PRIOR RESTRAINT/SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT

CHAVEZ VS GONZALES
545 SCRA 441; G.R. No. 168338
FACTS:
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact disc
audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo
and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents
could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing
said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated
that he had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations found to
have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network
owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by
government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they
shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful
misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or broadcast of the Hello Garci
taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law
and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It warned that their
broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for
the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said
media establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster
sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among
others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled
responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the
NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing
the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?
2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a
form of content-based prior restraint that has violated the Constitution?
DECISION:
1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is
given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of
media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech
and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. [T]he great evil which

government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the antiwiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and
respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test.
Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary confuse the identity of the voices
in the tape recording.
Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary
showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the
other, an altered version.
Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping
act is unclear, especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the
wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are
some of the invisibles of this case.
Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its
airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of
conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but
does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself
and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law
is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain
freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private
and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution
and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for
a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine
compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as
devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the
State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation
cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can
lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and
present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free
press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers
the national security of the State.
2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a
form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.
[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or
followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales
made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory
body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an
official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit
itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the
prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as
they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK VS. DY

583 SCRA 333; G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411
FACTS:
Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast
station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan City, Isabela. Back in
1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management office, and
transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial
structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is
classified as a commercial area. The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayors permit, City Zoning
Administrator-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance on the grounds that
petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was
converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the issuance of mayors permit
but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region
II office issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to
commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayors permit, attaching the
DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same,
claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have record of the DAR Order.
The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City
Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the provision of Omnibus Election
Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC
issued an order allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again
by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless,
COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors permit but both courts
denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits,
and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to
require a mayors permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However,
nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayors permit to submit either an approved
land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural
land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod
authorizing the reclassification of property from agricultural to commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial. Petitioners
are also armed with several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial area.
Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the classification of property as commercial
without objections raised by the respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the
commercial character of the property constitutes estoppel (legal bars) against respondents from
denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that the government of Cauayan

City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners classified that this concept is understood to only
refer to acts and mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan City is not
bound by estoppels on the grounds that the state is immune against suits.
DECISION:
No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its officials
or agents, there is an exception.
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in rare and
unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective
operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and
should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its
citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private
individuals
Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the
government official whose acts are being disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the
State, the Supreme Court have declined to apply State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is
absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City
government had previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial
use. The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications
were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting that
the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.
Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by
the Cauayan City government that the property was commercially zoned unless they had evidence,
which they had none, that the local officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing
so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure
approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted from
prime agricultural land to commercial land.
Respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives.
Petitioners have been aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that
appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such statement manifests and
confirms that respondents denial of the renewal applications on the ground that property is
commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City
and suppress the latters voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately
issue petitioners zoning clearances and mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners.

Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,

G.R. No. 103956, 207 SCRA 712 , March 31, 1992
Facts:
Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The COMELECs prohibition
on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in designated
areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether
public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on
constitutional grounds
Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech This qualitative significance
of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of
nearly every other freedom.
The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizens private property which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle.The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half
(8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places
whether public or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to
where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens
private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition,
another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated.
The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.
Decision:
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15(a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the
Commission on Elections providing that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL and
VOID.

Soriano vs. La Guardia

G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m-., petitioner (Soriano), as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the
MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints, were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and
seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to
in petitioners remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang
Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of the
religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III. (establishment of religion)
Decision:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse
effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well as petitioners clear
violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang
Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners
suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a
subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights,
the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to regulate
broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the
form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot
be expressed by the use of less offensive language.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad
first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic
Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for accreditation was
denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang
Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on
moral grounds.
Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that
the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose
interests are also the nations. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed
sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for
accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. That the Philippines cannot ignore
its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts
espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral
norms. COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national poltical
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also
argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941.
DECISION:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also
directed the COMELEC to grant petitioners application for party-list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently
demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records
has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to
elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.

National Press Club vs Comelec

201 SCRA 1 | G.R. No. 1026653 | March 5, 1992
Facts:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented
from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are
candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992
elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election Issue and
of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades
and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain
that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and
singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular
content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992.
It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to
provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue.
Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and
that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in
the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts,
would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information
and opinion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.
Decision:
Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines
freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in conjunction
with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific
limited period i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality of opportunity to
proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have
at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional
rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that "the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law." The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative
provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the
operations of communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether
such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court
considers that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or
regulation of media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time
to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates,
their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not
reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or
commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so
forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for

particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any
report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for
political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political advertisements of particular
candidates.
The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is
not unduly repressive or unreasonable.

Kapunan v de Villa
168 SCRA 264
Facts:
Prohibition and/or habeas corpus, petitioners, who were implicated in the unsuccessful coup
d'etat of August 28, 1987 and relieved of their duties in the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), seek
the issuance of the writs of certiorari (request of review) and prohibition
(1) to set aside, as null and void, the "pre-trial investigation" report finding a prima facie case
against them and recommending their trial for mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer and the
denial of their motion for reconsideration, and
(2) to enjoin respondent General Court Martial No. 8 from further proceeding in the case of
"People v. Lt. Col. Eduardo Kapunan, et al." Further, petitioner Kapunan seeks the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus to procure his release from confinement. In the aftermath of the failed August 28,
1987 coup d'etat where cadets of the Philippine Military Academy reportedly openly supported the
plotters and issued statements to that effect. PMA Board of Officers to investigate the alleged
involvement of officers and cadets of the PMA [Rollo, p.187]. A fact-finding investigation was
conducted by the PMA Board from September 1 to 11, 1987 and on September 23, 1987 it
submitted its findings to the AFP Chief of Staff. Charge sheets were filed against petitioners for
mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer and a "pre-trial investigation" was conducted by
respondent Maj. Baldonado. Kapunan was allegedly summoned to the General Headquarters of the
AFP for a dialogue, but upon his arrival thereat on September 4, 1987 he was ordered confined
under "house arrest" by then Chief of Staff Gen. Fidel Ramos. On February 19, 1988, the arrest of
petitioner Kapunan, together with three(3) others, was ordered by respondent Chief of Staff De Villa
in connection with the killing of Atty. Rolando Olalia and Leonore Alay-ay
Issue:
Whether or not the house arrest or confinement of Kapunan is illegal.
Decision:
The Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition . The Court finds that petitioner Kapunan's
continued confinement is not tainted with illegality. Among the grounds for the disallowance of the
writ of habeas corpus is that the applicant has been charged with or convicted of in offense [Sec. 4,
Rule 102, Rules of Court]. In the instant case, petitioner Kapunan had been charged with mutiny, a
serious offense punishable by death or such other punishment as a court- martial may direct. There
is a legal cause of his confinement. Art. 70. Arrest or confinement.Any person subject to military
law charged with crime or with a serious offense under these Articles shall be placed in confinement
or in arrest, as circumstances may require; but when charged with a minor offense only, such
person shall not ordinarily be placed in confinement. Any person placed in arrest under the
provisions of this article shall thereby be restricted to his barracks, quarters, or tent, unless such
limits shall be enlarged by proper authority.
It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the
freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree,
individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties
under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks.

GONZALES vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. L-28196, 27 SCRA 835
November 9, 1967
FACTS:
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite
shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14,
1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that
this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who would
be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving
the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came up
with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and other
respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts
because it is a political question.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
DECISION:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress.
II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election.
SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election
therein referred to is a special, not a general election.

Lagunzad VS Sotto
96 SCRA 476
Facts:
Lagunzad and de Gozales entered into a licensing agreement for the former was filming The
Moises Padilla Story. Manual Lagunzad was a newspaperman and, through his MML Productions,
began the production of the movie. The movie was based on the book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr.
The Long Dank Night in Negros.
Although the focus on the film on the Moises life, there were portions which dealt with his
private and family life including the portrayal in some sense of his mother, Maria Sotto Vda. De
Gonzales.
The movie was scheduled for a premiere showing on October 16, 1961. Thirteen days prior to
it, Moises half-sister, Mrs. Nelly Amante, objected to the movie as it exploited Moises life.
Issue/s:
The Court neither finds merit in petitioners contention that the Licensing Agreement
infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, in that, as a citizen and
as a newspaperman, he has a right to express his thoughts in film on public life of Moises Padilla
without prior restraint.
The clear and present danger rule was applied. In quoting Gonzales VS Comelec, the
prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion
for permissible limitation on the freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles
of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the balancing-of-interests test. The
principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation.
Decision:
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent
and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account an interplay of
those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the
obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such
agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

Zaldivar vs Gonzales
166 SCRA 316 October 7, 1988 G.R. Nos. 79690-707
FACTS:
At that time, Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the
Tanodbayan who was investigating his case. A petition for Certiorari was filed by Zaldivar in the
Supreme Court for prohibition and mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan (Gonzales)
to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition
issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from
investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar.

However Gonzales proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations
against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that the
Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich and influential persons get
favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his
petition to be given due course.

Note that Gonzales is a lawyer and he should show respect and trust to the Supreme Court as
the highest court in the Philippines. However, he dared to question its ruling.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez then the Supreme Court ordered
Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez defended himself with his right to exercise his freedom of
speech and stated that the statements in the newspapers were true and that he is entitled to
criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into
error. He also added that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to
ask him to go slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt?
DECISION:
Yes. The statements of the respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and calls for
awareness of the Supreme Court and for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. Gonzales statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their
oath of office. His statements constitute a disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very
clearly dishonor and damage the image of the Supreme Court and the entire system of
administration of justice in the country.

Although Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech, what he did was
not exceptional. Gonzalez seems to be unaware that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. Freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to
and accommodated with the requirements of equally important to public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the
system of administering justice.

Remember that Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a
Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and also to the Supreme
Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the
Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez is to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private
practicing lawyer.

Yes, Gonzalez is entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona
fide. His statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court
approached him has no relation to the Zaldivar corruption case. The Supreme Court suspended
Gonzalez from the practice of law.

INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
INC VS CA
259 SCRA 259
Facts:
Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every
Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's
religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR
tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or
not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other
religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of
the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former
Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the
decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses
any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that
the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring
petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program
Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD
No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the
literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be
condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic
and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this
petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form
of religious exercise and expression.
Decision:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the
burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden,
its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere
criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTCs ruling clearly
suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.
Attack is different from offend any race or religion.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but
that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace
among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion
prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech
of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens
to be the most numerous church in our country.
The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging
the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of
religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity
and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot
be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It
is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue
involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal
connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination
of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies
outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be
arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may
only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.

Reyes vs Bagatsing
125 SCRA 553 November 9, 1983 G.R. No. L-65366
FACTS:
Justice JBL Reyes filed a petition on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition to compel the issuance
of a permit for a rally to be held at the Luneta and a subsequent march to the U.S. Embassy on
Roxas Boulevard. The petition was filed the day before the scheduled assembly as no action had
apparently been taken on the application, although it turned out later that it had been rejected in a
letter sent earlier by ordinary mail. The reasons for the denial was the mayors fear that the
assemblage might be infiltrated by subversive elements to the prejudice of the public order, and
thus the intended rally would violate a city ordinance implementing the provisions of the Diplomatic
Convention requiring the receiving state to afford adequate protection to foreign embassies; hence
his suggestion that the rally be held at an enclosed place like Rizal Coliseum for better security .
ISSUE:
Whether the denial of the issuance and modification of the permit is meritorious and is
guaranteed
under
Article
II,
Section
3
of
the
Constitution.
DECISION:
The court set aside the denial or the modification of the permit sought and order the
respondent official to grant it. The choice of Luneta and U.S. Embassy for a public rally cannot
legally objected to in the absence of clear and present danger to life or property of the embassy.
The Philippines, being a signatory of Vienna Conventions which calls for the protection of the
premises of a diplomatic mission, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land as cited in Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
Petition is GRANTED. The court found that there was no clear and present danger of a
substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that would justify the denial of the exercise of the
constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly.

Cabansag vs. Fernandez

G.R. No. L-8974
Facts:
Apolonio Cabansag filed on January 13, 1947 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a
complaint seeking the ejectment of Geminiana Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land. Defendants
filed their answer on January 31, 1947 and a motion to dismiss on February 2, 1947 and a motion of
plaintiff's counsel, set the case for hearing on July 30, 1947. The meeting was postponed to August
8, 1947. On that day only one witness testified and the case was postponed to August 25, 1947.
Thereafter, three incidents developed, namely: one regarding a claim for damages which was
answered by defendants, another concerning the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which
was set for on March 23, 1948, and the third relative to an alleged contempt for violation of an
agreement of the parties approved by the court. Pleadings were filed by the parties on these
incidents and the court set the case for hearing on October 27, 1948. Hearing was postponed to
December 10, 1948. On this date, only part of the evidence was received and the next hearing was
scheduled for January 24, 1949 when again only a part of the evidence was received and the case
was continued to October 4, 1949.
Issue:
The question that now arises is: Has the lower court legitimately and justifiably exercised this
power in the instant case? The question then to be determined is: Has the letter of Cabansag
created a sufficient danger to a fair administration of justice? Did its remittance to the PCAC create
a danger sufficiently imminent to come under the two rules mentioned above?
Decision:
We would only add one word in connection with the participation in the incident of
Cabansag's co-appellants, Attys. Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera. While the conduct of
Cabansag may be justified considering that, being a layman, he is unaware of the technical rules of
law and procedure which may place him under the protective mantle of our constitution, such does
not obtain with regard to his co-appellants. Being learned in the law and officers of the court, they
should have acted with more care and circumspection in advising their client to avoid undue
embarrassment to the court or unnecessary interference with the normal course of its proceedings.
Their duty as lawyers is always to observe utmost respect to the court and defend it against unjust
criticism and clamor. Had they observed a more judicious behavior, they would have avoided the
unpleasant incident that had arisen. However, the record is bereft of any proof showing improper
motive on their part, much less bad faith in their actuation. But they should be warned, as we now
do, that a commission of a similar misstep in the future would render them amenable to a more
severe disciplinary action.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.

VIVA PRODUCTIONS, INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 123881 March 13, 1997
FACTS:
Assailed in the petition before us are the decision and resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals sustaining both the order of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
(Paraaque, Branch 274 hereinafter referred to as the Paraaque court) restraining "the exhibition
of the movie 'The Jessica Alfaro Story' at its scheduled premiere showing at the New Frontier
Theater on September 11, 1995 at 7:30 in the evening and at its regular public exhibition beginning
September 13,1995, as well as to cease and desist from promoting and marketing of the said
movie. writ of preliminary injunction "enjoining petitioner from further proceeding, engaging, using
or implementing the promotional, advertising and marketing programs for the movie entitled 'The
Jessica Alfaro Story' and from showing or causing the same to be shown or exhibited in all theaters
in the entire country UNTIL after the final termination and logical conclusion of the trial in the
criminal action now pending before the Paraaque Regional Trial Court. Ma. Jessica M. Alfaro the
star witness of the Vizconde massacre was offered a movie contract by Viva Productions, Inc. for the
filming of her life story, she inked with the latter the said movie contract while the said case (I.S.
95-402) was under investigation by the Department of Justice.
The private respondent sent separate letters to Viva Productions, Inc. and Alfaro, warning
them that the projected showing of subject movie on the life story of Alfaro would violate the sub
judice rule, and his (Hubert J.P. Webb's) constitutional rights as an accused in said criminal case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not private respondent committed forum shopping by filing two (2) cases with
exactly the same factual set-up, issues involved and reliefs sought before two (2) different courts of
coordinate jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the Paraaque Court can totally disregard and indiscriminately curtail the
petitioners constitutional right to freedom of expression and of the press without presence of a
clear and present danger.
Decision:
The private respondent has committed forum shopping. It is found that a shrewd and astute
maneuverings of private respondent ill-advised. It wont escape anybody's notice that the act of
filing the supposed action for injunction with damages with the Makati court, albeit a separate and
distinct action from the contempt proceedings then pending before the Paraaque court is obviously
and solely intended to obtain the preliminary relief of injunction so as to prevent petitioner from
exhibiting the movie on its premiere and on its regular showing.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND RIGHT TO PRIVACY

AYER PRODUCTIONS VS CAPULONG
160 SCRA 861, April 29, 1988, G.R. No. 82380
Facts:
Petitioners:

AYER Productions PTY. LTD. and McElroy

Productions.
Respondent: HON. Ignacio M. Capulong and Juan Ponce Enrile

&

McElroy

Film

In 1987, petitioner envisioned making a movie about the historic peaceful struggle of the
Filipinos at EDSA. The petitioners asked the approval of General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile who played major roles in the said revolution.
Enrile said that he would not and will not approve of any commercial exploitation and further
advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing, showing, distribution or exhibition of said or
similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether written, verbal or visual) should not be made to
[him] or any member of his family, much less to any matter purely personal to them.
The petitioners agreed and removed the name of Enrile from the script, and proceeded in
making the film.
Respondent Sen. Enrile filed a case against private petitioners for the production and filming
of the projected motion picture The Four Day Revolution for its unlawful intrusion upon his right to
privacy.
Petitioners' claim that in producing the film," they are exercising their freedom of speech and
of expression while the private respondent asserts a right of privacy.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the right to free speech.
Whether or not the projected motion constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent's "right of privacy."
Decision:
Yes. The projected motion picture is a guaranteed because it is of public interest and as long
as it limits itself in portraying the private respondent to the reasonably related public facts of the
EDSA Revolution.
No. The EDSA revolution where private respondent is a major character is one of public
interest. Private respondent is a public figure due to his participation in the culmination of the
change of government. The right of privacy of a public figure is necessarily narrower than that of
an ordinary citizen because they (1) had sought publicity and consented to it (2) that their
personalities and their affairs has already public, and (3) the press had a privilege, under the
Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public
interest.
PEOPLES JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN
December 13, 2005, G.R. No. 143372

Facts:
Petitioners: Philippine Journalists, Inc. (Peoples Journal), Zacarias Nuguid, Jr.
and Cristina Lee,
Respondent: Francis Thoenen
On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the Peoples Journal claiming that a certain
Francis Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors pets that he finds in his
domain. It also claimed that BF Homes residents, in a letter through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara,
requested for the deportation of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of such incident in the future.
Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the
community. He is seeking for damages. The petitioners admitted publication of the news item,
ostensibly out of a social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest,
promote the public good and protect the moral public of the people, and that the story was
published in good faith and without malice.
Issue:
Whether or not the news report fall under privileged communication and therefore protected
by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech.
Decision:
No. The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is not protected speech. In the instant
case, even if we assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost
its character when the matter was published in the newspaper and circulated among the general
population, especially since the individual alleged to be defamed is neither a public official nor a
public figure.
Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two levels. First, the BF Homes residents
did not ask for the deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of the Atty. Anagara was a
mere request for verification of Thoenens status as a foreign resident. The article is also untrue
because the events she reported never happened. Worse, the main source of information, Atty.
Efren Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer.
There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the
careless error materially advances societys interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate.
Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. The
knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not
enjoy constitutional protection
SOCORRO RAMIREZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
248 SCRA 590, September 25 1995, G. R. No. 93833
Facts:
Petitioner: Socorro D. Ramirez,
Respondents: Honorable Court Of Appeals, and Ester S. Garcia
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's

office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy."
To support her claim the petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording
of the confrontation made by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a
conversation.
Decision:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1 of the said law states that It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication
by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be
penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
EDGARDO A. GAANAN,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SCRA 112 (1986) G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
Facts:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among
the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation
would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a
telephone line.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of
Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant
made a telephone call to Laconico.

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office
and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon
Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico
where he was briefed about the problem.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of
the complaint for direct assault.
Issues:
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and
raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant
and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered
by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had
authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No.
4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
Ruling:
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of
evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a
telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and his
lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply
because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the
term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a
complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable
apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone
set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and
to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication corning from
the other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone, dictagraph
or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case
was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in
statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular
clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but
the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers
taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;
Decision:
No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court
or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with
the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
Thus, the review was denied for a lack of merit.
In re Alejano
468 SCRA 861 August 25, 2005 GR 160792
In Re-Petition for habeas corpus of CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN, et. al. v. GEN. PEDRO CABUAY,et al.

FACTS:
A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military
personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition
for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return
of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the
petition because the detainees are already charged of coup detat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in
this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment.
ISSUE:
What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus?
HELD:
The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the
propriety of the remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause
of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally
deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release
of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings
terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it
substitute for an appeal.
Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. The Director General
487 SCRA 623 (2006)
FACTS:
This case is consolidated with Consolidated with Bayan Muna vs Ermita
In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and streamline the
countrys id system. Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to enjoin
the Director-General from implementing the EO because they allege that the said EO is
unconstitutional for it infringes upon the right to privacy of the people and that the same is a
usurpation of legislative power by the president.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.
DECISION:
No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID
system. Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws
are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs.
Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The
President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the
Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the
1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices.
The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities,
in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID
format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public.

The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any
implementing legislation. Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive
branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional
commissions.
Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is
also authorized to issue voters ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national
ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all
branches of government.
In re Sabio
504 SCRA 214 October 17, 2006 G.R. No. 174340
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO,
petitioner,
J. ERMIN ERNEST LOUIE R. MIGUEL, petitioner-relator, vs.
HONORABLE SENATOR RICHARD GORDON, in his capacity as Chairman, and the HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES and
THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES of the Senate, HONORABLE SENATOR JUAN PONCE-ENRILE, in
his official capacity as Member, HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, Senate President, SENATE SERGEANTAT-ARMS, and the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked
Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within
its official cognizance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.
DECISION:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly,
there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the
mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are
also available to the committees.
Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of
inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its
purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis.

RIGHT AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION

VALMONTE VS BELMONTE
G.R No. 74930 FEBRUARY 13, 1989
Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy del Castillo, Rolado Bartolome, Leo Obligar,
Jun Gutierrez, ReynaldoBagatsing, Jun Ninoy Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro and
Rolando Fadul petitioners, Vs. Feliciano Belmonte JR., respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General
Manager, requesting to be furnished with the list of names of the defunct interim and regular
Batasang Pambansa including the ten (10) opposition members who were able to secure a clean
loan of P 2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. And if such is not possible, an access to
those said documents. Apart from Valmontes letter, he is stressing the premise of the request on
the present provision of the Freedom constitution at that time which is Art. IV, Sec. 6, which
emphasizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Mr. Belmonte,
aware that such request contains serious legal implications seeks the help of Mr. Meynardo A. Tiro, a
deputy General Counsel. In Mr. Tiros reply letter, a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS
and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to
preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this
confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
On June 26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy General
Counsel, Petitioner Valmonte wrote another letter saying that for failure to receive a reply, they are
now considering themselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue
their desired objective in pursuance of public interest.
Respondent filed separate comments Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners
filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file
their memoranda. The partys has complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision. In his
comment, respondent raise procedural objection to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among
which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that
actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS
petitioners. However, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees, It is therefore asserted
that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the
documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.

DECISION:
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the
people to the state. Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the
authority conferred by the people. Yet, like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is
not absolute. Peoples right to information is limited to matters of public concern and is further
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from
the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the
benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, sections.
5(b) and46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance act of 1977
provide for annual appropriations.
To pay for contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the
government, as employer, as well as the obligations, which the Republic of the Philippines assumes
or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its
resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent rules and regulations. It
is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly
with end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees.
Moreover, the supposed borrowers were members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who
themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it
that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its transactions were
above board. Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its
borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information. He further contends that in view of the right to privacy, which is equally protected by
the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents, evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS
must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its
borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information. He further contends that in view of the right to privacy, which is equally protected by
the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents, evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS
must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.
Neither can the GSIS through its General manager, the respondent, invoke the right to
privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence, may be invoked only by
the person whose privacy is violated. Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the
loan transactions are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern which guarantees access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions only. Further, they
argued that GSIS is a governmental corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the
coverage of the peoples right to access to official records. This Dichotomy characterizing
government function has long been repudiated in ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and
Government Corporations and Offices, the Court said that the government, WHETHER carrying
out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the SAME FUNCTION of service to
the people. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising proprietary function
would NOT justify the exclusion of transactions from thec overage and scope of right to information.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted, and the respondent General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and
records evidencing loans granted to members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners

may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to time and manner of inspection, not
incompatible with the decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary. SO ORDERED
Aquino vs Sarmiento
G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991
MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity
as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION
BOARD, respondents.
FACTS:
At issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official records as guaranteed by the
constitution.
In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to
examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board
members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that
films are banned, cut or classified accordingly.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that
whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the
individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and
completely private and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips
is the exclusive property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must
first secure his (the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.
Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in
character and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of
examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen
seeking examination of the board's records.
On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to
discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of
the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents, which rendered
the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent
Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much
later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as
confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of
the members.
Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary, which in turn,
referred the same to respondent Morato for appropriate comment.
Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred in a board meeting held on June 22,
1989. In that meeting, respondent Morato told the board that he has ordered some deletions on the
movie "Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier approved for
screening by the Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". He explained that his power to
unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by virtue of MTRCB

Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June 22,1988) which allows the chairman of the board "to downgrade
a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial."
Petitioner informed the Board, however, Another incident which gave rise to this petition
occurred in a board meeting held on June 22, 1989. In that meeting, respondent Morato told the
board that he has ordered some deletions on the movie "Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding
the fact that said movie was earlier approved for screening by the Board with classification "R-18
without cuts". He explained that his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review
Committee is authorized by virtue of MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June 22,1988) which
allows the chairman of the board "to downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which
are controversial."
Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent Morato possesses no authority to
unilaterally reverse a decision of the review committee under PD 1986 (Creating the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board).
After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary to the Justice Secretary, the latter
opined that PD 1896 does not vest respondent Morato any authority to unilaterally reverse the
decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the constitutionality of Res. No. 10-89
on the ground that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative (Rollo, pp. 38-42).
The Justice Secretary's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, respondent Morato opted to
ignore it.
ISSUE:
WON MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27, 1989) declaring as strictly confidential,
private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee which previously reviewed a certain
film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the committee that reviewed the film is
unconstitutional.
DECISION: YES.
We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of respondent MTRCB,
pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its
members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. More
specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions,as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied)
Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing
films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion
picture or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and
personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned.
The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company,
or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or
community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of respondent Board
and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private?
Certainly not, As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification
board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve

public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy
belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers
tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.)
There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a
product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise
would be to clothe public officials with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny
for their official acts.
Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor
private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which
is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right,
the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the
agency charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional
recognition of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the
consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered
nugatory.
CHAVEZ VS PCGG
545 SCRA 441 DECEMBER 9, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government
official) initiated this original action seeking
(1) to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into,
perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the
Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and
(2) to compel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or
perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between
the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who
committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the
country's economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports 2
bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to
(1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts
in Swiss banks; and
(2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government(through PCGG) and the
Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all negotiations and
agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that
any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public
interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly
prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have aright to

know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.-RESPONDENT
ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They
claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked
the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet
be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements
have not become effective and binding.-PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III].
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Sec. 28 [Article II].
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the
above constitutional provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to those still being
considered.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of
any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.
Decision:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND
VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all
government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in the
recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to
disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied
in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.
Zaldivar vs Gonzales
166 SCRA 316 October 7, 1988 G.R. Nos. 79690-707
FACTS:
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating
the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987
Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against
Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations against
Zaldivar.

Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal informations against
Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on

the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Courts issuance of the TRO is a manifestation theta the rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an
ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered
Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that
he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court,
to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching
notes, that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to go
slow on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.
DECISION:
Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that
the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the
grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and
degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in
the country.

Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware
of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no
antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who
owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment
and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of
Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In
the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the
Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.