You are on page 1of 76

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt,
reiterating the request for a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings
Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna.2

EN BANC
A.C. No. 6732

October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL


BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL
OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of
law is guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty
of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose,
Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in existent decision of Branch
64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC)
instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas
Regional Office, represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC,
received a written communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a
Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the
decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in
Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration
of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley
Quioyo.1

Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of
Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration
of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC
had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was
the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had
decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was
one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist, 3 Mr.
Hunt sent a letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the
purported decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of
the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been
presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK. 4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document
attached to the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document,
Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the situation. 5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to
communicate on the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the
investigation of the falsification.6
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an
affidavit on March 4, 2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent
who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations
against the respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose
Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005. 8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side, 9 but he invoked his
constitutional right to remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to
Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter appeared and gave his
sworn statement.

After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the
Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the investigation, with a
recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of
public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code,
and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of
the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced
against the respondent.11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to
the Office of the Bar Confidant.12
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counteraffidavit,13 whereby he denied any participation in the falsification. He
insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirleys petition for the
annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws
involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in
June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what
appeared to be a court decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to
him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had
advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an
investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had
previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his
documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from
Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of
Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before
Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr.
to the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for
making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondents
counter-affidavit as his comment, and referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006, 17 Atty. Lolita A.
Quisumbing, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent
guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorneys Oath and Code
of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged
the purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special
Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive

death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth
and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of
presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the
petitioner;18 and that the respondent had received P60,000.00 from Dy
Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions thusly:
Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it
was one Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as
proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the widow of Florencia
Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the
decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim
reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch
except for the names and dates? Respondent failed to explain this.
Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely
invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he
should have made this known in the investigation. His story therefore
appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible
reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely
implicate him in this incident. 19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200, 20 the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the report
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by suspending the
respondent from the practice of law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-70921 denying the respondents motion for reconsideration and
affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then
forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule
139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents
comment/opposition as his appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider
the complainants reply as his comment on the petition for review; (3) to
require the respondent to file a reply to the complainants comment within
10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original
records of the case within 15 days from notice.
Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the


respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in
consideration of a sum of money.
The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the
imputation. He insisted that he had had no hand in the falsification, and
claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He
implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto
Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW,
hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing unscrupulous means to
achieve his ends.
However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in
the illicit generation of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy
Quioyos categorical declaration on the respondents personal responsibility
for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not
overcome by the respondents blanket denial, which by nature was
negative evidence.23
Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible
specifics and did not command credence.1wphi1It is worthy to note, too,
that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after the Court, through
the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to
comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as
nothing more than an after thought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by
Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her deceased husband had been
instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But such reliance
was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered
unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the
unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of authorship of the
falsification by the husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the
falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic
decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No.
084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of
grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a
non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in


conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law.25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the
court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the
administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status
of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of
the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that
they should do nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the
confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and integrity.26 The
Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among
them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of
their Attorneys Oath for them to:
x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x
conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients
x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal
profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only to the
deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him
who fails to observe and respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons of
ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and
omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings,
but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional
duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the

principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him. 27 Verily, no
lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty
and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed
either in a professional or private capacity.28 The test is whether the
conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer
unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. 29 WHEREFORE, the Court
FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N.
PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon
receipt of this decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST.
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of
Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated
proceedings to be initiated against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the
country and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Re: FAKE DECISION ALLEGEDLY in G.R. No 75242

Applicant, was docketed as G.R. No. L-75242, and appeared to have


been promulgated on May 19, 2000. The alleged decision is quoted
hereunder:
H. G. DAVIDE, JR. CJ.
This is a petition filed by the University of the Philippines
for the review and reconsideration of a resolution promulgated by
this division on March 2, 2000 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in favor of the
applicant in LRC Case No. Q-90-021.
The case arose from an application for registration filed
by Saint Mary Crusade To Alleviate Poverty of Brethren
Foundation, Inc. with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86 of
Quezon City, for a parcel of land situated at Krus na Ligas,
Quezon City, with an area of approximately four hundred thirty
(430) hectares which they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in continuous and exclusive possession since prior to
March 25, 1877 and wherein they have introduced developmental
improvements thereon.
During the several hearings conducted by the Regional
Trial Court, the respondents, University of the Philippines, et al.,
could not present any evidences nor valid arguments to
controvert the application, prompting the said court to refer the
case to the Land Registration Authority by virtue of a Court Order
dated October 5, 1998 for their resolution and proper disposition.

RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative matter arose when Dario G. Silvestre,
Senior Manager, Credit and Appraisal Management OPS of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), furnished the Court with a
photocopy of an alleged certified true copy of a two-page decision of the
Second Division of the Court composed of and duly signed by Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Associate Justices Josue N. Bellosillo, Jose O. Vitug,
Santiago M. Kapunan, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Artemio V. Panganiban,
Arturo B. Buena and Minerva P. Gonzales-Reyes (sic). The decision
entitled University of the Philippines, et al., Petitioner, vs. St. Mary
Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc.

At the hearing conducted by the Land Registration


Authority on November 16 & 23 and December 2, 1998,
respondents presented among others Transfer Certificates of
Titles Nos. 9164 and 1378, which, after careful examination were
proven spurious, it appearing that the technical descriptions
thereon referred to parcels of land somewhere in Zambales and
not the parcel on (sic) land in question. There being no other
evidences to contravene the application of Saint Mary Crusade to
Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc., the Land
Registration Authority ordered the registration of the property in
its name.

Petitions for review and reconsideration filed by


respondents on May 27, 1999 and June 21, 1999 were both
denied by the court for lack of merits and on December 28, 1999
ruled that the registration of the property in the name of
applicant was meritorious and deserved the full protection of the
law.
Wherefore, let copies of this decision be forwarded to the
Register of Deeds of Rizal Province, the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City and the Director of Lands for their information and
guidance.
The following documents accompanied the alleged Court decision:
a) A four-paragraph Resolution dated March 2, 2000 purportedly
issued by the Second Division of this Court and signed by Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Associate Justices Josue N. Bellosillo, Jose O.
Vitug, Santiago M. Kapunan, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Artemio V.
Panganiban, Arturo B. Buena and Minerva P. Gonzales-Reyes (sic) in
General Land Registration Office Record No. LRC Case No. Q-90-021
entitled Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation,
Inc., Applicant, which states in full as follows:

THE PUBLISHER
SCRA, Annotated
Re: Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation
vs. UP 144 SCRA 763 (1999)
By virtue of the authority vested upon me, it is hereby
ordered that the attached Resolution en banc, duly concurred and
attested by the parties concerned, be included and compiled in the
publication of the SCRA, Annotated books.
The inclusion in the publication is deemed necessary in the
light of major developments in appellate jurisdiction and
procedures on the basis of judicial decisions and administrative
circulars of the Supreme Court bearing in the administration of
justice.
The accessibility of other legal publication, notwithstanding
the intent in the inclusion in the SCRA, Annotated books, is still to
publish a purely textual or topical treatment of judicial proceedings
and to contribute to the enrichment of Philippine legal literature.

H.G. DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

Supreme Court, Manila, March 2, 2000.

The petition for review and reconsideration filed by the


Land Registration Authority is hereby DENIED and the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Quezon City, is sustained and
APPROVED.

(Sg
d.)
LUZVIMINDA D.
PUNO

Careful evaluation of the records of the case, as well as


the reasons cited in the petition, proves that the Regional Trial
Court did not err in its decision in favor of the applicant.

Clerk of
Court

Wherefore, the foregoing resolution is hereby declared


final and irrevocable.

c) Notice of Resolution in LRC Case No. Q-90-021 dated March 3,


2000 allegedly issued by Atty. Puno, worded thusly:

The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish all the


parties and offices concerned with copies of this resolution.

Sir/Madam:

b) A Letter purportedly that of Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, Clerk of


Court, to wit:

Please take notice that on March 2, 2000, a resolution,


copy attached, was rendered by the SECOND DIVISION OF THE

SUPREME COURT on the above-entitled case, the original of


which is now on file in this office.
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly
yours,
(Sgd.
)
LUZVIMINDA
D. PUNO
Clerk of
Court
d) Certification dated August 14, 2000, which states:
Certification
I, LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, do
hereby certify that I have examined the attached documents described as
follows:
Xerox copies of the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-75242 entitled
University of the Philippines, et al. v. Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate
Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. promulgated on May 19, 2000
consisting of two (2) pages thereof.
That I have compared the same with the original on file in my office and
that the same is a true copy thereof.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto signed my name and affixed the seal
of this Court, this 14th day of August 2000.
(Sgd.
)
LUZVIMINDA
D. PUNO

Clerk of
Court
The records of the Court revealed, however, that the docket number
(G.R. No. 75242) of the alleged Court decision was assigned to the case
of Manila Resource Development Corporation, Petitioner vs.
National Labor Relations Commission and Ruben Manahan,
Respondents, which was promulgated on September 4, 1992. The
Decision of the Court in this case became final and executory and Entry of
Judgment was made of record on September 28, 1992.
Thus, in a Resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered
the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct a
discreet investigation of the matter and to thereafter submit a report
thereon. Mr. Silvestre was, likewise, directed to submit to the Court the
names of the party or parties who furnished his office with the spurious
decision and a detailed narration of the events surrounding the delivery
thereof.
In his Sworn Statement dated November 25, 2002, Mr. Silvestre
narrated that sometime in June 2002, a certain Ms. Teodora N. Villanueva
came to their office at the DBP Building, Sen. Gil Puyat corner Makati
Avenues, Makati City. She claimed to be the duly-authorized representative
of the Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc.
whom she alleged to be the owner of a track of land in Quezon City. She
then inquired if the bank could finance the alleged Housing Project of the
Foundation, or if there could be a local and foreign funder who would be
willing to finance the same. Mr. Silvestre informed Ms. Villanueva that the
bank would first have to conduct the proper verification and investigation
of the property, and that it was a long process. She then presented and
handed over to Mr. Silvestre the following photocopies of documents
proving the alleged ownership of the properties:
(a) Authorization dated May 28, 2002 issued by Jaime B. Borjal,
President and Chairman of the Board of the Foundation and attested by
Felicisimo C. Arellano, Corporate Secretary, vesting upon Ms. Teodora N.
Villanueva & Associates the authority to transact business and to negotiate
for the acquisition of local/foreign funding assistance to finance the
Housing and other relevant projects of the Foundation; [1]
(b) Secretarys Certificate dated May 25, 2002 issued by Felicisimo
C. Arellano of B-9 L-5 Sunnyville 4 Subd., Ampid I, San Mateo, Rizal,

stating that on May 25, 2002, the Board of Directors of the Foundation,
with address at Unit 627 Cityland Shaw Towers, Shaw Blvd., Mandaluyong
City, issued Board Resolution No. 02.009 manifesting the authority of
Teodora N. Villanueva & Associates, to transact business and to negotiate
for the acquisition of local/foreign funding assistance for housing and other
relevant projects of the Foundation, and to act as negotiator for and in
behalf of the Foundation and directing that copies of the Resolution be
furnished the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other
concerned offices/agencies for their information and guidance. [2]
(c) A Resolution dated March 2, 2000 allegedly issued by the
Second Division of this Court and signed by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. and Associate Justices Josue N. Bellosillo, Jose O. Vitug, Santiago M.
Kapunan, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Artemio V. Panganiban, Arturo B.
Buena and Minerva P. Gonzales-Reyes (sic) in LRC Case No. Q-90-021
entitled Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation,
Inc., Applicant, quoted above;[3]
(d) An Order dated December 28, 1999 issued in LRC Case No. Q90-021 in Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation,
Inc., Applicant by Judge Teodoro A. Bay of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 86, and certified as true a xerox copy by Idelrose B.
Mabunga, Officer-in-Charge, which reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, based on the records of the aforecited case, the adversarial
claims of the parties on the land in question were placed under the
jurisdiction of the Land Registration Authority by virtue of a Court Order
dated October 5, 1998 referring the case to them for resolution and proper
disposition.
WHEREAS, in accordance with the said Court Order dated October 5, 1998
and after evaluating the merits of the claims of the parties involved, the
Land Registration Authority issued a Decree of Registration in favor of the
Applicant, Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation,
Inc. and the land in question had been registered in the name of the said
Applicant.
WHEREAS, during the hearing of the aforecited case conducted by this
Court, the other claimants to the land in question, despite being given
sufficient opportunity, failed to present any evidence to contravene those
presented by the Applicant-Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of
Brethren Foundation, Inc.

NOW, THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the claims of
the Applicant-Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren
Foundation, Inc. meritorious and deserving of the full protection of the law.
Let it so ordered and forthwith disseminated to all parties, authorities and
offices concerned for their information and guidance.
This Order is final and executory.[4]
(e) The alleged Letter of Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, Clerk of Court
dated March 2, 2000, quoted above;[5]
(f) Original Certificate of Title No. 12390 issued on October 6, 1998
pursuant to LRC Case No. Q-ORIG. 98-021, LRC Record No. 6679 under
Decree No. N-198342 in favor of Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty
of Brethren Foundation, Inc., represented by Jaime B. Borjal, President, for
a parcel of land in Quezon City with an area of 4,304,623 square meters; [6]
(g) Sketch Plan of the 4,304,623 (sic) square meters of land situated
in Bago Bantay and Cruz na Ligas, Quezon City, issued on April 20, 1999
by the Chief of the Regional Surveys Division with the caveat that this plan
shall not be used for land registration,[7] and
(h) Memorandum dated August 23, 2001 purportedly issued by the
LRA which states in full:
TO: Saint Mary Crusade to
Alleviate Poverty of
Brethren Foundation, Inc.
RE: L.R.C. Case No. 0-90-02
I have been reminded by the Administrator why his order
for the relocation survey of the property in the above-captioned
case has not been implemented until now.
In this connection, please be advised that as a condition
for the conduct of the relocation survey ordered, the total
amount of Pesos: Three Hundred Sixty Thousand (P360,000.00)

to cover the cost and other related expenses for the survey
must first be deposited with us.
You are, therefore, requested to make the required deposit
within five (5) days from receipt hereof so that we can
implement the order soonest.
Very truly
yours,
(Sgd.
)
SALVADOR
L. ORIEL
LRA Office
Administrator
Records &
Decree
Section
Mr. Silvestre informed Ms. Villanueva that all the documents would be
verified by the bank, to which the latter made the assurance that the said
documents were authentic, legal and valid. Mr. Silvestre then personally
conducted the investigation and verification of the said documents. In his
Sworn Statement, he narrated the result of his investigation, as well as the
events that transpired thereafter, as follows:
6. That the Foundation is registered before the Office of the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Board Resolution
and the Secretarys Certificate were all registered;
7. That after verifying the registration of the Foundation, I
proceeded to the Supreme Court to verify the authenticity of the
Resolution promulgated by the Supreme Court dated March 2,
2000 in LRC Case No. Q-90-021, by presenting the very
documents given by Ms. Teodora N. Villanueva, which are all
photocopies;

8. That I was surprised to learn that the documents pertaining to


LRC Case No. Q-90-021 were all fabricated and [forged]
documents. [Worst] of all the signatures of the Honorable
Justices of the Second Division including that of the Clerk of
Court were not genuine and, hence, a forgery;
9. That I informed the Clerk who assisted me in the said
verification, that the very reason for my verification is to confirm
and verify the authenticity of the ruling of the Honorable
Supreme Court in the said case because Ms. Teodora N.
Villanueva is then trying to transact with the DBP and to other
local and foreign funder to finance the Housing Project of the
Foundation;
10. That being a credit investigator for a long period of time at
DBP, verification of documents is one of my duties and
responsibilities before accepting any application to finance a
certain project;
11. That in good faith I presented to the Honorable Supreme
Court all the documents supplied and presented by Ms. Teodora
N. Villanueva for the purpose of verification of the property
allegedly registered in the name of the Foundation;
Mr. Silvestre further certified that the documents presented by Ms.
Villanueva to the bank were mere photocopies and that no business
transaction was processed by the latter in favor of the said Foundation.
In compliance with the Courts resolution, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), through Director Reynaldo G. Wycoco, furnished the
Court with a copy of the Letter dated March 26, 2003 of NBI Deputy
Director Fermin N. Nasol, Special Investigative Services, NBI, and the
Agents Progress Report dated March 19, 2003 of Ha Rachel R. Marfil,
Reporting Agent, Team Leader, Atty. Nestor M. Mantaring, Deputy Director
of the NBI Special Investigative Services, regarding their discreet
investigation on the matter.
In his Letter dated March 26, 2003, NBI Deputy Director Nasol
requested Clerk of Court Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno to issue [an] official
certification that said documents were not issued by the Supreme Court
and to forward the requested Certification for the above mentioned
spurious documents so our Agents could file the criminal complaint before

the City Prosecutor of Manila. On the other hand, the Agents Progress
Report signed by Ha Rachel R. Marfil, Reporting Agent and Team Leader,
stated, thus:
05. Surveillance operations determined that Subject TEODORA
VILLANUEVA and the St. Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty Brethren
Foundation, Inc. were conducting business at Unit 627 Cityland Shaw
Towers, Shaw Blvd., Mandaluyong City. On several occasions, Employees of
said Foundation refused to divulge the whereabouts of Subject TEODORA
VILLANUEVA, JAIME BORJAL (President) and FELICISIMO ARELLANO
(Corporate Secretary).
06. In a conference with Assistant Clerk of Court, MA. LUISA D.
VILLARAMA, Agent Marfil requested for the names of the Clerk who
assisted Mr. DARIO SILVESTRE when he made the verification at the Office
of the Clerk of Court at the Supreme Court and the person who shall
represent the Supreme Court when the complaint for Falsification of Public
Document against Subjects TEODORA VILLANUEVA, JAIME BORJAL and
FELICISIMO ARELLANO of said Foundation. The Agents on case are ready
to file the complaint before the City Prosecutor of Manila as soon as the
above stated evidence are submitted to the NBI.
07. The Affidavits of the Clerk, Supreme Court Representative and the
Certification that the said Decision and other Certifications were not issued
by the Second Division or Atty. LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO and therefore
spurious are necessary before filing the criminal complaint before the City
Prosecutor of Manila.

Office of the Clerk of Court (requesting party) for the information and
disposition of the Supreme Court.
On February 17, 2004, the Court required Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno,
Clerk of Court, to comment on the report and recommendation of NBI
Agent Marfil. In compliance therewith, Atty. Puno made the following
observation in her Comment dated February 24, 2004:
Diligent effort was made by this office to find out the name of the clerk
from the Second Division who assisted Mr. Dario Silvestre when Mr.
Silvestre made the verification on whether or not the subject documents
were fake or not. By the lapse of time, and the fact that there are
numerous clients who constantly verify with said office, the clerks in the
Second Division could not anymore recall who among them assisted Mr.
Silvestre. Be that as it may, [absent] the affidavit of the clerk, the affidavit
of Mr. Silvestre would suffice to prove that, indeed, he made the proper
verification. As to who may represent the court as complainant, the
undersigned recommends the COMPLAINTS AND INVESTIGATION
DIVISION of the Office of the Administrative Services. With regard to the
certification on whether the subject documents are authentic or spurious[,]
[t]he National Bureau of Investigation thru Agent Marfil may coordinate
with the office of the undersigned for the issuance thereof.
In a Resolution dated March 2, 2004, the Court resolved to approve
the above recommendation to designate the Chief of Complaints and
Investigation Division to represent the Court as the Complainant, and
further directed the NBI to coordinate with Atty. Puno for the certifications
needed in the filing of the criminal case.

Agent Marfil made the following recommendations:


08. IN VIEW THEREOF, it is most respectfully requested that the Supreme
Court furnish the name of the Clerk from the Second Division who assisted
MR. DARIO SILVESTRE to complete the chain of evidence, name of the
Representative of the Supreme Court who will appear as Complainant in
the criminal case to be filed by the NBI and the Certification from the
appropriate Supreme Court personnel that the Decision (Photocopy
attached to this Report) in G.R. No. L-75242 entitled UP vs. St. Mary
Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. that was
furnished by Subject TEODORA VILLANUEVA and other Certifications
(Photocopies, attached to this Report) are spurious. Let a copy of the
Agents Progress Report be furnished Atty. LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO, of the

In a Resolution dated September 21, 2004, the Court resolved to


refer the instant administrative matter to the Office of the Chief Attorney
for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In their Report dated December 8, 2004, Atty. Edna E. Dio, Deputy
Clerk of Court and Chief Attorney, Atty. Wilfredo V. Lapitan, Assistant Chief
Attorney, and Atty. Cenon Voltaire B. Repollo, Court Attorney III, all of the
Office of the Chief Attorney, narrated the events that transpired thereafter:
17. On 25 June 2004, Atty. Edwin B. Andrada of the Office of
Administrative Services of this Court, submitted a Report on the Alleged
Fake Decision of the Supreme Court to Atty. Wendel V. Custodio, Chief of
the Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, purportedly in compliance with the

Resolution of 2 March 2004 directing the Chief of the Complaints and


Investigation Division of this Court to represent it as Complainant in the
filing of appropriate criminal cases against individuals who made use of
faked decisions to the Supreme Court to advance their interests. He said:
Sometime in April 2004, pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution of the
Supreme Court, Atty. Rachel Marfil-Angeles met with the undersigned to
confer and discuss the necessary documents to be secured from the Office
of the Clerk of Court En Banc for the preparation of the necessary
complaint to be filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor. In this
meeting, Atty. Marfil-Angeles and the undersigned agreed that the latter
secure: (1) a certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court En
Banc that the decision (used by the forgers) was never issued by the
Court; and (2) the identity of the Supreme Court employee who assisted in
the verification and to whom the xerox copy of the alleged fake decision of
the Supreme Court was handed by Mr. Dario G. Silvestre, Senior Manager,
Credit Department of the Development Bank of the Philippines. She,
likewise, requested the undersigned to prepare a complaint to be filed with
the NBI in accordance to his task as directed under the said resolution of
the Court.
As agreed, the undersigned went to the OCC En Banc. However, he was
informed by Atty. Basilia Ringol, Court Attorney V thereat that their office
does not issue negative certifications. It only certifies as to the fact that a
certain decision or process was issued. She elucidated that the mere fact
that the Court has doubts as to its authenticity, and by necessary
implication, the Court certifies that it did not render the said decision.
Anent the identity of the employee of the Court who assisted the
verification and to whom a xerox copy of the faked decision was handed by
Mr. Dario G. Silvestre, Atty. Ringol stated that it is hard to identify the
same because it was not even clear from the records to what particular
office the said employee is assigned. Furthermore, the employees in the
OCC En Banc deals (sic) with cases, judicial and administrative, by the
hundreds that one cannot possibly remember the nature or title of a
particular case.
As regards the complaint which the undersigned was requested to draft,
Atty. Marfil-Angeles considered it no longer necessary considering that the
requirements, i.e., the certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court,
and more especially the identity of the Supreme Court employee adverted

to above, that would serve as links for the successful prosecution of the
case, were not obtained.
18. Through First Indorsement dated 29 July 2004, Gen. Reynaldo G.
Wycoco, NBI Director and Department of Justice Undersecretary,
forwarded to Assistant Clerk of Court Ma. Luisa D. Villarama for her
information and whatever action she may deem proper to take under the
premises, a copy of the NBIs Evaluation Comment and the Agents Report.
19. The NBI Comment dated 29 July 2004, written in a Disposition Form
by Janette O. Herras-Baggas, Chief, SLPS, and approved by Roberto S. de
Alban, Chief of the LED, narrates the facts that led to Silvestres verification
in this Court of the documents presented to him by Teodora Villanueva,
adding as follows:
Sometime in April 2004, Agent-on-case approached ATTY. EDWIN B.
ANDRADA, Court Attorney IV, Complaints and Investigation Division,
Supreme Court, to confer and discuss with him the documents necessary
in filing the corresponding complaint. In that meeting, it was agreed that
ATTY. ANDRADA will secure (1) a certification from the Office of the Clerk
of Court En Banc, Supreme Court, showing that the questioned Resolution
was never issued by the Court; and (2) the identity of the Supreme Court
employee who assisted DARIO G. SILVESTRE in verifying the authenticity
of the questioned Resolution and to whom the photocopy of the fake
Resolution was handed by the latter. However, ATTY. ANDRADA was
informed by ATTY. BASILISA RINGOL, Court Attorney V, Office of the Clerk
of Court En Banc, Supreme Court, that their office [do] not issue negative
certifications. With respect to the Supreme Court employee who assisted in
the verification and to whom the photocopy of the fake decision was
handed by DARIO G. SILVESTRE, ATTY. RINGOL stated that it was difficult
to identify the said employee because it was not clear from the records to
what particular office the employee was assigned, and the Office of the
Clerk of Court En Banc dealt with cases, judicial and administrative, by the
hundreds so that one could not possibly remember the nature or title of a
particular case.
Other documents submitted by TEODORA N. VILLANUEVA to DARIO G.
SILVESTRE was a Board Resolution No. 02-009 and the Secretarys
Certificate of SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF
BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC. signed by FELICISIMO C. ARELLANO and
JAIME B. BORJAL Corporate Secretary and President & Chairman of the
Board, respectively. When these documents were presented by DARIO G.

SILVESTRE for verification with the office of the Securities and Exchange
Commission they were found to be authentic.
Moreover, probe conducted showed no evidence showing Subjects
FELICISIMO ARELLANO, JAIME BORJAL and TEODORA VILLANUEVA,
Officers of St. Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of the Brethren
Foundation, Inc., as the persons who made the falsification or would
benefit from the decision. Furthermore, although it was Subject TEODORA
VILLANUEVA who presented the questioned Resolution at the Development
Bank of the Philippines, there was no indication from said bank of their
intention to file the corresponding complaint against Subject TEODORA
VILLANUEVA since damage was prevented by the timely verification made
by DARIO SILVESTRE.

Inc. were sent NBI subpoena but did not appear before this Command on
February 17, 2003. [NBI ANNEX NOS. 06, 07, 08]
AGENTS RECOMMENDATION
09. There is no completed chain of evidence to link Subjects FELICISIMO
ARELLANO, TEODORA VILLANUEVA and JAIME BORJAL, Key Officers of St.
Mary Crusade to alleviate poverty of the Brethren Foundation, Inc. as the
persons who made the falsification or would benefit from the decision.
Although it was Subject TEODORA VILLANUEVA who presented the
questioned decision at the DBP, there is no indication from DBP to file any
complaint against Subject TEODORA VILLANUEVA since damage was
prevented by the timely verification made by DBP Manager SILVESTRE.
[NBI ANNEX NO. 09]

COMMENT/RECOMMENDATION:
Based on the above, Agent-on-case recommended that this case be
temporarily closed. We agree. Therefore, it is respectfully recommended
that the records of this case be filed with our IRD; and that the Office of
the Requesting Party be informed accordingly.
20. Agents Marfil, Ma. Leticia R. Mamalateo and Dennis S. Siyhian
prepared the Agents Report dated 29 June 2004 referred to by Ms. HerrasBaggas. Its pertinent portions state:

10. Attached to this report is the result of record check with our
Identification and Records Division in the name of Subjects FELICISIMO
ARELLANO, TEODORA VILLANUEVA and JAIME BORJAL [NBI ANNEX NOS.
10, 11 & 12]
11. The absence of the statement of the court personnel who made the
verification requested by DBP Manager DARIO SILVESTRE in effect broke
the chain of evidence to prosecute TEODORA VILLANUEVA for Falsification
of public documents under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.

AGENTS COMMENTS
07. The chain of evidence was not established. There was no identity of
the court personnel who made the verification of the alleged spurious court
decision and who would identify the DBP Manager who presented the court
decision for verification.
08. There was neither damage to the court or to the Development Bank of
the Philippines.
09. There is no court record to show that the questioned photocopies of
court decision and certifications were verified in June 2002 by the court
personnel.
08. Subjects FELICISIMO ARELLANO, TEODORA VILLANUEVA and JAIME
BORJAL of St. Mary Crusade to alleviate poverty of Brethren Foundation,

12. After receipt of NBI subpoena duces tecum, the Records Officer at the
Supreme Court did furnish this Command any record that the questioned
document was verified in June 2002. [NBI ANNEX NO. 13]
13. IN VIEW THEREOF, it is respectfully recommended that this case be
temporarily closed and that the Supreme Court en banc Secretariat be
furnished a copy of the Agents report and all its annexes for their
information and disposition.
21. Among the annexes submitted to the Court by the NBI are photocopies
of its indexes showing that Teodora Villanueva of Taban, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, has been charged with: (a) violation of BP 22 under
Criminal Case No. 44267 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Pasig City on 13
August 1999; (b) slight physical injuries under Criminal Case No. 2799 of
the Municipal Court of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro on 17 December 1975; (c)
violation of Art. 319 of the Revised Penal Code (removal, sale or pledge of

mortgaged property) under I.S. No. 77-2020 of the Office of the City
Fiscal, Malolos, Bulacan, on 2 March 1978; (d) less serious physical
injuries under Crim. Case No. 751 of the Municipal Court of Candaba,
Pampanga, on 4 October 1966 but case was dismissed on 18 May 1970;
and (e) swindling/estafa under I.S. No. 81-173 before the City
Prosecutors, Bicol Region, Camarines Sur, Naga City. The NBI also has
records of charges against three persons with the name Jaime Borjal: (a)
one from Luklukan Sur, J. Panganiban, Camarines Norte was charged with
acts of lasciviousness on 16 April 1974; (b) Jaime Borjal y Aonuevo was
charged for vagrancy before the Pasay City Court on 14 April 1971; and
(c) Jaime Borjal y Gurango of Panal, Tabaco, Albay, was charged with
damage to property thru reckless imprudence in Daraga, Albay, on 26
November 1990. One Felicisimo Arellano @ Felicing of So. Camperat, Brgy.
Bungalunan, Basay, Negros Oriental, was charged with estafa under
Criminal Case No. M-26(87) before the 2nd MCTC of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, and the case was forwarded to the RTC of Negros Oriental at
Dumaguete City on 29 November 1991.
22. One of the annexes was a subpoena duces tecum issued by Atty. Jose
Justo S. Yap, Chief of the Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, and served upon
the Clerk of Court on 5 February 2004, requiring her to appear before said
office on 13 February 2004 to submit official certification that the Supreme
Court did not issue Decision in G.R. #75242 (AM No. 02-823-0). The
record does not show whether this subpoena was complied with. Notably,
Dario G. Silvestre was also served a subpoena on 28 October 2002 for him
to appear before the same Anti-Graft Division on 5 November 2002 and to
give his statement and submit the court order requiring UP v. St. Mary
Crusade to Alleviate Poverty G.R. # L-75242.
The Office of the Chief Attorney made the following observations and
evaluation:
Observations on alleged spurious documents
The Resolution of 24 September 2004 states that Silvestre furnished the
Court with a copy of the Decision in G.R. No. L-75242 entitled University of
the Philippines, et al. v. St. Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren
Foundation, Inc. allegedly promulgated by the Second Division on 19 May
2000. However, aside from that decision, Silvestre subsequently
submitted, in compliance with the Resolution of 24 September 2002, his
sworn statement dated 25 November 2004, with photocopies of other
documents including a Resolution allegedly promulgated by the Second

Division on 2 March 2000 in General Registration Office Record No. LRC


Case No. Q-90-021 entitled Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of
Brethren Foundation, Inc., Applicant.
The photocopies of the Decision and the Resolution show, on their
respective faces, that both are, indeed, simulated and falsified.
The Resolution allegedly issued on 2 March 2000 by the Second Division
has the docket number of a land registration case before the Regional Trial
Court. The title of the case is also fashioned after that of a trial court
issuance in a land registration case. The Members of the Second Division
are listed continuously or in such a way that each name is not written on a
line by itself as in the form observed in authentic signed extended
Resolutions. The Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Second Division,
which is contrary to the practice that he chairs the First Division. Aside
from the Chief Justice, seven (7) other Justices are in the list; a Division in
this Court has only five (5) Members. In 2000, there was no Justice by the
name of Gonzales-Reyes; Justice Gonzaga-Reyes used to be a Member of
the Court. No initials or signature of the Clerk of Court or the Assistant
Clerk of Court is affixed after the date of promulgation. H. G. Davide,
Jr. CJ. Is not the usual way of indicating the name of the ponente; it
should have been Davide, Jr., C.J.: with a colon.
The subject of the Resolution is not proper for an extended and signed
resolution; it may be disposed in a minute resolution. The first sentence of
the Resolution speaks of a petition for review and reconsideration which
would mean that both the petition for review and the motion for
reconsideration were considered in one resolution, a procedure which is
irregular and not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The second sentence
which starts with Careful evaluation . . . is a general statement that should
have explained the reason for the denial of the petition/motion for
reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the Resolution starting with
Wherefore should state that the petition or motion is denied. The directive
that the Clerk of Court should furnish all the parties to the case is a
surplusage, as it is the ministerial the duty of the Clerk of Court to furnish
all parties to a case with copies of all issuances relative thereto. The other
directive stating that the offices concerned should be furnished by the
Clerk of Court with copies of the resolution should ordinarily specify the
offices that should be given a copy thereof. The term SO ORDERED at the
end of the dispositive portion is missing in the same way that the words
WE CONCUR before the signatures of the concurring Justices are missing.

That the Decision in G.R. No. L-75242 is a sham is also apparent on its
face. The L in the docket number, which means liberation, has been
deleted from docket numbers after the number of cases filed with the
Supreme Court reached 50,000. The petitioners are University of the
Philippines, et al. meaning there are parties other than U.P. but the word
Petitioner written under it is still in the singular form and with no comma
after Petitioner. The word versus is not written after Petitioner and before
the name of the opposing party under which is written the word Applicant.
The latter word should have been Respondent. As in the questioned
Resolution, the names of eight (8) Members of the Second Division are not
properly written in that the names are written continuously and not one
name for one line. The same erroneous name of Gonzales-Reyes is in the
list. The other indicia of falsification manifest in the Resolution and
repeated in the Decision are the omission of the initials or signature of the
Clerk of Court or the Assistant Clerk of Court after the date of
promulgation, the inclusion of the first and middle initials in the name of
the ponente with no colon after CJ, the fact that the Chief Justice does not
preside over the Second Division, the missing command SO ORDERED, and
the missing phrase WE CONCUR before the signatures of the concurring
Justices.
The first sentence of the Decision betrays the lack of legal knowledge of
whoever wrote it. It states: This is a petition filed by the University of the
Philippines for the review and reconsideration of a resolution promulgated
by this division on March 2, 2000 affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86, in favor of the applicant in LRC Case
No. Q-90-021. The Court simply does not review its own Resolution in a
petition for review. Moreover, the alleged Decision was promulgated later
than the Resolution. A decision is promulgated first before a resolution
resolving the motion for reconsideration of the same decision is issued and
promulgated. Another telling sign of simulation is the use of the term lack
of merits with respect to the petitions for review and reconsideration. The
dispositive portion simply directs that copies of the Decision be forwarded
to the Register of Deeds of Rizal Province, the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, and the Director of Lands for their information and guidance.
Thus, even without verifying from this Court, to a practitioner of law before
this Court, the alleged Resolution and Decision would be considered
offhand as spurious.
With respect to the communication of the Clerk of Court dated 2 March
2000 to the publisher of the SCRA, no such communication is ever sent.

Following the standing agreement between the Supreme Court and Central
Book Supply, Inc., the messenger of the latter simply picks up the
decisions promulgated for the month for publication in the SCRA, based on
a list of cases which a clerk in the Office of the Clerk of Court prepares
(Per Atty. Felipa B. Anama of the Office of the Clerk of Court). The subject
of the communication is stated, thus: Re: Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate
Poverty of Brethren Foundation vs. UP, 144 SCRA 763 (1999). Volume 144
of the SCRA publishes decisions of the Court from September to October
10, 1986 and it has only 719 pages. It appears that the alleged
communication was needed to project the idea that the Resolution en
banc, not the Second Division, was to be published in the SCRA.
The Notice of Resolution that the Clerk of Court allegedly signed on 3
March 2000 notifies, allegedly by registered mail, Jaranilla Vicente &
Associates at P.O. Box 3710, the Office of the President of the University of
the Philippines, the Land Registration Authority, the Department of Justice,
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and the Land Management Bureau in
Ermita, Manila, that the Second Division had rendered the alleged
Resolution of 2 March 2000 and that the original thereof was on file with
the Office of the Clerk of Court. Again, no such form of notice is sent to
parties. Resolutions issued by Divisions are sent to parties by the Division
Clerks of Court, not by the Clerk of Court en banc.
The Certification allegedly executed by the Clerk of Court on 14 August
2003 stating that she had examined the decision in G.R. No. L-75242
entitled University of the Philippines, et al. vs. Saint Mary Crusade to
Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. appears to the uninitiated as
a true reproduction of the one usually issued by Office of the Reporter, not
by the Clerk of Court. However, these details are lacking: (1) a statement
after the number of pages of the decision that the xerox copy is duly
sealed and signed on the left margin of each and every page thereof; (2)
the embossed seal of the Court with the initials of the personnel who
compared the original with the xerox copy at the lower left hand corner of
the certification; (3) the Deputy Clerk of Court and Reporter, as the
custodian of the originals of all decisions, signs for the Clerk of Court; and
(4) the name of the requesting party, the official receipt number and the
date of issuance at the bottom of the Certification.
Evaluation
From the documents at hand, it appears that on 23 August 2001, Salvador
L. Oriel, Office Administrator and Chief of the Docket Division of the Land

Registration Authority (LRA), issued a Memorandum requesting the Saint


Mary Crusade to Alleviate Brethren Foundation, Inc. to deposit within five
(5) days from notice the amount of P360,000.00 to cover the cost and
other related expenses for the relocation survey of the property covered
by L.R.C. Case No. 0-90-021. The Memorandum was allegedly triggered by
a reminder of the Administrator regarding the survey.
On 22 December 1998, the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration issued Original Certificate of Title No. 12390 in the name of
Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. for a
tract of land measuring 4,304,623 square meters in Quezon City pursuant
to the Order dated 6 October 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 86, under Land Registration Case No. Q-Orig. 98-021. The
title was signed by LRA Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez.
The sketch/special plan dated 20 April 1999 that was prepared for the
Foundation shows that the property, located in the barangays of Bago
Bantay and Cruz na Ligas in Quezon City, has an area of 4,304,523 square
meters.
In an Order dated 28 December 1999 in L.R.C. Case No. Q-90021 mentioning that the LRA registered the property in the name of the
Foundation by virtue of the Order dated 5 October 1998 referring the case
to the LRA for resolution and proper disposition, the RTC presided by
Judge Bay allegedly found the claims of the Foundation to be meritorious
and deserving of the full protection of the law, and, hence, the order
should be disseminated to all parties, authorities and offices concerned for
their information and guidance.
By the other purported documents, the authors of the scheme to get
financing from the DBP for an alleged housing project made it appear that
the LRA, notwithstanding its having issued OCT No. 12390, filed a petition
for review and reconsideration with this Court. On 2 March 2000, the
Second Division of this Court allegedly issued the Resolution, under docket
LRC No. Q-90-021, denying the petition for review and reconsideration
filed by the LRA and approving the decision of the RTC, Branch 86. In the
Decision, now entitled University of the Philippines, et al. v. Saint Mary
Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. under G.R. No. L75242, the Second Division of this Court, allegedly acting on a petition
filed by the University of the Philippines for the review and reconsideration
of a resolution it had promulgated on 2 March 2000, affirmed the decision
of RTC, Branch 86, in favor of the Foundation.

Villanueva, armed with the title and the other documents submitted to the
Court by Silvestre, including the subject Decision and Resolution of this
Court, attempted to get funds from the DBP for the housing project of the
Foundation. The scheme was to offer an overload of documentary support
for the application for funding. Unfortunately for Villanueva and the
Foundation, Silvestre doubted the authenticity of the documents and
submitted these to this Court for verification.
As observed earlier, the alleged Decision and Resolution are so blatantly
falsified on their faces that only parties who desperately want financial
gains by passing these off as genuine could have committed the forgeries,
even to the extent of brazenly attempting to delude the DBP about the
authenticity of the papers. The possible authors may either be persons
behind the Foundation, which Silvestre has found to have been actually
registered with the SEC, and/or insiders or Court personnel in cahoots with
persons behind the Foundation.
In exploring the graft and corruption angle of the matter, the NBI appears
to have zeroed in on Court personnel considering its discontinuance of the
investigation upon the failure of the Clerk of Court to issue the required
certification and the failure of Atty. Andrada of the Complaints and
Investigation Division (CID) of the Office of Administrative Services and
the Clerk of Court to identify the clerk who assisted Silvestre in verifying
the authenticity of the decision.
The matter of identifying the clerk who assisted Silvestre would hardly lead
to the author of the forgeries; neither is it an indispensable link in the
chain of evidence. The clerk may not be faulted for assisting Silvestre in
the verification of the authenticity of the questioned Decision and
Resolution. If the identity of the clerk is needed so that he or she could
attest to the fact that the photocopied documents attached to the rollo and
constituting its first seven (7) pages, were the ones presented by
Silvestre, the importance of such identity has been overshadowed by the
subsequent submission of Silvestre, in compliance with the Resolution of
24 September 2002, of his sworn statement and more photocopied
documents handed to him by Villanueva.
With all due respect, merely asking personnel of the Office of the Second
Division who among them could remember assisting Silvestre would not
attain the desired result. Considering the length of time that had elapsed
since the assistance was extended and, unfortunately, the lack of a
logbook in the Office of the Second Division wherein the names of persons

requesting assistance are recorded, the memory of personnel in the


Second Division Office could hardly be trusted.
Assuming that the identity of the assisting clerk is necessary as a link in
the chain of evidence, positive result could have been obtained in a proper
investigation, with Silvestre being asked to personally identify the clerk
among those presently employed in the office(s) where he sought
verification, unless the personnel involved have retired, transferred,
resigned or left the office. Identification would also be facilitated by
focusing on personnel who were employed at the offices where Silvestre
went on the date he sought assistance in verification. The list of such
personnel could be ferreted from the Office of the Administrative Services.
With all due respect, the certification required by the NBI from the proper
court official is of pivotal importance in the investigation. However, the
issuance of the certification appears to have been stonewalled by a
misunderstood advice. That Atty. Andrada literally relied on the
information furnished by Atty. Ringol of the Office of the Clerk of Court
that her office does not issue negative certifications is unfortunate. He
could have pursued the admission of Atty. Ringol that her office could issue
a certification that a decision or resolution was issued by the Court. The
certification need not state solely a negative fact or that there is no record
of a decision in G.R. No. L-75242 entitled University of the Philippines, et
al. v. Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc.
Using the G.R. No. as the guide, the proper official may issue a
certification on the true title of the case bearing G.R. No. 75242, i.e.,
Manila Resource Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission and Ruben Manahan, its date of promulgation, and
its ponente, i.e., Justice Nocon, aside from certifying that no case in the
Court is docketed as G.R. No. L-75242, with the purported case title. From
this certification, the NBI may deduce that the decision submitted to the
DBP is falsified. As it is, the NBI stopped its investigation apparently
because the non-issuance of the certification it required from the Clerk of
Court manifested disinterest in the matter, thereby effectively
whitewashing what it wanted to find out. Necessarily, the misperceived
uncooperativeness of Court officials stunted the NBI investigation.
In this regard, Atty. Andrada appears to have been instrumental in the
termination of the investigation by the NBI. He submitted a report to Atty.
Wendel Custodio of the NBI showing in details the difficulty he encountered
in securing the NBI-required certification from the Clerk of Court.

Unwittingly, he telegraphed the wrong message of lack of cooperation on


the part of court officials. Atty. Andrada should have reported first to the
Clerk of Court the information Atty. Ringol provided him so that corrective
measures could be made. Considering that the certification was important
in the filing of the criminal case and it could not be secured, the NBI
naturally closed the case.
Diligent cooperation with the NBI could have prevented the premature
termination of the case, albeit it is termed temporary. Atty. Andrada should
have resorted to the proper Court officials who should issue the
certification and provide information on whether the subject Decision or
Resolution was, indeed, issued. These officials are:
(1) Clerk of Court of the Second Division. She may certify from office
records, including indexes for each case, that a decision was issued in any
particular case, and she has access, upon request, to the rollosof cases
assigned to her Division where verification could be made;
(2) Chief of the Judicial Records Office. She has custody of the docket
books which is the source of data encoded in the Case Administration
System (CAS); and
(3) Chief Reporter. The Office of the Reporter has custody of the originals
of all decisions promulgated by the Court. To show that a certification from
that Office is easily obtainable, this Office secured a certification from the
Chief Reporter regarding G.R. No. L-75242. Attached hereto are
photocopies of the reply of the Chief Reporter to our query as Annex A,
with respect to the alleged Decision in G.R. No. L-75242, as well as its
attachments.
The Clerk of Court of the Second Division may issue the Certification by
herself. The Chiefs of the Judicial Records Office and the Office of the
Reporter usually sign certifications for and in behalf of the Clerk of
Court en banc as Deputy Clerks of Court.
This Office also made an initial inquiry on whether there is record in the
Judicial Records Office (JRO) of a case entitled University of the
Philippines, et al. v. Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren
Foundation, Inc. The JRO informed this Office that there was none. Since
the JRO has an index of cases elevated to this Court for review, this Office
inquired if General Land Registration Office Record No. L.R.C. No. Q-90021 entitled Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren

Foundation, Inc. The JRO informed this Office that there was none. Since
the JRO has an index of cases elevated to this Court for review, this Office
inquired if General Land Registration Office Record No. L.R.C. No. Q-90021 entitled Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren
Foundation, Inc. Applicant was ever elevated to this Court; the JRO
informed it that no such case was appealed to this Court.
Pursuing that aspect of this matter, this Office inquired from the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, through Atty. Thelma C. Bahia, OIC of the Court
Management Office of the Office of the Court Administrator, if Hon.
Teodoro A. Bay, presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon city,
Branch 86, issued the Order dated 28 December 1999 in L.R.C. Case No.
Q-90-021. The clerk of court of that court informed this Office, through
Atty. Bahia, that said Order is falsified because the petition was dismissed.
This Office received today a copy of the Order of 3 September 1998 issued
by Judge Bay dismissing the petition on the ground that the land sought to
be registered by the applicant Foundation is already covered by the
Torrens System of Registration (Annex B). The same Order required the
applicant Foundation and its counsel to show cause why no action shall be
taken against them for re-filing a case which has been previously
dismissed by this Court without informing the Court of such previous case
in violation of the Anti-Forum shopping rule and other pertinent laws or
rules).
The issue in this administrative matter is no less than the integrity of the
Court and its processes. This, the Court has expressly recognized in the
Resolution of 24 September 2002. As such, despite the fact that Villanueva
was not able to get financial benefit from the DBP through the bogus
documents she presented, the damage that has been wrought upon
the integrity of the Court and its processes is incalculable. It is erroneous
for the NBI to conclude that no damage has been done to the Court.
Should the matter be left hanging and unresolved, there is no stopping
other unscrupulous persons from passing off falsified decisions and
resolutions of this Court as genuine for personal and financial gratification.
However, the NBI could resume its investigation only if Court officials
extend full cooperation. The Clerk of Court of the Second Division, the
Chief of the JRO, and the Reporter should each issue a Certification on the
case docketed as G.R. No. L-75242. they may state therein its true title,
the date of promulgation of the Decision, and the ponente, as well as
whether a motion for its reconsideration was filed and if one was filed,
when the Court resolved the motion. To satisfy the NBI requirement, they

may be asked to state, after stating those positive data, that there is no
such case as G.R. No. 75242, entitled University of the Philippines, et al. v.
St. Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc., if,
indeed, no such case is on record in this Court. Contrary to the claim of
Atty. Ringol, the NBI may not be expected to rely on a certification by
implication arising from the fact that the Court doubts the authenticity of
the Decision and Resolution, Documentary evidence issued by this Court is
needed for the progress of any criminal case that may be filed against
those who falsified or simulated the Decision and Resolution and used
these.
For the same purpose, with all due respect, the Clerk of Court en
banc should make a statement on the authenticity of the certifications and
communications attributed to her. If, indeed, she did not issue the same,
then a disclaimer should be made in a sworn statement or affidavit. Along
with the certifications that other Court officials shall issue, her affidavit will
go a long way in the prosecution of any criminal case arising from the
falsification of the Decision and Resolution. The Resolution of 2 March 2004
underscores the importance of such certification, and her affidavit, when
the Court directed her to coordinate with the NBI for the certifications
needed in the filing of the criminal case.
Notably, the Resolution of 2 March 2004 approves the recommendation of
the Clerk of Court that the Chief of the Complaints and Investigation
Division of this court shall represent the Court as the Complainant.
With all due respect, the Clerk of Court en banc should be named the
complainant in filing the criminal case or cases against the suspected
authors of the falsification. As the case involves no less than theintegrity
of the Court and its processes, the Court itself is the offended party.
Inasmuch as the Court itself cannot be on record as the complainant to
avoid the absurd situation whereby the Supreme Court would be a
complainant to avoid the absurd situation whereby the Supreme Court
would be a complainant in a criminal case filed with the Regional Trial
Court, the Court should be represented as complainant by no less than its
highest official, the Clerk of Court en banc who, after all, is responsible for
the management of the adjudication function of the Court (as opposed to
administrative supervision of courts performed by the Court
Administrator), including the protection of the integrity of its Decisions and
Resolutions.

Although the Decision was allegedly promulgated by the Second Division,


the Clerk of Court of that Division should not be named the complainant in
representation of the Court. Firstly, the Court itself explicitly expressed in
the Resolution of 24 September 2002 that the integrity of the Court,
without qualifying whether it is the Court en banc or the Second Division,
is involved. Secondly, it is settled that the decision of a Division is a
decision of the Court itself. Thirdly, from the list of Members of the Court in
the falsified decision, eight (8) Justices have been named, which is more
than the five members of the Second Division. All these point to the need
to name the Clerk of Court en banc as complainant, in representation pf
the Court, in whatever criminal case may be filed.

officers of St. Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation,


Inc., as the persons who made the falsification or would benefit from the
decision. However, sufficient evidence is available to warrant a prima
facie finding of the culpability of those persons for the crime of falsification
of public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
The sworn statement of Silvestre directly and undoubtedly links Villanueva
to the falsified documents, which she claimed to be authentic. She may be
held liable for using false certificates under Article 175 of the Revised Penal
Code. Documents mentioning Borjal and Arellano are sufficient leads in the
investigation to pin down persons actually responsible for the simulated
and falsified documents.

As the complainant, the Clerk of Court need not personally attend the
investigation to be conducted by the NBI. Considering her workload, the
Clerk of Court may delegate the task of personally appearing thereat to
the Chief of the Complaints and Investigation Division (CID) [Atty. Edwin
Andrada, Attorney IV, is the chief of the CID of the Office of Administrative
Services under its plantilla. Per the Annual Report of 2003, the CID
handles administrative and disciplinary cases against Supreme Court
personnel (p. 248)] with the approval of the Court. Considering that in her
Memorandum to the Chief Justice dated 24 February 2004, the Clerk of
Court has expressed preference for that official, the same official should be
authorized as the representative of the complainant Clerk of Court during
the investigation, with reportorial responsibility to her. Once the case is
filed in court and it will have to be handled by the proper prosecutor, the
services of the Chief of the CID-OAS shall effectively be terminated. Of
course, the Clerk of Court may be required to testify during the trial but it
is an imperative official function that, unavoidably, must be performed.

Secondly, the NBI appears to be of the idea that only when the user of the
falsified document benefits therefrom may a case for falsification of public
document be pursued. Falsification of a public document is consummated
the moment the false document is executed. It is immaterial that the
falsifier did not achieve his objectives, for which reason, generally,
falsification has no attempted or frustrated stage. The simulation of a
public or official document, done in a manner as to easily lead to error as
to its authenticity, constitutes the crime of falsification. In the falsification
of public or official document, whether by public officials or by private
persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to
private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed. Since the Court has evidence that the documents are falsified,
locating Villanueva, Borjal and Arellano, who can shed light on the author
of the falsification, should be the NBIs first concern. It should be borne in
mind that no less than a Decision and a Resolution of this Court has been
simulated. For that reason alone, damage has been done to the integrity of
the Court and its processes, as there would necessarily result violation of
the public faith thereon.[8]

The Court must authorize the Clerk of Court to request the NBI to reopen
the investigation, with discretion as to the proper offense or offenses to be
charged before the Office of the Prosecutor. The NBI may pursue the graft
angle if, after investigation, it deems it covered by Rep. Act No. 3019. In
whatever course of action the NBI would take, the Court, through its
officials, should cooperate completely. The assistance of Silvestre may also
have to be solicited. After all, it was he who opened the door to the
investigation.
Notably, in closing the case temporarily, the NBI unfortunately manifested
its shallow treatment of the case. For one, the reason for temporary
closure of the case is actually for its total closure, i.e., no evidence
showing Subjects Felicisimo Arellano, Jaime Borjal and Teodora Villanueva,

Thirdly, that the DBP did not manifest its intention to file a case against
Teodora Villanueva is no valid reason to close the case. To reiterate,
damage has been done to the Court and its intention to pursue the case is
manifest in the Resolution of 2 March 2004 directing the Clerk of Court to
coordinate with the NBI with respect to the issuance of necessary
certifications. Indeed, not only the Court, but the State itself has been
aggrieved by the criminal act of simulating the Decision and Resolution of
this Court.

Considering that there are indications that the Order dated 28 December
1999 of Judge Bay is, likewise, falsified, the possibility that OCT No. 12390
is, likewise, simulated is not remote. Should the NBI pursue this angle,
chances are, it would discover underground operatives that subvert public
faith in public documents. There are simply several aspects to the matter
at hand that the NBI appears to have glossed over.
In the meantime, to reinforce its manifest intent to protect its integrity,
the Court must require full cooperation from its officials and employees.
Certifications stating that no decision and resolution were issued in G.R.
No. L-75242 entitled University of the Philippines, et al. v. St. Marys
Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc., as there was no
case by that docket number and title has been filed before the Court and
that the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 86, did not issue the Order of 28
December 1999 and, hence, there could be no appeal from its order, as
well as an affidavit disclaiming authorship of certifications attributed to the
Clerk of Court, to be issued by the proper officials may be the bases for a
charge against Villanueva, Borjal and Arellano for falsification of public
documents under Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code, as well as under Article 175 for the use of fictitious certificates. Or,
the NBI may prosecute them and others under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3109) should the investigation result in a
finding that the same private persons induced or caused any official of the
Court to commit any of the offenses defined by the same law.
The use of falsified documents for the purpose of obtaining financing from
a bank is just one of several acts perpetrated by unscrupulous persons
who use fake titles to property belonging to the University of the
Philippines. Unfortunately for them, the title of the University of the
Philippines over the vast tract of land in Diliman, Quezon City, has been
settled in a number of cases, the last of which is G.R. No. 156380, Caero
v. University of the Philippines, promulgated on 8 September 2004. In that
case, the Court strongly admonished courts and unscrupulous lawyers to
stop entertaining spurious cases seeking further to assail the title of the
University of the Philippines.
The admonition may also be addressed to private persons who falsify
documents in a vain attempt to grab a piece of the U.P. property or use
simulated title to it for financial gain. But if the Court, notwithstanding that
it has been victimized by persons who falsified a Decision and a Resolution
regarding the same property and used it in an attempt to obtain financial

benefits, remains indifferent to incursions that undermine its integrity,


then the Court may as well disown its admonition in Caero.
In fine, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) recommended that the
investigation of the instant administrative matter be re-opened and that
the persons responsible for the patently spurious decision be prosecuted
therefor.
The findings and recommendations of the OCAT are well taken. It is
wont to reiterate that what is involved in the present case is no less than
the integrity of the Court and its processes. Moreover, any attempt to
undermine the Judiciary by subverting the administration of justice, and,
as in this case, to make a mockery of Court decisions and Philippine
jurisprudence itself, must not go unnoticed. Indeed, times without number,
the Court has declared that it will never countenance any act which would
diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. The
present case is no exception.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Court thus resolves to ADOPT
the recommendation of the Office of the Chief Attorney, and hereby
DIRECTS:
(1) The Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration to ISSUE a certification on the authenticity or
falsity of OCT No. 12390 in the name of Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate
Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. for a tract of land in Quezon City with
an area of 4,304,623 square meters, pursuant to the Order dated October
6, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86, within five
(5) days from notice;
(2) The Clerk of Court of the Second Division and the Chief of the
Judicial Records Office to individually ISSUE certifications on (a) whether
or not there is a case before this Court entitled University of the
Philippines, et al. v. St. Marys Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren
Foundation, Inc. with G.R. No. L-75242 and its status, and (b) if there is
another case bearing the same G.R. No. and its status, within five (5) days
from notice;
(3) The Chief Reporter to ISSUE a certification on whether she has in
her custody the original copy of the Decision in G.R. No. L-75242
entitled University of the Philippines, et al. v. St. Marys Crusade to

Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc., likewise, within five (5)


days from notice;

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/resolutions/2014/08/13-11-09-SC.pdf

(4) Hon. Teodoro A. Bay of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 86, to ISSUE a certification as to the authenticity of the Order
dated October 28, 1999 in L.R.C. No. Q-90-021 entitled Saint Mary
Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc., Applicant and
the status of a case of the same title, if one has been filed before his
court, within five (5) days from notice;

A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA

(5) the Clerk of Court en banc to: (a) EXECUTE an affidavit on


whether she issued the Letter dated March 2, 2000 addressed to the
publisher of the Supreme Court Records Annotated, the Notice of
Resolution dated March 3, 2000 and the Certification dated August 14,
2000, within five (5) days from notice; (b) REQUEST, as soon as the Clerk
of Court shall have executed the affidavit and have in her possession the
certifications required above, the Director of the NBI to reopen and
resume the investigation relative to the falsified Decision and Resolution
of the Supreme Court as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 86, and to report to the Court the result of its
investigation, within the non-extendible period of sixty (60) days from
receipt of such request; and (c) FURNISH the NBI Director with the
original copies of the certifications and affidavit required above.
The Court further resolves to AMEND the Resolution of March 2,
2004, naming the Clerk of Court en banc as the complainant against
Teodora Villanueva, Jaime Borjal, Felicisimo Arellano and others in
whatever criminal case the NBI may deem proper to file against them
before the Office of the Prosecutor. The Chief of the Criminal Investigation
Division
of
the
Office
of
the
Administrative
Services
is,
likewise, AUTHORIZED to be the representative of the Clerk of Court en
banc in such proceedings, having the responsibility of coordinating with
the NBI and reporting regularly to the Clerk of Court the developments in
the investigation.
All officials and employees of this Court are ENJOINED to cooperate
in any investigation conducted by the NBI relative to the instant
administrative matter.
SO ORDERED.
Re: interview with Atty. Lorna Kapunan

March 27, 2001

IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF APPEALS


ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE
ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN:
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G.
DEMETRIA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor,
probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must
always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of
impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society
must be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence
and discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of preserving the
independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from influencing
in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another
court or administrative agency."1 The slightest form of interference cannot
be countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in
the regular course of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or
any of the parties therein, public confidence in the judicial system is
diminished, if not totally eroded.
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper accounts which
appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues of The Manila Standard, The Manila
Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national
dailies collectively reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese
drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to
play in a Manila casino.2
That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., issued
a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him to comment on the
derogatory allegations in the news items.3 On 24 July 2000, Justice
Demetria submitted his Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor
(CSP) Jovencito R. Zuo, who disclosed to the media the name of Justice

Demetria, and State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C. Formaran III, a member of


the Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug queen, filed their
respective Comments on the Compliance of Justice Demetria.4
On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation and
designated Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino as Investigator and
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo as Prosecutor. An investigation
then commenced on 22 August 2000 and continued until 16 November
2000.
The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP Zuo, SP
Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP Formaran, III, and Jose H.
Afalla, an employee from the Office of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab,
Jr. The defense on the other hand presented ten (10) witnesses:
respondent Justice Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Severino
Gaa, Jr., Senior State Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo Daosos, Go Teng Kok, Yu
Yuk Lai, MTC Judge Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas,
lawyer of Go Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng Kok, and
Luisito Artiaga, official of the Philippine Amateur Track and Field
Association (PATAFA).
The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the prosecution are
quite clear. In an Information dated 9 December 1998, SP Formaran III
charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth
Monceda y Sy alias William Sy, before the RTC of Manila, Br. 18, 5 with
violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as amended, for "conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent and
without authority of law . . . (to) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated
drug."6 Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth
Monceda were held at the detention cell of the PNP Narcotics Group in
Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 25 June 1999, accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a
Petition for Bail on the ground that the evidence of her guilt was not
strong.
On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the accused,
especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly playing in the casinos of
Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Transfer the Detention of the Accused to the
City Jail.7 On the same day, Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the

motion and ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2) accused to the
Manila City Jail.8
On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the evidence
standing alone and unrebutted, is strong and sufficient to warrant
conviction of the two accused for the crime charged" and denied the
petition for bail of accused Yu Yuk Lai for lack of merit. 9 Consequently, both
accused filed a Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial court's
actuation "do not inspire the belief that its decision would be just and
impartial."10 On 28 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., believing that the joint
motion was utterly without merit but considering the gravity of the offense
and for the peace of mind of the accused, inhibited himself.11
The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel V. Colet.
Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the Confinement of the
Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge Colet could resolve the motion, the
case was handled by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.
On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion and
allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for a period not
exceeding seven (7) days,12 contrary to the recommendation of Dr. Jose
Estrada Rosal, Chief of the Health Services of the Manila City Jail, that Yu
Yuk Lai be confined at the Philippine General Hospital. 13
On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent Motion for
Extension of Medical Confinement "for a period of one (1) month, or until
such time that she is fit to be discharged from the said hospital." 14 On 7
July 2000 Judge Muro also granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave of Court
to File Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Demurrer to
Evidence.15 Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila City Hall that Judge Muro
was partial towards accused Yu Yuk Lai.
The rumors did not end there. On 6 July 2000 unidentified employees of
the RTC Manila calling themselves "CONCERNED COURT EMPLOYEES"
wrote the Secretary of Justice, copy furnished the Chief State Prosecutor,
the Ombudsman, and Judge Muro. The letter alleged that Judge Muro
ordered the hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she (was) not sick and
there (was) already a rumor circulating around the City Hall, that the
notorious Judge had given the go signal to the counsel of the accused to
file the Motion to Quash, which (would) be granted for a consideration of
millions of pesos and the contact person (was) allegedly the daughter of
the Judge, who is an employee in the said branch."16

Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for


Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from further handling
this case and/or from resolving the demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused Yu Yuk Lai as well as any other pending incidents therein." 17
On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while she was
supposed to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai
was arrested inside the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn
Pavilion, Manila, while playing baccarat. She was unescorted at the time of
her arrest.

asking SP Formaran III to go slow in prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai. 19 SP


Formaran III at first politely declined the request. But later, "just to put an
end to (the) conversation," 20 he told them that he would bring the matter
to CSP Zuo. "Iyon pala," Justice Demetria replied. The Justice then stood
up, bade good bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok followed closely
behind.21
Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuo and informed the latter
of what had transpired. CSP Zuo replied, "No way!" SP Formaran III also
told ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who gave the same reply.22

On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for


Inhibition of Judge Muro was heard and submitted for resolution. Later, at
around 11:30 o'clock, when SP Formaran III arrived in his office from the
hearing, he was informed by his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the staff of
Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria had called earlier and said that
the Justice wanted to speak with him. The caller requested for a return
call. As requested, SP Formaran III immediately returned the call of Justice
Demetria but the Justice had already gone out for lunch.

At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuo received a call from
Justice Demetria who requested him to instruct SP Formaran III to
withdraw the motion for inhibition of Judge Muro so that the Judge could
already issue an order. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran
na i-withdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa
na ng Order si Judge Muro," Justice Demetria was quoted as
saying.23 Politely, CSP Zuo said that he would see what he could do.
"Tingnan ko po kung ano ang magagawa ko."24

Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice Demetria,
PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng
Kok and a close friend of Justice Demetria, went to the office of SP
Formaran III in the DOJ which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert
Fonacier. Apparently, Justice Demetria was not familiar with SP Formaran
III as he greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka, Prosecutor Formaran?"18

On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a "Supreme


Court Justice . . . and an outspoken sports person and leader" 25 had been
exerting "undue pressure" on the DOJ to go slow in prosecuting rearrested drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. That same afternoon, the names of
Justice Demetria and Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media to clear
the name of the Supreme Court justices who might have been affected by
the erroneous news report. The following day, 21 July 2000, several
newspapers named Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."

Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately pleaded with SP
Formaran III to withdraw his motion to inhibit Judge Muro as this would
purportedly delay the resolution of the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed
his apprehension that if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge might
convict his friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then already receiving bad
publicity.
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP Formaran III
informed the Justice that a motion for inhibition has been submitted for
resolution, one basis of which was the unsigned letter of the concerned
court employees. Justice Demetria opined that it was a bit dangerous to
anchor the inhibition of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The
Justice then advised Go Teng Kok who was becoming persistent to "keep
his cool" and asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help Go
Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to 18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had already been

Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a copy of an Order dated 19 July
2000 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from further hearing the case of Yu
Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda.26
Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied having
interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed visited the DOJ
on 18 July 2000, he went there to "visit old friends" and his meeting Go
Teng Kok whom he did not know until that time was purely accidental.
Expectedly, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok corroborated the claim of
respondent Justice.
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP Formaran III "to
do something to help Go Teng Kok about the case" without ever specifying

the kind of "help" that he requested. He averred that it was purely on the
basis of erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP Formaran
III that he impliedly asked him to withdraw the motion "because that is
what Mr. Go Teng Kok was appealing and requesting."27 Respondent
claimed that the "help" he was requesting could well be "within legal
bounds or line of duty."
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during the
discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III, such was not a form
of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the
discussion between the prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated. While
he asked about the status of the case this, he said, demonstrated his lack
of knowledge about the case and bolstered his claim that he could not
have possibly interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his identification by
CSP Zuo as the Justice exerting undue pressure on the DOJ were all
hearsay. Respondent submitted that CSP Zuo based his identification
from a newspaper account, from the statement of his secretary that it was
he (Justice Demetria) who was on the other end of the telephone and from
SP Formaran III when the latter consulted the Chief State Prosecutor
about the visit of the Justice and Go Teng Kok impliedly asking him to
withdraw the motion.
In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was actually he,
not Justice Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuo to inquire about the
latter's decision regarding the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit since SP
Formaran III had earlier told Go Teng Kok that the matter would be taken
up with his superiors.
In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is inconceivable for
him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just met for the first time to do
something for Go Teng Kok whom he claims he just likewise met for the
first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself
corroborated. It would be unthinkable for him to intercede in behalf of
someone he did not know. Indeed respondent Justice asserted that his
meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July 2000 at the DOJ was purely coincidence,
if not accidental.
So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of suspected
drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?

Investigating Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino believes so. In her Report


dated 5 January 2001, she found respondent Justice Demetria "guilty of
violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct" and recommended
that "appropriate disciplinary action be taken against him by this
Honorable Court."28
Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and damning.
Thus, even the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, after a
hearing, found that "there was a conspiracy to commit the following
offenses on the part of CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and
PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice
punishable under PD No. 1829 and Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act."29
While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the criminal
case, his denial cannot stand against the positive assertions of CSP Zuo
and SP Formaran III,30 which are consistent with natural human
experience. To accept the testimony of the defense witnesses that it was
Atty. Paas who telephoned CSP Zuo, and not Justice Demetria, and that
the "help" the respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran III was
something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than the withdrawal
of the motion is to strain too far one's imagination.
The testimony of CSP Zuo is plainly unambiguous and indubitably
consistent with the other facts and circumstances surrounding the case
CSP Zuo: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi
mo nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong
kanyang Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si
Judge Muro."31
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP Formaran III
said that he would consult his superiors regarding the proposal to
withdraw the motion. The timely telephone call to CSP Zuo was thus a
logical follow-up. And no one could have made the call except respondent
Justice since it is not uncommon for anyone to believe that CSP Zuo
would recognize the voice of respondent Justice who was CSP Zuo's
former superior in the DOJ. Thus, the confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo
nga kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion
to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro" could not have
come from anyone else but from respondent Justice who had moral

ascendancy over CSP Zuo, he being a Justice of the Court of Appeals and
a former Undersecretary and at one time Acting Secretary of the DOJ.

"[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend, we decided to drop by his


office . . . (and) I stayed a while."37

Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent Justice
claims he did not know and met only that time, could not have meant any
other assistance but the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.
True, Justice Demetria never categorically asked SP Formaran III to
withdraw his Motion. But when respondent Justice Demetria asked the
state prosecutor at that particular time "to do something . . . to help Mr.
Go Teng Kok," the latter was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion,
and nothing else. That was the only form of "help" that Go Teng Kok
wanted. The subtle pressure exerted simply pointed to one particular act.
Thus, subsequently respondent Justice called CSP Zuo to ask for just that
the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.

As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice was there


"to join forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the withdrawal of
Formaran's Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro, which was the real
purpose of their visit to SP Formaran and to the DOJ. The uncanny
coincidence in the timing of Justice Demetria's visit to SP Formaran's
office, and that of Go Teng Kok, could not have been 'accidental' but prearranged."38 And, "visiting old friends" only came as an afterthought. The
circumstances simply show that Justice Demetria and Atty. Paas, together
with Go Teng Kok, did not go to the DOJ to see Sec. Tuquero, but to visit,
if not "pressure," CSP Zuo and SP Formaran III.

Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty. Paas, went to
the DOJ, first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero and seek assistance in the
appointment of Atty. Paas to the Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit old
friends,"32 and that the meeting with Go Teng Kok was purely accidental.
But respondent Justice never mentioned in his earlier Compliance to the
Memorandum of the Chief Justice that his primary purpose in going to the
DOJ was to see Sec. Tuquero, and since Sec. Tuquero was not in, he
instead decided to see some officials/prosecutors whom he had not visited
for a long time.
We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very own witnesses
belied his alibi. ACSP Gaa, Jr. testified and confirmed that Justice
Demetria only said "hi."33 SSP Daosos, denied seeing him and claimed
that it was only Atty. Paas who peeped into his room.34 Suspiciously, it was
really in the office of SP Formaran III, whom respondent Justice Demetria
did not know, where Justice Demetria, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok decided
to "stay a while."35

Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him to help Yu


Yuk Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not personally know, and
more unthinkable that he would be asking help from SP Formaran III
whom he had just met for the first time.
The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that respondent is a
very close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok. And, it is not
necessary that respondent Justice Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng
Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of the
accused. It is enough that he is a close friend of the lawyer of Go Teng
Kok, who has been helping the accused, and that he wields influence as a
former DOJ Undersecretary and later, Acting Secretary, and now, a Justice
of the Court of Appeals.
In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses convincing
and trustworthy, as compared to those of the defense which do not only
defy natural human experience but are also riddled with major
inconsistencies which create well-founded and overriding doubts.

Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, the Investigating


Justice, Justice Demetria and company could not have been there to
exchange pleasantries with SPs Formaran III and Fonacier since they were
not acquainted with each other. Prior to this incident, Justice Demetria did
not personally know either SP Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact
corroborated by respondent himself.36

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged


with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy of
responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety and
must be above suspicion.39 His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety,
not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties, but also his
behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual.

All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's


earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that

Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed failed to live


up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not

only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable
damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the
national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and
interfering with her prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the
entire Judiciary.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness
tha a seat in the Judiciary.40 High ethical principles and a sense of
propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in
the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be
preserved.41 There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot
meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.42
WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice and hold
Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture
of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to
any government office, agency or instrumentality, including any
government owned or controlled corporation or institution.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.
and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.
Puno, J ., abroad on official leave.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ELVI JOHN S. Present:


ASUNCION, COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondent. PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 20, 2007
x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

EN BANC
The Cases
RE: COMPLAINT AGAINST JUSTICE
ELVI JOHN S. ASUNCION OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA
X----------------------------X
ATTY. ROBERTO C. PADILLA,
Complainant,
-versus- A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J

Before Us are two (2) administrative cases against Justice Elvi John S.
Asuncion of the Court of Appeals [CA].

The first, docketed as A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA, stems from an


unsigned letter dated February 17, 2006, addressed to Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, complaining that Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion has

been sitting on motions for reconsideration for six months to more than a

December 8, all in 2006, and on January 18, 2007. On each of these

year unless the parties come across.

dates, the respondent was present, and in connection with A. M. No. 06-

[1]

On July 18, 2006, the Court

resolved to refer the complaint to retired Supreme Court Justice Bernardo

44-CA-J, respondent Justice Asuncion was represented by counsel.

P. Pardo for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from


receipt thereof.
Justice Asuncions Antecedents
Subsequently, on August 29, 2006, the Court also referred to
Investigator-designate Justice Pardo an unsigned letter dated August 17,

From the record, it appears that respondent Justice Elvi John S.

2006, allegedly from an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, fully

Asuncion was appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on May

supporting the investigation of Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, and citing one

24, 1999, and assumed office on May 25, 1999. On July 5, 2004, he was

particular case pending in his division that will show how he operates.

assigned as Chairman, 18th Division of the CA, stationed in Cebu City. In

The case mentioned in the letter is Bank of Commerce v. Hon. Evelyn

an order dated July 7, 2004, CA Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia directed

Corpus-Cabochan, et al., CA-G.R. No. 91258, allegedly involving an

that all Manila cases left by Justice Asuncion shall automatically be

irregularly issued temporary restraining order [TRO].

assigned to Justice [Monina Arevalo] Zenarosa. [4] On November 3, 2004,

[2]

The second administrative case, A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, is based on


a verified complaint dated August 22, 2006 [3] filed by Atty. Roberto C.
Padilla with the Office of the Court Administrator, charging Justice Elvi John

Justice Asuncion was re-assigned to Manila, as Chairman, 17th Division,


CA. From August 4, 2006 to date, he has been Chairman, 11th Division,
CA, Manila.

S. Asuncion with culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the

The Investigation

administration of justice and gross ignorance of the law in connection with


CA-G.R. SP No. 60573, entitled Philippine National Bank v. NLRC and
Erlinda Archinas. The Court likewise referred this complaint to Justice
Bernardo P. Pardo for investigation, report and recommendation.

A.M. No. 06-6-8-CA


The unsigned letter complaint, that gave rise to the instant case,

On March 1, 2007, Justice Pardo submitted to this Court his Report


and Recommendation [Report] dated February 28, 2007.

Justice Pardo reports that he conducted an investigation of the


cases on August 10 and 30, September 14 and 27, October 4, 16 and 26,

reads:
February 17, 2006
Hon. Artemio V. Panganiban
Chief Justice, Supreme Court
Padre Faura, Manila
Sir:

Please direct an immediate judicial audit on Court of


Appeals Justice Elvi Asuncion.

some confusion in the status of cases assigned to him; (3) The physical

This magistrate has been sitting on motions for


reconsideration for six months to more than a year unless
the parties come across.

my office; and (4) The various administrative assignments, especially in

transfer of his office, aggravated by a lapse in the monitoring system of

helping organize special events, given to him by the CA Presiding Justice,


which demanded time and attention.

This CA Justice is an unmitigated disgrace to the


judiciary. How he ever reached his lofty position is truly
disconcerting. He is a thoroughly CORRUPT person who
has no shame using his office to extort money from
litigants. He is equally, if not more, deprave than Demetrio
Demetria
who
was
dismissed
by
the
Supreme
Court. Asunciondeserves
not
only
dismissal
but
DISBARMENT as well. Because the law profession should
also be purged of CROOKS like him.

On September 11, 2006, respondent filed his Comment [6] on the


unsigned letter dated August 17, 2006 of an alleged CA Associate
Justice. He denied that there was any irregularity in the issuance of the
temporary restraining order and of the subsequent writ of preliminary
injunction, stating that the same was done in the sound exercise of the

I hope you can terminate his service in the judiciary ASAP


to save the institution. Thank you.

Courts discretion. The respondent stressed that the cited case, CA-G.R. SP
No. 91258, was still pending in his division and not germane to the on-

Very truly yours,

going investigation against him for supposed deliberate inaction on


pending motions for reconsideration.

AN AGGRIEVED PARTY

To the foregoing complaint, respondent Justice Asuncion filed his

In this connection, the Investigating Justice reports that after

Comment dated August 30, 2006[5] in which he strongly denied the charge

making inquiries, he found that the Court of Appeals had not acted on the

of deliberate inaction on pending motions for reconsideration in cases

approval of the injunction bond in this case, thus, no writ of preliminary

assigned to him unless the parties came across. He adverted to the

injunction has been issued to date.[7]

unsigned letter as the work of the same group that previously instigated
false accusations which also resulted in my being investigated by the

Meanwhile, in the August 31, 2006 investigation, Atty. Tessie L.

Supreme Court through the Hon. Justice Carolina C. Grino-Aquino. He

Gatmaitan, Clerk of Court, CA en banc, submitted to the designated

admitted, however, to some delays in the resolution of some motions for

Investigator the list of cases raffled to respondent since his assumption of

reconsideration, and cited the following justifiable reasons: (1) The heavy

office in 1999, as follows:

caseload initially assigned to CA justices, coupled with the newly assigned


cases raffled daily and the re-raffled cases originally handled by promoted
or retired justices; (2) The reorganization of the CA and his assignment as
Chairman

of

the

18 th Division

based

in

Cebu

City, which

created

a) Master List of Criminal Cases Raffled to J.


Asuncion from 11 June 1999 to 25 May 2006, consisting of
112 cases;

b) Master List of Heinous Crimes Raffled to J.


Asuncion from 20 Nov. 2004 to 22 June 2006, consisting of
33 cases;
c) Master List of Civil Cases Raffled to J. Asuncion
from 14 June 1999 to 16 August 2006, consisting of 625
cases; and
d) Master List of Special Cases Raffled to J.
Asuncion from 14 June 1999 to 31 July 2006, consisting of
651 cases.
The Investigating Justice also required the respondent to submit a
report on the status of the cases contained in the handwritten list given to
the respondent on September 14, 2006. In his written compliance,[8] the
respondent reiterated his plea that justifiable reasons attended the delay
in the resolution of some cases.

Subsequently, on October 4, 2006, the respondent submitted a


report on the status of the cases in a new list given to him after
the September 27, 2006investigation[9]

This, and earlier reports on the status of cases assigned to


respondent Justice Asuncion, would be the basis of the findings of the
Investigating Justice.

A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J


As mentioned above, this second case is based on a verified complaint
filed by Atty. Roberto C. Padilla, charging Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with
culpable dereliction of duty, malicious delay in the administration of justice
and gross ignorance of the law, in connection with CA-G.R. SP No. 60573,
entitled Philippine National Bank vs. NLRC and Erlinda Archinas.

The facts, as culled from the Investigating Justices Report [10], are
as follows:
On June 27, 2000, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) decided in her favor the claim of Ms. Erlinda
Archinas for reinstatement and payment of back wages
against the Philippine National Bank (PNB), affirming in
toto the ruling of Labor Arbiter Celestino Daing ordering
her reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
payment of back wages.
On August 25, 2000, PNB filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision of the NLRC (CA-G.R. SP No. 60573).
Meantime, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment making
final and executory the decision of the labor arbiter as
of July 17, 2000, pursuant to Sec. 2[c], Rule VIII of the
NLRC Rules. Ms. Archinas filed a motion for a writ of
execution
for
the
uncontested
amount
of
P1,096,233.97. PNB opposed the motion. In view of the
pending petition with the CA, the labor arbiter deferred
action on the motion for execution.
On May 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals, through
respondent Justice Asuncion, dismissed the petition of PNB
and affirmed in toto the decision of NLRC in favor of Ms.
Archinas.
On June 13, 2001, PNB filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for reconsideration of the decision, to which Ms.
Archinas filed, on June 25, 2001, an opposition. On June
25, 2001, PNBs motion for reconsideration was deemed
submitted for resolution.
In the interim, on June 18, 2001, the labor arbiter granted
Ms. Archinas motion for execution of the uncontested
amount of P1,096,233.97, for which the Sheriff of the
NLRC levied upon personal property of the PNB and
scheduled an auction sale on July 25, 2001. Upon motion
of PNB, on July 24, 2001, respondent Asuncion issued the
questioned resolution, which granted a temporary
restraining order to stop the auction sale by directing the
labor arbiter to temporarily enjoin implementation of the
writ of execution. It likewise ordered the parties to
maintain the status quo pending resolution of PNBs motion
for reconsideration.

On October 30, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion issued


another resolution which reiterated the July 24, 2001
resolution ordering the parties to maintain the status
quo in this case pending resolution of PNBs motion for
reconsideration.
On November 5, 2001, Ms. Archinas filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the October 30,
2001 resolution.
Despite Ms. Archinas filing with the Court of Appeals of
numerous motions for early resolution of the motion for
reconsideration dated November 5, 2001, respondent
Justice Asuncion failed to act and resolve the motion.
Finally, on August 7, 2006, respondent Justice issued a
resolution denying PNBs motion for reconsideration
dated June 13, 2001. It, however, failed to directly address
and resolve Archinas November 5, 2001 motion for
reconsideration. At any rate, it is noted that the denial of
PNBs motion would render moot Mrs. Archinas motion for
reconsideration.

In

the

first

administrative

case,

A.M.

No.

06-6-8-CA,

Investigating Justice submits the following findings:


After meticulous analysis of the record and the
evidence submitted, the investigation would show that, as
related in the unsigned letter of February 17, 2006, there
were indeed several cases assigned to respondent Justice
Asuncion with motions for reconsideration still remaining
unresolved way beyond the ninety day period prescribed in
Rule 52, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, there
were also numerous motions for reconsideration which
respondent Justice resolved beyond the reglementary
period.
The master lists of cases submitted by the Clerk of
Court, CA, en banc, disclose that, as of September 30,
2006, there were seventy one motions for reconsideration
still pending resolution; further, there were one hundred
seventy nine motions for reconsideration which were
resolved beyond the ninety-day period[11]
xxxxxxxxx

Respondent Justice Asuncion filed his Comment dated November


15, 2006 on the Padilla complaint, raising the following arguments: [1]
That the July 24, 2001 and October 30, 2001 resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No.
60573 were collegial acts of the First Division, CA, duly concurred in by the
two other CA justices of the division; [2] That the July 24, 2001 resolution
did not grant PNBs motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order,
and the October 30, 2001 resolution is not tantamount to a preliminary
injunction issued ex parte; and [3] The delay in resolving the motion for
reconsideration

was

not

deliberate

or

maliciously

motivated. The

respondent restated therein the reasons he proffered in his Comment in


A.M. No. 06-8-08-CA.

What is more, there are several cases assigned to


respondent Justice Asuncion which are still undecided, and
those that were decided beyond the one (1) year period
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution.
xxxxxxxxx
As of September 30, 2006, the following eightytwo cases remain undecided[12]:
xxxxxxxxx
Further, there were four hundred nine cases
which had been decided beyond the twelve month period
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII, Section
15[1]), to wit[13]:
xxxxxxxxx

The Findings of the Investigating Justice

In his comments dated August 30, 2006, and


November 15, 2006, respondent Justice Asuncion admitted
delay in the resolution of some motions for reconsideration
of cases assigned to him albeit with obvious pride in his
massive record of disposition of cases x x x In fact,
respondent Justice Asuncion listed only nine cases that

the

were still unresolved and pending as of his reassignment to


the CA-Cebu Station.
However, the record would show that there were
motions for reconsideration filed as far back as 2000 that
were still pending resolution, as of the (sic) July 18, 2006,
when the Supreme Court took cognizance of the
complaint. One was resolved on August 7, 2006, the PNB
vs. NLRC and Ms. Erlinda Archinas docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 60573, which is the subject of the verified complaint of
Atty. Roberto C. Padilla (A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J). Such
inaction in resolving motions for reconsideration for years
in contrast to the ninety day prescribed period in the Rules
of Court constitutes gross inefficiency and serious
dereliction of duty that undermines the peoples faith in
the judiciary. x x x
There are also cases that were raffled to
respondent Justice Asuncion before July 7, 2004, that
remained undecided. More so, there were several cases
that were ordered transferred to Justice Monina ArevaloZenarosa but remained with, and unexplainedly decided by
respondent
Justice
Asuncion,
albeit
beyond
the
reglementary
period. How
such
cases
supposedly
transferred to Justice Zenarosa remained or returned to
Justice Asuncion is not explained, obviously in
contravention of Office Order No. 212-04-CG of the
Presiding Justice, CA (Annex E). Indeed, respondent
Justice Asuncion should have acted in such a manner as to
avoid suspicion in order to preserve faith in the
administration of justice[14]
xxxxxxxxx
As excuses or justification, respondent Justice
stated that the delay in resolving cases is partly due to the
heavy initial caseloads of CA justices, the continuous
raffling of new cases and the re-raffling of old cases
handled by promoted and retired CA justices. We find this
position unacceptable. It is necessary for newly-appointed
justices to be assigned initial caseloads. No one is
exempted. Further, in the raffling and re-raffling of
subsequent cases, these are more or less equally
distributed to all justices. Hence, not only respondent
Justice, but all CA Justices are swamped with cases. This,
however, is not a reason to violate the clear mandate in
the Constitution and the Rules of Court to decide cases
promptly and resolve motions for reconsideration within
their reglementary period. x x x

Again, respondent Justice attributes his admitted


delay in resolving pending motions for reconsideration to
various administrative functions assigned to him by the
Court or Presiding Justice that took much of his time and
attention. x x x
We are not impressed or swayed that these
administrative functions greatly burdened respondent
Justice to the extent that he failed to discharge the basic
duty of a justice with diligence and efficiency. It is evident
that such additional tasks are seasonal in nature, hence,
need not consume too much of his time to the detriment of
pending cases. x x x
Consequently, respondent Justice Asuncion must
be reminded that decision-making is the primordial duty of
a member of the bench. All other tasks must give way
thereto. What is alarming is that respondent Justice
seemed
to
have reveled in
his extra-curricular
activities of spearheading various celebrations and events
that are not judicial functions. These cannot take
precedence over decision-making.[15]

In the second case, A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J, the findings of the


Investigating Justice are, as follows:
Complainant Padilla contends that respondent
Justice Asuncion committed gross ignorance of the law in
issuing the October 30, 2001 resolution which extended
indefinitely the duration of the TRO issued on July 24,
2001, by ordering the parties to maintain the status
quo, pending resolution of the PNBs motion for
reconsideration, in violation of Rule 58, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court. Atty. Padilla further contends that
respondents failure to speedily resolve PNBs motion for
reconsideration dated June 13, 2001, Archinas motion for
reconsideration dated November 5, 2001 and her
numerous motions for early resolution thereof constitute
culpable dereliction of duty. Atty. Padilla stressed that
respondent Justices reliance on Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[16] decided in 1988,
to justify the issuance of the two resolutions constitutes
gross ignorance of the law, considering that the ruling

thereon was set aside by the Supreme Court in 1993 in the


case of Santiago v. Vasquez[17].Further, he averred that the
Eternal Gardens ruling was superseded by Rule 65, Section
7 of the Rules of Court (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
which states that the petition [in the Supreme Court or in
the Court of Appeals] shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the
public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
Respondent Justice Asuncion stressed that the July
24, 2001 and October 30, 2001 resolutions were the
collegial acts of the First Division of the Court of Appeals,
composed of three justices, unanimously approved by
them after due deliberation, and not the acts of
respondent justice alone. He denied that the July 24,
2001 resolution was, in fact, a TRO and maintained that
the purpose thereof was merely to remind the parties to
observe the status quo while PNBs motion for
reconsideration was pending resolution. He also claimed
that complainant Padilla mistook the October 30,
2001 resolution as extending the TRO, whereas there was
no indication in the July 24, 2001resolution that a TRO was
ever granted. Respondent Justice stressed that the
admonition to the parties to maintain the status quo was
merely directory in view of the pending motion in the CA,
following the principle of hierarchy of courts. Respondent
justice cited Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation v.
CA, Ibid., as basis for his action in issuing the July 24,
2001 and October 30, 2001 resolutions, which directed the
parties to maintain the status quo pending resolution of
PNBs motion for reconsideration.
We are not convinced. The July 24, 2001 resolution
was in fact and in reality essentially a TRO and the October
30, 2001 resolution effectively extended the same
indefinitely. This dispositive portion of the July 24,
2001 resolution clearly states:
WHEREFORE,
to
prevent
irreparable
injury,
the
public
respondent is temporarily
enjoined from implementing the
assailed Writ
of Execution datedJune
19,
2001. The parties are ordered
to maintain the status quo in
this
case
pending
the

resolution of
the
petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Technically, status quo is defined as the last
actual, peaceful and uncontested status that precedes
the actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of
the filing of the case [18] However, the Supreme Court has
ruled that a status quo ante order has the nature of a
temporary restraining order[19]. Thus, the decretal
portion of the resolution of July 24, 2001, specifically
ordered that the public respondent is temporarily enjoined
from
implementing
the
assailed
writ
of
execution. Respondent justice must be playing with
words. When a judge or justice uses technical or legal
terms with a well-defined meaning, such as a temporary
restraining order or a status quo order, he must have
intended those meaning; he cannot impute a directory
meaning to confuse the parties. x x x On the other hand,
he ought to know that a temporary restraining order
cannot exist indefinitely; it has a lifetime of a nonextendible period of sixty days and automatically expired
on the sixtieth day[20]. No judicial declaration that it has
expired is necessary[21], and, the lower courts, including
the Court of Appeals, have no discretion to extend the
same[22]. A second TRO by the Court of Appeals after the
expiration of the sixty day period is a patent nullity.[23]
Respondent Justice cannot seek refuge behind
the Eternal Garden case
to
justify
the October
30,
2001 resolution. The Eternal Garden case
involves
a
petition for certiorari filed before the Supreme Court,
which could issue a temporary restraining order or a
status quo order effective indefinitely or until further
orders (Rule 58, Section 5, par. 4, Rules of Court. On the
other hand, a temporary restraining order issued by the
Court of Appeals is effective only for sixty days.
(Ibid.) Hence, when respondent Justice Asuncion issued
the October 30, 2001 resolution ordering the parties to
maintain the status quo pending the resolution of PNBs
motion for reconsideration, he extended the restraining
order
until respondent could act on the PNB motion for
reconsideration which he did only as late as August 7,
2006, a glaring five years from submission. His interest
in the case is manifest in that, despite his assignment
to Cebu City on July 7, 2004, he did not unload the case to
Justice Zenarosa. (Office Order No. 212-04-CG, dated July

7, 2004).Worse, he recalled the case upon his return to the


CA Manila station. (Underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, the essence of the judicial function, as expressed in

We agree with complainant Padilla that the


deliberate act of respondent Justice Asuncion in extending
indefinitely the temporary restraining order or the status
quoorder pending resolution of PNBs motion for
reconsideration, relying on the Eternal Gardens Memorial
Park case, betrays his culpable gross ignorance of the
law. x x x

Section 1, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court is that justice shall be

x x x Judges are expected to exhibit more than


just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in
all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less.
Unfamiliarity
with
the
rules
is
a
sign
of
incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hand.
x x x When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with
the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the
courts. Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice.
[24]
Worse, respondent justices ignorance of procedural law
is exacerbated by his sloth in resolving PNBs motion for
reconsideration (See Garchitorena case, 422 Phil. 246
[2001], on reconsideration, 426 Phil. 01 [2002]) To
compound
matters,
Ms.
Archinas
motion
for
reconsideration date November 5, 2001, was not resolved
at all.[25]

The Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need


to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot
be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in
the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to
decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition
of administrative sanction against them.

impartially administered without unnecessary delay.

In Arap v. Judge Amir Mustafa,[27] We held that:

The record shows that, as of September 30, 2006, the respondent


had not resolved seventy-one (71) motions for reconsideration within the
prescribed ninety-day period, and he had resolved one hundred seventynine (179) motions for reconsideration beyond the reglementary period. As
of the same date, eighty-two (82) cases submitted for decision were still

THE COURTS RULING

undecided, even after the lapse of the twelve-month period prescribed by


the Constitution. He had also decided four hundred nine (409) cases

We adopt the findings of the Investigating Justice.

beyond the one-year period.

The Constitution mandates lower collegiate courts to decide or

Notably, of the seventy-one (71) motions for reconsideration

resolve cases or matters within twelve months from date of submission.

pending resolution, forty-six were filed in 2004 or earlier, with one dating

Section 3, Rule 52 of the Revised Rules of Court requires motions for

all the way back to 2000. Five were filed in 2001, sixteen in 2002, ten in

reconsideration to be resolved within ninety days. Section 5, Canon 6 of

2003, and thirteen in 2004. Respondents proffered justification is that the

the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides that (J)udges shall perform all

delay was caused by the reorganization of the CA, his assignment to the

judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,

CA Cebu Station and his transfer back to Manila which, allegedly, caused

fairly and with reasonable promptness.

some confusion in the assignment of cases and a lapse in the monitoring

[26]

system. The explanation miserably fails to persuade because the CA

We have already ruled that the failure of a judge to decide a case within

reorganization took place only in 2004, and at that time, there were at

the required period constitutes gross inefficiency [29] which, if the case

least thirty-two (32) motions for reconsideration crying out for resolution..

remains undecided for years, would become serious misconduct that would
justify dismissal from the service.[30]

This intolerable inaction is aggravated by misrepresentation. Upon


his assignment to the CA Cebu Station, respondent listed only nine (9)

In the case of respondent Justice Asuncion, the prolonged delay in

cases allegedly unresolved by and pending with him. The findings of the

deciding or resolving such a staggering number of cases/matters assigned

Investigator belie this assertion.

to him, borders on serious misconduct which could subject the respondent


to the maximum administrative sanction.

The excuse that respondent was burdened by a heavy caseload,


owing to the cases initially assigned to him, those raffled daily and those

In A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, We agree with the Investigating Justice

re-raffled from among the cases originally handled by promoted or retired

that respondents deliberate act of extending indefinitely the temporary

justices, must also fall flat. As aptly stated by the Investigating Justice,

restraining order or the status quo order pending resolution of PNBs

other CA justices are likewise subjected to such a heavy caseload, and yet,

motion for reconsideration, relying on the Eternal Gardens Memorial

have not incurred such inexcusable delay. As to respondents other

Park case, betrays his culpable gross ignorance of the law.

administrative assignments, including organizing special events, the


respondent should only be reminded that decision-making is the primordial

As correctly put by Investigating Justice Pardo, Eternal Gardens is totally

and most important duty of a member of the judiciary.

inapplicable. The July 24, 2001 resolution, which temporarily enjoined the

[28]

The delay incurred by respondent Justice Asuncion in deciding or resolving


the

numerous

cases

and

matters

mentioned

above

is,

therefore,

unjustified. Even in the case of PNB v. NLRC and Archinas alone, the
respondents

failure

to

resolve

PNBs June

13,

2001 motion

for

reconsideration until after the lapse of more than five (5) years, despite
Archinas four (4) motions urging immediate resolution of the same, truly
smacks of gross inefficiency and serious dereliction of duty.Worse, it
invites suspicion of malice, and casts doubt on the justices fairness and

public respondent from implementing the assailed writ of execution, was a


temporary restraining order, regardless of the nomenclature Justice
Asuncion used to characterize it. As such, its full life span can only be sixty
(60) days. Section 5, par. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is explicit: the
Court of Appeals may issue a temporary restraining order only for a limited
period of sixty days which cannot be renewed or extended. After sixty
days, the restraining order immediately ceases, without need of any
judicial order terminating it.

integrity.
The October 30, 2001 resolution, which ordered the maintenance
of the status quo, effectively extended the temporary restraining order, in

complete defiance of the aforesaid Rule. It was not a writ of preliminary

Citing Castanos v. Escano, Jr.,[34] this Court, in Macalintal v. Teh,[35] had

injunction, because respondent Justice Asuncion himself disclaims that it

occasion to state:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so
basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the
discharge of his functions, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he
holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission
was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority.In both cases, the judges dismissal is in
order.

was such. Besides, in the event of an injunctive writ, an injunction bond is


required, unless exempted by the Court (Section 4, Rule 58, Rules of
Court). Furthermore, there would have been no cause to issue such a writ,
because earlier, on May 28, 2001, respondent Justice Asuncion had already
dismissed the principal action for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction.

Yet, the purpose was clear; the October 30, 2001 resolution was intended
to extend the effectivity of the July 24, 2001 restraining order. It was, as
the Investigating Justice would characterize it, a renewed or second
temporary

restraining

order

proscribed

by

the

rule

and

extant

jurisprudence.

The respondent Justice would seek to extricate himself from any liability by
invoking

the

convenient

excuse

that

the

resolutions

of July

24,

2001 and October 30, 2001 were the collegial acts of the First Division of
the Court of Appeals, composed of three justices, and not the acts of
respondent justice alone. This, in fact, was the only significant subject
dwelt

on

by respondents

lawyer

in

the

cross-examination

of

the

complainant Atty. Padilla. What respondent Justice Asuncion, in effect, is


Such failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the
Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is
excused, and surely not a judge.[31] In Genil v. Rivera,[32] We declared that
judges owe it to the public to be knowledgeable, hence they are expected

saying is that if he, as ponente in PNB v. NLRC and Archinas, were to be


adjudged guilty of gross ignorance of the law, then the two other justices
in the Division should be held equally culpable. Perhaps, under ordinary
circumstances, such logic would be impeccable.

to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules.

While a judge is presumed to act with regularity and good faith in the
performance of judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and
unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars
enjoining strict compliance therewith, upends this presumption and
subjects the magistrate to administrative sanctions. [33]

However, what We said in Guerrero v. Villamor[36] is instructive:


For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed
order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance of official duties must not only be found
erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be
established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty,
hatred, or some other like motive.[37] x x x
Conversely, a charge for either ignorance of the law or
rendering an unjust judgment will not prosper against a
judge acting in good faith. Absent the element of bad faith,
an erroneous judgment cannot be the basis of a charge for

any said offenses, mere error of judgment not being a


ground for disciplinary proceedings.[38]

reconsideration of June 13, 2001? After all, he finally did so on August 7,


2006, with a mere three-page resolution. Why did it take more than five
years to resolve this PNB motion? Why were the four motions for early

Using this pronouncement as the norm, We now must consider the

resolution never addressed? If the Manila cases of respondent Justice

totality of the charges against the respondent, as well as the convergence

Asuncion were automatically assigned to Justice Zenarosa, how did

of attendant and subsequent events. On May 28, 2001, with respondent

Justice Asuncion continue to hold on to this case upon his reassignment

Justice as ponente, the First Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the

in Manila?

PNB petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, affirming in its entirety the decision of the National

The Investigating Justice supplies the answer in his Report thus: His

Labor Relations Commission. On June 13, 2001, PNB filed a motion for

(respondents) interest in the case is manifest in that, despite his

reconsideration. On June 25, 2001, Archinas (private respondent in the

assignment in Cebu City on July 7, 2004, he did not unload the case to

petition

Justice Zenarosa (Office Order No. 212-04-CG). Worse, he recalled the

for

certiorari)

filed

her

opposition

to

PNBs

motion

for

reconsideration. On July 24, 2001, acting upon PNBs urgent motion for

case upon his return to the CA Manila station.

issuance of a TRO, respondent issued the resolution enjoining the public


respondent from implementing the Writ of Execution. On October 30,

To the Court, these are badges of bad faith and manifest undue interest

2001, the resolution ordering the maintenance of the status quo was

attributable only to the respondent, and not to the other two justices of

issued. On November

the CA Division.Accordingly, only the respondent must be made to suffer

5,

2001,

Archinas

filed

her

motion

seeking

reconsideration of the October 30, 2001 resolution. Archinas filed four (4)
urgent

motions

for

early

resolution

of

the

pending

motion/s

the consequences.

for

reconsideration, on December 28, 2001, June 13, 2002, September 24,


2002, and August 23, 2005, Meantime, on July 5, 2004, respondent

Besides, the five-year delay in the resolution of the PNB motion for

Justice Asuncion was assigned to CA Cebu Station. With this transfer,

reconsideration would already constitute serious misconduct that would

respondents caseload was assigned to Justice Zenarosa. On November 3,

justify dismissal from the service[39]

2004, respondent was reassigned back to Manila. It was only on August 7,


2006 that respondent finally resolved the PNB motion for reconsideration.
Administrative Penalties
From this sequence of events, a number of questions arise. If the
respondent could issue the resolutions of July 24, 2001 and October 30,
2001 why did respondent not simply resolve the PNB motion for

In A. M. No. 06-6-08-CA, respondent is charged with undue delay in


rendering a decision or order. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
[40]

undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less

serious charge which may be penalized by (1) suspension from office


without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than
three months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding
P20,000.

In A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, for gross ignorance of the law and manifest


undue interest, Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion of the Court of
Appeals

is

hereby

ordered DISMISSED

FROM

THE

SERVICE with

forfeiture of retirement benefits, except leave credits.


This Decision is final and immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
On the other hand, gross ignorance of the law, for which respondent is
being faulted in A. M. No. 06-44-CA-J, is considered a serious charge, and
carries the penalty of (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or

EN BANC

part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-

JOVITO S. OLAZO,
Complainant,

A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC


Present:

owned or controlled corporations: provided, however, that the forfeiture of


benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not
exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not
exceeding P40,000.

versus -

The Investigating Justice recommends the maximum penalty for each of


the two offenses.

WHEREFORE, in A. M. No. 06-6-08, for having incurred undue


delay in the disposal of pending motions for reconsideration in several
cases, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, Associate Justice Elvi
John S. Asuncion of the Court of Appeals is SUSPENDED from office

JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.),


Respondent.

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
*
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
December 7, 2010
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

without pay, allowances and other monetary benefits for a period

DECISION

of THREE MONTHS.
BRION, J.:

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02


Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo
(complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02,

[1]

Rule

6.03[2] and Rule 1.01[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility for


representing conflicting interests.

In the complaint,[6] the complainant claimed that the respondent


abused his position as Congressman and as a member of the Committee
on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainants sales
application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The

Factual Background

complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and


influence over the complainants father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel


of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig.
The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that
was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation
No. 2476,[4] issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,
[5]

issued on October 16, 1987.

contest the complainants sales application and claim the subject land for
himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon
Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of
the latters alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further
claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject
land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the
nephew of the respondents deceased wife.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was


issued

by

then

Executive

Secretary

Catalino

Macaraig,

creating

Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a


recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open
for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of
Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his

As a result of the respondents abuse of his official functions, the


complainants sales application was denied. The conveyance of rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given
due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).

official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to


1998); the respondents district includes the areas covered by the
proclamations.

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the


proclaimed

areas

belonging

to

Manuel

Olazo,

the

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section

complainants

7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials

brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel

and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the

Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey

practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared

Rodriguez. As a result of the respondents promptings, the rights to the

as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the

land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

Committee on Awards.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the

In his Comment,[7] the respondent claimed that the present complaint is

respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance

the third malicious charge filed against him by the complainant. The first

of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant

one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was

claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to

nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second

one

complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged

Rolando

Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig.The

respondent in this regard executed an Assurance where he stated that he


was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.


With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a
different version of the antecedent events.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01


The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful

the subject land and he later conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey

conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a

Rodriguez. Miguel Olazos rights over the subject land and the transfer of

qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant

his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the

averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the

Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject

proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of

land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand,

his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation

and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the

of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.

DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his


application over the subject land was given due course. The respondent

emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was

(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that

affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the

the latter decided to sell his rights over the subject land for the

Supreme Court.

medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his


daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the

The respondent also advanced the following defenses:

money he extended to them was a form of loan.

(1) He denied the complainants allegation that Miguel Olazo told

(5) The respondents participation in the transaction between

him (complainant) that the respondent had been orchestrating

Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the

to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this

payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel

allegation was without corroboration and was debunked by the

Olazo.

affidavits

of

Miguel

Olazo

and

Francisca

Olazo,

the

complainants sister.

(6) Manuels belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang


Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, regarding what his father

(2) He denied the complainants allegation that he offered the

told

him,

cannot

prevail

over

his

earlierSinumpaang

complainant P50,000.00 for the subject land and that he (the

Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the

respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on

said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that

Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land. The

his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-

respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in

beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the

the subject land.

transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in


favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his

(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a


witness in Miguel Olazos affidavit where the latter asserted his

fathers application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs


application.

rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to


the truth.

(7) The complainants allegation that the respondent had pressured


and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the subject land was not

sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The

intervene

in

the

disposition

DENR decision was clear that the complainant had no rights

complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were

over the subject land.

not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.

The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code

of

the

conflicting

applications

of

the

The Courts Ruling

of Professional Responsibility. He alleged that during his third term as


Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be

complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included

disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his

in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards.Rather, their

duties as a government official. [9]He may be disciplined by this Court as a

conflicting claims and their respective supporting documents were before

member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of

the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over

his oath as a lawyer.[10]

the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis
of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the


respondents

actions

constitute

breach

of

the

standard

ethical

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of

conduct first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a

the Code of Professional Responsibility since the provision applies to

member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer

lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in

a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the

private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in

office he was previously connected with.

the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are
in the active practice of law.[8] In this regard, the respondent had already

After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their

completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on

respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative

Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.

complaint.

Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under


Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since he did not

Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the


continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by government
lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard
of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a
lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of

In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,[13] we defined promotion of private interest to


include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the
functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,[14] we recognized that

conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing


Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded
upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the
standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service
are

subject

to

constant

public

scrutiny

under

norms

of

public

the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with
public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge
of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.[15]

accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside
their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private

In Vitriolo v. Dasig,[16] we found the act of the respondent (an

activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.

official of the Commission on Higher Education) of extorting money from

[11]

persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a


serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. It imposes the following restrictions in the


conduct of a government lawyer:

[17]

We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the

respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation)


liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public


position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

the evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant who
had a pending application for visas before his office.[18]
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano[19] we found the respondent (a Court Attorney

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public
position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or
(3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We
previously

held

that

the

restriction extends

to

all

government

lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private interests. [12]

of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded
and received money from the complainant who had a pending case before
this Court.

Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the

Second,

the

complainants

allegation

that

the

respondent

absence of any concrete proof that the respondent abused his position as a

orchestrated the efforts to get the subject land does not specify how the

Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the

orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the

manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25,


2003,[20] categorically stating that the respondent had no interest in the

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainants sales

subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer of his

application was ever brought before the Committee on Awards. By the

rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazos

complaints own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March

disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondents alleged

1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainants

participation, and we find it to be in the respondents favor.

sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director,
NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and,

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the

subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was

complainant presented to support his claim that the respondent exerted

only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the

undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated

DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondents elective

June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR; [21] the Sinumpaang

public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired

Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;[22] and the Sinumpaang Salaysaydated July

in 1997.

17, 1996[23]), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force
exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely

These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any

showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots

way promote, advance or use his private interests in the discharge of his

(covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the

official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought

respondent merely acted as a witness in theSinumpaang Salaysay dated

before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member,

July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered

no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain

by one relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could

personal benefits. We note in

denial of the

have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainants

complainants sales application over the subject land was made by the

sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to

DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.

the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are

this

regard that the

not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the

It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary

record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what

evidence, specifically the dates when the sums of money were extended

Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent

by the respondent on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October

against Miguel Olazo.

17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance [27] over the subject
land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of

In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory

money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land.

explanation - backed by corroborating evidence - of the nature of the

These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondents allegation

transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo

that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the

and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25,

loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing

2003[24] and

medical treatment.

July

21,

2010,[25] Francisca

Olazo

corroborated

the

respondents claim that the sums of money he extended to her and Miguel
Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in
his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the
money borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment

Private practice of law after separation from public office

and hospitalization expenses.


As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the

practice of law after his separation from the government service, the

respondents claim that the latters involvement was limited to being paid

complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000,

the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to

of Manuel and the document entitled Assurance where the respondent

Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the

legally

loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent

Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to

and the amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of

conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional

the subject land.[26]

Responsibility.

represented

Ramon

Lee

and

Joseph

Jeffrey

Rodriguez.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[28] we defined the practice of law as any


activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal

his profession in connection with any matter before the


office he used to be with, in which case the one-year
prohibition shall likewise apply.

procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to


engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the

characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render

private practice of their profession during their incumbency.[29] By way of

any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree

exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her

of legal knowledge or skill.

profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is


authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated

not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions. [30] The last

with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of

which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in

lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under

private practice after their separation from the service.

subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition

Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In


addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed
in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

he used to be with.

xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto. Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxxx

he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless


authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; xx x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of
one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation
from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b)
(2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this


restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government service, to
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which

the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term intervene which we


previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to
influence the proceedings.[31] Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must
have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of
his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the
outcome of the proceedings.

practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the

Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

respondent previously interfered with the sales application covering


Manuels land when the former was still a member of the Committee on

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the

Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the

complainants claim that the respondent violated paragraph 4(1) [33] of

respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal

Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph

service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of

Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a

specifically

qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs qualifications

described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of

to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas

acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the

has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the

public as a lawyer.

decision dated April 3, 2004, [34]when the DENR gave due course to his

single

document. In Borja,

Sr.

v.

Sulyap,

Inc.,[32] we

sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this
In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the

finding.

definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are


insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed

Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented

by the Office of the President, the Court of Appeals [35] and, finally, the

before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot

Court, per our MinuteResolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No.

consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondents favor.

173453.

In

our

Resolution,

we

dismissed

the

petition

for

review

on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no


Violation of Rule 1.01

reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision. [36]

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of

deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we already struck down the

disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden rests on the

complainants allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized

complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the


Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.[37] The respondent generally is

under no obligation to prove his/her defense, [38] until the burden shifts to
him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has

Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of


Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The
investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's power of
administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary.1

in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense. [39]
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case
against the respondent for the complainants failure to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions
warranting the exercise of the Courts disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE,

premises

considered,

we DISMISS the

administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J
September 23, 2014
[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE
RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013
AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is
done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after
investigation into certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue

Factual Antecedents
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of
government funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the
"pork barrel scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority
Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of
Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest
actions all over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted
by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government
officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who
are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs.
Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by
the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles'
parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several
years with the Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs.
Napoles who accused him of double-dealing. When Luy went public with
his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the
warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out
to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead
point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement2 before the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I
witnessed several personalities visit our offices and join us as our
special guests during our parties and other special occasions. 33.
These personalities who would either visit our office or join our
events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla,
Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife,
Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita
Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen

Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty.


Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.

her sworn statement, alleged to have visited their office or attended their
events, thus:

34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles,
she told us that that case could take four to five years to clear. She
said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko para makakilos
ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na siyang
kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na


may petsang 29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na
nakikita mong bumibisita sa inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing
may party o special occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special
guests kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba
naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang
mga pangyayari sa mga bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila sa iyong
pagkaka-alala?

35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the


NBI, Janet Lim Napoles called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me
not to turn my back on her, that we should stay together. She said
"kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n
nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."

S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na


nakita ko po ang mga taong nabanggit ko:

xxxx
38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were
asked by the NBI. He said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong
masama si Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro wala naman
kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si Benhur
na siya ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang
pera."3(Emphasis supplied.)
The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by
Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court
Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator
Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam,
together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had interviewed
respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the
photograph was probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by
Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly
admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains
a different context; nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service
in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles
on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she
was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is
the Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice. 4
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang
Salaysay "5 wherein she gave details regarding those persons named in

xxxx
w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta
sa office sa 2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang
magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES sa conference room.
x x x x6
In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September
26, 2013, Sula was asked to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong,
thus:
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.
Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.
Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit
na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim
Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po
alam.
THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page
MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano
po

THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.


MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
x x x7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial
photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate,
particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the
Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which
convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.
Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday
of Senator Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but
definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he could vaguely
remember the circumstances but it would have been rude for him to
prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the
party. On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent
asserted:
(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended
any party or social event hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either
before she had a case with our court, or while she already had a pending
case with our court, or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the
term of Mr. Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses. (Emphasis
supplied.)

ponente of the decision. Respondent thus submitted himself to the


discretion of the Chief Justice such that even without being required to
submit an explanation, he voluntarily did so "to defend [his] reputation as
a judge and protect the Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair and
malicious innuendos."
On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court,
citing the testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee "[t]hat the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles,
Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and
other perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the intervention of Justice
Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:
SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon?
Kasi napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?
xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.
MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya
sa Sandiganbayan
SEN. ANGARA. Okay.
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles
at sinabi niya "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala
pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxxx
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA. Opo.

As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to
have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the
article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a.
Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided on the merits
by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not even the

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?


MS. SULA. Opo.

Xxxx8
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an
investigation motu proprio under this Court's power of administrative
supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal
profession (referring to notaries public who were alleged to have purposely
left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with Mrs.
Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations
[NGOs] involved in the scam).9
Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required
respondent to submit his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the
Court with certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013,
the Court received respondent's Comment.10 Respondent categorically
denied any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit
he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.
On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had
personal knowledge whether respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of
Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was
what Mrs. Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter
is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs. Napoles actually made the
statement, respondent believes it was given in the context of massive
media coverage of the pork barrel scam exploding at the time. With the
consciousness of a looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the
Ombudsman and later before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for
Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula and others involved in their business operation
that she would not leave or abandon them and that she would do all that
she can to help them just so they would not turn their backs on her and
become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs. Napoles made
misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her "connection", she
only had to do so in order to convince Sula and her co-employees that the
cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."
As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one
time visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and having a meeting with her at
the conference room, respondent said that at the birthday party of Senator
Estrada where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles
engaged him in a casual conversation during which the miraculous healing
power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was
mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend of
the Quiapo Church's parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to
the Black Nazarene icon. Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black

Nazarene devotee and was undergoing treatment for his prostate cancer,
was given special permission and was able to drape the Black Nazarene's
robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a
fragrant ball of cotton taken or exposed to the holy image, which article he
keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body in order to
receive healing. Because of such favor, respondent out of courtesy went to
see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank her. Respondent stressed that that
was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental
affidavit when she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at
the conference room of their office in Discovery Suites.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him
to have personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her,
considering that she no longer had any pending case with his court, and to
his knowledge, with any other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time
and even until the date of the preparation of his Comment. He thus prays
that this Court duly note his Comment and accept the same as sufficient
compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.
This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible
transgressions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by
respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on January 21, 2014
stating that:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative
matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made
Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on
September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong,
Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court Justice
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of
Atty. Joffre Gil C. Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, in compliance with the resolution of the Court En Banc
dated December 3, 2013, transmitting the original records of Criminal
Case Nos. 26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there is no
more need to transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation
reports and other reports on the supervisory history of the accusedprobationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice

Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court,


submitted her report with the following findings and conclusions:

xxxx
THE INVESTIGATION

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
xxxx
1. THE KEVLAR CASE
Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 Criminal Case No. 26768 for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal
Case No. 26769 for Violation of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged
were several members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees
including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother Magdalena Francisco
(now deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna Marie
Dulguime, and her (Napoles') three employees.
These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved
is the same - the questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the
Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of P3,865,310.00 from five suppliers
or companies owned by Napoles.
The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy,
released the payment although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar
helmets; that the suppliers are mere dummies of Napoles; and that the
helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.
Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two
Informations in an Order issued by the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.
Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted
for the lesser crime of Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all
underwent probation.
Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in
both cases.
The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the
transaction in question. Even if she owns the bank account where the 14
checks were later deposited, this does not in itself translate to her
conspiracy in the crimes charged x x x."

I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are


second cousins. After passing the Medical Technology Licensure
Examination in 2002, he was employed in the JLN (Janet Lim Napoles)
Corporation as Napoles' personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of
disbursements of her personal funds and those of her office. He was also
in charge of government transactions of the corporation and kept records
of its daily business activities.
In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles
mentioned to him the Kevlar case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan,
saying she has a "connect" in that court who would help her.
When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee concerning the Kevlar case, Benhur declared that Napoles'
"connect" with the Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:
Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and
I quote, "Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to
refresh your memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010.
Yun po yung lumabas po." And then going forward, Senator Angara
referred to both of you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam kung
inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam
ng ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag
kang matakot, Benhur." Do you remember that question being asked from
you?
xxxx
A Yes po.
Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon
Committee that Ms. Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who
was this connect you were talking about, if you remember?
Witness Luy

A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.


Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms.
Napoles at the Sandiganbayan?
A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second
cousins. So kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga
developments sa mga cases, kung ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po,
sinabi niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at
ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case
was promulgated, Napoles and respondent were already communicating
with each other (nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she was sure the
decision would be in her favor:
Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was
promulgated?
A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.
Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?
A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay
madam (Ms. Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na naguusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong.
Q That was after the decision was promulgated?
A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na
nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms.
Napoles. Noong lumabas po yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi
sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.
Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told
Senator Angara that Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a
"connect" in the Sandiganbayan:
"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na
iyon (Kevlar case). Sige huwag kang matakot Benhur."

Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga
siya sa Sandiganbayan."
On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he
kept a ledger of the Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her
expenses in the sum of P 100 million pesos. He was surprised why she
would spend such amount considering that what was involved in the Kevlar
case was only P3.8 million. She explained that she gave various amounts
to different people during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten
years. And before the decision in the Kevlar case was released, she also
gave money to respondent but she did not mention the amount. Thus, she
knew she would be acquitted.
Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while
ago, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan." You stated that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you
explain before us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon."
What do you mean by that "inayos"?
A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat
ng nagastos ni Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko
po kay Janet Napoles, parang pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano
nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala
yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na nagastos po ni Ms.
Napoles kasi di Jang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...
xxx
Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?
A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya
po si ... kasi si madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi
ako, nabanggit niya po si Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw
po siya ng pera kay Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano
yung amount.
xxx
Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?
A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).

Q To you?
A Yes, madam.
Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?
A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na
po si Ms. Napoles bago lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na
niya. Sa Kevlar case.
xxx
Justice Gutierrez
Continue counsel.
Witness Luy
Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang
nagastos niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million
na sa halagang P3.8 lang na PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos
P 100 million na ang nagastos mo?"
Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid?
How was it spent?
A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi
parang staggered. May P5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito
naman tutulong ng ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.
Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?
A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay
po siya kay Justice Ong, but she never mentioned the amount.
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent
went twice to Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB
Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On the first visit, Napoles introduced Justice
Ong to Benhur and her other employees.

Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him,


Napoles has so much money being placed at the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which
offered 13% interest annually. Napoles called Benhur telling him that
respondent would like to avail of such interest for his BDO check of P25.5
million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just
deposit respondent's P25.5 million in her personal account with Metro
bank. Then she would issue to respondent in advance eleven (11) checks,
each amounting to P282,000.00 as monthly interest, or a total
of P3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon Justice Ong's
suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the
corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:
Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there
was any?
Witness Luy
A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office
(of Ms. Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po
talaga ang office namin. Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si
Ms. Napoles, may pera siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI
at yung AFPSLAI po ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o nagooffer ng 13%
interest annually po. So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si
Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng interest parang ganoon. So
tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q Meaning to say, Justice
Ong would like to deposit money?
A Opo.
Q So he could get 13% interest?
A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles
sa kanyang opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin
ang checke. So, ang ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO
check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni
Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po nakita Madam yung
nakalagay sa ...
Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?

A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay P25.5 million ang amount


noong BDO check na inissue ...

name of the payee upon instruction of his lawyer, Atty. Baligod.


Nonetheless, he knew that the checks were issued to respondent.

Q That belongs to Justice Ong?

II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN
Corporation. Her duties included the formation of corporations by making
use of the forms, applying for business licenses, transfer of properties,
purchase of cars, and others.

A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po


13% interest ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang,
Ben, ipasok na lang muna natin yung check niya sa personal account ko.
Ako na lang muna for the meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para
maavail ni Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in
madam, P25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12,
lumalabas P282,000.00 orP283,000.00 or P281,000.00 po madam kasi
naground off kami sa P282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga
monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang prinepare namin. Kung hindi po ako
nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako pa nga po ang nagsulat
at saka bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So,
pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory
Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po sa
records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang P25.5 million na amount sa
kanyang account at the same time nag-issue siya ng checke
na P282,000.00 na eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro
sometime July or August or mga ganoong buwan po. Basta 11 checks,
hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.
Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was
deposited at the bank but the interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles,
and actually the bank will pay Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid
to Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you understand
me?
A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung P25.5 million ipinasok sa
personal account ni Ms. Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun
e.

Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of


Napoles twice sometime in 2012.
Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon
Committee during the hearing on September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:
The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)
Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang
lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles
sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxx
Ms. Sula
Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.
The Chairman
Gregory Ong?
Ms. Sula
Opo.

On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in


conversation. She ordered Chinese food for him which, according to
Benhur, is his (respondent's) favorite.

The Chairman
Sa Sandiganbayan?

On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the


NBI, he did not mention respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit
filed with the Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles issued P282,000.00
(the amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the

Ms. Sula
Opo.

The Chairman
Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the
hearing.
Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be
issued by the Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the PIO billion
PDAF scam against her is filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula
and the other employees not to worry because she has contact with the
Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:

A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa
Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit ang pangalan. Pero sa
Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.
Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?
A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Not the illegal detention case?

Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other
employees, she would say that Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case.
Sula's testimony is as follows:

Witness Sula

Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.


Q Okay, again?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya,


sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po
yung Kevlar case niya.

A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5


years, so hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan
niya para maluwag na tulungan kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na
sa Sandiganbayan.

Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that
she will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they
replied in jest that her acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles
retorted, "Ay huag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."

Q Yung PDAF?
A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?
A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam
tungkol sa PlO billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa
South Garden Unit na, Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan
dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa
Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron naman
akong mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa
Sandiganbayan.
Q Is that in your affidavit?

xxxx
III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who
gave him the photograph [of respondent beside Napoles and Senator
Jinggoy Estrada] because he is shielded by law and he has to protect his
source.
When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:
Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of
the members of the division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my
curiosity why he was in that picture. Second, because in journalism, we
also get to practice ethical standards, I immediately sensed though that a
Justice or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be going to a party or be
in an event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his
Division. He should not be in a situation that would compromise the
integrity of his office.

Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to


respondent to "get his side about the photo." The next day, he went to
respondent's office and showed it to him. Respondent was shocked. He
explained that it must have been taken during one of the parties hosted by
his friend Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that the woman
in the picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the hearing of
the Kevlar case; and that such picture must have been taken in one of
those instances when a guest would like to pose with celebrities or public
figures.
xxxx
Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled
against him.
1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of
Napoles at the Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know
her during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the
Kevlar case, respondent claimed that it was decided based on the
merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body.
The two other members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez
(ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independentminded jurists who could not be pressured or influenced by
anybody, not even by their peers;
3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of
money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in
the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the fact that Benhur was
attempting to tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it
is unthinkable for him to have received money from Napoles
considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were
convicted;
4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice,
sometime in March 2012, after the decision in the Kevlar case was
promulgated in 2010 and narrated what prompted him to do so,
thus:
At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012,
Napoles approached him and introduced herself. She engaged him in a

casual conversation and thanked him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case.
Respondent replied she should thank her "evidence" instead, adding that
had the court found enough evidence against her, she would have been
convicted. She talked about her charity works like supporting Chinese
priests, building churches and chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese
Catholic priests. He was not interested though in what she was saying until
she mentioned the name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo
Church.
Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy
Black Nazarene since he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr.
Ramirez has with him the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene which has a
healing power if one wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have
access to the robe so he can be cured of his ailment (prostate cancer)
which he keeps only to himself and to the immediate members of his
family. Napoles made arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until respondent
was able to drape the robe over his body for about one or two minutes in
Quiapo Church. He also received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps
until now to heal any ailing part of his body. That was a great deal for him.
So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and thanked her. That
was his first visit.
Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office,
but he kept on declining. Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she
might think he is "walang kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk
for about 30 minutes and had coffee.
5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an
advanced interest consisting of eleven (11) checks in the amount
of P282,000.00 each and that he issued to her his BDO check of P25.5
million which she deposited in her account, he claimed that "he never
issued that check as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he
does not have any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue
any BDO check, it follows that Napoles could not have given him those
eleven (11) checks representing advanced interest. He further explained
that he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI, an investor can only make
an initial deposit of P30,000.00 every quarter or Pl20,000.00 per year. The
limit or ceiling is P3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum.
6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack
credibility. While Sula testified that Napoles told her that she did not want
to approach respondent (should a case involving the pork barrel scam be

filed with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however,
both whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the
Sandiganbayan.
With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was
insinuating four things: 1. That there was irregularity in the manner the
Kevlar case was decided;
2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the
Kevlar case;

In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were


consistent with their testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee. During cross-examination, they did not waver or falter. The
undersigned found the two whistle blowers as credible witnesses and their
story untainted with bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and
trustworthy witnesses.
The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that
Benhur and Sula were lying.

3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and

. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of


the Kevlar case considering that Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law
were convicted.

4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to


the Kevlar case. Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false
and without factual basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised
Napoles about legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case,
respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial body and that
he never interceded on her behalf.

Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was selfpreservation. Hence, she would avail of every possible means to be
exonerated. Besides, respondent's belief that the two members of his
Division are independent-minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.
xxxx

EVALUATION
xxxx
It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur
initially testified that Napoles fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she
has a contact at the Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula
corroborated Benhur's testimony.
Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal.
The witnesses and everything they say are open to the public. They are
subjected to difficult questions propounded by the Senators, supposedly
intelligent and knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And
they can easily detect whether a person under investigation is telling the
truth or not. Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it is
indubitably improbable that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y
against respondent.
Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in
a candid, straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were
instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.

With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of


Benhur and Sula, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at
the inevitable conclusion that in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the
consideration ... Benhur testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of
expenses amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles for the
Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up
to ten years; and that Napoles told him she gave respondent an
undetermined sum of money.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure
hearsay, inadmissible in evidence:
Justice Ong
Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula,
and according to Luy and Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles,
always their statements were ... they do not have personal knowledge, it
was only told to them by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles
so that the truth will come out? If. ..
xxxx

Justice Gutierrez

concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent P3, 102,000.00 as


advanced interest.

That is your prerogative.


Justice Ong
I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of
Napoles. Just to clear my name whether I should be hung or I should not
be hung.
xxxx
Atty. Geronilla
I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)
Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.
However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the
undersigned's suggestion. They did not present Napoles to rebut the
testimonies of Benhur and Sula. Significantly, respondent failed to consider
that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr.
Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding their role
which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.
x x xx
Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the
Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting
money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles
handed to respondent led the undersigned to conclude without hesitation
that this charge is true. It is highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise
or concoct his story. He gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events,

According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles
for making it possible for him to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe.
Even assuming it is true, nonetheless it is equally true that during that
visit, respondent could have transacted business with Napoles. Why should
Napoles pay respondent an advanced interest of P3,102,000.0 with her
own money if it were not a consideration for a favor?
Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct
relation to his judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty.
His act is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a
member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on
him. Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports Benhur's assertion that
he received money from Napoles.
Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same
Code providing in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above
reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the
Judiciary.
Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.
xxxx
...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited
Napoles twice in her office considering that the visits took place long after
the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.
Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross
misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section
1 provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities .
. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help
in making it possible for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.
Instead of visiting her, respondent could have extended his gratitude by
simply calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may
think he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely frail reason. He was
seen by the whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt,

readily confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the Sandiganbayan and


that he "fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.
Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds.
Being aptly perceived as the visible personification of law and justice, his
personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but
also outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office
circumscribes a personal conduct and imposes a number of inhibitions,
whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding an
exalted position.
xxxx
On the photograph showing respondent
with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.
xxxx
This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety
and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from
judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.
In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent
gave a ground for reproach by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating
Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the same Code which provides that judges
shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because
she was not present before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the
Kevlar case for she must have waived her appearance. Respondent's
explanation lacks merit. That court could not have acquired jurisdiction
over her if she did not appear personally for arraignment.
Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that
respondent has been charged administratively. In "Assistant Special
Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong,
Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the
Supreme Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of PD 1606
and The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of

collegiality in hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City.


Instead of siting as a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division adopted a different procedure. The Division was divided
into two. As then Chairperson of the Division, respondent was ordered to
pay a fine of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
xxxx
...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal
of Napoles. The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was
the Chairman, held that Napoles did not conspire with the suppliers in the
questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of the
"dealer-payees" in the transaction in question and that there was no proof
of an overt act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such
conclusion? The Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was
following up the processing of the documents; (2) that she was in charge
of the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the checks amounting
toP3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets were deposited and cleared
in only one bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-000-2200, in the
name of Napoles.
Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed
respondent has a hand in the acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle
blowers were telling the truth.
xxxx
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for
consideration of the Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S.
Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all
in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH
FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits,
and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
xxxx
The Court's Ruling

This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the


Investigating Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.
Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice
formulated the charges against the respondent, as follows:
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the
Kevlar case while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division wherein he is the Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed
the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from
Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar
case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of her acquittal; 4.
Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him
eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 or a total
ofP3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for his P25.5 million BDO
check she deposited in her personal account; and
5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed
with Senator Estrada and Napoles.11
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and
corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and
impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her
acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his
September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually
visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having
partied with or attended any social event hosted by her.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in
character, improper or wrong behavior; while "gross" has been defined as
"out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as
is not to be excused."12 We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that
respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct
evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only


substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is
required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.13
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in
contact with respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the
Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin)
were privy to her daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly
updated them of developments regarding the case. She revealed to them
that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help
"fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and some employees.
Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will
be acquitted even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar
case, they were convinced she was indeed in contact with respondent,
whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically
testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not
disclose the amount. There was no reason for them to doubt Napoles'
statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the
"Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles' information about
her association with respondent was confirmed when she was eventually
acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent visit her office and given
the eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay
as they have no personal knowledge of the matters they were testifying,
which were merely told to them by Napoles. Specifically, he points to
portions of Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but
"contact persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it could
have been other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the
Kevlar case, especially since Napoles never really disclosed to Sula who
was her (Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their
conversations Napoles even supposedly said that respondent's "talent fee"
was too high. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform
an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration
of any offer, promise, gift or present received.14 Ajudge who extorts money
from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious
misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest
possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by one charged

with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it


quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts. 15
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The
complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an
accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge
connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be
more than substantial.16 Concededly, the evidence in this case is
insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the
respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually
receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar
case. Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the
respondent, we find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after
the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the
circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt
inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the
decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on
two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was
partial to Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision
which was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of
partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by the publication
of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy
Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and
Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height
of the "Pork Barrel" controversy, made all the difference as respondent
himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the present administrative
proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the public
revelations of what they know of that government corruption controversy,
and how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest
because of their close relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation
in her transactions with government officials, dubbed by media as the
"Pork Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez,
the "challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate hearings where they
first testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle blowers would
testify against the respondent. During the investigation of this case,
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid,
straightforward and categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as
"instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth,"

and more important, these are consistent with their previous testimonies
before the Senate; they never wavered or faltered even during crossexamination.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are
generally given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched
opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. 17 The
rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of
credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a
fortiori to administrative cases.18 In particular, we concur with Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and
disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling
lies about his association with Napoles.
Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that
whenever Napoles talked about her contacts in the Ombudsman and
Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was
concerned, it was understood that she was referring to respondent even as
she may have initially contacted some persons to get to respondent, and
also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It
appears that Napoles made statements regarding the Kevlar case not just
to Luy but also to the other employees of JLN Corporation. The following
are excerpts from Sula's testimony on direct examination, where she even
hinted at their expected outcome of the Kevlar case:
Atty. Benipayo
Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim
Napoles regarding her involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was
trying to address the problem with the Kevlar case pending before the
Sandiganbayan?
Witness Sula
A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na
binabayaran niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case.
Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang
nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos,
sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami. Pero hindi
niya sinabi na meron din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi
po dalawa sa mga empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya,
isang kapatid niya at sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung mother

niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa
niya ang bale makli-clear sa kaso.

willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as


burdensome by the ordinary citizen.21

Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one
brother will answer for the case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband
will be acquitted, is that right?

In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:

A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh,
yung mga officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang
hatol, meron silang probation period.
xxxx
Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya,
sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po
yung Kevlar case niya.

Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so,
for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their
conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground
for reproach. [Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He
should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and
endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression
of indecorum.
xxxx
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

xxxx

19

(Emphasis supplied.)

As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations
while her mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser
charge of falsification of public documents. Apparently, after her acquittal,
Napoles helped those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our
earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the merits of the
Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative
liability.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two
occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4
(Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June
1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial
and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. 20 Public
confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct
of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof.
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and

"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal
conduct, a price one has to pay for o ccupying an exalted position in the
judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the
performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his public
or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground
for reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)
On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid
association or socializing with persons who have pending cases before
their court. Respondent cites the case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr.23 where this
Court did not find fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing
with his lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:
Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989
when they were both RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both
resided in Camarines Norte, Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to
Daet, Camarines Norte in the latter's car.
In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his
chambers open to lawyers or parties with official court business, whose
requests and complaints regarding their cases he listens to in full view of

his staff, who are witnesses to his transparency and honesty in conducting
such dialogues. He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house on
several occasions, but only to make emergency long-distance calls to his
children in Metro Manila. He, however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo
were frequently seen eating and drinking together in public places.
We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against
respondent on this point was insufficient, viz.:
"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two
public functions where Atty. Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo
had been in his house twice or thrice and used his telephone; and that he
receives lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his
chambers, the door to which is always open so that [the] staff could see
that no under the table transactions are taking place, is not proof that he
is fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former
colleague and friend whenever they meet each other or when the latter
makes requests which are not in any manner connected with cases
pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
provides:
'30. Social relations
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges
should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the
reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they
continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not
discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the
bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before
him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to
waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in determining his judicial course.'"
The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case
because Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a
former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by
respondent and which acquitted her from malversation charge. What
respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for judges, in
pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may
raise suspicion on their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus,
he emphasized in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a
personal level while she was still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet

case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony expressing her opinion


that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles' office
because at that time, the Kevlar case had already been terminated.
We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover
only pending and prospective litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the
mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge."
Section 2 further provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept
personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall
conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.
As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana 25
... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and
counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of
possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should
live in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may
be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work commitments
permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in
such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims
and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations
before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid
anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social
or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must
judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave
in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their
counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when
improper acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are
under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter
public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or
resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's association with
Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel"

controversy which initially involved only legislative and executive officials.


Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a
Justice of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft
cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider
respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.

Justice Gutierrez

What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could


it not be possible for you to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the
priest there to help you or assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?

Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice
you should have been very, very careful about your actuations. You should
not have been seen in public, you know, with a woman like her who was
an accused before. You could have thanked her simply by calling her. You
could have relayed to her your true feelings that you are so grateful
because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have worn
that Holy Robe of the Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her
instead of going to her office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of
Santuario de San Antonio in Forbes Park. And you should have been more
careful not to be seen by the public with her considering that she was a
former accused in that case.

Justice Ong

Justice Ong

You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never
got near the image of the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.

I will heed to that advice, your honor.

During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial


ethics and its serious repercussions, as shown by his answers to the
questions from the Investigation Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez

Justice Gutierrez
Justice Gutierrez
No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and
make the proper request. Why did you not do that?
Justice Ong
I don't know, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and
that you are a devotee of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the
Office of the priest there and had that request for you to wear that robe of
the Black Nazarene?

Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr.
Aries Rufo that. "That is a lesson for me; that I should not have
associated, you know, with a former respondent or accused in a case
before me." You admitted that? You said you learned you lesson. Was that
the first time you learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even before
you took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already knew that
lesson, isn't it or was that the first time? That is why you associated
yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada who was accused before of plunder?
Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about ....
Justice Gutierrez

Justice Ong

Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?

Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles
during that conversation. Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong
gawin. Had I known that there is such a robe, maybe I will do that.

Justice Ong
A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)

In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's


purported reason for visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated,
as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were not presented as witnesses
despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand,
Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with
Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version.
Expectedly, respondent denied having issued a BDO check for P25 .5
million as claimed by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not deposit
any money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present
documentary evidence saying that, as previously testified by him before
the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded upon
orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of P282,000.00
supposed advance interest for respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were
given to respondent as consideration for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar
case.1wphi1 Such finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles
spent a staggering PlOO million just to "fix" the said case. Under the
circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to Napoles
office the second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again
visiting Napoles at her office, after he had supposedly merely thanked her
during the first visit, tends to support Luy's claim that respondent had a
financial deal with Napoles regarding advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit.
The question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles extend such an
accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her acquittal in
the Kevlar case? Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised
adverse public opinion, with the media speculating on pay-offs taking place
in the courts.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general
to doubt the honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case
and the integrity of our courts of justice. Before this Court, even prior to
the commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less
than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied
having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to
mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a
plain omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his
social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the
Senate and named him as the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan,
that respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles ("This
is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in her supplemental
affidavit x x x."27).

The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters
even before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu
proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray."28 Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a
malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.29
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found
guilty of a serious charge may be penalized as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge,
any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
governmentowned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering that respondent is not a first time offender and the
charges of gross misconduct and dishonesty are both grave
offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the
special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme
penalty of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and
IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if

any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or


instrumentality of the government including government-owned or
-controlled corporations.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all


members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, filed with the Court in G.R. No.
162230 a special civil action ofcertiorari with application for preliminary
mandatory injunction against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor
General.

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC


OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO. Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 12, 2010
x
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

Petitioners claimed that in destroying villages in the Philippines during


World War II, the Japanese army systematically raped them and a number
of other women, seizing them and holding them in houses or cells where
soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them.

Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the
Executive Department, represented by the respondent public officials,
requesting assistance in filing claims against the Japanese military officers
who established the comfort women stations. But that Department
declined, saying that petitioners individual claims had already been fully
satisfied under the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Petitioners wanted the Court to render judgment, compelling the


Executive Department to espouse their claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of
Justice and other international tribunals.

PER CURIAM:
On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners
This case is concerned with charges that, in preparing a decision for the

action. Justice Mariano C. del Castillo wrote the decision for the Court. The

Court, a designated member plagiarized the works of certain authors and

Court essentially gave two reasons for its decision: it cannot grant the

twisted their meanings to support the decision.

petition because, first, the Executive Department has the exclusive

The Background Facts

prerogative under the Constitution and the law to determine whether to

espouse petitioners claim against Japan; and, second, the Philippines is

manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism [3] that resulted in gross

not under any obligation in international law to espouse their claims.

prejudice to the petitioners.

On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of

Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for

the Courts decision. More than a month later on July 18, 2010, counsel for

reconsideration generated, Justice Del Castillo circulated a letter to his

petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced in his online blog

colleagues, subsequently verified, stating that when he wrote the decision

that his clients would file a supplemental petition detailing plagiarism

for the Court he had the intent to attribute all sources used in it. He said in

committed by the court under the second reason it gave for dismissing

the pertinent part:

the petition and that these stolen passages were also twisted to support
the courts erroneous conclusions that the Filipino comfort women of World
War Two have no further legal remedies. The media gave publicity to Atty.
Roques announcement.

On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion for


reconsideration that Atty. Roque announced. It accused Justice Del Castillo
of manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism [1] when he wrote the
decision for the Court and of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized
sources to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment. [2]They charged
Justice Del Castillo of copying without acknowledgement certain passages
from three foreign articles:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J.
Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of
International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International
Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian
J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).

It must be emphasized that there was every


intention to attribute all sources, whenever due. At
no point was there ever any malicious intent to
appropriate anothers work as our own. We recall
that this ponencia was thrice included in the Agenda
of the Court en banc. It was deliberated upon during
the Baguio session on April 13, 2010, April 20, 2010
and in Manila on April 27, 2010. Each time,
suggestions were made which necessitated major
revisions in the draft. Sources were re-studied,
discussions modified, passages added or deleted.
The resulting decision comprises 34 pages with 78
footnotes.
xxxx
As regards the claim of the petitioners that
the concepts as contained in the above foreign
materials were twisted, the same remains their
opinion which we do not necessarily share. [4]

On July 27, 2010, the Court En Banc referred the charges against
Justice Del Castillo to its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards,
chaired by the Chief Justice, forinvestigation and recommendation. The
Chief Justice designated retired Justice Jose C. Vitug to serve as consultant

Petitioners claim that the integrity of the Courts deliberations in


the case has been put into question by Justice Del Castillos fraud. The
Court should thus address and disclose to the public the truth about the

of the Committee. He graciously accepted.

On August 2, 2010, the Committee directed petitioners to

and in connection with a citation from another author (Bruno Simma)

comment on Justice Del Castillos verified letter. When this was done, it set

rather than with respect to the passages taken from his work. He thought

the matter for hearing.

that the form of referencing was inappropriate. Mr. Tams was also
concerned that the decision may have used his work to support an

In the meantime, on July 19, 2010, Evan Criddle wrote on his blog
that he and his co-author Evan Fox-Descent (referred to jointly as Criddle-

approach to erga omnes concept (obligations owed by individual States to


the community of nations) that is not consistent with what he advocated.

Descent) learned of alleged plagiarism involving their work but Criddles


concern, after reading the supplemental motion for reconsideration, was

On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the parties submissions in the

the Courts conclusion that prohibitions against sexual slavery are not jus

summary manner of administrative investigations. Counsels from both

cogens or internationally binding norms that treaties cannot diminish.

sides were given ample time to address the Committee and submit their
evidence. The Committee queried them on these.

On July 23, 2010, Dr. Mark Ellis wrote the Court expressing
concern that in mentioning his work, the Court may have misread the

Counsels for Justice Del Castillo later asked to be heard with the

argument [he] made in the article and employed them for cross

other parties not in attendance so they could make submissions that their

purposes. Dr. Ellis said that he wrote the article precisely to argue for

client regarded as sensitive and confidential, involving the drafting process

appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes.

that

went

into

the

the Vinuya case. Petitioners

making
counsels

of

the

vigorously

Courts

decision

objected

and

in
the

On August 8, 2010, after the referral of the matter to the

Committee sustained the objection. After consulting Justice Del Castillo,

Committee for investigation, the Dean of the University of the Philippines

his counsels requested the Committee to hear the Justices court

(U.P.) College of Law publicized a Statement from his faculty, claiming that

researcher, whose name need not be mentioned here, explain the research

the Vinuya decision was an extraordinary act of injustice and a singularly

work that went into the making of the decision in the Vinuya case. The

reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest

Committee granted the request.

Court of the land. The statement said that Justice Del Castillo had a
deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors work, and that the

The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation how the

Courts decision amounted to an act of intellectual fraud by copying works

attribution of the lifted passages to the writings of Criddle-Descent and

in order to mislead and deceive.

Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice Del Castillo,

[5]

were unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her


On August 18, 2010 Mr. Christian J. Tams wrote Chief Justice Renato C.

grievous mistake and grief for having caused an enormous amount of

Corona that, although relevant sentences in the Courts decision were

suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family.[6]

taken from his work, he was given generic reference only in the footnote

On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to the

avoid touching the merits of the Courts decision in that case or the

researchers explanation, counsel for petitioners insisted that lack of intent

soundness or lack of soundness of the position it has so far taken in the

is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for a writer to

same. The Court will deal, not with the essential merit or persuasiveness

acknowledge that certain words or language in his work were taken from

of the foreign authors works, but how the decision that Justice Del Castillo

anothers work. Counsel invoked the Courts ruling in University of the

wrote for the Court appropriated parts of those works and for what

Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William

purpose the decision employed the same.

Margaret Celine,[7] arguing that standards on plagiarism in the academe


should apply with more force to the judiciary.

At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons


language, thoughts, or ideas. To plagiarize, as it is commonly understood

After the hearing, the Committee gave the parties ten days to file
their

respective

memoranda. They

filed

their

memoranda

in

due

course. Subsequently after deliberation, the Committee submitted its

according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and


pass them off as ones own.[8] The passing off of the work of another as
ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.

unanimous findings and recommendations to the Court.


The Passages from Tams
The Issues
Petitioners point out that the Vinuya decision lifted passages from
This case presents two issues:

Tams book, Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law


(2006) and used them in Footnote 69 with what the author thought was a

1. Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case,

mere generic reference. But, although Tams himself may have believed

Justice Del Castillo plagiarized the published works of authors Tams,

that the footnoting in this case was not an appropriate form of referencing,

Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.

[9]

he and petitioners cannot deny that the decision did attribute the source

or sources of such passages. Justice Del Castillo did not pass off Tams
2. Whether or not Justice Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors to

work as his own.The Justice primarily attributed the ideas embodied in the

make it appear that such works supported the Courts position in

passages to Bruno Simma, whom Tams himself credited for them. Still,

the Vinuya decision.

Footnote 69 mentioned, apart from Simma, Tams article as another source


of those ideas.
The Courts Rulings
The Court believes that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently

Because of the pending motion for reconsideration in the Vinuya case, the

detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting standards of counsel for petitioners

Court like its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards will purposely

is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of writing. The

statement See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International


Law (2005) in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams
thought that it gave him somewhat less credit than he deserved. Such
attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off
the challenged passages as his own.

That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the
introductory phrase cited in rather than the phrase See would make a case
of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of manifest
intellectual theft and outright plagiarism. If the Justices citations were
imprecise, it would just be a case of bad footnoting rather than one of
theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would be target of abuse for
every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination, and for every
technical detail of form.
The Passages from Ellis
and Criddle-Descent

Petitioners also attack the Courts decision for lifting and using as
footnotes, without attribution to the author, passages from the published
work of Ellis. The Court made the following statement on page 27 of its
decision, marked with Footnote 65 at the end:
We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture,
and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as
legally prohibited under contemporary international
law. 65 xxx

Footnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the


lengthy passages in that footnote came almost verbatim from Ellis article,
[10]

such passages ought to have been introduced by an acknowledgement

that they are from that article. The footnote could very well have read:

65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an


International Crime, Case Western Reserve Journal
of International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said: The
concept of rape as an international crime is relatively new.
This is not to say that rape has never been historically
prohibited, particularly in war. But modern-day sensitivity
to the crime of rape did not emerge until after World War
II. In the Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not
mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity
explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape was not
mentioned by name. (For example, the Treaty of Amity and
Commerce between Prussia and the United States provides
that in time of war all women and children shall not be
molested in their persons. The Treaty of Amity and
Commerce, Between his Majesty the King of Prussia and
the United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785,
U.S.-Pruss., 8 TREATIES & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS OF
THE U.S. 78, 85. The 1863 Lieber Instructions classified
rape
as
a
crime
of
troop
discipline.
(Mitchell, The Prohibition
of
Rape
in
International
Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus cogens: Clarifying the
Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. INTL. L. 219, 224). It specified
rape as a capital crime punishable by the death penalty
(Id. at 236). The 1907 Hague Convention protected
women by requiring the protection of their honour. (Family
honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice,
must be respected. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws &
Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907. General
Assembly resolution 95 (I) of December 11, 1946 entitled,
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law
recognized by the Charter of the Nrnberg Tribunal; General
Assembly document A/64/Add.1 of 1946;See Agreement
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6(c) of the Charter
established crimes against humanity as the following:
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated.
The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any reference
to rape and rape was not prosecuted. (Judge Gabrielle

Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals


Crime
and
Punishment
in
the
International
Arena,7 ILSA J. INTL. COMP. L. 667, 676.) However,
International
Military
Tribunal
for
the
Far
East prosecuted rape crimes, even though its Statute
did not explicitly criminalize rape. The Far East Tribunal
held General Iwane Matsui, Commander Shunroku
Hata and Foreign Minister Hirota criminally responsible
for a series of crimes, including rape, committed by
persons under their authority. (THE TOKYO JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 445-54 (1977).
The first mention of rape as a specific crime came
in December 1945 when Control Council Law No. 10
included the term rape in the definition of crimes
against humanity. Law No. 10, adopted by the four
occupying powers in Germany, was devised to
establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war criminals
in German courts. (Control Council for Germany, Law
No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20,
1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany
50, 53 (1946))
The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first modernday international instrument to establish protections
against rape for women. Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(entry into force Oct. 20, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention].Furthermore, the ICC, the ICTY,
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) have significantly advanced the crime of rape
by enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a war
crime, and a crime against humanity.
But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar
introduction was missing from Footnote 65.

Next, petitioners also point out that the following eight sentences
and their accompanying footnotes appear in text on pages 30-32 of
the Vinuya decision:
xxx In international law, the term jus
cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms
that command peremptory authority, superseding

conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms


are considered peremptory in the sense that they are
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of
equivalent authority.71
Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed
since the 1700s,72 but peremptory norms began to
attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of
Alfred von Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden
Treaties in International Law.73 The recognition of jus
cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s
with the ILCs preparation of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT).74 Though there was a
consensus that certain international norms had attained
the status of jus cogens,75 the ILC was unable to reach a
consensus on the proper criteria for identifying
peremptory norms.
After an extended debate over these and other
theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in
1963 that there is not as yet any generally accepted
criterion by which to identify a general rule of
international law as having the character of jus
cogens.76 In a commentary accompanying the draft
convention, the ILC indicated that the prudent
course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of
this rule to be worked out in State practice and in
the jurisprudence of international tribunals. 77 Thus,
while the existence of jus cogens in international
law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its
substance,77 beyond a tiny core of principles and
rules.78

Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including their


footnotes, from Criddle-Descents article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens.
[11]

Criddle-Descents footnotes were carried into the Vinuya decisions own

footnotes but no attributions were made to the two authors in those


footnotes.

The Explanation

Unless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis

carpenter. The carpenter first gets the pieces of lumber he would need,

and Criddle-Descent could be construed as plagiarism. But one of Justice

choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has in mind, say a

Del Castillos researchers, a court-employed attorney, explained how she

table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he needs, cut them

accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning

out of the pieces of lumber he had collected, and construct his table. He

drafts of her report to him, which report eventually became the working

would get rid of the scraps.

draft of the decision. She said that, for most parts, she did her research
electronically. For international materials, she sourced these mainly from

Here,

Justice

Del

Castillos

researcher

did

just

that. She

Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-related materials to

electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the

which the Court subscribes.

Westlaw website and pasted these to a main manuscript in her computer


that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the

In the old days, the common practice was that after a Justice

Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program.[12] Later, after she decided

would have assigned a case for study and report, the researcher would

on the general shape that her report would take, she began pruning from

source his materials mostly from available law books and published articles

that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions in

on print. When he found a relevant item in a book, whether for one side of

the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting

the issue or for the other, he would place a strip of paper marker on the

paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with

appropriate page, pencil mark the item, and place the book on his desk

Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the

where

standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use everyday in

other relevant books

would have piled up. He would later

paraphrase or copy the marked out passages from some of these books as

their work.

he typed his manuscript on a manual typewriter. This occasion would give


him a clear opportunity to attribute the materials used to their authors or
sources.

Justice Del Castillos researcher showed the Committee the early


drafts of her report in the Vinuya case and these included the passages
lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis with proper

With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos

attributions to these authors. But, as it happened, in the course of editing

researcher also explained, most legal references, including the collection of

and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the

decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in internet

attributions.

websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the
researcher found items that were relevant to her assignment, she

First Finding

downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord


plate of materials that she thought she might need. The researchers

The Court adopts the Committees finding that the researchers

technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a

explanation regarding the accidental removal of proper attributions to the

three authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the Microsoft


program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to
sources of research materials is not remote.

But then, to be of use in his materials-gathering scheme,


researcher X would have to tag the Tolentino passage with a short
description of its subject for easy reference. A suitable subject description

For most senior lawyers and judges who are not computer literate,

would

be: The

inalienable

character

of

juridical

personality.23 The

a familiar example similar to the circumstances of the present case would

footnote mark, 23 From Tolentino, which researcher X attaches to the

probably help illustrate the likelihood of such an accident happening. If

subject tag, serves as reminder to him to attribute the passage in its final

researcher X, for example, happens to be interested in the inalienable

form to Tolentino. After the passage has been tagged, it would now appear

character of juridical personality in connection with an assignment and if

like this:

the book of the learned Civilist, Arturo M. Tolentino, happens to have been

The inalienable character of juridical personality.23

published in a website, researcher X would probably show interest in the

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act


are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.24
xxx
_____________________________
23 From Tolentino.
24 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

following passage from that book:


xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act
are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.15
xxx
_____________________________
15 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

The tag is of course temporary and would later have to go. It


Because the sentence has a footnote mark (#15) that attributes the idea
to other sources, it is evident that Tolentino did not originate it. The idea is
not a product of his intellect. He merely lifted it from Von Tuhr and
Valverde, two reputable foreign authors.

When researcher X copies and pastes the above passage and its footnote
into a manuscript-in-the-making in his computer, the footnote number
would, given the computer program in use, automatically change and

serves but a marker to help researcher X maneuver the passage into the
right spot in his final manuscript.
The mistake of Justice Del Castillos researcher is that, after the
Justice had decided what texts, passages, and citations were to be
retained including those from Criddle-Descent and Ellis, and when she was
already cleaning up her work and deleting all subject tags, she
unintentionally deleted the footnotes that went with such tagswith
disastrous effect.

adjust to the footnoting sequence of researcher Xs manuscript. Thus, if the


preceding footnote in the manuscript when the passage from Tolentino was
pasted on it is 23, Tolentinos footnote would automatically change from
the original Footnote 15 to Footnote 24.

To understand this, in Tolentinos example, the equivalent would be


researcher Xs removal during cleanup of the tag, The inalienable character
of

juridical

personality.23,by

simple

delete

operation,

and

the

unintended removal as well of the accompanying footnote (#23). The

But nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false

erasure of the footnote eliminates the link between the lifted passage and

testimony. Justice Del Castillo merely explained that there was every

its source, Tolentinos book. Only the following would remain in the

intention to attribute all sources whenever due and that there was never

manuscript:

any malicious intent to appropriate anothers work as our own, which as it

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act


are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.43
_____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

turns out is a true statement. He recalled how the Court deliberated upon
the case more than once, prompting major revisions in the draft of the
decision. In the process, (s)ources were re-studied, discussions modified,
passages added or deleted. Nothing in the letter suggests a coverup. Indeed, it did not preclude a researchers inadvertent error.

As it happened, the Microsoft word program does not have a


function that raises an alarm when original materials are cut up or

And it is understandable that Justice Del Castillo did not initially

pruned. The portions that remain simply blend in with the rest of the

disclose his researchers error. He wrote the decision for the Court and was

manuscript, adjusting the footnote number and removing any clue that

expected to take full responsibility for any lapse arising from its

what should stick together had just been severed.

preparation. What is more, the process of drafting a particular decision for


the Court is confidential, which explained his initial request to be heard on

This was what happened in the attributions to Ellis and Criddle-

the matter without the attendance of the other parties.

Descent. The researcher deleted the subject tags and, accidentally, their
accompanying footnotes that served as reminder of the sources of the

Notably, neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a

lifted passages. With 119 sources cited in the decision, the loss of the 2 of

motive or reason for omitting attribution for the lifted passages to Criddle-

them was not easily detectable.

Descent or to Ellis. The latter authors are highly respected professors of


international law. The law journals that published their works have

Petitioners point out, however, that Justice Del Castillos verified

exceptional reputations. It did not make sense to intentionally omit

letter of July 22, 2010 is inconsistent with his researchers claim that the

attribution to these authors when the decision cites an abundance of other

omissions were mere errors in attribution. They cite the fact that the

sources. Citing these authors as the sources of the lifted passages would

Justice did not disclose his researchers error in that letter despite the

enhance rather than diminish their informative value. Both Justice Del

latters confession regarding her mistake even before the Justice sent his

Castillo and his researcher gain nothing from the omission. Thus, the

letter to the Chief Justice. By denying plagiarism in his letter, Justice Del

failure

Castillo allegedly perjured himself and sought to whitewash the case. [13]

unquestionably due to inadvertence or pure oversight.

to

mention

the

works

of

Criddle-Decent

and

Ellis

was

Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material in committing


plagiarism since all that a writer has to do, to avoid the charge, is to
enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge the sources
from which these were taken.

[14]

Second Finding

Petitioners point out that the Court should

apply to this case the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of

The Court also adopts the Committees finding that the omission of

Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine.

attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis did not bring about an impression

They argue that standards on plagiarism in the academe should apply

that Justice Del Castillo himself created the passages that he lifted from

[15]

with more force to the judiciary.

their published articles. That he merely got those passages from others
remains self-evident, despite the accidental deletion. The fact is that he

But petitioners theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially


a form of fraud where intent to deceive is inherent. Their theory provides

still imputed the passages to the sources from which Criddle-Descent and
Ellis borrowed them in the first place.

no room for errors in research, an unrealistic position considering that


there is hardly any substantial written work in any field of discipline that is

This is best illustrated in the familiar example above. After the

free of any mistake. The theory places an automatic universal curse even

deletion of the subject tag and, accidentally, its footnote which connects to

on errors that, as in this case, have reasonable and logical explanations.

the source, the lifted passage would appear like this:


xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act
are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.43
_____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

Indeed, the 8th edition of Blacks Law Dictionary defines plagiarism


as the deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's original
ideas

or

creative

expressions

as

one's

own.[16] Thus,

plagiarism

presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious effort to steal anothers


work and pass it off as ones own.

Although the unintended deletion severed the passages link to


Tolentino, the passage remains to be attributed to Von Tuhr and Valverde,
the original sources that Tolentino himself cites. The text and its footnote

Besides, the Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that


would indicate that an intent to pass off anothers work as ones own is not
required in plagiarism. The Court merely affirmed the academic freedom of
a university to withdraw a masters degree that a student obtained based
on evidence that she misappropriated the work of others, passing them off
as her own. This is not the case here since, as already stated, Justice Del
Castillo actually imputed the borrowed passages to others.

reference cancel out any impression that the passage is a creation of


researcher X. It is the same with the passages from Criddle-Descent and
Ellis. Because such passages remained attributed by the footnotes to the
authors original sources, the omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent
and Ellis gave no impression that the passages were the creations of
Justice Del Castillo. This wholly negates the idea that he was passing them
off as his own thoughts.

Ellis supported the Courts conclusion that the Philippines is not under any
True the subject passages in this case were reproduced in

obligation in international law to espouse Vinuya et al.s claims.

the Vinuya decision without placing them in quotation marks. But such
passages are much unlike the creative line from Robert Frost, [17] The

The fact is that, first, since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and

woods are lovely, dark, and deep, but I have promises to keep, and miles

Ellis were accidentally deleted, it is impossible for any person reading the

to go before I sleep, and miles to go before I sleep. The passages here

decision to connect the same to the works of those authors as to conclude

consisted of common definitions and terms, abridged history of certain

that in writing the decision Justice Del Castillo twisted their intended

principles of law, and similar frequently repeated phrases that, in the world

messages. And, second, the lifted passages provided mere background

of legal literature, already belong to the public realm.

facts that established the state of international law at various stages of its
development. These are neutral data that could support conflicting

To paraphrase Bast and Samuels,[18] while the academic publishing

theories regarding whether or not the judiciary has the power today to

model is based on the originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system

order the Executive Department to sue another country or whether the

is based on the doctrine ofstare decisis, which encourages courts to cite

duty to prosecute violators of international crimes has attained the status

historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The

of jus cogens.

judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The


strength of a decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the
precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from.

Considering how it was impossible for Justice Del Castillo to have


twisted the meaning of the passages he lifted from the works of Tams,
Criddle-Descent, and Ellis, the charge of twisting or misrepresentation

Third Finding

against him is to say the least, unkind. To be more accurate, however, the
charge is reckless and obtuse.

Petitioners allege that the decision twisted the passages from


Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. The Court adopts the Committees finding

No Misconduct

that this is not so. Indeed, this allegation of twisting or misrepresentation


remains a mystery to the Court. To twist means to distort or pervert the

On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong

meaning of.[19] For example, if one lifts the lyrics of the National Anthem,

sources, failed to use quotation marks, inadvertently omitted necessary

uses it in his work, and declares that Jose Palma who wrote it did not love

information from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in every case,

his country, then there is twisting or misrepresentation of what the

amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption,

anthems lyrics said. Here, nothing in the Vinuya decision said or implied

or malice are subject of disciplinary action. [20] This is not the case

that, based on the lifted passages, authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and

here. Justice Del Castillos acts or omissions were not shown to have been
impelled by any of such disreputable motives.[21] If the rule were

otherwise, no judge or justice, however competent, honest, or dedicated

decision. The wheels of justice in the Supreme Court will grind to a halt

he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an unblemished

under such a proposition.

record.[22]
What is important is that, in this case, Justice Del Castillo retained
No Inexcusable Negligence

control over the writing of the decision in the Vinuya case without,
however, having to look over his researchers shoulder as she cleaned up

Finally, petitioners assert that, even if they were to concede that

her draft report to ensure that she hit the right computer keys. The

the omission was the result of plain error, Justice Del Castillo is

Justices researcher was after all competent in the field of assignment given

nonetheless guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. They point out that he

her. She finished law from a leading law school, graduated third in her

has full control and supervision over his researcher and should not have

class, served as Editor-in Chief of her schools Law Journal, and placed

surrendered the writing of the decision to the latter.[23]

fourth in the bar examinations when she took it. She earned a masters
degree in International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious

But this assumes that Justice Del Castillo abdicated the writing of

university in the United States under the Global-Hauser program, which

the Vinuya decision to his researcher, which is contrary to the evidence

counsel for petitioners concedes to be one of the top post graduate

adduced during the hearing. As his researcher testified, the Justice set the

programs on International Law in the world. Justice Del Castillo did not

direction that the research and study were to take by discussing the issues

exercise bad judgment in assigning the research work in the Vinuya case

with her, setting forth his position on those issues, and reviewing and

to her.

commenting on the study that she was putting together until he was
completely satisfied with it.[24] In every sense, Justice Del Castillo was in

Can

errors

in

preparing

decisions

be

prevented? Not

until

control of the writing of the report to the Court, which report eventually

computers cease to be operated by human beings who are vulnerable to

became the basis for the decision, and determined its final outcome.

human errors. They are hypocrites who believe that the courts should be
as error-free as they themselves are.

Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney, the


equivalent of a law clerk in the United States Supreme Court, is standard

Incidentally, in the course of the submission of petitioners exhibits,

practice in the high courts of all nations. This is dictated by necessity. With

the Committee noted that petitioners Exhibit J, the accusing statement of

about 80 to 100 cases assigned to a Justice in our Court each month, it

the Faculty of the U.P. College of Law on the allegations of plagiarism and

would be truly senseless for him to do all the studies and research, going

misinterpretation, was a mere dummy. The whole of the statement was

to the library, searching the internet, checking footnotes, and watching the

reproduced but the signatures portion below merely listed the names of 38

punctuations. If he does all these by himself, he would have to allocate at

faculty members, in solid rows, with the letters Sgd or signed printed

least one to two weeks of work for each case that has been submitted for

beside the names without exception. These included the name of retired
Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a U.P. professor.

2. DIRECTS the Public Information Office to send copies of this


decision to Professors Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Dr. Mark Ellis,

Because the Committee declined to admit a mere dummy of

and Professor Christian J. Tams at their known addresses;

Exhibit J, it directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy within three
days of the August 26 hearing. [25]He complied. As it turned out, the original

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to provide all court attorneys

statement was signed by only a minority of the faculty members on the

involved in legal research and reporting with copies of this decision and to

list. The set of signatories that appeared like solid teeth in the dummy

enjoin them to avoid editing errors committed in the Vinuya case while

turned out to be broken teeth in the original. Since only 37 out of the 81

using the existing computer program especially when the volume of

on the list signed the document, it does not appear to be a statement of

citations and footnoting is substantial; and

the Faculty but of just some of its members. And retired Justice V. V.
Mendoza did not sign the statement, contrary to what the dummy

4. Finally, DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to acquire the necessary

represented. The Committee wondered why the Dean submitted a dummy

software for use by the Court that can prevent future lapses in citations

of the signed document when U.P. has an abundance of copying machines.

and attributions.

Since the above circumstances appear to be related to separate en


banc matter concerning the supposed Faculty statement, there is a need

Further, the Court DIRECTS the Committee on Ethics and Ethical

for the Committee to turn over the signed copy of the same to the en

Standards to turn over to the en banc the dummy as well as the signed

banc for its consideration in relation to that matter.

copy of petitioners Exhibit J, entitled Restoring Integrity, a statement by


the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law for the en

WHEREFORE, in view of all of the above, the Court:

bancs consideration in relation to the separate pending matter concerning


that supposed Faculty statement.

1. DISMISSES for lack of merit petitioner Vinuya, et al.s charges


of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice
Mariano C. del Castillo;

SO ORDERED.

You might also like