in accordance with Rule X of these Rules, that the
petition is filed outside the one-year period from such
certification or run-off election and no appeal is pending
thereon, or from the time the fact of recognition was entered
into the records of such union.
(g) In an organized establishment, the signatures of at least twenty-five
(25%) percent of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit which
shall be attached to the petition at the time of its filing; and
(h) Other relevant facts.
On the other hand, Section 4 of Rule VIII of the implementing rules as amended
by D.O. No. 40-03, series of 2003 provides:
Section. 4. Form and contents of petition. - The petition shall be in writing,
verified under oath by the president of petitioning labor organization. Where
the petition is filed by a federation or national union, it shall be verified under
oath by the president or its duly authorized representative. The petition shall
contain the following:
(a) the name of petitioner, its address, and affiliation if appropriate, the
date and number of its certificate of registration. If the petition is filed
by a federation or national union, the date and number of the
certificate of registration or certificate of creation of chartered local;
(b) the name, address and nature of employers business;
(c) the description of the bargaining unit;
(d) the approximate number of employees in the bargaining unit;
(e) the names and addresses of other legitimate labor unions in the
bargaining unit;
(f) A statement indicating any of the following circumstances:
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1) that the bargaining unit is unorganized or that there is no

registered collective bargaining agreement covering the
employees in the bargaining unit;
2) if there exists a duly registered collective bargaining
agreement, that the petition is filed within the sixty-day
freedom period of such agreement; or
3) if another union had been previously recognized voluntarily
or certified in a valid certification, consent or run-off election,
that the petition is filed outside the one-year period from entry
of voluntary recognition or conduct of certification or run-off
election and no appeal is pending thereon.
g) in an organized establishment, the signature of at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of all employees in the appropriate bargaining unit shall
be attached to the petition at the time of its filing; and
h) other relevant facts. xxx
26
Section 12, Implementing Rules of Book V, Rule XI, as amended by D.O. No. 9.
27
Rollo, pp. 78-79.
28
Section 1, Implementing Rules of Book V, Rule II, as amended by D.O. No. 9.
29
This was reported to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on June 26, 2001 in
accordance with Rule VI, as amended by D.O. No. 9. Thus, the BLR issued a certificate of
creation of local/chapter no. LIKHA-11;rollo, pp. 26, 67.
30
Section 5, Implementing Rules of Book V, Rule V, as amended by D.O. No. 9.
31
Id., Section 3, Rule VI.
32
Tagaytay Highlands Intl Golf Club Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees UnionPGTWO, 443 Phil. 841, 852 (2003); San Miguel Corporation (Mandaue Packaging
Products Plants) v. MPPP-SMPP-SMAMRFU-FFW, G.R. No. 152356, 16 August 2005, 467
SCRA 107, 132.
33
Section 11, paragraph II, Implementing Rules of Book V, Rule XI, as amended by D.O.
No. 9.
34
Rollo, p. 12 of petitioners memorandum.
35
SMC Quarry 2 Workers Union-February Six Movement (FSM) Local Chapter No. 1564 v.
Titan Megabags Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 150761, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 524,
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528, citing Toyota Motor Phils. Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 148924, 24 September 2003, 412 SCRA 69.
36
San Miguel Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 116172, 10
October 1996, 263 SCRA 68, 81-82. This was reiterated in Laguna Autoparts
Manufacturing Corporation v. Office of the Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment, G.R. No. 157146, 29 April 2005, 457 SCRA 730, 742.
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MARANAW HOTELS VS CA, ET AL.; GR NO. 149660

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149660
January 20, 2009
MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SHERYL OABEL AND MANILA RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
CORP., Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing a resolution issued by the Court
of Appeals. The resolution denied the petition for review filed by petitioner Maranaw Hotels and
Resort Corp.
The present proceedings emanate from a complaint for regularization, subsequently converted
into one for illegal dismissal, filed before Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan by private respondent
Sheryl Oabel.
It appears that private respondent Oabel was initially hired by petitioner as an extra beverage
attendant on April 24, 1995. This lasted until February 7, 1997.1 Respondent worked in Century
Park Hotel, an establishment owned by the petitioner.
On September 16, 1996,2 petitioner contracted with Manila Resource Development
Corporation.3 Subsequently, private respondent Oabel was transferred to MANRED, with the
latter deporting itself as her employer.4 MANRED has intervened at all stages of these
proceedings and has consistently claimed to be the employer of private respondent Oabel. For
the duration of her employment, private respondent Oabel performed the following functions:
Secretary, Public Relations Department: February 10, 1997 - March 6, 1997
Gift Shop Attendant:
April 7, 1997
- April 21, 1997
Waitress:
April 22, 1997
- May 20, 1997
Shop Attendant:
May 21, 1997
- July 30, 19985
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On July 20, 1998, private respondent filed before the Labor Arbiter a petition for regularization
of employment against the petitioner. On August 1, 1998, however, private respondent Oabel
was dismissed from employment.6Respondent converted her petition for regularization into a
complaint for illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan rendered a decision on July 13, 1999, dismissing the complaint
against the petitioner. The decision held:
While complainant alleged that she has been working with the respondent hotel in different
department (sic) of the latter on (sic) various capacities (although not all departments are part
and parcel of the hotels), complainant never disputed the fact that her work with the same were
on a per function basis or on a "need basis" co-terminus with the function she was hired
for.Considering that complainant job (sic) with the respondent hotel was on a per function
basis or on a "need basis", complainant could not even be considered as casual employee or
provisional employee. Respondent hotel consider (sic) complainant, at most, a project employee
which does not ripened (sic) into regular employee (sic).7
Private respondent appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC
reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and held that: (1) MANRED is a labor-only contractor,
and (2) private respondent was illegally dismissed.
Of the first holding, the NLRC observed that under the very terms of the service contract,
MANRED shall provide the petitioner not specific jobs or services but personnel and that
MANRED had insufficient capitalization and was not sufficiently equipped to provide specific
jobs.8 The NLRC likewise observed that the activities performed by the private respondent were
directly related to and usually necessary or desirable in the business of the petitioner.9
With respect to the termination of private respondents employment, the NLRC held that it was
not effected for a valid or just cause and was therefore illegal. The dispositive portion of the
ruling reads thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED. xxxx Respondents Century Park
Hotel and Manila Resource Development Corporation are hereby declared jointly and severally
liable for the following awards in favor of complainant: 1) her full backwages and benefits from
August 1, 1998 up to the date of her actual reinstatement; 2) her salary differentials, share in
the service charges, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay from July 20, 1995 to July
31, 1998.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner subsequently appealed before the Court of Appeals. In a resolution, the appellate
court dismissed the petition on account of the failure of the petitioner to append the board
resolution authorizing the counsel for petitioner to file the petition before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held:
After a careful perusal of the records of the case, We resolve to DISMISS the present petition on
the ground of non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping taking into
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account that the aforesaid certification was subscribed and verified by the Personnel Director of
petitioner corporation without attaching thereto his authority to do so for and in behalf of
petitioner corporation per board resolution or special power of attorney executed by the
latter.11
Petitioner duly filed its motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in
a resolution dated August 30, 2001.12
In the present petition for review, the petitioner invokes substantial justice as justification for a
reversal of the resolution of the Court of Appeals.13 Petitioner likewise contends that the filing of
a motion for reconsideration with the certificate of non-forum shopping attached constitutes
substantial compliance with the requirement.14
There is no merit to the petition.
Well-settled is the rule that the certificate of non-forum shopping is a mandatory requirement.
Substantial compliance applies only with respect to the contents of the certificate but not as to
its presence in the pleading wherein it is required.
Petitioners contention that the filing of a motion for reconsideration with an appended
certificate of non forum-shopping suffices to cure the defect in the pleading is absolutely
specious. It negates the very purpose for which the certification against forum shopping is
required: to inform the Court of the pendency of any other case which may present similar
issues and involve similar parties as the one before it. The requirement applies to both natural
and juridical persons.
Petitioner relies upon this Courts ruling in Digital Microwave Corp. v. Court of Appeals15 to
show that its Personnel Director has been duly authorized to sign pleadings for and in behalf of
the petitioner. Petitioner, however, has taken the ruling in Digital Microwave out of context.
The portion of the ruling in Digital Microwaveupon which petitioner relies was in response to
the issue of impossibility of compliance by juridical persons with the requirements of Circular
28-91.16 The Courts identification of duly authorized officers or directors as the proper
signatories of a certificate of non forum-shopping was in response to that issue. The ruling does
not, however, ipso facto clothe a corporate officer or director with authority to execute a
certificate of non-forum shopping by virtue of the formers position alone.
Any doubt on the matter has been resolved by the Courts ruling in BPI Leasing Corp. v. Court of
Appeals17where this Court emphasized that the lawyer acting for the corporation must be
specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the corporation.18 Specific authorization, the Court
held, could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that
specifically authorizes the counsel to institute the petition and execute the certification, to make
his actions binding on his principal, i.e., the corporation.19
This Court has not wavered in stressing the need for strict adherence to procedural
requirements. The rules of procedure exist to ensure the orderly administration of justice. They
are not to be trifled with lightly.
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For this reason alone, the petition must already be dismissed. However, even if this grave
procedural infirmity is set aside, the petition must still fail. In the interest of averting further
litigation arising from the present controversy, and in light of the respective positions asserted
by the parties in the pleadings and other memoranda filed before this Court, the Court now
proceeds to resolve the case on the merits.
Petitioner posits that it has entered into a service agreement with intervenor MANRED. The
latter, in turn, maintains that private respondent Oabel is its employee and subsequently holds
itself out as the employer and offers the reinstatement of private respondent.
Notably, private respondents purported employment with MANRED commenced only in 1996,
way after she was hired by the petitioner as extra beverage attendant on April 24, 1995. There is
thus much credence in the private respondents claim that the service agreement executed
between the petitioner and MANRED is a mere ploy to circumvent the law on employment, in
particular that which pertains on regularization.
In this regard, it has not escaped the notice of the Court that the operations of the hotel itself
do not cease with the end of each event or function and that there is an ever present need for
individuals to perform certain tasks necessary in the petitioners business. Thus, although the
tasks themselves may vary, the need for sufficient manpower to carry them out does not. In any
event, as borne out by the findings of the NLRC, the petitioner determines the nature of the
tasks to be performed by the private respondent, in the process exercising control.
This being so, the Court finds no difficulty in sustaining the finding of the NLRC that MANRED is a
labor-only contractor.20 Concordantly, the real employer of private respondent Oabel is the
petitioner.
It appears further that private respondent has already rendered more than one year of service
to the petitioner, for the period 1995-1998, for which she must already be considered a regular
employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code:
Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination
of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the
work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of
the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:
Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity
exists. (Emphasis supplied)
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IN VIEW WHEREOF, the present petition is DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
June 15, 2001 is affirmed.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 137.
Id., at p. 62.
Hereafter MANRED.
Rollo, p. 67.
Id., at p. 61.
Id., at p. 62.
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7
Id., at pp. 147-148.
NLRC Rollo, pp. 535-536.
Id., at pp. 536-537.
10
Id., at p. 538.
11
Id., at p. 27.
12
CA Rollo, p. 107.
13
Rollo, p. 18
14
Id.
15
G.R. No. 128550, March 16, 2000, 328 SCRA 286.
16
Id., at p. 290.
17
G.R. No. 127624, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 4.
18
Id., at p. 10.
19
Id., at p. 11.
20
Supra, note 8.
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STO. TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL VS SURLA; GR NO.

129718

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 129718 August 17, 1998

SANTO TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, petitioner,
vs.
CESAR ANTONIO Y. SURLA and EVANGELINE SURLA, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Can a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be dismissed on the ground of a failure to
accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping? This question is the core issue
presented for resolution in the instant petition.
First, a factual background.
On 26 December 1995, respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Santo Tomas University Hospital with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City predicated on an
allegation by the spouses that their son, Emmanuel Cesar Surla, while confined at the said
hospital for having been born prematurely, had accidentally fallen from his incubator on 16 April
1995 possibly causing serious harm on the child. The case was raffled and assigned to Branch
226 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by the Hon. Leah S. DomingoRegala, and there docketed Civil Case No. Q-95-25977.
On 28 February 1996, petitioner hospital filed its Answer with "Compulsory Counterclaim"
asserting that respondents still owed to it the amount of P82,632.10 representing hospital bills
for Emmanuel's confinement at the hospital and making a claim for moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney's fees, by reason of the supposed unfounded and malicious suit filed
against it.
On 21 March 1996, petitioner received a copy of respondents' Reply to Counterclaim, dated 12
March 1996, that sought, inter alia, the dismissal of petitioner's counterclaim for its noncompliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring that a complaint
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and other initiatory pleadings, such as a counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party
complaint, be accompanied with a certificate of non-forum shopping.
In its Rejoinder to respondents' Reply to Counterclaim, petitioner contended that the subject
circular should be held to refer only to a permissive counterclaim, an initiatory pleading not
arising out of, nor necessarily connected with, the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim but not
to a compulsory counterclaim spawned by the filing of a complaint and so intertwined therewith
and logically related thereto that it verily could not stand for independent adjudication.
Petitioner concluded that, since its counterclaim was compulsory in nature, the subject circular
did not perforce apply to it. 1
In its Order of 22 March 1996, the trial court dismissed petitioner's counterclaim; it held:
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provides; among others:
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and
subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint,
counterclaim, crossclaim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or
complaint-in-intervention, petition or application wherein a
party asserts his claim on (sic) relief.
It will be noted that the counterclaim does not distinguish whether the same
should be permissive or compulsory, hence this Court finds that the
counterclaim referred to in said Circular covers both kinds.
WHEREFORE, the counterclaim of defendant is hereby DISMISSED. Let the pretrial of this case be set on May 14, 1996 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon . . . . 2
On 16 April 1996, petitioner filed before the same court an Omnibus Motion seeking a
clarification of the court's Order of 14 March 1996 denying respondents' Reply to Counterclaim
and a reconsideration of the 22nd March 1996 Order dismissing the compulsory
counterclaim. 3 On 22 April 1996, petitioner received a copy of the court's Order, dated 16 April
1996, which pertinently read:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated March 14, 1996 is hereby clarified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The Reply to counterclaim filed by counsel for plaintiffs is
hereby NOTED.
SO ORDERED.
The Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order dated March 22, 1996 is
hereby DENIED. The pre-trial conference set on May 14, 1998 will go on as
scheduled. 4
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Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court, asseverating grave abuse of
discretion by public respondent in dismissing the compulsory counterclaim and in
espousing the view that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 should apply even to
compulsory counterclaims.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision promulgated on 12 March 1997, dismissed the petition
for certiorari; it opined:
. . . the Supreme Court circular aforequoted requires without equivocation that
to the original civil complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim, third (fourth, etc.) party
complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party
asserts his claim for relief to be filed in all courts and agencies other than the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals must be annexed and simultaneously
filed therewith the required certification under oath to avoid forum shopping or
multiple filing of petitions and complaints. Non-compliance therewith is a cause
for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory
pleading. Included in such initiatory pleading is the defendant's counterclaim,
permissive or compulsory.
A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action
against the plaintiff in a case . . ., only this time it is the original defendant who
becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same footing and is tested by the same
rules as if it were an independent action. 5
In its present recourse, petitioner contends that
The Court of Appeals (has) committed serious, evident and palpable error in
ruling that:
5.1 THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT IS UNAVAILING. THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPULSORY
COUNTERCLAIM BEING A FINAL ORDER, THE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE TAKEN
AN APPEAL THEREFROM; AND
5.2 ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT
LIKEWISE APPLIES TO BOTH KINDS OF COUNTERCLAIMS, PERMISSIVE AND
COMPULSORY. 6
The petition is partly meritorious.
The appellate court ruled that the dismissal of the counterclaim, being a final order, petitioner's
remedy was to appeal therefrom and, such appeal being then available, the special civil action
of certiorari had been improperly filed.
The concept of a final judgment or order, distinguished from an interlocutory issuance, is that
the former decisively puts to a close, or disposes of, a case or a disputed issue leaving nothing
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else to be done by the court in respect thereto. Once that judgment or order is rendered, the
adjudicative task of the court is likewise ended on the particular matter involved. 7 An order is
interlocutory, upon the other hand, if its effects would only be provisional in character and
would still leave substantial proceedings to be further had by the issuing court in order to put
the controversy to rest. 8
The order of the trial court dismissing petitioner's counterclaim was a final order since the
dismissal, although based on a technicality, would require nothing else to be done by the court
with respect to that specific subject except only to await the possible filing during the
reglementary period of a motion for reconsideration or the taking of an appeal therefrom.
As a rule, errors of judgment, as well as of procedure, neither relating to the jurisdiction of the
court nor involving grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari. 9 As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its
discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special
civil action of certiorari. 10 This rule, however, is not a rigid and inflexible technicality. This Court
has not too infrequently given due course to a petition for certiorari, even when the proper
remedy would have been an appeal, where valid and compelling considerations could warrant
such a recourse. 11 Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for instance, in order to prevent
irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically
exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an
ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the
judgment complained of. 12
In the case at bar, an appeal from the dismissal of the counterclaim, although not totally
unavailable, could have well been ineffective, if not futile, as far as petitioner is concerned since
no single piece of evidence has yet been presented by it, that opportunity having been
foreclosed by the trial court, on the dismissed counterclaim which could form part of the
records to be reviewed by the appellate court. The object of procedural law is not to cause an
undue protraction of the litigation, but to facilitate the adjudication of conflicting claims and to
serve, rather than to defeat, the ends of justice. 13
The opinion of this Court on the next issue persuades it to accept, tested by the foregoing
disquisition, the instant petition for its consideration.
The pertinent provisions of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 provide:
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the
complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under
oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and
undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no
such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or
proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state
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the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and
sworn certification contemplated here have been filed.
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this
Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim third (fourth,
etc.) party complaint or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application
wherein a party asserts his claim for relief. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears stressing, once again, that the real office of Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made
effective on 01 April 1994, is to curb the malpractice commonly referred to also as forumshopping. It is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. 14 The language of the circular distinctly suggests that it is
primarily intended to cover an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting
a claim for relief. 15
It should not be too difficult, the foregoing rationale of the circular aptly taken, to sustain the
view that the circular in question has not, in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of claim
which, by its very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its
substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the
answer and not remain outstanding for independent resolution except by the court where the
main case pends. Prescinding from the foregoing, the proviso in the second paragraph of Section
5, Rule 8, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., that the violation of the anti-forum shopping
rule "shall not be curable by mere amendment . . . but shall be cause for the dismissal of the
case without prejudice," being predicated on the applicability of the need for a certification
against forum shopping, obviously does not include a claim which cannot be independently set
up.
Petitioner, nevertheless, is entitled to a mere partial relief. The so-called "counterclaim" of
petitioner really consists of two segregative parts: (1) for unpaid hospital bills of respondents'
son, Emmanuel Surla, in the total amount of P82,032.10; and (2) for damages, moral and
exemplary, plus attorney's fees by reason of the alleged malicious and unfounded suit filed
against it. 16 It is the second, not the first, claim that the Court here refers to as not being
initiatory in character and thereby not covered by the provisions of Administrative Circular No.
04-94.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby modified in that the claim for moral, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in Civil Case No. Q-95-25977 of petitioner is ordered reinstated.
The temporary restraining order priorly issued by this Court is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 77-78.
2 Rollo, pp. 81-82.
3 Rollo, pp. 84-92.
4 Rollo pp. 130-131.
5 Rollo, pp. 47-48.
6 Rollo, pp. 18-19.
7 Investments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 334; Denso (Phils.,) Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 280.
8 Bairan vs. Tan Siu Lay, 18 SCRA 1235.
9 Presco vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 232.
10 Commissioner on Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200.
11 Oriental Media, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 647; Rosario vs. Court of
Appeals, 211 SCRA 384.
12 See Presco vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 245
SCRA 150; Vda. de Saludes vs. Pajarillo, 78 Phil. 754.
13 See Continental Leaf Tobacco (Phil.) Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
140 SCRA 269 citingDimayacyac vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 265.
14 See Chemphil Export & Import Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA
257.
15 Adopting the requirement in initiatory pleadings of a certification against
forum shopping, Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure now
provides:
Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
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pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or noncompliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
16 Rollo pp. 9-10.
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MANCHESTER DEVT CORP. VS CA; GR NO. 75919

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW
LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January
28,1987 and another motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the
Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted
but the motion to set the case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the
amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages
sought in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
with damages. 2While the present case is an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the
defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to
plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. 4 However, in the present case, the prayer is
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for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action
against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for
the property in question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy
any judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a
contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of
the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during
the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff
valid and producing the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount
of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the
total amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of
the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as
merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the
sheriff's fee were paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from
the allegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for
damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount
only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the
amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the
total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out
in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the
basis of assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of
this Court together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the
Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended
complaint on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as coplaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint.
The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October
15, 1985 ordering the reassessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that
were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the
amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that
plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount
of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended
complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount
of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not
consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and
possession of real property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to
include the government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and
attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted. 9
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In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also
for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although
the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was
held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the
proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint
superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should
be the basis of the computation of the filing fee.11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the
complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and
specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of
damages as alleged in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the present
case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as
docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the
Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which
could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of
the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the
amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of
counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount
of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the
correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This
fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the
anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended
complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the
complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the
trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that
petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00
in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the
required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical
practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
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The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 115 SCRA 193.
2 Supra, p. 194.
3 P. 64, Rollo.
4 Magaspi vs. Ramolete, supra, pp. 114-115.
5 Pp. 65-66, Rollo.
6 Magaspi case, supra, p. 194. Pp.
7 121-122, Rollo.
8 Magaspi vs. Ramolete, supra, pp. 199-200.
9 Pp. 201-202, Rollo.
10 Supra, 115 SCRA 204-205.
11 Supra, 115 SCRA 205.
12 Supra,115 SCRA 204, citing Malimit vs. Degamo, G.R.No. L-17850, Nov. 28,
1964, 12 SCRA 450, 120 Phil 1247; Lee vs. Republic, L-15027, Jan 31, 1964, 10
SCRA 65.
13 Gaspar vs. Dorado, L-17884, November 29,1965 15 SCRA 331; Tamayo vs.
San Miguel Brewery,G.R.No. L-17449, January 30, 1964; Rosario vs. Carandang,
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96 Phil 845; Campos Rueda Corp. vs. Hon. Judge Bautista, et al., G.R. No. L18452, Sept. 29, 1962
14 Supra.
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SUN INSURANCE OFFICE VS ASUNCION; GR NO. 79937-38

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for petitioners. Tanjuatco,
Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over
a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium refund
on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private
respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the
required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and
thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint
sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated
damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the
complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from
the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted
petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge
Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records
of said case together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees
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were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court
with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of
Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-108752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of
deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue
certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in
their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was
temporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate
of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include
the same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On
August 30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two
additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his
assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in
the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying
with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private
respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986,
private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim
of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of
the said second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and
compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended
complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution
of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the
reassessment of the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private
respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages"
amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said
order of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional
claim of P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On
October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private
respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
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1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it

seeks annulment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the
portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and
requiring the Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be
paid by private respondent on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00. 2
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent
court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower
court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment of
the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private
respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and
considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental
complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is
P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint
should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their
theory, petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs.
CA, 4 as follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was
no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is
the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5wherein this Court held that the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and
to that extent. 6
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and
detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a
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judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he
deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within the reglementary
period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the
additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the
basis of these facts, this court held that the Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction to
hear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipino
citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the
required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of the petition for
citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal
requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year before the filing of the
petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's
declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing
fee was paid on May 23, 1956.
In Malimit vs. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was
an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates
which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the one-week
period after the proclamation as provided therefor by law. 10 However, the required docket fees
were paid only after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of
such payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the
date when it was mailed.
Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paid
before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not
applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not
required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in
the same special proceeding then pending before the same court.
Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed
filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Said
case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with
damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket
fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The
prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the
defendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner
thereof to whom the proper title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly
rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to plaintiff,
P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the
action and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the
docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the
recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed value and that the
amount of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay
P3,104.00 as filing fee.
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The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as the
defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was
eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may determine,
attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to
the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted
by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket
fee which plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid
the total docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must
be based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed
the case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule
that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference
of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that as the action appears to be
one for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is
also one, for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the
damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which
was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.
However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an
action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants'
announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question,
the attachment of such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment
that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to
execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal
forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay the
plaintiff jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of
said amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked the
trial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient
for purposes of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages
sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total
amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the docket fee
based on the nature of the action for specific performance where the amount involved is not
capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint
as well as its designation that the action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus,
this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee computed against the
amount of damages of about P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the prayer
of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an amended complaint
on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of
the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was
maintained.
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On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said case
and other cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985, the trial court directed the
plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking for.
This plaintiff did as instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was
reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in the prayer. Said
amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither
can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal
purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and
actions taken by the trial court were declared null and void. 13
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment of docket
fee which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts and
circumstances of this case are similar toManchester. In the body of the original complaint, the
total amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of
damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of the premium and the
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was
paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint
wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is
approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private
respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not
less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional
claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On
October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the
promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private
respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of
this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent
paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid
a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in
the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner
insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the
intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the
original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until] the case was
decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the
government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and
that the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint
was null and void.
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In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that,
unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester
must have had that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional
docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting
his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient
considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower
court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and,
thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment
of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is
hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by
private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint
and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof
and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
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1 Annexes 1, 1-A, 1-B of Comment of private respondent.

2 Page 34, Decision of the Court of Appeals; p. 57 Rollo.
3 Annex 2 to Memorandum of private respondent.
4 149 SCRA 562 (1987).
5 115 SCRA 193, 204 (1982).
6 People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946); Alday vs. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521
(1983) and Palomo Building Tenants Association, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 133 SCRA 168 (1984).
7 57 Phil. 552 (1932).
8 SCRA 65 (1964).
9 12 SCRA 450 (1964).
10 Section 173, Revised Election Code.
11 28 SCRA 3301 (1969).
12 Supra.
13 Supra, pp. 567-568.
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SWEET LINES INC., VS TEVES; GR NO. L-37750

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37750 May 19, 1978
SWEET LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO TEVES, Presiding Judge, CFI of Misamis Oriental Branch VII, LEOVIGILDO
TANDOG, JR., and ROGELIO TIRO, respondents.
Filiberto Leonardo, Abelardo C. Almario & Samuel B. Abadiano for petitioner.
Leovigildo Vallar for private respondents.
SANTOS, J.:
This is an original action for Prohibition with Pre Injunction filed October 3, 1973 to restrain
respondent Judge from proceeding further with Civil Case No. 4091, entitled Leovigildo D.
Tandog, Jr. and Rogelio Tiro v. Sweet Lines, Inc." after he denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss
the complaint, and the Motion for Reconsideration of said order. 1
Briefly, the facts of record follow. Private respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro,
a contractor by professions, bought tickets Nos. 0011736 and 011737 for Voyage 90 on
December 31, 1971 at the branch office of petitioner, a shipping company transporting interisland passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents were to board petitioner's
vessel, M/S "Sweet Hope" bound for Tagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the
vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers were bound for Surigao, private
respondents per advice, went to the branch office for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town".
Because the said vessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree "to hide at the
cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of the Philippine Coastguard." Private
respondents alleged that they were, during the trip," "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun
and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits," and that the tickets they bought at
Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were not honored and they were constrained to pay for
other tickets. In view thereof, private respondents sued petitioner for damages and for breach
of contract of carriage in the alleged sum of P10,000.00 before respondents Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental. 2
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Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. This motion was
premised on the condition printed at the back of the tickets, i.e., Condition No. 14, which reads:
14. It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of the
conditions and provisions of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall
be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu. 3
The motion was denied by the trial court. 4 Petitioner moved to reconnsider the order of denial,
but no avail. 5 Hence, this instant petition for prohibition for preliminary injunction, 'alleging
that the respondent judge has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
preoceeding" and "had acted without or in excess or in error of his jurisdicton or in gross abuse
of discretion. 6
In Our resolution of November 20, 1973, We restrained respondent Judge from proceeding
further with the case and required respondent to comment. 7 On January 18, 1974, We gave due
course to the petition and required respondent to answer. 8 Thereafter, the parties submitted
their respesctive memoranda in support of their respective contentions. 9
Presented thus for Our resolution is a question is aquestion which, to all appearances, is one of
first impression, to wit Is Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the petitioner's passage
tickets purchased by private respondents, which limits the venue of actions arising from the
contract of carriage to theCourt of First Instance of Cebu, valid and enforceable? Otherwise
stated, may a common carrier engaged in inter-island shipping stipulate thru condition printed
at the back of passage tickets to its vessels that any and all actions arising out of the ocntract of
carriage should be filed only in a particular province or city, in this case the City of Cebu, to the
exclusion of all others?
Petitioner contends thaty Condition No. 14 is valid and enforceable, since private respndents
acceded to tit when they purchased passage tickets at its Cagayan de Oro branch office and took
its vessel M/S "Sweet Town" for passage to Tagbilaran, Bohol that the condition of the venue
of actions in the City of Cebu is proper since venue may be validly waived, citing cases; 10 that is
an effective waiver of venue, valid and binding as such, since it is printed in bold and capital
letters and not in fine print and merely assigns the place where the action sing from the contract
is institution likewise citing cases; 11 and that condition No. 14 is unequivocal and mandatory,
the words and phrases "any and all", "irrespective of where it is issued," and "shag" leave no
doubt that the intention of Condition No. 14 is to fix the venue in the City of Cebu, to the
exclusion of other places; that the orders of the respondent Judge are an unwarranted
departure from established jurisprudence governing the case; and that he acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction in is the orders complained of. 12
On the other hand, private respondents claim that Condition No. 14 is not valid, that the same is
not an essential element of the contract of carriage, being in itself a different agreement which
requires the mutual consent of the parties to it; that they had no say in its preparation, the
existence of which they could not refuse, hence, they had no choice but to pay for the tickets
and to avail of petitioner's shipping facilities out of necessity; that the carrier "has been exacting
too much from the public by inserting impositions in the passage tickets too burdensome to
bear," that the condition which was printed in fine letters is an imposition on the riding public
and does not bind respondents, citing cases; 13 that while venue 6f actions may be transferred
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from one province to another, such arrangement requires the "written agreement of the
parties", not to be imposed unilaterally; and that assuming that the condition is valid, it is not
exclusive and does not, therefore, exclude the filing of the action in Misamis Oriental, 14
There is no question that there was a valid contract of carriage entered into by petitioner and
private respondents and that the passage tickets, upon which the latter based their complaint,
are the best evidence thereof. All the essential elements of a valid contract, i.e., consent, cause
or consideration and object, are present. As held inPeralta de Guerrero, et al. v. Madrigal
Shipping Co., Inc., 15
It is a matter of common knowledge that whenever a passenger boards a ship
for transportation from one place to another he is issued a ticket by the shipper
which has all the elements of a written contract, Namely: (1) the consent of the
contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger boards the ship
and the shipper consents or accepts him in the ship for transportation; (2) cause
or consideration which is the fare paid by the passenger as stated in the ticket;
(3) object, which is the transportation of the passenger from the place of
departure to the place of destination which are stated in the ticket.
It should be borne in mind, however, that with respect to the fourteen (14) conditions one of
which is "Condition No. 14" which is in issue in this case printed at the back of the passage
tickets, these are commonly known as "contracts of adhesion," the validity and/or enforceability
of which will have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and
the nature of the conditions or terms sought to be enforced. For, "(W)hile generally, stipulations
in a contract come about after deliberate drafting by the parties thereto, ... there are certain
contracts almost all the provisions of which have been drafted only by one party, usually a
corporation. Such contracts are called contracts of adhesion, because the only participation of
the party is the signing of his signature or his 'adhesion' thereto. Insurance contracts, bills of
lading, contracts of make of lots on the installment plan fall into this category" 16
By the peculiar circumstances under which contracts of adhesion are entered into namely,
that it is drafted only by one party, usually the corporation, and is sought to be accepted or
adhered to by the other party, in this instance the passengers, private respondents, who cannot
change the same and who are thus made to adhere thereto on the "take it or leave it" basis
certain guidelines in the determination of their validity and/or enforceability have been
formulated in order to that justice and fan play characterize the relationship of the contracting
parties. Thus, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and
Rock Insurance Co., 17 and later through Justice Fernando in Fieldman Insurance v.
Vargas, 18 held
The courts cannot ignore that nowadays, monopolies, cartels and concentration
of capital endowed with overwhelm economic power, manage to impose upon
parties d with them y prepared 'agreements' that the weaker party may not
change one whit his participation in the 'agreement' being reduced to the
alternative 'to take it or leave it,' labelled since Raymond Saleilles 'contracts by
adherence' (contracts d' adhesion) in contrast to those entered into by parties
bargaining on an equal footing. Such contracts (of which policies of insurance
and international bill of lading are prime examples) obviously cap for greater
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strictness and vigilance on the part of the courts of justice with a view to
protecting the weaker party from abuses and imposition, and prevent their
becoming traps for the unwary.
To the same effect and import, and, in recognition of the character of contracts of this kind, the
protection of the disadvantaged is expressly enjoined by the New Civil Code
In all contractual property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance indigence, mental
weakness, tender age and other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his
protection. 19
Considered in the light Of the foregoing norms and in the context Of circumstances Prevailing in
the inter-island ship. ping industry in the country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14
printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the
following reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship. ping industry, it is
not just and fair to bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the
passage tickets, on which Condition No. 14 is Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No.
14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same
will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers in different s of the country who,
under Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.
1. It is a matter of public knowledge, of which We can take judicial notice, that there is a dearth
of and acute shortage in inter- island vessels plying between the country's several islands, and
the facilities they offer leave much to be desired. Thus, even under ordinary circumstances, the
piers are congested with passengers and their cargo waiting to be transported. The conditions
are even worse at peak and/or the rainy seasons, when Passengers literally scramble to
whatever accommodations may be availed of, even through circuitous routes, and/or at the risk
of their safety their immediate concern, for the moment, being to be able to board vessels
with the hope of reaching their destinations. The schedules are as often as not if not more so
delayed or altered. This was precisely the experience of private respondents when they were
relocated to M/S "Sweet Town" from M/S "Sweet Hope" and then any to the scorching heat of
the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits, " because even the latter was
filed to capacity.
Under these circumstances, it is hardly just and proper to expect the passengers to examine
their tickets received from crowded/congested counters, more often than not during rush
hours, for conditions that may be printed much charge them with having consented to the
conditions, so printed, especially if there are a number of such conditions m fine print, as in this
case. 20
Again, it should be noted that Condition No. 14 was prepared solely at the ms of the petitioner,
respondents had no say in its preparation. Neither did the latter have the opportunity to take
the into account prior to the purpose chase of their tickets. For, unlike the small print provisions
of contracts the common example of contracts of adherence which are entered into by the
insured in his awareness of said conditions, since the insured is afforded the op to and co the
same, passengers of inter-island v do not have the same chance, since their alleged adhesion is
presumed only from the fact that they purpose chased the tickets.
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It should also be stressed that slapping companies are franchise holders of certificates of public
convenience and therefore, posses a virtual monopoly over the business of transporting
passengers between the ports covered by their franchise. This being so, shipping companies, like
petitioner, engaged in inter-island shipping, have a virtual monopoly of the business of
transporting passengers and may thus dictate their terms of passage, leaving passengers with no
choice but to buy their tickets and avail of their vessels and facilities. Finally, judicial notice may
be taken of the fact that the bulk of those who board these inter-island vested come from the
low-income groups and are less literate, and who have little or no choice but to avail of
petitioner's vessels.
2. Condition No. 14 is subversive of public policy on transfers of venue of actions. For, although
venue may be changed or transferred from one province to another by agreement of the parties
in writing t to Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such an agreement will not be held valid
where it practically negates the action of the claimants, such as the private respondents herein.
The philosophy underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of
the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote 21 the ends of justice. Considering the
expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim
in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will
thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. Upon the other hand, petitioner has
branches or offices in the respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of
these places. Hence, the filing of the suit in the CFI of Misamis Oriental, as was done in the
instant case, will not cause inconvenience to, much less prejudice, petitioner.
Public policy is ". . . that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully
do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good ... 22 Under
this principle" ... freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the good of the
public. 23 Clearly, Condition No. 14, if enforced, will be subversive of the public good or interest,
since it will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions of passenger cants outside of Cebu City, thus
placing petitioner company at a decided advantage over said persons, who may have perfectly
legitimate claims against it. The said condition should, therefore, be declared void and
unenforceable, as contrary to public policy to make the courts accessible to all who may have
need of their services.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DISMISS. ED. The restraining order issued on
November 20, 1973, is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner.
Fernando (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
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Separate Opinions
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Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 2.
2 Id, P. 12, Annex "B",
3 Id., p. 18, Annex "C".
4 Id., p. 20, Annex "D".
5 Id., pp. 21 an d 26, Annexes "E" and "F"
6 Rollo, p. 5; Petition, paars. 8, 9 &10.
7 Id., p. 30.
8 Id., p. 47.
9 Id., pp. 66 and 76.
10 Manila Company vs. Attorney General 20 Phil 523; Central Azucarera de
Tarlac vs. de Loon, 56 Phil 129; Marquez Lain Cay vs. Del Rosario, 55 Phil 622;
Abuton vs. Paler, 54 Phil 519, De la Rosa vs. De Borja, 53 Phil 990; Samson vs.
Carra 50 Phil 647, See Rollo, p. 77.
11 Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. de Leon, supra; Air France v C , 18 SCRA,
(Sept. 28, 1966), p. 155, Id, pp. 77 and 80.
12 Rollo, pp. 81-81, Memorandum of Petitioner.
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13 Shewaram v PAL Inc., G.R. No. L-20099, July 7, 1966, 17 SCRA 606-612;
Mirasol vs. Robert Dollar and Company, 53 Phil 124, See Rollo, p. 79.
14 Rollo. pp- 66-70, Memorandum of Respondents, citing Polytrade Corporation
v. Blanco, 30 SCRA 187-191.
15 106 Phil 485 (1959).
16 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Seventh ed., Vol. 1, p. 80.
17 98 Phil 95 (1955).
18 L-24833. 25 SCRA 70 (1968).
19 Civil Code, Art. 24.
20 Condition No. 14 is the last condition printed at the back of the 4 x 6 inches
pa tickets.
21 See Nicolas v. Reparations Commission et al G. R. No. L-28649 (21 May 1975),
64 SCRA 111, 116.
22 Ferrazini v. Gsell, 34 Phil 711-712 (1916).
23 Id., p. 712.
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MIJARES VS RANADA; GR NO. 139325

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 139325
April 12, 2005
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI

DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs
in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional
Trial Court, Makati City, and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court
appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of
Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have yet to finish weeding out
its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom and the fundamental structures and processes
of democracy have been much lauded, according to a significant number, the changes, however,
have not sufficiently healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive conditions of
the martial law period. The cries of justice for the tortured, the murdered, and
the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in the hearts of the fair-minded, yet the
dispensation of the appropriate relief due them cannot be extended through the same caprice
or whim that characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage done was not merely
personal but institutional, and the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve the award
of reparations due within the confines of the restored rule of law.
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights violations1 who, deprived of
the opportunity to directly confront the man who once held absolute rule over this country,
have chosen to do battle instead with the earthly representative, his estate. The clash has been
for now interrupted by a trial court ruling, seemingly comported to legal logic, that required the
petitioners to pay a whopping filing fee of over Four Hundred Seventy-Two Million Pesos
(P472,000,000.00) in order that they be able to enforce a judgment awarded them by a foreign
court. There is an understandable temptation to cast the struggle within the simplistic confines
of a morality tale, and to employ short-cuts to arrive at what might seem the desirable solution.
But easy, reflexive resort to the equity principle all too often leads to a result that may be
morally correct, but legally wrong.
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Nonetheless, the application of the legal principles involved in this case will comfort those who
maintain that our substantive and procedural laws, for all their perceived ambiguity and
susceptibility to myriad interpretations, are inherently fair and just. The relief sought by the
petitioners is expressly mandated by our laws and conforms to established legal principles. The
granting of this petition for certiorari is warranted in order to correct the legally infirm and
unabashedly unjust ruling of the respondent judge.
The essential facts bear little elaboration. On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United
States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino
citizens2 who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention,
torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime.3 The Alien
Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it
involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international law.4 These plaintiffs brought the
action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly
consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who
between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the
custody of military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of
approximately ten thousand (10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was
impracticable.
The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of the US
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which were invoked by the plaintiffs.
Subsequently, the US District Court certified the case as a class action and created three (3) subclasses of torture, summary execution and disappearance victims.5 Trial ensued, and
subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages
in favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge
Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total
of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars
and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996.6
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of
Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. They alleged that they are
members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court awarded damages.7 They
argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme
Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of
the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and
enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.8
On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the nonpayment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten
Pesos (P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a
monetary amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars
(US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the
proper computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that an
action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence,
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a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of
Rule 141.9
On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada10 of the Makati RTC issued the
subject Orderdismissing the complaint without prejudice. Respondent judge opined that
contrary to the petitioners' submission, the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable
of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the
payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign
judgment. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find
application, and the RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four
Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.
Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada denied in
an Order dated 28 July 1999. From this denial, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 assailing the twin orders of respondent judge.11 They prayed for the annulment of the
questioned orders, and an order directing the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 97-1052 and the
conduct of appropriate proceedings thereon.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of
the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum
of money or recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay
Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and
render inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, as required by Section 6,
Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action.
Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, which provides
that "Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not
be denied to any person by reason of poverty," a mandate which is essentially defeated by the
required exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived at by the RTC,
was characterized as indisputably unfair, inequitable, and unjust.
The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to intervene in this case.12 It urged that
the petition be granted and a judgment rendered, ordering the enforcement and execution of
the District Court judgment in accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a
foreign judgment as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a case has been decided
between the same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be
relitigated again in another country.13 The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity, and of
vested rights.
The Court's disposition on the issue of filing fees will prove a useful jurisprudential guidepost for
courts confronted with actions enforcing foreign judgments, particularly those lodged against an
estate. There is no basis for the issuance a limited pro hac vice ruling based on the special
circumstances of the petitioners as victims of martial law, or on the emotionally-charged
allegation of human rights abuses.
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An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily evinces that the respondent judge
ignored the clear letter of the law when he concluded that the filing fee be computed based on
the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation.
In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for
the computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million. The provision states:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an
estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party,
fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical
services in the same time, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the
started value of the property in litigation, is:
1. Less than P 100,00.00
P 500.00
2. P 100,000.00 or more but less than P 150,000.00
P 800.00
P 1,000.00
P 1,500.00
P 1,750.00
6. P 300,000.00 or more but not more than P 400,000.00
P 2,000.00
7. P 350,000.00 or more but not more than P400,000.00
P 2,250.00
8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of P 400,000.00
P 10.00
(Emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the above-quoted provision covers, on one hand, ordinary actions, permissive
counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints and complaints-in-interventions, and on the other,
money claims against estates which are not based on judgment. Thus, the relevant question for
purposes of the present petition is whether the action filed with the lower court is a "money
claim against an estate not based on judgment."
Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a
judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. The provision does not make any
distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not
distinguish, we shall not distinguish.
A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is computed
on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or on the value of the property in litigation. The
filing fee for requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is based on the amount of
indebtedness or the mortgagee's claim.14 In special proceedings involving properties such as for
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the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again based on the value of the property.15 The aforecited
rules evidently have no application to petitioners' complaint.
Petitioners rely on Section 7(b), particularly the proviso on actions where the value of the
subject matter cannot be estimated. The provision reads in full:
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.(b) For filing
1.
Actions where the value

of the subject matter
cannot be estimated
2.
---
P 600.00
Special civil actions except

judicial foreclosure which
shall be governed by
paragraph (a) above
3.
---
P 600.00
All other actions not

involving property
---
P 600.00
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value,
thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
It is worth noting that the provision also provides that in real actions, the assessed value or
estimated value of the property shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees. Yet again, this provision does not apply in the case at bar. A real action is
one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or an action affecting title to or
recovery of possession of real property.16 Neither the complaint nor the award of damages
adjudicated by the US District Court involves any real property of the Marcos Estate.
Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that the filing fees
should be computed on the basis of the schematic table of Section 7(a), as the action involved
pertains to a claim against an estate based on judgment. What provision, if any, then should
apply in determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?
To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a
foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.
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The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized
states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries.17 This principle was prominently affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v.
Guyot18 and expressly recognized in our jurisprudence beginning withIngenholl v. Walter E.
Olsen & Co.19 The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment were originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
was taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn, was derived from the
California Act of March 11, 1872.20 Remarkably, the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has remained unchanged down to the last word in nearly
a century. Section 48 states:
SEC. 48.
Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in
personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the
thing, while in an action inpersonam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive,
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title.21 However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local
courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party,22 collusion, fraud,23or clear
mistake of law or fact.24 Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend
against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there should be
an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy.25
It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign
judgment26, even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only
for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment,
and in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy.27 Consequently, the party attacking
a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.28
The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint is
an appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right,29 and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is
in essence a vindication of a right prescinding either from a "conclusive judgment upon title" or
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the "presumptive evidence of a right."30 Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a

quasi-judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular
courts.31
There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the
enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that
occasioned the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an
essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For example,
in a complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from the violation
of the right of the complainant through the act or omission of the respondent. On the other
hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages from the
same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the same manner of action, the
cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign judgment itself.
More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the
complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious act or omission committed by
the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuating
circumstances. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to
and amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an action to enforce a foreign
judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it
prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of
jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of
fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all
legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.32 Otherwise known as the policy
of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to
safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote
what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: "rest and
quietness."33 If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation.34
Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support the proposition that the
subject matter of the complaintthe enforcement of a foreign judgmentis incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Admittedly the proposition, as it applies in this case, is counter-intuitive,
and thus deserves strict scrutiny. For in all practical intents and purposes, the matter at hand is
capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. In the assailedOrder, the respondent
judge pounced upon this point without equivocation:
The Rules use the term "where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated."
The subject matter of the present case is the judgment rendered by the foreign court
ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs definite sums of money, as and for compensatory
damages. The Court finds that the value of the foreign judgment can be estimated;
indeed, it can even be easily determined. The Court is not minded to distinguish
between the enforcement of a judgment and the amount of said judgment, and
separate the two, for purposes of determining the correct filing fees. Similarly, a plaintiff
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suing on promissory note for P1 million cannot be allowed to pay only P400 filing
fees (sic), on the reasoning that the subject matter of his suit is not the P1 million, but
the enforcement of the promissory note, and that the value of such "enforcement"
cannot be estimated.35
The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter of an action is capable of
pecuniary estimation is well-entrenched. The Marcos Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill
and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, which ruled:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature
of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on
the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
On the other hand, petitioners cite the ponencia of Justice JBL Reyes in Lapitan v.
Scandia,36 from which the rule in Singsong and Raymundo actually derives, but which
incorporates this additional nuance omitted in the latter cases:
xxx However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance.37
Petitioners go on to add that among the actions the Court has recognized as being incapable of
pecuniary estimation include legality of conveyances and money deposits,38 validity of a
mortgage,39 the right to support,40validity of documents,41 rescission of contracts,42 specific
performance,43 and validity or annulment of judgments.44 It is urged that an action for
enforcement of a foreign judgment belongs to the same class.
This is an intriguing argument, but ultimately it is self-evident that while the subject matter of
the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of a foreign judgment, the effect of a providential
award would be the adjudication of a sum of money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is
primarily for "the enforcement of the foreign judgment," but there is a certain obtuseness to
that sort of argument since there is no denying that the enforcement of the foreign judgment
will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money.
But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond the point of reckoning, we must examine
its possible ramifications. Petitioners raise the point that a declaration that an action for
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enforcement of foreign judgment may be capable of pecuniary estimation might lead to an

instance wherein a first level court such as the Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to
enforce a foreign judgment. But under the statute defining the jurisdiction of first level courts,
B.P. 129, such courts are not vested with jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of foreign
judgments.
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and
intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value
of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged:
Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or
different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots.45
Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains
to an assertion of rights and interests over property or a sum of money. But as earlier pointed
out, the subject matter of an action to enforce a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself,
and the cause of action arising from the adjudication of such judgment.
An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for enforcement of
a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts, thus negating the fears of the petitioners. Indeed, an examination of
the provision indicates that it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to actions
for enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no other court or office is vested
jurisdiction over such complaint:
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Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
xxx
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.
Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District
Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action
based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule
141. What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing fees over the instant
complaint? For this case and other similarly situated instances, we find that it is covered by
Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not involving property."
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for "other actions
not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a
grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable
rule and dismissed the complaint.
There is another consideration of supreme relevance in this case, one which should disabuse the
notion that the doctrine affirmed in this decision is grounded solely on the letter of the
procedural rule. We earlier adverted to the the internationally recognized policy of
preclusion,46 as well as the principles of comity, utility and convenience of nations47 as the basis
for the evolution of the rule calling for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
The US Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot48 relied heavily on the concept of comity, as especially
derived from the landmark treatise of Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws
of 1834.49 Yet the notion of "comity" has since been criticized as one "of dim contours"50 or
suffering from a number of fallacies.51Other conceptual bases for the recognition of foreign
judgments have evolved such as the vested rights theory or the modern doctrine of obligation.52
There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral agreements the standards
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, but these have not borne fruition.
The members of the European Common Market accede to the Judgments Convention, signed in
1978, which eliminates as to participating countries all of such obstacles to recognition such as
reciprocity and rvision au fond.53 The most ambitious of these attempts is the Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
prepared in 1966 by the Hague Conference of International Law.54 While it has not received the
ratifications needed to have it take effect,55 it is recognized as representing current scholarly
thought on the topic.56 Neither the Philippines nor the United States are signatories to the
Convention.
Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory behind the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments or a universal treaty rendering it obligatory force, there is
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consensus that the viability of such recognition and enforcement is essential. Steiner and Vagts
note:
. . . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on private international law,
each following a quite separate path, is not one conducive to the growth of a
transnational community encouraging travel and commerce among its members. There
is a contemporary resurgence of writing stressing the identity or similarity of the values
that systems of public and private international law seek to further a community
interest in common, or at least reasonable, rules on these matters in national legal
systems. And such generic principles as reciprocity play an important role in both
fields.57
Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide renown, points out:
Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments, there can be
little dispute that the end is to protect the reasonable expectations and demands of the
parties. Where the parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one
state, and proceedings there are not tainted with irregularity, they may fairly be
expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the judgment
issued by the court.58
There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign judgment and the
defenses against the enforcement thereof. As earlier discussed, the exceptions enumerated in
Section 48, Rule 39 have remain unchanged since the time they were adapted in this jurisdiction
from long standing American rules. The requisites and exceptions as delineated under Section
48 are but a restatement of generally accepted principles of international law. Section 98 of The
Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, states that "a valid judgment rendered in a foreign
nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States," and on
its face, the term "valid" brings into play requirements such notions as valid jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties.59 Similarly, the notion that fraud or collusion may preclude the
enforcement of a foreign judgment finds affirmation with foreign jurisprudence and
commentators,60 as well as the doctrine that the foreign judgment must not constitute "a clear
mistake of law or fact."61 And finally, it has been recognized that "public policy" as a defense to
the recognition of judgments serves as an umbrella for a variety of concerns in international
practice which may lead to a denial of recognition.62
The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has
been recognized in this jurisdiction.63 This defense allows for the application of local standards
in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive
right, as it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a person.64 The defense is also
recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law nations adhere to a broad public
policy exception which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in the light
of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing court, applied the wrong law to the case.65 The
public policy defense can safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore
litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional values.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to
recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However,
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generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations.66 The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted
as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.67
While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that
such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law.68 As
earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the
need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The
fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a
widespread rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules
governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement.
Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition and
enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in
various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which has existed in its current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the
Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the
viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid
enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there may be
distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state,69 but they all prescind from the
premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has
attained the status of opinio juris in international practice.
This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and requisites outlined in
Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely from the procedural rule, but by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules of procedure are promulgated by the
Supreme Court,70 and could very well be abrogated or revised by the high court itself. Yet the
Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State components, to obey the laws of the land, including
generally accepted principles of international law which form part thereof, such as those
ensuring the qualified recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.71
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there
is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such
enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.
The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country merely due to
an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted practices and principles
in international law. Indeed, there are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing
fee on the pecuniary award or the value of the property subject of the foreign decision. Such
pecuniary award will almost certainly be in foreign denomination, computed in accordance with
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the applicable laws and standards of the forum.72 The vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative
low-income capacity of the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually
unenforceable in this country, despite its integral validity, if the docket fees for the enforcement
thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought to be enforced. The theory
adopted by respondent judge and the Marcos Estate may even lead to absurdities, such as if
applied to an award involving real property situated in places such as the United States or
Scandinavia where real property values are inexorably high. We cannot very well require that
the filing fee be computed based on the value of the foreign property as determined by the
standards of the country where it is located.
As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as it recognizes
that the subject matter of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment is the foreign
judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign judgment. In this
particular circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is based on the
US District Court's Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of classification
under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule
141, i.e., within the class of "all other actions not involving property." Thus, only the blanket
filing fee of minimal amount is required.
Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the Constitution, which states that "[F]ree
access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied
to any person by reason of poverty." Since the provision is among the guarantees ensured by
the Bill of Rights, it certainly gives rise to a demandable right. However, now is not the occasion
to elaborate on the parameters of this constitutional right. Given our preceding discussion, it is
not necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It is
axiomatic that the constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy
can be settled on other grounds73 or unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the
determination of the case.74
One more word. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final
Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence of a right of the petitioners against
the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees and no other, does not render verdict
on the enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, or for that matter any other issue which may legitimately be presented before the
trial court. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court, but within the confines of the
matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other hand, the speedy resolution
of this claim by the trial court is encouraged, and contumacious delay of the decision on the
merits will not be brooked by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a
new order REINSTATING Civil Case No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
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Footnotes
1
Priscilla Mijares is a judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay, Loretta Ann P. Rosales
an incumbent member of the House of Representatives, and Joel Lamangan a noted film
director.
2
Namely Celsa Hilao, Josefina Hilao Forcadilla, Arturo P. Revilla, Jr., Rodolfo G. Benosa,
Danila M. Fuente, Renato Pineda, Domiciano Amparo, Chistopher Sorio, Jose Duran, and
Adora Faye De Vera.Rollo, pp. 42-47.
3
Except for Celsa Hilao, who instead alleged that her daughter, Liliosa Hilao, had been
tortured then executed by military personnel during martial law. Id. at 42-43.
4
Id. at 42.
Id. at 35.
The Opinion was authored by Circuit Judge Betty B. Fletcher and concurred in by
Circuit Judge Harry Pragerson. Circuit Judge Pamela Ann Rymer filed an opinion
concurring and dissenting in part, her dissent centering on the methodology used for
computing compensatory damages. Rollo, pp. 84-132.
7
Under Section 58 of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the judgment for
compensatory damages in a class suit is awarded to a randomly selected. Petitioner
Joel Lamangan was among the randomly selected claimants of the Torture subclass
awarded damages by the US District Court. See Rollo, p. 71.
8
Now Section 48, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Since increased to P600.00.
10
Now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
11
Petitioners correctly note that they are precluded from filing an appeal on certiorari
under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which bars an appeal taken
from an order dismissing an action without prejudice and dictates the aggrieved party to
file an appropriate civil action under Rule 65 instead. See Rollo, p. 9
12
In a Resolution dated 4 December 2000. Rollo, p. 282.
13
Id. at 205.
14
See Section 7(c), Rule 141.
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15
See Section 7(d), id.
16
Gochan v. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491, 502 (2001).
17
Philippine Aluminum Wheels v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 137378, 12 October
2000, 342 SCRA 722, 734; citing Jovito R Salonga, Rex Bookstore, Manila, Philippines,
1995 Edition, p. 543.
18
159 U.S. 113 (1895)
19
47 Phil. 189 (1925). While the Philippine Supreme Court in this case refused to enforce
the judgment of the Hongkong Court on the ground of mistake of law or fact, it was
reversed on appeal to the US Supreme Court.
20
Id. JJ. Malcolm and Avancea, dissenting.
21
See also Borthwick v. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, G.R. No. L-57338, 23 July 1987, 152
SCRA 129, 235; Philippine International Shipping Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
77085, 26 April 1989, 172 SCRA 810, 819.
22
" Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to appear and
represent a defendant and the formal requirements in a decision are governed by the
lex fori or the internal law of the forum." Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M)
Berhad v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil. 13, 29 (1991).
23
"Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must
be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where
judgment is rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would
deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to
which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which
goes to the very existence of the cause of action such as fraud in obtaining the consent
to a contract is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against
the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment." Philippine Aluminum
Wheels v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc., supra note 17.
24
See, e.g., Nagarmull v. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., 144 Phil. 72, 77 (1970);
Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen and Company, Inc., supra note 20.
25
Roeher v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, 20 June 2003, 404 SCRA 495, 503.
26
"An action must be brought in the second state upon the judgment recovered in the
first." J. Salonga, Private International Law (3rd ed., 1967), at 500; citing Goodrich, 600,
601; Chesire, 628; II Beale, 1377. But see E. Scoles and P. Hay, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed.,
1982), at 969, which recognizes that civil law countries provide a procedure to give
executory force to the foreign judgment, as distinguished from the Anglo-American
common law (but not statutory) practice of requiring an action on the judgment.
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27
See Philsec Investment Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, 19 June 1997, 274
SCRA 102, 110.
28
Northwest Orient Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112573, 9 February 1995, 241
SCRA 192, 199.
29
See Section 3(a), Rule 1, Rules of Civil Procedure.
30
Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action. Section 1, Rule 2, Rules
of Civil Procedure. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another. Section 2, Rule 2, Rules of Civil Procedure.
31
See Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76595. 6 May 1988, 161
SCRA 122, 133.
32
Soles & Hay, supra note 27, at 916.
33
Ibid.
34
Salonga, supra note 27, at 514; citing Cheshire, 803.
35
Rollo, p. 30. Emphasis omitted.
36
133 Phil. 526 (1968).
37
Id. at 528.
38
Rollo, at 326, citing Arroz v. Alojado, 19 SCRA 711 (1967).
39
Ibid citing Bunayog v. Tunas, 106 Phil. 715 (1959)
40
Id. citing Baito v. Sarmiento, 109 Phil. 148 (1960).
41
Id. citing De Rivera v. Halili, 9 SCRA 59 (1963).
42
Id. citing Bautista v. Lim, 88 SCRA 479 (1979) and De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 287
SCRA 94 (1998).
43
Id. citing Amorganda v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 203 (1988); Ortigas &
Company v. Herrera, 120 SCRA 89 (1983).
44
Id. citing Mercado v. Ubay, 187 SCRA 719 (1990) and Filipino Pipe Workers
Union v. Batario, Jr., 163 SCRA 789 (1988).
45
As amended by Rep. Act No. 7691.
46
Supra note 32.

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47
Supra note 17.
48
Supra note 18.
49
H. Steiner & D. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems: Materials and Text (2nd ed.,
1976), at 775.
50
Ibid.
51
See Salonga, supra note 27, at 66.
52
Id. at 502-503.
53
Scoles & Hays, supra note 27, at 970.
54
Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51, at 808. "A decision rendered in one of the Contracting
States shall be entitled to recognition and enforcement in another Contracting State
under the terms of this Convention (1) if the decision was given by a court considered
to have jurisdiction within the meaning of this Convention, and (2) if it is no longer
subject to ordinary forms of review in the State of origin." Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Chapter II, Article 4.
55
To date, only Cyprus, the Netherlands, Portugal and Kuwait have either ratified or
acceded to the Convention.
56
Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51.
57
Steiner & Vagts, supra note 51,at 776.
58
Salonga, supra note 51, at 502.
59
Steiner & Vagts, supra note 27, at 779. "A policy common to all legal systems is to
provide for the final resolution of disputes. The policy is furthered by each nation's
adoption of a view of 'jurisdiction in the international sense' which recognizes the
foreign court's assertion of jurisdiction as satisfying its own notions of due process in
circumstances in which it itself would have asserted jurisdiction." Soles &
Hay,supra note 27, at 976; citing Hay, International versus Interstate Conflicts Law in the
United States, 35 Rabels Zeitschrift 429,450 n. 101 (1971) and Cherun v. Frishman, 236
F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1964). Salonga, in affirming the rule of want of jurisdiction, cites
the commentaries of Cheshire, Wolff, Goodrich and Nussbaum.
60
See, e.g., Salonga, supra note 27 at 513.
61
Ibid; citing Henderson v. Henderson, 6 Q.B. (1844) 288; Vanquelin v. Bouard, 15 C.B.
(N.S. 1863) 341; Godard v. Gray, L.R. 6 Q.B. 139 (1870); Vadala v. Lawes 25 Q.B.D. (1890)
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319, 316; cf. Chandler v.Peketz, 297 U.S. 609, 56 S.Ct., 80 L.Ed. 881 (1936); Cheshire,
661-664; Wolff, 268; Goodrich, 603.
62
Soles & Hay, supra note 27, at 978.
63
"Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not
be applied." Bank of America v. American Realty Corp., 378 Phil. 1279, 1296 (1999);
citing Philippine Conflict of Laws, Eight Edition, 1996, Paras, page 46. "Las sentencias de
tribunals extranjeros no pueden ponerse en vigor en Filipinas si son contrarias a las leyes,
costumbres y orden pblico. Si dichas decisiones, por la simple teora de reciprocidad,
cortesa judicial y urbanidad internacional son base suficiente para que nuestros
tribunales decidan a tenor de las mismas, entonces nuestros juzgados estaran en la
pobre tessitura de tener que dictar sentencias contrarias a nuestras leyes, costumbres y
orden pblico. Esto es absurdo." Querubin v. Querubin, 87 Phil. 124, 133. (1950).
64
See Section 48, Rule 39, Rules of Civil Procedure.
65
Soles & Hays, supra note 27, at 979.
66
"[It] is generally recognized that, subject to [exceptions], a rule of general customary

international law is binding on all States, whether or not they have participated in the
practice from which it sprang." H. Thirlway, "The Sources of International Law",
International Law (ed. by M.Evans, 1st ed., 2003), at 124.
67
"Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be
such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a
belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of
the opinion juris sive necessitatis. North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports
1969, p. 3, para. 77; cited in H. Thirlway, ibid.
68
"The problems that arise in the enforcement of foreign judgments are generally to be
solved by the principles of international law. The Philippines by its Constitution, adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law. F. Gupit, "Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments and Arbitral Awards", XXIII J. Integ. Bar. Phil. 3, at 69.
69
Divergent practices do not necessarily preclude recognition of a customary norm. In

reviewing the question of the existence of customary rules forbidding the use of force or
intervention, the International Court of Justice pertinently held: "It is not to be expected
that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question should have been
perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete consistency, from
the use of force or from intervention in each other's internal affairs. The Court does not
consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice
must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the
existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States,
should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct
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inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that
rule, not as indications of recognition of a new rule." (emphasis supplied) Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 186; citing in H. Thirlway, supra note 66.
70
And other inferior courts, relative to their jurisdictions.
71
Sec. 2, Art. II, 1987 Const., which states "The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
72
Indeed, the valuation of foreign money judgments remains a matter of debate in

international law. In the United States, Section 144 of the Restatement, Second,
Conflicts of Laws (1971) adopts the rule that the forum would convert the currency into
local currency as of the date of the award. However, this rule has been criticized. In
England, the judgment debtor may now effect payment either in the foreign currency in
the amount due or in local currency equivalent to the foreign currency on the date of
payment. French and German law similarly permit the expression of a judgment in
foreign currency. Soles & Hays, supra note 27, at 973.
73
Ty v. Trampe, 321 Phil. 81 (1995).
74
Tarrosa v. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, 25 May 1994, 232 SCRA 553, 557.
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MACASAET VS CO; GR NO. 156759
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156759
June 5, 2013
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS
R. GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS, Petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO R. CO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the serving
officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the
attempt at personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable time may the
officer resort to substituted service.
The Case
Petitioners defendants in a suit for libel brought by respondent appeal the decision
promulgated on March 8, 20021 and the resolution promulgated on January 13, 2003,2 whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively dismissed their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus and denied their motion for reconsideration. Thereby, the CA upheld the order the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 51, in Manila had issued on March 12, 2001 denying their
motion to dismiss because the substituted service of the summons and copies of the complaint
on each of them had been valid and effective.3
Antecedents
On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western Police District in
Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A.
Macasaet; its Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its
Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes
(petitioners), claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in
the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite. The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97907, was
raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which in due course issued summons to be served on each
defendant, including Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing Corporation,
301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street,
Intramuros, Manila.4
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In the morning of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address
to effect the personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to personally
serve each defendant in the address were futile because the defendants were then out of the
office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at
serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He
decided to resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriffs
return dated September 22, 2005,5 to wit:
SHERIFFS RETURN
This is to certify that on September 18, 2000, I caused the service of summons together with
copies of complaint and its annexes attached thereto, upon the following:
1. Defendant Allen A. Macasaet, President/Publisher of defendant AbanteTonite, at
Monica Publishing Corporation, Rooms 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building,
Solana corner A. Soriano Streets, Intramuros, Manila, thru his secretary Lu-Ann Quijano,
a person of sufficient age and discretion working therein, who signed to acknowledge
receipt thereof. That effort (sic) to serve the said summons personally upon said
defendant were made, but the same were ineffectual and unavailing on the ground that
per information of Ms. Quijano said defendant is always out and not available, thus,
substituted service was applied;
2. Defendant Nicolas V. Quijano, at the same address, thru his wife Lu-Ann Quijano, who
signed to acknowledge receipt thereof. That effort (sic) to serve the said summons
personally upon said defendant were made, but the same were ineffectual and
unavailing on the ground that per information of (sic) his wife said defendant is always
out and not available, thus, substituted service was applied;
3. Defendants Isaias Albano, Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang, Randy Hagos and Lily Reyes, at
the same address, thru Rene Esleta, Editorial Assistant of defendant AbanteTonite, a
person of sufficient age and discretion working therein who signed to acknowledge
receipt thereof. That effort (sic) to serve the said summons personally upon said
defendants were made, but the same were ineffectual and unavailing on the ground
that per information of (sic) Mr. Esleta said defendants is (sic) always roving outside and
gathering news, thus, substituted service was applied.
Original copy of summons is therefore, respectfully returned duly served.
Manila, September 22, 2000.
On October 3, 2000, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint through counsels
special appearance in their behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the
invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. They contended that the sheriff had
made no prior attempt to serve the summons personally on each of them in accordance with
Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. They further moved to drop Abante
Tonite as a defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a juridical person that could be
impleaded as a party in a civil action.
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At the hearing of petitioners motion to dismiss, Medina testified that he had gone to the office
address of petitioners in the morning of September 18, 2000 to personally serve the summons
on each defendant; that petitioners were out of the office at the time; that he had returned in
the afternoon of the same day to again attempt to serve on each defendant personally but his
attempt had still proved futile because all of petitioners were still out of the office; that some
competent persons working in petitioners office had informed him that Macasaet and Quijano
were always out and unavailable, and that Albano, Bay, Galang, Hagos and Reyes were always
out roving to gather news; and that he had then resorted to substituted service upon realizing
the impossibility of his finding petitioners in person within a reasonable time.
On March 12, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss, and directed petitioners to file their
answers to the complaint within the remaining period allowed by the Rules of Court,6 relevantly
stating:
Records show that the summonses were served upon Allen A. Macasaet, President/Publisher of
defendant AbanteTonite, through LuAnn Quijano; upon defendants Isaias Albano, Janet Bay,
Jesus R. Galang, Randy Hagos and Lily Reyes, through Rene Esleta, Editorial Assistant of
defendant Abante Tonite (p. 12, records). It is apparent in the Sheriffs Return that on several
occasions, efforts to served (sic) the summons personally upon all the defendants were
ineffectual as they were always out and unavailable, so the Sheriff served the summons by
substituted service.
Considering that summonses cannot be served within a reasonable time to the persons of all the
defendants, hence substituted service of summonses was validly applied. Secretary of the
President who is duly authorized to receive such document, the wife of the defendant and the
Editorial Assistant of the defendant, were considered competent persons with sufficient
discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served upon them and to relay the same
to the defendants named therein (Sec. 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED for lack of merit..
Accordingly, defendants are directed to file their Answers to the complaint within the period still
open to them, pursuant to the rules.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the sheriff had immediately
resorted to substituted service of the summons upon being informed that they were not around
to personally receive the summons, and that Abante Tonite, being neither a natural nor a
juridical person, could not be made a party in the action.
On June 29, 2001, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.7 It stated in respect of
the service of summons, as follows:
The allegations of the defendants that the Sheriff immediately resorted to substituted service of
summons upon them when he was informed that they were not around to personally receive
the same is untenable. During the hearing of the herein motion, Sheriff Raul Medina of this
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Branch of the Court testified that on September 18, 2000 in the morning, he went to the office
address of the defendants to personally serve summons upon them but they were out. So he
went back to serve said summons upon the defendants in the afternoon of the same day, but
then again he was informed that the defendants were out and unavailable, and that they were
always out because they were roving around to gather news. Because of that information and
because of the nature of the work of the defendants that they are always on field, so the sheriff
resorted to substituted service of summons. There was substantial compliance with the rules,
considering the difficulty to serve the summons personally to them because of the nature of
their job which compels them to be always out and unavailable. Additional matters regarding
the service of summons upon defendants were sufficiently discussed in the Order of this Court
dated March 12, 2001.
Regarding the impleading of Abante Tonite as defendant, the RTC held, viz:
"Abante Tonite" is a daily tabloid of general circulation. People all over the country could buy a
copy of "Abante Tonite" and read it, hence, it is for public consumption. The persons who
organized said publication obviously derived profit from it. The information written on the said
newspaper will affect the person, natural as well as juridical, who was stated or implicated in
the news. All of these facts imply that "Abante Tonite" falls within the provision of Art. 44 (2 or
3), New Civil Code. Assuming arguendo that "Abante Tonite" is not registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, it is deemed a corporation by estoppels considering that it possesses
attributes of a juridical person, otherwise it cannot be held liable for damages and injuries it
may inflict to other persons.
Undaunted, petitioners brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamusin the CA to
nullify the orders of the RTC dated March 12, 2001 and June 29, 2001.
Ruling of the CA
On March 8, 2002, the CA promulgated its questioned decision,8 dismissing the petition for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, to wit:
We find petitioners argument without merit. The rule is that certiorari will prosper only if there
is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction committed
by the respondent Judge. A judicious reading of the questioned orders of respondent Judge
would show that the same were not issued in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment.
There are factual bases and legal justification for the assailed orders. From the Return, the
sheriff certified that "effort to serve the summons personally xxx were made, but the same were
ineffectual and unavailing xxx.
and upholding the trial courts finding that there was a substantial compliance with the rules
that allowed the substituted service.
Furthermore, the CA ruled:
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Anent the issue raised by petitioners that "Abante Tonite is neither a natural or juridical person
who may be a party in a civil case," and therefore the case against it must be dismissed and/or
dropped, is untenable.
The respondent Judge, in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, held that:
xxxx
Abante Tonites newspapers are circulated nationwide, showing ostensibly its being a corporate
entity, thus the doctrine of corporation by estoppel may appropriately apply.
An unincorporated association, which represents itself to be a corporation, will be estopped
from denying its corporate capacity in a suit against it by a third person who relies in good faith
on such representation.
There being no grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge in the exercise of
his jurisdiction, the relief of prohibition is also unavailable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Orders of respondent Judge are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9
On January 13, 2003, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.10
Issues
Petitioners hereby submit that:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER HEREIN PETITIONERS.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY SUSTAINING THE
INCLUSION OF ABANTE TONITE AS PARTY IN THE INSTANT CASE.11
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam the power of the court to render a
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other
rulings rendered in the action is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil
as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendantin an
action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an actionas
long as it acquires jurisdiction over the resthat is thesubject matter of the action. The purpose of
summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.12
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The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in personam, on the one hand,
and an action inrem or quasi in rem, on the other hand, are aptly delineated in Domagas v.
Jensen,13 thusly:
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature
and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person,
although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose
of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility
or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An
action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the property to determine its state. It has been held that
an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is
brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled
that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that
proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are
rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam.
Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject
the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem,
an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests
therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the
status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut
off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon
the parties who joined in the action.
As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person
unless he voluntarily appears in court; but when the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem
enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the
person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. In the latter instance, extraterritorial
service of summons can be made upon the defendant, and such extraterritorial service of
summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of
complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that the defendant will be
informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the
Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On
the other hand, when the defendant in an action in personam does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case against him because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.14
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As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction
of the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary
appearance in the action.15
Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court
forthwith issues the corresponding summons to the defendant.16 The summons is directed to
the defendant and signed by the clerk of court under seal. It contains the name of the court and
the names of the parties to the action; a direction that the defendant answers within the time
fixed by the Rules of Court; and a notice that unless the defendant so answers, the plaintiff will
take judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for.17 To be attached to the
original copy of the summons and all copies thereof is a copy of the complaint (and its
attachments, if any) and the order, if any, for the appointment of a guardian ad litem.18
The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an action in
personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental
objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b)
to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him.19 As to
the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the proper
service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the ensuing trial and
judgment are void.20 If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object
to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.21 As to the latter, the essence
of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the
defendant may have in support of his defense. With the proper service of the summons being
intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him, he may also
waive the process.21 In other words, compliance with the rules regarding the service of the
summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.23
Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the
defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a copy
of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for
it, in tendering it to him.24 The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to
ensure the realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable
reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of the
summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy
at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.25 The
latter mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of the summons on
the defendant is made through his substitute.
It is no longer debatable that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by
statute is considered ineffective.26 This is because substituted service, being in derogation of the
usual method of service, is extraordinary in character and may be used only as prescribed and in
the circumstances authorized by statute.27 Only when the defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time may substituted service be resorted to. Hence, the
impossibility of prompt personal service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
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defendant himself and the fact that such efforts failed, which statement should be found in the
proof of service or sheriffs return.28Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the impossibility of
prompt personal service as basis for resorting to substituted service may be waived by the
defendant either expressly or impliedly.29
There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of
petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and
the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and
Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were "always roving
outside and gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in the office address on
his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during
the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in
person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his
conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by
all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted
service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that
regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we
are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness
should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the
procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.30
In reality, petitioners insistence on personal service by the serving officer was demonstrably
superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served through their substitutes, as
borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC, including an answer with compulsory
counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam. They had also availed themselves of
the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their voluntary
appearance in the action.
Nor can we sustain petitioners contention that Abante Tonite could not be sued as a defendant
due to its not being either a natural or a juridical person. In rejecting their contention, the CA
categorized Abante Tonite as a corporation by estoppel as the result of its having represented
itself to the reading public as a corporation despite its not being incorporated. Thereby, the CA
concluded that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that the non-incorporation
of Abante Tonite with the Securities and Exchange Commission was of no consequence, for,
otherwise, whoever of the public who would suffer any damage from the publication of articles
in the pages of its tabloids would be left without recourse. We cannot disagree with the CA,
considering that the editorial box of the daily tabloid disclosed that basis, nothing in the box
indicated that Monica Publishing Corporation had owned Abante Tonite.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 8, 2002; and ORDERS
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
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WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 53-59; penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (retired), with
Associate Justice Teodoro P. Regino (retired) and Associate Justice Rebecca De GuiaSalvador concurring.
2
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 134-136.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 134-136.
Id. at 149-150.
Supra note 1, at 56.
Id. at 57-58.
10
Supra note 2.
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11
Rollo, p. 33.
12
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004,425 SCRA 98, 104.
13
G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 663, 673-674.
14
Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242,
August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 170, 187-188; Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, G.R. No. 150656,
April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 762, 769-770; Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108538,
January 22, 1996, 252 SCRA 92.
15
Pursuant to Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the defendants voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to the service of summons; see also Davao Light
and Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93262, November 29, 1991, 204 SCRA
343, 347; Munar v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 372, 379; Minucher v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 97765, September 24, 1992, 214 SCRA 242, 250.
16
Section 1, Rule 14, Rules of Court.
17
Section2, Rule 14, Rules of Court.
18
Id.
19
Umandap vs. Sabio, Jr., G.R. No. 140244, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 243, 247.
20
Vda. de Macoy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95871, February 13, 1992, 206 SCRA 244,
251;Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, No.L-7776, December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 305, 311312; Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-70661, April 9,
1987, 149 SCRA 193, 198-199; Consolidated Plywood Industries, Inc. v. Breva, No. L82811, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 589, 593-594; Philippine National Construction
Corp. v. Ferrer-Calleja, No.L-80485, November 11, 1988, 167 SCRA 294, 301.
21
La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103200, August 31, 1994, 236
SCRA 78, 86.
22
Keister v. Navarro, No. L-29067, May 31, 1977, 77 SCRA 209, 214-215; Vda. de Macoy
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 20.
23
Samartino v. Raon,G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 664, 670.
24
25
26
Keisterv. Navarro, supranote 22, at 215.
27
Ang Ping v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126947, July 15, 1999, 310 SCRA 343, 350.
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28
Keisterv. Navarro,supra, note 22; see also Wong v. Factor-Koyama, G.R. No. 183802,
September 17, 2009, 600 SCRA 256, 268; Jose v. Boyon, G.R. No. 147369, October 23,
2003, 414 SCRA 216, 222; Casimina v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 147530. June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA
171, 177-178; Oaminal v. Castillo, G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 189, 196197; Laus v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101256, March 8, 1993, 219 SCRA 688, 699.
29
E.g., in Orosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118696, September 3, 1996, 261 SCRA 376,
379, where the substituted service was sustained notwithstanding thatthe requirement
for the showing of impossibility of personal service of summons was not complied with
by the sheriff before resorting to substituted service, because the defendants
subsequently filed a motion for additional time to file answer, which was deemed a
waiver of objection to the personal jurisdiction of the trial court.
30
Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006, 510 SCRA 678, 684.
95
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Civil Procedure

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES MIDTERMS

SWEET LINES INC., VS TEVES; GR NO. L-37750

Republic of the Philippines

BARREDO, J., concurring:

ARQUERO VS FLOJO; GR NO. L-68111

Republic of the Philippines

(Annex "D", P. 16, Rollo)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS GORDON; GR. NO. 134171

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 134171 November 18, 1998

We find for respondents.

SAMMA-LIKHA VS SAMMA CORP.; GR NO. 167141

Republic of the Philippines

March 13, 2009

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG KAPATIRANG

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Per Special Order No. 584 dated March 3, 2009.

Per Special Order No. 583 dated March 3, 2009.

Per Special Order No. 570 dated February 12, 2009.

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices

Id., pp. 45-47.

Docketed as case no. RO400-0107-RU-006; id., p. 26.

Id. Captioned "In Re: Petition for Cancellation of Charter/Union Registration of

Id., pp. 80-82.

Id., pp. 77-79.

Id. pp. 62-76.

Under Rule 65; id., p. 25.

Id., pp. 6-12.

Association of the Court of Appeals Employees v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. 94716, 15

Supra note 16.

Id., pp. 454- 455, citations omitted.

Before they were amended by D.O. No. 40-03, series of 2003.

(i) That the bargaining unit is unorganized or that there is no

1) that the bargaining unit is unorganized or that there is no

Rollo, pp. 78-79.

Section 1, Implementing Rules of Book V, Rule II, as amended by D.O. No. 9.

Section 5, Implementing Rules of Book V, Rule V, as amended by D.O. No. 9.

Id., Section 3, Rule VI.

Rollo, p. 12 of petitioners memorandum.

MARANAW HOTELS VS CA, ET AL.; GR NO. 149660

Republic of the Philippines

January 20, 2009

MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., Petitioner,

- April 21, 1997

April 22, 1997

- May 20, 1997

May 21, 1997

- July 30, 19985

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Id., at pp. 147-148.

NLRC Rollo, pp. 535-536.

Id., at pp. 536-537.

G.R. No. 128550, March 16, 2000, 328 SCRA 286.

G.R. No. 127624, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 4.

STO. TOMAS UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL VS SURLA; GR NO.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 129718 August 17, 1998

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

MANCHESTER DEVT CORP. VS CA; GR NO. 75919

Republic of the Philippines